Decentralized Mechanism Design Using Blockchains

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Contents

- 1. Motivation
- Blockchain and DAMD
- 3. Current State of the Art
- 4. Smart Contract Based Auctions
- 5. Secret Network Based Auctions
- 6. Theoretical Results
- 7. Summary and Conclusion

Motivation

Manipulating Mechanisms

- Boston School Choice Mechanism Problem
 - a. College preference order, students ranked
 - b. A>B>C, IITB, IITK have 1 seat each
- 2. First Price Auctions
- 3. Second Price Auctions

- Corruption of central authority/mechanism designer
- Revealing of one's choice/bids to the other parties

The need for a decentralised mechanism design, that keeps the bid of all parties private

BlockChain and DAMD

- BlockChain Distributed ledger with no central authority. Correctness on consensus and discourages tampering through Cryptographic primitives.
- Smart Contracts: Essentially code which runs on each node after verification; leads to same state throughout the network.
- Consider BlockChain as a game. PoW ensure incentive compatibility and honest computation.
- By coding rules of Mechanism into the Smart Contract, we can ensure a decentralized and distributed implementation without any central authority.
- Even if agent is a miner, he has no incentive to deviate unless she holds a monetary or computational stake in the network.

PoW: Solve computationally hard problem.

PoS: Get chance to add block by staking your worth.


Current State of the Art

- Verifiable sealed bid auction
 - Pederson commitment scheme to store bids
 - Real bids revealed to a semi-trusted auctioneer to compute the final winner
 - Zero knowledge proof to prove correctness of winner to all parties
 - Only winning bid is revealed, others stay private

- Enigma Protocol:
 - Off-loading private computation to a different network making use of Secret Sharing and MPC
 - The other network has nodes with special hardware which ensures that the computation is secure.
 - The nodes only have parts of private data.


Smart Contract Based Auctions

- We simulated Decentralised VCG
 Auctions on the Ethereum blockchain.
- Made a Smart Contract for the auction and deployed it in a private blockchain
- While the auction was live, all the nodes in the network were able to see the data present inside the smart contract.
- Hence, all nodes were aware of the current highest bid and also the highest bidder at any time during bidding.



Smart Contract Auction simulation

Click on image to watch, or use this link: https://youtu.be/kgCkKmR4dKw



Bird's Eye view of Secret Network

- Tackling trade-off between decentralization and privacy
- Evolution from Enigma: Places trust on hardware through TEE's(Trusted Execution environments)
- Smart contracts become secret contracts

Secret Network: TEE + Blockchain + SC

- TEE's and enclaves.
- How Does TEE provide confidentiality?
- Validators check correctness of output and execute Secret Contracts.
- The fee is distributed through PoS.
- The Secret Network Private;
 Decentralized; No Mediator;

Auction Simulation on Secret Network (Demo)

Link to slides:

https://github.com/rohanblueboybaijal/CS711-secret-VCG/tree/main/Secret%20Contracts/Assets/simulation.pdf

Theoretical Results

- Modelled Normal Form Game between bidder and seller.
- Derived that participating in Secret Network BlockChain mechanisms is a dominant strategy, even when privacy is a significant concern for agent.

Observation:

- In the current implementation of the enigma protocol, the worker enigma nodes lack the ability to choose which computation task they would like to perform.
- Necessary for them to compute the task allotted to them, no matter how low the transaction fee offered is.

Proposal/Construction:

- Could give nodes the ability to reject allotted tasks, but this is again a waste of time and loss of revenue, due to how enigma works
- Propose: a 2nd lowest bid auction tackles this problem by allowing the participating nodes to bid the amount of transaction fee they would like to receive for each task,

Summary

- Motivated the need for a decentralised auction (mechanism in general), that preserves the privacy of bids
- Simulated auctions in a private and decentralised manner
- Modelled a game and derived that participating in a secret network auction is a dominant strategy
- Observed a shortcoming of the current enigma system
- Proposed an improvement in the enigma protocol