



Logistics

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
Questions welcome! There is time allocated for Q&A at the end of today's session but you can ask relevant questions verbally or in the chat as we go.

Please keep your microphone muted when not speaking!

Slides and lab resources can be downloaded from:

https://fileserver.linaro.org/s/fE6iBYca8bYqrrk





Biography: Sumit Garg

For most of my early career I worked at NXP where I joined the platform team with a primary focus on security aspects across the entire platform software stack.


I have been contributing to TF-A and OP-TEE since 2015. The contributions are ranging from maintaining multiple platforms to adding core features to the role of Linux's TEE subsystem reviewer and maintaining firmware encryption framework in TF-A.

I joined Linaro in 2018 as a member of the Support and Solutions Engineering team. My work at Linaro is varied but all of it is centred around my background in **platform security** inclusive of **my role as a trainer**. I also help Linaro members/customers in my other areas of interest including toolchains and embedded Linux distributions such as OpenEmbedded where, among other things, I maintain the meta-arm-toolchain layer.




Training modules overview

- 1. Introduction to TF-A
- 2. Generic boot
- 3. Firmware security
- 4. Secure/Realm world interfaces



Introduction to TF-A

- Arm A-Profile Architecture evolution
 - ARMv7-A -> ARMv8-A
 - Armv8-A -> ARMv9-A
- About TF-A project
 - History and origins
- TF-A as EL3 firmware
 - Firmware components
- Handling Secure Monitor Call
- Context management
- Power State Coordination Interface



Arm A-Profile Architecture

The Arm Application-profile (A-profile) architecture targets high performance markets, such as PC, mobile, gaming, and enterprise. The application profile supports:

- A **Virtual Memory System Architecture** (VMSA) based on a Memory Management Unit (MMU).
- The A64, A32, and T32 instruction sets.

Execution states:

- AArch64: Is the 64-bit Execution state, meaning addresses are held in 64-bit registers, and instructions in the base instruction set can use 64-bit registers for their processing. AArch64 state supports the A64 instruction set.
- AArch32: Is the 32-bit Execution state, meaning addresses are held in 32-bit registers, and instructions in the base instruction sets use 32-bit registers for their processing. AArch32 state supports the T32 and A32 instruction sets.

Arm A-Profile Architecture - II

A-profile architecture version mapping for the execution states. Here we will only discuss the last three architecture versions namely, Armv7-A, Armv8-A and Armv9-A.


Armv7-A: Supports **32-bit** execution state with ARM (A32) and Thumb (T32) instruction sets, implies AArch32.

Armv8-A: Supports **both** execution states AArch64 and AArch32 (to be backwards compatible with 32-bit software stack).


Armv9-A: Supports **AArch64** execution state. The AArch32 state might **optionally** be implemented at EL0. The AArch32 state is **not implemented** at EL1, EL2 and EL3.




ARMv7-A privilege levels



ARMv7-A: Firmware fragmentation




ARMv8-A exception levels






ARMv8-A exception levels (with S-EL2)



Aside: ARMv8-A exception levels (with 32-bit EL3)





Aside: A simplified exception model?

ARMv8-A is often described as having a **simplified exception model** compared to ARMv7-A. Perhaps you are wondering why you haven't seen this yet?


ARMv7-A has a **16 register ISA but it actually has 31 general purpose registers** (excluding Trustzone state) . Most of the **extra registers are banked** and depends on whether you are running in user mode (PL0) or one of the five exception modes (PL1). There are banked registers for each exception mode.

ARMv8-A does introduces a new exception level but it also replaces the exception modes with exception vectors which drastically reduces the number of banked registers. ARMv8-A/A64 has a 32 register ISA and 35 general purpose registers.

(roughly... and depending how you define general purpose)




ARMv9-A exception levels



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What is Trusted firmware-A?

A reference implementation of:

- **EL3 monitor firmware** for Armv8-A and Armv9-A.
- Early bootloaders including BootROM for Arm based application processors.

TF-A provides foundation to build a Trusted Execution Environment (**TEE**). It is supported by **35+ platform ports** upstream originating from **20+ different vendors**.


Open source project since **October 2013**:

- BSD-3-Clause license
- Contributions accepted under the term of Developer Certificate of Origin
- Open governance model on trustedfirmware.org
- **6-monthly** releases



History and origins


- Arm open sourced it in October 2013 as "Arm Trusted Firmware" on Github
- Been developed for >9 years
- Became widely adopted EL3 firmware





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Role of EL3

EL3 is the **most privileged** exception level where the **runtime resident** monitor firmware executes. TF-A provides **reference implementation** for EL3 monitor firmware.

Provide runtime services, such as:

- Arm architectural services
- Standard services such as PSCI, SDEI, MM, TRNG etc.
- SiP/OEM specific services
- Foundation to build:
 - Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)
 - Realms for Confidential Compute Architecture (CCA)

to lower exception levels (EL1/EL2 and S-EL1/S-EL2)

- EL1 -> Rich OS or EL2 -> Hypervisor
- S-EL1 -> Trusted OS or S-EL2 -> Secure hypervisor




TF-A EL3 monitor firmware design goals

Some of the major design goals for TF-A EL3 monitor firmware are:

- Aims to have a minimal and generic EL3 firmware
 - Move secure and platform specific services to lower exception levels such as S-EL0, S-EL1 and S-EL2.
- Aims to reduce firmware attack surface, has its own generic firmware threat model.
- Aims to reduce firmware complexity to ease auditing and certification process.
- Promotes standardized interfaces such as Firmware Framework-A for communication among normal and secure world.




TF-A: EL3 firmware components



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
Handling Secure Monitor Call

- SMCs may originate from **both secure and non-secure** worlds
- Some SMCs are serviced by TF-A itself, others are forwarded to the Secure EL1/EL2 payload
 - S-EL1/EL2 payload dispatcher is linked into TF-A and is responsible for forwarding calls
 - Dispatcher copies register values between the worlds and, using library calls, saves
 context and controls the world switch
- SMC call type may be either fast or yielding
 - Fast calls are **atomic and uninterruptible**.
 - Yielding calls can be pre-empted, and the call can return before the requested operation has completed.
 - All **TF-A services calls are fast calls** (thus TF-A does not need any machinery to track thread states).



Fast SMC calling convention


Entity Number	Bit Mask	Description	
0	0x0000000	ARM Architecture Calls	
1	0x01000000	CPU Service Calls	
2	0x02000000	SIP Service Calls	
3	0x03000000	OEM Service Calls	
4	0x04000000	Standard Service Calls	
5 - 47	0x05000000 – 0x2F000000	Reserved for future use	
48 - 49	0x30000000 - 0x31000000	Trusted Application Calls	
50 - 63	0x32000000 – 0x3F000000	Trusted OS Calls	





Yielding SMC calling convention

Entity Number	Bit Mask	Description	
0-1	0x00000000 – 0x0100FFFF	Reserved because this region is already in use by ARMv7 devices on the field.	
		Strictly speaking this is reserved only when Bit[30] is set for smc32.	
2-31	0x02000000 – 0x1FFFFF	Trusted OS Calls	
32-63	0x20000000 – 0x3F000000	Reserved for future expansion of Trusted OS Yielding Calls	





AArch64 ABI for SMC calls


Register Name		Role during SMC or HVC call			
SMC32/HVC32	SMC64/HVC64	Calling values	Modified	Return state	
SP_	ELx	ELx stack pointer	No		
SP_EL0		EL0 stack pointer	No	Unchanged; registers are saved or restored	
X30		The Link Register	No		
X29		The Frame Pointer	No		
X19X28		Registers that are saved by the called function	No		
X1	18	The Platform Register	No		
X17		The second intra-procedure-call scratch register	Yes	Unpredictable;	
X16		The first intra-procedure-call scratch register	Yes		
X9X15		Temporary registers	Yes		
X8		Indirect result location register	Yes		
W7	W7	Optional Client ID in bits[15:0] (ignored for HVC calls) Optional Secure OS ID in bits[31:16]	Yes	scratch registers	
W6	X6 (or W6)	Parameter register Optional Session ID register	Yes		
W4W5	X4X5	Parameter registers	Yes		
W1W3	X1X3	Parameter registers	Yes	SMC and HVC result registers	
W0	W0	Function Identifier	Yes		

Same as Procedure Call Standard for the ARM 64-bit Architecture except that LR is also preserved

SMC CALLING CONVENTION (SMCCC)




TF-A runtime service calls handling





TF-A Trusted OS calls forwarding



Commercial break

Based on feedback from previous courses...

... we moved this to the middle...

... because it is important ...

... and after two hours it is hard to remember this bit

Remember this for any post-training support...

... even simple things like not being able to find the slides



Developer Services help build, test and deploy your products on Arm

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As part of Linaro, Developer Services has access to some of the world's **leading Arm Software experts**. All of this expertise and experience is made available to you on your project.

Secure your product


Specialists in security and Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) on Arm, we leverage open source to ensure you benefit from the latest upstream features and security fixes.

Maintain quality cost-effectively

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Our downloadable catalogue includes:

Advanced kernel debugging techniques and tools

Upstream Kernel Development

Arm Trusted Firmware, Secure boot and PSCI

Power Management - Energy Aware Scheduler (EAS) Introduction and tuning

Introduction to OP-TEE

Building Custom Systems with OE/Yocto

Automatic Validation with LAVA




Linaro Developer Technical Support

LDTS means **developer to developer** technical support. Our **support team** is **staffed by** experienced **developers**... and is **reinforced by** the many domain **experts** employed by Linaro.



"The I3C subsystem does not currently implement the features you need to achieve this, largely because there are no drivers in the upstream kernel that would require anything like this. The most effective way to influence the evolution of this subsystem would be to share a driver that demonstrates the gaps (if that is possible for you). If you need advice on how to work with

Ask us about: Android system integration, board support and enablement, embedded GNU/Linux distributions, Linux Kernel, Yocto/OpenEmbedded, testing using LAVA, TF-A, OP-TEE, GNU and clang compilers, Zephyr and more.



How to get support

By e-mail

support@linaro.org

Any e-mail to this address will raise a support ticket. Accounts are created automatically based on the reporter's e-mail address.

Your developers must use their company e-mail addresses to raise tickets!

From a web browser

https://support.linaro.org

Developers can self-enroll using their company e-mail address.

Entitlements to the different levels of service are determined using this e-mail address.

With a search engine


"linaro support"

Busy developers sometimes forget things. The search term "linaro support" will bring up a web page containing reminders about what LDTS is and how to raise support tickets both by e-mail and from a web browser.

support@linaro.org

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Context Management

The context management library in TF-A provides the **basic CPU context** initialization and management routines for use by different components in EL3 firmware.

The EL3 runtime firmware is responsible for **managing register context** during switch between Normal and Secure worlds. The register context to be saved and restored **depends on the mechanism** used to trigger the world switch.

Mechanisms to trigger the world switch:

- Synchronous mechanism via SMC exception.
- Asynchronous mechanism via interrupt handling.



Context Management - II

The context management library

- Will force to save and restore **general purpose registers**
- Provides helper functions for **system register** save and restore
 - Different scenarios will save and restore different context
 - If don't switch to another world, then doesn't save EL3's context
 - o If don't turn off CPU, then doesn't save GIC and arch timer's context
- Context management for secure payload dispatcher
 - Standard dispatcher: Op-TEE dispatcher (OPTEED), Test secure payload dispatcher
 (TSPD), trusty, TLK dispatcher (tlkd) in firmware
 - Save and restore context during world switch
 - Route interrupt handling and execute context switch
 - If integrate own dispatcher, need manually save and restore context




Aarch64 CPU registers

- Aarch64 execution state has:
 - Only one copy of general purpose registers
 - System registers (TTBR_ELx, VBAR_ELx, etc)
 - Permission: SMP bit ONLY can be accessed from EL3
- Per CPU registers context
 - General purpose registers (X0 ~ X30, LR, SP_ELx)
 - EL1/EL2/EL3's system control registers
 - VFP/NEON registers
 - CVE registers (optional)
 - Pointer authentication registers (optional)
 - GIC IF registers
 - Arch timer registers
- Some registers are banked
 - o GIC, arch timer, etc



CPU Context





CPU Context

gp_regs_t

CTX_GPREG_X0 - X29

CTX_GPREG_LR

CTX_GPREG_SP_EL0

fp_regs_t

CTX_FP_Q0 - Q31

CTX_FP_FPCR

CTX_FP_FPSR

el3_state_t

CTX_SCR_EL3

CTX_ESR_EL3

CTX_RUNTIME_SP

CTX_SPSR_EL3

CTX_ELR_EL3

CTX_PMCR_EL0 CTX_IS_IN_EL3

CTX_CPTR_EL3

CTX_ZCR_EL3


el2_sysregs_t

CTX_ACTLR_EL2	CTX_AFSR0_EL2	CTX_AFSR1_EL2	CTX_AMAIR_EL2	CTX_CNTHCTL_EL2	CTX_CNTVOFF_EL2
CTX_CPTR_EL2	CTX_DBGVCR32_EL	CTX_ELR_EL2	CTX_ESR_EL2	CTX_FAR_EL2	CTX_HACR_EL2
CTX_HCR_EL2	CTX_HPFAR_EL2	CTX_HSTR_EL2	CTX_ICC_SRE_EL2	CTX_ICH_HCR_EL2	CTX_ICH_VMCR_EL2
CTX_MAIR_EL2	CTX_MDCR_EL2	CTX_PMSCR_EL2	CTX_SCTLR_EL2	CTX_SPSR_EL2	CTX_SP_EL2
CTX_TCR_EL2	CTX_TPIDR_EL2	CTX_TTBR0_EL2	CTX_VBAR_EL2	CTX_VMPIDR_EL2	CTX_VPIDR_EL2
CTX_VTCR_EL2	CTX_VTTBR_EL2	CTX_TFSR_EL2	CTX_MPAM2_EL2	CTX_MPAMHCR_EL2	CTX_MPAMVPM[07]_EL 2
CTX_MPAMVPMV_E	CTX_HAFGRTR_EL2	CTX_HDFGRTR_EL2	CTX_HDFGWTR_EL2	CTX_HFGITR_EL2	CTX_HFGRTR_EL2
CTX_HFGWTR_EL2	CTX_CNTPOFF_EL2	CTX_CONTEXTIDR_E L2	CTX_SDER32_EL2	CTX_TTBR1_EL2	CTX_VDISR_EL2
CTX_VNCR_EL2	CTX_VSESR_EL2	CTX_VSTCR_EL2	CTX_VSTTBR_EL2	CTX_TRFCR_EL2	

el1_sysregs_t


CTX_SPSR_EL1	CTX_ELR_EL1	CTX_SCTLR_EL1	CTX_TCR_EL1	CTX_CPACR_EL1
CTX_CSSELR_EL1	CTX_SP_EL1	CTX_ESR_EL1	CTX_TTBR0_EL1	CTX_TTBR1_EL1
CTX_MAIR_EL1	CTX_AMAIR_EL1	CTX_ACTLR_EL1	CTX_TPIDR_EL1	CTX_TPIDR_EL0
CTX_TPIDRRO_EL0	CTX_PAR_EL1	CTX_FAR_EL1	CTX_AFSR0_EL1	CTX_AFSR1_EL1
CTX_CONTEXTIDR_EL	CTX_VBAR_EL1	CTX_CNTP_CTL_EL0	CTX_CNTP_CVAL_EL0	CTX_CNTV_CTL_EL0
CTX_CNTV_CVAL_EL0	CTX_CNTKCTL_EL1	CTX_TFSRE0_EL1	CTX_TFSR_EL1	CTX_RGSR_EL1
CTX_GCR_EL1				

Stack pointer (SP) refers context



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Power State Coordination Interface

- Power State Coordination Interface (PSCI)
- Defines a standard interface for making power management requests across exception levels and operating systems
- Allows secure firmware to arbitrate power management requests from secure and non-secure software
- Default method for power control in Linux AArch64 kernel

https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0022/c/




Before, when there was no PSCI...

- The state machine for power management is not easily expressed
- Misunderstanding between silicon and software architects
 - Sometimes silicon design engineer don't understand well software implementation, vice versa
 - State machine mismatch between hardware and software
 - Bad thing: surprises after tapeout
- Surprising changes with product families
 - Total different solution within SoC series, why?
 - It's hard for upstreaming, such like workaround, have no clean code layout, etc
- ARM64 maintainers likely to resist integrating alternatives to PSCI





SMC Calls For PSCI





PSCI CPU context management

PSCI library is in charge of initializing/restoring the **non-secure CPU system registers** according to PSCI specification during cold/warm boot. Registers that need to be preserved across **CPU power down/power up** cycles are maintained in **cpu_context_t** data structure.

PSCI library internally uses CPU Context management API:


- cm_set_context_by_index()
- cm_get_context()
- cm_get_context_by_index()

PSCI context management can be split into following categories:

- **PSCI core layer** will help save system registers
- Platform code need save and restore GIC and arch timer context



PSCI Core Layer






	_		1 -					ı	I
Ν	Function	Description	X0/R0	X1/R1	X2/R2	X3/R3	Result	PSCI 0.2	PSCI 1.0
О									
1	PSCI_VERSION	Return the version of PSCI implemented	0x8400 0000	N/A	N/A	N/A	Bits [31:16] Major Version Bits [15:0] Minor Version	Mandatory	Mandatory
2	CPU_SUSPEND	Suspend execution on a core	ARM32: 0x8400 0001 ARM64: 0xC400 0001	power_state	entry_Point	context_id	SUCCESS INVALID_PARAMETERS INVALID_Address DENIED	Mandatory	Mandatory
3	CPU_OFF	Hotplug the calling core	0x8400 0002	N/A	N/A	N/A	No return DENIED	Mandatory	Mandatory
4	CPU_ON	Power up a core	ARM32: 0x8400 0003 ARM64: 0xC400 0003	target_cpu	entry_point	context_id	SUCCESS INVALID_PARAMETERS ALREADY_ON ON_PENDING INTERNAL_FAILURE	Mandatory	Mandatory
5	AFFINITY_INFO	Enables the caller to request status of an affinity level	ARM32: 0x8400 0004 ARM64: 0xC400 0004	Target_affinity	lowest_affinity _level		2 ON_PENDING 1 OFF 0 ON INVALID_PARAMETERS NOT_PRESENT DISABLED	Mandatory	Mandatory



Aside: CPU Power On Main Flow



N o	Function	Description	X0/R0	X1/R1	X2/R2	X3/R3	Result	PSCI 0.2	PSCI 1.0
6	MIGRATE	Migrate its context to a specific core	ARM32: 0x8400 0005 ARM64: 0xC400 0005	Target_cpu	N/A	N/A	SUCCESS NOT_SUPPORTED INVALID_PARAMETERS DENIED INTERNAL_FAILURE NOT_PRESENT	Optional	Optional
7	MIGRATE_INFO_TYPE	Identify the level of multicore support present in the Trusted OS	0x8400 0006	N/A	N/A	context_id	0 1 2 NOT_SUPPORTED	Optional	Optional
8	MIGRATE_INFO_UP_CPU	Returns the current resident core	ARM32: 0x8400 0007 ARM64: 0xC400 0007	N/A	N/A	N/A	UNDEFINED MPIDR based value	Optional	Optional
9	SYSTEM_OFF	Shutdown the system	0x8400 0008	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Mandatory	Mandatory
10	SYSTEM_RESET	Reset the system	0x8400 0009	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Mandatory	Mandatory




Ν	Function	Description	X0/R0	X1/R1	X2/R2	X3/R3	Result	PSCI 0.2	PSCI 1.0
0									
11	_	Discover whether a specific function is implemented	0x8400 000A	Function Id	N/A	N/A	NOT_SUPPORTED Feature Flag	Not Applicable	Mandatory
12		In an IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED low-power state, Still valid for interrupts	0x8400 000B	N/A	N/A	N/A	NOT_SUPPORTED DENIED	Not Applicable	Optional
13		power_state parameter	ARM32: 0x8400 000C ARM64: 0xC400 000C	Entry_point	context_id		SUCCESS INVALID_ADDRESS	Not Applicable	Optional
14	NODE_HW_STATE	return the true HW state of a node	ARM32: 0x8400 000D ARM64: 0xC400 000D	target_cpu	target_level	N/A	2 HW_STANDBY 1 HW_OFF 0 HW_ON NOT_SUPPORTED INVALID_PARAMETERS	Not Applicable	Optional
15	SYSTEM_SUSPEND	Implement suspend to RAM	ARM32: 0x8400 000E ARM64: 0xC400 000E	Entry_point	context_id	N/A	NOT_SUPPORTED INVALID_ADDRESS ALREADY_ON	Not Applicable	Optional



Ν	Function	Description	X0/R0	X1/R1	X2/R2	X3/R3	Result	PSCI 0.2	PSCI 1.0
0									
	l	Setting the mode used by CPU_SUSPEND to coordinate power states.	0x8400 000F	Function Id	N/A	N/A	SUCCESS NOT_SUPPORTED INVALID_PARAMETERS DENIED	Not Applicable	Optional
17	NCY	given nower state since cold	ARM32: 0x8400 0010 ARM64: 0xC400 0010		power_state	N/A	residency time	Not Applicable	Optional
18		given power state since cold	ARM32: 0x8400 0011 ARM64: 0xC400 0011	target_cpu	power_state	N/A	count	Not Applicable	Optional



Lab sessions



Preparation: Install host packages



For Debian/Ubuntu:

\$ sudo apt install build-essential bc bison flex git libelf-dev libncurses-dev libssl-dev

For Fedora and RHEL/CentOS/RockyLinux:

(or perhaps sudo yum install gcc ...)



Preparation: Downloadable content



The assets that we will use to provide a development environment that can be used for the lab exercises can be downloaded from here:

https://fileserver.linaro.org/s/fE6iBYca8bYgrrk

You will need to download:

- poky-glibc-x86_64-core-image-tfa-cortexa57-qemuarm64-secureboot-toolchain-4.0.10.sh
- flash.bin.xz
- core-image-tfa-qemuarm64-secureboot.wic.qcow2.xz



Preparation: Install the development tools



\$. /home/sumit/build/ts/tfa/sdk/environment-setup-cortexa57-poky-linux
\$ aarch64-poky-linux-gcc (GCC) 11.3.0
Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
\$ qemu-system-aarch64 --version
QEMU emulator version 6.2.0
Copyright (c) 2003-2021 Fabrice Bellard and the QEMU Project developers



Preparation: Unpack and boot kernel and rootfs



Decompress

```
unxz -T0 flash.bin.xz
unxz -T0 core-image-tfa-qemuarm64-secureboot.wic.qcow2.xz
```

Boot

```
qemu-system-aarch64 \
    -machine virt,secure=on -cpu cortex-a57 \
    -smp 4 -nographic -m 1G -bios flash.bin \
    -drive \
    file=./core-image-tfa-qemuarm64-secureboot.wic.qcow2,if=virtio,format=qcow2 \
    -netdev user,id=eth0,hostfwd=tcp::2222-:22 \
    -device virtio-net-device,netdev=eth0
Don't forget to source the SDK environment setup script!
```

Explore


- root user has no password set
- Use poweroff command to shutdown cleanly or press Ctrl-A x to force immediate off



Aside: QEMU



Qemu is a free and open source emulator providing hardware virtualization. It will allow us to work with an arm64 machine by emulating the processor(s) and its peripherals.




Aside: "Hardware" information



- We decide to create a custom board for an embedded IoT project.
- This board is built around the "virt,secure" virtual SoC. The simplified SoC devices memory mapping is given below:

Device	Address	Size
VIRT_ROM	0x0000000	0×08000000
VIRT_GIC	0x08000000	0x00010000
VIRT_UART (UART 0)	0x09000000	0×00001000
VIRT_RTC	0x09010000	0x00001000
VIRT_I2C	0x0901A000	0x00001000
VIRT_FW_CFG	0x09020000	0x00000018
VIRT_GPIO	0x09030000	0x00001000
VIRT_SECURE_UART (UART 1)	0x09040000	0×00001000
VIRT_MEM	0x40000000	0x08000000

Our custom board 'virt-2.8-linaro' is populated with virt-2.8 SoC, 1 GiB of RAM, a connector routed to UART for debug console and a power off button.



For Qualcomm - July 2023

Aside: Understanding the virtual network



```
qemu-system-aarch64 \
    -machine virt,secure=on -cpu cortex-a57 \
    -smp 4 -nographic -m 1G -bios flash.bin \
    -drive \
     file=./core-image-tfa-qemuarm64-secureboot.wic.qcow2,if=virtio,format=qcow2 \
     -netdev user,id=eth0,hostfwd=tcp::2222-:22 \
     -device virtio-net-device,netdev=eth0
```

Emulate a private network (in **user**space) as part of the qemu process. The emulated network includes the host workstation (10.0.2.2), the VM (10.0.2.15) and a DNS server (10.0.2.3).

The emulated network uses **NAT routing** to communicate with other devices. **hostfwd allows** us to configure **port forwarding**, in this case routing port 2222 on your host workstation to port 22 on the VM (port 22 is secure shell).



Preparation: Test the networking and NAT routing



- Boot the VM
 - Use ifconfig to check the networking is active (the VM is pre-configured to bring up the network interface and launch a DHCP request)
- Open a new Terminal emulator window on your workstation and try:
 - Connecting to the target interactively (lower case -p)
 ssh -p 2222 root@localhost
 - Copying files from host to target (upper case -P)
 scp -P 2222 my_file root@localhost:
 - Copying files from target to host (upper case -P)
 scp -P 2222 root@localhost:/proc/config.gz .
- From the target try:
 - Pinging your workstation ping 10.0.2.2
 - Test NAT routing (if you are behind a company firewall replace https://linaro.org with something served internally)

```
wget https://linaro.org
```



LAB1 - Build and boot your own TF-A



Build TF-A from source code

```
$ . /poky/sdk/path/environment-setup-cortexa57-poky-linux
$ git clone https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git
$ cd trusted-firmware-a
$ git checkout -b v2.9.0 v2.9.0
$ LDFLAGS= make CFLAGS= PLAT=qemu DEBUG=1 \
        BL33=$SDKTARGETSYSROOT/boot/u-boot.bin BL32 RAM LOCATION=tdram \
        all fip
$ dd if=build/qemu/debug/bl1.bin of=flash-src.bin bs=4096 conv=notrunc
$ dd if=build/qemu/debug/fip.bin of=flash-src.bin seek=64 bs=4096 conv=notrunc
```



Update with "flash-src.bin" and boot



Launch Qemu with cmdline:

```
qemu-system-aarch64 \
    -machine virt,secure=on -cpu cortex-a57 \
    -smp 4 -nographic -m 1G -bios trusted-firmware-a/flash-src.bin \
    -drive \
    file=./core-image-tfa-qemuarm64-secureboot.wic.qcow2,if=virtio,format=qcow2 \
    -netdev user,id=eth0,hostfwd=tcp::2222-:22 \
    -device virtio-net-device,netdev=eth0
```



Modify TF-A source and rebuild

Modify TF-A source code and see if you can confirm if its the one that you booted?

```
diff --git a/bl31/bl31_main.c b/bl31/bl31_main.c
index e70eb5584..86a1e4f01 100644
--- a/bl31/bl31 main.c
+++ b/bl31/bl31 main.c
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ void bl31 setup(u register t arg0, u register t arg1, u register t arg2,
 void bl31 main(void)
      NOTICE("BL31: %s\n", version string);
      NOTICE("<Your name> built this BL31: %s\n", version_string);
      NOTICE("BL31: %s\n", build message);
#if FEATURE DETECTION
```



LAB2 - Exploring PSCI flow



Attach GDB during TF-A boot



Launch Qemu with cmdline:

```
qemu-system-aarch64 \
    -machine virt,secure=on -cpu cortex-a57 \
    -smp 2 -nographic -m 1G -bios trusted-firmware-a/flash-src.bin \
    -drive \
     file=./core-image-tfa-qemuarm64-secureboot.wic.qcow2,if=virtio,format=qcow2 \
     -netdev user,id=eth0,hostfwd=tcp::2222-:22 \
     -device virtio-net-device,netdev=eth0 \
     -gdb tcp::1234 -S __
```

"-gdb" option: Accept gdb connection over "tcp" port no. "1234". QEMU defaults to starting the guest without waiting for gdb to connect; use "-S" too if you want it to not start execution.

"-S" option: Freeze CPU at startup (use 'c' to start execution).



Attach debugger during TF-A boot



Launch GDB in another terminal:

- \$. /poky/sdk/path/environment-setup-cortexa57-poky-linux
- \$ cd trusted-firmware-a
- \$ aarch64-poky-linux-gdb

GDB setup commands:

- (gdb) target remote localhost:1234
- (gdb) add-symbol-file build/qemu/debug/bl31/bl31.elf



Exploring PSCI_CPU_ON flow

spsr = 0x3c5,

```
(gdb) hbreak psci_cpu_on_start
Hardware assisted breakpoint 1 √at 0xe044584: file lib/psci/psci_on.c, line 64.
(gdb) c
                                   Set hardware breakpoint
Continuing.
Thread 1 hit Breakpoint 1, psci_cpu_on_start (target_cpu=target_cpu@entry=1, ep=ep@entry=0xe04c038) at lib/psci/psci_on.c:64
64
            int ret = plat_core_pos_by_mpidr(target_cpu);
(gdb) set print pretty
(gdb) p / x * ep
                                                                   Primary CPU calls PSCI to power on
$1 = {
                                                                   secondary CPU
 h = {
   type = 0x1,
   version = 0x1,
   size = 0x58,
    attr = 0x1
  },
                           This is the non-secure entry point
  pc = 0x40f8a254,
```



Exploring PSCI_CPU_ON_FINISH flow

Thread 2 hit Breakpoint 2, 0x0000000040f8a254 in ?? ()

```
(gdb) hbreak *0x40f8a254 ←
                                                            Set hardware breakpoint for
Hardware assisted breakpoint 2 at 0x40f8a254
                                                            non-secure and secure entry point
(gdb) hbreak bl31_warm_entrypoint ←
Hardware assisted breakpoint 3 at 0xe040114: file bl31/aarch64/bl31_entrypoint.S, line 166.
(gdb) c
Continuing.
                                                              Set hardware breakpoint for PSCI
[Switching to Thread 1.2]
                                                              CPU ON finish entry
Thread 2 hit Breakpoint 3, bl31_warm_entrypoint() at bl31/aarch64/bl31_entrypoint.S:166
166
            el3_entrypoint_common
(gdb) hbreak psci_cpu_on_finish
Hardware assisted breakpoint 4 at 0xe04448c: file lib/psci/psci_on.c, line 177.
(gdb) c
Continuing.
Thread 2 hit Breakpoint 4, psci_cpu_on_finish (cpu_idx=1, state_info=0xe04d0b0) at lib/psci/psci_on.c:177
177
            psci_plat_pm_ops->pwr_domain_on_finish(state_info);
                                                                    CPU hit the non-secure entry point
(gdb) c
                                                                    meaning that it has jumped to kernel
Continuing.
```



