CS 60002: Distributed Systems

T7: Fault Tolerance

Department of Computer Science and **Engineering**



INDIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY KHARAGPUR




Sandip Chakraborty sandipc@cse.iitkgp.ac.in

Networks and Failures

- Synchronous vs Asynchronous Networks
 - Synchronous: I am sure that I'll get the message within a predefined time threshold
 - Asynchronous: I am not sure whether and when the message will arrive
- Failures in a network ---
 - Crash Fault: A node stops responding
 - Link Fault (or Network Fault): A link fails to deliver the message
 - Byzantine Fault: A node starts behaving maliciously


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
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Reliability

- How often does the system fail?
- What is the conditional probability that the system will work for the duration [0,t] given that it is working at time zero?
- Measured by: MTTF (Mean Time To Failures), MTTR (Mean Time To Repair), MTBF (Mean Time Between Failures = MTTF + MTTR)

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Safety

- How safe the system is, even if it fails
- Does it always maintain some safety property?

Reliability vs Availability

- A highly reliable system is also highly available
- A highly available system may or may not be highly reliable
 - Ex: If a system fails for 1 second every hour, it can still be considered highly available (99.97%) but not highly reliable
- The reliability of a system depends on the reliability of the components used to build the system
- Reliability/Availability can be of interest at different component levels
 - A memory chip
 - A disk controller with memory
 - A PC with disks
 - A cluster with a large number of PCs

Fault Tolerance

 The ability of a system to deliver desired services in spite of faults in its components

- Fault tolerance can be at the level of
 - A full service (specified behavior in fault-free state); ex. A primary-backup server system to tolerate one server failure
 - A degraded service (deviate from the specified behavior in fault-free state, but in a pre-defined manner); ex. A web service with multiple load balanced servers

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- Many modern distributed system needs to be highly available
 - Gmail
 - Facebook
 - Airline reservation system

Types of Fault Tolerance

 Masking: Always behave as per specification even in the presence of faults in the system

 Non-masking: System may violate specification in presence of faults, but behave in a well-defined manner

- A fault tolerant system should specify
 - Class of faults tolerated (Fault Model)
 - What tolerance is given for each class (Fault Tolerance)

Primitive Operations for Fault Tolerance

- Building reliable storage from unreliable disks
 - RAID
 - Centralized network storage
- Reliable communication over unreliable links
 - Unicast, multicast, broadcast
- Agreement/Consensus
- Enforce atomic actions
- Checkpoint and Recovery

Agreement Problem

- A set of n processes, m of them may be faulty
- Non-faulty processes need to agree on some value(s) even in the presence of faulty processes


- One of the most studied problems in Distributed System
 - Agreement (Typically used for handling Byzantine faults, so use the term Byzantine agreement or Byzantine Generals Problem)
 - Consensus
 - Interactive Consistency
- All three problems are equivalent; solution of any one of them can be used to solve the other two


Agreement Protocol


- One process x broadcast a value v
- All <u>non-faulty</u> processes must agree on a common value (agreement condition)
- The agreed upon value must be v is x is non-faulty (validity condition)


 This idea is used to solve the Byzantine Generals Problem → Byzantine Agreement Protocols

























Consensus

- Each process broadcast its initial value
 - Satisfy agreement condition
 - If initial value of all non-faulty processes is v, then the agreed upon value must be v




















































































How can we make this decision in a distributed way?








Distributed Consensus – Message Passing




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









Count votes and decide!








Distributed Consensus – Message Passing



Distributed Consensus – Message Passing



Interactive Consistency

- Each process i broadcasts its own value v_i
 - All non-faulty processes agree on a common vector {v₁, v₂, ..., v_n}
 - If i^{th} process is non-faulty, then the i^{th} value in the vector agreed upon by non-faulty processes must be v_i

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Correct processes will yield the correct output

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Correct processes will yield the correct output

The output will be produced within a finite amount of time (eventual termination)

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1998: Paxos got published in ACM Transactions on Computer Systems

- 2001: FLP Impossibility paper wins Dijkstra Prize
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- 2009: Zookeeper released
 - Service for managing distributed applications
- 2010's onward: Different types of consensus algorithms released
 - Multi-Paxos
 - Raft
 - Byzantine Fault Tolerance
 - PBFT
 - •


Another Interesting Impossibility Result


• [Santoro and Widmayer, 1989] Even in a synchronous model, consensus is not possible even with a single link failure.


Santoro, Nicola, and Peter Widmayer. "Time is not a healer." *Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science*. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 1989.


Asynchronous Consensus with Crash Faults


- Remember the FLP Impossibility
 - Give priority to safety over liveness
- Guarantees the followings ---
 - Validity: If all correct process proposes the same value v, then any correct process decides v
 - Agreement: No two correct processes decide differently
 - **Termination**: Every correct process eventually decides






































Asynchronous CFT

• If there are F faulty nodes (crash fault), we need at least 2F+1 nodes to reach consensus


Paxos: A family of distributed algorithms to reach consensus in an asynchronous CFT


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
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
- Paxos: A family of distributed algorithms to reach consensus in an asynchronous CFT
 - We'll discuss vanilla Paxos
 - Proposed by Lamport in 1989
 - Received a lot of criticism about its proof of correctness
 - Accepted in ACM Transactions on Computer Systems in 1998, titled "The Part-time Parliament"
 - Lamport received the Turing award in 2013


Paxos

















Two majorities will always overlap in atleast one nodes

5 acceptors, majority = 3, 2 proposers:
To accept based on majority voting, at least one acceptor need to choose between one of the two proposals

A node can have any or all of the three roles However, the nodes must know how many acceptors a majority is

Movie is a great idea

Paxos Basics

- Paxos is based on state-machine replication
 - Proposers and Acceptors maintain a state of the running epochs
 - Uses a variable IDp where p is an epoch number maintains the state
 - We'll see the concept of state-machine replication later in details


- A Paxos run aims at reaching a single consensus
 - Once a consensus is reached, Paxos cannot progress to another consensus
 - To reach multiple consensus, you need to run Paxos in rounds (Multi-Paxos)

Proposer




Proposer wants to propose its choice (values):

Sends PREPARE IDp to a majority (or all) of the acceptors




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


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
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
- Did it promised to ignore requests with this IDp?
 - YES: Ignore
 - NO: Will promise to ignore any request lower than IDp
 - (?) Reply with PROMISE IDp




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
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- Sends ACCEPT-REQUEST IDp, <u>VALUE</u> to a majority (or all) of <u>Acceptors</u>
 - (?) It picks any value of its choice




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
Acceptor receives an ACCEPT-REQUEST IDp, VALUE:

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


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



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
Proposer or Learner gets ACCEPT message with IDp, VALUE:

 If a proposer/learner gets majority of accept for a specific IDp, they know that consensus is reached for the value (not IDp).







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
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
- Did it promised to ignore requests with this IDp?
 - YES: Ignore
 - NO: Will promise to ignore any request lower than IDp
 - Has it ever accepted anything? (Assume accepted ID = IDa)
 - YES: Reply with PROMISE IDp accepted IDa, VALUE
 - NO: Reply with PROMISE IDp




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
What the proposer will do?




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



- It sends ACCEPT-REQUEST IDp, <u>VALUE</u> to a majority (or all) of Acceptors
 - Has it got any already accepted value from promises?
 - YES: Picks the value with the highest IDa
 - NO: Picks the value of its choice





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




































Majority of Accepts

- Majority of accepts accepts a request with an ID and a value
 - Consensus has been reached
 - The consensus is on the **value**
- Accept request with a lower ID
 - Will not be accepted by the majority (Would require majority of promises with the lower ID, but we got for a higher one, hence the accept request)

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
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
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
So, the consensus is on the value


We need the ID to maintain the <u>current</u> state of promise and accept, so that multiple values does not propagate

- Accept request with a higher ID but a different value
 - Will not be accepted by the majority
 - At least one acceptor will piggyback the previously accepted value (Remember, two majority implies that there is a common node)









Multi-Paxos

- Applications often needs a continuous stream of agreed values
 - Commit the transactions in a replicated database each transaction needs a consensus to be agreed upon by the replicas
- Run multiple instances of Paxos with different round numbers
 - Each value is associated with a round number
- If a value is already accepted for Round n, ignore the accept requests for a different value under Round n
 - Forward an ACCEPT IDp, (ROUNDn, VALUE) only when no value has been agreed upon for the Round n

