# Assignment 2 SPM 2022 Report

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Round key	Value(4 bytes)
$RK_0$	[0x40, 0xdc, 0x56, 0xd3]
$RK_1$	[0x2a, 0x15, 0xb0, 0x57]
$RK_{34}$	[0x6c, 0x89, 0xf8, 0x4]
$RK_{35}$	[0x5, 0xa5, 0xad, 0x5c]
$RK_2 \oplus WK_0$	[0x50, 0x94, 0x2f, 0xa0]
$RK_3 \oplus WK_1$	[0xf9, 0xff, 0x6c, 0x21]

## Explanation

The r-round encryption function can be described as follows:

$$C_0^0|C_1^0|C_2^0|C_3^0 = P_0|P_1 \oplus WK_0|P_2|P_3 \oplus WK_1$$

$$\forall i \in 0 < i \le r$$

$$C_0^i = C_1^{i-1} \oplus F_0(C_0^{i-1}, RK_{2i-2})$$

$$C_1^i = C_2^{i-1}$$

$$C_2^i = C_3^{i-1} \oplus F_1(C_2^{i-1}, RK_{2i-1})$$

$$C_3^i = C_0^{i-1}$$

and,

$$C_0|C_1|C_2|C_3 = C_3^r|C_0^r \oplus WK_2|C_1^r|C_2^r \oplus WK_3$$

where  $P_0|P_1|P_2|P_3$  is the plaintext,  $C_0|C_1|C_2|C_3$  is the ciphertext,  $RK_{2i-2}$ ,  $RK_{2i-1}$  are the rounds keys and  $WK_0|WK_1|WK_2|WK_3$  is the whitening key. The function  $F_0$  takes in two 4 byte inputs, X and RK, returns Y, and is defined as follows:

$$X_0|X_1|X_2|X_3 = X_0 \oplus RK_0|X_1 \oplus RK_1|X_2 \oplus RK_2|X_3 \oplus RK_3|X_3 \oplus RK_3|X_1 \oplus RK_3|X_2 \oplus RK_3|X_3 \oplus RK_3|X_$$

$$Y_0|Y_1|Y_2|Y_3 = T_{00}[X_0] \oplus T_{01}[X_1] \oplus T_{02}[X_2] \oplus T_{03}[X_3]$$


The function  $F_1$  is similar to  $F_0$ , and is defined as follows:

$$X_0|X_1|X_2|X_3 = X_0 \oplus RK_0|X_1 \oplus RK_1|X_2 \oplus RK_2|X_3 \oplus RK_3|$$

$$Y_0|Y_1|Y_2|Y_3 = T_{10}[X_0] \oplus T_{11}[X_1] \oplus T_{12}[X_2] \oplus T_{13}[X_3]$$

#### Power Attacks

To implement a power attack, we first need to perform N encryption operations using N random plaintexts  $P(n), n \in \{1, ..., N\}$  with the same key. We capture the corresponding power trace Tr(P(n)), having 18000 samples, and the ciphertext C(n). Let  $RK_i$  be the round key to be attacked.  $RK_i$  can be split in 4 bytes, denoted by  $RK_{i,b}, 0 \le b < 4$ . We guess the round key one byte at a time by varying it from 0 to 255. Each round can be represented as follows:



In the first round, the observable is  $C_0^0 = P_0$ , and the round key used is  $RK_0$ . The intermediate value is  $F_0(C_0^0, RK_0)$ . Similarly, for  $RK_1$  used in the first round, the observable is  $C_2^0 = P_2$ , and the intermediate value is  $F_1(C_2^0, RK_1)$ .

In both DOM and CPA methods the Hamming weight model is used. Let HW(x) denote the hamming weight of x.

#### DOM

The select function of DOM is defined as follows:

$$D(P(n), b, RK_{i,b}) = 0, HW(intermediate) < 16$$

else,

$$D(P(n), b, RK_{i,b}) = 1, HW(intermediate) > 16$$

Depedending on the value of D, the power traces are classified in two sets,

$$T_0 = \{Tr(P(n))|D(P(n), b, RK_{i,b}) = 0\}$$

and

$$T_1 = \{Tr(P(n))|D(P(n), b, RK_{i,b}) = 1\}$$

Then, the difference of means of both the sets are calculated. There is an obvious peak in the difference if the value of the key guess is correct. The code for this approach is present in the file ee19b106 dom.ipynb.

#### CPA

In correlation power analysis, the correct part of the power trace is correlated with the hamming weight of the intermediate value. The key guess resulting in the maximum correlation is selected as the correct key value. The code for this approach is present in the file ee19b106 cpa.ipynb.

In case of  $RK_{34}$  and  $RK_{35}$  we go in the reverse order. The observables are  $C_0 = C_3^r$  and  $C_2 = C_1^r$ . The intermediate values are  $F_0(C_3^r, RK_{34})$  and  $F_1(C_1^r, RK_{35})$  used in the calculation of  $C_0^r$  and  $C_2^r$  respectively.

In the second round, the intermediate values are  $F_0(C_0^1, RK_2)$  and  $F_1(C_2^1, RK_3)$ . They can be simplified as follows:

$$F_0(C_0^1, RK_2) = F_0(C_1^0 \oplus F_0(C_0^0, RK_0), RK_2)$$

$$= F_0(P_1 \oplus WK_0 \oplus F_0(C_0^0, RK_0), RK_2)$$


$$= F_0(P_1 \oplus F_0(C_0^0, RK_0), RK_2 \oplus WK_0)$$

Here, the observable is  $P_1 \oplus F_0(C_0^0, RK_0)$ , as we know the correct value of  $RK_0$  now. The key which we will guess is  $RK_2 \oplus WK_0$  and using the DOM and CPA methods, the correct value of  $RK_2 \oplus WK_0$  is calculated. Similarly,

$$F_1(C_2^1, RK_3) = F_1(P_3 \oplus F_1(C_2^0, RK_1), RK_3 \oplus WK_1)$$

and we get the value of  $RK_3 \oplus WK_1$ .

The higher the number of traces used, the higher is the difference of means in DOM and correlation in CPA. For CPA, all the traces were used as the difference in correlation was not significant for fewer number of traces. In DOM, there is a clear distinction between the correct key and remaining keys after around 500 traces. As it takes a long time to run the key guess, the following analysis has been done only for RK0. Other keys should follow a similar pattern.



					_		
Num	ber of	traces	used	= 300			
	0	1	2	3			
0							
1							
2							
3							
4							
Num	ber of	traces	used	= 400			
	0	1	2	3			
0							
1							
2							
3							
4							
Num	Number of traces used = 500						
	0	1	2	3			
0							
1							
2							
3							
4							

Nu	mber	of trac	es use	d = 100	0			
		0 1	2	3				
0								
1								
2								
3								
4								
Nui	mber (	of trac	es used	d = 200	0			
	(	) 1	2	3				
0								
1								
2								
3								
4								
Nu	Number of traces used = 5000							
		0 1	1 2	3				
0								
1								
2								
3								
4								



The above tables show the DOM values for different key guesses. We can get the correct key guess with high confidence from around 300-400 number of power traces.