

ANALYSIS OF SESSION HIJACKING via MITM USING OWASP ZAP



Submitted by

Group Number: 10

Abishek E[CB.EN.U4CSE22001]

Aditya R [CB.EN.U4CSE22004]

Guhanesh T[CB.EN.U4CSE22015]

Prashanna R [CB.EN.U4CSE22036]

COMPUTER SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING



AMRITA SCHOOL OF COMPUTING

AMRITA VISHWA VIDYAPEETHAM

COIMBATORE - 641 112

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
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Section 1: Introduction

In today's interconnected world, securing user sessions is a critical aspect of cybersecurity. With countless applications relying on session tokens to maintain user state, any compromise can result in unauthorized access and significant data breaches.

Cybersecurity threats range from injection attacks and cross-site scripting (XSS) to advanced session hijacking. Among these, session hijacking is particularly dangerous as it directly leads to account takeover—granting an attacker the same privileges as a legitimate user.

Tools such as OWASP ZAP are essential in detecting vulnerabilities and simulating attacks. They help organizations identify misconfigurations and weak security practices (like missing Secure, HttpOnly, and SameSite flags) that leave session tokens exposed. This report demonstrates how an attacker can perform a session hijacking attack via MitM using OWASP ZAP. It also discusses how OWASP ZAP not only identifies vulnerabilities but also aids in implementing robust mitigation strategies.




STEPS OF ATTACK

Launch ZAP Proxy on Kali Linux.

Configure ZAP Proxy for the victim machine.

Capture and break traffic using ZAP.

Initiate the attack, manipulate website content.



Section 2: Session Hijacking via MitM

Session hijacking is a critical cybersecurity threat that involves intercepting and taking over an active user session. Literature on the subject consistently highlights that once a session token is compromised, the attacker can bypass authentication controls. Research shows that the lack of properly secured cookies (missing Secure, HttpOnly, and SameSite attributes) is a primary contributor to such vulnerabilities.

Key Research Findings and Methodologies

- **Intercepting Traffic:** Using intercepting proxies like OWASP ZAP, attackers can capture session tokens when they are transmitted in plaintext.
- **Token Injection:** Once intercepted, session tokens can be injected into a different browser session to impersonate the legitimate user.
- **Mitigation Techniques:** Research emphasizes the importance of cookie flagging, token regeneration, and multi-factor authentication (MFA) to limit the window of opportunity for an attacker.

Notable Real-World Incidents

Notable incidents, such as the Firesheep attack (which exploited insecure HTTP sessions on public Wi-Fi), illustrate how session hijacking can lead to mass compromise of user accounts. These incidents have spurred enhanced security practices and the adoption of tools like OWASP ZAP in penetration testing environments.

Impact and Security Challenges

The impact of a successful session hijacking attack includes:

- **Full Account Takeover:** The attacker gains complete access to the victim's account.

- **Data Breach:** Sensitive information may be exposed.
- **Loss of Trust:** Compromises can lead to significant reputational damage. The primary challenge is ensuring that session tokens are secured both in transit and at rest.

The screenshot shows the Docker Desktop interface. On the left is a sidebar with navigation options: Containers, Images, Volumes, Builds, Docker Hub, Docker Scout, and Extensions. The main panel displays the 'funny_chaum' container, which is currently 'Exited (255) (7 minutes ago)'. Below the container name are tabs for Logs, Inspect, Bind mounts, Exec, Files, and Stats. The 'Logs' tab is active, showing a series of log entries from the container. The logs indicate the initialization of various plugins and the loading of data from a repository. At the bottom of the interface, a status bar shows 'Engine running', system resources (RAM 2.02 GB, CPU 0.17%, Disk 10.62 GB used), and a 'Terminal' button with a 'New version available' notification.

```

0100-01-01 00:00:00 3811 0 0 100 3811 0 44292 --:--:-- --:--:-- --:--:-- 44313
2025-03-27 17:01:41 [INFO ] 2025-03-27 11:31:41,556 [repository-manager-0 | c.o.t.g.FunctionLoader] Registered 50 functions from package com.usekm.geosparql.
2025-03-27 17:01:41 [INFO ] 2025-03-27 11:31:41,560 [repository-manager-0 | c.o.t.p.a.AutoCompletePluginUtils] >>>>>> AutoCompletePlugin: No configuration file fo
und at /opt/graphdb/dist/data/repositories/langchain/storage/autocomplete/v2/config.properties. Assuming default options for plugin.
2025-03-27 17:01:41 [INFO ] 2025-03-27 11:31:41,632 [repository-manager-0 | c.o.t.p.g.GeoSpatialPlugin] Plugin:geospatial initialized
2025-03-27 17:01:41 [INFO ] 2025-03-27 11:31:41,641 [repository-manager-0 | c.o.t.e.EntityPoolFactory] Using entity pool implementation: transactional-disk
2025-03-27 17:01:41 [INFO ] 2025-03-27 11:31:41,641 [repository-manager-0 | c.o.c.AbstractParameter] Configured parameter 'storage-folder' to value '/opt/graphdb/di
st/data/repositories/langchain/storage/history/tx-metadata'
2025-03-27 17:01:41 [INFO ] 2025-03-27 11:31:41,645 [repository-manager-0 | c.o.c.AbstractParameter] Configured parameter 'entity-index-size' to value '97.7K'
2025-03-27 17:01:41 [INFO ] 2025-03-27 11:31:41,681 [repository-manager-0 | c.o.p.literals-index] Full-text search functionality is disabled
2025-03-27 17:01:41 [INFO ] 2025-03-27 11:31:41,688 [repository-manager-0 | c.o.p.literals-index] Rebuilding literals indexes. Starting from id: 1
2025-03-27 17:01:41 [INFO ] 2025-03-27 11:31:41,701 [repository-manager-0 | c.o.p.literals-index] Complete in 0.008, num entries indexed:0
2025-03-27 17:01:41 [INFO ] 2025-03-27 11:31:41,713 [repository-manager-0 | c.o.t.p.p.PluginControlPlugin] Plugin:plugincontrol initialized
2025-03-27 17:01:41 [INFO ] 2025-03-27 11:31:41,930 [repository-manager-0 | c.o.g.s.FunctionLoader] Registered 50 functions from package com.github.tkurz.sparqlwn.f
unction.
2025-03-27 17:01:42 [INFO ] 2025-03-27 11:31:42,179 [repository-manager-0 | c.o.t.s.l.PluginManager] Finished initializing plugins
2025-03-27 17:01:42 [INFO ] 2025-03-27 11:31:42,181 [repository-manager-0 | c.o.t.MemoryConfig] Configured global page cache size to 486 MB
2025-03-27 17:01:42 [INFO ] 2025-03-27 11:31:42,182 [repository-manager-0 | c.o.t.MemoryConfig] Max Heap Size: 1 GB
2025-03-27 17:01:42 [INFO ] 2025-03-27 11:31:42,182 [repository-manager-0 | c.o.t.MemoryConfig] Initial Heap Size: 1 GB
2025-03-27 17:01:42 [INFO ] 2025-03-27 11:31:42,227 [repository-manager-0 | c.o.r.p.ParallelLoader] Data will be parsed + resolved + loaded.
2025-03-27 17:01:42 [INFO ] 2025-03-27 11:31:42,270 [repositories/langchain | c.o.g.s.StatementsController] POST data to repository
2025-03-27 17:01:45
2025-03-27 17:01:45 Importing rdfls.ttl
2025-03-27 17:01:45 [INFO ] 2025-03-27 11:31:45,229 [repositories/langchain | c.o.g.s.StatementsController] POST data to repository
  
```

Section 3: Overview of OWASP ZAP

Description of OWASP ZAP

OWASP ZAP (Zed Attack Proxy) is a free, open-source security testing tool maintained by the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP). It is designed for finding security vulnerabilities in web applications during the development and testing phases.

Developer and Version Details

Developed by the OWASP community, OWASP ZAP is continuously updated to address the latest threats. It is widely adopted in both academic and professional environments for its effectiveness and community support.

Working Mechanism

OWASP ZAP works as an intercepting proxy that sits between the tester's browser and the target application. By intercepting HTTP/HTTPS traffic, ZAP can capture requests, analyze responses, and detect vulnerabilities such as insecure cookie configurations or missing security headers.

Key Functionalities and Features

- **Intercepting Proxy:** Captures and modifies requests/responses in real time.
- **Active and Passive Scanning:** Automatically scans for common vulnerabilities.
- **Session Analysis:** Identifies insecure session tokens and potential hijacking vectors.
- **Automated Alerts:** Provides recommendations for mitigating detected vulnerabilities.
- **Extensibility:** Supports plugins and scripts for custom testing scenarios.

Section 4: Detailed Analysis of Session Hijacking via MitM

Using OWASP ZAP

Nature of the Attack:

Session hijacking via MitM occurs when an attacker intercepts the communication channel between a client and a web server to capture session tokens (e.g., cookies or JWTs). Once the token is intercepted, the attacker can inject it into their own browser session and impersonate the legitimate user. This technique is especially effective in environments where data is transmitted in plaintext or where cookie attributes (Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite) are misconfigured. The MITM method splits the original TCP connection into two separate connections—one between the client and attacker, and the other between the attacker and server—allowing for both passive observation and active modification of data packets.

Existing Mitigation Solutions:

Traditionally, defenses against session hijacking include:

- **Proper Cookie Attributes:** Setting Secure, HttpOnly, and SameSite flags prevents client-side script access and ensures cookies are only transmitted over secure channels.
- **Encryption (HTTPS/TLS):** Encrypting the data in transit helps protect session tokens from interception.
- **Token Regeneration and Expiry:** Regularly rotating session tokens and enforcing strict expiration policies reduce the attack window.
- **Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA):** Adding an extra verification layer helps mitigate the damage even if the session token is compromised.

Many organizations also employ network-level tools such as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) to monitor for unusual network traffic patterns that could indicate a MITM attack.

OWASP ZAP is an effective tool for detecting vulnerabilities that can lead to session hijacking. Its key features include:

- [illegible]

History Search Alerts Output +											
Filter: OFF Export											
ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
15	Proxy	31/03/25, 10:10:19 pm	GET	http://jira.amritanet.edu:8080/s/58ee667663b176be42acd	200		482 ms	232 bytes			
16	Proxy	31/03/25, 10:10:19 pm	GET	http://jira.amritanet.edu:8080/s/bc9834ced76d56e8802e	200		426 ms	300 bytes			Comment
17	Proxy	31/03/25, 10:10:19 pm	GET	http://jira.amritanet.edu:8080/s/d41d8cd9900c204e9800c	200		434 ms	544 bytes			Comment
18	Proxy	31/03/25, 10:10:19 pm	GET	http://jira.amritanet.edu:8080/s/e80a0b6f6a25ede1d1bb	200		454 ms	2,288 bytes			
20	Proxy	31/03/25, 10:10:19 pm	GET	http://jira.amritanet.edu:8080/s/d41d8cd9900c204e9800c	200		440 ms	1,391 bytes			
21	Proxy	31/03/25, 10:10:19 pm	GET	http://jira.amritanet.edu:8080/s/2d96d13252797e705135c	200		456 ms	7,260 bytes			
22	Proxy	31/03/25, 10:10:19 pm	GET	http://jira.amritanet.edu:8080/s/d41d8cd9900c204e9800c	200		443 ms	3,848 bytes			
23	Proxy	31/03/25, 10:10:19 pm	GET	http://jira.amritanet.edu:8080/s/58ee667663b176be42acd	200		530 ms	528 bytes			
24	Proxy	31/03/25, 10:10:19 pm	GET	http://jira.amritanet.edu:8080/s/d41d8cd9900c204e9800c	200		443 ms	265 bytes			
25	Proxy	31/03/25, 10:10:19 pm	GET	http://jira.amritanet.edu:8080/s/d41d8cd9900c204e9800c	200		470 ms	538 bytes			
28	Proxy	31/03/25, 10:10:19 pm	GET	http://jira.amritanet.edu:8080/s/d41d8cd9900c204e9800c	200		554 ms	12,849 bytes			
35	Proxy	31/03/25, 10:10:19 pm	GET	http://jira.amritanet.edu:8080/s/bca734e0d9e2290e68c39	200		477 ms	12,213 bytes			
76	Proxy	31/03/25, 10:10:19 pm	GET	http://jira.amritanet.edu:8080/s/345c4024b070b17430e59	200		592 ms	22,030 bytes			Comment

History Search Alerts Output +											
Filter: OFF Export											
ID	Source	Req. Timestamp	Method	URL	Code	Reason	RTT	Size Resp. Body	Highest Alert	Note	Tags
76	Proxy	31/03/25, 10:10:19 pm	GET	http://jira.amritanet.edu:8080/s/345c4024b070b17430e59	200		592 ms	22,030 bytes			Comment
124	Proxy	31/03/25, 10:10:19 pm	GET	http://jira.amritanet.edu:8080/s/280b3dc21d1f9bdadd1d0c	200		1.05 s	1,115 bytes			Comment
125	Proxy	31/03/25, 10:10:19 pm	GET	http://jira.amritanet.edu:8080/s/280b3dc21d1f9bdadd1d0c	200		1.07 s	774 bytes			Comment
126	Proxy	31/03/25, 10:10:19 pm	GET	http://jira.amritanet.edu:8080/s/70e2b247d349e4eb30b4	200		1.11 s	7,520 bytes			
132	Proxy	31/03/25, 10:10:19 pm	GET	http://jira.amritanet.edu:8080/s/2d96d13252797e705135c	200		1.02 s	54,733 bytes			
164	Proxy	31/03/25, 10:10:19 pm	GET	http://jira.amritanet.edu:8080/s/8945c0d611791a2c29c7	200		1.47 s	3,548 bytes			Comment
164	Proxy	31/03/25, 10:10:19 pm	GET	http://jira.amritanet.edu:8080/s/51a6b137843ad74762ea	200		1.47 s	12,379 bytes			Comment
174	Proxy	31/03/25, 10:10:19 pm	GET	http://jira.amritanet.edu:8080/s/7e980a043b153c30ca5d5	200		2.38 s	40,660 bytes			Comment
207	Proxy	31/03/25, 10:10:19 pm	GET	http://jira.amritanet.edu:8080/s/4984cc6899e8bdf46d1f	200		7.52 s	13,318 bytes			
218	Proxy	31/03/25, 10:10:19 pm	GET	http://jira.amritanet.edu:8080/s/d335c332e7e50290c2b8e	200		12.54 s	428,453 bytes			Comment
238	Proxy	31/03/25, 10:10:32 pm	GET	http://jira.amritanet.edu:8080/s/kg5lm712004b511e0087	200		98 ms	25,512 bytes			
250	Proxy	31/03/25, 10:10:32 pm	GET	http://jira.amritanet.edu:8080/s/d41d8cd9900c204e9800c	200		151 ms	26,138 bytes			Comment
258	Proxy	31/03/25, 10:10:32 pm	GET	http://jira.amritanet.edu:8080/s/42678a89ae69fc08260dax	200		33 ms	30,820 bytes			

Proposed Solution:


The solution we propose enhances existing mitigation strategies by integrating proactive defenses with real-time detection capabilities:

- Enhanced Cookie Security:** Beyond enforcing Secure, HttpOnly, and SameSite flags, our approach advocates for dynamic session token regeneration upon significant actions or at periodic intervals.
- Real-Time Anomaly Detection:** Combining OWASP ZAP's alert system with behavioral analysis (e.g., monitoring for IP address or user agent changes) can help quickly identify and terminate hijacked sessions.
- Automated Response and Token Binding:** Implementing automated responses that immediately invalidate tokens suspected of being hijacked (using techniques such as IP binding or device fingerprinting) further minimizes exposure.

- 4. Integration with Multi-Factor Authentication:** By integrating MFA directly with session management, even if a token is intercepted, unauthorized access is prevented.

How the Proposed Solution Differs:

- **Proactive Versus Reactive:** While traditional methods rely on periodic checks and static configurations, the proposed solution employs continuous monitoring and dynamic token management to preemptively cut off hijacked sessions.
- **Automated Response:** Instead of solely alerting developers to vulnerabilities, the solution includes automated remediation (e.g., immediate token invalidation and user re-authentication) when suspicious activity is detected.
- **Enhanced User Session Binding:** By using additional parameters (like IP address or device fingerprinting) for token validation, the system reduces the risk of session token reuse from a different location or device—a gap in many standard implementations.



Section 5: Comparative Analysis

Comparison with Other Cybersecurity Tools

OWASP ZAP is often compared with tools such as Burp Suite and Acunetix. While Burp Suite offers a more polished commercial experience and Acunetix provides automated scanning for enterprise environments, OWASP ZAP stands out for its:

- **Cost-Effectiveness:** Being free and open-source.
- **Community Support:** Frequent updates and contributions from security professionals.
- **Flexibility:** Customizable through add-ons and scripts.

Strengths and Weaknesses

Strengths:

- Extensive plugin ecosystem.
- Ease of integration into CI/CD pipelines.
- Robust scanning capabilities for a wide range of vulnerabilities.

Weaknesses:

- May require manual configuration for advanced scenarios.
- User interface can be less intuitive compared to commercial tools.
- Occasional performance lags with very large applications.

Best Use Cases

OWASP ZAP is best suited for:

- **Development Environments:** Where cost-effective, frequent testing is needed.
- **Small to Medium Enterprises:** That need robust vulnerability assessments without heavy investments.
- **Educational Purposes:** Training ethical hackers and developers in recognizing common vulnerabilities.

Section 6: Challenges and Limitations

Challenges Faced While Using OWASP ZAP

- **Configuration Complexity:** Proper proxy and certificate configuration is required to intercept HTTPS traffic.
- **Learning Curve:** New users may find the array of options and settings overwhelming.
- **Resource Intensive:** Active scanning on large applications can be time-consuming.

Scenarios Where the Tool May Not Be Effective

- **Encrypted or Obfuscated Traffic:** When applications use advanced encryption or token obfuscation, ZAP may struggle to intercept and analyze traffic effectively.
- **Highly Customized Environments:** Applications with nonstandard session management mechanisms might require custom scripts or additional

tools for full analysis.

Possible Improvements Suggested in Research Studies

- **Enhanced Automation:** More streamlined scanning and reporting features.
- **Integration with Machine Learning:** To predict potential vulnerabilities based on historical data.
- **User Interface Enhancements:** Making it more intuitive for both beginners and experts.

Section 7: Conclusion and Future Advancements

This report has detailed the mechanics, impact, and mitigation strategies for a session hijacking attack via MitM using OWASP ZAP. Key takeaways include:

- **High Impact:** Session hijacking poses severe risks, leading to unauthorized access and data breaches.
- **Critical Role of Proper Cookie Management:** Implementing Secure, HttpOnly, and SameSite flags, along with other security measures, is paramount.
- **OWASP ZAP as a Dual-Use Tool:** Not only can it simulate attacks, but it also educates and guides developers in remediating vulnerabilities.

Future Advancements

Looking ahead, integrating more sophisticated automation, machine learning analytics, and better UI/UX designs could further enhance OWASP ZAP's capabilities. These improvements will help security teams quickly adapt to evolving threats and protect increasingly complex web applications.

References

- **OWASP ZAP Official Documentation – Comprehensive resource on setup, configuration, and best practices.**
- **Research papers and case studies on session hijacking and MitM attacks.**
- **Documentation and security advisories for OWASP Juice Shop.**