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Course outline

About NPTEL

How does an NPTEL online course work? ()

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Thank you for taking the Week 12 : Assignment 12.

Week 12 : Assignment 12

Your last recorded submission was on 2024-04-17, 11:51 IST Due date: 2024-04-17, 23:59 IST.

1) **1 poin**:

India is trying to auction its telecom spectrum. All the bidders in the market know the benefit of getting the right after assessing the Indian Teleom Market. Which of the following auction models best describes this situation?

- a. Private value model
- b. Common value model
- c. Interdependent Value Models
- d. Public goods model

Oa.

b.

O c.

Od.

2) 1 point

India is trying to auction its telecom spectrum. All the bidders in the market know the benefit of getting the right after assessing the Indian Telcom Market. Telcom spectrum is a public good. Which of the following should be the objective of the auction?

- a. Profit regularisation
- b. Profit maximisation
- c. Pareto efficiency
- d. Bidder authentication

Oa

Ob.

4/17/24, 11:50 AM Assessmere & Both itted. Χ Week 9 () Week 10 () Week 11 () Week 12 () Lecture 58: Economic Considerations in Auction (unit? unit=133&less on=134)Lecture 59: Winner Determination Problem (unit? unit=133&less on=135) Lecture 60: Online auction issues (unit? unit=133&less


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Ass	sessm leiM₽ submitted.
Χ	Interactive
•	session ()

Live Interactive session (Previous) ()

nder an interdep	endent value setting, the basic assumption is	
a. Each bidd	er has only partial information about the value of the item being sold in the	
	er has only partial information about the value of the item being sold	
	er has complete information about the value of the item being sold in the for	rm
q. Estiponia o Acollinat	nswers are gsfullyngld与infittedion about the value of the item being sold	
o a.		
Ob.		
○ c.		
\bigcirc d.		
) high of the foll	1 po owing auctions is an example of an incentive-compatible direct mechanism	
		n c
a. First price		
b. Second pr	ice auction	
d. English A		
-		
○ a.		
o b.		
O c.		
Od.		
More Bid	ders implicates 1 pc	oint
	a. Higher Expected Payoff	
	b. Lower Expected Payoff	
	c. Higher Payoff	
	d. Lower Payoff	
o a.		
○ b.		
○ c.		
\bigcirc d.		
)	1 pc	oint
hich of the	following auctions can be treated as a simple sorting problem	m
a.	Multiunit auction with divisible bids	
Ъ.	Single unit reverse auction	
c.	Single unit forward auction	
d.	All of the above	
· ·	17-17-17-19-18-17-18-18-18-18-18-18-18-18-18-18-18-18-18-	

Assessment submitted. X

○ a.
○ b.
o:Thank You!!
Tour answers are Which of the following auctions earnot guarantee the complete fulfilment of a buyer's requirement a. Multiunit auction with indivisible bids b. Multiunit auction with divisible bids
c. Single unit reverse auction
d. Single unit forward auction
● a.
○ b.
○ c.
○ d.
You may submit any number of times before the due date. The final submission will be considered for grading.
Submit Answers