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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT  
(CPL-39560 SCL-3956A SCPD-3956S PPFB-P2440)

ON A

LOAN

IN THE AMOUNT OF US\$51.0 MILLION

TO THE REPUBLIC OF

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

FOR A

BASIC EDUCATION PROJECT

December 29, 2003

**Human Development Sector Management Unit  
Caribbean Country Management Unit  
Latin America and the Caribbean Region**

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## CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective October 2003)

Currency Unit = Trinidadian Dollar (TT \$)

TT\$ 1.00 = US\$ 0.16

US\$ 1.00 = TT\$ 6.15

## FISCAL YEAR

July 1 to June 30

## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CEE	Common Entrance Examination
DRE	Division of Research and Evaluation
DSS	Division of School Supervision
ECCE	Early Childhood Care and Education
EPCU	Education Project Coordinating Unit
GORTT	Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICB	International Competitive Bidding
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
MOE	Ministry of Education
MTR	Mid-term Review
NCB	National Competitive Bidding
NCECCE	National Council on Early Childhood Care and Education
NTFE	National Task Force on Education
PCU	Project Coordinating Unit
SAR	Staff Appraisal Report
SEA	Secondary Entrance Exam
SIPs	School Improvement Plans
SMG	School-based Maintenance Grant Program
THA	Tobago House of Assembly
TOT	Training of Trainers
UWI	University of the West Indies

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**TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO  
BASIC EDUCATION PROJECT**

**CONTENTS**

	<b>Page No.</b>
1. Project Data	1
2. Principal Performance Ratings	1
3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry	2
4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs	8
5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome	19
6. Sustainability	20
7. Bank and Borrower Performance	21
8. Lessons Learned	25
9. Partner Comments	26
10. Additional Information	26
Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix	27
Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing	29
Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits	32
Annex 4. Bank Inputs	34
Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components	35
Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance	36
Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents	37
Annex 8. Borrower's Contribution	39

<i>Project ID:</i> P035312	<i>Project Name:</i> TT- BASIC EDUCATION
<i>Team Leader:</i> Alexis De Roquefeuil	<i>TL Unit:</i> LCSHE
<i>ICR Type:</i> Core ICR	<i>Report Date:</i> December 29, 2003

## 1. Project Data

*Name:* TT- BASIC EDUCATION

*L/C/TF Number:* CPL-39560; SCL-3956A;  
SCPD-3956S;  
PPFB-P2440

*Country/Department:* TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

*Region:* Latin America and the  
Caribbean Region

*Sector/subsector:* Primary education (56%); General public administration sector (25%); Secondary education (9%); Pre-primary education (7%); Tertiary education (3%)

*Theme:* Education for all (P); Access to urban services for the poor (P); Civic engagement, participation and community driven development (S); Social analysis and monitoring (S); Decentralization (S)

### KEY DATES

*PCD:* 09/24/1994

*Appraisal:* 05/11/1995

*Approval:* 11/16/1995

*Original Effective:* 01/01/1996

*MTR:* 05/27/1999

*Closing:* 06/30/2003

*Revised/Actual*

11/27/1996

11/08/1999

06/30/2003

*Borrower/Implementing Agency:* Republic of Trinidad and Tobago/Ministry of Education

*Other Partners:*

STAFF	Current	At Appraisal
<i>Vice President:</i>	David de Ferranti	S. Javed Burki
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## 2. Principal Performance Ratings

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible)

*Outcome:* S

*Sustainability:* L

*Institutional Development Impact:* M

*Bank Performance:* S

*Borrower Performance:* S

QAG (if available)

ICR

*Quality at Entry:*

S

*Project at Risk at Any Time:* No

### 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry

#### 3.1 Original Objective:

The Trinidad and Tobago Basic Education Project evolved out of the 1993–2003 Education Policy Framework, carried out by the National Task Force on Education (NTFE), with strong support from the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (GORTT).<sup>[1]</sup> The GORTT was aware that an investment in human capital was required for faster economic growth and reduction of social inequities and sought to improve the role of the education system in supplying a well-prepared labor force. In the mid-1990s, the GORTT was concerned about the declines in the quality (overall achievement) and equity of teaching and learning (differences in quality among schools and access to quality education among socioeconomic groups).

The Basic Education Project (Loan 3956-TR), approved in November 1995, was intended to provide a framework of support to the GORTT to enhance the quality of education, to reduce the disparity in the education system and to achieve an effective and efficient management of the education sector. The main objectives of the project were to:

- (a) Enhance the cognitive and social development of children in preschool—Early Childhood Care and Education (ECCE) to prepare them to enter primary education;
- (b) Improve the quality of teaching and student achievement in primary education;
- (c) Improve the physical infrastructure of facilities for ECCE and primary and secondary education; and
- (d) Strengthen the management and institutional capabilities of the education sector at all levels.

#### Assessment

The project objectives were consistent with the GORTT's policies on education and the World Bank Group's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS, March 1995). The project was designed to invest in the foundation for future investments in human resources by addressing the quality of and access to preschool and primary education. The project was responsive to the needs in the basic education sector by considering attention to infrastructure needs, quality enhancement, and institutional issues. However, the project objectives may have been too wide-ranging and trying to address too many challenges at the same time (improving the linkages across ECCE, primary and secondary levels and addressing the issues of quality, access, and equity), which eventually had an impact on project implementation.

At the time, the GORTT demonstrated a commitment to and ownership of its social programs, particularly education, which was a significant factor in project success as noted in the previous education loans. In terms of basic education, the Government's strategy placed importance on: (a) preparing children for primary schools; (b) providing quality education at the primary level and easing the transition from primary to secondary school; and (c) improving public institutional capacity to accomplish these goals.

The project supported the CAS objective of helping Trinidad and Tobago resume its economic growth by providing a strong human and capital base for sustainable development. The project contributed directly to this objective by emphasizing the need to increase and effectively and efficiently utilize investments in human resources. Bank financing would help revitalize capital investments in the education sector, which were drastically reduced during the previous decade, catalyze economic growth, and assist in developing a solid human resource base for sustainable development. Also, increased access to quality education would contribute to a more equitable income distribution.

<sup>[1]</sup> The NTFE was created in 1991 as a permanent council to advise the Ministry of Education and its Council. The Task Force consisted of leading educators from the University of the West Indies, local NGOS, the MOE, and regional and school staff.

### *3.2 Revised Objective:*

During the Mid-term Review (MTR), carried out in November 1999, the project objectives were confirmed, but it was agreed that some project subcomponents would be revised to reflect the evolution of the Government's strategic priorities and accelerate implementation.

### *3.3 Original Components:*

The project had four components financed with a US\$51.0 million IBRD Loan and the GORTT counterpart of US\$70.7 million for a total cost of US\$121.7 million.

**Component A. ECCE Quality and Access** (US\$8.59 million; IBRD 3.75 million). The basic education system in Trinidad and Tobago includes a two-year preschool program (Early Childhood Care and Education—ECCE) for the 3–4 age cohort. This component would be implemented by the Ministry of Education (MOE), under the auspices of the National Council for Early Childhood Care and Education (NCECCE), an umbrella body for various ministries and agencies involved in the ECCE sector, to be created under the project. Non-governmental organizations, churches, or private early childhood service providers would be able to assist poor communities in submitting viable proposals for ECCE investments and if approved, would sign a contract with the MOE to support the communities in the construction program and in managing the ECCE centers.<sup>[2]</sup>

This component would finance the following two subcomponents:

*1) Upgrading Quality* (US\$2.46 million). This subcomponent would: (a) improve the in-service training of ECCE training institutions and the supervision activities of field officers and regional facilitators of ECCE training institutions through training of trainers (TOT) programs; (b) rehabilitate existing public ECCE centers and provide furniture, equipment and instructional materials to bring them up to acceptable operating standards; and (c) strengthen the management and monitoring capacity of the NCECCE by providing technical assistance, furniture, equipment and staff costs (on a declining basis).

*2) Improving Access* (US\$6.12 million). This subcomponent would increase access of the poorest children to new ECCE centers by: (a) construction and equipment of about 50 new ECCE centers for about 2,250 children; (b) providing pre-service training scholarships for up to 350 prospective ECCE teachers, with additional stipends for trainees from low-income communities; and (c) expanding the Parental Outreach Program (workers assist parents at home to develop healthy childcare practices) managed by NGOs.

**Component B. Primary Level Teaching and Learning Quality** (US\$18.21 million; IBRD US\$15.0 million). This component would fund two inter-linked subcomponents to upgrade primary education quality as below:

*1) Classroom Instruction and Curriculum Strengthening* (US\$5.93 million). This subcomponent would finance: (a) design and implementation of a school-based training program, focusing on improved instructional and assessment methods for delivery of traditional subjects and for other areas such as art and crafts, drama, and music, for principals and teachers of primary education; (b) a part-time university in-service program (as part of the Bachelor in Education program, B.Ed.) to support the improvement of teaching efficiency and relevance through curriculum adaptation, pedagogical methods improvement, and the decentralization of learning aimed initiatives (with community participation); and (c) a pilot program to teach the Spanish language in primary education.

*2) Textbooks and Instructional Materials* (US\$12.28 million). This subcomponent would finance: (a) a

school-based loan scheme to make textbooks available to children of low income families; (b) provide textbooks, library books, educational materials, computers, software and audio-visual equipment for primary education schools and their libraries, teacher's colleges, and the MOE learning resources center; and (c) technical assistance for the production of local educational materials.

**Component C. Upgrading the Physical Environment for Teaching and Learning** (US\$81 million; IBRD US\$19.7 million). This component would seek to reduce serious overcrowding and lack of student places through construction and expansion of primary schools in low-income neighborhoods, particularly targeting fast-growing neighborhoods and disadvantaged communities through the following three subcomponents:

*1) Construction and Reconstruction* (US\$48.23 million). This subcomponent would finance the construction and equipment of 15 new primary schools to accommodate a total of 9,900 new students and reconstruction and equipping of 15 dilapidated schools to benefit an additional 8,250 students.

*2) School Extension and Renovation* (US\$11.0 million). This subcomponent would finance the extension and renovation of 16 schools, with improved sanitation systems, furniture, and equipment, benefiting 6,145 students in existing buildings and 3,760 additional new students in extensions to existing schools.

*3) Pilot Secondary School Construction* (US\$21.86 million). To lay the groundwork for access of primary school graduates to the secondary level in selected parts of the country, this subcomponent would finance a pilot program to improve the design, construction, and utilization of secondary education schools with: (a) development of a cost-effective design for secondary schools; (b) the pilot construction of 3–4 secondary schools with a capacity of 800 students each; and (c) the initial preparation and assessments needed for a follow-up project at the secondary level.

**Component D. Education Management and Institutional Strengthening** (US\$13.90 million; IBRD US\$12.55 million). This component would finance three subcomponents as below:

*1) MOE Reform and Decentralization* (US\$4.24 million). This subcomponent would: (a) support the reform and decentralization goals of the MOE while improving the managerial, monitoring, planning and technical capacity of the MOE and its regional offices; (b) develop and implement viable action plans to implement the recommended reform and decentralization strategy; (c) assist in improving central and regional planning, management and team work skills; and (d) establish a Project Coordinating Unit.

*2) Testing and Assessment Reform* (US\$1.16 million) This subcomponent would improve monitoring of nationwide student achievement, and increase the analysis and planning capacity of the MOE Division of Research and Evaluation (DRE). The project would assist the MOE to: (a) collect timely, relevant, and diagnostic information on academic achievement of students in Standards 1, 3 and 5; (b) establish a computer-based test development and student tracking system; and (c) prepare and implement a plan to improve the assessment and monitoring capacity of the education sector, including the introduction of the two additional national diagnostic tests at Standards 1 and 3.

*3) School-Based Management Strengthening* (US\$8.5 million). This subcomponent would encourage and assist principals, teachers and parents at the local level to diagnose their own schools and plan quality and efficiency improvements through financing provided to approved School Improvement Plans (SIPs). Educationally-at-risk and low-income schools, as identified through targeting mechanisms based on educational performance and economic needs, would be provided with technical assistance to develop and implement their school subprojects.

### *Assessment*

The project design was linked to the objectives described above and addressed the most significant issues facing the GORTT in terms of providing better opportunities for children as they enter the school system. However, in order to address the multiple objectives, the project may have integrated too many components, subcomponents, and activities, without carrying out a realistic assessment of the Government's absorptive capacity. The MTR played an important role in working with Government to simplify the project design and link component and actions together to create a more coherent and focused objective.

The project included a School-based Management Strengthening Subcomponent with training and technical assistance to support changes at the classroom level and promote school-community linkages. The focus at the school-level, in addition to reforms at the central level, was seen to be key to strengthening the performance of basic education with the active involvement and leadership of teachers, parents, and the community. The component design was technically appropriate for addressing three issues perceived as critical interventions: curriculum reform, pre-service and in-service teacher training, classroom level processes, and school managers' empowerment.

The project components also complemented investments financed under an Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)-financed initial primary education project, which included school libraries, a computer provided to all Government schools, and construction of one primary school. The estimates of costs and implementation plans for the construction of the primary schools for this project were based on the IDB-financed construction.

### *3.4 Revised Components:*

During the MTR, the four original components were maintained, but several subcomponents were revised and the changes and reallocations formalized in an Amendment to the Loan Agreement dated February 10, 2000. At that time, slow disbursement was a significant issue since only about 20 percent of the loan had been disbursed. The adjustments during the MTR reflected the lessons learned during the first three years and were intended to simplify and accelerate project implementation. During the MTR, the GORTT reiterated its commitment to the project objectives and its desire to continue implementation at the approved loan amount. The revisions were not considered a major restructuring and were not reported to the Executive Directors.

The revisions were designed to: (a) build on the success of key project components (quality improvement through the SIPs); (b) adjust other activities to respond to new policy directions and implementation realities (learning materials and civil works); and (c) discontinue those areas supported by other Government or donor initiatives (MOE decentralization, evaluation and assessment). For all components, the total allocations were adjusted according to the real cost experience of the first three years of implementation (Please see Table 1).

<sup>[2]</sup> In 1988, the Government transferred administration of Government-assisted preschool/ECCE centers to community-based NGOs. NGOs, through sub-contracting arrangements with the Government, can provide ECCE teacher training, furniture, and equipment, teacher salaries, and administration support. The communities where the preschool centers are located, are expected to establish a board of education to manage the schools and provide for maintenance of the premises.



**Table 1 – IBRD Financing Original and Revised by Component**

Components	Original IBRD Financing	Revised IBRD Financing	Difference IBRD Financing
A. ECCE Quality and Access	3.75	2.66	-1.09
B. Primary Teaching and Learning Quality	15.0	5.73	-9.27
C. Upgrading Physical Environment	19.7	26.71	+7.01
D. Education Mgmt./Institutional Strengthening	12.65	15.79	+3.14
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>51.0</b>	<b>51.0</b>	<b>--</b>

The main revisions to the subcomponents are described below:

**Component A. ECCE Quality and Access.** *Unchanged.* The MTR recommended that this component should strengthen its community outreach activity to support poor communities and promote their interest in coming together and organizing themselves to be beneficiaries of ECCE interventions.

#### **Component B. Primary Level Teaching and Learning Quality**

*1) Classroom Instruction and Curriculum Strengthening. Unchanged.* The MTR recommended that effective curriculum dissemination should depend on a solid school-level training system focused on revising and upgrading actual classroom instruction. Emerging curricular standards should be aligned with: (a) developments in national and school-level assessment systems; (b) future purchases of textbooks and instructional materials; and (c) pre-service training efforts.

*2) Textbooks and instructional materials.* The procurement of school library books and instructional materials at the central level was maintained, but these materials would now be eligible for purchase by each school through a second round of the SIPs program. The MTR noted that securing full participation of principals and a high quality, technically based and transparent textbook and instructional materials selection process would continue to be the key to success of this subcomponent.

#### **Component C. Upgrading the Physical Environment for Teaching and Learning.**

*Establishment of a school-based system for school maintenance.* A School-based Maintenance Grant Program (SMG) was introduced to finance a direct transfer to schools so they could autonomously undertake any needed minor repairs to physical facilities. The subcomponent would finance: (a) a physical facilities survey to assess current needs and produce an asset inventory; (b) the systematization of the above-mentioned inventory; (c) the design of an effective yet simple mechanism to guide principals in the decision-making process that would lead to the use of the grant; (d) the financial transfer to each school; and (e) the evaluation, monitoring, and auditing of the use of the grants. Every public primary school would benefit from this program.

#### **Component D. Education Management and Institutional Strengthening**

*1) MOE Reform and Decentralization and (2) Testing and Assessment Reform. Eliminated.* Financing for both of these subcomponents was reallocated since the MOE reform activities were being financed through core Ministry resources and a new IDB-financed Secondary Education Modernization Project.

3) *School-based Management Strengthening.* For the second half of the project, the initial round of SIPs would be significantly expanded to cover all remaining primary schools. In addition, to reinforce the process of school-level strategic planning and resource management, a second round of SIPs would be implemented in all the primary schools that successfully completed round one. During round two, special emphasis would be placed on providing schools with the opportunity to select and purchase library books and instructional materials. The transfer to each school in Round 1 remained limited to TT\$90,000, and in Round 2, the transfer to each school was limited to TT\$60,000. The MTR recommended that a SIP should continue to have an exclusively pedagogic focus and its activities must directly support improvements in teaching practice and learning materials. The SIPs would not include investments in facilities, which would be supported through newly-created School-based Maintenance Grants (SMG) (see Component C).

4) *Project Administration.* The amount of resources allocated to project administration was increased to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation function of the Education Project Coordinating Unit (EPCU), which was originally part of the MOE Reform and Decentralization Subcomponent.

### 3.5 *Quality at Entry:*

The project's quality at entry is considered *satisfactory*. The project design was based on a technical analysis, the involvement of stakeholders and beneficiaries, and it was consistent with the GORTT strategy in the education sector and the Bank's CAS. The project incorporated lessons learned from other Bank-financed education projects and three education loans to Trinidad and Tobago prior to 1980. The project appropriately identified the main risks and included actions to mitigate these risks. Nonetheless, as described below, there were some weaknesses that became apparent during implementation in both the approach and appropriateness of the design to the situation in the education sector in Trinidad and Tobago and in the assessment of the institutional capacity of the MOE to undertake such a large and comprehensive project.

***Decentralization.*** The MOE Reform and Decentralization Subcomponent was designed to change the overall organizational culture of the education sector (both institutions and individuals) through improved efficiency and strong decentralization. Early in implementation, it became clear that the apparent GORTT consensus on decentralization and its capacity to fully implement the attempted reforms had been overestimated as no clear policy priority emerged on the need to strengthen the management role of the Regional Education Offices in such a small territory. Prior to disbursement for the decentralization plans, the Government was supposed to "...provide evidence acceptable to the Bank that the decentralization analysis has been conducted, its recommendations are viable, and a master implementation plan has been prepared" (SAR and Loan Agreement), which could not be fully implemented by the MOE in terms acceptable to the Bank during the entire project life.

***Stakeholder/Beneficiary Participation.*** Project preparation was informed by a series of participatory workshops and focus groups involving education stakeholders and it included a beneficiary-centered monitoring system that was based on the logical framework methodology used in the stakeholder workshops. During preparation, there was close collaboration among executing agencies (MOE, regional districts, NGOs, the University of the West Indies-UWI) and stakeholders, which improved institutional and professional linkages among actors in the education sector.

The ECCE Component anticipated extensive community participation during implementation, which proved to be overly ambitious. The communities were required "...to provide an extensive financial or cash contribution, and to fully participate to the management of the Centers" (Implementation Manual). While the financial contribution was lacking for obvious reasons, the poorest communities also experienced significant difficulties in managing the centers, particularly in the construction and procurement aspects.

This is one of the factors leading to the unsatisfactory implementation of the ECCE Component in targeted communities.

It should be noted that negotiations did not initially involve the Tobago House of Assembly (THA) regarding the actions on that island. At the start of implementation, the THA stated that no school construction or ECCE center rehabilitation could be operated outside of its Education Plan since education is a sovereign domain of the Tobago Island. Legally, although Tobago could not be a signatory of the Loan Agreement, the representatives of the THA could have been included or consulted during the project preparation phase as observers or as stakeholders. This issue stalled actions until an arrangement was reached during the MTR whereby the THA allowed the establishment of a Project Implementation Unit (PIU), merged with the IDB-financed Secondary Modernization Program. In fact, the PIU staff financed by the IDB implemented the World Bank-financed program in Tobago until completion.

**Monitoring and Evaluation.** The monitoring indicators provided only generic or analytical evidence of progress and therefore, implementation progress was difficult to follow during implementation. At the MTR, it was necessary to introduce a quantitative set of threshold indicators to allow for more consistent and systematic monitoring.

**Demographic Assessment.** The project planned for an increase in the number of pupils in primary schools from 200,000 to 209,900 during 1995–2003. However, the number actually dropped to 147,000 in 2003, as a consequence of a sharp decline in the birth rate, which intervened earlier. Preparation did not fully assess the impact of demographic changes on the planned activities.

## **4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs**

### **4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective:**

The project's overall performance is considered *satisfactory*. Most of the target outcomes confirmed during the MTR were achieved, except for in the ECCE Quality and Access Component. The project improved access to preschool, primary, and secondary education and enhanced the quality of teaching, although testing and examination data are lacking in order to evaluate the effects on learning achievements. The project successfully increased community involvement in schools through the School Improvement and the School-based Maintenance Grant Programs. Both of these programs are seen as building blocks of the GORTT's current decentralization policy in the education sector.

The project was a program of targeted interventions and the poverty alleviation objective was *partially* achieved. The MOE developed specific mechanisms to target project inputs for the educational needs of children of the lowest-income groups of the population, but performance was uneven. The main outcomes are below:

**Enhance the cognitive and social development of children in preschool (ECCE).** During the first four years of implementation, this component financed the creation of new ECCE facilities and in-service and pre-service teacher training. The National Council on Early Childhood Care and Education (NCECCE) was established and operating in 1997. The expected achievements of this objective were limited however, when the Government initiated a policy revision exercise of this program with attention to quality issues and the effectiveness of poverty targeting, and then, halted all new construction in 2001. For this reason, the MOE did not endorse the final tendering of 19 new ECCE centers to be built in 2002. At the end-of-project, only 57 out of the targeted 100 ECCE centers were constructed or refurbished and the number of new ECCE places for children in poor communities increased by only 1,150, falling short by 1,100 places to meet the end-of-project target of 6,750 (Please see Table 2 below).

**Table 2 - ECCE Impact Indicators**

Impact Indicators	Baseline	Project Target (2003)	Actual End-of-Project
# new ECCE places for children in poor communities	4,500 (37.5 % net)	6,750 (55% net)	5,650
# of students in primary schools	200,000 (96% net)	209,900	147,359

Ministry of Education, Education Planning Division and Education Project Coordination Unit, October 2003.

Of the 57 new ECCE centers, 25 are located in low-income communities. There were several concerns raised during implementation that the ECCE centers did not benefit the poorest communities. According to the GORTT and the NCECCE, the requirements of the program including land tenure, community financial contribution for the construction of new schools, and for teachers salaries, were not consistent with attaining the program objective of targeting the poorest communities. An updated poverty map is not available to assess to what extent ECCE centers built by the project were in the country's poorest areas. The Government plans to conduct a needs assessment to better identify the poor communities and to provide land to construct the centers in these communities.

A systemic measurement of behavioral and cognitive achievements was not available when the ICR was prepared. A critical part of the impact evaluation will be the third phase of the longitudinal early childhood study, currently being carried out (previous studies were carried out in 1995 and 1999). In September 2003, the firm completed a systematic training of 18 ECCE teachers to collect data samples at 60 centers on teacher time management, activities, achievements survey, and parent interviews. The data are currently being processed and the final evaluation report will be available in the spring of 2004. A preliminary indicator from the MOE shows that in 1999, the time in the classroom in which children are not actively engaged had increased from the baseline of 22 percent to 24 percent (negative effect, as the target was 12 percent) (Please see Table 3 below). This indicator is being updated through the current evaluation.

**Table 3 - ECCE Impact Indicator**

Impact Indicator	Baseline (1995) %	MTR (1999) %	Project Target (2003) %	Comments
% of time in classroom in which children are not actively engaged	22	24	12	As measured by the quality baseline study for ECCE sponsored by the Bank.

High Scope Educational Research Foundation, July 2000.

The Government is currently planning a new strategy to expand the ECCE program to achieve universal coverage and specifically target poorest communities. The results from the evaluation currently in process should provide useful information on the coverage of poverty areas and under-enrollment because of lack of parental involvement or financial resources, which will help provide a useful basis for the development of this new comprehensive program.

**Improve the quality of teaching and student achievement in primary education.** Most of the threshold indicators were met under this component. Six curricular areas were reformed (five were piloted), teachers were trained in these areas, and 474 teachers and principals completed the B.Ed. in Education at the UWI. Library materials and textbooks were purchased and distributed and low-income students received

textbooks through the project (in the first phase about 53,000 benefited and in the second phase about 56,600 students benefited). The textbooks are owned by the schools and lent at no charge to low-income children. However, critical indicators are missing to accurately assess the impact of the project on the quality of teaching and learning achievements in the primary education sector, for the following reasons:

*a) Testing.* The project had planned to assist the MOE to collect timely diagnostic information on academic achievements of students in standards 1, 3, and 5 to build a comprehensive database of continuous attainment through the Testing and Assessment Subcomponent. There was no progress and this subcomponent was eliminated during the MTR, which has made it impossible to measure the quality of teaching and student achievement. The National Test system, designed from curriculum objectives and conducted annually on Language Arts (English) and Mathematics, measured knowledge and skills that students were expected to have acquired each academic year in standards one to four, produced results until 2001. Since 2001, the classroom-based tests were no longer centrally collected, processed and analyzed. The Division of Educational Research and Evaluation should produce a new collection of National Test data in 2004.

*b) Standard Examination.* The Common Entrance Examination (CEE) (at the end of primary school) was replaced by the Secondary Entrance Examination (SEA) in 2001. Student learning achievement could not be consistently compared during the project since the methodology and objectives of these examination systems radically differed in the following ways: (i) the CEE utilized a knowledge-oriented multiple choice format and the SEA utilizes a skills and analysis oriented open-end format; (ii) the CEE was aimed at assisting with student selection at the end of primary school, while the SEA was introduced for promoting universal access from primary to secondary and directing all students to secondary schools best suited to their skills; and (iii) during 1995 (baseline indicator) to 2003, there was a 25 percentage point drop in the percent of children scoring below 40 percent of the maximum score in English in the Standard 5 CEE, actually better than the expected target. In Mathematics, the portion of students with significant learning difficulties also dropped significantly from 40 to 25 percent, which supports achievements of the objective (Please see Table 4 below). However, it is not possible to assess if this available figure shows a reduction of the learning achievements gap in these two subjects or only reflects the change in examination methodology.

**Table 4 - Impact Indicators**

Impact Indicators	Baseline %	Project Target %	Actual End-of-Project %
Percent of children age 11 or more scoring below 40 percent of the maximum score in Math-CEE	40	25	25.6
Percent of children age 11 or more scoring below 40 percent of the maximum score in English-CEE	52	30	27

*c) Curriculum Coverage.* The SEA includes three subjects (Mathematics, Language Arts and Essay) and two CEE subjects were dropped (Science and Social Science). Thus, achievements in these two curriculum areas reformed by the project are no longer examined at national level. In the other curriculum reformed areas, both systematic testing and examination results are not available to measure the impact of the new syllabi, teacher training, updated pedagogy or additional learning resources provided through the project.

**Improve the physical infrastructure of facilities for primary and secondary education.** The project had a significant impact on improving school environment quality and modernizing school facilities (report by

construction management firm). School services were significantly upgraded (libraries, computer rooms, sport facilities, concert halls etc). New schools are already fully occupied and refurbished schools were well received by communities. There was a growth in school places in secondary education and some primary schools that were overcrowded have perceived a significant relief. However, the actual number of primary school students decreased since there was an overall decrease in the primary school population. Three high quality secondary schools were built by the project, including one on Tobago Island (one less than planned since there was some overlap when the IDB-financed Secondary Education Modernization Program became effective in 1999 and included the construction of 20 new secondary schools). As shown by an assessment questionnaire completed by the principals of the new or renovated schools, the design and construction of most of the primary and secondary schools financed under the project is considered of exemplary quality by the end users. Also, school quality is in conformity with international practices in school construction standards (construction management firm and observed in ICR mission).

**Strengthen the management and institutional capabilities of the education sector at all levels.** This objective produced important outcomes in terms of local flexibility and autonomy at the school level. All of the primary schools have an approved SIP, exceeding the forecast of 70 percent at the end-of-project and more than 30 percent received a second round grant. SIPs have had an impressive impact on communities' interest in education and are demonstrating that schools can successfully plan and implement projects. A systematic evaluation of the main achievements, which the Government will be carrying out in order to institutionalize the SIP program, was not yet available at the time of the ICR mission. However, through its monitoring mechanisms, the EPCU has found that the SIPs have had a significant impact on most of the schools. New roles were defined for principals, teachers, and empowerment has been noticed. Parental involvement in the planning, design, and management of the projects has reached unprecedented levels and stronger links were forged with the communities on teaching and learning programs and school administration. Another significant impact of the program is the financing of projects of a similar nature by the schools and communities (in addition to or without project assistance). The SIPs also supported the curriculum reform efforts of the teachers in school-selected subject areas.

The School-based Maintenance Grant program (SMG), introduced at the MTR, was completed and has received high praise from principals. This program has further encouraged the decentralization effort supported by the project. The Government is committed to continue and expand the SIP and SMG programs even after the end of this project.

Regarding MOE reform and decentralization and testing and assessment reform objectives, there was less progress because of a delay in high-level policy decisions and at the MTR, Government informed the Bank that there was other financing for these activities.

#### *4.2 Outputs by components:*

**Component A. ECCE Quality and Access. *Unsatisfactory.*** When implementation progress slowed in 2000, the Bank team assisted the MOE in addressing technical recommendations by organizing a systematic mid-term review study on the ECCE Component. At that time, there were about 19 communities (including five in Tobago) that were ready to move forward with new centers. The tendering process for construction of these centers was successfully completed, but in September 2001, the MOE decided to cancel the process (furniture for these centers, which had already been purchased by the EPCU, was re-distributed to already existing ECCE centers).

The Government position was that these remaining ECCE centers were not in the lowest income populated areas and the MOE was also concerned about the quality of the construction design. ECCE center construction, renovation, and equipping did not always meet international safety and quality standards

because MOE architects underestimated the budget at the onset of the project and as a result of high inflation affecting construction costs throughout project implementation. The MOE and NCECCE were particularly concerned about structural integrity in case of natural disaster like a landslide. Also, facilities were often considered to be too small for a full qualitative implementation of the curriculum or for providing all care services. At the time, the budget ceiling for the construction of the ECCE centers established by the GORTT Cabinet (US\$60,000) was too low to ensure that safety standards and building requirements would be followed in the construction stage. This ceiling was later increased to US\$100,000. By end-of-project, only 25 ECCE centers were built and furnished in poor communities, half of the original target; and 32 were expanded or refurbished, about two-thirds of the original target (Please see Table 5 below).

*School board and community management.* Eligibility criteria for the ECCE program included land ownership (initially established by the Government) and community financial contribution for the construction and management of the schools, which were not consistent with the objective of targeting the lowest-income communities. Some school boards also felt that the original design did not support their activities and curriculum delivery. Some sites selected by the community proved unsuitable for construction. The inability of some ‘community contractors’ to effectively manage the construction projects resulted in extended construction time. Many school boards proved to be uncommitted to the management of the construction phase and later repair and maintenance (EPCU, October 2003).

**Table 5 - Implementation Indicators**

Selected Implementation Indicators	Project Target (2003)	Actual End-of-Project	Comments
# of ECCE Centers built and furnished	50	25	Further construction or improvements were halted pending a policy revision exercise.
# of ECCE Centers expanded and refurbished	50	32	

*ECCE teacher development.* The in-service and pre-service training targets were not met because of the reduction in the number of new ECCE centers. At end-of-project, 25 trainers, 9 facilitators, and 25 Parent Outreach Workers (POW) were selected, placed and trained to provide in-service training to the teachers (slightly above the project target of 55). The POWs also trained parents in childcare practices. Only 350 early childhood education teachers were pre-service trained for positions in the ECCE centers (55 percent of the target of 650) including 120 ECCE teachers from private schools. The project organized a training workshop for all ECCE teachers (1,398) in October 2002.

Pre-service training was provided by the implementing NGO providing support to private ECCE center management, and the School of Continuing Studies of the UWI. The NCECCE ensured coordination of a common teacher training syllabus. However, coordination between the Government and the NGO on salary policies was not always smooth. Turnover among teachers is relatively high since salaries are not competitive enough to retain the best teachers. For each departing teacher, new training had to be organized. Some communities from the poorest areas (generally supported by churches) complained that they will not be in a position to sustain the payment of teachers’ additional incentives, since tuition fees paid by the poorest parents are low.

By 2003, it was clear that Government preferred to roll any existing commitments to communities into a

new ECCE policy, which would focus on universal access and target poverty alleviation. The program is expected to be re-launched by Government, conserving the key elements as supported under this loan. The MOE is also committed to promoting technically sound design and construction standards in order to guide the process of ECCE centers development and service management in accordance with international standards. The Government has prepared draft standards following extensive consultation with various stakeholders and has initiated a discussion with the Bank about technical assistance or a new loan to support these efforts.

**Component B. Primary Level Teaching and Learning Quality. *Satisfactory.*** This component had an important impact on the quality of classroom instruction. Six curriculum subject areas were efficiently adapted to students' demands, needs, and environment, following modern pedagogical standards, and five of these were piloted in schools. The project has financed and organized the large-scale distribution of textbooks, with specific targeting of low-income children.

#### Classroom Instruction and Curriculum Strengthening Subcomponent

*Bachelor in Education (Education Administration) training program.* The MOE invited applications from principals, deputies and senior teachers who were interested in pursuing the B.Ed. While all school principals were admitted, the UWI had to submit to the MOE a list of teachers satisfying entry requirements for the program (those teachers later being considered for promotion to principal positions). Initially, the selection process for teacher training had to be carefully monitored by the MOE to ensure that younger teachers were benefiting from these programs rather than teachers near retirement age.

According to the MOE, the performance of the two-year training program provided by the St. Augustine Faculty of Education at the UWI, an internationally recognized institution, was highly satisfactory (the UWI is also currently undertaking an overall evaluation of the program). About 474 school directors and senior teachers participated in the two-year B.Ed. course. In 1999, the first cohort completed the training with a 97 percent pass rate (30 with first class honors). The program focused on strengthening the role of principals as instructional leaders in school management. The program was part-time (one day a week during the school term and selected periods during school vacations) and was described by participants as rigorous and challenging. Successful completion of the program enhanced administrative and managerial knowledge and skills and improved promotional potential. The program contents and structure, as presented to the ICR team, are of high quality.

*Curriculum Reform.* Five primary school subject area curricula were reformed and piloted: Language Arts, Mathematics, Science, Social Studies, and Spanish Language, and a sixth, the Visual and Performing Arts curricula was reformed, but not yet piloted. New innovative syllabi were developed, together with performance standards and indicators, for all primary grades.

In the six subject areas, the project organized a systematic in-depth reform process of the curricula. Teams of international and local consultants (recruited by the project) trained selected teams of Trinidad and Tobago educators to review the existing syllabi and draft the new syllabi. As part of the pilot, curriculum officers, school supervisors, principals, and senior teachers were trained in the methods and procedures required for effective implementation of the revised curricula and production of relevant instructional material at central (textbooks) and school-level (didactic tools). This served as a model of the training of trainers (TOT) for principals and senior teachers in all primary schools. The new curriculum was then piloted in selected primary schools before being modified and extended to all primary schools. The approach for each subject area is detailed below:



- *Language Arts*—completed in August 1997. The new approach reflected contemporary thinking about the nature and purpose of language, the processes involved in language learning and the pedagogical implications. The new syllabus also promoted the use of Creole, as a vernacular second language, and Caribbean artistic language expression.
- *Mathematics*—completed in March 1998. A new mathematics syllabus was prepared, focusing on innovative learning strategies including: student centered hands-on activities, integration of the socio-cultural context, and learner experience and teachers' pedagogical innovation.
- *Science*—completed in September 2001. The revised curriculum methodologies were designed to strengthen the skills used by students such as, creative problem solving, critical thinking, teamwork, and the use of technology.
- *Social Studies*—completed in September 2002. This curriculum seeks to transform the culture of the classroom to active learning methods. It enables the students, through a multidisciplinary approach, to find out and discuss what is going on the world (family, school, local community, country, world). It assists the child to understand how to resolve conflicts, the culture and values of their own society and of others, and develop a sense of pride in their own history and culture.
- *Spanish Language*—completed in June 2002. In 1999, the MOE and EPCU contracted the services of a language school to assist in new curriculum development and teacher training activities in standards 4 and 5. The pilot program was launched in September 1999 in 23 primary schools and evaluated in 2002. The pilot revealed a low to moderate level of language proficiency among primary school teachers, which is a concern for a full curriculum implementation at the classroom level.
- *Visual and Performing Arts (Aesthetics)*. The curriculum was reformed and will soon be piloted. The new syllabus seeks to enhance awareness and appreciation through the use of artistic techniques and to develop a means to incorporate them into teaching modules however, until the curriculum reform is fully implemented at school level, the aesthetic arts will continue play a relatively small part in the primary school curriculum given the emphasis on subjects in the national level testing.

*Teaching and Learning Quality: Training of Trainers.* After the reformed curricula were piloted in a number of primary schools, full implementation was facilitated by a series of regional training of trainers (TOT) workshops for principals and selected teachers in all Education Districts. The EPCU and the Curriculum Unit of the MOE organized the logistical arrangements and the coordination of the workshops. The workshop participants then organized school-based training workshops either at individual schools or for groups of schools. In addition to implementing the new curricula, the TOT cascading training program was aimed at scaling up a peer learning dynamic among schools and teachers.

Except for the Spanish Language curriculum, no systematic evaluation was carried out on the impact of the curricular training organized by the project. Officials from the MOE Curriculum Division recognize however, that the training workshops and TOT approaches had limited success in implementing teacher training and teacher guidance at all schools due to the following constraints: (a) time availability and lack of incentives to ensure full commitment of trainees after the workshop; (b) lack of motivation among teachers or availability to attend the training; and (c) absence of curriculum facilitators in some Education Districts. It was also noted that the local consultants in charge of training the District Curriculum

facilitators were contracted for too short a period of time to perform their duties in a satisfactory manner. In the Science subject area, no budget was assigned for scientific teaching instruments and the workshops were found to be too theoretical.

However, during the ICR mission, it was observed that some teachers and principals speak positively about the training delivered through the workshops and the TOT approach implementation. In some cases, subject-area teachers groups among peer schools were formed, which periodically discuss pedagogical tools and provide support to junior teachers. In addition, the SIPs provided pedagogical resources to implement selected curriculum reform projects, planned and managed by the school community.

**Textbook and Instructional Material Subcomponent.** The textbook selection process carried out by the Textbook Selection Committee was initially slow and school principals were insufficiently involved. However, by the end of 1999, 221,300 textbooks in Math, Science, and Language Arts were purchased and distributed (of these, 53,000 were targeted to low-income children). During the MTR, it was agreed that a second round of textbook purchase would be made, but there were some specific recommendations about the selection process used by the Textbook Committee and the inclusion of school principals in the final selection. Again, there were delays until 2002 when the MOE presented its new strategy for textbooks for 2002–2003. In agreement with the Bank, the MOE identified those textbooks that were previously purchased through the loan, which were repurchased from the same supplier. About 113,200 textbooks in Mathematics and Reading were purchased and the Bank financed the books for approximately 56,600 low-income students (35 percent of student body). Under a new GORTT policy decision, the MOE provided more than 600,000 textbooks for all primary school children. At the start of the 2002 school year, the project was financing 25 percent of all textbooks distributed to all primary pupils, as part of the Government's new policy of universal free distribution of school textbooks. The MTR also reviewed the distribution of school library books and instructional materials and included an option for each school to purchase these items through the second round of the SIP program. At the end of project, library books were distributed to 476 schools.

Table 6 below summarizes the outputs achieved by the Project at completion.

**Table 6 - Implementation Indicators**

Selected Indicators	Implementation	Project Target (2003)	Actual End-of-Project	Comments
# of school directors trained or in training in a B.Ed		450	474	A two-year program.
# of schools that selected library books and were provided with them		476	476	
# of curricular areas with reformed and piloted curriculum		5	5	
# of poor students that have received textbooks		75,000	round 1: 53,000 round 2: 56,600	
				The MOE provided more than 600,000 textbooks for <u>all primary school children</u> in Trinidad and Tobago

**Component C. Upgrading the Physical Environment for Teaching and Learning. Satisfactory.** Primary and secondary school facilities were substantially improved and expanded through new

construction and rehabilitation. Initially, the MOE produced a priority list of fifty schools to be constructed or renovated, based on an evaluation of the existing schools and a demographic study carried out by the Ministry's Planning Unit, to determine where new schools were required or the population of existing schools was expected to increase. Teams consisting of architects, civil and service engineers and quantity surveyors carried out the design work and the schools were divided into packages based on location, type and size. During the MTR, the deliverables for new primary school construction were reduced according to the repair and construction priorities of the MOE, and also to address some incipient concerns about implementation capacity and uncertainty about the demographic need for these new schools. Special attention was given to the availability of suitable sites and budgetary constraints (especially with regard to difficult sites). The design of the final package of schools commenced in 2002 and was completed by November 2003.

In total, 25 primary schools were constructed or remodeled and three pilot secondary schools were constructed (Please see Table 7 below). A private construction firm was contracted by the MOE to provide project management advice and support to the EPCU for the civil works component, initially for a three-year period and later (after a six months hiatus) for a three-year renewal. Overall, the civil works proceeded on schedule and were well managed by the EPCU and the construction management firm.

**Table 7 - Implementation Indicators**

Selected Implementation Indicators	Project Target (2003)	Actual End-of-Project
# of new and reconstructed primary schools built	23	23
# of remodeled and refurbished primary schools	3	2
# of new secondary schools built	3-4	3

A survey of school principals, carried out by the Education Planning Division in the MOE, shows a high degree of satisfaction on most facility construction including: site entry, building entrance, principal's office, staff room, toilets, classrooms, science rooms, libraries, assembly areas, cafeteria, storeroom, courtyard, water storage, cleaners rooms, security, grounds, parking, site drainage, fencing. However, some principals noted that the schools were lacking adequate garbage disposal facilities and that additional equipment is still needed for the science rooms and computer rooms, and air conditioning is lacking in the labs.

The introduction of the School-based Maintenance Grant Program (SMG) during the MTR (a direct grant transfer to schools) was successful in implementing minor repairs in school facilities by decentralizing decision-making to the local schools. The successful experience of the SIPs program (see below) helped to fast track the SMG program. The target of disbursing School Maintenance Grants to all primary schools was achieved (477 schools), and field visits and interviews with principals and teachers indicate that the SMGs have had a positive impact on school facilities, management, and efficiency. Similar to the SIPs program, monitoring the use of these grants proved most challenging for the schools and this required additional attention by the EPCU. Based on the positive experience with the SMG program, Government plans to continue this program and has prepared a draft proposal to institutionalize this program (together with the SIP program).

**Component D. Education Management and Institutional Strengthening. *Satisfactory.*** The achievements at the local-level through the School-based Management Strengthening Subcomponent were *highly satisfactory* based on the outstanding performance of the SIP program, but since the two central-level institutional capacity strengthening subcomponents (MOE Reform and Decentralization and Testing and Assessment Reform) as originally designed, had to be dropped at MTR, the overall rating for this component is considered satisfactory.

School-based Management Strengthening Subcomponent. This subcomponent strengthened the local-level school decentralization effort with the successful implementation and expansion of the SIP program. The SIP program served as a strategic component in educational reform and was a key element in increasing the autonomy, management capacity, and accountability of schools. This program, which started as a pilot in 10 schools in 1997, extended to all primary schools in the first phase (477 schools) and proved to be so popular and effective, that at the MTR, the program was expanded and by the end of project, 164 schools that had participated successfully in the first round, received second round grants. The implementation of a limited and credible pilot of the SIP program to test the instruments proved invaluable for the successful expansion of the program.

The SIPs Program included significant training and technical assistance provided by the EPCU and consultants for the school staff and the local community (on school boards, school-based management, technical and financial guidelines for all school principals) so that high-quality, participatory SIPs could be developed and submitted for approval. There was an early delay while the mechanism for direct resource transfers to the schools was designed (issuance of a Cabinet Memorandum in 1998). After many of the first SIPs had been approved, there was still no agreement on the internal disbursement procedures in Government (Ministry of Finance and Comptroller of Accounts). This was eventually resolved, but it does illustrate the initial resistance and change in mindset that was needed to advance the decentralization agenda.

During implementation of the SIPs grants, the issue of financial management and monitoring of the grants proved to be challenging for the schools. The EPCU, MOE's internal auditors, School Supervision, and the Auditor General were involved in oversight of the financial management and monitoring of the grants. In 2001, the EPCU strengthened its capacity building program for the schools related to implementation of the grant, not just preparation of the SIPs, and created some simple tools to facilitate monitoring of expenditures by the schools. In one district, the principals developed a peer support program to assist each other in the implementation of the SIPs. Based on the findings of an Internal Audit carried out in 2003, the MOE will review and modify the accountability guidelines under the program and strengthen its monitoring and oversight role.

According to the supervision missions' reports, the program has had a very positive impact, particularly in the area of resource development, parent and community involvement, curricular reform, and teacher professional development. Based on discussions with teachers and parents, it is evident that their involvement in SIP committees and decision-making was the most important factor in success—it gave them a sense of ownership of the school and it positively affected the learning environment. Principals, teachers, and parents all confirm their strong commitment to and engagement with the program. The EPCU carried out a survey with a sample of 29 schools during April to June 2002 with SIP projects underway and found that, although some schools did face several implementation challenges, the program was overwhelmingly well received and successful. Government has expressed interest in furthering the impact and sustainability of the SIPs program and has prepared a proposal to continue funding the program at the end of the project.

MOE Reform and Decentralization Subcomponent. Progress and achievements for this subcomponent were disappointing. By mid-1999, Government had not provided an approved plan for the MOE decentralization. The expected output of “a completely restructured and decentralized MOE” could not be implemented. A World Bank-financed study in 1999 observed that a “mindset against decentralization [existed] in the personnel of the MOE and in the population at large” (Alleyne, 1999). The activities supporting the network of Regional Education Offices were never fully internalized by the Ministry since there was no consensus on how to and whether to decentralize. Therefore, during the MTR, Government and the Bank agreed that, in light of these significant delays in implementation, this subcomponent should be reallocated.

Testing and Assessment Reform Subcomponent. The implementation of this subcomponent suffered significant delays from the very beginning. The testing and assessment program was never actually developed by the MOE, even though a comprehensive report on the *Reform of Assessment and Testing in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago* was produced in May 1997. One of the main problems that stalled progress was the non-appointment of key ministerial positions such as, the Deputy Director and Testing Officers in the Division of Educational Research and Evaluation. Instead, a continuous assessment program was advanced in 1999 and the results could not be formalized until 2001. During the MTR, Government informed the Bank that the activities under this subcomponent would be financed through other sources and given the expected further delays in policy decisions, the Bank funds were reallocated.

*4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:*

Not applicable.

*4.4 Financial rate of return:*

Not applicable.

*4.5 Institutional development impact:*

As a result of the varied implementation performance of the Education Management and Institutional Strengthening Component, the overall institutional development impact was *modest*. Institutional development impact at the central level was minimal, but this was compensated for by substantial impact at the local-level. Core institutional capacity was less than marginally increased by the project since the MOE Reform and Testing and Assessment Reform Subcomponents were dropped at the MTR.

***Decentralization and Reform.*** The decentralization plan, proposed in the MOE Reform and Decentralization Subcomponent, as originally conceived, may have been unworkable, but it is important to note that the decentralization efforts continued under the IDB-financed Secondary Education Modernization Program. In 2003, following the recommendations of an IDB-sponsored study, a Restructuring and Decentralization Action Unit was established and fully staffed. The Unit organized a *National Consultation Report on Restructuring and Decentralization of the Ministry of Education* in July 2003.

***School-based Management.*** The project had a substantial impact on local-level sustainability related to school-based management. The implementation of this project improved the capacity of local schools to develop their own SIPs and SMGs and execute the funds effectively. The project also had an impact on curriculum development capacity and the textbook selection and evaluation policy. The ‘one book same book’ policy was abandoned in June 2002, following a MOE and Bank recommendation to allow for multiple submissions by authors resulting in an improvement of the quality of textbooks and diversity of pedagogic styles. The Textbook Evaluation Committee reformed its operations by providing a list of recommended books, to be selected by principals, in consultation with teachers.

**Testing and Assessment Reform.** The National Test Report has not been formalized since 2001, although the tests were continuously organized at the school level. The Research and Evaluation Unit of the MOE will restart central test collection and reporting in 2004, based on 2003 school test performance collection. The transition from the CEE to the SEA (after this subcomponent was dropped at MTR) contributed to promoting a more equitable, skill oriented access to secondary schools, however, according to the MOE, it was a disincentive to students' performance in Science and Social Science, the two subjects that were no longer included in the SEA.

## **5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome**

### *5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency:*

**Land Availability.** The lack of available land for the construction of ECCE centers in the poorest neighborhoods, which are increasingly in mountainous areas subject to landslides, has affected the building of ECCE centers in Trinidad.

### *5.2 Factors generally subject to government control:*

**Commitment to School-based Management.** The Government consistently supported the initiatives related to the SIPs and SMG programs and other agencies became involved when it was necessary. However there were several issues that slowed implementation including: (a) insufficient personnel assigned by the MOE to monitor the implementation of SIP and SMGs at the field level (this slowed SIP grant approvals in the most remote areas, in particular in Tobago); and (b) a delay while the mechanism for the direct transfers of resources to the schools was defined, which required a significant investment of time and energy on the part of the MOE, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Planning and Development, and the Attorney General, first to authorize the transfers and then determine internal procedures. Although these decisions took time, the Government was always committed to the idea and eventually, all the arrangements were agreed.

**Counterpart Budget Allocations.** Beginning in 1998, the construction schedule and tendering for some of the planned civil works was delayed since the Government did not assign sufficient funds in the MOE's budgetary provisions. The availability of resources was dependent on the allocations in the Public Sector Investment Program and the budget uncertainty continued in 1999 and 2000. In 2001, there was some concern about whether there would be sufficient funds to complete the project. At that time, the Minister of Finance provided confirmation that every effort would be made to provide funding once assured of the implementation capacity of the EPCU, and this problem was subsequently addressed.

**Sector Policies.** Project implementation was affected by the slow consensus on policy decisions in several of the activities, specifically, the selection of textbooks, and the reform of MOE and the testing and assessment. As mentioned above, the later two activities did not progress at all and were reallocated during the MTR. The project was also subject to policy changes and adjustments by the Government.

### *5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:*

**EPCU Staffing.** At times, the working relationship between the EPCU and the MOE was challenging. The EPCU had six directors in seven years and by the middle of 2002, it was severely understaffed in terms of technical staff (a breach of covenant 3.05 (b) of the Loan Agreement) and as a result, implementation progress suffered. This problem festered until the end of the project and during supervision, as expected, some motivation problems were detected among the remaining staff in the EPCU. The main difficulty encountered by the EPCU when hiring professionals for specialized positions was that the level of incentives proposed under the civil service status was not sufficiently attractive.

#### 5.4 Costs and financing:

The total project cost was US\$ 82.3 million of which IBRD financed US\$47.9 million (US\$ 3.1 million was cancelled at the end of the project, representing a total disbursement of 94 percent) and the GORTT provided US\$ 34.4 million in counterpart financing (see Table below). The project suffered slow disbursement during the early years and in the last few years the result of bureaucratic problems in the EPCU financial management unit and political changes and uncertainties in the staffing of the EPCU. During the MTR, Government did not want to cancel any amount of the loan, and the Bank agreed to change the cost share from only 50 percent IBRD financing to about 63 percent.

**Table 8 - Total Project Costs**

Source	Planned Total Cost at Appraisal (US\$ million)	MTR Adjustment Total Cost	Actual Total Cost (US\$ million)	% of Actual Total Cost MTR Adjustment
IBRD	51.0	51.0	47.9	94
GORTT (including incremental recurrent costs, duties, and taxes)	71.7	27.4	34.4	125
TOTAL	121.7	78.4	82.3	104

## 6. Sustainability

### 6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating:

Overall, the project achievements are *likely* to be maintained, particularly the school-based management programs (SIPs and SMG) and the curriculum strengthening. The Government has established these programs as recurrent expenditures in the annual budget.

The success of the school-based management activities served as a *pull* from the local-level to decentralize, rather than a centralized *push*, which in the end, seems to have increased the likelihood of sustainability of these programs. The implementation success and the long-term sustainability of the school-based management model is being further consolidated by: (a) provision of direct technical support by the MOE with Bank support, and organization of stakeholders consultations; (b) full internalization by Government of the policy effort required; and (c) the development of a stronger dialogue between parents and teachers in communities through working on both school projects and local education institution management.

The sustainability of the curriculum reform results was strengthened at the school level by the implementation of the SIPs. In many cases, the SIPs provided the needed finances for the purchase of learning instruments and resources needed for the implementation of the revised curricula and the SIPs helped to develop a dynamic by which parents and teachers planned for common pedagogical objectives. Under the planned decentralization reform, the school supervisors in the eight Educational Districts will be given additional duties, including the monitoring of SIPs and SMGs.

Project sustainability was encouraged from the beginning by including stakeholder participation, with information campaigns, regular stakeholder and teachers workshops, direct financing of community proposals, school SIPs, and decentralized procurement in subcomponents with NGO-community participation. NGOs played a significant role in the management of ECCE activities and assisted in the formulation of SIPs. The project also made efforts to ensure that the schools that were most in need had appropriate support, through training, technical assistance, and special outreach, to increase likelihood that

they would benefit from and be able to absorb the project inputs. Also, the education supply capacity of the private sector has been developed through the design, supervision, and construction of primary and secondary schools.

Despite difficulties in the implementation of the ECCE component, the ECCE activities and the methodology have had an input into making universal ECCE access one of the top priorities in the Government's new agenda for education improvement and poverty reduction. The NCECCE, established at the start of the project, is playing an active role in coordinating the Government and different stakeholder activities in this area including, promoting a standard curriculum for teachers training and ensuring standards in the operation of private and Government sponsored ECCE centers.

However, the monitoring and evaluation capacity of the MOE did not advance during the project implementation. The evaluation of the project's impact on learning quality and teaching achievements for the preparation of the ICR was hampered by the lack of assessment and standardized testing data. Indicators on the achievements of curriculum training of trainers are also not available.

#### *6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations:*

**Decentralization.** Although the central-level decentralization and testing activities were dropped during the MTR, the Government did not abandon its commitments to these objectives and continued them under the IDB-financed Secondary Education Modernization Program. This transfer of responsibility was fully coordinated among the GORTT, the IDB, and the World Bank. Local-level school-based management is now a key component of the MOE's education decentralization and institutional development practices. The Government is currently undertaking an evaluation of the project, which will provide recommendations on the modalities for the institutionalization of the SIP program; in particular, the monitoring role of the school supervisors in the Education Districts is being strengthened.

**Curriculum Reform.** Four new curricula and syllabi have been introduced in all levels in the primary schools and the teachers and principals are fully trained. The revised Spanish curriculum was piloted and is being evaluated and the Visual and Performing Arts will be piloted. The Government has launched a new policy of universal free distribution of school textbooks.

**ECCE.** The ECCE experience is being analyzed carefully as the Government is launching a new, larger initiative to achieve universal access to ECCE by 2008 with the construction, equipping and staffing of about 200 ECCE Centers. The GORTT is seeking World Bank technical assistance and possible financing for this initiative. The GORTT has learned from this project and is committed to developing an innovative approach aimed at fostering the role of the communities, the churches, students, unions and Parent-Teachers Associations in the development, upgrading and management of ECCE Centers. The MOE Ministerial leadership on this issue is effective and of high quality. The MOE and NCECCE prepared a report on *Standards for Regulating Early Childhood Services*, which resulted from extensive consultation with various stakeholders, and is under review by the Government Cabinet (December 2003). In April 2001, 19 representatives of ECCE stakeholders participated in a workshop to discuss the status of early childhood services, and to clarify systems and identify resources for monitoring and supporting ECCE services.

## **7. Bank and Borrower Performance**

### **Bank**

#### *7.1 Lending:*

**Satisfactory.** The Bank worked closely with the MOE during the identification and preparation phases and implementation readiness was well advanced at the time of appraisal. The project was consistent with the



GORTT's objectives in the education sector at that time and the Bank's CAS. The SAR was based on substantial analytical work and the Bank team involved in appraisal was staffed with specialists in education, architecture, curriculum and instruction experts, and preschool specialists. Nonetheless, the Bank's overall lending performance was affected by the apparent overestimation of the country's institutional absorption capacity and policy commitments for undertaking an in-depth reform of the education system. The SAR did however, appropriately recognize that not all the risks inherent in change management projects could be completely controlled and the reforms would require a clear shift in the organizational culture of all the institutions and individuals involved.

Project preparation included a series of focus groups and education stakeholder workshops, involving teachers, principals, regional staff, and other education stakeholders in assessing needs and developing a strategy and logical framework for project design. The incorporation of this participatory strategy and the plans to continue strong beneficiary-centered monitoring during implementation were notable features of project preparation. However, the planned community participation in the ECCE component during implementation proved to be overly ambitious.

The Bank team secured additional project preparation funds with a US\$200,000 Japanese PHRD Grant that supported the ECCE and the textbooks and instructional material surveys, and short-term support from international and national experts to assist the MOE in the project design. Based on the lessons learned from previous projects in Trinidad and Tobago, the Bank invested in analytical work to assess financial sustainability and management capacity including: a sector study of education financing in the country, issued as *The Financing of Education in Trinidad and Tobago 1985-1993* (Bank Report 14628-TR); an assessment of project recurrent costs implications for the MOE budget during and after implementation; and development of recommendations on financial sustainability. A project preparation facility (PPF) in the amount of US\$300,000 was requested to assist the Government in the preparation of the project and in establishing the EPCU.

## **7.2 Supervision:**

**Satisfactory.** The Bank provided consistent and timely supervision with regular supervision missions every six months (except for one visit in 2001 when supervision was held through email, phone and exchange of reports) and a comprehensive MTR mission. The Project Status Reports (PSRs) were realistic and informative. In its comments, the current Government recognized the Bank's support and commitment to the project and the usefulness of the supervision missions, but it observed that the EPCU and the MOE would have liked more time for interaction and problem-solving of implementation difficulties.

The Bank was responsive to Government's proposed restructuring during the MTR, which resulted in an Amendment to the Loan Agreement. Technical support provided by the Bank to the MOE and to the EPCU allowed for the revision of the project description at the MTR to allow for successful accomplishment of the project and achievement of its objectives. As it was evident that the decentralization agenda was not advancing, the Bank was proactive and was open to strengthening and expanding the school-based management programs (SIPs and SMG), which were working very well and responding to the demand of communities. The Bank's supervision team provided the needed skills and dedication to put the project back on track, following a threshold indicators supervision methodology. The achievement or nonachievement of the agreed thresholds for each component would trigger upgrading or downgrading of the key ratings in the PSR.

The most critical issue throughout implementation was a significant disbursement lag. The Bank brought this issue to Government's attention during every supervision mission. During the mission in mid-2001, Government informed the Bank that it was not interested in canceling portions of the loan and expressed its

commitment to the project and executing the loan.

When there were concerns about the low counterpart budget allocations and the delay in policy decision and the impact these issues had on project implementation, the Bank raised these issues with Government appropriately. Just a year after effectiveness, the Bank raised some concerns about problems that were affecting implementation and noted specific actions to be undertaken to address these issues. This up-front acknowledgment of implementation problems, the identification of next steps and actions needed to advance, and regular updating of the situation are clearly presented in the PSRs.

### *7.3 Overall Bank performance:*

The Bank's overall performance was *satisfactory*.

### **Borrower**

#### *7.4 Preparation:*

**Satisfactory.** The project preparation carried out by Government was comprehensive and based on technical and financial analysis. Preparation also included the incorporation of a stakeholder participation activity and close collaboration among the executing agencies (MOE, regional districts, NGOs) and stakeholders. The project design reflected the priorities of Government at that time and incorporated findings from several Government-financed studies and reports on the education system. However, as noted previously, the design was over-programmed and Government may have misjudged its own capacity and readiness for the changes that decentralization reforms required.

As evidenced in the SAR, the Government prepared most of the background documentation needed for the civil works program prior to appraisal, including terms of reference, pre-qualification of architects and engineers, and a general costing and an implementation schedule. All construction sites were selected and cadastral and topographical surveys were completed for 90 percent of the sites. The MOE also carried out detailed project implementation planning. The EPCU, with inputs from the MOE, also drafted operational manuals for each main implementation activity containing standard terms of reference, draft contracts, schedules, and budgets.

The Government showed a strong commitment to the project and established the EPCU early on in project preparation and appointed experienced staff. In preparation for the first year of implementation, the GORTT opened the respective line items in the MOE budget for allocation of IBRD funds and made initial counterpart funds available.

#### *7.5 Government implementation performance:*

**Satisfactory.** In the first year of implementation, the availability of counterpart funds ensured a timely project launch. Government consistently expressed a commitment to the project objectives, but the project experienced several setbacks that affected implementation performance including, delayed consensus on policy decisions regarding MOE reform and the testing and assessment reforms, and the reduced counterpart budget allocations in the Public Sector Investment Program beginning in 1998, which affected the civil works component. Government's decision to halt all new commitments in the ECCE Program in 2001 also limited the achievements in this component. The project did introduce several significant reforms, particularly in terms of the direct resource flow to local schools, and there was high-level support from Government to establish the authority and mechanism for the funds transfers. These decisions were time-consuming, but they were resolved satisfactorily.

As mentioned previously, the Tobago House of Assembly (THA), raised an issue regarding the implementation of project activities on Tobago, which after some discussions among all parties, was

resolved through a Memorandum of Understanding with the THA.

The current Government is committed to implementing a new restructuring and decentralization strategy. The MOE Strategic Plan 2002-2006 has identified key transformation strategies to reform the governance structure and facilitate widespread community participation in the governance process.

#### *7.6 Implementing Agency:*

**Satisfactory.** The MOE adequately managed project implementation and achieved several significant transformations in the basic education sector. The reorientation of the original central-level decentralization reform towards a local-level school-based management program was successfully implemented by the MOE. The MOE and its EPCU provided strong support, training, and technical assistance for the implementation of the school-based management component, the SMG program introduced at the MTR, and the civil works component.

Overall, project administration was satisfactory. Beginning early on, however, the EPCU struggled with administration difficulties and implementation delays, which were unexpected given the advancements during preparation. There was high turnover of the Project Coordinators (six coordinators in seven years), sometimes for clearly nontechnical reasons. At times, the EPCU was left without guidance on education priorities and plans from the MOE. At the end of the project, there was severe understaffing of the because of a lack of staff in key technical positions and the return of staff to the MOE, which was never resolved satisfactorily. The working relationship between the EPCU and the MOE was strained at times, likely the result of the perceived lack of integration between the EPCU and the Ministry's internal structure. Nonetheless, until project completion, the EPCU coordinators provided competent and dedicated leadership to the EPCU teams, even in difficult circumstances.

The financial management system of the project was satisfactory. The records and accounts of the EPCU were audited in each fiscal year and the reports were submitted regularly to the Bank. While the financial statements were satisfactorily prepared, the Audit Reports were often late, caused by delays in the Office of the Auditor General. The project fiscal year coincides with the Government's fiscal year, which made it difficult for the Office of the Auditor General to devote scarce resources to audit the EPCU in a timely manner. Another related issue concerns the implementation of activities in Tobago overseen by the Tobago House of Assembly, which were not subjected to the same audit of the project accounts, but only the overall audit undertaken by the Auditor General of the THA accounts. During the ICR mission, the project accounts and financial records in the EPCU were reviewed and were found to be well kept and satisfactory.

A procurement post-review carried out in 2002 showed that the Bank procedures were followed by the EPCU, but there were some weaknesses related to consistency in procedures, the preparation of technical specifications, coordination between the MOE and the Ministry of Finance-Central Tenders Board, organization and maintenance of procurement files, contract management, and information on the scope of works.

#### *7.7 Overall Borrower performance:*

The Borrower's overall performance was **satisfactory**, considering the achievements related to expanding basic education access and introduction of school-based management, in an implementation environment beset by delays, policy changes, administrative difficulties, and under-funding.

## 8. Lessons Learned

General Lessons:

**Rigorous Assessment of Implementation Capacity and Appropriate Project Design.** In this project, as described previously, the project design was overly optimistic. As it became clear during implementation, the MOE did not have the capacity to fully absorb and internalize all project activities and many activities relied on the sole implementation performance of the EPCU. Future education projects should focus on fewer core project objectives and be better adapted to the institutional short- and medium-term implementation capacities. Strong coordination and division of roles should be established with the donor community during preparation activities.

**Capacity Building Support for Information Management, Planning, and Monitoring and Evaluation.** Deficiencies in the MOE information and education statistics systems represented a weakness for project efficiency. In this type of environment, projects should include financing of well-designed technical assistance to strengthen a Ministry of Education's capacity on issues such as, student performance by school and locality; the incidence, scale and nature of poverty and poverty mapping tools; education equity analysis; and education sector and sub-sectors efficiency and productivity (learning tests, student attendance and behavioral patterns). In parallel, planning and coordination capacity inside of the Ministry, within Ministries, and among donors should also be strengthened. The monitoring and evaluation capacity of the Ministry of Education should be strengthened, since, as detected in this project, this weakness can have an impact on implementation and the final evaluation. When possible, the technical capacity to establish and monitor quantitative indicators, and to provide feedback to policy decision makers with regular information on project progress, should be in place prior to project launch.

**Targeting Poor Communities.** In the development of a community-based ECCE program, projects should be mindful to ensure that the criteria for future selection of the ECCE centers will allow the poorest communities to be more easily selected and to benefit from full public support. As noted in this project, the implementation of the ECCE component was slow because poor communities in need of or interested in an ECCE center invariably did not possess or could not acquire required land. In a country where there is increasing scarcity of land, the resulting high prices makes long-term land planning of land acquisition by the Government a necessity for the construction of additional ECCE centers in poor areas. Also, the state should construct, furnish and handover the ECCE buildings to the school boards. In future ECCE development, the school boards should receive training in basic project management and supervision, thereby allowing the poor communities to become empowered and more effectively manage the facilities.

**Civil Works.** Site selection, governed by physical characteristics of the proposed location for a school, is crucial and sites should be chosen to maximize the use of the school. The selected sites should be free from any encumbrances and time should be allowed for compulsory acquisition. Land surveys must be carried out on selected sites to verify boundaries and ensure there are no encroachments by neighbors. As it was learned in this project, a clearly defined hierarchy regarding the roles of the Ministry, the Project Managers, the design consultant team, and the contractor is important. Contracts with design consultants should include objective evaluation criteria and ensure accountability for cost overruns or time slippage. For construction contracts, the design development and contractual obligations should be closely reviewed and monitored on a continual basis to ensure that the needs and expectations of the Ministry are achieved.

**Role of the Project Coordination Unit and Incentives.** Project design should consider the close

integration of the Project Coordination Unit (PCU) into the Ministry's internal structure to help foster effective communication and coordination and minimize the possible 'politicization' of the PCU. Adequate incentives should be offered to attract experienced professionals in the most technically challenging positions (architects, curriculum and testing specialists, information experts), or to provide project-based incentives for assignment to these particularly challenging positions in the public sector.

**Assistance to Schools in Implementation and Monitoring of Resources.** When there are direct transfers to schools based on SIPs or SMGs, there is a need for continuous support to the schools on monitoring the use of the grants, particularly on procurement methods. Financial audits, which were undertaken by the EPCU with very limited personnel, should ideally be carried out by the Internal Audit Unit of the Ministry, and provide regular feedback to the SIP and SMG programs. The implementation capacity at the local level should be strengthened to allow for closer supervision of the funds. Principals, school boards, and communities at school level also need to be further empowered. In particular, a recurrent subvention on a per student basis could be considered as a valid option, and additional requirements for the decentralized use and accounting of funds should be established.

Lessons specific to future projects in Trinidad and Tobago:

**Role of Central Tender Board.** A disagreement emerged between the GORTT and the Bank since the Bank does not consider the Central Tender Board as an adequate entity for operating tenders according to Bank procedures. This created implementation delays at different times and hampered project disbursement. In order to avoid procurement delays, a clear and definitive understanding should be reached between the GORTT and the Bank on the role of the Central Tender Board.

**Financial Management.** The project operated with reimbursements only, without a Special Account. The project accounts performed in a satisfactory manner and the system operated in coordination with the Ministry of Finance. Releases of funds made by the Ministry of Finance and checks to suppliers were issued within two to three working days. Future projects should consider using the same account system.

**Tobago Island.** Greater attention should be paid to the particular decentralized status of the education system of the Island of Tobago, in order to prevent legal and political difficulties that may arise during project implementation. A representative of the Tobago House of Assembly (THA) should be involved in the project appraisal and be present during negotiations to ensure its commitment to the proposed activities. Geographic constraints should also be taken into account, such as providing teacher training on Tobago. In addition, appropriate plans should be prepared in advance to ensure that project components implemented in the Tobago House of Assembly are subject to the same accountability and auditing arrangements as the components in Trinidad.

## **9. Partner Comments**

*(a) Borrower/implementing agency:*

The Borrower's contribution is included in Annex 8.

*(b) Cofinanciers:*

N/A

*(c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):*

N/A

## **10. Additional Information**

N/A

## Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix

### Outcome / Impact Indicators:

Indicator/Matrix	Projected in last PSR <sup>1</sup>	Actual/Latest Estimate
Enhance cognitive and social development of children in ECCE	An impact evaluation is currently in progress and expected in spring 2004.	
Indicator: % of time in classroom in which children are not actively engaged	Baseline indicator: 22% Target EOP: 12%	EOP information not available.
Improve quality of teaching and student achievement in primary schools.	Baseline and target % is related to the Common Entrance Examination (CEE), while the current % is related to the Secondary Entrance Assessment Exam (SEA) of 2002.	1999: 24% (measured through the quality baseline indicators for ECCE sponsored by the Bank)
Indicator 1: % of children age 11+ scoring below 40% of the maximum score in Math - CEE	Baseline indicator: 40% Target EOP: 25%	25.6 %
Indicator 2: % of children age 11+ scoring below 40% of the maximum score in English - CEE	Baseline indicator 2: 52% Target EOP: 30%	27%
Improve and expand physical infrastructure of facilities for ECCE, primary and secondary education		
Indicator 1: # new ECCE places for children in poor communities	Baseline 1: 4,500 Target EOP: 6,750	5,650
Indicator 2: # of students in primary schools	Baseline 2: 200,000 Target EOP: 209,900	47,359
Indicator 3: # of students in secondary school	Baseline 3: 98,000 (75% net) Target EOP: 100,400	111,749
Local flexibility and autonomy at the school level		
Indicator: % of primary schools which have functioning SIP Management Committees	Baseline: 0% Target EOP: 70%	100%

<sup>1</sup> (Actual/Latest estimates date - Year 2003, except when otherwise indicated)

### Output Indicators:

Indicator/Matrix	Projected in last PSR <sup>1</sup>	Actual/Latest Estimate
Enhance cognitive and social development of children in ECCE		
# of ECCE Trainers/ Facilitators selected, placed, and trained	MTR Actual: 24 Target EOP: 55	59 (25 Trainers, 9 Facilitators, and 25 Parent Outreach Workers)
# of ECCE Teachers pre-trained	MTR Actual: 181 Target EOP: 650	350
NCECCE established and operating	Baseline: 0	Established in 1997
# of school directors and senior teachers trained in the B.Ed. Program	MTR: 291 Target EOP: 450	474 (two-year program)
# of schools that selected library books and were provided with them	Baseline: 0 MTR: 476 Target EOP: 476	476

# of curricular areas with a reformed and piloted curriculum	Baseline: 0 MTR: 4 Target EOP: 5	5
# of poor students that have received textbooks	Baseline: 0 MTR: 53,000 Target EOP: 75,000	109,600
# of ECCE Centers in poor communities built and furnished	Baseline: 0 MTR: 23 Target EOP: 50	25
# of ECCE Centers expanded and refurbished	Baseline: 0 MTR: 18 Target EOP: 50	32
# of new and reconstructed primary schools	Baseline: 0 MTR: 6 Target EOP: 23	23
# of refurbished and remodeled primary schools	Baseline: 0 MTR: 0 Target EOP: 3	2
# of new secondary schools built	Baseline: 0 MTR: 0 Target EOP: 3-4	3
# of schools trained to produce a SIP (round 1)	Baseline: 0 MTR: 116 Target EOP: 483	477
# of schools that received direct transfers of funds to develop SIPs	Baseline: 0 MTR: 73 Target EOP: 483	477 (Round 1) including 163 schools with Round 2.

<sup>1</sup> End of project

At the time of the loan, there were 483 functional schools. When the SIP program was implemented, six schools had closed.



## Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing

**Project Cost by Component (in US\$ million equivalent)**

Component	Appraisal Estimate	Revised Estimate	Actual Estimate	Percent of Appraisal
<b>A. Increasing ECCE Quality &amp; Access</b>				
Upgrading Quality	2.63	0.78	1.05	40%
Increasing Access	6.21	2.17	2.07	33%
Sub-Total	8.84	2.95	3.12	35%
<b>B. Improving Educational Quality</b>				
Classroom Instruction and Curriculum Strgth.	6.17	3.06	1.80	29%
Textbooks and Instructional Materials	12.15	3.30	7.48	62%
Sub-Total	18.32	6.36	9.28	51%
<b>C. Upgrading the Physical Environment</b>				
School Construction and Reconstruction	47.54	25.85	29.23	61%
Upgrading Existing School Facilities	10.45	6.20	8.98	86%
Secondary Schools Pilot	21.91	16.8	15.20	69%
School-Based Maintenance Grants	0.00	2.54	2.62	NA
Sub-Total	79.90	51.39	56.03	70%
<b>D. Education Management Strengthening</b>				
Management Decentralization	4.49	2.54	2.44	54%
Reform Sector - Monitoring and Evaluation	1.21	0.02	0.08	7%
School-Based Management Strengthening	8.92	11.93	8.48	95%
Project Management	0.00	3.24	2.82	NA
Sub-Total	14.62	17.73	13.82	95%
Total (including Contingencies and Taxes)	121.68	78.43	82.25	68%

**Project Cost By Categories (US\$ million equivalent)**

	Planned		Actual	
	Total	(Bank Ln)	Total	(Bank Ln)
<b>A. Civil Works</b>				
New Construction	37000	15000	37290	18645
Renovations and Extensions	10000	4000	7334	3667
Small Works	3000	1700	0	0
Design and Supervision	5500	0	6849	3425
Sub-Total	55500	20700	51473	25737
<b>B. Goods</b>				
Textbooks and Reading Books	8600	8600	7484	1741
Computer Hardware and Software	2000	1700	0	0
Class Room Furniture	4500	0	1939	1745
Other	4000	4000	388	349
Sub-Total	19100	14300	9811	3835
<b>C. Consultant Services</b>	5700	5700	4349	4349
<b>D. Miscellaneous</b>				
Subprojects				
School Improvement Plans	7500	7500	11066	9959
ECCE Proposal	1500	1400	2982	2684
Training Grants	2250	0	0	0
Recurrent Cost	6123	1400	2567	1367
Non-IBRD Fin. Recurrent Cost	23577	0	0	0
Sub-Total	40950	10300	16615	14010
<b>TOTAL (including Contingencies)</b>	<b>121250</b>	<b>51000</b>	<b>82248</b>	<b>47931</b>



**Project Cost By Procurement Arrangements – Planned (US\$ million equivalent)**

	ICB	NCB	Other	N. B. F.	Total
<b>A. Civil Works</b>					
New Construction	37000				37000
Renovations and Extensions		10000			10000
Small Works			3000		3000
Design and Supervision				5500	5500
Total	37000	10000	3000	5500	55500
(of which Bank)	(15000)	(4000)	(1700)	( 0 )	(20700)
<b>B. Goods</b>					
Textbooks and Reading Books	7100	1500			8600
Computer Hardware and Software			2000		2000
Class Room Furniture				4500	4500
Other			4000		4000
Total	7100	1500	6000	4500	19100
(of which Bank)	(7100)	(1500)	(5700)	( 0 )	(14300)
<b>C. Consultant Services</b>			5700		5700
(of which Bank)			(5700)		(5700)
<b>D. Miscellaneous</b>					
Subprojects					
School Improvement Plans			7500		7500
ECCE Proposal			1500		1500
Training Grants				2250	2250
Recurrent Cost			6123		6123
Non-IBRD Fin. Recurrent Cost				23577	23577
Total			15123	25827	40950
(of which Bank)			(10,300)	( 0 )	(10300)
Total Planned	44100	11500	29823	35827	121250
(of Which Bank Planned)	(22100)	(5500)	(23400)	( 0 )	(51000)

\*May not add up to total project cost due to rounding.

-Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank loan. All costs include contingencies.

-"Other" includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff of the project coordinating unit, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to managing the project and re-lending project funds to local government units.

**Project Cost By Procurement Arrangements – Actual (US\$ million equivalent)**

	ICB	NCB	Other	N. B. F.	Total
<b>A. Civil Works</b>					
New Construction	37290				37290
Renovations and Extensions		7334			7334
Small Works			0		0
Design and Supervision		6849			6849
Total	37290	14183	0	0	51473
(of which Bank)	(18645)	(7092)	( 0 )	( 0 )	(25737)
<b>B. Goods</b>					
Textbooks and Reading Books	1300	6184			7484
Computer Hardware and Software			0		0
Class Room Furniture		955	984		1939
Other			388		388
Total	1300	7139	1372		9811
(of which Bank)	(1300)	(2186)	(349)		(3835)
<b>C. Consultant Services</b>			4349		4349
(of which Bank)			(4349)		(4349)
<b>D. Miscellaneous</b>					
Subprojects					
School Improvement Plans			11066		11066
ECCE Proposal			2982		2982
Training Grants			0		0
Recurrent Cost			2567		2567
Non-IBRD Fin. Recurrent Cost			0		0
Total	0	0	16615		16615
(of which Bank)			(14010)		(14010)
(of Which Bank Planned)	38590	21322	22336		82248
(of Which Bank Actual)	(19945)	(9278)	(18708)		(47931)

\*May not add up to total project cost due to rounding.

Project Financing by Component				
Component	Appraisal Estimate	Revised Estimate	Actual Estimate	Percent of Appraisal
A. Increasing ECCE Quality & Access				
Upgrading Quality	2.63	0.78	1.05	40%
Increasing Access	6.21	2.17	2.07	33%
Sub-Total	8.84	2.95	3.12	35%
B. Improving Educational Quality				
Classroom Instruction and Curriculum Strgth.	6.17	3.06	1.80	29%
Textbooks and Instructional Materials	12.15	3.30	7.48	62%
Sub-Total	18.32	6.36	9.28	51%
C. Upgrading the Physical Environment				
School Construction and Reconstruction	47.54	25.85	29.23	61%
Upgrading Existing School Facilities	10.45	6.20	8.98	86%
Secondary Schools Pilot	21.91	16.8	15.20	69%
School-Based Maintenance Grants	0.00	2.54	2.62	NA
Sub-Total	79.90	51.39	56.03	70%
D. Education Management Strengthening				
Management Decentralization	4.49	2.54	2.44	54%
Reform Sector - Monitoring and Evaluation	1.21	0.02	0.08	7%
School-Based Management Strengthening	8.92	11.93	8.48	95%
Project Management	0.00	3.24	2.82	NA
Sub-Total	14.62	17.73	13.82	95%
Total (including Contingencies and Taxes)	121.68	78.43	82.25	68%

**Project Financing by Component (in US\$million equivalent)**

Component	Appraisal Estimate		Actual/Latest Estimate		Percentage of Appraisal	
	IBRD	Gov't	IBRD	Gov't	IBRD	Gov't
A. Increasing ECCE Quality & Access						
Upgrading Quality	1.80	0.83	0.72	0.33	40%	40%
Increasing Access	1.95	4.26	0.65	1.42	33%	33%
Sub-Total	3.75	5.09	1.37	1.75	37%	34%
B. Improving Educational Quality						
Classroom Instruction and Curriculum Strgth.	3.20	2.97	0.94	0.86	29%	29%
Textbooks and Instructional Materials	11.80	0.35	1.71	5.77	14%	1649%
Sub-Total	15.00	3.32	2.65	6.63	18%	200%
C. Upgrading the Physical Environment						
School Construction and Reconstruction	11.20	36.34	18.70	10.53	167%	29%
Upgrading Existing School Facilities	4.00	6.45	3.67	5.31	92%	82%
Secondary Schools Pilot	4.50	17.41	5.10	10.10	113%	58%
School-Based Maintenance Grants	0.00	0.00	2.62	0.00	0%	0%
Sub-Total	19.70	60.20	30.09	25.94	153%	43%
D. Education Management Strengthening						
Management Decentralization	3.60	0.89	2.44	0.00	68%	0%
Reform Sector - Monitoring and Evaluation	0.75	0.46	0.08	0.00	11%	0%
School-Based Management Strengthening	8.20	0.72	8.48	0.00	103%	0%
Project Administration	0.00	0.00	2.82	0.00		0%
Sub-Total	12.55	2.07	13.82	0.00	110%	0%
Total (including Contingencies and Taxes)	51.00	70.68	47.93	34.32	94%	49%

### **Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits**

N/A

## Annex 4. Bank Inputs

(a) Missions:

Stage of Project Cycle		No. of Persons and Specialty (e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.)		Performance Rating	
Month/Year		Count	Specialty	Implementation Progress	Development Objective
<b>Lending</b>	01/01/1995	8	SR. INSTITUTIONAL SPECIALIST (1); DIVISION CHIEF (1); EDUCATION PROJECT ADVISOR (1); EDUCATION SPECIALIST (2); ARCHITECTS CONSULTANTS (2); CURRICULUM & INSTRUCTION EXPERT (1);		
	05/01/1995	8	SR. INSTITUTIONAL SPECIALIST (1); DIVISION CHIEF (1); EDUCATION PROJECT ADVISOR (1); EDUCATION SPECIALIST (2); ARCHITECTS CONSULTANTS (2); CURRICULUM & INSTRUCTION EXPERT (1);		
<b>Supervision</b>					
	11/26/1996	3	FINAN. M. SPECIALIST (1); H. R. SPECIALIST (1); MONITORING AND EVALUAT (1)	S	S
	06/27/1997	5	FACILITATOR (1); TASK ASSISTANT (1); MISSION LEADER (1); FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT (1); CONSULTANT (1)	S	S
	10/26/1997	2	FORMER TASK MANAGER (1); MISSION LEADER (1)	S	S
	02/18/1998	5	TASK MANAGER (1); PROCUREMENT ADVISOR (1); FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT (1); EARLY CHILDHOOD SPEC. (1); PROCUREMENT (1)	S	S
	12/11/1998	3	TASK MANAGER (1); FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT (1); PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST (1)	S	S
	04/29/1999	2	TASK MANAGER (1); EDUCATION REFORM (1)	U	S
	11/17/2000	1	T.M. AND EDU SPEC. (1)	S	S
	06/08/2001	2	TASK MANAGER (1); FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT (1)	S	S
	03/22/2002	4	TASK MANAGER (1); EDUCATION CONSULTANT (1); JPA (1); PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST (1)	S	S

<b>ICR</b>	03/22/2002	3	TASK MANAGER (1); EDUC. SPECIALIST (1); JPA (1)	S	S
	04/04/2003	4	TASK MANAGER (1); ECD POLICY (1); SCHOOL-BASED MANAGEMEN (1); JPA (1)	S	S
	7/6/2003	2	SR. EDUCATION SPECIALIST (1); FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST (1)	S	S
	10/3/2003	2	EDUCATION SPECIALIST (1); FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST (1)		

*(b) Staff:*

Stage of Project Cycle	Actual/Latest Estimate	
	No. Staff weeks	US\$ ('000)
Lending	97	486,845.18
Supervision	54	270,691.13
ICR	2.3	11,415.12
Total	147	738,951.43

## Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components

(H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)

	<u>Rating</u>				
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Macro policies</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input checked="" type="radio"/> NA
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>Sector Policies</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input checked="" type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>Physical</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input checked="" type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Financial</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input checked="" type="radio"/> NA
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>Institutional Development</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input checked="" type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Environmental</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input checked="" type="radio"/> NA
 <i>Social</i>					
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>Poverty Reduction</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input checked="" type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Gender</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input checked="" type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Other (Please specify)</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Private sector development</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input checked="" type="radio"/> NA
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>Public sector management</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input checked="" type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Other (Please specify)</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA

## Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)

### 6.1 Bank performance

#### Rating

- |   |                          |                                    |                         |                          |
|---|--------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Lending     | <input type="radio"/> HS | <input checked="" type="radio"/> S | <input type="radio"/> U | <input type="radio"/> HU |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Supervision | <input type="radio"/> HS | <input checked="" type="radio"/> S | <input type="radio"/> U | <input type="radio"/> HU |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Overall     | <input type="radio"/> HS | <input checked="" type="radio"/> S | <input type="radio"/> U | <input type="radio"/> HU |

### 6.2 Borrower performance

#### Rating

- |   |                          |                                    |                         |                          |
|---|--------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Preparation                           | <input type="radio"/> HS | <input checked="" type="radio"/> S | <input type="radio"/> U | <input type="radio"/> HU |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Government implementation performance | <input type="radio"/> HS | <input checked="" type="radio"/> S | <input type="radio"/> U | <input type="radio"/> HU |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Implementation agency performance     | <input type="radio"/> HS | <input checked="" type="radio"/> S | <input type="radio"/> U | <input type="radio"/> HU |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Overall                               | <input type="radio"/> HS | <input checked="" type="radio"/> S | <input type="radio"/> U | <input type="radio"/> HU |

## **Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents**

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## **Additional Annex 8. Borrower's Contribution**

### **Executive Summary**

In the early 1990's, the Fourth Basic Education Project (FBEP), was conceptualized in an economic and social milieu which in many ways saw the neglect of a number of needed educational reforms in the areas of physical upgrade of school plants, which were mainly dilapidated and unsuitable for teaching and learning; inadequate teacher training and low salary remuneration, which fostered lack of motivation and poor teaching habits, on the part of teachers; low quality and limited access to ECCE places for disadvantaged groups, limited secondary school places for primary school graduates and low levels of achievement of students at the primary school level. The Fourth Basic Education Project addressed these deficiencies in the education sector and comprised the following project components:

- Increasing the quality and access to early childhood care and education by preschool age (3-4) pupils of low-income and socially disadvantaged families;
- Improving teacher and learning quality at the primary school level;
- Upgrading the physical environment of teaching and learning at the preschool, primary, and secondary levels of the education sector
- Enhance curriculum revision and curriculum delivery in the traditional core subject areas;
- Introduction of school-based management programmes to assist principals, teachers, parents to diagnose the needs of their own schools, design and implement school improvement plans;
- Initiate the process of decentralization of the Ministry of Education operations;
- Strengthen the testing, evaluation and assessment of student performance.

The Fourth Basic Education Project laid the foundation to facilitate a number of the strategic goals and plans of the Ministry of Education especially in its thrust towards the modernization of its curricula, decentralization of Ministry of Education operations and development of the holistic child as the major outcome and output of the education system.

At the end of the Implementation stage of the Fourth Basic Education Project there were a number of new and revised policy directives, which emerged as a result of project outcomes and achievements. These included:

- Establishment of a Decentralization Unit;
- Establishment of a stronger National ECCE Council and Unit;
- Revised and enhanced curricula for the teaching and learning in the core subject areas at the primary school level, namely Science, Mathematics, Language Arts;
- Provision of free textbooks for all primary school children;
- Improved and upgraded physical school plants, thus creating greater access to more school places;
- Increased number of university trained principals and senior teachers capable of undertaking administrative, pedagogical, curricular, decentralization and community participation programmes and goals;
- Announcement of new Government policy for the achievement of universal preschool education for all in Trinidad and Tobago.

The GORTT has demonstrated its support and commitment to the human resource development and education of its citizenry by providing in 2003, the largest share of the national budget to the Education Sector.

The Fourth Basic Education Project, in the laying of a solid base through its project outcomes, can be seen to play both a facilitating role and as a catalyst to the Ministry of Education's new strategic plans and policies over the next five (5) years, 2002-2006.

While the Fourth Basic Education Project achieved most of its intended project goals and objectives over a seven (7) year period, the imminent closure of World Bank funding at the end of 2003 will necessitate the discussion of the way forward and project sustainability of the project outputs and lessons learnt.

At the last World Bank's supervision mission in early October 2003, discussions with Ministry of Education's officials included the preparation of the Implementation Completion Report as well as the submission of a letter of intent to the World Bank for another loan initiative, namely a request for a Fifth Basic Education Loan.

The last supervision mission in October 2003 to discuss the preparation and submission of the Implementation Completion Report was deemed very useful and informative and assisted the Government in understanding the purpose of the ICR in documenting lessons learnt and project achievements. Experiences from other countries were shared as a guide to assist the GORTT in the preparation of this most important 'close out' document.

The GORTT is committed to the transformation of the Education Sector to a more technically driven and Modernized System to help prepare its citizens for the Twenty-first century. The underlying premise and philosophy being that increased access to quality education would contribute to a more equitable driven income distribution.

## **PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW:**

In September 1995 the GORTT negotiated a US\$51 million loan from the World Bank to support its social reforms in the Education Sector. The Loan was approved by the World Bank and the Loan Agreement was signed by the Minister of Finance on 7th March 1996. Loan effectiveness was achieved on 27th November 1996. The Fourth Basic Education Project was estimated to be US\$121.65 million, of which US\$71.69 million was to be contributed by the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (GORTT) while \$51 million was to be loaned by the IBRD.

After the World Bank MTR in November 1999, there was agreement between both the IBRD and the GORTT that the Project should be redefined in keeping with the realities of the implementation pace and reflection of the GORTT's then strategic priorities. In April 2000, the Cabinet of the GORTT agreed to the Revised Fourth Basic Education Project with a revised total cost estimate of US\$ 78.43 million consisting of a GORTT contribution of US\$ 27.43 million and an unchanged IBRD contribution of US\$ 51 million.

The redefined and adjusted scope of the FBEP continued to build upon the successes experienced in the civil works, curriculum revision, teacher training and school based management project components

The Implementation Agency of the FBEP was the EPCU, which the GORTT established in 1995 to function outside the normal administrative and bureaucratic confines and constraints of a typical Government ministry. The duration for the implementation of the project activities under the EPCU was for a period of seven (7) years 1996-2003.

The Fourth Basic Education Project (FBEP) was intended to provide a framework of support to the GORTT to enhance the quality of education, to reduce disparity in the Education System and to achieve an effective and efficient management of the Education Sector.

After seven (7) years of Implementation, the FBEP has completed most of its targeted objectives, with a resultant implementation rate of 93.9% of the allocated budget being expended, to date.

Concerns raised by the World Bank over the years, which posed challenges to project implementation are highlighted below:

- The disbursement lag which has been one of the chief concerns of the World \*Bank during the years of project implementation;
- The slow rate of implementation of the construction of ECCE Centres. The GORTT informed the World Bank of its new policy directive in the ECCE area;
- The limited budget allocation of funds to the FBEP by the Ministry of Finance at the start of each year posed a problem for the project unit in balancing funds;
- The lack of technical staff to implement the project in an effective manner.

The World Bank noted, as in previous supervision missions, that the lack of adequate EPCU staff has presented a serious obstacle to successful implementation and reflects a breach of Section 3.05 (b) of the Loan Agreement. The streamlining of recruitment processes discussed in the last mission has not occurred. The Government indicated that many contracts ended in 2002, making it difficult to hire qualified personnel given that the duration of the project is short.

Although the Project experienced a number of delays in key areas, project implementation was shown to be slow but steady. Areas experiencing delays in 2002/2003 have been:

- Absence of key technical expertise especially in the area of civil works.
- Construction of the remaining 43 ECCE Centres.
- Procurement of Furniture and Equipment.

During the latter half of 2002, project implementation seemed to have slowed, despite this being the critical time for bringing Project Activities to finalization and setting goals to achieve original Project Objectives stated in the Loan Agreement.

The GORTT fully supported the Ministry of Education's (MOE) thrust towards modernization and endorses the MOE's strategic plans to attain its goals as it seeks to transform the Educational System through its planned revolutionary educational goals/reforms.

## **PROJECT RESULTS AND ACHIEVEMENT**

The Fourth Basic achieved many of its project objectives except in three (3) component areas, two of which were excised in 1999, namely:

- Reform and Decentralization of the Ministry of Education operations. This involved funding on a Decentralization Study and recommendations
- Testing and Evaluation/Assessments
- Construction of ECCE Centres

**Component A: ECCE QUALITY AND ACCESS (US\$ 8.59 MILLION)**

OBJECTIVE: Upgrading ECCE Quality (US\$ 2.46 million)

- Establishment of a National Council for Early Childhood Care and Education NCECCE.
- In service training by ECCE training Institutions for field officers and regional facilitators and 300 untrained ECCE teachers
- Pre-service training for 350 new ECCE teachers
- Employment of ECCE facilitators to register all preschool centers
- Employment of 25 Parent Outreach Workers (POW's) to work with parents at home to develop healthy childcare practices

**RESULTS/ ACHIEVEMENTS**

- The NCECCE was established and furnished in 1997 and is still operational
- In service training provided by a NGO for 75 enrolled ECCE teachers
- Pre-service training provided by a training school for 190 new ECCE teachers. 120 ECCE Teachers for Private Centres were included in the training in October, 2002
- 1398 teachers trained by 9 Field facilitators and 25 trainers through the training of trainers workshops
- 25 POWs employed to train parents in childcare practices

OBJECTIVE: Increasing Access (US\$ 6.12 Million)

- Construction and furnishing of 50 new ECCE Centres to increase access for children in poor communities
- upgrading/rehabilitation and furnishing of 50 existing ECCE Centres to bring them up to acceptable operating standards
- an additional 100 existing ECCE Centres to be provided with furniture, equipment, instructional materials

**RESULTS**

- 25 out of the targeted 50 new ECCE Centres constructed and furnished ;
- 32 out of the targeted 50 existing ECCE Centres rehabilitated and furnished out of 100 existing ECCE Centres furnished

**Component B: TEACHING AND LEARNING QUALITY (US\$18.20 MILLION)**

OBJECTIVE: Classroom Instruction and Curriculum Strengthening (US\$ 5.93 MILLION),

- Review and Revision of existing curricula of traditional core subject areas, namely, Mathematics, Science, Language Arts, Social Studies
- Training of trainers (TOT) workshops to study, recommend and design appropriate curriculum delivery and assessment methods.
- to support the professionalization of primary school staff, the project would provide a part-time university programme for school principals, vice-principals and senior teachers
- Pilot Project in the teaching of Spanish at the Primary level

**RESULTS**

- Curricula reviewed and revised in the areas of: Mathematics, Science, Language Arts, and Social Studies. Pilot Spanish project implemented

- 474 principals, vice-principals and senior teachers received B. Ed., UWI.
- Training of Trainers Workshop conducted for 1398 teachers

#### OBJECTIVE: TEXTBOOKS AND INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS (US\$ 12.28 MILLION)

The principal objectives of the Textbooks and Instructional Materials aspect of the Fourth Basic Education Project were to:

- Reduce the cost of education for needy families through the provision of textbooks to their students;
- Provide schools with quality instructional materials;
- Enhance teacher capability for designing and developing classroom instructional materials; and
- Promote the use of appropriate instructional materials in classrooms

#### RESULTS

Provision of Textbooks: This component would assist the Ministry of Education in selecting and recommending quality textbooks. Two (2) trenches of textbooks have been provided to 35% of the total primary school population defined as 'needy' in 1999 and in 2002. In 1999 and 2002, approximately 221,000 textbooks in Mathematics, Science and Language Arts, were provided to 53,000 needy students, respectively, while the rest of the student population had to purchase their own textbooks. By September 2003, the Ministry of Education's new initiative to provide free primary school textbooks to all children was achieved. The Fourth Basic Education Project participated in this initiative, by providing textbooks in Mathematics and Reading for approximately 600,000 needy students.

Because of the imminent closure of the Fourth Basic Education Project, the purchase of these books to be finance by Government funds. This was done due the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago new policy decision to provide free textbooks to all primary school students.

Provision of Library Books: Library books were supplied at a cost of US\$ 2.42 million to all primary schools in 1998 and 1999.

#### **Component C: CIVIL WORKS COMPONENT:**

The Civil Works Component consisted of three subcomponents, which sought to reduce school overcrowding and provide more school places at both the primary and secondary school levels.

Construction/Furnishing of Primary Schools: The school construction got off to a slow start in 1996 but by 1997 construction of schools had started and continued to gain momentum as the project was ably assisted by the Construction Management Firm. Under the revised Fourth Basic Education Project the project targeted the construction and furnishing of twenty-six (26) primary schools scheduled for completion by September 2003.

#### RESULTS

Twenty-three (23) Primary Schools out of a targeted 26 were completed and furnished with two (2) other primary schools still under construction and carded for completion by the end of November 2003. One (1) school was dropped from the FBEP there was no longer any demographic demand for the school.

Construction/Furnishing of Secondary Schools: The project targeted three (3) secondary schools to be constructed and furnished. The objective was to lay the groundwork for access of primary school

graduates to the secondary level in selected parts of the country. The proposed sites of the secondary schools were to be located in areas where the transition rate to the secondary level is below the national average.

## RESULTS

All three (3) secondary schools were completed and furnished: Guaico Secondary; Mason Hall Secondary; and Cunupia High School

Early Childhood Education: The ECCE Component was guided by the following objectives:

- To improve the social and cognitive readiness for learning of preschool age children of disadvantaged families
- To increase access to ECCE Centers for some 2,250 children in poor communities,
- To rehabilitate 50 existing ECCE Centers and bring them up to acceptable operating standards,
- To implement Parent Outreach programme in order to increase the access of adults to the programme and so improve child-rearing practices

## RESULTS

Fifty-seven (57) ECCE Centres out of one hundred (100) were built and furnished. Of the fifty-seven (57), thirty-two (32) were upgraded and twenty-five (25) were newly constructed. A remaining balance of forty-three (43) ECCE Centres were not constructed and furnished (eighteen {18} existing and twenty-five {25} new ECCE Centres.

The GORTT has decided to conduct a needs assessment in the poorest communities as it was noted that the poor communities did not have land tenure. As a result construction has been halted with no new construction occurring since September 2001. Nineteen (19) communities, including five (5) in Tobago, were tendered and were poised to move forward for construction. However, the GORTT has informed the Bank that ECCE policy is currently under review with a view to a new and expanded approach, which is expected to achieve both universal ECCE and specifically target poorer communities. It is expected that all already tendered Communities will be given some priority in the new policy. As a result, loan proceeds originally allocated for this component will not be utilized. The Bank stressed that Trinidad and Tobago has an international example of both a community-driven ECCE initiative and a private-public partnership in the National Council for Early Childhood Care and Education (NCECCE). Both of these innovative characteristics should be built upon as the expanded effort to support ECCE is developed.

## SCHOOL –BASED MANAGEMENT PROGRAMMES

The School Improvement Plan (SIP) and the School Management Programme (SMG) programmes were seen as innovative pilot projects, which empowered principals to improve their school environment for the benefit of students, parents and community. The Ministry of Education intends to absorb these programmes into its normal operations and these programmes would also undergrad the decentralization and modernization processes.

## RESULTS

**School Maintenance Grants (SMG).** The target of disbursing School Maintenance Grants (SMG) to all four hundred and seventy-seven (477) primary schools has been achieved and field visits and interviews with School Principals and Teachers indicate that the SMGs have had a positive impact on school facilities,

management and efficiency. Repairs were under-taken in three areas of priority, namely, Electrical/ Plumbing and Minor Structural repairs. Allocations ranged from \$5000- \$50,000). Workshops were conducted with school principals to ensure the technical and financial guidelines were adhered to.

**School Improvement Plans (SIP).** The SIP Programme has advanced strongly and consistently throughout project implementation. The Bank was informed that the MOE intends to review and modify the accountability guidelines in light of the findings of an Internal Audit, which was provided to the Bank. While the World Bank agrees that the monitoring role of the MOE should be strengthened, it stressed that the continuity of the SIPs programme is critical in maintaining the impressive community-level capacity, involvement and momentum that have been achieved during the project.

## RESULTS

SIP grants were provided to 477 functional schools in the amount of \$90,000 in Round 1 – and 163 schools who completed Round I, in the amount of \$60,000. The SIP Round I and II Programmes were well supported and appreciated by the school supervisors, principals, teachers, parents and school communities as it support not only school improvement but assisted in team building / cooperation between all stakeholders of the school environment. Workshops on technical and financial guidelines were conducted for all school principals to ensure accountability of Government funds were adhered to. Follow-up workshops were also conducted for new school principals, when the first trained principal retired and had to hand-over the projects.

Major Constraints to Project Implementation: The main area, which constrained the implementation of the FBEP, was:

- Inadequate attention to the management of the construction of ECCE Centers;
- Limitation of a ceiling cost to the construction of ECCE Centers;
- Poor supervision and lack of required skills by the Community Boards who were appointed to oversee the construction of ECCE Centers;
- Small contractors hired by the Community Boards to build ECCE Centers usually faced financial difficulties when delayed construction further;
- Poor communities who wanted ECCE Centers had no land tenure to qualify for the approval of a center;
- Inadequate monitoring of construction and management of primary and secondary schools by both consultants and project management firm, the result of which was that schools were at times not delivered ON TIME;
- Insufficient funds provided by the Ministry of Finance to the Project Unit at the start of each fiscal year;
- Heavy turnover and contraction of staff in key technical positions and delays in having them filled;
- Slow response by the MOE Human Resource Division in the finalization o staff contracts and terms and conditions;
- Lack of collaboration between Managers of the Project Staff and Divisional Heads, not due to lack of Interest on the part of individuals but because there was little time to do so.

## Bank Performance

The GORTT is satisfied that the World Bank representatives demonstrated support and commitment to the successful implementation of the Fourth Basic Education Project. The introduction of thresholds to guide and keep the project ‘on track’ was a successful intervention mechanism.



On another level, collaboration between the Project Unit and the World Bank could have been better, if more time was allotted for providing greater interaction on project activities and issues/problems which emerged during the implementation stages. The role of the Task Manager could have been more supportive to the Project Unit rather than supervision visits geared towards discussion of achievement of thresholds and obtaining of 'satisfactory rating' by the World Bank. Missions could have been longer at times to advise the Project Unit and the GORTT on areas of weakness and sharing of the information could have lead to resolution of implementation difficulties, however both the EPCU and the MOE found the missions to be useful in guiding the project implementation overall.

### Borrower's Performance

The GORTT performance during project implementation was supportive and committed to the objectives of the FBEP. The GORTT fully endorsed the FBEP throughout the implementation stages and saw it as a catalyst to many of its planned educational reforms. There was always the political will to ensure that the project achieved its targets. It may be worth mention that during the seven (7) years of project implementation, there were five (5) Permanent Secretaries and six (6) Project Coordinators managing the Project.

At the World Bank Mid-Term Review in 1999, recognizing key project execution weaknesses and implementation capacity due to a slow start-up in the Civil Works Component, the project goals were re-visited and re-adjusted to ensure the Project met its most important objectives. Most importantly, the GORTT continued to build upon its previous project successes and introduced changes that greatly enhanced the overall quality of the project and put in place valuable lessons learnt to ensure project sustainability.

LESSONS LEARNT. The main lessons leaned through the Implementation of the FBEP are:

### CIVIL WORKS: PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS

Lessons learned are categorized as follows:

- Sites Selection
- Demographic studies that indicate where schools to be constructed are located must reflect recent data and not old data, when demand for the school could have been no longer viable and relevant
- Site selection should be governed by the physical characteristics of the site such as size, soil type
- Sites selected should be free of any encumbrances and sufficient time should be allowed for compulsory acquisition
- Land surveys must be carried out on selected sites to verify boundaries and ensure no encroachments by neighbors
- Sites should be chosen to maximize the use of the school and minimize the long term problems associated with heavy civil works

### HIRING OF DESIGN CONSULTANTS

- There should be a clearly defined hierarchy with respect to roles of the client (MOE), the Project Managers, the Design Consultant team and the Contractor;
- The Project Management Team should have been empowered to properly represent the Client and be made accountable for the delivery of the Programme;
- The Project Management Team was hired after selection of Design Consultants

## DESIGN CONSULTANT TEAM ISSUES

- Before variations are issued to the contractor, they must be quantified and approved by the Client, (MOE/EPCU) and Project Managers
- The Design Team should pay more attention to the verification of the physical conditions and characteristics of the selected sites prior to the design and tendering processes
- There should be some mechanism by which Design Team Performance can be evaluated prior to award of more schools granted to them
- Design Consultants are being paid administration and supervision fees and should be held accountable for any cost overruns or time slippage

## FINANCIAL LESSONS

- Late payments to contractors should be avoided so as to prevent the accruing of interest fees;
- The issues of overtime payment for accelerated works should be considered as a contingency payment;
- The timely completion of schools could be delayed by untimely payment to contractors
- Contractors should be penalized for delays caused by poor management of construction and liquidated damages applied for delinquent contractors
- Design development and contractual obligations should be closely reviewed and monitored on a continuous basis to ensure that Client needs and expectations are achieved

## ECCE CENTRES CONSTRUCTION

An evaluation of the performance of the construction of ECCE Centers indicated that the objectives of the Component were not being fully met. Whereas 57 out of the targeted 100 Centers were constructed and furnished, it was noted that the poorer communities were under-represented. Reasons posed were:

- the possession of land tenure was the main criterion which exempted the poor communities from benefiting from the program
- The construction appears to be predominantly focused on the western side of the island and the eastern side of the island and Tobago did not benefit significantly.
- The perceived role of the community boards was not as effective in reality. Boards did not take decisions of a financial nature and appeared too docile in decision making;
- The financial ceiling set by the GORTT of \$250,000 (Trinidad) and \$300,000 (Tobago) became insufficient to construct the prototype design in a climate of a construction boom in the country
- There is need for the GORTT to conduct a need assessment of ECCE sites and to assist the poorer communities with land, if necessary to create access and availability of places to poor children.
- In order to ensure there is Universal preschool for all children 3-4 years old, there is need for new policy directives and a plan of action to achieve this.

## Administrative Lessons

- The FBEP suffered from an absence of key technical staff to guide the project in the areas of Accounts, and Civil Engineering One key reason was insufficient attention paid to offering adequate remuneration to attract qualified staff.
- Human Resources Matters were not given high priority thus demotivating existing staff. Contracts and Terms and Conditions took too long to be finalized.
- Collaboration between Project Unit and Divisional Managers of the MOE could have been better. The FBEP was conceptualized with heavy involvement by the MOE divisional heads. This did not take

place as much as was expected. The MOE needed to “own “ the project, which would have facilitated project sustainability.

- There was need for additional staff to monitor the project activities at field level. Reliance on the MOE existing staff who were few in number rendered the project “unable “ to respond to emergencies and led to delays in implementation.
- The Project Unit was a part of the MOE but the MOE did not understand its role in the implementation process

### **Project Sustainability/Future Initiatives**

The MOE has found the FBEP to be a necessary and timely intervention in assisting it to lay certain foundation blocks to its strategic plans and goals. Project sustainability has already borne fruits in the following areas: Decentralization; ECCE; School-Based Management Programmes; Curriculum Review/Revision; ECCE Teacher Training; National Council on ECCE(NCECC); Textbooks; School Boards; Fifth Basic Education Project

In summary, the following initiatives have been put in place:

- A Decentralization Unit has been established and staffed- the school-based management programmes have played an important role in this process.
- The GORTT has begun to put in place the process and plans to incorporate the SIPs and SMG’s into its future operations
- The Decentralization Study is now being reviewed for implementation of its recommendations
- Curriculum revision commenced under the FBEP with the traditional core subject areas will continue in other subject areas
- Free textbooks are now provided for all primary school children
- The NCECC has been commissioned to provide guidance and policy direction to the MOE on all ECCE issues
- Universal Preschooling announced in 2003 which would build upon the successes of the FBEP;
- The important Role of Community Boards in the administration of ECCE Centers has been recognized and the MOE has plans to create Primary and Secondary School Boards in its decentralization Process
- The MOE is committed to building on the successes of the FBEP and has begun discussions with the World Bank for the funding of another loan initiative
- The ECCE training provided to ECCE teachers by training institutions (will be continued utilizing GORTT’s funding).

### **PROJECT COSTS**

Financial Audited Statement for the expenditure and utilization of project funds were submitted annually to the World Bank since 1998. The most recent Statement was submitted for the period September 2002. The Audited Statement for the period September 2003 is due on or before March 2004. See Appendix V.

### **CONCLUSION**

The scheduled in accordance with the Loan Agreement whereby completion date for project implementation of the FBEP was December 31, 2002 continues with counterpart funding until completion of the Project. The scheduled date for reimbursement of funds was June 30, 2003.

During its seven (7) years of implementation the Project experienced slow but steady momentum. School Construction commenced in 1997 and the last five (5) Primary Schools are under construction and were

completed at the end of April 2003. The FBEP has provided a number of educational initiatives that will assist the MOE in its reform towards ‘decentralization’ and ‘restructuring’.

The MOE wishes to thank all stakeholders to the project for their inputs and commitment. The Project staff is to be complimented for the yeoman services rendered despite a number of extenuating circumstances, which plagued the project, from its inception. The lessons learned should be applied to the next loan agreement and the MOE is satisfied with the final outcomes of the FBEP.

