Ⅱ H97dbla5

Yes.

Hessler - cross

1	Q. Mr. Hessler, does the document reference the fact that the
2	settlement discussions are ongoing?
3	THE COURT: The document speaks for itself. Next
4	question.
5	I'm sure the members of the jury are fully capable of
6	reading it.
7	Q. All right. During that time period, September of 2016, did
8	the settlement discussions continue between you and Blacksands?
9	MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: Objection.
10	THE COURT: Sustained.
11	Q. During the period September 27th through and continuing on
12	from there, did the settlement did the discussions continue
13	between you and Blacksands regarding payment of the judgment?
14	MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: Objection.
15	THE COURT: Sustained.
16	MS. FRITZ: If we could pull up Exhibit Y.
17	Q. As of on or about Monday, September 26th, did you
18	communicate over to Chris Harris certain terms pursuant to
19	which ICBC would accept would agree to a settlement of the
20	matter?
21	A. Bear with me.
22	(Pause)
23	Yes.
24	Q. And did you communicate that by email over to Mr. Harris?

H97dbla5 Hessler - cross 1 And is that the email that you are looking at there, 2 Exhibit Y? 3 Α. Yes. OK. 4 Ο. MS. FRITZ: I offer into evidence Exhibit Y. 5 MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: Objection. 6 7 THE COURT: Ground? MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: It is the 403 connection issue 8 9 that we have discussed. THE COURT: Sustained. 10 BY MS. FRITZ: 11 O. Did you communicate to Mr. Harris in that same email that 12 13 ICBC has agreed --MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: Objection. 14 THE COURT: Ms. Fritz, I just sustained the objection 15 to the document. 16 17 MS. FRITZ: Yes. THE COURT: And you know that it is inappropriate to 18 refer in a question to the contents of a document that is not 19 in evidence, and your question is embarking on embodying the 20 content of the document I just excluded and thereby bringing it 21 to the attention of the jury, in violation of my ruling. The 22 objection is sustained. It's not to happen again. 2.3

BY MS. FRITZ:

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On or about September 26th, did you also confirm to Chris

H97dbla5 Hessler - cross Harris that ICBC was forbearing its further --1 MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: Objection. 2 Q. -- discovery -- demand for the discovery at that point? 3 THE COURT: Answer that yes or no. 4 5 I don't recall. Α. I understand. If you could take a look at the document and 6 see if that refreshes your recollection, particularly paragraph 7 8 2. -9 (Pause) So, I'm sorry, can I have your question again? 10 Α. Did you communicate to Mr. Harris, on or about 11 September 26th, that ICBC was forbearing pressing its discovery 12 demands at that point? 13 14 A. No. 15 Did you state to Mr. Harris that ICBC will not seek further relief --16 17 MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: Objection. THE COURT: Are we talking about a telephone 18 conversation, a meeting, or the document I've excluded? 19 MS. FRITZ: We're talking about the communication that 20 did occur in writing in the document. 21 THE COURT: Sustained. 22 Q. At the time September 26th, were you continuing to pursue 23 the discovery demands relating to the Court's order dated 24 25 August 22nd?

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Hessler - cross

My client and I had no need to pursue discovery if we were going to receive payment of the judgment. The entire point of discovery was to enable us to enforce the judgment. On September 6th, when Mr. Harris represented to the Court that Blacksands agreed to pay the judgment, we put some faith in that because of the standing in which we held Latham & Watkins and Mr. Harris. And in reliance on his representation to the Court that Blacksands had agreed to pay the judgment, we unilaterally took the position that we would not continue to litigate to obtain the responses that we were entitled to on September 6th because we didn't want to waste the money doing that because we had been led to believe, by Mr. Harris, that we would imminently receive payment. Q. With respect to the settlement discussions, or discussions regarding payment of the judgment, I believe you stated during your direct examination that Blacksands had not provided specific information about its proposal for payment of those -of the judgment? MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: Objection. THE COURT: Sustained. Did Blacksands during this period of time provide specific proposals -- specific information regarding how it could pay the judgment?

MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: Objection.

THE COURT: Sustained.

Hessler - cross

1 | Q. Did Blacksands --

THE COURT: It is not an accurate summary. Let's just go on.

Q. Did Blacksands, during this period of time, provide information regarding how it intended to pay the judgment?

A. In vague terms we received sort of very, you know, sort of 10,000-foot level explanations of where the money would come from. For example, I don't recall if it was this proposal, but there was one proposal that some unrelated party had proposed to put up a residential apartment in Manhattan as security pending payment of the judgment, for example. We had a lot of communications from Blacksands about potential financings from which we would be paid. None of them had come to fruition. We were now three years into this litigation, and we were not going to put our faith in those further vague statements.

So, we asked for specific information, for example, who owned the property, were there any security, were there any liens on the property, was there a mortgage on it, how was the financing proposed to work, how was the grant of security proposed to work. And other than the initial high-level description of what was planned or proposed, we never received the concrete details that we had asked for that would have given us the assurances we would have needed to forbear from enforcement.

). You mentioned this issue of security. Was that an issue

H97dbla5 Hessler - cross that ICBC had raised, that it wanted security if the proposal 1 was that its judgment would be paid sometime in the future? 2 3 MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: Objection. THE COURT: Ground? 4 MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: The same objection, 403. 5 6 THE COURT: Anything else? MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: I think there is also perhaps a 7 form objection there. 8 THE COURT: Sustained at least as to form. 9 BY MS. FRITZ: 10 Q. Let's just take a step back. 11 The proposal that Blacksands made with respect to 12 paying the judgment, did that involve a project that Blacksands 13 14 was currently involved in? MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: Objection. 15 THE COURT: Sustained. 16 Q. Was the discussion that was going on relating to providing 17 information about a project from which Blacksands intended to 18 19 pay the judgment? MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: Objection. 20 THE COURT: Sustained. 21 Based on the conversations that occurred, was there 22 discussion, now moving into the November timeframe, regarding a 23 meeting, Blacksands and ICB attending a meeting to further 24

discuss the proposal that Blacksands was making?

H97dbla5 Hessler - cross MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: Objection. 1 THE COURT: Sustained. 2 3 Did a meeting then occur in London? MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: Objection. 4 5 THE COURT: Sustained. In connection with the document production that was 6 provided by Mr. Brennerman, the one that you looked at earlier, 7 you had indicated that it included documents regarding some 8 contracts, things like that. Do you recall that? 9 MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: Objection. 10 THE COURT: Sustained. It is not an accurate summary 11 of what he said. He said, as I remember, notably, though there 12 may have been other things, two unsigned leases for office 13 space, or something like that. 14 MS. FRITZ: OK. 15 Do you have a recollection of whether that discovery that 16 was provided also included documentation relating to the 17 project that Blacksands was involved in at that point? 18 MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: Objection. 19 THE COURT: Sustained. That assumes that there was in 20 fact a project that Blacksands was involved in. 21 MS. FRITZ: Not assuming that, again --22 THE COURT: Of course it does. The question says, "Do 23 you have a recollection of whether that discovery that was 24

provided also included documentation to the project that

H97dbla5 Hessler - cross 1 Blacksands was involved in at that point?" That was your 2 question. BY MS. FRITZ: 3 Q. At the meeting in London, was there an extensive 4 presentation done for ICBC regarding Blacksands' project? 5 MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: Objection. 6 THE COURT: Sustained. There was no evidence of any 7 meeting in London, there are simply questions, to which 8 9 objections have been sustained. The jury is reminded that the questions are not 10 evidence. 11 MS. FRITZ: If we could pull up Defendant AI. 12 So let me just ask you, Mr. Harris, was there a 13 OK. meeting in London at the offices of Exotic --14 MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: Objection. 15 THE COURT: I believe you already asked if there was a 16 17 meeting in London. I sustained that objection. Am I mistaken, Ms. Fritz? 18 MS. FRITZ: Your Honor just indicated that I needed to 19 20 prove that there was a meeting. I didn't say that at all. I said your 21 THE COURT: question assumed that there was one. I didn't say you had to 22 prove it. I sustained the objection to your attempt to do so, 2.3 if indeed there ever was a meeting. 24

Now, let's get on with it.

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Hessler - cross

- Q. Mr. Hessler, if you could take a look at Exhibit AI. Is that a communication that you had with Chris Harris during the period November 2016?
- A. Yes, it is.
- Q. OK. And does this relate to the discussions that were occurring between --

MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: Objection.

THE COURT: Sustained.

Now, I don't want to do this, but if you can't ask proper questions from this point onward, I'm going to have to consider terminating your examination.

I have made the ruling. This material is not relevant. You are going to go on to a different subject, or you are going to sit down.

- MS. FRITZ: If we could pull up Government Exhibit 309.
- Q. Did there come a time on or about October 14th when ICBC filed an order to show cause for an adjudication of contempt against Blacksands?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And is Exhibit 309 a copy of the document filed by Blacksands but also with entries by the Court?
- A. Yes. This is a copy of the order to show cause that commenced that motion, yes.
 - Q. All right. And can you briefly explain what is meant by

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First, the orders are short, clear, specific. They are easy to understand. We have been through them a number of times with the witnesses. The second element, Christopher Harris testified that, among other things, the particular orders in question were communicated to the defendant. Third, they were clearly disobeyed. By September 6th, there was no compliance with the Court's order. By October 4th, there was no compliance with the Court's order. The jury heard evidence that the ultimate production was insufficient. And there is ample evidence that it was willful and knowing and that includes, among other things, the time period that went by, the fact that the defendant had all these documents in his possession and we went through that at length, and his production indicates that -- and his responses to discovery indicate that he understood an obligation and just chose to do something differently.

THE COURT: OK. The motion is denied.

OK. Now, I have a draft charge which my law clerk will distribute to you and it is short, and we'll start the charge conference at 5 o'clock so that we are in a position to sum up tomorrow morning and get the case fully to the jury.

Now, I'm in the process of preparing what will be an addition -- you can distribute them -- an addition to the charge that isn't in there already. And in the most general terms, and subject to it being reduced to writing in a form

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satisfactory to me, it will go something like this -- in substance like this. It will address the evidence with respect to settlement discussions and it will address the evidence with respect to the purported responses in November -- purported responses.

The substance of what I'll say about the settlement discussion argument will be that they've heard evidence about what one side characterizes as settlement discussions and the other -- at least one witness on the other side has something somewhat different. But in any case, the existence of settlement discussions, even if there were any, do not suspend or abrogate an individual's obligation to comply promptly with court orders unless the Court suspends or alters the order.

You have heard evidence, I will say to them, about these purported responses, dated November 4th and whatever the other November date is. I propose to instruct them that the crime of contempt is complete as of the first day on which a defendant was obliged to comply with a court order that otherwise meets the requirements for criminal contempt; in other words, all of the elements are satisfied. Evidence of a subsequent compliance or attempted compliance can be relevant to the question of whether the failure to comply earlier was willful.

In considering whether the purported responses -- in considering what significance to give the purported responses

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1 I hear nothing.

I am going to ask my law clerk to distribute a very brief proposed addition, which we'll mark as Court Exhibit B, which is what I discussed earlier.

MS. FRITZ: Thank you.

May I, your Honor?

THE COURT: You want to begin?

MS. FRITZ: Unless the government --

THE COURT: Has the government had enough time?

MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: Yes. Thank you.

THE COURT: Go ahead, Ms. Fritz.

MS. FRITZ: It is the first one regarding settlement discussions that concerns me and it concerns me for following reason, but I don't have the law here to cite for your Honor. It concerns me based on the following hypothetical: If the parties in this case agreed on August 22nd that the plaintiff was not further seeking the discovery while settlement discussions were going on and if that continued —

THE COURT: I missed the date. August 22nd?

MS. FRITZ: The Court order's compliance on the 22nd and actually gives him two weeks.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. FRITZ: So if as of the date that compliance would have been required, the parties have agreed that ICBC is not pursuing its discovery demands at that point and is instead is

very desirous of and wishes to engage in discussions regarding payment of the judgment and if that circumstance continues for a period of time, I totally understand your Honor saying that as a technical matter that doesn't in any way eliminate the existence the Court orders, but I do believe the law says that the parties are allowed to agree between themselves that discovery demands are not being pursued. If that is what is going on and that is being communicated, I have told your Honor before I don't think it is fair to say that someone is in contempt if the adversary has stood down at that point.

Now, I am happy to go get the law to say that parties are able to agree on things that may be inconsistent with a pending court order without coming back and getting that order revised. For example, we had all kinds of monetary cases with the government where there is limits on what could be paid. We go to the government and we say, Look, is it okay if we pay the kid's tuition. There is a court order that may restrain payment; but if the parties agree, then that may not be a wilful violation of a court order.

That may have been a lousy example.

THE COURT: Look, you know, I will give you a counter example. If a court after having innumerable times extended the discovery period in a civil case and finally after two years of delays says July 1st, and I mean it, and the parties on June 30th start talking and they are very desirous of

settling and they blow right through it, seems to me the judge is entirely within his rights to say, okay, you are going to trial. I don't care what you agreed between yourselves. It was my order. You didn't do it at your own risk.

MS. FRITZ: Is that a willful violation of the Court's order? In other words, I think we're dealing with a very consensual problem here, which is can parties basically agree to things -- I said it a moment -- that is inconsistent with the order. I believe that they can and I believe that is exactly what happened here.

THE COURT: Obviously they do. Sometimes it can be a crime. That's the problem. If there were an agreement between two parties where there was a court order to produce the discovery by September 4th that they are not going to insist on it while they are seeking discovery and there is a pending contempt application and then the talks break down and the beneficiary of the court order then presses the contempt application, first thing that could happen is going forward they could get a coercive order forcing compliance.

MS. FRITZ: Absolutely.

THE COURT: The place where the agreement pinches them is that the extent civil contempt is a compensatory remedy as well as coercive seems to me they would be blocked from getting damages caused by the delay in compliance during the period in which there would be a delay in compliance. It seems to me

also that that example doesn't answer your point.

MS. FRITZ: I think there is a couple of issues. Honestly, if on a particular day there is an agreement that discovery is not being demanded and if on that day -- you can argue the next day he violated the order but at that point is there a willful violation of a court order, I do not believe so. Not only here did the parties deal with precisely that issue, but the parties then went onto exchange settlement agreements that also would have addressed settlement of any contempt sanctions.

THE COURT: Civil.

MS. FRITZ: Yes. So the parties were in this case treating the Court's orders as if they were suspectable of alteration by the parties in terms of amount, in terms of whether the order to — the demand for production applies today or tomorrow or the next day. They were treating it as if they had the ability to impact the Court order. Whether they were correct or incorrect, I don't know. This instruction to me goes a step too far to basically say I would argue it suggests that the parties cannot do that and as a matter of law I don't think that is correct nor do I think it is appropriate where the pivotal issue is willfulness and whether an individual in Mr. Brennerman's position would have understood that if Hessler says okay now we're going to settle, let's go meet in London, let's go do all these things to try to resolve this because

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honestly ICBC just wanted its money, if all that is going on, would he know that no matter with a Paul Hessler says, he is engaging in a violation of the Court's order?

THE COURT: I will hear from the government.

MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: Well, your Honor, first of all, the vast majority of this is not even in evidence. So we're arguing from a hypothetical. Our view is that the instruction is appropriate for at least two reasons. First, is that largely, and this was argued by my colleague this morning and it is in our letter briefing, in many ways this argument amounts to a collateral attack on the underlying order. Even if you credit defense counsel's argument that this somehow goes to willfulness, the law is pretty clear that willfulness or good-faith defense is limited to the circumstances where an individual tries to comply but fails.

So the example here would be had Mr. Brennerman gathered up a lot of the bank records in his apartment and a lot of things on his computer and missed some and that was held to have violated the Court order, that would be a plausible good-faith defense. This I didn't understand the law or I was given the wrong view of the law is not a valid good-faith defense. So the Court's instruction is totally appropriate. It is not a defense to willfulness if he thought in the civil context — even if this is true and there is evidence that he thought in the civil context their settlement discussions could

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put things on hold.

THE COURT: One more minute, Ms. Fritz.

MS. FRITZ: Now I am going to the clearest example I can think of which is Mr. Hessler indicated that forbearance concept in the documents that are in evidence. He sat on the witness stand and he said, We have no interest in pursuing that issue if we were going to settle. That is in evidence. If that information is communicated by Mr. Harris to

Mr. Brennerman saying, okay, he has agreed to standdown while we try to settle this thing, it goes to knowledge of whether there is an extant duty. It goes to willfulness. It goes to intent. Even if he is wrong and I am not sure he is wrong.

THE COURT: Last one minute, government.

MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: The only thing I would add is the citation Remini decision from the Second Circuit that my colleague put on the record this morning defines the parameters of a good-faith defense, discusses in that context a mistake of law defense in terms of what advice was given by counsel. It is not exactly advice of counsel defense here. We think the principle is similar. To the extent Mr. Brennerman's lawyers told him what was going on in settlement discussions, that is not a basis for a good-faith defense.

THE COURT: My present disposition is to overrule Ms. Fritz' objection. I will think about it some more overnight and before summations somebody remember to ask me whether I

changed my mind.

MS. FRITZ: Obviously, your Honor, particularly given the nature of my personality, I will try to find some case law also.

THE COURT: That's not a bad idea.

There is nothing else on Exhibit B, right?

MS. FRITZ: That's correct.

THE COURT: How long do you expect to be on closings?

MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: We're still refining but my hunch is less than a half hour.

THE COURT: Ms. Fritz?

MS. FRITZ: I shall strive for the same.

THE COURT: Look, the last thing I want here is summations interrupted by objections. I would say that is the penultimate thing I want. The last thing I want is summations interrupted by objections that require me to instruct the jury either in the middle or later with respect to what counsel has just said. By this time you all know what I am going to charge and you all know the in limine rulings and you all know that my view quite clearly is that summations are based on the evidence of record not on anything else. I trust you will comply with that. It is in nobody's interest otherwise.

Thank you.

MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: Your Honor, one other issue. I mentioned there would be the potential instruction on documents

Hessler - cross

(At the sidebar)

MS. FRITZ: Your Honor, this seems to me to be indicative, first of all, of bias, particularly given the way it plays out. While he is absolutely insisting that ICBC is not a party here and can't be served with a subpoena and isn't responding, he delivers 5,000 pages to the government. So I want to bring it out, in terms of our efforts from the defense side, to be able to show the jury the extent of the material that was already in Blacksands' possession that is directly responsive to the questions that Mr. Landsman-Roos just asked. He specifically said did you ever get financial statements, were there ever bank accounts. This is the material that proves it. And I want to start by showing that he refused to provide it but that ultimately we do have a binderful only by virtue of cooperating with the government.

THE COURT: You know, I'm really somewhat at a loss to understand what your argument is.

MS. FRITZ: OK. Let me try it this way.

THE COURT: I mean, there are just concepts floating around. In my mind they are not connecting.

MS. FRITZ: OK. The issue is had Blacksands produced to the bank financial statements for the relevant period, that includes volumes of documents that were produced during the period 2013 through 2014, the period covered by him. That material --

l	H97dbla3 Hessler - cross
1	THE COURT: His request didn't even go back before
2	April 1, 2014, first of all.
3	MS. FRITZ: That's not true. It is 2013.
4	THE COURT: Look, you are a very difficult lawyer to
5	deal with, I have to tell you.
6	The Exhibit is 304?
7	MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: Yes, your Honor.
8	THE COURT: You may be right but let's look. My
9	recollection is different.
10	(Pause)
11	You are right, it is April 1, 2013.
12	MS. FRITZ: During that period, all the way through
13	2013 and 2014, volumes of material were being provided.
14	THE COURT: But it is April 1, 2013 to the date of the
15	response to the request, which was in 2016, right?
16	MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: Correct, your Honor.
17	MS. FRITZ: That is correct.
18	THE COURT: And it is your position that Brennerman
19	produced 2014, '15 and '16 financial statements, 2014, '15 and
20	'16 wire transfers, bank statements before the loan agreement
21	get signed; is that your position?
22	MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: Of course not, your Honor.
23	THE COURT: Of course not.
24	MS. FRITZ: Obviously, in terms of many of his
25	40-some-odd requests, they have to do with assets and

Hessler - cross

financials and banking relationships. That's what he keeps going on and on about. It's there. They have it.

THE COURT: That's, by your own acknowledgment --

MS. FRITZ: Let me just -- all I'm saying --

THE COURT: You just stop.

By your own acknowledgment, if Blacksands produced such records, in general, before the loan agreement was signed, it all happened before the end of 2014, which was the date the loan agreement was signed, in my recollection. OK? It doesn't touch anything at all from November of 2014 to 2016, which was the core, if not the entirety, of the post-judgment discovery. It was focused, in material part, on where are the assets now, where are the bank relationships now, where is the money now, and what's been happening for the past couple of years. That's the first point. Not a complete match on the time period, that's the first point.

The second point is in my judgment, whatever ICBC -excuse me, Blacksands provided to ICBC before the loan was made
is completely irrelevant. It's completely irrelevant at least
because a motion to compel compliance with the discovery
requests that were served post-judgment was made. Objections
were interposed. The objections do not object to producing
materials previously furnished to ICBC. In any case, even if
they had objected to that, the ruling was comply with the
document request in full.

H97dbla3 Hessler - cross

Excuse me. Now, it is not open to you in a contempt proceeding to argue that the ruling, the order that he violated, was mistaken, erroneous, improvident. It's just closed. You have no argument on that ground.

MS. FRITZ: All right. First of all, the Latham Watkins' responses and their opposition to the motion to compel laid all of this out for your Honor, that this material that is being demanded in 2016 had been provided in '11, '12 and '13.

THE COURT: OK. I believe you are wrong about that but it is immaterial.

MS. FRITZ: I wish we could just go and take a look at it so we could confirm --

THE COURT: That is what I just did during the last break. I read the objections to the document requests. It is not there.

MS. FRITZ: The opposition to the motion to compel briefs the fact that that is -

THE COURT: Suppose so. And the order was the objections are not meritorious, produce the documents.

MS. FRITZ: All right. So assuming that to be the case, I know that what your Honor was ruling was not that everything has to be reproduced, that whatever --

THE COURT: You think so? That is not what the order says.

MS. FRITZ: If that's what the Court's order -- then

Hessler - cross

we need to clarify that one way or the other.

THE COURT: There is nothing to clarify.

MS. FRITZ: In my view, if something is provided in the hands of ICBC, a lawyer cannot come back in 2016 because he simply never looked at it, never paid attention to it, and demand exactly the same material.

THE COURT: Do you want to add anything else?

MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: Two things, your Honor. One is I don't believe that is even the law, the ruling under the civil discovery rules. But in any event, I think your Honor is correct that to the extent it even was, it has already been addressed. And we have an in limine ruling that we are not going to relitigate the underlying contempt hearing.

The second is I think defense counsel is trying to bring out the fact -- and we've already had some testimony on it, but the discovery requests that Latham served and the witness has testified were pulled back because of a jurisdictional problem. And I think her questions are, to some degree, also trying to confuse the --

MS. FRITZ: No. That's not the point.

The issue also is, from Mr. Brennerman's point of view, this has to be willful, this has to be intentional. I don't know that Mr. Brennerman would understand what your Honor just said, that even though I delivered a truckload of documents to them, I have to do it again. So I think the

H97dbla3 Hessler - cross

record needs to reflect the background against which he was operating. And this is what I said in the opening. He knows that they have all of that material. Paul Hessler, if you could just view him as a relevant party --

THE COURT: Look, I have made my ruling. Go on.

MS. FRITZ: OK. Go on.

THE COURT: That doesn't mean go on on what I've sustained the objection to. That means proceed, obeying my ruling.

 $\,$ MS. FRITZ: Which is that I am not allowed to elicit the fact that this material was produced to ICBC, financial statements --

THE COURT: I've already allowed you to ask him the scope of his knowledge of anything that was produced because there was no objection, as I remember. And you are not getting into anything else with this witness that I can see unless you ask a question that's not within the scope of the ruling and I see it in a different light. I'm not stopping you from making a record, but you are not heading down a productive path here.

MS. FRITZ: All right. Because I have -- there is significant -- the next area of questioning really has to do with some of the aspects of what was provided to ICBC.

THE COURT: You are going to have a hard time.

MS. FRITZ: All right. I'll give it a go.

(In open court)

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Hessler - cross

- THE COURT: The objection is sustained. Let's proceed.
- 3 | BY MS. FRITZ:
- Q. All right. Mr. Hessler, in anticipation of this
 proceeding, you've indicated that you sat down and you met with
- 6 | the government, right?
- 7 | A. Yes.

- Q. How many times did you do that?
- 9 A. I believe it was five in total, including briefly vesterday.
- 11 Q. OK. And how many hours do you think that that encompassed?
- 12 A. So yesterday it was 10 minutes, 15 minutes order of
- magnitude, and the first four meetings, I don't recall
- 14 | precisely but I would say between two hours and three hours,
- maybe three and a half -- maybe two to four. Let's say two to
- 16 | four to be safe.
- Q. OK. And is it correct that during this same time period in
- the runup to this trial, that you and I had conversations where
- 19 | I was seeking to get certain documents?
- 20 A. Umm, you are going to have to refresh my recollection. I
- 21 | don't believe so.
- 22 | Q. Did you and I have a series of communications concerning my
- efforts to get ICBC documents through you?
- 24 A. Yes, we did.
- 25 | Q. And I was not successful?

H9cdbla3

Rebuttal - Mr. Sobelman

conduct some of their most important affairs by email and by phone, and that seems to be exactly what was going on here.

Ms. Fritz also suggested that Brennerman might have disobeyed the Court's orders because somehow he thought the bank already had some of his documents, and this doesn't make sense. First, let's be clear, there is no evidence that the bank already had the information or documents that Brennerman was required to produce — none — and no evidence that Brennerman's company had already given the bank the documents it was required to produce. In fact, the defense asked Mr. Hessler if ICBC had those documents and he said no.

Second, there is nothing in the Court's orders that says that Brennerman's company doesn't need to produce a document or answer a question that he thinks or the company thinks that the bank already has that document in its possession. In fact, the orders require Brennerman's company to, quote, comply fully with the Court's orders.

Third, if you look back at Brennerman's company's responses, there is not one request or interrogatory to which Brennerman responds by saying, oh, the bank already has the information, please reference what I sent you on X date. It just isn't there.

If this is what Brennerman thought --

MS. FRITZ: Objection. The information about the data room is in the interrogatory response.

the issue in the charge conference and maybe on motions, but I will tell you that provisionally without hearing anything from either of you about the case. It seems to make a lot of sense to me. The case is G & C Miriam v. Webster Dictionary, 639 F.2d, 29 principally at page 37 but not only on page 37. That's the first item.

Now, I have Ms. Fitz's letter of September 3rd. Does anybody have anything further to say about the subject raised there?

No.

MS. FRITZ: Your Honor, with respect to that letter, we forwarded the letter and now we've had a bit of a dialogue on it. The government did respond on the issue and we provided some additional remarks in our September 5th letter. All of those relate to the same issue that was presented in the September 3rd letter.

THE COURT: Yes. I've seen the September 5th letter also. It seems to me that the government is allowed to prove the two civil contempt orders in the civil case because they go at least to the question of whether failure to comply with the underlying disclosure orders was willful at least from the date of the civil contempt adjudications. There is authority that in my view supports that. As long as we have a moment, I will find it here. I refer to United States v. Wells, 1994 WL 421471 and Red Bull Interior Demolition v. Palmadessa, 908

F.Supp 1226 at 1241. There may be other authority, but those are the things I have in mind.

With respect to that, I have the two orders of contempt before me. I don't know what their exhibit numbers here are. The first one is Document 108 on the civil docket. I think there could be some redactions from this that might improve the situation. So try to follow along with me.

The second paragraph, which starts with the words "Having considered," over onto page 2 and concluding with the words "reasonable manner" seems to me might be usefully might be redacted because the recitals I don't think do much of anything, and they contain findings that are not necessary to the willfulness and indeed the knowledge issues to which this is also relevant.

Secondly, paragraphs two through five are unnecessary and could be redacted. I don't know if either side has a view as to whether the fact that I am the judge who signed the order should remain or should be redacted, just my name and signature.

Does anybody have any comments on those proposed redactions?

MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: One clarification, point, your Honor. The order, which is Government Exhibit 311 and is the October 24th, 2016 order, referenced the redaction of paragraph five. I assume you're meaning what you have renumbered as

you.

paragraph five in addition to the excised?

THE COURT: No, I didn't renumber it. I don't think I renumbered anything. Oh, I see what you are saying. There are two paragraph fives. I was proposing to redact both of them.

MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: Okay.

THE COURT: Any other comments from either side on the proposed redactions?

MS. FRITZ: Your Honor, with respect to any of the issues relating to contempt, it has been our position throughout that the contempt information should not be presented. I understand that your Honor just referenced -
THE COURT: I understand that. I am ruling against

MS. FRITZ: I want the record to reflect that both sides have now cited for the Court the decision in Senffner that your Honor didn't reference a moment ago.

THE COURT: Which I have read and to the extent, if any and I doubt much, it supports or point of view, I disagree with it in this context on these facts.

MS. FRITZ: It appears, though, that your Honor is being guided by it somewhat though by trying to remove findings that would be redundant to what the jury is being asked.

THE COURT: If you don't want them removed or you want to remove different ones, you should tell me. I mean no disrespect. This is not a continuing seminar. I am offering

1.5

to redact material because I am trying to be responsive to concerns you have raised where I think the proposed redactions are not necessary to the proper use the government in my view is entitled to make of the contempt finding. Now, if you don't like the redactions, you don't want them, you want them all to stand, fine; but I am not going to back to square one of the discussion of whether the fact of the contempt will go before the jury. It will.

MS. FRITZ: Our position is on the record. We appreciate the redaction.

THE COURT: Fine.

With respect to the order finding Mr. Brennerman personally in contempt, which was Docket Item 139 in the civil docket, I am treating essentially the same way. The second full paragraph, except for the final fragmentary sentence which reads "The Court therefore orders that" would be redacted. At least that is my proposal. It seems to me paragraphs two and three are unnecessary to the proper use. If the defense wants them out, I will take them out.

MS. FRITZ: The defense's position is we would like to keep two, but the other redactions are fine.

THE COURT: Two is relevant why and what is the government's position? Let's take the government's position first.

MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: Well, your Honor, it is not

immediately clear to me what the relevance of two is.

THE COURT: Do you object to it? You wanted to put the whole order in.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ LANDSMAN-ROOS: Yes. We don't have an objection to it.

THE COURT: Paragraph two will stand. That takes care of that. So that takes care of the September 3rd letter.

Now we have Ms. Fitz's letter of September 5th, Docket Item 86 in the criminal docket. What is going on with these transcripts and motion papers, Mr. Landsman-Roos?

MR. LANDSMAN-ROOS: Yes, your Honor. At this time we're not intending to enter in as exhibits the transcripts or the motion papers, at least they are in the 300 series, which is cited in the letter. The one potential exception is the 100 series are documents that were found in Mr. Brennerman's apartment. So to the extent the motions existed there, they are relevant to his notice, knowledge, willfulness.

THE COURT: Ms. Fitz.

MS. FRITZ: My position is to the extent that the motions are being put in, whatever may be the rationale for them being put in, we would object to it first of all but also we want to make certain that whatever the opposition is, whatever the opposing pleading is also becomes part of the record.

THE COURT: We'll deal with it if and when it arises.