GSERM 2023Regression for Publishing

June 20, 2023

Parameter Invariance

Implicit in

$$Y = \mathbf{X}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \mathbf{u}$$


is that

$$\frac{\partial E(Y)}{\partial X_k} = \beta_k \ \forall \text{ values of } X_k, X_\ell, k \neq \ell.$$

Conceptually: The marginal association between Y and every X is identical for all values of X.

Moderators

Moderating variable Z:



Intuition: The marginal association between X and Y varies with / depends on the value(s) of Z.

Moderating variables imply interactive models.

Interaction Effects

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{1i} + \beta_2 X_{2i} + \beta_3 X_{1i} X_{2i} + u_i$$

$$E(Y_i) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{1i} + \beta_2 X_{2i} + \beta_3 X_{1i} X_{2i}$$

= $\beta_0 + \beta_2 X_{2i} + (\beta_1 + \beta_3 X_{2i}) X_{1i}$
= $\beta_0 + \beta_2 X_{2i} + \psi_1 X_{1i}$

where $\psi_1 = \beta_1 + \beta_3 X_{2i}$. This means that the marginal effect:

$$\frac{\partial \mathsf{E}(Y_i)}{\partial X_1} = \beta_1 + \beta_3 X_{2i}.$$

Interaction Effects

Similarly:

$$E(Y_i) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{1i} + (\beta_2 + \beta_3 X_{1i}) X_{2i}$$

= $\beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{1i} + \psi_2 X_{2i}$

which implies:

$$\frac{\partial \mathsf{E}(Y_i)}{\partial X_2} = \beta_2 + \beta_3 X_{1i}.$$

"Direct Effects"

If $X_2 = 0$, then:

$$E(Y_i) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{1i} + \beta_2(0) + \beta_3 X_{1i}(0)$$

= $\beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{1i}$.

Similarly, for $X_1 = 0$:

$$E(Y_i) = \beta_0 + \beta_1(0) + \beta_2 X_{2i} + \beta_3(0) X_{2i} = \beta_0 + \beta_2 X_{2i}$$

Key Point

In most instances, the quantities we care about are not β_1 and β_2 , but rather ψ_1 and ψ_2 .

Inference

Point estimates:

$$\hat{\psi}_1 = \hat{\beta}_1 + \hat{\beta}_3 X_2$$

and

$$\hat{\psi}_2 = \hat{\beta}_2 + \hat{\beta}_3 X_1.$$

For variance, recall that:

$$Var(a + bZ) = Var(a) + Z^{2}Var(b) + 2ZCov(a, b)$$

Inference

Means that:

$$\widehat{\mathsf{Var}(\hat{\psi}_1)} = \widehat{\mathsf{Var}(\hat{\beta}_1)} + X_2^2 \widehat{\mathsf{Var}(\hat{\beta}_3)} + 2X_2 \widehat{\mathsf{Cov}(\hat{\beta}_1, \hat{\beta}_3)}.$$

and

$$\widehat{\mathsf{Var}(\hat{\psi}_2)} = \widehat{\mathsf{Var}(\hat{\beta}_2)} + X_1^2 \widehat{\mathsf{Var}(\hat{\beta}_3)} + 2X_1 \widehat{\mathsf{Cov}(\hat{\beta}_2, \hat{\beta}_3)}.$$

Types of Interactions: Dichotomous Xs


For

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 D_{1i} + \beta_2 D_{2i} + \beta_3 D_{1i} D_{2i} + u_i$$


we have:

$$\begin{split} &\mathsf{E}(Y|D_1=0,D_2=0) &= \beta_0 \\ &\mathsf{E}(Y|D_1=1,D_2=0) &= \beta_0+\beta_1 \\ &\mathsf{E}(Y|D_1=0,D_2=1) &= \beta_0+\beta_2 \\ &\mathsf{E}(Y|D_1=1,D_2=1) &= \beta_0+\beta_1+\beta_2+\beta_3 \end{split}$$

Values of E(Y) for Changes in D_1



Values of E(Y) for Changes in D_2



Dichotomous and Continuous Xs

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 D_i + \beta_3 X_i D_i + u_i$$

gives:


$$E(Y|X, D = 0) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X$$

 $E(Y|X, D = 1) = (\beta_0 + \beta_2) + (\beta_1 + \beta_3) X$


Four possibilities:

- $\beta_2 = \beta_3 = 0$
- $\beta_2 \neq 0$ and $\beta_3 = 0$
- $\beta_2 = 0$ and $\beta_3 \neq 0$
- $\beta_2 \neq 0$ and $\beta_3 \neq 0$


No Slope or Intercept Differences ($\beta_2 = \beta_3 = 0$)




Intercept Shift ($\beta_2 \neq 0, \beta_3 = 0$)



Slope Change ($\beta_2 = 0, \ \beta_3 \neq 0$)



Slope and Intercept Change $(\beta_2 \neq 0, \beta_3 \neq 0)$




Two Continuous Xs

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{1i} + \beta_2 X_{2i} + \beta_3 X_{1i} X_{2i} + u_i$$


Implies

$$\beta_3 = 0 \rightarrow \frac{\partial E(Y)}{\partial X_1} = \beta_1 \,\forall \, X_2 \text{ and } \frac{\partial E(Y)}{\partial X_2} = \beta_2 \,\forall \, X_1$$

Two Continuous Variables: No Interactive Effects



Two Continuous Variables: Interaction Present



Quadratic, Cubic, and Other Polynomial Effects

$$Y_{i} = \beta_{0} + \beta_{1}X_{i} + \beta_{2}X_{i}^{2} + \beta_{3}X_{i}^{3} + \dots + \beta_{j}X_{i}^{j} + u_{i}.$$

In general:

$$\frac{\partial \mathsf{E}(Y)}{\partial X} = \beta_1 + 2\beta_2 X + 3\beta_3 X^2 + \dots + j\beta_j X^{j-1}$$


Quadratic case (j = 2):

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 X_i^2 + u_i$$
.

implies


$$\frac{\partial \mathsf{E}(Y)}{\partial X} = \beta_1 + 2\beta_2 X$$

Two Quadratic Relationships



Note: Red line is $Y_i=10+1X_i-5X_i^2+u_i$; black line is $Y_i=-50-1X_i+3X_i^2+u_i$.

Example of a Cubic Relationship



Note: Solid line is $Y_i = -1 + 1X_i - 8X_i^2 + 5X_i^3 + u_i$.

Higher-Order Interactive Models


Three-way interaction:

$$Y_{i} = \beta_{0} + \beta_{1}X_{1i} + \beta_{2}X_{2i} + \beta_{3}X_{3i} + \beta_{4}X_{1i}X_{2i} + \beta_{5}X_{1i}X_{3i} + \beta_{6}X_{2i}X_{3i} + \beta_{7}X_{1i}X_{2i}X_{3i} + u_{i}$$

Special case of dichotomous X_1 , X_2 :

$$Y_{i} = \beta_{0} + \beta_{1}X_{i} + \beta_{2}D_{1i} + \beta_{3}D_{2i} + \beta_{4}X_{i}D_{1i} + \beta_{5}X_{i}D_{2i} + \beta_{6}D_{1i}D_{2i} + \beta_{7}X_{i}D_{1i}D_{2i} + u_{i}$$

Three-Way Interaction: Two Dummy and One Continuous Covariates



Example: President Clinton's "Thermometer Score"

> summary(ClintonTherm)


```
ClintonTherm
                                      ClintonConserv
   caseid
                           RConserv
Min.
      :1001 Min. : 0
                         Min. :1.00
                                      Min. :1.00
1st Qu.:1440    1st Qu.: 30    1st Qu.:3.00    1st Qu.:2.00
Median: 1854 Median: 60 Median: 4.00
                                      Median:3.00
Mean :2001 Mean : 57 Mean :4.32
                                      Mean :2.98
3rd Qu.:2262 3rd Qu.: 85 3rd Qu.:5.00
                                      3rd Qu.:4.00
           Max. :100 Max. :7.00
Max.
      :3403
                                      Max. :7.00
                 GOP
    PTD
Min.
      :1.00 Min.
                   :0.000
1st Qu.:1.00
           1st Qu.:0.000
Median :2.00 Median :0.000
Mean :2.06 Mean :0.316
3rd Qu.:3.00 3rd Qu.:1.000
Max.
      :5.00 Max.
                   :1.000
```

A Basic Regression

Residual standard error: 23.65 on 1294 degrees of freedom Multiple R-squared: 0.3795, Adjusted R-squared: 0.3786 F-statistic: 395.7 on 2 and 1294 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1


Coefficient Plot: Non-Interactive Model



An Interactive Model

```
> fit1<-with(ClintonTherm, lm(ClintonTherm~RConserv+GOP+
            RConserv*GOP))
> summary(fit1)
Call:
lm(formula = ClintonTherm ~ RConserv + GOP + RConserv * GOP)
Coefficients:
            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 89.9271 2.4866 36.165 < 2e-16 ***
RConserv -5.5705 0.6085 -9.154 < 2e-16 ***
GOP -6.4840 6.5690 -0.987 0.32379
RConserv:GOP -4.0581 1.2808 -3.168 0.00157 **
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
Residual standard error: 23.57 on 1293 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.3843, Adjusted R-squared: 0.3829
F-statistic: 269 on 3 and 1293 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
```

Coefficient Plot: Interactive Model




Two Regressions, Sort Of

$$\begin{split} \mathsf{E}(\mathsf{Thermometer} \mid \mathsf{Non\text{-}GOP})_i &= 89.9 - 6.5(0) - 5.6(\mathsf{R's}\;\mathsf{Conservatism}_i) \\ &- 4.0(0 \times \mathsf{R's}\;\mathsf{Conservatism}_i) \\ &= 89.9 - 5.6(\mathsf{R's}\;\mathsf{Conservatism}_i) \end{split}$$

E(Thermometer | GOP)_i =
$$[89.9 - 6.5(1)] + [-5.6 - 4.0(1 \times \text{R's Conservatism}_i)]$$

= $83.4 - 9.6(\text{R's Conservatism}_i)$

Thermometer Scores by Conservatism, GOP and Non-GOP



Interactive Results are (Almost) Identical to Separate Regressions

```
> NonReps<-subset(ClintonTherm,GOP==0)</pre>
> summary(with(NonReps, lm(ClintonTherm~RConserv)))
Call:
lm(formula = ClintonTherm ~ RConserv, data = NonReps)
Coefficients:
           Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 89.9271
                        2.4695 36.416 <2e-16 ***
RConserv
            -5.5705
                        0.6043 -9.217 <2e-16 ***
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
Residual standard error: 23.41 on 885 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.08759, Adjusted R-squared: 0.08656
F-statistic: 84.96 on 1 and 885 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
```

Interactive Results are (Almost) Identical to Separate Regressions

```
> Reps<-subset(ClintonTherm,GOP==1)</pre>
> summary(with(Reps, lm(ClintonTherm~RConserv)))
Call:
lm(formula = ClintonTherm ~ RConserv, data = Reps)
Coefficients:
           Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 83.443 6.170 13.524 < 2e-16 ***
RConserv -9.629 1.144 -8.419 6.52e-16 ***
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
Residual standard error: 23.92 on 408 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.148, Adjusted R-squared: 0.1459
F-statistic: 70.88 on 1 and 408 DF, p-value: 6.518e-16
```

Discovering $\hat{\psi}_1$ and $\hat{\psi}_2$

For RConserv:

Clinton Thermometer;
$$= \beta_0 + (\beta_1 + \beta_3 \mathsf{GOP}_i)\mathsf{R's} \; \mathsf{Conservatism}_i + \beta_2 \mathsf{GOP}_i + u_i$$

 $= \beta_0 + \psi_{1i}\mathsf{R's} \; \mathsf{Conservatism}_i + \beta_2 \mathsf{GOP}_i + u_i.$

So:

$$\hat{\psi}_{1i} = \hat{\beta}_1 + \hat{\beta}_3 \times \mathsf{GOP}_i$$

and

$$\hat{\sigma}_{\psi_1} = \sqrt{\widehat{\mathsf{Var}(\hat{\beta}_1)} + (\mathsf{GOP})^2 \widehat{\mathsf{Var}(\hat{\beta}_3)} + 2(\mathsf{GOP}) \widehat{\mathsf{Cov}(\hat{\beta}_1, \hat{\beta}_3)}}.$$

Discovering $\hat{\psi}_1$ and $\hat{\psi}_2$

For GOP:

Clinton Thermometer_i =
$$\beta_0 + (\beta_2 + \beta_3 \times R's Conservatism_i)GOP_i + \beta_1(R's Conservatism_i) + u_i$$

= $\beta_0 + \psi_{2i}GOP_i + \beta_1(R's Conservatism_i) + u_i$.

So:

$$\hat{\psi}_{2i} = \hat{eta}_2 + \hat{eta}_3 imes$$
 (R's Conservatism $_i$).

and

$$\hat{\sigma}_{\psi_2} = \sqrt{\widehat{\mathsf{Var}(\hat{\beta}_2)} + \big(\mathsf{R's\ Conservatism}_i\big)^2 \widehat{\mathsf{Var}(\hat{\beta}_3)} + 2k\widehat{\mathsf{Cov}(\hat{\beta}_2,\hat{\beta}_3)}}.$$

Discovering $\hat{\psi}_1$ and $\hat{\psi}_2$

```
> Psi1<-fit1$coeff[2]+fit1$coeff[4]
> Psi1
    RConserv
-9.628577
> SPsi1<-sqrt(vcov(fit1)[2,2] + (1)^2*vcov(fit1)[4,4] + 2*1*vcov(fit1)[2,4])
> SPsi1
[1] 1.127016
> Psi1 / SPsi1 # <-- t-statistic
    RConserv
-8.543422</pre>
```

Discovering $\hat{\psi}_1$ and $\hat{\psi}_2$

```
> # psi_2 | RConserv = 1
> fit1$coeff[3]+(1 * fit1$coeff[4])
    GOP
-10.54208
[1] 5.335847
# Implies t is approximately 2
> # psi_2 | RConserv = 7
> fit1$coeff[3]+(7 * fit1$coeff[4])
    GOP
-34.89045
> sqrt(vcov(fit1)[3,3] + (7)^2*vcov(fit1)[4,4] + 2*7*vcov(fit1)[3,4])
Γ17 3.048302
# t is approximately 11
```

An Easier Way: linearHypothesis()

```
> library(car)
> linearHypothesis(fit1, "RConserv+RConserv:GOP")
Linear hypothesis test
Hypothesis:
R.Conserv + R.Conserv:GOP = 0
Model 1: restricted model
Model 2: ClintonTherm ~ RConserv + GOP + RConserv * GOP
 Res.Df RSS Df Sum of Sq F Pr(>F)
   1294 758714
2 1293 718173 1 40541 72.99 < 2.2e-16 ***
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
> # Note: Same as t-test:
> sqrt(72.99)
[1] 8.543419
```


An Easier Way: linearHypothesis()

```
> # psi_2 | RConserv = 7:
> linearHypothesis(fit1, "GOP+7*RConserv:GOP")
Linear hypothesis test
Hypothesis:
GOP + 7 RConserv: GOP = 0
Model 1: restricted model
Model 2: ClintonTherm ~ RConserv + GOP + RConserv * GOP
 Res.Df RSS Df Sum of Sq F Pr(>F)
   1294 790938
2 1293 718173 1 72766 131.01 < 2.2e-16 ***
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1
```


Marginal Effects Plots, I

```
> ConsSim<-seq(1,7,1)
> psis<-fit1$coeff[3]+(ConsSim * fit1$coeff[4])
> psis.ses<-sqrt(vcov(fit1)[3,3] +
    (ConsSim)^2*vcov(fit1)[4,4] + 2*ConsSim*vcov(fit1)[3,4])

> plot(ConsSim,psis,t="l",lwd=2,xlab="Respondent Conservatism",
    ylab="Estimated Marginal Effect",ylim=c(-40,0))
> lines(ConsSim,psis+(1.96*psis.ses),lty=2,lwd=2)
> lines(ConsSim,psis-(1.96*psis.ses),lty=2,lwd=2)
> abline(h=0,lwd=1,lty=2)
```



Same, Using plot_me



Interacting Two Continuous Covariates

```
> fit2<-with(ClintonTherm.
       lm(ClintonTherm~RConserv+ClintonConserv+RConserv*ClintonConserv))
> summary(fit2)
Call:
lm(formula = ClintonTherm ~ RConserv + ClintonConserv + RConserv *
   ClintonConserv)
Coefficients:
                       Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
                       119.3515 5.1634 23.115 < 2e-16 ***
RConserv
                      -19.5673 1.0362 -18.884 < 2e-16 ***
ClintonConserv
                      -7.9311 1.6477 -4.813 1.66e-06 ***
                                   0.3394 10.695 < 2e-16 ***
RConserv:ClintonConserv 3.6293
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
Residual standard error: 22.03 on 1293 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.4619, Adjusted R-squared: 0.4606
F-statistic: 370 on 3 and 1293 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
```

Hypothesis Tests

```
> fit2$coef[2]+(1*fit2$coef[4])
RConserv
-15.93803
> sqrt(vcov(fit2)[2,2] + (1)^2*vcov(fit2)[4,4] + 2*1*vcov(fit2)[2,4])
[1] 0.7439696
> linearHypothesis(fit2, "RConserv+1*RConserv:ClintonConserv")
Linear hypothesis test
Hypothesis:
RConserv + RConserv:ClintonConserv = 0
Model 1: restricted model
Model 2: ClintonTherm ~ RConserv + ClintonConserv + RConserv * ClintonConserv
           RSS Df Sum of Sq F Pr(>F)
1 1294 850442
2 1293 627658 1 222784 458.94 < 2.2e-16 ***
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
```

More Hypothesis Tests

```
> # psi 1 | ClintonConserv = mean
> fit2$coef[2]+((mean(ClintonTherm$ClintonConserv))*fit2$coef[4])
 RConserv
-8.735424
> sgrt(vcov(fit2)[2.2] + (mean(ClintonTherm$ClintonConserv)^2*vcov(fit2)[4.4] +
                              2*(mean(ClintonTherm$ClintonConserv))*vcov(fit2)[2.4]))
[1] 0.4507971
> pt(((fit2$coef[2]+(2.985*fit2$coef[4])) / sqrt(vcov(fit2)[2,2] +
      (2.985)^2 \times \text{cov}(\text{fit2})[4,4] + 2 \times 2.985 \times \text{cov}(\text{fit2})[2,4]), df = 1293)
    RConserv
6.483788e-74
> # psi 2 | RConserv = 1
> fit2$coef[3]+(1*fit2$coef[4])
ClintonConserv
     -4.301803
> # psi_2 | RConserv = 6
> fit2$coef[3]+(6*fit2$coef[4])
ClintonConserv
      13.84463
```


Marginal Effect Plot, II

```
> psis2<-fit2$coef[3]+(ConsSim*fit2$coef[4])
> psis2.ses<-sqrt(vcov(fit2)[3,3] + (ConsSim)^2*vcov(fit2)[4,4]
+ 2*ConsSim*vcov(fit2)[3,4])


> plot(ConsSim,psis2,t="l",lwd=2,xlab="Respondent's
    Conservatism",ylab="Marginal Effect of Clinton's
    Conservatism",ylim=c(-10,20))
> lines(ConsSim,psis2+(1.96*psis2.ses),lty=2,lwd=2)
```

> lines(ConsSim,psis2-(1.96*psis2.ses),lty=2,lwd=2)

> abline(h=0,lty=2,lwd=1,col="red")




Same, Using plot_me



Predicted Values: A Contour Plot


```
> library(lattice)
> grid<-expand.grid(RConserv=seq(1,7,1),
   ClintonConserv=seq(1,7,1))
> hats<-predict(fit2,newdata=grid)

> levelplot(hats~grid$RConserv*grid$ClintonConserv,
   contour=TRUE,
   cuts=12,pretty=TRUE,xlab="Respondent's Conservatism",
   ylab="Clinton's Conservatism",
   col.regions=heat.colors)
```



Predicted Values: A Wireframe Plot

```
> trellis.par.set("axis.line",list(col="transparent"))
> wireframe(hats~grid$RConserv*grid$ClintonConserv,
    drape=TRUE,
    xlab=list("Respondent's Conservatism",rot=30),
    ylab=list("Clinton's Conservatism",
    rot=-40),zlab=list("Predictions",rot=90),
    scales=list(arrows=FALSE,col="black"),
    zoom=0.85,pretty=TRUE),
    col.regions=colorRampPalette(c("blue","red"))(100))
```



Variable Transformations

Why Transform?

- Induce / conform to linearity
- Induce / conform to additivity
- Induce normality in the u_i s
- Facilitate interpretation
- Make the model fit the theory

Examples

This:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 X_i^{\beta_1} u_i$$

becomes this:

$$ln(Y_i) = ln(\beta_0) + \beta_1 X_i + ln(u_i)$$

And this:

$$\exp(Y_i) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_i + u_i$$

becomes this:

$$Y_i = \ln(\beta_0) + \beta_1 \ln(X_i) + \ln(u_i)$$

Monotonic Transformations

The "Ladder of Powers":

Transformation	р	f(X)	Fox's $f(X)$
Cube	3	X^3	$\frac{X^3-1}{3}$
Square	2	X^2	$\frac{X^2-1}{2}$
(None/Identity)	(1)	(X)	(\bar{X})
Square Root	$\frac{1}{2}$	\sqrt{X}	$2(\sqrt{X}-1)$
Cube Root	1 1 3	$\sqrt[3]{X}$	$3(\sqrt[3]{X}-1)$
Log	0 (sort of)	ln(X)	In(X)
Inverse Cube Root	$-\frac{1}{3}$	$\frac{1}{\sqrt[3]{X}}$	$\frac{\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt[3]{X}}-1\right)}{-\frac{1}{3}}$
Inverse Square Root	$-\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{\sqrt{X}}$	$\frac{\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{X}}-1\right)}{-\frac{1}{2}}$
Inverse	-1	$\frac{1}{X}$	$\frac{\left(\frac{1}{X}-1\right)}{-1}$
Inverse Square	-2	$\frac{1}{X^2}$	$\frac{\left(\frac{1}{X^2}-1\right)}{-2}$
Inverse Cube	-3	$\frac{1}{X^3}$	$\frac{\left(\frac{1}{X^3}-1\right)}{-3}$

A General Rule

Using higher-order power transformations (e.g., squares, cubes, etc.) "inflates" large values and "compresses" small ones; conversely, using lower-order power transformations (logs, etc.) "compresses" large values and "inflates" (or "expands") smaller ones.

Power Transformations: Two Issues

1. X must be positive; so:

$$X^* = X + (|X_{\ell}| + \epsilon)$$

with (CZ's Rule of Thumb):

$$\epsilon = \frac{X_{\ell+1} - X_{\ell}}{2}$$

2. Power transformations generally require that:

$$\frac{X_h}{X_l} > 5$$
 (or so)

A Note On Logarithms

Note that:

$$ln(X|X \le 0)$$
 is undefined.

For X = 0, we might:

- 1. exclude observations,
- 2. add some arbitrary amount (perhaps 1.0) to all observations
- 3. add some arbitrary amount (perhaps 1.0) to observations where X=0
- 4. add some arbitrary amount (perhaps 1.0) to observations where X=0, and include a variable D_i in your regression, where:


$$D_i = \begin{cases} 1 \text{ if } X_i = 0 \\ 0 \text{ otherwise} \end{cases}$$

The short answer: Do #4. Find out more at this poster.

A Note On Logarithms (continued)

For X < 0, we should think about how we expect X and Y to covary when X < 0:


- 1. a "shift", where the logarithmic form starts at values of X less than zero,
- 2. a "V-curve," where E(Y|X=k)=E(Y|X=-k), or
- 3. an "S-curve," where the X-Y relationship for X<0 "mirrors" that for X>0 [so E(Y|X=k)=-E(Y|X=-k)]



Which is correct? It depends on your theory. Again: find out more at this poster.

Which Transformation?

Mosteller and Tukey's "Bulging Rule":



Transformed Xs: Interpretation

For:

$$ln(Y_i) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_i + u_i,$$

then:

$$\mathsf{E}(Y) = \exp(\beta_0 + \beta_1 X_i)$$

and so:

$$\frac{\partial \mathsf{E}(Y)}{\partial X} = \exp(\beta_1).$$

Transformed Xs: Interpretation

Similarly, for:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln(X_i) + u_i$$

we have:

$$\frac{\partial \mathsf{E}(Y)}{\partial \ln(X)} = \beta_1.$$

So doubling X (say, from X_{ℓ} to $2X_{\ell}$):

$$\begin{array}{rcl} \Delta \mathsf{E}(Y) & = & \mathsf{E}(Y|X = 2X_{\ell}) - \mathsf{E}(Y|X = X_{\ell}) \\ & = & [\beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln(2X_{\ell})] - [\beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln(X_{\ell})] \\ & = & \beta_1 [\ln(2X_{\ell}) - \ln(X_{\ell})] \\ & = & \beta_1 \ln(2) \end{array}$$

Log-Log Regressions

Specifying:

$$ln(Y_i) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 ln(X_i) + ... + u_i$$

means:

Elasticity
$$_{YX}\equiv \frac{\%\Delta Y}{\%\Delta X}=\beta_1.$$

IOW, a one-percent change in X leads to a $\hat{\beta}_1$ -percent change in Y.

Nonmonotonicity

Simple solution: Polynomials...

• Second-order / quadratic:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 X_i^2 + u_i$$

• Third-order / cubic:

$$Y_{i} = \beta_{0} + \beta_{1}X_{i} + \beta_{2}X_{i}^{2} + \beta_{3}X_{i}^{3} + u_{i}$$

pth-order:

$$Y_{i} = \beta_{0} + \beta_{1}X_{i} + \beta_{2}X_{i}^{2} + \beta_{3}X_{i}^{3} + \dots + \beta_{p}X_{i}^{p} + u_{i}$$

Understanding Polynomials

Read coefficients "left to right." So, for:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 X_i^2 + u_i$$

then:

	\hat{eta}_2					
\hat{eta}_1	< 0	= 0	> 0			
< 0	E(Y) decreases in X at an increasing rate	E(Y) decreases linearly in X	E(Y) decreases in X at low values of X , but increases in X at high values of X			
= 0	$E(Y)$ decreases in X^2	E(Y) is (quadratically) unrelated to X	$E(Y)$ increases in X^2			
> 0	E(Y) increases in X at low values of X , but decreases in X at high values of X	E(Y) increases linearly in X	E(Y) increases in X at an increasing rate			

An Example: Military Spending and GDP

Q: Are Militaries Luxury Goods?


Data are from the CNTS Data archive...

- Panel-type data on ≈ 200 countries over ≈ 70 years (1946-2014)
- Two variables:
 - Y = National Defense Expenditures Per Capita (in thousands of constant \$U.S.)
 - X = GDP Per Capita (at factor cost, in thousands of constant \$U.S.)

```
> summary(Data)
   BanksCode
                   WRCode
                                   Year
                                                  BanksCountry
 Min.
        . 10
                       : 722
                               Min.
                                      .1946
                                             Afghanistan:
 1st Qu.: 310
               AFG
                         69
                               1st Qu.:1972
                                             Albania
                                                            69
 Median: 680
               ALB.
                         69
                              Median:1987
                                             Argentina :
                                                            69
 Mean
        : 661
               ARG
                         69
                               Mean
                                     :1986
                                             Australia :
                                                            69
               AUS
 3rd Qu.:1000
                         69
                              3rd Qu.:2001
                                             Belgium
                                                            69
       :1300
               BEL.
                              Max.
                                     :2014
                                             Bolivia
                                                            69
 Max.
                         69
                (Other):9589
                                              (Other)
                                                      :10242
                                          GDP
    AreaKM2
                     Population
                                                       MilitarySpending
 Min.
                   Min.
                                     Min.
                                              0.021
                                                       Min.
                                                                 0.00
           30000
                   1st Qu.:
                              1596
                                     1st Qu.:
                                              0.280
                                                       1st Qu.:
                                                                 0.38
 1st Qu.:
 Median :
          164000
                   Median: 6130
                                     Median: 0.884
                                                       Median :
                                                                 1.17
 Mean
       : 818610
                   Mean
                             28738
                                     Mean
                                          : 4.563
                                                       Mean
                                                                 5.38
                         :
 3rd Qu.:
          600000
                    3rd Qu.: 18148
                                     3rd Qu.: 3.411
                                                       3rd Qu.: 4.68
 Max.
        :22402000
                    Max.
                          :1354503
                                     Max.
                                            :186.243
                                                       Max.
                                                               :222.22
                    NA's
                          : 6
                                     NA's
                                            :1208
                                                       NA's
                                                              :7790
```


Summaries...

1 9448 4.56 10.65 0.88 2.03 1.09 0.02 186.24 186.22 5.85




54.74 0.11


"Ladder of Powers": GDP



"Ladder of Powers": Military Spending



Scatterplots



Linear-Linear (Untransformed)

Untransformed:

```
> linlin <- with(Data, lm(MilitarySpending~GDP))</pre>
> summary(linlin)
Call:
lm(formula = MilitarySpending ~ GDP)
Residuals:
  Min
         10 Median 30
                             Max
-46.08 -1.88 -1.41 -0.46 191.61
Coefficients:
           Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 1.2936 0.2430 5.32 0.00000011 ***
GDP
             2.9123 0.0823 35.39 < 2e-16 ***
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1
Residual standard error: 11.3 on 2810 degrees of freedom
  (7844 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared: 0.308, Adjusted R-squared: 0.308
F-statistic: 1.25e+03 on 1 and 2810 DF, p-value: <2e-16
```

Linear-Log (Transforming X)

Logging X:

```
> linlog <- with(Data, lm(MilitarySpending~log(GDP)))</pre>
> summary(linlog)
Call:
lm(formula = MilitarySpending ~ log(GDP))
Residuals:
  Min
         1Q Median 3Q
                             Max
-22.55 -4.63 -1.25 2.23 201.86
Coefficients:
           Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 8.458 0.241 35.1 <2e-16 ***
log(GDP)
             5.155
                        0.166 31.0 <2e-16 ***
---
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1
Residual standard error: 11.7 on 2810 degrees of freedom
  (7844 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared: 0.255, Adjusted R-squared: 0.255
F-statistic: 963 on 1 and 2810 DF, p-value: <2e-16
```

Log-Linear (Transforming Y)

```
Logging Y:
```

```
> loglin <- with(Data, lm(log(MilitarySpending+1)~GDP))</pre>
> summary(loglin)
Call:
lm(formula = log(MilitarySpending + 1) ~ GDP)
Residuals:
          10 Median
                        3Q
                              Max
  Min
-4.751 -0.538 -0.203 0.451 3.284
Coefficients:
           Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.77309 0.01650 46.9 <2e-16 ***
GDP
           0.25864 0.00559 46.3 <2e-16 ***
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1
Residual standard error: 0.766 on 2810 degrees of freedom
  (7844 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared: 0.433, Adjusted R-squared: 0.433
F-statistic: 2.14e+03 on 1 and 2810 DF, p-value: <2e-16
```

Log-Log (Transforming X and Y)

```
Logging X and Y:
```

```
> loglog <- with(Data, lm(log(MilitarySpending+1)~log(GDP)))</pre>
> summary(loglog)
Call:
lm(formula = log(MilitarySpending + 1) ~ log(GDP))
Residuals:
  Min
          10 Median
                       30
                              Max
-3.165 -0.359 -0.039 0.302 2.668
Coefficients:
           Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 1.4980 0.0126 118.7 <2e-16 ***
log(GDP) 0.6101 0.0087 70.1 <2e-16 ***
---
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1
Residual standard error: 0.613 on 2810 degrees of freedom
  (7844 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared: 0.636, Adjusted R-squared: 0.636
F-statistic: 4.91e+03 on 1 and 2810 DF, p-value: <2e-16
```


(Slightly) Prettier Table...

	Linear Y		Logged Y	
	<u>Linear-Linear</u>	Linear-Log	Log-Linear	Log-Log
(Constant)	1.29***	8.46***	0.77***	1.50***
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.02)	(0.01)
GDP	2.91***		0.26***	
	(80.0)		(0.01)	
log(GDP)	, ,	5.15***	, ,	0.61***
		(0.17)		(0.01)
Observations	2,812	2,812	2,812	2,812
R ²	0.31	0.26	0.43	0.64
Adjusted R ²	0.31	0.25	0.43	0.64
Residual Std. Error (df = 2810)	11.28	11.70	0.77	0.61
F Statistic (df = 1; 2810)	1,252.62***	963.03***	2,143.49***	4,912.36**

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Density Plots of \hat{u}_i s



Transformation Tips

- Theory is valuable.
- Try different things.
- Look at plots.
- It takes practice.