



United States Human Rights Policy and Foreign Assistance

Author(s): Clair Apodaca and Michael Stohl

Source: *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Mar., 1999), pp. 185-198

Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The International Studies Association

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600970>

Accessed: 24/08/2008 14:19

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at <http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=black>.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

United States Human Rights Policy and Foreign Assistance

CLAIR APODACA

Florida International University

AND

MICHAEL STOHL

Purdue University

This study furthers the inquiry into the relationship between human rights and U.S. bilateral foreign aid. We build the most comprehensive data set to date, extending the time period (1976–1995) and enlarging the number of countries under review (140). Rhetoric aside, human rights considerations did play a role in determining whether or not a state received military aid during the Reagan and Bush administrations, but not for the Carter or Clinton administration. With the exception of the Clinton administration, human rights was a determinant factor in the decision to grant economic aid, albeit of secondary importance. To the question “Does a state’s human rights record affect the amount of U.S. bilateral aid it receives?” we answer yes for economic aid, but no for military aid. Human rights considerations are neither the only nor the primary consideration in aid allocation.

Human Rights Policy: Its Formulation and Evolution

The last decade has witnessed a surge of publications investigating the linkage of human rights and United States foreign policy. This scholarly interest arose in the decade following congressional initiatives designed to ensure that U.S. bilateral foreign assistance would be contingent on the recipient country’s human rights record. Since that time, several studies have shown that there is little evidence that the congressional mandate has been followed. The majority of the work has centered on the quantitative differences between the Carter and Reagan administrations with respect to their foreign aid distribution. This study expands previous scholarship on this topic by including the second Reagan administration, along with the Bush and Clinton terms in office. We build on the work of Schoultz (1981), Stohl, Carleton, and Johnson (1984), and Carleton and Stohl (1985, 1987), while incorporating the refinements of Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) and Poe (1991, 1992) to determine the relationship between human rights violations and the distribution of U.S. foreign aid in the presidential administrations from Jimmy Carter through Bill Clinton.

Authors’ note: The authors would like to thank T. David Mason, Francois Debrix, and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and advice. Any errors remain our own.

©1999 International Studies Association.

Published by Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK.

Congressional interest in human rights was originally spurred by the American civil rights movement, the backlash against American involvement in Vietnam, and disenchantment with the amoral character of the Nixon-Kissinger-Ford foreign policy (Carleton and Stohl, 1985:206). Congress wrote into law formal requirements for the restriction or denial of foreign aid to countries that consistently violated the human rights of their citizens.¹ Congress and the American public believed that U.S. foreign policy should reflect the moral principles of the nation. Thus, foreign aid ought to be directed to democratic regimes that respect human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The Carter administration (1976–1980) pledged to implement a foreign policy based on moral considerations. Carter vowed to link foreign assistance to the human rights performance of the recipient country. In accordance with Carter's rhetoric, and relying upon the existent legislative package on human rights, we hypothesize that during the Carter administration human rights performance is a good predictor of aid distributions.

The rhetoric of the Reagan White House emphasized the return of U.S. strength and prestige. International terrorism (antistate attacks) was declared to be the principal threat to human rights. Not surprisingly, the Reagan administration identified the Soviet Union as the source of international terrorism and hence the chief provocateur of human rights abuse. Anticommunism, camouflaged as human rights, led the Reagan administration to fund and maintain undemocratic regimes. Therefore, we expect to find a significant negative relationship between human rights and bilateral aid distributions during the Reagan administration.

The Bush administration's human rights policy, in the well-respected opinion of Jack Donnelly, "lay somewhere between those of its predecessors" in both word and deed (1993:116). During the Bush years, human rights objectives were neither the "heart" of U.S. foreign policy nor entirely downplayed and minimized. Bush's human rights policy was much less moralistic, more pragmatic, yielding to realism and post-Cold War power politics (Forsythe, 1995). Bush's foreign policy incorporated "moral impulses as long as they did not prove inconvenient to expedient concerns" (Forsythe, 1995:126). Therefore, we postulate that human rights would play a secondary role, behind economic and strategic interests, in the allocation of U.S. foreign aid during the Bush years.

Campaigning for presidential office in 1992, Bill Clinton reproached George Bush for his indifference to democracy and human rights in foreign policy considerations. In particular, Clinton criticized Bush for his policy of returning fleeing Haitians, for renewing China's most-favored-nation (MFN) status following the Tiananmen Square massacre, and for failing to take decisive action in Bosnia. Upon assuming office in 1993 Clinton included in his rhetoric a warning to China that his administration "has made human rights a cornerstone of our foreign policy." Thus, we expect human rights to play a pivotal role in the allotment of foreign aid during the Clinton years. There should be a positive relationship between respect for human rights and aid distribution after 1993.

Building a Model of Foreign Aid Allocation

To replicate and extend prior studies in the investigation of presidential compliance with congressional legislation linking the allocation of foreign aid to a country's human rights standard, we collect and analyze data on 140 countries from 1976 to

¹ Congress enacted a series of legislation linking foreign aid and trade benefits to the status of human rights in foreign countries. Notably, the Harkin Amendment (Section 116) of the International Development and Food Assistance; Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act; The International Security and Arms Export Control Act; the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Reform Act, and Section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act.

1995 (see the Appendix for list of countries).² We employ the two-stage framework in foreign U.S. bilateral aid decision-making conceptualized by Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985). Cingranelli and Pasquarello suggest that

[i]n the initial stage the US policy-makers performed a function analogous to "gatekeeping"; some countries were systematically excluded from the recipient pool, while others were passed on to the second stage of the decision-process. In the second stage policy-makers interacted to decide the level of assistance to be provided. (1985:540)

For the first stage, the gate-keeping stage, we use the statistical method of logistic regression to estimate the model.³ Logistic regression estimates the coefficients of a probabilistic model involving a set of independent variables that best predict the value of a dichotomous dependent variable (foreign aid granted, yes = 1, no = 0). To estimate the second stage of our model, a pooled-time series (country by year) and a least squares dummy variable (LSDV) procedure was used.⁴

Dependent and Independent Variables

Even the most optimistic human rights advocate would not believe that the U.S. would forego its strategic interests in favor of human rights concerns. Foreign aid is often used to further U.S. foreign policy, for diplomatic, compensatory, and strategic purposes rather than humanitarian purposes (Guess, 1987). Thus, Steven Poe and his collaborators attempted to rectify the shortcomings of previous research by including several control variables; variables that would logically assert some influence on U.S. foreign policy considerations (Poe, 1991, 1992; Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1994; Poe et al., 1997). We use the model designed by Poe and his collaborators with some further modifications. Several control variables (below) are now included in the equation to model the political, economic, and humanitarian determinants of U.S. bilateral foreign aid.

² Ideally, we would have liked to include every country for the entire time frame, but this was not possible. The inclusion and exclusion of countries from our study does present a sample selection problem, but incorporates the realities of a changing international environment and the difficulties inherent in cross-national research. The number of states has not remained static during the time frame of our study. For example, the explosion of new states due to the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1990 created a different sample in 1990 from the samples prior to 1990. Excluding these countries from our study in an attempt to maintain a single sample would distort the value and usefulness of our study. Several countries, such as the micro-states of Cento, Sao Tome and Principe, and Brunei, are excluded due to a lack of available data. Lack of data is a problem common to all cross-national studies. Furthermore, we exclude from our inquiry OECD countries. During the time frame under review (1976–1995) these countries were never seriously considered for U.S. foreign aid. Since these countries are generally considered economically wealthy, democratic, and human rights observing, their inclusion would bias the results, leading one to conclude that the U.S. does not grant assistance to countries that observe human rights standards.

³ Since the logistic regressions are run separately for each presidential administration (with a maximum of four years) the threat of autocorrelation is minor. For an excellent discussion of determining equation fit see Lottes, DeMaris, and Adler, 1996.

⁴ To estimate the model, the data are stacked or pooled (country by year) and a least squares dummy variable covariance (LSDV) procedure was used. When analyzing a data set that has marked heteroskedasticity, and is cross-sectionally dominant (there are a large number of cases and only a few time points), a LSDV model is appropriate and can correct for problems of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation by allowing the intercept to vary by time and across sections. Thus, the intercept manifests the effects unique to the cross-sections. There are, of course, some general drawbacks in using a LSDV model. A weakness of LSDV modeling is the interpretation of dummy variables. The coefficients of the dummy variables can only be interpreted as how each category differs from the reference category. In our study, the reference category is the Carter administration, and the LSDV estimates reflect how each presidential administration deviates from the coefficient calculated for Carter. For a complete discussion on the LSDV method see Stimson, 1985, and Sayers, 1989.

Foreign Aid. Our dependent variable is U.S. bilateral military and economic aid per capita. Data on U.S. foreign aid are taken from the Agency for International Development's annual publication, *United States Overseas Loans and Grants* (various years). The dependent variable for the logistic regression is dichotomized (foreign aid granted, yes = 1, no = 0).

Past Aid. We believe that past aid is a significant determinant of present aid. Foreign aid appropriations have for the past several years been incorporated into the continuing appropriations resolutions. Guess (1987) concludes that the continuing resolutions are the result of the bureaucratic inability to agree on appropriations. Aid allocations, without decisive intervention, are the outcome of bureaucratic procedures and routines based on organizational interest allowing only incremental change (Allison, 1971). Aid is lagged one year.

Human Rights Measure. The Political Terror Scale (PTS)⁵ codes countries on a scale of 1 to 5 according to the level of terror reported in annual State Department country reports and Amnesty International reports. We average these to comprise an index of political terror. The strength of this PTS index is its balance. The Political Terror Scale counterbalances the often biased reports of the State Department⁶ with the ideologically and politically neutral Amnesty International reports.

Needy People. U.S. foreign aid legislation allows for the continuation of economic assistance to even the most repressive governments if the aid programs directly benefit the needy people of the country. The fulfillment of basic human needs for the recipient country's citizens may legitimately influence the decision to provide foreign economic aid to countries that blatantly and brutally violate human rights standards. To assess recipient need, the measure of GNP per capita was used. The data are reported in the World Bank annual publication *World Tables* (various years), supplemented with data from Ruth Sivard's *World Military and Social Expenditures* (various years).

Economic Importance. Economic importance is measured by the amount of exports from the U.S. into the country one year prior to the aid package. Data on exports, in millions of U.S. dollars, are taken from the International Monetary Fund's annual publication *Direction of Trade Yearbook*.

Military Presence. A country's strategic importance to U.S. security interests is gauged by the number of military personnel stationed within the country. Data are taken from the U.S. Department of Defense annual publication *Worldwide Manpower Distribution by Geographical Area* for the years under review.

Latin America. A country offers a strategic interest to the U.S. if it is located within the traditional power sphere of the U.S. Since the inception of the Monroe Doctrine, the U.S. has attempted to establish a sphere of influence in Latin America. The country is coded 1 if it is located in Latin America, 0 if not.

Presidential Administration. Each presidential administration is coded as a dummy variable using the Carter administration as the referent. Reagan's first

⁵ For a discussion on the methodology and coding scheme used in the PTS see Gibney and Dalton, 1996.

⁶ For a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the State Department's *Country Reports* see Americas Watch, Helsinki Watch and Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1985. For a discussion of the merits and shortcomings of the Amnesty reports see Poe, Tate, and Keith, 1997.

administration (0 = no, 1 = yes); Reagan's second administration (0 = no, 1 = yes); Bush administration (0 = no, 1 = yes); Clinton administration (0 = no, 1 = yes).

The Findings

Past studies suggest the decision to provide foreign aid involves a two-stage decision-making process (Cingranelli and Pasquarello, 1985; Poe, 1991, 1992; Poe and Tate, 1994). The gatekeeping stage involves the decision of whether or not a country is to be given aid. The second stage determines how much aid countries will receive. Each stage requires a different statistical method.

Turning to the gatekeeping stage, Table 1 shows the result of the logistic regression. Logit,⁷ a maximum likelihood estimation procedure, is used since the dependent variable is dichotomous (foreign aid granted, yes = 1, no = 0).

That human rights violations reduce the odds of receiving economic aid from the U.S. is evident from the significant $\exp(b)$ during the Carter administration, both the Reagan administrations, and the Bush administration. The measure of human rights is statistically significant for each administration with the exception of the Clinton administration. Human rights, for the Clinton administration, do not increase or decrease a country's odds of receiving economic aid from the U.S. The Clinton administration does not appear to be sensitive to human rights issues at the gatekeeping stage of foreign aid assistance.

The results of the model also indicate that other interests have statistically significant impact on the decision of whether a country receives U.S. economic aid or not. Past aid has the largest and most statistically significant impact on whether a country receives aid for every administration. For each administration the variable of need, as measured by GNP per capita, was large and statistically significant. A rise in GNP per capita reduced the odds of receiving U.S. economic aid.

Table 2 displays similar results for U.S. bilateral military aid. Our human rights measure, PTS, is statistically significant for the two Reagan administrations and the Bush administration. This indicates that during the Reagan and Bush years, rhetoric aside, human rights played a pivotal role in determining who received aid. A statistically significant negative PTS coefficient indicates that a rise in human rights abuses reduced a country's odds of being granted military assistance. Again, the model demonstrates that other interests influence the decision as to whether or not a country receives U.S. foreign assistance. Having received foreign aid in the past greatly increases the odds of being allocated aid in the present time period.

At the second stage of foreign aid allocation, an LSDV technique is used to estimate the influence of human rights, basic human needs, U.S. economic interest, and U.S. military presence on the amount of aid granted. At this stage, we limit our

⁷ Because logistic regression is less well known than OLS regression, an explanation of how to interpret the result is in order. Betas in a logistic regression represent a change in the log odds due to unit increments in the value of the independent variable. Thus, for example, Table 1 reveals that during the Carter administration, a one-point increase in a PTS reduces the log odds (-.64) of a country being in the category of aid recipient. The beta (b) estimates the change in the log odds of being in the category of interest (receiving U.S. aid) for a one-unit increase in each predictor variable, while controlling for all other predictors in the model. Furthermore, as DeMaris (1992) explains, the exponential beta, $\exp(b)$, can be used to determine the percentage change in the odds for every one-unit increase in the predictor variable. The $\exp(b)$ "is the estimated multiplicative change in the odds for a one-unit increase in the j th predictor, and $100[\exp(b)-1]$ is the estimated percentage change in the odds for a one-unit increase in the j th predictor" (1992:46). Extending the example used above, during the Carter administration, each additional unit increase in PTS reduces the odds of receiving economic aid by about 47 percent [$100(\exp(b)-1) = -47.0$].

TABLE 1. Logit Regression Estimates of the Effects of Human Rights Measures on the Probability of Receiving U.S. Economic Assistance for Each Presidential Administration

Dependent variable: Recipient of U.S. Economic Aid (Yes or No)													
<i>Carter Administration:</i>			<i>Reagan I Administration:</i>			<i>Reagan II Administration:</i>			<i>Bush Administration:</i>			<i>Clinton Administration:</i>	
	<i>B</i>	<i>Exp(B)</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Exp(B)</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Exp(B)</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Exp(B)</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Exp(B)</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Exp(B)</i>	
	(<i>S.E.</i>)		(<i>S.E.</i>)		(<i>S.E.</i>)		(<i>S.E.</i>)		(<i>S.E.</i>)		(<i>S.E.</i>)		
Past Aid	2.12*** (.54)	8.30	3.00*** (.41)	20.05	3.45*** (.43)	31.53	2.44*** (.39)	11.05	1.35* (.71)			3.87	
PTS	-.64* (.31)	.53	-.62** (.23)	.54	-.50* (.21)	.61	-.64** (.21)	.53	-.21 (.26)			.81	
Economic Interest	-.27 (.18)	.76	-.13 (.12)	.88	.09 (.09)	1.09	.03 (.10)	1.03	-.34* (.20)			.72	
Need	-1.62*** (.33)	.20	-1.47*** (.23)	.23	-1.66*** (.23)	.19	-1.37*** (.22)	.25	-1.74*** (.39)			.18	
Military Presence	.42 (.32)	1.53	.38 (.25)	1.46	.17 (.23)	1.19	.02 (.20)	1.02	.29 (.33)			1.33	
Latin American Region	2.32** (.72)	10.14	3.09*** (.73)	22.06	.71 (.47)	2.03	1.77** (.55)	5.89	10.12 (30.18)			24904.3	
Constant	13.73*** (2.15)		11.18*** (1.74)		11.23*** (1.82)		11.09*** (1.82)		13.84*** (2.66)				
N=252			N=388			N=390			N=389			N=303	
Chi-square	df	Sign.	6.0000	Sign.	6.0000	229.91	Sign.	6.0000	142.73	Sign.	6.0009	df	Sign.
Goodness of fit			190.42		332.75		294.95				301.96	5.27	6.0000
PRE			10.0%		50.0%		50.7%				2.3%		608.91
													10.5%

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

TABLE 2. Logit Regression Estimates of the Effects of Human Rights Measures on the Probability of Receiving U.S. Military Assistance for Each Presidential Administration

Dependent variable: Recipient of U.S. Military Aid (Yes or No)	<i>Carter Administration:</i>			<i>Reagan I Administration:</i>			<i>Reagan II Administration:</i>			<i>Bush Administration:</i>			<i>Clinton Administration:</i>		
	<i>B</i> (<i>S.E.</i>)	<i>Exp(B)</i>		<i>B</i> (<i>S.E.</i>)	<i>Exp(B)</i>		<i>B</i> (<i>S.E.</i>)	<i>Exp(B)</i>		<i>B</i> (<i>S.E.</i>)	<i>Exp(B)</i>		<i>B</i> (<i>S.E.</i>)	<i>Exp(B)</i>	
Past Aid	1.88*** (.33)	6.55		2.81*** (.30)	16.64		3.09*** (.32)	21.89		1.96*** (.27)	7.12		1.68*** (.30)	5.38	
PTS	-.25* (.17)	.78		-.48** (.17)	.64		-.72*** (.17)	.49		-.30* (.15)	.74		-.20 (.15)	1.09	
Economic Interest	.39** (.13)	1.47		.10 (.10)	1.11		.14 (.09)	1.15		.13* (.08)	1.14		.08 (.09)	1.08	
Need	-1.11*** (.23)	.34		-1.19*** (.18)	.31		-1.09*** (.17)	.34		-.69*** (.15)	.50		-.13 (.16)	.88	
Military Presence	.26 (.23)	1.30		1.31*** (.34)	3.73		.32 (.22)	1.37		.03 (.15)	1.03		.02 (.19)	1.01	
Latin American Region	.50 (.34)	1.64		.90* (.38)	2.45		.61 (.40)	1.84		.89* (.38)	2.43		.29 (.43)	1.33	
Constant	4.88*** (1.35)			6.18*** (1.22)			7.22*** (1.25)			4.48*** (1.01)			.97 (1.03)		
	N=252			N=388			N=390			N=389			N=303		
Chi-square	df	Sign.		df	Sign.		df	Sign.		df	Sign.		df	Sign.	
Goodness of fit	91.58	6.0000		226.63	6.0000		220.37	6.0000		106.29	6.0000		42.15	6.0000	
PRE		260.59			357.55			386.09			426.36			293.18	
		43.8%			52.8%			47.9%			4.8%			-42.6%	

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

data set to only those countries that received aid. Thus, our pooled cross-national time series regression equation is as follows:

$$\text{Foreign Aid}_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Past Aid}_{t-1} + \beta_2 \text{PTS} + \beta_3 \text{Need} + \beta_4 \text{Economic Interest} + \beta_5 \text{Military Presence} + \beta_6 \text{Latin America} + e$$

where i =presidential administration; t =1977, . . . , 1995; e =error term

Table 3 reveals that, for economic aid, the coefficients for PTS, military presence, and Latin America are statistically significant.⁸ Interestingly, the dummy variables for presidential administration never reach statistical significance. The Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations are not statistically different in the allocation of aid from the Carter administration (our referent category). This confirms the previous observation that there is very little overall variation between presidential administrations in the allocation of economic aid.

We use a duplicate model to estimate the relationship between PTS and the apportionment of U.S. bilateral military assistance while controlling for recipient need, military presence and economic interests, Latin America, and presidential administration. The results are presented in Table 3. Human rights, as measured by the PTS scale, is statistically insignificant. Human rights do not influence the amount of military aid a country receives. U.S. military presence is a significant determinant of aid allocation. The distinctive consideration given to Latin America in foreign assistance disbursement extends to military aid. Interestingly, presidential administrations are now statistically significant. The first Reagan administration is not significantly different in military aid allocation from the Carter administration, our referent category. However, in Reagan's second term, along with the Bush and Clinton administrations, there is a significant reduction in military aid appropriations.

Discussion

In the first study of its kind, Lars Schoultz (1981) found that aid was given disproportionately to those countries that abused the human rights of their citizens. A study by Stohl, Carleton, and Johnson (1984) determined that during the Nixon-Ford administrations there was a positive relationship between human rights violations and foreign aid. Expanding the data set to include more countries and time points, we find mixed results.

Given the rhetoric of the Carter administration, which insisted that its commitment to human rights was absolute, we expected the relationship between human rights and aid to be positive and statistically significant during the Carter years. Earlier studies indicate that there was no significant relationship between human rights performance and U.S. aid during the Carter years (Stohl et al., 1984; Carleton and Stohl, 1985). Carter's good intentions were often undermined by the realities of power politics. Our study also provides evidence that human rights concerns did not play an absolute role in the allocation of foreign aid during the Carter administration. At the gatekeeping stage (when the initial decision of whether or not a country is to be considered a potential economic aid recipient), human rights concerns did come into play during the Carter administration. Higher levels of

⁸ Conventional statistical tests were performed to confirm that the assumptions of LSDV were observed. A Goldfeld-Quandt test, along with visual inspection of the residual scatterplot, demonstrate that heteroskedasticity is also not a problem. Correlations analysis of the independent variables demonstrates the absence of multicollinearity. A Durbin's-H test demonstrates that first order autocorrelation is not a problem.

TABLE 3. LSDV Regression of the Effects of Human Rights, Economic and Strategic Interests on U.S. Foreign Assistance

	<i>Economic Aid</i>			<i>Military Aid</i>		
	<i>b</i> (S.E.)	<i>Beta</i>	<i>sign.</i>	<i>b</i> (S.E.)	<i>Beta</i>	<i>sign.</i>
Past Aid	.71*** (.02)	.71	.0000	.82*** (.02)	.82	.0000
PTS	-.61** (.23)	-.05	.0085	-.004 (.10)	-.001	.9498
Need	-.16 (.26)	-.01	.5313	.06 (.14)	.01	.6433
Economic Interest	-.18 (.13)	-.03	.1813	.03 (.07)	.01	.6472
Military Presence	.65* (.27)	.05	.0160	.28** (.10)	.05	.0079
Latin America	2.29*** (.54)	.09	.0000	-.37* (.21)	-.03	.0780
<i>Presidential intercepts</i>						
Reagan I	.68 (.67)	.03	.3067	.26 (.36)	.02	.4676
Reagan II	.76 (.67)	.03	.2619	-.68* (.26)	-.05	.0106
Bush	.61 (.66)	.02	.3552	-.46* (.26)	-.04	.0758
Clinton	-.26 (.69)	-.01	.7066	-.57* (.27)	-.04	.0370
R sq.	.56			.71		
Adj. R sq.	.56			.71		
	N=1421			N=1424		

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

human rights abuses reduced the odds of receiving economic aid by 47 percent. But human rights concerns are not the only, nor the largest consideration in the determination of economic aid. Economic need, past aid, and the U.S. traditional interest in Latin America proved to have a greater impact on the decision to grant foreign economic assistance during the Carter years.

For military aid, our indicator of human rights did not reach statistical significance. David Forsythe (1988) reports that the application of 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act resulted in the termination of security assistance to Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Yet human rights legislation was ignored in the case of Indonesia, El Salvador (1980–early 1981), and Guatemala (1980 through early 1981). Carter's human rights policy was limited to a few select countries. Our study finds that there were no major alterations in the relationship between foreign assistance and human rights from the Carter years into the Reagan years. Reagan's campaign promises proclaimed that he would reverse Carter's human rights policy insofar as the provision of foreign assistance was concerned. However, these promises were not fulfilled.

The logit regression reveals that, for economic aid, an increase in human rights abuses, as measured by the PTS, reduced the odds of a country receiving aid during the two Reagan terms in office. This supports prior statistical study which found that

human rights concerns did significantly influence U.S. foreign economic aid during the Reagan years (Poe, 1991, 1992). Hofrenning also concluded that, with regard to economic aid in 1983, "there was more sensitivity to human rights during the Reagan administration than in the Carter administration" (1990:523). Again, human rights concerns, during the Reagan administration, were not the most important factor in decision-making. Perhaps the most surprising finding is that during the Reagan era human rights considerations played a statistically significant role in the decision of whether or not to grant military aid (see Table 2). Higher levels of human rights abuses reduced the odds of receiving military aid.

Given Reagan's declaration that human rights were not a proper concern of foreign policy, how can we explain these findings? According to Donnelly, during the Reagan years, "human rights actually became more and more institutionalized in U.S. foreign policy" (1995:239). The Congress was controlled by the Democrats who were more committed to human rights, or at least, committed to maintaining congressional initiatives constraining executive prerogatives in matters of foreign policy. The 1980s were also associated with a rise in pressure groups and nongovernmental organizations concerned with human rights. Moreover, the State Department bureaucracy became more professional in its development of exacting procedures and meticulous routines in the collection and reporting of country-specific human rights.

We find that the differences between Carter and Reagan's human rights policies were not as great as their critics, or champions, like to claim. Carter's assertion that his commitment to human rights was absolute is not borne out by the actual distributions of bilateral foreign assistance. Human rights were subordinated to other concerns on numerous occasions. The Reagan administration's efforts to dismiss human rights as a policy objective were at least partially stymied by Congress, human rights advocacy groups, and public opinion, and consequently the outcomes of such efforts were closer to the Carter administration in the actual distribution of foreign assistance than Reagan or Carter imagined. This supports the findings of the Poe studies (Poe, 1991, 1992; Poe et al., 1994) and their conclusions that human rights abuses do affect U.S. economic and military aid during both the Carter and Reagan administrations.

Forsythe's (1995:126) characterization of President Bush's human rights policy as a mix of "moral impulses as long as they did not prove inconvenient to expedient concerns" is supported by our findings. Human rights did influence the decision as to which countries would receive economic aid and military aid. Economic need and the U.S. traditional geopolitical concerns played a larger role in determining which states would receive economic aid. Economic interests and military presence also increase the odds of a country receiving U.S. military assistance.

Although Clinton decried Bush's foreign policy, once elected, Clinton continued a number of George Bush's policies. Aryeh Neier (1996-97) charges the Clinton administration with enacting a new double standard. Neier argues that the Clinton administration willingly denounced human rights violations in "pariah states or the governments of countries that are not considered politically or economically important," but refused to condemn repressive governments deemed to be economic or strategically important for U.S. interests (1996-97:96). Our findings show that Clinton is more concerned with shoring up U.S. economic interests by maintaining and expanding overseas markets than with human rights issues.

Human rights concerns, during the Clinton years, played no role at the gatekeeping stage of economic aid allocation. Our measure of human rights is statistically insignificant, indicating that when the Clinton administration decided which countries would be granted economic aid, human rights was not a factor in the decision. Recipient need, past aid, and economic interest influenced the decision of whether

or not to grant economic aid. Our findings show that only past aid increases the odds of receiving U.S. military aid.

The second stage of foreign aid allocations concerns the amount of aid to be given. The empirical results show that human rights are a statistically significant concern in the determination of the amount of economic aid a country is to receive. U.S. strategic and geopolitical interests also proved to be significant. Yet Table 3 reveals that neither the Reagan, the Bush, nor the Clinton administration was significantly different from the Carter administration in the amount of economic aid granted. Human rights concerns did not play a significant role in how much military aid the country received (Table 3). The finding that human rights are not statistically significant in the allocation of military aid is not surprising. The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights reports that Section 502B has "never been applied to restrict the distribution of security assistance to a foreign country, largely because successive administrations have been anxious to avoid antagonizing allies by publicly characterizing them as gross human rights violators" (1989:22).

Military presence played a decisive role in the amount of military aid granted. With military aid, we found that presidential administration had an impact on the amount of aid a country received. Surprisingly, with Carter as our referent category, we found that during the second Reagan term, and the Bush and Clinton terms, the amount of military aid was reduced. Since the human rights measure was found to be insignificant, it is clear that overall budget cuts, not concerns for human rights, were the most important inputs in the reduction of individual nations' military aid allocations.

In every presidential administration, at both the gatekeeping and the second stage of decision-making, past aid is the most important variable in determining present allocations. This comes as no surprise. In Allison's words, "The best explanation of an organization's behavior at t is $t-1$ " (Allison, 1971:88).

Conclusions

U.S. law requires that the government give human rights priority over other foreign policy considerations, such as economic interest or military presence, in the allocation of foreign aid. But human rights are not an absolute criterion for the dispersion of aid. The legislation allows for lawful digression from the human rights requirement in cases of "extraordinary circumstances" or when the aid will directly help needy people. Is there a relationship between the allocation of foreign economic and military aid and human rights performance? Our study is the most comprehensive research to date on the relationship between human rights and foreign aid. Not only did we include more country cases, but we also expanded the time of study to include the Bush and Clinton administrations.

At the gatekeeping stage we established that human rights concerns did impact whether a country received U.S. economic aid or not (with the exception of the Clinton administration). A country's human rights performance significantly determined how much aid the country received. Those countries with bad human rights records received less U.S. bilateral economic aid than those countries with better records. U.S. military presence, measured by the number of military personnel stationed within the country, also determined the sum of economic aid allocated. Rhetoric notwithstanding, we found that, on a worldwide scale, the amount of economic aid allocated was remarkably consistent between administrations. Using the Carter administration as our referent, we found no statistically significant differences in the amount of aid allotted to each country among the administrations.

In sum, we find that human rights do play a role in the decision of who receives U.S. bilateral foreign assistance, and how much aid they are allotted. But other national security interests play a more prominent role. Countries perceived to be of

vital importance to U.S. national security, as measured by the presence of a large number of military personnel, along with Latin America, receive aid regardless of their human rights records.

Appendix

Countries included in study:

Afghanistan	Eq. Guinea	Mozambique	Vietnam
Albania	Estonia	Namibia	Yemen Rep
Algeria	Ethiopia	Nepal	S. Yemen
Angola	Gabon	Nicaragua	N. Yemen
Argentina	Gambia	Niger	Zaire
Armenia	Georgia	Nigeria	Zambia
Azerbaijan	Ghana	Oman	Zimbabwe
Bahamas	Grenada	Pakistan	
Bahrain	Guatemala	Panama	
Bangladesh	Guinea-Bis	Pap N. Guinea	
Barbados	Guinea	Paraguay	
Belarus	Guyana	Peru	
Belize	Haiti	Philippines	
Benin	Honduras	Poland	
Bhutan	Hungary	Romania	
Bolivia	India	Russia	
Botswana	Indonesia	Rwanda	
Brazil	Iran	South Africa	
Bulgaria	Iraq	Saudi Arabia	
Burkina Faso	Israel	Senegal	
Burma	Jamaica	Seychelles	
Burundi	Jordan	Sierra Leone	
Cambodia	Kazakhstan	Slovak Rep	
Cameroon	Kenya	Slovenia	
Cape Verde	South Korea	Somalia	
Central Afr. Rep	Kuwait	Sri Lanka	
Chad	Kyrgyztan	Sudan	
Chile	Laos	Suriname	
China	Latvia	Swaziland	
Colombia	Lebanon	Syria	
Comoros	Lesotho	Tajikistan	
Congo	Liberia	Tanzania	
Costa Rica	Libya	Thailand	
Cote d' Ivoire	Lithuania	Togo	
Croatia	Madagascar	Tunisia	
Cuba	Malawi	Turkey	
Cyprus	Malaysia	Turkmenistan	
Czechoslovakia	Maldives	USSR	
Czech. Rep	Mali	Uganda	
Djibouti	Mauritania	Ukraine	
Dominican Rep	Mauritius	United Arab E.	
Ecuador	Mexico	Uruguay	
Egypt	Mongolia	Uzbekistan	
El Salvador	Morocco	Venezuela	

References

- ALLISON, G. (1971) *Essence of Decision*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- AMERICAS WATCH, HELSINKI WATCH AND LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (May 1985) *Critique: Review of the Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*. New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights.
- AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (various years) *Amnesty International Report*. London: Amnesty International Publications.
- CARLETON, D., AND M. STOHL (1985) The Foreign Policy of Human Rights: Rhetoric and Reality from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan. *Human Rights Quarterly* 7:205–229.
- CARLETON, D., AND M. STOHL (1987) The Role of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Assistance Policy: A Critique and Reappraisal. *American Journal of Political Science* 31:1002–1018.
- CINGRANELLI, D., AND T. PASQUARELLO (1985) Human Rights Practices and the Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid to Latin American Countries. *American Journal of Political Science* 29:539–563.
- DEMARIS, A. (1992) *Logit Modeling: Practical Applications*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- DONNELLY, J. (1993) *International Human Rights*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- DONNELLY, J. (1995) "Post-Cold War Reflections on the Study of International Human Rights." In *Ethics & International Affairs: A Reader*, edited by J. Rosenthal, pp. 236–256. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- FORSYTHE, D. (1988) *Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Congress Reconsidered*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press.
- FORSYTHE, D. (1995) Human Rights and US Foreign Policy: Two Levels, Two Worlds. *Political Studies* 43:111–130.
- GIBNEY, M., AND M. DALTON (1996) "The Political Terror Scale." In *Human Rights and Developing Countries*, edited by D. Cingranelli, pp. 73–84. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- GUESS, G. (1987) *The Politics of United States Foreign Aid*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- HOFRENNING, D. (1990) Human Rights and Foreign Aid: A Comparison of the Reagan and Carter Administrations. *American Politics Quarterly* 18:514–526.
- INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (various years) *Direction of Trade Yearbook*. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
- LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (1989) *Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Linking Security Assistance and Human Rights*. New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights.
- LOTTE, I., A. DEMARIS, AND M. ADLER (1996) Using and Interpreting Logistic Regression: A Guide for Teachers and Students. *Teaching Sociology* 24:284–298.
- NEIER, A. (1996–97) The New Double Standard. *Foreign Policy* 105:91–101.
- POE, S. (1991) Human Rights and the Allocation of US Military Assistance. *Journal of Peace Research* 28:205–216.
- POE, S. (1992) Human Rights and the Economic Aid Allocation Under Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter. *American Journal of Political Science* 36:147–167.
- POE, S., AND N. TATE (1994) Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis. *American Political Science Review* 88(4):853–872.
- POE, S., S. PILATOVSKY, B. MILLER, AND A. OGUNDELE (1994) Human Rights and US Foreign Aid Revisited: The Latin American Region. *Human Rights Quarterly* 16:539–558.
- POE, S., N. TATE, AND L. CAMP KEITH (1997) Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto.
- SAYRS, L. (1989) *Pooled Time Series Analysis*. London: Sage.
- SCHOULTZ, L. (1981) *Human Rights and United States Policy Toward Latin America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- SIVARD, R. (various years) *World Military and Social Expenditures*. Washington, DC: World Priorities.
- STIMSON, J. (1985) Regression in Space and Time: A Statistical Essay. *American Journal of Political Science* 29: 914–947.
- STOHL, M., D. CARLETON, AND S. JOHNSON (1984) Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Assistance from Nixon to Carter. *Journal of Peace Research* 21:215–233.
- UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (various years) *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (various years) *Worldwide Manpower Distribution by Geographical Area*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE (various years) *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

WORLD BANK (various years) *World Tables*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.