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J'accuse! Does Naming and Shaming Perpetrators Reduce the Severity of Genocides or Politicides?[1]

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This study tests the effectiveness of naming and shaming by transnational advocacy networks in reducing the severity of ongoing instances of genocide or politicide. I argue that naming and shaming should force perpetrators to reduce the severity of these ongoing atrocities in order to shift the spotlight, save their reputation, reframe their identity, maintain international legitimacy and domestic viability, and ease pressure placed on them by states or IOs. I test whether naming and shaming by NGOs, the media, and IOs significantly reduces the severity of the killing. Ordered logit analyses of ongoing genocides and politicides from 1976 to 2008 reveal that naming and shaming by Amnesty International, the Northern media, and the UNCHR have significant ameliorative effects on the severity of the most extreme atrocities. Transnational advocacy networks have the potential, through naming and shaming, to lead to life-saving changes in these murderous policies.

Genocides and politicides,[2] atrocities of unparalleled inhumanity, were regular features of the international political landscape of the twentieth century (Fein 1979, 1993; Rummel 1994; Power 2002; Harff 2003; Valentino 2004; Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004; Wayman and Tago 2010). There is no reason to expect that they will cease to be recurrent problems in the twenty-first century. The persistence of genocides and politicides, and the savagery of the slaughter in Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia, East Timor, and Darfur to name just a few, suggest the need to understand how to halt entirely, or at least reduce the severity of, these murderous policies.

One approach that does seem to succeed at stopping the killing once it has begun is overt military intervention in favor of targets or against the perpetrators (Krain 2005; DeMeritt 2009). However, some have argued that this approach may create a moral hazard, encouraging rebel groups to escalate their armed efforts while inadequately protecting unarmed civilians from retaliation by the government (Kuperman 2008).[3] Still others suggest that intervention may be politically untenable, and thus unlikely (Straus and Valentino 2007). The hollow echo of the repeated calls of ''Never Again!'' and ''Not on My Watch'' by the United Nations, American presidents, and other key members of the international community suggest that this may be correct. As such, we must endeavor to find effective strategies besides military intervention.

An extensive and evolving literature has proposed naming and shaming as an important method for addressing human rights violations and has highlighted the role that the media, international governmental and non-governmental organizations, and other actors within a human rights transnational advocacy network (TAN) can serve in that effort. Yet evidence of this approach's effectiveness is mixed. While many studies demonstrate its effectiveness (Brysk 1993; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse and Sikkink 1999), or conditional effectiveness (Franklin 2008; Murdie and Bhasin 2011; Murdie and Davis 2012), others suggest that naming and shaming has either little impact or a negative impact on human rights in targeted countries (Bob 2005; Hafner-Burton 2008). Yet most of these studies examine human rights violations in the aggregate, despite the fact that we might expect naming and shaming to have different effects on different types of rights violations.

Brysk (1993:274) argues that despite its limitations, in situations of extreme repression, transnational advocacy network pressure ''can save lives, and is the only nonviolent strategy that can.'' Can naming and shaming be another strategy for alleviating the slaughter in ongoing instances of mass killings? If so, it would provide an avenue through which nonstate actors and states can, via transnational advocacy networks, employ nonviolent pressure to slow or stop the killing. It

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[2] *Genocides* are mass killings in which the victims are defined by association with a particular communal group. *Politicides* are mass killings in which victims are defined primarily in terms of their hierarchical position or political opposition to the regime and dominant groups (Harff 1986, 2003). Both are lethal policies carried out by the state or some sovereign nonstate actor against civilians, where there is intent on the part of the aggressor to destroy the target group ''in whole or in part.''

[3] For an excellent discussion of the problems with employing the moral hazard framework in this manner, see Rauchhaus (2009).

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could serve either as a useful alternative to overt military intervention, or as a warning to perpetrators of possible sanctions to come.[4] This study tests the effectiveness of this network-based approach in reducing the severity of ongoing instances of genocide or politicide.[5]

Naming and Shaming Human Rights Violators

Although human rights concerns have been on the international agenda since the end of the Second World War, it was a series of major changes during the 1970s that brought the issue to prominence globally. This period saw the growth in the legitimacy, influence, and sheer number of international human rights non-governmental organizations, an increase in coverage of human rights issues by the Northern media, and greater and more public engagement with human rights issues by both states and international governmental organizations (IGOs; Keck and Sikkink 1998). The result was the creation of what Keck and Sikkink (1998) refer to as a human rights-based transnational advocacy network that worked to publicize rights violations and their perpetrators (naming) and bring more pressure to bear on perpetrators of rights violations to change their behavior (shaming).

The creation of this transnational advocacy network allows activists in countries experiencing human rights violations to begin a process that ultimately may lead to changes in their governments' behavior. Domestic human right activists seek to change severely repressive state behavior but are unable to do so directly. They act to circumvent state authorities and hope that international attention to their plight will lead to international condemnation of, or action against, the perpetrators of abuses via what Keck and Sikkink (1998) describe as a ''boomerang effect'' (see also Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). Domestic activists lobby international activists, who attempt to garner global media attention (Keck and Sikkink 1998:22; Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers 2005; Ramos, Ron, and Thoms 2007). Information from local and global activists and the media highlights the nature and extent of the abuses and shapes public and elite opinion about the atrocities and/or their willingness to act. This process may lead to public condemnation of perpetrators at all points along the boomerang's path by non-governmental organization (NGO) activists, Northern media outlets, international organizations (IOs) and states, all of whom may name and shame perpetrators and in some cases actively impose political or economic sanctions on perpetrators. When effective, naming and shaming changes state behavior, reducing or eliminating human rights abuses (Brysk 1993; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse and Sikkink 1999; Risse et al. 1999; Schneider 2000; Hawkins 2002; Franklin 2008; Lebovic and Voeten 2009; Wright and Escribà-Folch 2009).

Human rights organizations (HROs)—the specific type of international non-governmental organization (INGO) focused on these issues—play a central role in this process, acting as credible conduits of information from targets and their local activists to the wider international community (Keck and Sikkink 1998). The power that HROs have comes from their ability to disseminate information about rights abuses that regimes would prefer to remain hidden in the shadows, yielding common knowledge about the abuses and undermining the illusion that perpetrators act unobserved. They can also damage the reputation of perpetrators in the eyes of relevant international political actors, framing states as violators of rights and norms (Schneider 2000; Bob 2005; Hendrix and Wong 2010). They connect victim groups and/or domestic movements to the international community, help disseminate their information to increase awareness of atrocities, and encourage other actors to act to shame or sanction the perpetrators (Brysk 1993; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999; Murdie and Bhasin 2011).

The media is another key player in TAN information politics: ''To reach a broader audience, networks strive to attract press attention… networks activists cultivate a reputation for credibility with the press, and package their information in a timely and dramatic way to draw press attention'' (Keck and Sikkink 1998:22). Northern media coverage is significantly influenced by NGO reports of these human rights abuses (Ramos et al. 2007).[6] Media outlets investigate, publicize, and sometimes explicitly denounce these atrocities. The Northern media tends to cover human rights abuses and employ the human rights frame, particularly in situations where repression is more extensive such as cases of genocide or politicide (Ramos et al. 2007). Theoretically, this would then shame Northern governments and/or IOs into action. Power (2002) and others suggest the need for ''a strong media presence on genocide issues'' for precisely these reasons (Straus and Valentino 2007:5).

Like HROs and the media, IGOs can name and shame. However, their naming and shaming of human rights violations, often in response to (or with the aid of) HRO or media reports, comes not from the global civil society but from the governance structure set up and managed by states. Public condemnation by relevant IGOs suggests that perpetrators are beyond the bounds of acceptability with regard to the human rights norms of the international community, which frames these states as ''rogues'' or ''pariahs'' (Risse and Sikkink 1999:15; Schneider 2000:115; Peterson and Drury 2011). This damages perpetrators' reputations with other IGOs or IGO members—potential allies, partners or donors—and signals to other actors that they can legitimately sanction these states at will (Schneider 2000; Lebovic and Voeten 2006, 2009). It

[4] Some of the power of naming and shaming lies in its ability to signal the increased likelihood of more costly negative sanctions in the near future if perpetrator behavior does not change. As a result, if naming and shaming is found to have an ameliorative effect on genocide/politicide severity, we should consider the possibility that it is either because it works in lieu of military intervention or because it works due to the implicit threat of subsequent action by activated bystanders. That is an empirical question that I leave for future studies. I owe this point to an anonymous reviewer.

[5] As multiple authors note, examining possible types of international reactions to atrocities and their effect on one specific type of abuse of physical integrity is an important strategy for yielding policy-relevant research in this area (Midlarsky 2009:296–297; DeMeritt 2010:1).

[6] The Northern media is particularly sensitive to information provided by Amnesty International, perhaps due to its credibility, or to its aggressive information politics strategy (Ramos et al. 2007).

also lends credibility to victims' claims and suggests a weakened government to potential domestic challengers, even in autocratic regimes (Wright and Escribà-Folch 2009:3). Of course, states may not wish to sanction human rights infractions directly for a variety of political or economic reasons, but might use multilateral organizations to send the same message without incurring these costs (Lebovic and Voeten 2006, 2009; Wright and Escribà-Folch 2009). Finally, unlike HROs or the media, IGOs can also use more than rhetoric to sanction perpetrators. IGOs such as the World Bank can and do respond to naming and shaming by increasing real costs to perpetrators (Lebovic and Voeten 2009).

In sum, naming and shaming by HROs, the media, and IGOs works because it: creates common knowledge about the abuses based or reliable reports; frames perpetrators as violating international norms and as untrustworthy partners in future interactions; publicly signals international disapproval to perpetrators, their allies, partners or donors, and to domestic challengers; pressures states and IGOs to act upon the information rather than remaining as bystanders; and makes continuing the rights violations in question a more costly strategy, both domestically and internationally. Perpetrators will change their behavior if they cannot risk the loss of power, resources, allies, or legitimacy that inaction in the face of such condemnation would bring. In the next section, I apply this logic to ongoing cases of genocide or politicide, to generate expectations about whether and why naming and shaming should reduce its severity.

Naming and Shaming Perpetrators of Genocide or Politicide

Genocides and politicides are by definition policy choices made by perpetrators about murderous actions against specifically targeted populations. They are strategies devised and implemented by perpetrators to counter threats to power and solve their most difficult problems (Valentino 2004). Perpetrators make rational but horrific calculations about whether to employ such atrocities (Krain 1997, 2005; Valentino 2004; Midlarsky 2005; DeMeritt 2009, 2010). For governments wishing to counter or eliminate a threat, either real or (mis)perceived, this seemingly unthinkable and inhumane policy may be an attractive and rational ''final'' solution, and one that is lower in cost than doing less in the face of the ''threat'' (Valentino 2004; Midlarsky 2005). In short, these policies are chosen because the perpetrators perceive them as ''rational''—that is, in vital areas of concern, perpetrators reap benefits without incurring significant countervailing costs.

This rational actor approach to understanding genocide or politicide suggests that attempts by international actors to slow or stop the killing should focus on raising the costs of such murderous policies for the perpetrators (Krain 2005; Straus and Valentino 2007; DeMeritt 2009, 2010). To do so effectively, however, actors must first signal a shift in the global context from permissive to prohibitive and make any current or future threat of action against perpetrators credible. This policy of directly challenging perpetrators is an approach deemed effective in studies of overt military intervention's effects on genocide or politicide severity (Krain 2005). That same logic applies here, in instances where primarily nonstate actors name and shame perpetrators, challenging their actions and framing them as norm violators and untrustworthy partners or allies.

If the killing has already begun, the perpetrators have evaluated the international context and decided that there is a degree of permissiveness sufficient to allow them to commit genocide or politicide without consequence (Harff 1986:168). They have not been deterred at least in part because they view the credibility or resolve of potential interveners as low (Carment and Rowlands 1998; Rothchild and Lake 1998). Yet perpetrators may not have accurately assessed the level of scrutiny and condemnation that their actions would incur. If they had, costs associated with naming and shaming would have been factored in to the original decision to kill, and we might expect to see no change in their murderous behavior. I argue that directly challenging the perpetrator, whether through naming and shaming or other oppositional action, clearly signals the credibility and resolve of interveners, changing their perception of the costs of continuing the slaughter, and thus should lead to a change in the severity of the ongoing killing (see also Krain 2005).

Naming and shaming brings atrocities to light and creates common understandings of the actions of perpetrators across the international community. While a lack of attention suggests to perpetrators that their actions are hidden from scrutiny (Power 2002:230), the international spotlight shone on perpetrators by naming and shaming means that the killing no longer goes ''unseen'' (Staub 1989). Perpetrators now think of themselves as acting publicly, rather than privately, and within the global arena, rather than domestically, and may change their behavior to avoid ''being seen'', or to avoid the continuing spotlight. This is especially true if they believe that relevant actors in the international community will continue to pay attention and to act if the killing continues unabated.

Naming and shaming publicly signals that international disapproval of the perpetrators and their actions, potentially changing perpetrators' self-perceptions. Perpetrators' sense of ''the rightness of their cause'' is reaffirmed by the passivity of bystanders, but called into question in the face of a challenge that frames them as norms and rights violators at best, *genocidaires* at worst (Staub 1989, 1996). Naming and shaming also affects the relationship between perpetrators and their (potential) allies or partners. Framing perpetrators as international pariahs makes it harder for others to support or do business with them without also being similarly labeled (Schneider 2000:155–156; Peterson and Drury 2011). The framing of the 2008 Olympics in China as the ''Genocide Olympics'' by transnational rights advocates, the resulting international and domestic dissent, and China's attempts to counter these efforts in rhetoric and in shifting policy regarding Sudan all illustrate this point (Economy and

Segal 2008; Yardley 2008). That case also suggests that those framed as human rights violators or *genocidaires* have much to lose in terms of reputation and standing from naming and shaming.

Perpetrators respond to human rights pressure in order to maintain both international legitimacy and domestic viability (Hawkins 2002). Naming and shaming signals the declining legitimacy of the perpetrators in the eyes of the international community and can suggest to others with power that it may be time to replace the incumbent regime or may be acceptable to disobey orders from the regime. As Straus and Valentino (2007:19) suggest, when developing policies to stop the killing, ''the focus should be not on the hardliners committed to genocide, but rather the moderates and local actors who make the execution of mass violence possible, but who may have natural reasons to oppose the hardliners.'' Naming and shaming changes agents' calculations as they consider whether to obey the orders to kill from principals (DeMeritt 2009, 2010). And even in autocratic regimes, naming and shaming can increase rival elites' capacity and willingness to replace the incumbent (Schneider 2000; Wright and Escribà-Folch 2009).

Naming and shaming can also activate bystanders, a crucial step in slowing or stopping ongoing genocides or politicides (Stohl 1987; Staub 1989, 1996). A lack of attention suggests to bystanders that the veracity of atrocity claims may be questionable and allows politicians to choose not to act in the face of atrocities without attracting negative publicity. For example:

> When Alison Des Forges of Human Rights Watch met with National Security Advisor Anthony Lake two weeks into the Rwanda genocide, he informed her that the phones were not ringing. ''Make more noise!'' he urged. Because so little noise has been made about genocide, U.S. decision-makers have opposed U.S. intervention, telling themselves that they were doing all they could—and, most important, all they should—in light of competing American interests and a highly circumscribed understanding of what was domestically ''possible'' for the United States to do (Power 2002:509).

Once genocide or politicide is brought to light the emotional distance between bystanders and victims decreases, making it difficult to remain passively on the sidelines (Staub 1996). With perpetrators framed as ''pariahs'' or ''evil others,'' bystanders are pressured to act in order to distance their own identities from those of the perpetrators or become accessories (Addis 2003). This also enhances the credibility of any threats made by potential challengers, as they will require a sustained commitment to the threatened sanction in order to sustain both this identification within the international society and their reputation within the international system.

Once activated, actors can impose material or political costs on perpetrators. Naming and shaming by TANs may push other states to place political or economic sanctions on the target states or on the perpetrators themselves (Risse and Sikkink 1999; Hawkins 2002; Lebovic and Voeten 2009; Wright and Escribà-Folch 2009). Labeling a state a pariah lowers prohibitions on challenging perpetrators and makes targeting perpetrators with political or economic sanctions or military action more likely (Peterson and Drury 2011). These actions impose additional domestic political costs on perpetrators, beyond reputation effects (Lebovic and Voeten 2009; Wright and Escribà-Folch 2009). For instance, shaming campaigns can lead to a loss of foreign aid or international trade (Lebovic and Voeten 2009; Wright and Escribà-Folch 2009:3).

In sum, naming and shaming should force perpetrators to reduce the severity of ongoing genocidal or political campaigns in order to shift the spotlight, save their reputation, reframe their identity, maintain international legitimacy and domestic viability, and ease pressure placed on them by states or IOs. As a result, I hypothesize:

Hypothesis: *Increases in human rights ''naming and shaming'' activity against perpetrators of an ongoing genocide or politicide by actors within transnational advocacy networks should reduce the severity of genocide or politicide.*

Reasons to be Skeptical

There are a variety of reasons to suggest that naming and shaming may not have an ameliorative effect on genocide or politicide severity, the null hypothesis in this study. For instance, the impact of naming and shaming may be overstated (Hafner-Burton and Ron 2009). Some quantitative studies find that naming and shaming has little effect on the overall level of human rights in targeted countries (Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004; Hafner-Burton 2008). Even more troubling, some qualitative studies suggest that the global spotlight, or even its potential, may actually embolden opposition groups to rebel, increasing the threats posed to leaders and prompting them to respond with escalating personal integrity rights violations (Kuperman 2001; Bob 2005).

Naming and shaming may not raise the costs of genocide or politicide enough for perpetrators to end genocidal campaigns, nor may it, in and of itself, lead bystanders to act (Straus and Valentino 2007; Davenport and Appel 2008). For instance, the debate over the use of the term ''genocide'' during the Rwandan genocide was extensive, but the use of the term regarding for naming and shaming purposes in the Darfur case yielded little in the way of serious policy consequences on the part of the United States (Straus 2005). Perhaps this is because states use naming and shaming for political or strategic reasons—as ''cheap talk''—so as to be able to claim that they acted without actually having to do anything (Power 2002). This argument suggests that ultimately states will determine changes in perpetrator behavior, as HROs, the media, and IGOs lack either the necessary authority or legitimacy to have that effect (Hafner-Burton 2008:691). Yet Franklin (2008) finds that naming and shaming is more effective at yielding better rights outcomes when employed by nonstate actors, suggesting that this particular approach, if effective, is well suited to the types of actors considered here.

The fact that these very same actors were not specifically focused on genocides or politicides around the world until recently may also be problematic. In some cases, the media or HROs focus on particular regions or countries of interest to the exclusion of others, thus missing rights abuses elsewhere. In other cases, the HRO or IO is more concerned with trying to deal with the perpetrators directly, shying away from publicly shaming them for fear of losing access or leverage (Power 2002:114). Sometimes, the HRO is more focused on one type of atrocity, such as Amnesty International's traditional focus on jailed dissidents, and is less active on issues of systematic killing of target groups (Power 2002:228–229). Yet even a more general focus on overall human rights conditions leads potential namers or shamers to examine instances of the worst atrocities around the world (Ramos et al. 2007).

Finally, naming and shaming might be ineffective in stopping the killing even if perpetrator regimes choose to scale back or terminate their campaign of genocide or politicide. Principals may be unable to control the agents actually doing the killing sufficiently to slow or stop ongoing atrocities (Mitchell 2004; Hafner-Burton 2008). Yet DeMeritt's recent study of the effects of naming and shaming on mass killing events short of genocide/politicide suggests that this concern may be unwarranted. Using a more formalized principal-agent model, DeMeritt (2010) demonstrates that naming and shaming simultaneously discourages principals from killing, deters agents from carrying out killings, and reduces principals' ability to coerce agents to kill.

Methodology

Unit of Analysis

In this study, I examine country-years in which a genocide or politicide is ongoing.[7] Naming and shaming data must be lagged to insure the ability to infer causality through temporal ordering, so I also include the year immediately following the end of that instance of state-sponsored mass murder. This allows me to examine the effects of naming and shaming in the final year of the genocide or politicide.

Dependent Variable: Genocide/Politicide Severity

The Political Instability Task Force (formerly the State Failure Task Force) has developed a list of all genocides and politicides from 1955 to 2008 (Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2009).[8] This list is an updated version of the data previously compiled by Harff (2003),[9] which has been used as the basis for a number of comparative empirical studies examining genocide and politicide (Fein 1993; Krain 1997, 2005; Harff 2003; Valentino et al. 2004; Wayman and Tago 2010). This study will examine cases from 1976 to 2008, as the earliest data available for some of the main independent variables is 1975. Since these independent variables must be lagged 1 year prior to the case-year observation of the dependent variable, I can examine the effects of naming and shaming in 1975 on genocide/politicide severity in 1976. The list of cases examined here is reproduced here in Table 1, including location and start and end years of the instance of state-sponsored mass murder.

The data set also includes information about the magnitude of severity of the genocide or politicide. All data on the severity of state-sponsored mass murder have an inherent flaw—the more successful the policy, the less we may know about it. In particular, body counts, the usual measures of severity, are problematic.[10] There will be underreporting of fatalities by the aggressors in most cases in order to hide the extent of the atrocity, and over-reporting of fatalities by the victims in order to highlight to degree of the atrocity (Rummel 1994). The particular subset of the Political Instability Task Force data employed here consists not of exact body counts, but a more approximate scaled magnitude index representing the likely range for the estimated number of deaths per year.[11] I adopt Marshall et al.'s (2009) severity scale (Table 2) as the dependent variable in this study. The eleven-point scale is recoded to range from 0 to 10, rather than 0 to 5, eliminating half-point changes in magnitudes to make interpretation more intuitive. Note that the dependent variable is an ordinal categorical variable, suggesting the necessity of an appropriate statistical method.

[7] I examine only *ongoing* cases of state-sponsored mass murder because I am interested in the international community's ability to affect cases that have already begun. Overt military intervention tends to be a reactive policy, as humanitarian disasters are rarely pre-empted by military means. Even successful identification of a potential genocide or politicide does not necessarily lead to prevention (Straus 2005). Large-scale atrocities often occur despite early warnings and some measure of preventative action. An analysis of preemption's effects must be done with equal care, and in the context of very different theoretical arguments. As a result, I defer this question to a future study.

[8] For a complete list of genocides and politicides, see Harff (2003) and Marshall, Gurr, and Harff (2009). For a brief description of each case, see http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitfcode.htm.

[9] The version recently released by the Political Instability Task Force (Marshall et al. 2009) updates the earlier State Failures Task Force version of the dataset (Harff 2003) by, among other things, adding two pre-1997 cases: Equatorial Guinea from 1969 to 1979 and Nigeria (Biafra) from 1967 to 1970. A number of post-1997 cases were also added or updated in the newest version, including the addition of the Darfur case.

[10] Body counts do not necessarily define what is or is not a genocide or politicide. One does not have to successfully eliminate a group to qualify the policy as genocidal. The mere attempt with intent is sufficient (Harff 1986, 2003).

[11] The Political Instability Task Force (PITF) Worldwide Atrocities dataset provides body count estimates data for ''deliberate killing of non-combatant civilians in the context of a wider political conflict'' from 1995 to 2008 (Ulfelder and Schrodt 2009:1). The One-Sided Violence project provides body count estimate data for ''violence against civilians in war'' from 1989 to 2004 (Eck and Hultman 2007). However, in many instances, these events do not necessarily rise to the level of (or occur during) genocide or politicide. They are thus unsuitable for this project. In addition, given the lack of precision in most body count estimates of mass killings, analyses of such data can likely be no more precise in estimating effects on severity than those that use the magnitude of severity data. As a result, I employ the PITF magnitude of severity of genocide/politicide data. This is still a significant improvement over data previously available. In many previous analyses of severity, the unit of analysis employed had to be the nation-state, as only total severity per genocide/politicide was available. Yearly magnitude of severity data allows the unit of analysis to be changed to the country-year, increasing precision, data differentiation, and the number of observations.

TABLE 1. Genocides and Politicides, 1976–2008

Afghanistan 1978–1992	Indonesia 1975–1992
Angola 1975–1994	Iran 1981–1992
Angola 1998–2002	Iraq 1988–1991
Argentina 1976–1980	Pakistan 1973–1977
Bosnia 1992–1995	Philippines 1972–1976
Burma 1978	Rwanda 1994
Burundi 1988	Somalia 1988–1991
Burundi 1993	Sri Lanka 1989–1990
Cambodia 1975–1979	Sudan 1983–2002
Chile 1973–1976	Sudan 2003–*X*
D.R. Congo/Zaire 1977–1979	Syria 1981–1982
El Salvador 1980–1989	Uganda 1971–1979
Equatorial Guinea 1969–1979	Uganda 1980–1986
Ethiopia 1976–1979	Yugoslavia 1998–1999
Guatemala 1978–1990	

(*Source:* Marshall et al. (2009).
Note. X = Ongoing after December 31, 2008.)

TABLE 2. Genocide/Politicide Severity Measures: Magnitudes of Severity and their Equivalents in the Ranges of the Estimated Number of Deaths per Country-Year

0	Less than 300
1	300–1,000
2	1,000–2,000
3	2,000–4,000
4	4,000–8,000
5	8,000–16,000
6	16,000–32,000
7	32,000–64,000
8	64,000–128,000
9	128,000–256,000
10	256,000+

(*Source:* Marshall et al. (2009).)

Therefore, I employ ordered logit as my method of statistical analysis in this study.

Independent Variables: Naming and Shaming Variables

To capture the naming and shaming activities of the three key types of actors discussed above—human rights NGOs, the media, and IOs—I employ a set of independent variables used extensively in the literature to examine how naming and shaming affects human rights (Ron et al. 2005; Lebovic and Voeten 2006, 2009; Ramos et al. 2007; Franklin 2008; Hafner-Burton 2008; Wright and Escribà-Folch 2009). I use two measures of the naming and shaming efforts of Amnesty International (*Background Reports* and *News Releases*), as well as *Average Media Coverage* of human rights abuses, *Targeting by the UNCHR*, and *Severity of Punishment by the UNCHR*.

I employ two separate measures developed and coded by Ron et al. (2005) to capture Amnesty's naming and shaming efforts—*Amnesty International News Releases* and *Background Reports* condemning human rights abuses within a specific country in a specific year.[12] Amnesty International, as Ron and his colleagues suggest, has a reputation for credibility among academics studying human rights, policymakers acting upon such information, and among citizens more broadly (cf. Poe, Carey, and Vazquez 2001; Edelman 2003).[13] Amnesty has ''the longest history and broadest name recognition in the field, won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1977, and … its methods of information gathering, 'naming and shaming' abusers; elite advocacy; and grassroots mobilization, have informed the work of many other NGOs'' (Ron et al. 2005:559). Moreover, research suggests that while some of Amnesty's written work is driven by information politics, it is heavily influenced by real-world human rights conditions (Ron et al. 2005).

Ron and his colleagues code all background reports and press releases found in the *Amnesty International Cumulative Guide, 1962–2000*. They provide cross-national longitudinal data for the 1986–2000 period. Using their approach, I coded both background reports and press releases for all cases of interest to this study from 1975 to 1985 period using the *Cumulative Guide*, and from 2001 to 2008 using the similarly organized searchable index on the Amnesty International web site, which functions as the post-2000 reports archive.[14]

To capture the naming and shaming behavior of the media, I employ a measure of the average coverage by the Northern media of human rights-related stories developed by Ron et al. (2005; Ramos et al. 2007). The Northern media is sensitive to large-scale human rights abuses and tends to cover the most severe human rights violations more heavily (Ramos et al. 2007:398). This sensitivity to massive abuses, coupled with the information provided by NGOs like Amnesty International, makes it likely that the Northern media will publicize atrocities during instances of genocide or politicide and will likely employ the human rights frame when doing so.

As Ramos et al. (2007:391) note, *The Economist* is ''a reasonable indicator of the type of news read by elite Northerners interested in international affairs. *Newsweek's*… readers are far more numerous, but their income and education levels are substantially lower.'' Ron and his colleagues used Lexis-Nexis to find all articles in these two newsweeklies that referred to ''human rights.'' They then coded only articles that specifically mentioned an abuse in a given country-year

[12] Using an alternative strategy, Hafner-Burton (2008) combines the number of press releases and the number of background reports into one measure of shaming by Amnesty International. Given that research suggests that these two are substantively different, require different amounts of resources to produce, are targeted at different audiences, and have differential impacts (Ron et al. 2005; Ramos et al. 2007), I prefer to examine the effects of each of these methods of naming and shaming separately.

[13] A systematic bias in Amnesty's coverage in its early years, that it emphasized the most severe human rights abuses over others, actually works as an advantage in examining genocide or politicide (Poe et al. 2001).

[14] In an effort to insure reliability of the new data being collected, I trained myself as a coder by re-coding data for the countries of interest in this study for all of the years of data already coded by Ron et al. (2005). Given the straightforward organization of the data in the *Cumulative Guide,* it is not surprising that my intercoder reliability with Ron and his colleagues' dataset was .91, increasing my confidence in my codings of the Amnesty data beyond the years in the Ron et al. (2005) data.

in order to capture an estimate of the media's engagement in human rights discourse. *Average Media Coverage*, the average number of articles per country-year for both sources, is likely a better measure of Northern media coverage given differences between news sources.[15] Ron and his colleagues provide cross-national longitudinal data for the 1986–2000 period. Using their approach, I coded *The Economist* and *Newsweek* stories for all cases of interest to this study from 1975 to 1985 and from 2001 to 2008.[16]

I employ two separate measures developed and coded by Lebovic and Voeten (2006) to capture the United Nations Commission on Human Rights' naming and shaming efforts—*Targeting by the UNCHR*, and *Severity of Punishment by the UNCHR*. According to Lebovic and Voeten (2006), ''the UNCHR was the first global, intergovernmental organization charged specifically with safeguarding and promoting human rights around the world'' (863) and ''served as the primary forum in which governments publicly named and shamed others for abusing their citizens'' (861). Despite having a reputation for extreme bias and questionable legitimacy,[17] analysis suggests that their targeting and punishment of rights violators were ''driven to a considerable degree by the actual human rights records of potential targets'' (Lebovic and Voeten 2006:863).

Lebovic and Voeten (2006) code available UN documents to provide cross-national longitudinal data 1977 through 2001. Given that this variable will be lagged 1 year, it allows me to examine the effect of UNCHR naming and shaming on genocide/politicide severity from 1978 to 2002. The *Targeting* variable is a dummy variable, coded as 1 if a state is targeted in a given year, and 0 if not. Despite concerns about the role that politics might have played in the targeting of states by the highly politicized UNCHR, research suggests that whether or not a country is targeted was largely a result of real-world human rights conditions, both during and after the Cold War (Lebovic and Voeten 2006:876–877). Countries targeted by the UNCHR have their alleged abuses discussed in private sessions of the international organization.[18] Subsequently, the state whose human rights record has been highlighted by the commission can face one of the four possible outcomes:

> First, the commission could choose not to act, either by discontinuing the confidential consideration of an allegation or by considering a matter in public without passing a resolution (that is, the resolution failed or a motion not to consider the resolution passed). Second, the commission could continue consideration under confidential session (which means that the unreleased allegations are deemed to have merit). Third, the commission could initiate a somewhat mild sanction in the form of the advisory procedure or a critical statement from the chair of the commission. Fourth, the commission could pass a resolution that publicly condemns a state and expresses the reasons for doing so (Lebovic and Voeten 2006:864).

I generate a variable capturing *Severity of Punishment by the UNCHR* following Lebovic and Voeten's above description and ordering of these outcomes. I place each of these outcomes along an ordinal index from 0 to 4, with higher values representing more severe punishments or outcomes. Situations where countries were not targeted at all receive a 0, or no sanction by the UNCHR.

Control Variables

There are other ways in which international actors can affect the severity of ongoing mass killings, most notably via overt military intervention (Krain 2005). To control for the effects of military action by international actors, I employ measures from the International Military Interventions (IMI) data set (Pickering and Kisangani 2009), which codes all overt International Military Interventions (IMI) from 1946 to 2005. The IMI data set records the direction in which the intervener acts. I compress a number of IMI categories into three main intervention types: I code all interventions that are explicitly anti-perpetrator, as well as those that are pro-target, as *Anti-Perpetrator Interventions*. I code as *Pro-Perpetrator Interventions* all interventions that are explicitly pro-perpetrator, as well as those that are anti-target. Those that support neither side explicitly or are expressly impartial are coded as *Impartial Interventions*. I examined all other interventions (including those that support or oppose third party governments, or those that oppose rebel groups in sanctuary) and recoded them as to whether they indirectly were pro-perpetrator or pro-target. I was thus able to code the number of interventions for and against the perpetrator, as well as those that were impartial.[19] To extend the data past

[15] *The Economist* tends to report more stories using the human rights frame than other weeklies such as *Newseek*, or even major Northern daily print news sources (Ramos et al. 2007:387). Averaging these two sources gives a more accurate picture of the use of naming and shaming regarding human rights by the Northern media.

[16] Again, to insure reliability of the new data being collected, I trained myself as a coder by re-coding data for the countries of interest in this study for 2 years' worth of already coded data. Given the straightforward method of looking for all stories for each country-year of interest that included the search term ''human rights'', it is not surprising that my intercoder reliability with Ramos and his colleagues' dataset was .86, increasing my confidence in my codings of the Northern media data beyond the years in the Ramos et al. (2007) dataset.

[17] The United Nations Human Rights Council replaced the UNCHR in 2006, in part in response to these concerns (Lebovic and Voeten 2006:863).

[18] The UNCHR publicly released an annual list of states considered in such confidential sessions (though not the details of the discussion) starting in 1978 (Lebovic and Voeten 2006:864). As such, targeting itself can be considered public naming and shaming, despite the fact that the discussion of the human rights record itself is not public. Given Bussman and Schneider's (2010) findings that naming and shaming by international organizations needs to be public to be effective, this is an important distinction.

[19] The updated IMI dataset (Pickering and Kisangani 2009) contains the information necessary to code the direction of intervention for each individual intervener in each country-year. The lone exception is for the Persian Gulf War of 1991. The IMI dataset notes that a coalition of states intervened against Iraq in 1991, but does not indicate which states are members of that coalition. I therefore employ Krain's (2005) re-coding of the case, which relies on the Correlates of War (COW) dataset's listing of actors opposing Iraq in the 1991 war in coding interveners against Iraq.

2005, in consultation with Pickering and Kisangani, I applied their coding scheme to the lone post-2005 case—Sudan/Darfur.[20]

I also control for some key characteristics of the ongoing genocide or politicide itself, which are likely to have an effect on its magnitude of severity—the *Duration* of the genocide or politicide and its *Previous Magnitude of Severity*. In order to control for the effect of duration on the severity of ongoing atrocities (Krain 1997, 2005; Straus and Valentino 2007:14), I code in which year of the genocide or politicide the observation occurs. For example, the first year of the genocide or politicide is coded as ''1,'' the second year as ''2,'' and so on. I also lag the dependent variable by 1 year to enable me to control for the effects of *Prior Severity of Genocide or Politicide* on current genocide or politicide severity. This helps to control for the effects of autocorrelation (Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995), and for the finding that previous levels affect current or future levels of atrocities (Gurr 1986; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995, 2004; Krain 2005; DeMeritt 2009, 2010).

Following what has become standard practice in the quantitative human rights literature, I also control for the *Population* of the country experiencing the atrocity by taking the natural log of the data to account for the skewed nature of such data (Henderson 1993; Poe and Tate 1994). I use population data from the World Bank (2009) *World Development Indicators* and lag the data 1 year to insure that population affected this year's atrocity observation rather than that this year's killings depleted the population being observed. Accounting for total population controls for the possibility that the sheer number of people available to kill, and the pressures that large populations place on regimes and their resources, may affect severity of atrocities.

Genocides and politicides are almost always a consequence of other types of *State Failure* such as civil war. State failures promote domestic instability and open windows of opportunity during which murderous policies become more likely (Fein 1979, 1993; Harff 1986, 2003; Krain 1997). Evidence suggests that the greater the number of state failures experienced, the more severe the instance of state-sponsored mass murder (Krain 1997, 2005). The *State Failure* variable is a dummy variable measuring whether the state experiencing genocide or politicide is also experiencing another kind of state failure in the prior year. The Political Instability Task Force developed a list of all state failures from 1955 to 2008 (Marshall et al. 2009).[21] State failures are defined as all revolutionary wars, ethnic civil wars, genocides or politicides, and disruptive regime transitions.[22] Since all cases examined here are ongoing genocides or politicides, this variable would be a constant if it included the ongoing state-sponsored mass murder. For the purposes of this study, I exclude the ongoing genocides or politicide from the state failure variable.

Wright and Escribà-Folch (2009:8) argue, ''an increased risk of irregular exit may therefore provide leaders with an incentive to increase repression in an effort to remain in power and forestall a particularly nasty post-exit fate.'' Perhaps not surprisingly, such serious political and existential threats to leaders have been found to increase the severity of ongoing mass killings (Krain 1997; Midlarsky 2005). I employ Marshall and Marshall's (2009) data on the number of successful, attempted, plotted, or alleged *Coups* experienced in the prior year to capture direct internal threats to leadership and (the possibility of) extra-constitutional changes.[23]

Regime Type has been found by some researchers to play a direct role in affecting the overall severity of mass killing (Rummel 1994) and an indirect role via conditioning how naming and shaming impacts regime choices to improve human rights compliance, even among nondemocracies (Wright and Escribà-Folch 2009). And Hafner-Burton and Ron (2009:386) note that most statistical work finds, when adequately distinguishing between the two, that regime type is a more important explanatory variable than international human rights advocacy or policy. Thus, I control for regime type here, despite its lack of significance in numerous studies of mass killing severity (Krain 1997, 2005; DeMeritt 2009, 2010). I employ the Polity IV data set's measure of *Regime Type* recommended by Marshall and Jaggers (2009), the Polity IV democracy measure minus the autocracy measure. The regime type score ranges from −10 to 10, with lower scores denoting more autocratic states and higher scores more democratic states. I employ the recommended coding rules for transitional states (interpolation) and those in a state of interregnum (set at zero).[24]

Evidence also suggests that states that are less open to trade, and thereby less connected to the global economic system, are more likely to experience instances of state-sponsored mass murder (Gurr 1986; Harff 2003). While economic marginalization is not a significant determinant of genocide or politicide severity (Krain 1997, 2005; Valentino 2004), it may affect the

[20] Using this approach, I coded neutral interventions in Sudan by the African Union in 2006–2007, and by the United Nations in 2006–2008. In refining my ability to apply the IMI codebook, I also back-coded the rest of the Sudan/Darfur case (2003–2005). I successfully replicated the IMI codings and identified a previously missed intervention—Chad's small but significant foray across Sudan's border to pursue rebels and their Sudanese supporters in 2005 (an anti-perpetrator intervention). After reviewing the relevant news reports, Pickering confirmed that this case should have been coded accordingly and is thus included in the data used here.

[21] Data on previous state failures, and other Political Instability Task Force data, can be found at http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitfcode.htm. See also Marshall et al. (2009).

[22] Disruptive regime changes are abrupt shifts in patterns of governance, including state collapse, secession, revolution, severe regime instability, and dramatic shifts toward authoritarian rule (Marshall et al. 2009). Any negative change of six or more points on the POLITY index score over a 3 year period, or any transition period uncodable by Polity IV because of a lack of stable political institutions, were coded as state failures.

[23] I use the *Coups* variable here as opposed to the Archigos (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009) dataset's *Irregular Exit* variable because of the former's inclusion of perceived threats of coups as well as cases of both failed and successful coups. This captures better the concept of ''threat of irregular exit'' and the resulting anxiety produced among potential perpetrators better than a variable that only counts the irregular exits that come to fruition. As a robustness check, I re-ran the analyses in Tables 3 and 4 using *Irregular Exit* in place of *Coups*. The results are nearly identical and are available in Appendix 2, online at http://www3.wooster.edu/polisci/mkrain/naming&shaming.html.

[24] See http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/data/showFiles.asp.

presence or intensity of international pressures faced by perpetrators (Gurr 1986; Harff 1986; Stohl 1987) or the degree to which regimes are sensitive to naming and shaming (Franklin 2008). Therefore, I control for the level of international economic interconnectedness, measured as the degree of *Marginalization within the World Economy*. This is operationalized as a function of that country's percentage of world trade, computed by calculating the total imports plus total exports of a given nation divided by the total imports plus exports of the world economy. The inverse of that figure is then divided by 100, yielding the economic marginalization score. The score is thus the degree of marginalization—low scores on this index indicate greater centrality within the world economy; high scores indicate greater marginalization. The data were collected from the IMF's *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook*.[25]

Finally, the end of the Cold War changed the geopolitical realities in the international system and placed international organizations and non-governmental organizations in a position of greater influence than they had during the prior era (Simon 2000). Moreover, this momentous change saw greater emphasis on global human rights norms, greater need to conform to liberal standards of rights, and the removal of Cold War strategic or ideological limitations on condemning human rights behavior of other states (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Lebovic and Voeten 2006). In order to account for the potential temporal differences caused by changes in the structure of the international system and the resulting effect on actor behavior, I created a dummy variable for *The Cold War*, with the years 1975–1989 coded as ''1,'' and the years 1990–2008 coded as ''0.''

Results of Statistical Analyses

Below I present the results of ordered logit models of factors affecting the severity of ongoing instances of state-sponsored mass murder.[26] I employed five statistical models to test expectations regarding the effects of naming and shaming by different international actors on the magnitude of severity of an ongoing genocide or politicide. All five models, shown here in Tables 3 and 4, employ the same set of control variables, but each includes different independent variables—the lagged naming and shaming variables. I do not include multiple ''naming and shaming'' variables in any model due to multicollinearity.[27] All models are estimated using STATA, version 11.1, using the White estimator of robust standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity.[28] The results for the first three models, the effects of naming and shaming by Amnesty International and the Northern media on the severity of ongoing genocides and politicides, are presented in Table 3.

Model 1 tests whether Northern media coverage has an effect on the severity of ongoing instances of genocide or politicide. The results suggest that severity declines as average Northern media coverage increases ($p < .01$). In fact, both sets of actions that challenge the perpetrator—''naming and shaming'' in the press and overt military interventions against perpetrators—significantly reduce the severity of any ongoing genocide or politicide. In addition, the previous magnitude of severity has a positive effect on subsequent severity, suggesting that there is some element of inertia in genocide or politicide severity, even given international efforts to oppose perpetrators. Moreover, the longer the duration of the episode of mass killing the lower the subsequent severity, confirming other findings in the literature that more killing occurs earlier in ongoing atrocities than later (Straus and Valentino 2007:14). Finally, population size is, surprisingly, inversely related to severity—as population size increases, severity decreases.

Model 2 demonstrates that Amnesty International Background Reports have similar effects. Severity declines significantly as the number of Background Reports issued increases. Again, both sets of actions that challenge the perpetrator—''naming and shaming'' by a high-profile credible human rights INGO and overt military interventions against perpetrators—significantly reduce the severity of any ongoing genocide or politicide. The duration and previous magnitude of severity again achieve strong statistical significance, as does economic marginalization, although its substantive impact is relatively minimal. Here population size is only marginally significant.

Model 3, however, suggests that Amnesty International News Releases do not have significant effects on the severity of subsequent genocide/politicide. Perhaps this is because Amnesty's news releases are more sensitive to the need for NGOs to engage in the use of information politics than are their background reports. Amnesty news releases are strongly influenced by prior media coverage, suggesting that ''Amnesty reports more heavily on countries whose abuses are already in the media's eye'' (Ron et al. 2005:572). Another possible explanation is that naming and shaming that targets feature story writers and policymakers (such as the elite-focused background reports) are more effective than those aimed at influencing public opinion (the press releases) because policymakers can act directly to impose costs on perpetrators while mass publics cannot. Once again, overt military interventions against perpetrators, and the duration of the episode of mass killing, significantly reduce the severity of any ongoing

[25] During the Cold War, economic data for Eastern Bloc nations were typically reported only every 5 or 10 years. Some missing data for these countries were interpolated whenever possible. Data for Angola in 1992–1993, Burundi in 1993–1994, and Rwanda in 1994–1995 were collected from COMESA trade statistics, http://comstat.comesa.int/.

[26] Descriptive statistics for each variable are available in Appendix 1.

[27] Multicollinearity between and among these ''naming and shaming'' variables is expected. Ron et al. (2005) and Ramos et al. (2007) find strong relationships between Amnesty press releases and media reports of human rights abuses. Amnesty background reports are often sent to UN officials, and Amnesty reports and media accounts documenting local atrocities influence UNCHR and other human rights-related organizations within the UN system (Schneider 2000).

[28] White's (1980) estimators of variance are particularly useful when estimating ordered logit models using unbalanced panel data (each panel has a different number of observations because each genocide or politicide lasts a different number of years). White's robust standard errors help to produce estimates that account for the fact that ''observations are likely to be independent across countries but not within them'' (Davenport 2004:550; see also Poe and Tate 1994:859–60).

TABLE 3. Effects of ''Naming and Shaming'' by Amnesty International and the Northern Media on the Severity of Ongoing Genocides and Politicides, 1976–2008 (Estimated using Ordered Logit, with White Robust Standard Errors)

Explanatory Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*
Independent Variables			
Average Western Media Coverage$_{t-1}$	−0.36 (0.11)***	—	—
AI Background Reports$_{t-1}$	—	−0.06 (0.02)***	—
AI News Reports$_{t-1}$	—	—	−0.03 (0.03)
Control Variables			
Magnitude of Gen./Pol. Severity$_{t-1}$	0.55 (0.09)***	0.54 (0.08)***	0.56 (0.08)***
Duration of Genocide or Politicide	−0.07 (0.03)**	−0.07 (0.03)**	−0.08 (0.03)**
State Failure(s)$_{t-1}$	0.02 (0.38)	0.10 (0.36)	0.06 (0.38)
Coups(s)$_{t-1}$	0.32 (0.26)	0.27 (0.28)	0.22 (0.29)
Regime Type	−0.05 (0.03)	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.06 (0.03)*
Economic Marginalization	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)**	−0.00 (0.00)
Ln(Population)$_{t-1}$	−0.40 (0.20)**	−0.37 (0.20)*	−0.33 (0.20)*
Cold War Dummy Variable	−0.52 (0.40)	−0.55 (0.39)	−0.43 (0.39)
Pro-Perpetrator Intervention(s)$_{t-1}$	−0.15 (0.17)	−0.14 (0.18)	0.07 (0.19)
Anti-Perpetrator Intervention(s)$_{t-1}$	−0.30 (0.14)**	−0.38 (0.14)***	−0.37 (0.15)**
Neutral/Impartial Intervention(s)$_{t-1}$	−0.09 (0.33)	−0.24 (0.36)	−0.29 (0.42)
Ancillary Parameters			
Cut 1	−7.89 (3.42)	−7.68 (3.29)	−6.46 (3.29)
Cut 2	−7.07 (3.39)	−6.85 (3.26)	−5.64 (3.26)
Cut 3	−6.44 (3.37)	−6.21 (3.24)	−5.03 (3.25)
Cut 4	−5.97 (3.37)	−5.69 (3.24)	−4.56 (3.26)
Cut 5	−5.63 (3.37)	−5.31 (3.23)	−4.19 (3.25)
Cut 6	−4.89 (3.36)	−4.56 (3.22)	−3.48 (3.24)
Cut 7	−3.85 (3.35)	−3.52 (3.21)	−2.47 (3.23)
Cut 8	−2.65 (3.34)	−2.35 (3.20)	−1.28 (3.22)
Cut 9	−1.33 (3.31)	−1.07 (3.18)	0.01 (3.20)
Cut 10	0.14 (3.29)	−0.39 (3.16)	1.47 (3.16)
N	202	203	202
Wald χ^2 (11)	69.41***	70.49***	68.75***
Pseudo R^2	0.13	0.13	0.12
Log pseudo-likelihood (robust standard errors in parentheses)	−399.08	−402.52	−403.74

(*Notes.* ***Significant at $p < .01$, two-tailed test; **significant at $p < .05$, two-tailed test; *significant at $p < .10$, two-tailed test.)

genocide or politicide, while previous magnitude of severity has a significant escalatory effect on subsequent severity. Population size is again only marginally significant. No other variables in the model have significant effects on severity ($p < .05$).[29]

The results for the next two models, the effects of naming and shaming by the UNCHR on the severity of ongoing genocides and politicides, are presented in Table 4. Model 4 shows that the severity of ongoing genocide or politicide declines significantly when a perpetrator state is targeted by the UNCHR. Model 5 shows that the increasing severity of punishment by the UNCHR has a significant dampening effect on the severity of ongoing genocide or politicide. Again, in both models, both sets of actions that challenge the perpetrator—including military interventions against perpetrators—significantly reduce the severity of any ongoing genocide or politicide. The only other factor that achieves strong statistical significance is the previous magnitude of severity.[30]

Clearly, naming and shaming plays a role in reducing the severity of ongoing genocides or politicides.[31] The question remains as to the magnitude of that effect. The ordered logit coefficients presented in Tables 3 and 4 are difficult to interpret on their own. However, one can use them to generate predicted

[29] An anonymous reviewer suggested the possibility that there may be accumulation effects of naming and shaming by media and INGO actors. To test for these, I re-ran the analyses that appear in Table 3 using both 2 and 3-year moving counts of media coverage prior to the year in which severity is measured. Two things are clear from these analyses: first, accumulation effects exist for Average Northern Media Coverage and Amnesty Background Reports; second, media and INGO impacts on genocide/politicide severity are consistent, regardless of whether they are measured as short-term effects (lagged 1 year) or longer-term accumulation effects (accumulated coverage over the previous 2 or 3 years). In short, the results are remarkably similar to those in Table 3. These results are available in Appendix 3, which appears online at http://www3.wooster.edu/polisci/mkrain/naming&shaming.html.

[30] The models presented in Tables 3 and 4 are robust to a more parsimonious specification that includes the lagged dependent variable, the relevant naming and shaming variable, duration of the genocide/politicide, and the presence of a challenging (anti-perpetrator/pro-target) military intervention. The lone exception is Amnesty International News Releases (Model 3, Table 3), which changes from not significant to marginally significant ($p = .09$). These results are available in Appendix 4, which appears online at http://www3.wooster.edu/polisci/mkrain/naming&shaming.html.

[31] To insure that the effects observed are not a result of endogeneity, I tested whether media and NGO coverage and the severity of the killing were exogenous. First, I ran a 2-stage least squares (2SLS) regression using US Military aid (logged) as an instrument for Average Northern Media Coverage (Ramos et al. 2007). US Military Aid (logged) was significant ($p < .01$) in the first stage model, given the controls for the other exogenous variables. 2SLS results suggest that we cannot reject the hypothesis that Average Northern Media Coverage is exogenous in the original model [Durbin χ^2 (1) = 0.0000046, $p = .9983$; Wu-Hausman F (1,181) = 0.0000046, $p = .9984$]. Next I ran a 2SLS regression using Change in Telephone Lines as an instrument for Amnesty International (AI) Background Reports (Murdie 2009). Change in Telephone Lines was a significant predictor of the number of AI Background Reports in this sample ($p < .01$) and was not a predictor of the dependent variable. 2SLS results suggest that we cannot reject the hypothesis that Amnesty International Background Reports are exogenous in the original model [Durbin χ^2 (1) = 0.033764, $p = .8542$; Wu-Hausman F (1,169) = 0.031186, $p = .8600$].

TABLE 4. The Effects of ''Naming and Shaming'' by the UNCHR on the Severity of Ongoing Genocides and Politicides, 1976–2008 (Estimated using Ordered Logit, with White Robust Standard Errors)

Explanatory Variables	*Model 4*	*Model 5*
Independent Variables		
Targeted by $UNCHR_{t-1}$	−0.66 (0.32)**	—
Severity of Punishment by $UNCHR_{t-1}$	—	−0.17 (0.09)**
Control Variables		
Magnitude of Gen./Pol. $Severity_{t-1}$	0.58 (0.09)***	0.57 (0.09)***
Duration of Genocide or Politicide	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.04 (0.03)
State $Failure(s)_{t-1}$	−0.04 (0.42)	−0.06 (0.43)
$Coups(s)_{t-1}$	0.10 (0.33)	0.12 (0.32)
Regime Type	−0.02 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.04)
Economic Marginalization	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)
$Ln(Population)_{t-1}$	−0.18 (0.22)	−0.20 (0.23)
Cold War Dummy Variable	−0.23 (0.41)	−0.26 (0.42)
Pro-Perpetrator $Intervention(s)_{t-1}$	−0.11 (0.21)	−0.09 (0.21)
Anti-Perpetrator $Intervention(s)_{t-1}$	−0.34 (0.15)**	−0.32 (0.16)**
Neutral/Impartial $Intervention(s)_{t-1}$	−0.51 (0.51)	−0.47 (0.51)
Ancillary Parameters		
Cut 1	−4.16 (3.88)	−4.46 (3.94)
Cut 2	−3.27 (3.85)	−3.56 (3.91)
Cut 3	−2.62 (3.86)	−2.91 (3.91)
Cut 4	−2.15 (3.88)	−2.44 (3.93)
Cut 5	−1.84 (3.87)	−2.13 (3.93)
Cut 6	−1.14 (3.87)	−1.44 (3.92)
Cut 7	−0.12 (3.86)	−0.43 (3.91)
Cut 8	1.10 (3.85)	0.77 (3.90)
Cut 9	2.50 (3.82)	2.17 (3.88)
Cut 10	4.16 (3.74)	3.83 (3.80)
N	177	177
Wald χ^2 (11)	65.83***	68.75***
Pseudo R^2	0.13	0.13
Log pseudo-likelihood (robust standard errors in parentheses)	−348.45	−348.81

(*Notes.* ***Significant at $p < .01$, two-tailed test; **significant at $p < .05$, two-tailed test; *significant at $p < .10$, two-tailed test.)

probabilities that are much more intuitive. Therefore, I explore the degree of the effect of such interventions in Tables 5–8, examining predicted probabilities of a hypothetical case of interest.

The case examined in Tables 5–8 is an ''average'' or ''typical'' post-Cold War case in that most values of the independent and control variables are set at the mean or modal values. The hypothetical case occurs in a somewhat economically marginalized (49.46) autocracy (−4.70) that is experiencing another state failure besides the ongoing genocide or politicide, but has not experienced a coup or threat of a coup. The case is in its sixth year of the genocide/politicide (6.28). The natural log of the population is that variable's mean (16.54). The previous year saw between 4,000 and 8,000 killed (Magnitude = 5). No overt military interventions of any kind have yet occurred.

Table 5 shows the probability that this same ''typical'' post-Cold War era case of genocide or politicide will experience different magnitudes of severity up to a year after the publication of a given number of stories about human rights in that country in the Northern media. The first column indicates the probabilities predicted for the case in the absence of any news coverage in the prior year. This type of analysis allows us to employ an analytical strategy discussed by Hafner-Burton and Ron (2009:377): ''One way to evaluate the success of humanitarian rights promotion efforts … is to imagine what might have happened without the human rights intervention.'' Given that this case has already experienced a magnitude of killing of 5 (4,000–8,000 killed), absent any news attention to human rights issues it appears is likely that the killings escalate. The probability that the magnitude of the killing will remain about the same is .1453. The predicted probability of escalation is .6500 (the sum of predicted probabilities for all magnitudes greater than 5), while the probability that the killings taper off on their own is .2047 (the sum of predicted probabilities for all magnitudes less than 5).

The publication of an average of just one news story in the Northern media (the mean, rounded to the nearest whole number) has a measurable effect on the severity of genocide or politicide in this case, reducing the predicted probability that the killings will escalate from .6500 to .5638. The probability that the killings will abate increases from .2047 to .2698. If an average of two news stories appear (one standard deviation above the mean), the probability of escalation drops further to .4738 (a change of more than .17 from no coverage) while the probability that the killings will abate increases to .3468. The appearance of the maximum average number of stories—12—is associated with an increase in the probability of lives saved to .9519.

As Table 6 demonstrates, the release of the average number of (six) Amnesty International Background Reports on a perpetrator country has a measurable effect on the severity of genocide or politicide in the ''typical'' post-Cold War case. When compared to the effects of no Background Reports being issued, the predicted probability that the killings will escalate drops from .6912 to .6156 and the probability that the killings will decrease jumps from .1749 to .2275. If Amnesty published fourteen Background Reports in the previous year (one standard deviation above the mean), the probability of escalation drops further to .5064 while the probability that the killings will abate increases to .3161. Release of the maximum number of Background Reports—40—is related to an increase in the probability of lives saved to .6629.

Tables 7 and 8 show the probability that this same ''typical'' post-Cold War era case of genocide or politicide will experience different magnitudes of severity up to a year after being referred to the UN Commission on Human Rights. As Table 7 demonstrates, targeting by the UNCHR has a measurable dampening effect on the severity of genocide or politicide in the ''typical'' case, reducing the predicted probability that the killings will escalate from .6676 to .5097 and increasing the probability that the killings will abate from .1989 to .3240. As Table 8 shows, however, UNCHR targeting absent any follow-up action has a small ameliorative effect. Sanctioning by the UNCHR with increasing strength yields greater effects, as one might expect.

TABLE 5. Predicted Probabilities of the Effects of Naming and Shaming by Northern Media on the Magnitude of Severity of an ''Average'' Case of an Ongoing Genocide or Politicide in the Post-Cold War Era, By Magnitude of Severity

	No News Reports (Minimum)	*1 News Report (>Mean)*	*2 News Reports (Mean + 1 SD)*	*12 News Reports (Maximum)*
Magnitude of Severity (no. killed/year)				
0 (<300)	.0263	.0373	.0528	.6747
1 (300–1,000)	.0312	.0432	.0590	.1494
2 (1,000–2,000)	.0446	.0599	.0783	.0732
3 (2,000–4,000)	.0529	.0681	.0845	.0365
4 (4,000–8,000)	.0497	.0613	.0722	.0181
5 (8,000–16,000)	.1453	.1662	.1794	.0245
6 (16,000–32,000)	.2550	.2513	.2333	.0152
7 (32,000–64,000)	.2306	.1920	.1534	.0059
8 (64,000–128,000)	.1143	.0851	.0622	.0019
9 (128,000–256,000)	.0382	.0271	.0191	.0005
10 (>256,000)	.0119	.0083	.0058	.0002
Effect on Magnitude of Severity				
Decreased Magnitude of Severity	.2047	.2698	.3468	.9519
No Change in Magnitude of Severity	.1453	.1662	.1794	.0245
Escalation of Magnitude of Severity	.6500	.5638	.4738	.0237

(*Notes.* Held constant: post-cold war case; state failure in prior year; no coups or coup threats in prior year; no overt military interventions; regime type = −4.7 (autocracy); economic marginalization = 49.46 (somewhat marginalized); ln(population) = 16.54; duration of genocide/politicide = 6.28; prior magnitude of severity = 5 (4,000–8,000 dead).
Probabilities may not sum to 1.0000 due to rounding error.)

TABLE 6. Predicted Probabilities of the Effects of Naming and Shaming by Amnesty International on the Magnitude of Severity of an ''Average'' Case of an Ongoing Genocide or Politicide in the Post-Cold War Era, By Magnitude of Severity

	No Background Reports (Minimum)	*6 Background Reports (Mean)*	*14 Background Reports (Mean + 1 SD)*	*40 Background Reports (Maximum)*
Magnitude of Severity (no. killed/year)				
0 (<300)	.0195	.0270	.0415	.1555
1 (300–1,000)	.0240	.0327	.0487	.1412
2 (1,000–2,000)	.0359	.0478	.0681	.1478
3 (2,000–4,000)	.0474	.0611	.0822	.1295
4 (4,000–8,000)	.0481	.0598	.0756	.0889
5 (8,000–16,000)	.1340	.1560	.1775	.1428
6 (16,000–32,000)	.2494	.2541	.2402	.1157
7 (32,000–64,000)	.2454	.2127	.1655	.0529
8 (64,000–128,000)	.1328	.1025	.0705	.0184
9 (128,000–256,000)	.0480	.0351	.0230	.0056
10 (>256,000)	.0156	.0112	.0072	.0017
Effect on Magnitude of Severity				
Decreased Magnitude of Severity	.1749	.2275	.3161	.6629
No Change in Magnitude of Severity	.1340	.1560	.1775	.1428
Escalation of Magnitude of Severity	.6912	.6156	.5064	.1943

(*Notes.* Held constant: post-cold war case; state failure in prior year; no coups or coup threats in prior year; no overt military interventions; regime type = −4.7 (autocracy); economic marginalization = 49.46 (somewhat marginalized); ln(population) = 16.54; duration of genocide/politicide = 6.28; prior magnitude of severity = 5 (4,000–8,000 dead).
Probabilities may not sum to 1.0000 due to rounding error.)

However, the dampening effect of moving from the least to the most severe UNCHR sanction—from no targeting at all to a resolution condemning the human rights record of the perpetrator—is a .13 change in probability. This is markedly lower as compared to that of moving from the minimum (0) to the maximum (40) number of AI Background Reports published, which yields an increase in the probability of a drop in the severity of mass killing of .49. Yet AI's effect is dwarfed by that of the media. Moving from no news stories published to the maximum number of average news stories published in the Northern media (12) in a given year yields an increase in the probability of lives saved of .75, suggesting why HROs so actively court media attention.

Conclusion

This study examined whether naming and shaming could reduce the severity of ongoing instances of genocide or politicide. The results suggest that naming and shaming by NGOs, the Northern media, and IOs all have significant ameliorative effects on the severity of the most extreme atrocities. At minimum, naming and shaming takes away the excuse of policymakers that they ''did not know'' that mass killing was occurring, or that they ''did not fully appreciate'' the extent of the killing (Power 2002:504–505) and may spur them to action. At their most effective, transnational advocacy networks can bring atrocities to light, frame perpetrators as pariahs and hurt their international

TABLE 7. Predicted Probabilities of the Effects of Naming and Shaming (Targeting) by the UNCHR on the Magnitude of Severity of an ''Average'' Case of an Ongoing Genocide or Politicide in the Post-Cold War Era, By Magnitude of Severity

	Not Targeted by UNCHR	*Targeted by UNCHR*
Magnitude of Severity (no. killed/year)		
0 (<300)	.0237	.0447
1 (300–1,000)	.0323	.0580
2 (1,000–2,000)	.0457	.0767
3 (2,000–4,000)	.0521	.0804
4 (4,000–8,000)	.0451	.0642
5 (8,000–16,000)	.1336	.1663
6 (16,000–32,000)	.2476	.2371
7 (32,000–64,000)	.2436	.1729
8 (64,000–128,000)	.1263	.0732
9 (128,000–256,000)	.0402	.0214
10 (>256,000)	.0099	.0051
Effect on Magnitude of Severity		
Decreased Magnitude of Severity	.1989	.3240
No Change in Magnitude of Severity	.1336	.1663
Escalation of Magnitude of Severity	.6676	.5097

(*Notes.* Held constant: post-cold war case; state failure in prior year; no coups or coup threats in prior year; no overt military interventions; regime type = −4.7 (autocracy); economic marginalization = 49.46 (somewhat marginalized); ln(population) = 16.54; duration of genocide/politicide = 6.28; prior magnitude of severity = 5 (4,000–8,000 dead).
Probabilities may not sum to 1.0000 due to rounding error.)

reputations, activate powerful bystanders who can and sometimes do impose costs on perpetrators, and ultimately help lead to changes in the murderous policy.

These findings are consistent with research that suggests that attempts to slow or stop ongoing mass killings should focus on opposing perpetrators (Valentino 2004; Krain 2005; DeMeritt 2009, 2010). The fact that one of the only other consistently significant factors affecting severity is overt military intervention against the perpetrator suggests that efforts that explicitly challenge the perpetrator of the atrocities—in words or in deeds—are those that are most effective in curtailing the killing.

Why do the results of this study differ so much from those of Hafner-Burton (2008) and other quantitative human rights scholars? Perhaps it is because this analysis examines the effects of human rights shaming on one specific and extreme form of human rights violation—genocide or politicide. To check this possibility, I re-ran the analyses, this time substituting the two most commonly used ordinal measures of overall human rights conditions in the country—the Political Terror Scale average score (Gibney, Cornett, and Wood 2010) or the Cingranelli and Richards (2010) physical integrity index—as the dependent variable in place of the magnitude of genocide/politicide severity.[32] As expected, none of the naming and shaming variables were significant predictors of the overall human rights conditions in countries experiencing an ongoing genocide or politicide, except targeting and punishment by the UNCHR, which actually had negative effects on human rights conditions in those countries.[33] Examining changes in human rights measures erroneously suggests that naming and shaming has no effect (or even a deleterious effect, in the case of the UNCHR) on life integrity. Yet as this study shows, naming and shaming has an ameliorative effect on the physical integrity of people on the ground in cases of genocide or politicide. Perhaps this is not surprising, as one might expect the human rights conditions in countries experiencing an ongoing genocide or politicide to be almost uniformly awful, even when the severity of the ongoing mass killing abates somewhat. The human rights measures we traditionally employ to capture the effects of naming and shaming on perpetrator behavior may not be refined enough to capture the positive effects of naming and shaming on life integrity during the worst atrocities, a conclusion in line with arguments made by Hafner-Burton and Ron (2009:381), as well as DeMeritt's (2010) findings.

Of course, another alternative explanation is that leaders are substituting one form of brutal repression for another in the face of the international spotlight. Risse and Sikkink (1999:25) note that, in an effort to stop criticism and shift the spotlight away from them, perpetrators of rights violations make ''cosmetic changes'' or ''tactical concessions'' in the face of naming and shaming. Sometimes these concessions yield better rights practices overall, but sometimes they merely change repressive tactics. Hafner-Burton (2008) finds that rights violators put in the spotlight improve some types of rights, most notably political rights, while compensating by continuing or even ratcheting up personal integrity rights violations in order to maintain order and counteract the other more noticeable rights improvements. Rejali (2007) demonstrates that in the face of international scrutiny, governments can and do find new and less visible ways of violating the same personal integrity rights (torture, in his study). Perhaps it is also possible that perpetrators of genocide or politicide, when named and shamed, find other equally terrorizing but less lethal methods of dealing with targeted populations, while scaling back the killing until the spotlight shines elsewhere. These substitution policies may not yield better overall human rights records, but they will reduce the severity of ongoing mass killing, at least in the short term. Recent work by Fariss and Schnakenberg (2009) finds that government choice of a specific violation of life integrity is related to their earlier use of other related types of life integrity violations and suggests that substitution of one for another may be possible, and even likely, in the face of the need to alter policies. Regardless, this seems an area ripe for future research.

Additionally, this study confirms other findings in the literature that the longer the duration of the episode of mass killing the lower the subsequent severity. This suggests the importance of examining when during the ongoing atrocity interventions occur for understanding how best to reduce severity while also trying to end the episode.[34] On

[32] Most quantitative studies in the international relations human rights literature examine the effect of naming and shaming on overall human rights violations, or on levels of repression. These studies typically employ a single-scaled measure of rights violations, such as the Political Terror Scale (Gibney et al. 2010) or the Cingranelli and Richards (2010) physical integrity rights data. See for instance: Ron et al. (2005); Cardenas (2007); Franklin (2008); Hafner-Burton (2008); Hendrix and Wong (2010); Murdie and Davis (2012).

[33] Due to space considerations, these results were omitted from this manuscript, but are available from the author upon request.

[34] For recent work on how interventions by members of the international community affect the duration of an episode of genocide or politicide, see Davenport and Appel (2008).

TABLE 8. Predicted Probabilities of the Effects of Naming and Shaming (Punishment) by the UNCHR on the Magnitude of Severity of an ''Average'' Case of an Ongoing Genocide or Politicide in the Post-Cold War Era, By Magnitude of Severity

	Not Targeted by UNCHR (0)	*Targeted, No Further Action (1)*	*Confidential Session (2)*	*Mild Sanctions (3)*	*Resolution Passed (4)*
Magnitude of Severity (no. killed/year)					
0 (<300)	.0258	.0304	.0358	.0421	.0495
1 (300–1,000)	.0353	.0411	.0478	.0553	.0638
2 (1,000–2,000)	.0497	.0570	.0651	.0739	.0833
3 (2,000–4,000)	.0557	.0627	.0701	.0776	.0852
4 (4,000–8,000)	.0475	.0525	.0575	.0623	.0667
5 (8,000–16,000)	.1383	.1479	.1563	.1631	.1680
6 (16,000–32,000)	.2463	.2467	.2438	.2378	.2290
7 (32,000–64,000)	.2341	.2165	.1983	.1798	.1617
8 (64,000–128,000)	.1198	.1047	.0910	.0788	.0680
9 (128,000–256,000)	.0380	.0324	.0276	.0234	.0199
10 (>256,000)	.0094	.0079	.0067	.0057	.0048
Effect on Magnitude of Severity					
Decreased Magnitude of Severity	.2140	.2437	.2763	.3112	.3485
No Change in Magnitude of Severity	.1383	.1479	.1563	.1631	.1680
Escalation of Magnitude of Severity	.6476	.6082	.5674	.5255	.4834

(*Notes.* Held constant: post-cold war case; state failure in prior year; no coups or coup threats in prior year; no overt military interventions; regime type = −4.7 (autocracy); economic marginalization = 49.46 (somewhat marginalized); ln(population) = 16.54; duration of genocide/politicide = 6.28; prior magnitude of severity = 5 (4,000–8,000 dead).
Probabilities may not sum to 1.0000 due to rounding error.)

the other hand, we have the seemingly odd finding that larger populations are likely to face less severe massacres, and vice versa. This runs counter to most findings in the human rights literature that suggest that population size is related to more, and more serious, human rights abuses (Henderson 1993; Poe and Tate 1994). Perhaps the results are related to the rationality of genocide/politicide—larger populations likely contain larger groups that might be targets, which might make mass killings too ''costly'' in terms of resources needed, visibility of the massacres internationally, and likely opposition faced domestically. Again, this is an area ripe for future inquiry.

Appendix 1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	*Mean*	*SD*	*Minimum*	*Maximum*
Dependent Variable				
Magnitude of Geno/Politicide Severity	4.32	2.94	0	10
Independent Variables				
Average Media Coverage$_{(t-1)}$	0.67	1.43	0	12
Amnesty Background Reports$_{(t-1)}$	6.49	7.19	0	40
Amnesty News Releases$_{(t-1)}$	1.75	4.73	0	39
Was State Targeted by UNCHR?$_{(t-1)}$	0.55	0.50	0	1
Severity of Punishment by UNCHR$_{(t-1)}$	1.80	1.80	0	4
Control Variables				
Magnitude of Geno/Politicide Severity$_{(t-1)}$	4.30	2.95	0	10
Duration of Genocide or Politicide	6.28	4.79	1	21
State Failure$_{(t-1)}$	0.72	0.45	0	1
Coups$_{(t-1)}$	0.33	0.72	0	5
Regime Type	−4.70	4.39	−9	8
Economic Marginalization	49.46	117.21	0.36	1287.50
Ln(Population)$_{(t-1)}$	16.54	1.41	12.16	20.64
Cold War Dummy Variable	0.79	0.41	0	1
Pro-Perpetrator Interventions$_{(t-1)}$	0.53	1.18	0	8
Anti-Perpetrator Interventions$_{(t-1)}$	0.36	0.93	0	13
Impartial Interventions$_{(t-1)}$	0.19	0.52	0	3

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