

Kravis 790, 665 West 130th Street, New York, NY 10027

All future dates indicate expected activities as time traveling is not feasible (yet).

## **Education**

**Columbia University** 

New York, USA

PhD Candidate in Finance

Aug. 2018 - June 2024

• GPA: 9.8/10

#### **Toulouse School of Economics**

Toulouse, France

MASTER IN ECONOMIC THEORY AND ECONOMETRICS (PHD TRACK)

Sept. 2016 - June 2018

• First Year Grade: 16.8/20, Ranking 6/104, Summa Cum Laude; Second Year Grade 15.8, Ranking 5, Tuition Waiver Recipient

**Fudan University**Shanghai, China

BACHELOR IN ECONOMICS

Sept.2011 - Jul. 2016

• Grade: 3.56/4, Ranking 11/68, Scolarship Recipient

• Thesis: Network Effect in China's Cross-Border Merge and Acquisition (Originally Written in Chinese)

Waseda University

Tokyo, Japan

EXCHANGE PROGRAM

Sept.2014 - Jul. 2015

• Major Grade: 4/4, Dean's List (Top 10%), JASSO Scholarship Recipient

## Fields of Interest

Corporate Finance, Bankruptcy, Contract Theory, Capital Structure, Security Design, Information Economics, Financial Networks

### Research

#### A General Theory of Holdouts (2023)

JOB MARKET PAPER

This paper presents a unified framework for analyzing the holdout problem, a pervasive phenomenon in the economy that arises in various contexts, such as takeover, debt restructuring, and land assembly, where value creation is hindered by the incentive to exploit other agents' concessions. My framework encompasses the specific applications examined in the literature and demonstrates that the problem can be resolved through contingent contracts, provided that the principal is committed. I then add limited commitment by requiring the exchange offers to be credible, i.e., initial exchange offers are renegotiation-proof in the event of agent deviation. I show that adding limited commitment can substantially alter the outcome depending on the shape of the existing contracts, which explains the absence of unanimity rule despite its efficacy and cross-sectional heterogeneity in contractual tools. (E.g., senior debt used in debt restructuring but not takeover.) Furthermore, I investigate the impact of commitment and reveal that an increase in commitment could backfire, exacerbating the holdout problem.

Presented at Finance Theory Group Summer School 2023, Financial Colloquium in the Economics Department, Columbia University

#### Systemic Risk in Financial Networks Revisited: The Role of Maturity (2023)

R&R at the Journal of Finance

WITH JASON DONALDSON AND GIORGIA PIACENTINO

We develop a model of interbank networks in which banks experience state-contingent liquidity shocks. We show that networks of long-term debt facilitate the efficient transfer of liquidity: They allow shocked banks to raise liquidity using interbank assets as collateral for new debt, diluting interbank liabilities. Networks of long-term debt thus have strikingly different properties from those of short-term, which cannot be diluted; e.g., high indebtness and connectedness can be sources of stability, not fragility. Networks in a specific class, which we call the "exponential networks," implement optimal contingent transfers despite consisting of plain (non-contingent) debt—they are robust but never fragile.

#### Restructuring vs. Bankruptcy (2023)

R&R at the Journal of Finance

WITH JASON DONALDSON, ED. MORRISON AND GIORGIA PIACENTINO

We develop a model of a firm in financial distress. Distress can be mitigated by filing for bankruptcy, which is costly, or preempted by restructuring, which is impeded by a collective action problem. We find that bankruptcy and restructuring are complements, not substitutes: reducing bankruptcy costs facilitates restructuring, rather than crowding it out. And so does making bankruptcy more debtor-friendly, under a condition that seems likely to hold now in the U.S. The model gives new perspectives on current relief policies (e.g., DIP finance subsidies) and on long-standing legal debates (e.g., about APR violations).

#### **Liquidity Insurance and Pledgeability (2023)**

ΧΙΑΟΒΟ Υυ

I model the design of liquidity insurance when firms suffer a concurrent unverifiable quality shock. The contactual incompleteness limits the extent of liquidity insurance: A fully insured firm has incentives to continue inefficient projects as the cost is borne by the creditors. The optimal contract involves limited insurance and co-investment with internal cash. In contrast to the canonical theory that low-pledgeability firms rely more on liquidity insurance, I find that lack of pledgeability also prevents them from getting more liquidity insurance. This positive relationship between liquidity insurance and pledgeability uncovers another role of pledgeability and explains the seemingly paradoxical fact that smaller firms who need liquidity insurance the most, are less insured and get revoked the most. It also rationalizes the typical cash-related covenants in credit lines.

Presented at 20th Macro Finance Society Workshop, Finance Theory Group "Bridging Theory and Empirical Research in Finance" Conference, Transatlantic Doctoral Conference 2023

#### Spatial Outward FDI: Evidence from China's Multinational Firms (2023)

Review of International Economics

WITH YIQING XIE, ZHIHONG YU AND YU ZHOU

This paper studies the impacts of geographic positions and economic connections on how Chinese multinational firms evolve their global network by conducting outward direct investment (ODI), including both green field investment and cross border merger and acquisition. We collect outward direct investment data of 3479 Chinese multinational firms from 2002 to 2013 whose investment destination covers more than 160 countries. We find two dominant geographic driving forces: a direct search effect and an indirect extension effect. That is, a firm tends to invest in the country that is closer to China; and a firm uses its existing ODI network to make further investment, radiating from the existing subsidiaries to their neighbors. Analogously, we also find two economic driving forces: a firm is more likely to invest in the country with more intense Chinese ODI transactions; and a firm takes advantage of its existing host countries ODI linkage to make further investment decisions. These findings are robust when we use other geographic and economic measures, and/or put more control variables.

This paper subsumes my undergrad thesis *Network Effect in China's Cross-Border Merge and Acquisition* (Yu, 2016), originally in Chinese.

### Work in Progress

- A General Theory of Holdouts
- Optimal Liquidity Intervention in Financial Networks
- Measurement of Markup under risk, with Laura Veldkamp
- Flight to Liquidity: how pledgeability affects debt issuance, with Lukas F. Fischer
- Structure of Core in Top Trading Cycle problem, with Dov Samet

## **Conferences/Seminars**

Asterisk indicates presentation by a co-author; Dagger indicates invited workshop or attendance without a presentation.

June 2023	FTG Summer School	Seattle, US
May. 2023	SFS Cavalcade North America	Austin, US
May. 2023	Transatlantic Doctoral Conference	London, UK
May. 2023	Financial Colloquium   Economics Department, Columbia Univ.	New York, US
Apr. 2023	Columbia Business School PhD Seminar	New York, US
Jan. 2023	AEA Annual Meeting <sup>†</sup>	New Orleans, US
Dec. 2022	FTG Group Bridging Theory and Empirical Research in Finance PhD Poster Session	Chicago, US
Sept. 2022	The 20th Macro Finance Society Workshop PhD Poster Session	Athens, Greece
July 2022	NBER Summer Institute: Law and Economics*	Boston, US
May 2022	Columbia Business School PhD Seminar	New York, US

Dec. 2021 July 2021 June 2021	Columbia Business School PhD Seminar Columbia Business School PhD Seminar Western Finance Association Meeting†	Online Online Online
Sept. 2020 Sept. 2020 Sept. 2020	Search and Matching in Macro and Finance (SaMMF) Seminar* Finance Theory Group Seminar* Columbia Business School PhD Seminar	Online Online Online
July 2019 June 2019	The 30th Jerusalem Advanced School in Economic Theory: Finance $^\dagger$ Financial Economics of Insurance $^\dagger$	Jerusalem, Israel Princeton, US
Paper Discu	ıssion	
Asterisk indicates the	presenting author.	
May 2023	<b>Transatlantic Doctoral Conference</b> Tiange Ye*, Lorenzo Bretscher, Lukas Schmid, Passive Demand and Active Supply:  Evidence from Maturity-mandated Corporate Bond Funds	London, UK
Experience		
Mar. 2019 - Jun. 2021 June 2017 - Aug. 2017	Laura Veldkamp, Research Assistant  Giorgia Piacentino, Research Assistant  Patrick Bolton & Neng Wang, Summer Research Assistant  Yiqing Xie & Yu Zhou, Research Assistant	New York, US New York, US New York, US Shanghai, China
Sep. 2022 - Dec. 2022 Jan. 2022 - Apr. 2022 Sep. 2019 - Oct. 2019 Jan. 2019 - May 2019	Frank Lichtenberg, TA for Economics of Healthcare and Pharmaceuticals (MBA) Frank Lichtenberg, TA & Review Session Instructor for Managerial Economics (EMBA) Giorgia Piacentino, TA for Financial Intermediation (Ph.D.) Ethan Namvar & Charles Jones, TA & Review Instructor for Corporate Finance (EMBA) Anton Lines, TA for Financial Markets (MBA) Yu Zhou, TA for Industrial Organization (Undergrad)	New York, US New York, US New York, US New York, US New York, US Shanghai, China
	MSFE 2023 Admission, Committee Member MSFE 2022 Admission, Committee Member	New York, US New York, US
Fed. 2014 - June 2016 Dec. 2013 - Feb. 2014	Silicon Valley Bank Venture Capital, Summer Investment Analyst Bain & Company, Part-Time Assistant Meritco Group, Consultant Intern MicroWorld Corp., Consultant Intern	Shanghai, China Shanghai, China Shanghai, China Shanghai, China
Extracurric	ular Activity	
2011-2012 <b>"Xieshou</b>	a Club, Vice President "Education Project, Team Leader Academic Project (with Prof. Dehua Fu), Core Member	Shanghai, China Shanghai, China Shanghai, China
Honors & A	wards	
2022 <b>Selective</b>	Sixth-year Funding, Columbia University	New York, USA
2017 <b>Summa C</b>	Cum Laude, Second Year Master, TSE tum Laude, First Year Master, TSE sed Tuition Waiver Recipients, Second Year Master, TSE	Toulouse, France Toulouse, France Toulouse, France
2016 Scholarsh	nip, Fudan University	Shanghai, China

First Prize, China-Taiwan Cross-strait Mock Startup Competition

Shanghai, China

2016

2015	JASSO Scholarship, Waseda University	Tokyo, Japan
2015	<b>Dean's List,</b> Waseda University	Tokyo, Japan
2014	Finalist, Bain & Co. Cup Consulting Mock Case Competition	Shanghai, China
2013	Scholarship, Fudan University	Shanghai, China
2012	Scholarship, Fudan University	Shanghai, China

# Skills\_\_\_\_\_

**Programming** R, Python, LaTeX, Mathematica, Scheme/Lisp, Linux, SQL, C/C++, SAS **Languages** Chinese (Native), English (Fluent), French and Japanese (Basic Knowledge)