


II) if the polynomial is irreducible then period of LFSR will divide $2^n - 1$

III) If it is reducible then different state will have different cycle length (different period)

n-bit LFSR



$$k = (k_0, \dots, k_{n-1})$$

output bits $x_i \rightarrow$ keystream bits z_i

$$m_i \oplus z_i = c_i \rightarrow \text{ciphertext bits}$$


1) Known Plaintext attack

$$z_0 = k_0, z_1 = k_1, \dots, z_{n-1} = k_{n-1}$$

if you have the keystream bits then you can prepare a system linear eqⁿ.

LFSR with non-linear filter f
 $f: \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$

n-bit LFSR, $n \geq 1$



state update of LFSR

- 1) linear feed back
- 2) shifting

$$c_i = m_i \oplus z_i$$

$$z_i \in \{0,1\}$$


//_

State update fn of LFSR is α

$$S_{t+1} = \alpha(S_t)$$

$$Z_{t+1} = f(S_{t+1})$$

II LFSR with combiner fn



III non-linear feedback shift register (NLFSR)

→ feedback fn is non-linear

$$f: \{0,1\}^l \rightarrow \{0,1\}$$

$$f = f(x) + f(y) + f(x+y)$$

$$t = 0, 1 \quad \left| \quad f(x_0, x_1, x_2) = x_0 + x_1 x_2$$




Hash Functions

$$h: A \rightarrow B$$

$$h(x) = y$$

- 1) if x is altered to x' then $h(x')$ will be completely different from $h(x)$
- 2) Given y you can't possibly find x s.t. $h(x) = y$
- 3) given x & $y = h(x)$ you can't find x' s.t. $h(x) = h(x')$



if $h(x_1, k) = s_2$ then Bob accepts x_1

* we are able to check authenticate both the data & the source.

Defⁿ: a hash fn is a four tuple (P, S, k, H) where:

- 1) P is set of all possible messages
- 2) S : set of all possible message digests or authⁿ tags
- 3) k is the key space
- 4) for each $k_i \in k$ there is a hash fn $h_{k_i} \in H$ s.t.

$$h_{k_i}: P \rightarrow S \text{ here } |P| \geq |S|$$

more interestingly $|P| \geq 2 \times |S|$

- if key is involved in computation then it is called keyed hash fn, if not then unkeyed hash fn

Problem 1 (Preimage finding Problem)
 $h: P \rightarrow S$

given $y \in S$ Find $x \in P$
 such that $h(x) = y$

if you can't find x in reasonable time then h is preimage resistant hash fn, else it is preimage friendly.

Problem 2 (2nd preimage finding problem)
 $h: P \rightarrow S$

$x \in P$ & $h(x)$ find $x' \in P$ s.t.
 $x' \neq x$ & $h(x') = h(x)$

if finding this is hard then h is second preimage resistant hash fn.

Problem 3 (Collision finding Problem)
 $h: P \rightarrow S$

find $x, x' \in P$ s.t. $x \neq x'$
 & $h(x) = h(x')$

• if finding is hard \rightarrow collision resistant hash fn.

Q. ideal hash fn
 let $h: P \rightarrow S$
 h is ideal if given $x \in P$ to find $h(x)$ either you have to apply h on x or you have to look into the table corresponding to h (hash table)

Q. Preimage finding algo. given $y \in S$
 find $x \in X$
 s.t. $h(x) = y$
 $h: X \rightarrow Y$

choose any $X_0 \subseteq X$ s.t. $|X_0| = \alpha$

for every $x \in X_0$
 if $h(x) = y$
 return x

else choose another subset

so the probability $\propto \frac{1}{\alpha}$ complexity

E_i : event $h(x_i) = y$: $1 \leq i \leq \alpha$

$$\Pr[E_i] = \frac{1}{m}$$

$$\Pr[E_i'] = 1 - \frac{1}{m}$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[E_1 \cup E_2 \cup E_3 \dots \cup E_\alpha] \\ &= 1 - \Pr[E_1' \cap E_2' \cap \dots \cap E_\alpha'] \\ &= 1 - \left(1 - \frac{1}{m}\right)^\alpha \approx 1 - \left[1 - \frac{\alpha}{m}\right] \\ &= \frac{\alpha}{m} \end{aligned}$$

\therefore complexity = $O(m)$