Responsible & Safe AI

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Robustness

Robustness

Model to maintain the performance when faced with uncertainties or adversarial conditions

Model should generalize well and provide reliable predictions

Handling noisy data, distribution shifts, adversarial conditions

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https://medium.com/@slavadubrov/understanding-machine-learning-robustness-why-it-matters-and-how-it-affects-your-models-5e2cb5838dab

Robustness

Transition from AI Risks to Robustness, through Risk Decomposition

Black Swans

Distribution Shifts

Methods to deal with distribution shifts and black swans

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Black Swans

Black Swans
Long Tailed Distributions
Mediocristan and Extremistan
Unknown Unknowns



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Black Swans

events that are outliers, lying outside typical expectations, and often carry extreme impact

Europeans widely assumed swans were only white, until explorers eventually discovered black-colored swans in Australia

While often ignored as outliers, Black Swans are costly to ignore since these events often matter the most

Black Swans









WAYMO

Black swans

Tilted, occluded, by lights, etc.

2008 financial crisis – I graduated (with PhD) around this ☹

COVID 19

https://arxiv.org/pdf/2109.13916.pdf

Long Tail Distributions

A tail of a distribution is the region that is far from the head or center of the distribution

Tails taper off gradually rather than drop off sharply

Pareto principle / 80-20 principle



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Power Law Distributions are “Scale Free”

The Web’s Approximate Degree Distribution

Power Law Distributions are “Scale Free”

The Web’s Approximate Degree Distribution



Long Tails Are Pervasive

#of followers in Twitter.



Long Tails Are Pervasive

~0.1% of drugs generate a ~50% pharmaceutical industry sales

~0.2% of books account ~50% their sales

~1% of bands and solo artists earn ~77% of all revenue from recorded music

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Nonlinear Interactions Generate Long Tails

$$X_t = \mathcal{E}_{t-1}\mathcal{E}_{t-2}\cdots\mathcal{E}_1\mathcal{E}_0, \qquad \mathcal{E}_i \geq 0$$

The result is a long-tailed, but it would be a thin-tailed Gaussian if variables were added instead of multiplied

Nonlinear interactions arise when parts are connected or interdependent

If the observation becomes zero when a part becomes zero → nonlinear interaction

Research output = Ideas X Time X Students X Resources



Mediocristan and Extremistan

Mediocristan

Thin tails
Total is determined by many small events
Typical member mediocre/average
Tyranny of the collective
Top few get small slice
Easy to predict
Impact nonscalable
Mild randomness

Extremistan

Long tails
Total is determined by a few large events
"Typical" member giant or dwarf
Tyranny of the accidental
Top few get large share
Hard to predict
Impact potentially scalable
Wild randomness

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Unknown Unknowns

Known Knowns Things we are aware of and understand We know what we know Facts and requirements Recollection	**Unknown Knowns** Things we understand but are not aware of We don't know that we (can) know Unaccounted facts / Tacit knowledge Self-analysis
Known Unknowns Things we are aware of but don't understand We know that we do not know these Known classic risks / Conscious ignorance Closed-ended Questions	**Unknown Unknowns** Things we are not aware of nor understand We don't know what we don't know Unknown risks / Meta-ignorance Open-ended Exploration

Black Swans, Unknown Unknowns, and Long Tails

Often statistically characterized by long tailed distributions or cause long tail events

Because Black Swans dominate risk analysis, we discuss long tails to characterize these highly impactful events statistically

Events widely regarded as Black Swans may be known unknowns to a few in-the-know people, but they are typically unknown unknowns

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Black Swans and Long-Term Safety

AI's eventual impact on the world may be long-tailed

We want models that can withstand and detect Black Swans, which are more likely to arise in the future when the world is changing rapidly and unexpectedly

If we have multiple AI agents deployed in the future, and if the social power or command over resources is more long-tailed, the collective will be less able to rein in the most powerful agents; extremistan is relevant for future ML deployment dynamics

Other existential risks can be viewed as sufficiently extreme long tail events (e.g., biorisks and asteroids are long-tailed and pose x-risks)

Measuring Vulnerability To Unexpected Events

We can measure vulnerability to long tail events by simulating extreme or highly unusual events using stress-test datasets

To simulate stressors, the stress-test datasets are from a different data generating process than the training data

The overall goal is to make model performance not degrade as sharply in the face of extreme stressors

ImageNet

ImageNet

13 languages

Article Talk Read Edit View history Tools

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The **ImageNet** project is a large visual database designed for use in visual object recognition software research. More than 14 million[1][2] images have been hand-annotated by the project to indicate what objects are pictured and in at least one million of the images, bounding boxes are also provided.[3] ImageNet contains more than 20,000 categories,[2] with a typical category, such as "balloon" or "strawberry", consisting of several hundred images.[4] The database of annotations of third-party image URLs is freely available directly from ImageNet, though the actual images are not owned by ImageNet.[5] Since 2010, the ImageNet project runs an annual software contest, the ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge (ILSVRC), where software programs compete to correctly classify and detect objects and scenes. The challenge uses a "trimmed" list of one thousand non-overlapping classes.[6]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ImageNet

How Can We Test Robustness to Adverse Inputs?

ImageNet-C



ImageNet-C [corruptions]



Train on ImageNet, test on ImageNet-C

ResNet-50 gets **76**% on ImageNet

Residual Network, specific type of CNN, 50 layers

ImageNet-R [Rendition]

ImageNet: photos only, no painting, no drawings, etc.

ImageNet-Rendition is a style robustness test set with 30K images with different texture and styles

Flickr images with query as “art,” “cartoons,” “graffiti,” “embroidery,” “graphics,” “origami,” “paintings,” “patterns,” “plastic objects,” “plush objects,” “sculptures,” “line drawings,” “tattoos,” “toys,” “video game,” and so on.

Train a model on normal ImageNet, and then test on ImageNet-R’s paintings, drawings, sculptures, ...

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ImageNet-R is Disjoint from ImageNet

Which of these images contain at least one object of type

crane

Definition: large long-necked wading bird of marshes and plains in many parts of the world

Task:

For each of the following images, check the box next to an image if it contains at least one object of type *crane*. Select an image if it contains the object regardless of occlusions, other objects, and clutter or text in the scene. Only select images that are photographs (no drawings or paintings).

ImageNet-R [Rendition]

Mining for Hard Examples and Adversarial Filtration

A way to create a stress test for models is to collect examples that fool an existing strong model ("natural adversarial examples")

One can mine for hard examples by having a model classify a large set of examples and create a test set of the examples that it got wrong

Researchers sometimes collect egregious errors where models are highly mistaken, such as high-confidence misclassifications

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ImageNet-A [Adversarial]

ImageNet-Adversarial contains naturally occurring examples that are difficult for ResNet-50 models to classify

These examples are difficult for other new models too, including Vision Transformers, which demonstrates shared weaknesses across architectures

ObjectNet

Collected to show objects from new viewpoints on new backgrounds



ANLI

ANLI is an adversarial natural language inference (NLI) dataset

NLI is about determining whether a “hypothesis” is true, false, or undetermined given a “context”

The dataset is created by crowdworkers with the aim of fooling large-scale models

GPT-3 only gets up to ~40% accuracy

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ANLI Construction Process

An annotator writes a hypothesis. A model makes a prediction about the context-hypothesis pair. If the model's prediction was correct, the annotator writes a new hypothesis. If the model was fooled, the context-hypothesis pair is validated by other annotators.



Improving Long Tail Robustness

Large Models Improve Robustness

Models with more parameters generalize to unseen situations better



ImageNet-C error, lower better



Larger models, more parameter, more redundancy in representations, one neuron fails, another pick up detect the feature detected by other neuron

Mixup

Mixup augments the data by performing an elementwise convex combination on inputs and outputs

Mixup improves corruption robustness



More formally, given a finite number of points $x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n$ in a real vector space, a convex combination of these points is a point of the form

$$\alpha_1 x_1 + \alpha_2 x_2 + \cdots + \alpha_n x_n$$

where the real numbers α_i satisfy $\alpha_i \geq 0$ and $\alpha_1 + \alpha_2 + \cdots + \alpha_n = 1$.[1]

If x_i and x_j are audio signals, then mixup is just mixing the audio

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convex_combination

AutoAugment

AutoAugment proposes data augmentation strategies using diverse Python Imaging Library augmentations such as Invert, Solarize, and so on

Example Augmentations



AutoAugment composes two augmentations together, each with two parameters:

a probability of being turned on and an intensity

They train tens of thousands of deep networks to search for a few augmentation parameters, and they propose some of their best parameter settings

Random Augmentations

To avoid AutoAugment's computational cost, we may want to use randomized augmentations. To achieve diverse, random augmentations we could combine many random augmentations together



However, uncontrolled random augmentations can make images start to become unrecognizable

AugMix

Uses random augmentations and mixes these augmentations to keep images recognizable

we randomly sample the operations, the intensity, the depth of each branch, and all mixing weights.

Avoiding Train-Test Overlap

ImageNet-C corruptions



operations used by AugMix

PixMix

PixMix mixes training images with images from another dataset

The bird training image is mixed with an image from a fractal dataset



Unlike mixup, the mixing set is not the original training set

PixMix Pseudocode

```
def pixmix(x_orig, x_mixing_pic, k=4, beta=3):
    x_pixmix = random.choice([augment(x_orig), x_orig])

    for i in range(random.choice([0,1,...,k])): # random count of mixing rounds

        # mixing_pic is from the mixing set (e.g., fractal, natural image, etc.)
        mix_image = random.choice([augment(x_orig), x_mixing_pic])
        mix_op = random.choice([additive, multiplicative])

        x_pixmix = mix_op(x_pixmix, mix_image, beta)

    return x_pixmix

def augment(x):
    aug_op = random.choice([rotate, solarize, ..., posterize])
    return aug_op(x)
```

PixMix Evaluation

PixMix helps with robustness as well as other safety metrics



Method	Baseline	Cutout	Mixup	CutMix	PixMix
					
Corruptions mCE (↓)	50.0 +0.0	51.5 +1.5	48.0 −2.0	51.5 +1.5	**30.5** −19.5
Adversaries Error (↓)	96.5 +0.0	98.5 +1.0	97.4 +0.9	97.0 +0.5	**92.9** −3.9
Consistency mFR (↓)	10.7 +0.0	11.9 +1.2	9.5 −1.2	12.0 +1.3	**5.7** −5.0
Calibration RMS Error (↓)	31.2 +0.0	31.1 −0.1	13.0 −18.1	29.3 −1.8	**8.1** −23.0
Anomaly Detection AUROC (↑)	77.7 +0.0	74.3 −3.4	71.7 −6.0	74.4 −3.3	**89.3** +11.6

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					
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Note many of these methods do not improve typical accuracy. They just improve safety metrics.

Distribution Shifts



Distribution Shifts

Occurs when the joint distribution of inputs and outputs differs between training and test stages

$$p_{\text{train}}(\mathbf{x}, y) \neq p_{\text{test}}(\mathbf{x}, y)$$

This issue is present, to varying degrees, in nearly every practical ML application, in part because it is hard to perfectly reproduce testing conditions at training time.

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Different types of distribution shifts: Covariate shift



Different types of distribution shifts: Covariate shift

P(x) changes between train and test, but p(y|x) does not change

When the distribution of training data and test data differ significantly, a learned model can fit training data well but perform poorly on test data.

Driverless car – Sunny streets train – Snow test

Speech recognition – native English speaking train – test on all English speaking

Any other examples?



Different types of distribution shifts: Concept shift



Different types of distribution shifts: Concept shift

2 class dataset with 2 dimensional features

Classes color coded in red & green, purple is the decision boundary

Input distribution exactly same in train & test, but the relationship between them / decision boundary changes

Any examples?



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Any examples?

Browsing history from pre-pandemic deployed in March 2020 for purchase recommendations. Any shifts?



Different types of distribution shifts: Concept shift

2 class dataset with 2 dimensional features

Classes color coded in red & green, purple is the decision boundary

Input distribution exactly same in train & test, but the relationship between them / decision boundary changes

Any examples?

Browsing history from pre-pandemic deployed in March 2020 for purchase recommendations. Any shifts?

Watching travel videos → might buy plane / hotel tickets, pay for nature documentary movies



Different types of distribution shifts: Prior probability shift / label shift

Reverse of Covariance shift

Prior probability shift appears only in y → x problems (when we believe y causes x). It occurs when p(y) changes between train and test, but p (x | y) does not.

Examples?

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Different types of distribution shifts: Prior probability shift / label shift

Reverse of Covariance shift

Prior probability shift appears only in y → x problems (when we believe y causes x). It occurs when p(y) changes between train and test, but p (x | y) does not.

Examples?

Medical Diagnosis

Train on data to predict diagnoses given symptoms

Test on data during flu season where test(flu) > train(flu) while flu symptoms p(symptoms | flu) is still the same

Detecting distribution shift

Monitor the performance of your model. Monitor accuracy, precision, statistical measures, or other evaluation metrics. If these change over time, it may be due to distribution shift.

Monitor your data. You can detect data shift by comparing statistical properties of training data and data seen in a deployment.

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Distribution shifts—where a model is deployed on a data distribution different from what it was trained on—pose significant robustness challenges in real-world ML applications. Such shifts are often unavoidable in the wild and have been shown to substantially degrade model performance in applications such as biomedicine, wildlife conservation, sustainable development, robotics, education, and criminal justice. For example, models can systematically fail when tested on patients from different hospitals or people from different demographics.

This workshop aims to convene a diverse set of domain experts and methods-oriented researchers working on distribution shifts. We are broadly interested in methods, evaluations and benchmarks, and theory for distribution shifts, and we are especially interested in work on distribution shifts that arise naturally in real-world application contexts. Examples of relevant topics include, but are not limited to:

- **Examples of real-world distribution shifts in various application areas.** We especially welcome applications that are not widely discussed in the ML research community, e.g., education, sustainable development, and conservation. We encourage submissions that characterize distribution shifts and their effects in real-world applications; it is not at all necessary to propose a solution that is algorithmically novel.
- **Methods for improving robustness to distribution shifts.** Relevant settings include domain generalization, domain adaptation, and subpopulation shifts, and we are interested in a wide range of approaches, from uncertainty estimation to causal inference to active data collection. We welcome methods that can work across a variety of shifts, as well as more domain-specific methods that incorporate prior knowledge on the types of shifts we wish to be robust on. We encourage evaluating these methods on real-world distribution shifts.
- **Empirical and theoretical characterization of distribution shifts.** Distribution shifts can vary widely in the way in which the data distribution changes, as well as the empirical trends they exhibit. What empirical trends do we observe? What empirical or theoretical frameworks can we use to characterize these different types of shifts and their effects? What kinds of theoretical settings capture useful components of real-world distribution shifts?
- **Benchmarks and evaluations.** We especially welcome contributions for subpopulation shifts, as they are underrepresented in current ML benchmarks. We are also interested in evaluation protocols that move beyond the standard assumption of fixed training and test splits -- for which applications would we need to consider other forms of shifts, such as streams of continually-changing data or feedback loops between models and data?

NeurIPS 2021 Workshop on

https://sites.google.com/view/distshift2023

Bibliography / Acknowledgements

https://course.mlsafety.org/

https://www.aisafetybook.com/

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Thank you for attending the class!!!

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Adversarial Robustness: Overivew

Adversarial Examples

Adversarial Attacks:

- Fooling a binary classifier
- Fast Gradient Sign Method
- Projected Gradient Descent
- Text based attacks

Adversarial Defenses:

- Data and Parameters
- Data Augmentation
- Adversarial Training

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Adversarial Distortions



[Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples (Goodfellow et al.)]

Adversar



Syntehsizing Robust Adversarial Examples – Athayle et al.

Modern Adversarial Examples

Changes here are perceptible to the human eye.

Modern models are robust to imperceptible distortions, but not perceptible ones

Example: Misclassifying a Stop sign as a speed limit 45 sign

100% Attack success in lab tests, 85% in field test



Eykholt (2017) - Robust Physical-World Attacks on Deep Learning Visual Classification

Fooling a Binary Classifier

$$\sigma(x) = \frac{\exp(w^T x)}{1 + \exp(w^T x)}$$



Input x	2	-1	3	-2	2	2	1	-4	5	1
Weight w	-1	-1	1	-1	1	-1	1	1	-1	1

$$w^T x = -2 + 1 + 3 + 2 + 2 - 2 + 1 - 4 - 5 + 1 = -3$$

$$\sigma(x) \approx 5\%$$

Fooling a Binary Classifier

Input	x	2	-1	3	-2	2	2	1	-4	5	1
Adv Input	$x+\varepsilon$	1.5	-1.5	3.5	-2.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	-3.5	4.5	1.5
Weight	w	-1	-1	1	-1	1	-1	1	1	-1	1

$$w^{\mathsf{T}}(x+\varepsilon) = -1.5 + 1.5 + 3.5 + 2.5 + 2.5 - 1.5 + 1.5 - 3.5 - 4.5 + 1.5 = 2$$

$$\sigma(x) \approx 5\% \qquad \|\varepsilon\|_\infty = 0.5 \qquad \sigma(x+\varepsilon) \approx 88\%$$

The cumulative effect of many small changes made the adversary powerful enough to change the classification decision

Adversarial examples exist for non-deep learning, simple models

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Fast Gradient Sign Method

Recall Gradient Descent

Goal: To minimize the Loss

How: update model parameters iteratively based on the gradient

$$\theta_{k+1} = \theta_k - \alpha \nabla \mathcal{L}(\theta_k)$$



Fast Gradient Sign Method

Goal: To create x_{adv} from x such that the loss is maximized, leading to wrong predictions

Assume p-norm distortion budget = ϵ

$$||x_{adv} - x||_p \leqslant \epsilon$$

$$x_{adv} = x + \underset{\delta:\, ||\delta||_p \leqslant \epsilon}{argmax}\, L(f(x + \delta, w), y)$$

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Fast Gradient Sign Method

The FGSM Attack:

$$x_{\text{FGSM}} = x + \varepsilon \text{sign}(\nabla_x \mathcal{L}(x, y; \theta))$$

Fast: Since it performs a single step of gradient ascent

Very easy to defend against





Projected Gradient Descent (PGD)

Unlike the single-step FGSM attack, the PGD attack uses multiple gradient ascent steps and is thus far more powerful

Pseudocode for PGD subject to an ℓ_∞ budget:

$$x_{\text{adv}} := x + n, \text{ where } n_i \sim \mathcal{U}[-\varepsilon, \varepsilon]$$

For more diverse examples, the first step randomly initializes gradient ascent

n_i is a uniformly randomly sampled value from $[-\varepsilon, \varepsilon]$

for t = 1, ..., T: For CIFAR-10, T is often 7

$$x_{\text{adv}} := \mathcal{P}(x_{\text{adv}} + \alpha \text{sign}(\nabla_\delta \mathcal{L}(x_{\text{adv}} + \delta, y; \theta)))$$

$$\text{where } \mathcal{P}(z) = \texttt{clip}(z, x - \varepsilon, x + \varepsilon)$$

Projected Gradient Descent (PGD)

Original image

Prediction: baboon

Adversarial image

Prediction: Egyptian cat

Egyptian cat

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Targeted Attacks

Untargeted attacks are not as effective in a scenario with many similar labels (see below)

Targeted attacks: Minimize the target label loss while maximizing original label loss

White Box, Black Box, Transferability

White box attacks: Attackers have access to the ML model (parameters, architecture etc.)

Black box attacks: No access. Attackers can query the model to obtain information. More realistic

Transferability: Adversarial examples crafted for one model, can be used to attack other models. For example: attacks crafted for ResNet50 might work well for other CNN models.

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Text attacks

Perturbing images vs perturbing text

Original Input	Connoisseurs of Chinese film will be pleased to discover that Tian's meticulous talent has not withered during his enforced hiatus.	Prediction: **Positive (77%)**
Adversarial example [Visually similar]	**Aonnoisseurs** of Chinese film will be pleased to discover that Tian's meticulous talent has not withered during his enforced hiatus.	Prediction: **Negative (52%)**
Adversarial example [Semantically similar]	Connoisseurs of Chinese **footage** will be pleased to discover that Tian's meticulous talent has not withered during his enforced hiatus.	Prediction: **Negative (54%)**

Text attacks

Usually operations such as insertion, deletion and replacement at the:

1. Character level
2. Word level
3. Sentence level
4. Multilevel

Text attack (Library with many text attack methods): https://github.com/QData/TextAttack

https://arxiv.org/pdf/2203.06414.pdf - Survey of NLP attacks and defenses

Jailbreaks



https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.03825 - DAN paper (Shen et al., 2023)

Tutorial on Jailbreaking

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Universal and Transferable attacks (Guest Lecture Soon)



Play around! https://llm-attacks.org

Defenses - More data

Is more data enough?

- Robustness does scale with data size. But data is always a bottleneck
- Adversarial pretraining on a larger dataset (like ImageNet) helps



	CIFAR-10		CIFAR-100	
	Clean	Adversarial	Clean	Adversarial
Normal Training	96.0	0.0	81.0	0.0
Adversarial Training	87.3	45.8	59.1	24.3
Adv. Pre-Training and Tuning	87.1	57.4	59.2	33.5

Defenses - Data Augmentation



Defenses – Adversarial Training

The best-known way to make models more robust to ℓ_p adversarial examples is adversarial training

As follows is a common adversarial procedure:

sample minibatch $\{(x^{(i)}, y^{(i)})\}_{i=1}^{n}$ from the dataset

create $x_{\text{adv}}^{(i)}$ from $x^{(i)}$ for all i

optimize the loss $\frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathcal{L}(x_{\text{adv}}^{(i)}, y^{(i)}; \theta)$

For adversarial training to be successful, $x_{\text{adv}}^{(i)}$ is from a multistep attack such as PGD

Currently, AT can reduce accuracy on clean examples by 10%+

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Activity #Robustness

What will be a good activity to add here? Say they do it themselves for 15 – 30 mins and send something on the mailing list that they did…

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Thank you for attending the class!!!