

KringleCon 4: Calling Birds!

Talks Lobby



1. Click to talk to Jewel Loggins

Well hello! I'm Jewel Loggins.

I have to say though, I'm a bit distressed.


The con next door? Oh sure, I'm concerned about that too, but I was talking about the issues I'm having with IPv6.

I mean, I know it's an old protocol now, but I've just never checked it out.

So now I'm trying to do simple things like Nmap and cURL using IPv6, and I can't quite get them working!

Would you mind taking a look for me on this terminal?

I think there's a Github Gist that covers tool usage with IPv6 targets.




2. Click to talk to Jewel Loggins

The tricky parts are knowing when to use [] around IPv6 addresses and where to specify the source interface.

I've got a deal for you. If you show me how to solve this terminal, I'll provide you with some nice tips about a topic I've been researching a lot lately - Ducky Scripts! They can be really interesting and fun!


3. Click the **i** (Hints) icon

4. Click **IPv6 Reference**




5. Click **[Exit]**


6. Click **IPv6 Sandbox** Cranberry Pi terminal



7. Type **ping6 ff02::1 -c2**



8. Type **nmap -6 fe80::42:c0ff:fea8:a002%eth0**



9. Type `nc -6 fe80::42:c0ff:fea8:a002%eth0 9000` and then press **CTRL + C**

```
PieceOnEarth
^C
elf@d7a93b228da1:~$
```

10. Click in the **Top** windows

11. Type **PieceOnEarth**



```
Checking....
CANDY STRIPER REENGAGED. THANK YOU!

* ping / ping6
* curl

Welcome, Kringlecon attendee! The candy stripper is running as a service on
this terminal, but I can't remember the password. Like a sticky note under the
keyboard, I put the password on another machine in this network. Problem is: I
don't have the IP address of that other host.

Please do what you can to help me out. Find the other machine, retrieve the
password, and enter it into the Candy Striper in the pane above. I know you
can get it running again!

elf@d7a93b228da1:~$ ping6 ff02::1 -c2
PING ff02::1(ff02::1) 56 data bytes
64 bytes from fe80::42:c0ff:fea8:a003%eth0: icmp seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.027 ms
64 bytes from fe80::42:bcff:fe17:d9b4%eth0: icmp seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.055 ms (DUP!)
64 bytes from fe80::42:c0ff:fea8:a002%eth0: icmp seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.068 ms (DUP!)
64 bytes from fe80::42:c0ff:fea8:a003%eth0: icmp seq=2 ttl=64 time=0.037 ms

--- ff02::1 ping statistics ---
2 packets transmitted, 2 received, +2 duplicates, 0% packet loss, time 2ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 0.027/0.046/0.068/0.017 ms
elf@d7a93b228da1:~$ nmap -6 fe80::42:c0ff:fea8:a002%eth0
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2021-12-21 19:26 UTC
Nmap scan report for fe80::42:c0ff:fea8:a002
Host is up (0.000074s latency).
Not shown: 998 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
80/tcp    open  http
9000/tcp  open  cslistener

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 13.05 seconds
elf@d7a93b228da1:~$ nc -6 fe80::42:c0ff:fea8:a002%eth0 9000
PieceOnEarth
^C
elf@d7a93b228da1:~$
```

Close


12. Click the **Close** button

13. Click to talk to **Jewel Loggins**

Great work! It seems simpler now that I've seen it once. Thanks for showing me!

Prof. Petabyte warned us about random USB devices. They might be malicious keystroke injectors!

A troll could program a keystroke injector to deliver malicious keystrokes when it is plugged in.



14. Click to talk to Jewel Loggins

Ducky Script is a language used to specify those keystrokes.



New [Hint] Unlocked: Duck Encoder!

[Click here to see this item in your badge.](#)

15. Click to talk to Jewel Loggins

What commands would a troll try to run on our workstations?



New [Hint] Unlocked: Ducky RE with Mallard!

[Click here to see this item in your badge.](#)

16. Click to talk to Jewel Loggins

I heard that SSH keys can be used as backdoors. Maybe that's useful?



New [Hint] Unlocked: Mitre ATT&CK™ and Ducky!

[Click here to see this item in your badge.](#)

17. Click the i (Hints) icon

18. Click Mitre ATT&CK™ and Ducky

Mitre ATT&CK™ and Ducky

From: Jewel Loggins

Objective: 5) Strange USB Device

The MITRE ATT&CK™ tactic T1098.004 describes SSH persistence techniques through authorized keys files.

19. Click **Ducky RE with Mallard**

```
Ducky RE with Mallard
From: Jewel Loggins
Objective: 5) Strange USB Device
.....
It's also possible the reverse engineer encoded Ducky
Script using Mallard.
.....
```

20. Click **Duck Encoder**

```
Duck Encoder
From: Jewel Loggins
Objective: 5) Strange USB Device
.....
Attackers can encode Ducky Script using a duck
encoder for delivery as inject.bin.
.....
```

21. Click **Ducky Script**

```
Ducky Script
From: Jewel Loggins
Objective: 5) Strange USB Device
.....
Ducky Script is the language for the USB Rubber Ducky
.....
```

22. Click **[Exit]**

23. Move **Left** and enter the **Speaker UNPreparedness Room**