



**Ministry
of Defence**

**MOD Integrated Assurance Gate Review Report
XXXXXX Programme
Gate 5**

Version Number:	V1.0 FINAL
Senior Responsible Owner (SRO):	XXXX XXXX
Date of Osmotherly Appointment letter issued to SRO:	XX XXX 22
Has SRO completed the Major Projects Leadership Academy?	No
Programme/Project Director:	XXXX XXXX
TLB, Organisation, Agency or NDPB (if applicable):	TLB
Business Case stage reached:	Full Business Case or equivalent
Review Dates:	XX XXX 2023 – XX XXX 2023
Review Team Leader:	XXXX XXXX
Review Team Members:	XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX
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About this report

This report is an evidence-based snapshot of the status of the Project/programme at the time of the review. It reflects the views of the independent Review Team, based on information evaluated over the review period, and is delivered to the SRO immediately at the conclusion of the review.

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This report provides a snapshot of the programme at a pre-agreed point in time

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Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA)

See Annex A for DCA criteria and definition

All Gate Review Guidance and Workbooks can be found [here](#).

<https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/infrastructure-and-projects-authority-assurance-review-toolkit>

Delivery Confidence Assessment:	Amber
<p>The Delivery Confidence Assessment is rated Amber because successful delivery appears probable (although not without difficulty), and constant attention will be needed to ensure risks do not materialise into major issues threatening delivery. Additionally, issues exist requiring management attention. These appear resolvable at this stage, if addressed promptly.</p> <p>Since the last Gateway Review the Acceleration and Progress Plan continues to demonstrate a positive trajectory, with in excess of XXX platforms (from a total of XXX) now embodied. Some technical difficulties are being encountered, which are impacting the completion of Final Qualification Reviews (FQRs) for some platform types, but these are currently being addressed.</p> <p>Commercial relationships with the prime supplier, CONTRACTOR, continue to be somewhat strained owing to the unprofitable nature of the contract and the late running of the programme compared with the timeline originally anticipated.</p> <p>IOC has been achieved, and FOC in 2026 (as originally planned) appears probable but there are a number of issues to be tackled in the intervening period, including;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• The establishment of a pan-MOD CAPABILITY policy/capability owner;• The completion of the production phase for remaining FQRs;• The implementation of an interim In-Service Support (ISS) contract; and• Clarity on programme exit criteria to achieve graduation. <p>TLB and DELIVERY ORGANISATION continue to work in a collegiate manner and, notwithstanding continued SQEP shortages, there is every potential that the above issues can be tackled in a timely manner.</p>	

Summary of concerns, evidence and recommendations

Priority	Risks* Identified with Evidence and Recommendations	Classification Reference	Critical, Essential, Recommended	Target Date
1	<p>Risk: If the UK does not have a pan-MOD Capability Owner then the operation, onward maintenance and evolution of the standard across all platforms and Front Line Commands could lack authoritative leadership, and become uncontrolled and inadequately funded, ultimately undermining the UK's ability to participate in NATO and other coalition operations.</p> <p><u>Recommendation 1:</u> Escalate to the MCB the need to resolve with OTHER TLB the requirement for pan-MOD Capability ownership.</p>	1. Governance	Critical	XXX 23
2	<p>Risk: If the residual commercial strategy is not promptly developed and agreed, then there is a risk that the relationship with CONTRACTOR could put programme completion at risk.</p> <p><u>Recommendation 3:</u> Expedite a commercial deal, potentially leveraging wider commercial relationships, for completion of the Production Phase in a way that incentivises momentum and avoids an extended tail of embodiments.</p>	7. Commercial Strategy & Management	Critical	XXX 23
3	<p>Risk: If an agreed interim ISS solution is not in place before the current arrangements lapse then future operations would be at risk, as would migration to a longer-term through-life pan-MOD ISS solution.</p> <p><u>Recommendation 4:</u> Investigate ISS options, such as the provision of interim arrangements, and whether platform specific agreements (including out of scope PROGRAMME platforms) can be extended to make each platform the owner of its</p>	7. Commercial Strategy & Management	Essential	XXX 23

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	PROGRAMME implementation and ISS rather than the PROGRAMME supplier (CONTRACTOR).			
4	<p>Risk: If the criteria for programme graduation remain unclear then there is a risk that programme closure becomes unplanned as a function of reducing SQEP and/or funding, with the consequential run-on of an uncontrolled tail of activity and lack of grip surrounding PROGRAMME evolution into the future.</p> <p><u>Recommendation 5:</u> Define, agree, and plan clear criteria for graduation of the programme, including handover of post-FQR embodiment activity, ISS responsibilities, and Defence-wide Capability Owner / Sponsor.</p>	1. Governance	Essential	XXX 23
5	<p>Risk: If the approach to delivery does not evolve to enable resolution of the key issues currently impacting implementation, the ability to realise intended Programme benefits in the required timescales and in the most efficient manner may be compromised.</p> <p><u>Recommendation 2:</u> Continue to build lessons learned into the PROGRAMME schedule.</p>	6. Benefits Management & Realisation	Recommended	Ongoing

**Risk denotes risks, issues, concerns and key dependencies*

Blockers to delivery

Ref No	Blocker	Specific nature of blocker	Consequence to programme if not resolved
B1	PROGRAMME POLICY OWNER	No centralised owner of capability pan-Defence	Without a central owner providing clear policy pan-Defence for the use of CAPABILITY and development of the capability, training and its wider integration, Defence will fail to realise the full benefits not only of the PROGRAMME but also from the beyond-Programme embodiment of the capability on circa 30 out-of-scope platforms.

Comments from the SRO

I am extremely grateful to the Review Team for pursuing such a comprehensive interview schedule, for the depth of their analysis, and for such well-considered and logical recommendations. This report will be shared widely across the entire PROGRAMME team and form the foundation for Programme and Project level improvements moving forwards.

Review Team findings and recommendations

Defence-wide PROGRAMME / CAPABILITY Policy Owner / Capability Sponsor

Over the past several years, every Gateway Review has recorded the absence of an overarching MoD Policy Owner for CAPABILITY:

As the Programme progresses and begins to plan for Capability maintenance, In Service Support (ISS) and Programme closure in due course, future stewardship of the capability will become increasingly prominent for resolution.

There is a need to ensure the pan-Defence ownership of the Capability, particularly to ensure consistent evolution, maintenance, and support of the CAPABILITY across the Front-Line Commands. The absence of such presents the risk that the UK's Capability becomes less interoperable across Force Elements and also with coalition partners.

At the time of the last Gateway Review in XXX 22, a letter had been drafted to be sent by the SRO, via SENIOR STAKEHOLDER, to the Military Capabilities Board (MCB), with a view to establishing OTHER TLB as the CAPABILITY policy owner.

At this time, the issue remains unresolved and will remain a blocker to success outside the SRO's control.

The Review Team understands that efforts have been made to engage with OTHER TLB at a senior level on this matter, but with little progress. During the course of this Gateway Review, interviewees expressed growing concern that as the proximity of Programme-end becomes closer, the absence of a CAPABILITY Owner is having a practical effect being felt in:

- Programme Team being unable to make decisions for already-in-service platforms operating CAPABILITY
- The risk of SQEP expertise evaporating without a long term and stable lead
- Ensuring the whole system continues to operate effectively across platforms
- Sustained NATO coordination and tracking of standards
- Onward funding and resourcing
- Sustaining capability over time, i.e. new platforms and as new PROGRAMME requirements emerge/evolve
- Coordination of RSOs in FRONT-LINE COMMANDS
- Diverting DELIVERY ORGANISATION effort/resources away from programme delivery to assist out-of-scope Platforms
- Being one of – if not *the* only – NATO partner who does not have a dedicated policy lead

This is a constant issue that has not been solved for several years. As the Programme draws to a close, the long-term ISS contract becomes closer, and the out-of-scope platforms get delivered, there will be an even more acute need for UK to have an overarching Policy and Capability owner.

CAPABILITY ownership pan-defence is acknowledged across multiple interviewees as being critical to ongoing progression of the capability across Defence, and across UK allies. This issue needs to be addressed with urgency and definitely before knowledge and experience is lost from the Programme and Delivery teams.

It appears that the UK is now the only NATO country without a unified PROGRAMME representation. This needs urgent attention.

Risk: If the UK does not have a pan-MOD Capability Owner then the operation, onward maintenance, and evolution of the standard across all platforms and Front-Line Commands could lack authoritative leadership, and become uncontrolled and inadequately funded, ultimately undermining the UK's ability to participate in NATO and other coalition operations.

Recommendation 1: Escalate to the MCB the need to resolve with OTHER TLB the requirement for pan-MOD capability ownership. (Critical – Do Now)

Business Case Status

The Main Gate Business Case (MGBC) stated Not to Exceed dates for a programme Initial Operating Capability (IOC) of XXX 2021 (at 50% confidence). A Review Note (RN) was submitted in XXX 2021, which sought approval for a revised IOC date of XXX 22 (50%) and the regularisation of the removal of PLATFORM, PLATFORM, PLATFORM and PLATFORM from the scope of the Programme, to align with previous Defence decisions. An Information Note (IN) was submitted to the IAC in XXX 22 noting that Programme IOC was considered to have been achieved (Para 4(h)); fulfilment of the IOC conditions was acknowledged by DG Fin in his Outletter of XXX 23.

The FOC date of XXX 26 remains unchanged from that in the MGBC.

Governance

The Programme has historically been governed by its programme board, supported by a programme working group and CIWG. As indicated in the last Gateway Review, the degree of 'business change' is now minimal (crypto and user interface). As a result, the CIWG has been ceased and the programme governance coalesced into a combined Steering Group.

Notwithstanding the comparatively repetitious nature of the programme at this stage, the Review Team was told of an ongoing need to ensure feedback to the Steering Group on progress in Training, Doctrine & Concepts, Equipment and Logistics DLODs in particular.

Programme Management Approach & SQEP

The Programme Team is being led by TLB, with DELIVERY ORGANISATION acting as delivery agent, contracting with CONTRACTOR as prime to deliver the Demonstrate and Manufacture phase. The Review Team observed broad adherence to the CADMID cycle and the defined MOD standards for programme and project management.

Some interviewees expressed the view, however, that delivery effectiveness may be being limited as a result of:

- Cessation of the CIWG for PROGRAMME, potentially contributing in a number of ways to a reduction in engagement from the platform delivery teams, limiting the opportunities to voice concerns/risks/issues, and drive priorities;
- Inadequate schedule management against which progress can be monitored and changes approved;
- Inadequate regular and detailed analysis of project-level risks across all delivery agents and suppliers, undermining opportunities to mitigate emergent risks;
- Transactional relationships which rarely result in maximising desired outcomes as opposed to those driven through a more partner focussed relationship.

The Review Team also heard wide ranging recognition of the challenges being faced in the defence sector in attainment of Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel (SQEP). This appears a common theme across the MOD and its suppliers with the issue seemingly having deepened over the past three to four years (post COVID).

The Review Team heard of particular difficulties in resourcing platform and chief engineering roles, business change management, commercial, project control, and private sector technical expertise. All of these shortages contribute to the delivery challenges being faced by the programme, and though these can be mitigated through resource planning and scheduling there are limited levers within MOD and its suppliers to rectify.

Progress

The Review Team heard that there has been significant progress in delivery of the Programme, particularly in the twelve months since the previous Gateway Review. By the time of this Gateway Review a further XXX platforms had been embodied, taking the total number of in-scope platforms embodied to over XXX of an intended XXX.

Positive feedback has been received in relation to the front-line reception of the new capability, in particular on FRONT-LINE COMMAND assets. In addition, data is increasingly starting to be collated from exercises, which demonstrates the functionality of the PROGRAMME equipment and its successful use.

While there have been successes in the past twelve months, issues in relation to embodiment and overall programme completion still persist:

- DELIVERY ORGANISATION and supply chain resourcing is reducing the resilience of delivery, both in the development phase and in the implementation phase;
- Availability of platforms to complete embodiment activities, either as a result of operational deployment (e.g. PLATFORM) or higher-priority upgrade (e.g. PLATFORM) or refit (e.g. PLATFORM) activity;
- Non-availability of spares is resulting in use of equipment for embodiment for repairs;
- Requirement for remedial work on platforms that were embodied prior to completion of qualification/acceptance processes in order to meet deadline for delivering minimum PROGRAMME operational requirements.

The Review Team heard different characterisations of the remedial work identified under the final bullet but resolving the associated commercial considerations and managing completion of this remedial work (especially noting the challenges around access to platforms) will clearly require a significant amount of DELIVERY ORGANISATION and supply chain effort, which would ideally have been utilised in closing out remaining embodiment activity.

As the programme draws nearer to completion, there is a risk that the embodiment plan will become more difficult to complete as the issues above interact and become more acute. This situation could be further aggravated by unclear and complex ISS arrangements, and the lack of a long-term capability owner. The Review Team saw evidence that a workstream model is evolving to give adequate visibility of these areas, but it appears that this is yet to be formalised.

Risk: If the approach to delivery does not evolve to enable resolution of the key issues currently impacting implementation, the ability to realise intended Programme benefits in the required timescales and in the most efficient manner may be compromised.

Recommendation 2: Continue to build lessons learned into the Programme schedule.
(Recommended – Do ongoing)

Commercial Relationships

The Review Team was made aware of three main commercial issues in the review:

- Completion of the Demonstration and Manufacture phase of the programme;
- Provision of an effective in-service support (ISS) arrangement; and
- Resolution of on-going and emerging remedial work

It is widely known that this is not a profitable programme for CONTRACTOR. There have been delays in making platforms available for embodiment that have increased costs. There have been agreed changes to the programme - such as rolling out an interim solution ahead of FQR – that have complicated the commercial position. There are chronic SQEP resource pressures in CONTRACTOR and in the DELIVERY TEAM. Despite significant efforts across the programme, there remain persistent contract management issues: from lengthy document turnarounds to change and cost control processes. There have been delivery quality issues that require rework and there is significant remediation work to complete on already embodied platforms (e.g. PLATFORM and PLATFORM). The CONTRACTOR team is only programmed through to XXX 24. Managing the performance of this contract through to the completion of the programme will not be straightforward – especially as these chronic issues could become more acute over time; and CONTRACTOR may seek to minimise cost towards the end of the programme.

The Review Team also heard a consistent view that the current In-Service Support (ISS) arrangement is not fit for purpose. It was narrowly defined and under-bid at the time of contract award. Equipment repairs have taken over a year to action and equipment scheduled for embodiment has been used to repair already-embodied platforms because of a lack of spares. This is in contrast with the support arrangements for the legacy CAPABILITY which are generally regarded as being fit for purpose. Both THE DELIVERY

TEAM and CONTRACTOR have agreed that exercising the 10-year support option is not the right answer. However, the current in-service arrangement ends in XXX 24.

The Review Team heard a wide range of views about the health of the relationship with CONTRACTOR. There are positive relationships between key individuals. But overall, the prime contractor relationship feels difficult and at risk of deteriorating. The remaining incentives on CONTRACTOR to complete are mostly 'stick' (and not 'carrot').

A lack of an agreed way forward that incentivises all parties is underpinning continued commercial tension and acting as a blocker to programme completion. The spirit of common endeavour and partnership that was formed through building the Acceleration & Progress Plan in 2019 is being eroded. There is little consensus across the range of interviewees on the commercial strategy required to complete the Programme.

Risk: If the residual commercial strategy is not promptly developed and agreed, then there is a risk that the relationship with CONTRACTOR could put programme completion at risk.

Recommendation 3: Expedite a commercial deal, potentially leveraging wider commercial relationships, for completion of the Production Phase in a way that incentivises momentum and avoids an extended tail of embodiments. (Critical – Do Now)

In-Service Support Contract

The Review Team noted a broad recognition across CONTRACTOR and the Programme Team that the long-term In-Service Support (ISS) option offered within the existing contract with CONTRACTOR was not one either party wished to exercise for XXX 24 (when the current support provision lapses).

The Review Team is of the view that the new contract needs to ensure that an ISS solution is put in place that does not simply continue the current not-fit-for-purpose arrangement but explores options, such as the provision of interim arrangements, and whether platform specific ISS agreements (including out of scope PROGRAMME platforms) can be extended to make each platform the owner of its PROGRAMME implementation and ISS rather than the PROGRAMME Delivery Team.

Risk: If an agreed interim ISS solution is not in place before the current arrangements lapse then future operations would be at risk, as would migration to a longer-term through-life pan-MOD ISS solution.

Recommendation 4: Investigate ISS options, such as the provision of interim arrangements, and whether platform specific agreements (including out of scope PROGRAMME platforms) can be extended to make each platform the owner of its PROGRAMME implementation and ISS rather than the PROGRAMME supplier (CONTRACTOR). (Essential – Do By end 2023)

Benefits Realisation

The Review Team observed widespread recognition that the benefits resulting from the programme would be maximised through the expansive deployment of the CAPABILITY and its effective operation.

The Review Team believes that this requires persistent, ongoing, and broad-ranging support for the capability to drive the utilisation and maintain alignment to the evolving CAPABILITY standard(s).

As noted above the Review Team believe that this will be aided through the establishment of a Defence-wide Capability Owner / Sponsor. Without this, the Review Team believe the primary benefits will, at best, be significantly diminished.

The Capability Owner / Sponsor should look to own the policies and standards, integrate and interface with our partners/allies, and implement the necessary feedback loops of operational data from training exercises and active deployments to continually improve and exploit the capability.

Programme Graduation and Path to FOC

The Review Team reflect here a number of risks and concerns that were raised during the review as the programme progresses towards graduation:

- Embodiment cadence drops over time due to reduced resourcing/prioritisation in either or both of the Programme Team and CONTRACTOR
- Ineffectual support arrangements result in a drop in operational outcomes and confidence in PROGRAMME across the Commands
- Loss of Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel (SQEP) across the Programme Team, CONTRACTOR and sub-contractors resulting in further degraded outcomes
- Evolution of CAPABILITY standards lead to ineffective operation and an inability to operate with our allies

Recognising these concerns, the Review Team is of the view that there is a need for clear 'exit criteria' from the programme and a need to establish the activities necessary to define, agree, and plan for delivery of the programme's graduation. The Review Team considers that those criteria could include, but not be limited to:

- Agreement on instantiation of a Defence-wide Capability Owner / Sponsor
- Completion of FQRs for all in-scope platforms and successful embodiment within at least one instance of each platform
- Strategy agreed for provision of the in-service support model for PROGRAMME (interim and longer-term) along with an agreed plan for its delivery
- Agreement on the embodiment of all remaining in-scope platform instances whether by the programme or delivered post-graduation by the In-Service Platform Support Functions/Teams

Risk: If the criteria for programme graduation remain unclear then there is a risk that programme closure becomes unplanned as a function of reducing SQEP and/or funding,

with the consequential run-on of an uncontrolled tail of activity and lack of grip surrounding PROGRAMME evolution into the future.

Recommendation 5: Define, agree, and plan clear criteria for graduation of the programme, including handover of post-FQR embodiment activity, ISS responsibilities, and Defence-wide Capability Owner / Sponsor. (Essential – Do By end 2023)

Acknowledgement

The Review Team would like to thank all participants for their contributions to the review. The support provided by XXXX XXXX was much appreciated.

Next Assurance Review

The next Assurance Review might usefully be conducted around **XXX 24**, by which time the 'production' phase should be complete, the interim In-Service-Support contract should be verging on agreement (if not already agreed) and enacting the plan to achieve Programme graduation should be well advanced. The MOD Capability Owner will need to be in place ahead of that time.

ANNEX A – DCA Descriptions

From 1 April 2021, the IPA has moved to a 3-tier RAG status (Red, Amber, Green). The Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) RAG status should use the definitions below.

Colour	Criteria Description
Green	<p>Successful delivery of the programme/project to time, cost and quality appears highly likely and there are no major outstanding issues that at this stage appear to threaten delivery.</p> <p><i>Recommendation: The programme/project is ready to proceed to the next stage.</i></p>
Amber	<p>Successful delivery of the programme/project to time, cost and quality appears feasible but significant issues already exist requiring management attention. These appear resolvable at this stage and, if addressed promptly, should not present a cost/schedule overrun.</p> <p><i>Recommendation: This programme/project can proceed to the next stage with conditions, but the programme/project must report back to the IPA and HMT on the satisfaction of each time bound condition within an agreed timeframe.</i></p>
Red	<p>Successful delivery of the programme/project to time, cost and quality appears to be unachievable. There are major issues which, at this stage, do not appear to be manageable or resolvable. The programme/project may need re-baselining and/or its overall viability re-assessed.</p> <p><i>Recommendation: This programme/project should not proceed to the next phase until these major issues are managed to an acceptable level of risk and the viability of the project/programme has been re-confirmed.</i></p>

ANNEX B – Terms of Reference for Review

This is a Gate 5 review.

The standard terms of reference for all Guidance and Workbooks can be found here :

<https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/infrastructure-and-projects-authority-assurance-review-toolkit>

ANNEX C – Project/Programme Background

[completed by the programme team]

<p>The aims of the programme / the driving force for the programme / the policy intent the programme is delivering to:</p>	<p>CAPABILITY equipment is required to support the PURPOSE OF CAPABILITY. Prior to this programme the PREVIOUS CAPABILITY system/equipment was no longer operationally robust and was withdrawn from service on XX XXX 20. PREVIOUS CAPABILITY has been replaced by CAPABILITY which provides BENEFITS.</p> <p>The PROGRAMME covers the upgrade, installation and support of XX UK legacy platforms and training systems to achieve the new NATO standard (declared by NATO on XX XXX XX).</p>
<p>The impact if the programme fails to deliver e.g. any risks to or any material impact on civilians/citizens:</p>	<p>Military platforms not fitted with CAPABILITY will be unable to operate effectively in combined operations with NATO PARTNERS and INCREASE OPERATIONAL RISK.</p>
<p>Project/programme link to departmental or government strategies or policies:</p>	<p>Meet Defence Strategic Aims:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protect the UK and its Overseas Territories • Enhance global security through persistent engagement and response to crises • Understand and counter state and non-state threats • Contribute to NATO collective deterrence and defence • Modernise and integrate defence capabilities by taking a Whole-Force approach to our people and increasing the use of technology and innovation
<p>Projects or programme interdependencies [if applicable]:</p>	<p>The project faces multiple interdependencies based on the multitude of platforms. The key dependencies are:</p>

	<p>Front Line Command (FLC) prioritisation of platforms for PROGRAMME embodiment.</p> <p>Support to OTHER PROGRAMME / Single Prime Contractor (SPC).</p> <p>Production programmes, trials and embodiment, (identifying suitable production programmes and management of trials/embodiments to meet FOC criteria).</p> <p>Simulators and Training Aids. (The platform PTs will work with their Simulator Design Authority to upgrade their platform simulators and training aids.</p> <p>Additional dependencies include OTHER PROGRAMME and OTHER PROGRAMME on the PLATFORM fleet and OTHER PROGRAMME requirements with the PLATFORM fleet.</p>
Has the SRO's Osmotherley letter (letter of appointment) been approved at the appropriate levels?	Yes.
The procurement / delivery status:	The programme is operating in both <i>Delivery</i> and <i>In-Service</i> phases.
Funding / business case:	Main Gate Business Case (MGBC) was approved by XXXX XXXX and Scrutiny on XX XXX 17. The contract was signed on XX XXX 2017.
Integrated Assurance and Approval Plan (IAAP):	An Integrated Assurance and Approval Plan is in place and has been provided to the Gateway Review Team.
Project plan:	The Programme has an appropriate level 0 plan which contains the contract baseline and is updated monthly by CONTRACTOR. This is fed by the individual platform lower-level

	plans. Additionally, we also have an Acceleration & Progress Plan to monitor the Programme's progress against the minimum operational requirements (and other milestones) following PREVIOUS CAPABILITY cessation.
Current position regarding previous IPA assurance reviews:	<p>Gateway Reviews have taken place since programme conception at the appropriate level. The last Gateway Review was conducted XX-XX XXX 22.</p> <p>A subsequent action plan, based on GWR recommendations, was produced and forwarded to Defence Project Delivery Centre of Excellence.</p>

ANNEX D – Progress against previous assurance review

Recommendation or Blocker	Status
<p>Risk: If the delivery schedule and financial forecast do not improve then the FLC will not be able to optimise the deployment of assets into the embodiment activity and TLB will not be able to efficiently apply its financial resources across the wider portfolio, leading to reduced capability.</p> <p><u>Recommendation 1:</u> Improve the robustness of the contract schedule and the associated financial profile to ensure that progress and accruals are properly aligned to avoid the risk of late changes in forecast.</p>	Actioned.
<p>Risk: If there is no effective plan to close out the current contract then its legacy may cause problems to the effective support and development of the CAPABILITY system over the next 10 to 20 years due to ongoing disputes and lack of trust.</p> <p><u>Recommendation 2:</u> Review the current contract with the intention of determining a plan to close the contract and to resolve as many of the existing legacy problems as possible as part of an ongoing commercial strategy for PROGRAMME.</p>	Remains a theme.
<p>Risk: If the through life planning for PROGRAMME is not put in place then the full capabilities of PROGRAMME may not be sustained or the full capability realised, leading to a loss of the PROGRAMME benefit.</p> <p><u>Recommendation 3:</u> Develop and implement a plan for through life sustainment of the capability and in particular the plan to develop the follow-on contract for in-service support.</p>	Actioned.

<p>Risk: If there is no agreed plan for the handover of residual embodiment responsibilities then that could impede programme graduation by TLB.</p> <p><u>Recommendation 4:</u> Develop and implement a plan for the graduation of the programme to BAU to include clear conditions for handover of the responsibility for the residual embodiment activity.</p>	<p>Remains a theme.</p>
<p>Blocker: PROGRAMME POLICY OWNER</p> <p>No centralised owner of the capability pan-Defence.</p> <p>Without a central owner providing clear policy pan-Defence for the use of CAPABILITY and development of the capability, training and its wider integration, Defence will fail to realise the full benefits from the Programme outcomes.</p>	<p>Remains a theme.</p>

ANNEX E – List of Interviewees

The following stakeholders were interviewed during the review:

Name	Organisation and role
XXXX XXXX	XXXX XXXX
XXXX XXXX	XXXX XXXX
XXXX XXXX	XXXX XXXX
XXXX XXXX	XXXX XXXX
XXXX XXXX	XXXX XXXX
XXXX XXXX	XXXX XXXX
XXXX XXXX	XXXX XXXX
XXXX XXXX	XXXX XXXX
XXXX XXXX	XXXX XXXX
XXXX XXXX	XXXX XXXX
XXXX XXXX	XXXX XXXX
XXXX XXXX	XXXX XXXX
XXXX XXXX	XXXX XXXX
XXXX XXXX	XXXX XXXX
XXXX XXXX	XXXX XXXX
XXXX XXXX	XXXX XXXX
XXXX XXXX	XXXX XXXX

OFFICIAL (REDACTED AND ANONYMISED)

XXXX XXXX	XXXX XXXX
XXXX XXXX	XXXX XXXX
XXXX XXXX	XXXX XXXX
XXXX XXXX	XXXX XXXX
XXXX XXXX	XXXX XXXX
XXXX XXXX	XXXX XXXX
XXXX XXXX	XXXX XXXX

ANNEX F – Recommendation Classifications and Priority

There are 13 classifications in the classification set, Review Teams are asked to record the classification reference number of each recommendation as per the table below.

#	Classification	Definition
1	Governance	Recommendations related to the oversight, structure and decision making of a project/ programme. This theme also includes recommendations relating to alignment with pan-government priorities, strategies, and controls.
2	Stakeholder Management	Recommendations related to relationships with all parties with an interest in the outcome of the project/programme, whether internal to the agency, internal to government or external.
3	Programme and Project Management	Recommendations related to all aspects of project, programme and portfolio management, but excludes recommendations on Risk, Issues and Dependency Management (Theme 9) and Resource Management (Theme 10)
4	Change Management & Transition	Recommendations related to the Management of Business Change – all the work required with and in the business and with the customer to make ready for the initiative, in terms of changes to business processes including: business continuity planning, changes to work processes and resourcing, changes to organisational structures and staffing to support transformational or process changes to business delivery to ensure a smooth transition to BAU It does not include Technology Readiness for Service (Theme 12).
5	Financial Planning and Management	Recommendations related to financial planning, organising, directing and controlling of financial activities.
6	Benefits Management & Realisation	Recommendations related to the identification, ownership, measurement and realisation of benefits and dis-benefits. Benefits can be either financial or non-financial.
7	Commercial Strategy & Management	Recommendations related to the end-to-end procurement process including: Procurement strategy and planning, Approaches to the market, Contract negotiation and Contract management.
8	Context, Aim & Scope	Recommendations that are aimed at the clarity of the change to be implemented. It covers alignment to vision, strategy, and policy; the purpose, objectives, justification and description of the change; and the determination of success and the necessary environment to ensure success.
9	Risk, Issues & Dependency Management	Recommendations related to the identification, analysis, impact assessment, response and the on-going review and management of Risks, Issues and Dependencies (i.e. outputs that are required by a project to succeed, but which will be delivered by parties not under the direct control of the project).
10	Resource & Skills Management	Recommendations related to all aspects of the identification, supply, optimisation, prioritisation and maintenance of resources and appropriate skills.

11	Knowledge Management	Recommendations related to the process of capturing, developing, sharing, and effectively using organizational knowledge. It includes sharing knowledge and experiences or Lessons Learnt.
12	Technology	Recommendations related to all technology issues, including the alignment of the technology solution to the technology and business strategy, the integration of one or more technology solutions, the operational readiness of the solution (including testing of the solution), and all aspects of security relating to the technology solution.
13	Other	To be used only when other classifications do not apply.

Each risk-based recommendation will be recorded as Critical / Essential or Recommended:

- **Critical (Do Now):** To increase the likelihood of a successful outcome it is of the greatest importance that the programme/project should take action immediately.
- **Essential (Do By):** To increase the likelihood of a successful outcome the programme/project should take action in the near future.
- **Recommended:** The programme/project should benefit from the uptake of this recommendation.