

Predicting Malicious URLs

Proofpoint, Inc.

Aidan Cheng
Kevin Herrera
Carli Lessard
Vidushi Ojha (PM)

Advisor:
Prof. Elizabeth Sweedyk

Liaisons:
Thomas Lynam
Mike Morris '97

Proofpoint, Inc.

- Cybersecurity firm
- Provides software as a service
- Products that protect against malware, ransomware
- Products for email, social media, mobile devices, and the cloud

proofpointTM 

Proofpoint's security suite **analyzes URLs** embedded in client emails and detects whether they **lead to malware**, blocking those it deems dangerous. Our task was to investigate various **machine learning models** to improve the accuracy of the classification process.

Project Description

Existing Solution

- Filtration technique:
 - Number of appearances in time period
 - Domains passed through
- Sandboxing: sped-up virtual environment



Data Sample

```
{ u'queue_ts': datetime.datetime(2017, 5, 4, 0, 56, 37, 485000),  
  u'url': u'https://www.cs.hmc.edu/program/course-descriptions/',  
  u'recv_ts': datetime.datetime(2017, 5, 4, 0, 41, 4),  
  u'misc': { u'content': None,  
             u'ip': u'134.173.193.149',  
             .../  
             u'details': None,  
             u'scanid': u'3096224878164377',  
             u'forensics_score': 0,  
             u'result': u'malicious' },  
  ... }
```

Models


Support
Vector
Machines

Naive
Bayes

Logistic
Regression




Naive Bayes



- Bayes' net encodes *conditional dependence*
- Independent features make it *naive*
- Use probability rules to compute likelihood of URL being malicious

Logistic Regression



$$\sigma(t) = \frac{e^t}{e^t + 1} = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-t}}$$

where

$$t = Wx + b$$

Use gradient descent optimization algorithm to determine the best coefficients, W and b for our model

Features

URLs

- Tokenization on all punctuation
- Character n -grams

https://www.cs.hmc.edu



'https'
'www'
'cs'
'hmc'
'edu'



'http'
'ttps'
'tps:'
...
'.edu'

IP addresses

- Tokenization on '.'
- Word n -grams

134.173.193.149



['134' , '173']
['173' , '193']
['193' , '149']

Testing

Offline

- Splits up the data set we have into training and testing
- Learns from the training set
- Test on the testing set
- Repeat with a different split

Online

- Trains on the first 1000 chronological samples
- Tests on the next 1000 samples
- Train on the 1000 samples just tested, plus most recent malicious samples
- Repeat

Experiments

Model

Data

Testing Method

Parameters

Naive Bayes

URLs

Offline

Logistic Regression

IP addresses

Online

For example:

- Iterations
- Malicious set size
- Etc.

Naive Bayes Results

	% of malicious URLs correctly classified	% of clean URLs correctly classified
Offline URL	37.7%	95.5%
Offline IP	75.8%	96.4%
Online URL	55.9%	92.7%
Online IP	85.3%	53.2%
Online URL & Offline IP	78.1%	95.1%

Logistic Regression Results

	% of malicious URLs correctly classified	% of clean URLs correctly classified
Online URL	78.6%	80.2%
Online IP	52.2%	94.2%
Online URL & IP	78.4%	90.6%

Combining Models

- Added Naive Bayes' predicted probability of being clean as feature to Logistic Regression

	% of malicious URLs correctly classified	% of clean URLs correctly classified
Bayes + URL + IP	78.4%	90.4%
Bayes + URL	80.1%	80.9%
Bayes + IP	65.2%	90.0%

Takeaways

- Chronological nature of data: online model
- IP addresses
- Combining models that complement one another

Future Directions

Models:

- Neural Nets
- AdaBoosting

Features:


- Email subject line
- IP identities (WHOIS)

With Thanks To:

- Prof Z Sweedyk
- Mike Morris '97
- Thomas Lynam
- DruAnn Thomas
- Prof Geoff Kuenning


Questions?

Naive Bayes



- Our final model combined the two classifiers
- An online classifier worked best for URLs, and Offline worked best for IPs

True positive/false negative rates



Results for Naive Bayes

Logistic Regression

Online vs. offline

Offline:
Train on a set, test on
a different set

Online:
Continuously learn
from samples as they
come in

Number of iterations

Count:
Frequency of features
in URLs

Tf-idf:
Frequency of features
in URLs times inverse
document frequency

Features

N-grams:
Word or character

N-gram ranges:
Take n-grams of every
size n in some range

Experiments

Online vs. offline

Offline:
Train on a set, test on
a different set

Online:
Continuously learn
from samples as they
come in

Vectorizer type

Count:
Frequency of features
in URLs

Tf-idf:
Frequency of features
in URLs times inverse
document frequency

Features

N-grams:
Word or character

N-gram ranges:
Take n-grams of
every size n in some
range

Training parameters

Iterations:
Training time

Features generated:
Maximum number of
features extracted
from samples

Usage

