


## **CRISP** REPORT

Connecting Research in Security to Practice

### **Sports Team Travel Security**

*Peter Tarlow, Ph.D*

*Jacques R. Island*



## ABOUT THE CRISP SERIES OF REPORTS

Connecting Research in Security to Practice (CRISP) reports provide insights into how different types of security issues can be effectively tackled. Drawing on research and evidence from around the world, each report summarizes the prevailing knowledge about a specific aspect of security, and then recommends proven approaches to counter the threat. Connecting scientific research with existing security actions helps form better practices.

Reports are written to appeal to security practitioners in different types of organizations and at different levels. Readers will inevitably adapt what is presented to meet their own requirements. They will also consider how they can integrate the recommended actions with existing or planned programs in their organizations.

This CRISP report by Dr. Peter Tarlow and Jacques R. Island specifically focuses on major special events, academic studies of the causes and effects of crime on the sports industry, the growing awareness of violence against athletes, and medical information for travelers. It is both timely and one of the most important security topics in today's society. This valuable report also provides guidance on how to measure STTS and the need for further research into the growing problem of violence against Sports Team Travel Security athletes. This report will benefit readers understanding of how to use security best practices for training needed for STTS personnel; a better definition of the functions and conduct of an STTS event; and better models, templates and tools based on primary research for STTS managers and practitioners.

CRISP reports are sister publications to those produced by Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) of the U.S. Department of Justice, which can be accessed at [www.cops.usdoj.gov](http://www.cops.usdoj.gov). While that series focuses on policing, this one focuses on security.

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*Connecting Research in Security to Practice*

## Sports Team Travel Security

Peter Tarlow, Ph.D

Jacques R. Island

**Table of Contents**

Foreword .....	2
Executive Summary.....	6
Definitions, Scope and Purpose.....	8
Sports Team Travel Security Defined .....	8
Limited Scope.....	9
STTS as a Discipline .....	9
Summation of Valid Literature .....	10
A Focus on Mega-Event Planning.....	10
Academic Analyses of Limited Value to STTS .....	11
Growing Awareness of Violence Against Athletes.....	11
A Bounty of Medical Information .....	12
Current Responses: Strategies and Methods in Use .....	12
The Increasing Role of Hotel Security.....	13
One Point of Contact .....	14
Team Separation From Guests.....	14
Ingress and Egress.....	15
Crime Avoidance Training .....	15
Coordination Between Public and Private Sectors .....	16
Establishing Policies and Planning Early .....	17
Strategic Use of Logistics .....	18
Assessments of Threats and Vulnerabilities .....	19
Communications.....	19
The Importance of Good Media Relations.....	20
Medical Issues for Sports Travelers.....	20
Eating disorders.....	21

## SPORTS TEAM TRAVEL SECURITY

Weather and atmospheric conditions .....	21
Pollution.....	21
Deep Venous Thrombosis .....	21
Body clocks and jet lag .....	22
Conclusions.....	22
A Dearth of Information about Sports Travel.....	22
Needs of Female Travelers.....	23
The Need to Downscale and Adapt Existing Data.....	23
Approaches Suggested by the Literature .....	24
The STTS Practitioner's Scope.....	25
The Sports Team Travel Security Cycle.....	26
Early Preparations: Policies and Procedures .....	26
Risk-Based Planning .....	26
Intelligence .....	26
Risk assessments.....	29
Business continuity and crisis management.....	35
Execution.....	36
Post Operative Evaluation .....	37
Measuring Effectiveness .....	38
Future Research Needs .....	39
Sports Teams and Terrorism .....	40
Relationship Between Security and Athletic Health.....	40
About Athlete Travel .....	40
Mitigating Violence Against Athletes .....	41
Other Subjects.....	41
References.....	43

## SPORTS TEAM TRAVEL SECURITY

Recommended Reading .....	47
Appendix: Sports Team Security Checklist.....	49
Biographies .....	52
Peter Tarlow, Ph.D .....	52
Jacques R. Island .....	52

### Foreword

As we were writing the final draft of this paper, news broke about the terrorism incidents in Paris. We also learned that Brussels was under security lockdown due to the threat of potential terror attacks. The first breaking news concerned the November 13 attacks at the *Stade de France*, France's largest sports stadium. At the time of the attacks, a soccer match was occurring between the French and German national teams; the match was attended by the President of France, François Hollande. There were no deaths in the stadium that night, possibly because good security measures blocked the suicide bombers from entering the crowded 80,000-seat stadium; there was, however, much bloodshed just outside of the stadium and across the city. The Paris attacks serve as backdrop for this paper and as a reminder of the importance of security at large sporting events.

It appears that the terrorists took the French authorities completely by surprise. Does this surprise attack indicate good planning on the part of the terrorist or failures on the part of the international security community—or both? Did the terrorist choose their targets for political or economic reasons? Was their goal economic destruction, to deliver a political warning to France to stay out of the Middle East, or merely murder for murder's sake? We may never fully know the answers to these questions.

Despite the paucity of our knowledge, the Paris events still remind us that sporting events are first and foremost composed of living human beings.

### Executive Summary

Sports Team Travel Security (STTS) provides visible and behind-the-scenes mobile security to traveling athletic teams participating in all levels of competitive sports, from amateur and collegiate teams in practice or competition to pro sports participating in major events such as the Olympic Games, World Cups, and Super Bowls. This report reviews and summarizes the existing STTS literature to meet five objectives:

1. **Identify the types of literature currently available**, which we found to be focused on major special events, academic studies of the causes and effects of crime on the sports industry, the growing awareness of violence against athletes, and medical information for travelers;
2. **Review the current responses by public agencies and private security**, to include the changing role of hotel security staff, training, coordination between public and private security organizations, lessons learned and best practices expressed by public safety officials, the importance of planning, risk assessments, and media relations for successful crisis management;
3. **Synthesize the dispersed bits of relevant STTS wisdom** into this report's suggested approaches, to which we add our *STTS Group in Normal Mode of Operation* model as a low-profile or stand-alone STTS operating alternative to the complex, major special events model;
4. **Offer two ways for measuring STTS activities**, namely: its overall effectiveness over time, and the effectiveness of a single event; and,
5. **Identify future research needs**, with the following issues being worthy of mention as understudied and in need of primary research: a growing problem of violence against



## SPORTS TEAM TRAVEL SECURITY

athletes, especially female athletes; the kinds of security training needed for STTS personnel; a better definition of the functions and conduct of an STTS event; and better models, templates and tools based on primary research for STTS managers and practitioners.

### Sports Team Travel Security

#### **Definitions, Scope, and Purpose**

Sports and athletic events are major industries around the globe. In a world of sporting mega-events, such as the Olympic Games, World Cups, and Super Bowls, we also find a host of behind-the-scenes and supporting activities. Because competitions occur not only in the athletes' local communities but also at other, often distant locales, travel can be an integral part of the athletic experience. In fact, the field of travel for sport is highly diverse and must be approached from various perspectives. There is no one accepted definition or scope for sports team travel security. Different authors have unique opinions on defining terms such as security, safety, travel, problems in travel, and risks. Consequently, the STTS community does not have a wealth of literature that addresses questions of sports travel according to such criteria as age groups, type of sport and location, gender, and media coverage.

#### **Sports Team Travel Security Defined**

Frosdick (2009) differentiates between *security* as the measures we take to protect from intentional criminal attack or terrorism; and *safety* as the activities that consider the overall well-being of the people within a public space, such as a sports arena, where thought is given to such issues as public ingress and egress, the structural integrity of the construction, capacity, fire procedures, and issues of health. In this report, we consider both security and safety issues, and we use the two terms synonymously. As such, we focus on the total safety and security needs of traveling sports teams. A more succinct definition follows:

Sports team travel security includes standards, tools, and best practices to protect adult amateur, collegiate, and professional team athletes during travels to and from sports

## SPORTS TEAM TRAVEL SECURITY

venues and while lodging away from their home base, by identifying, mitigating, or managing potential threats or actual incidents of harassment, demonstrations, criminal assaults, theft or robbery, sabotage, terrorism, natural disasters, health hazards, and other safety issues.

For purposes of brevity, the authors also use the STTS acronym to refer to a traveling sports team or its various members (athletes, coaches and support staff) under a security program as an “STTS group” or “STTS member.” And we refer to STTS security professionals, whether traveling with an STTS group or not, as STTS practitioners, managers or consultants.

### **Limited Scope**

Some STTS topics, like travel health and medicine, are well-covered in the literature but other topics such as the security needs of female athletes or the actual practices of sports teams traveling to less than complex activities or mega events, to name just two, remain largely unaddressed. This affects our scope and limits the suggested approaches later in this paper to those in the existing literature, but for three exceptions that are based on the authors’ own experiences or extrapolations from the literature: our suggested *STTS Group in Normal Mode of Operation* model (p.37) that is conceived as a variation of Connors’ (2007) major special events model (p. 14), a risk-based planning methodology adapted to STTS (p. 26), and STTS checklists (p.48) that are provided to jumpstart the planning of STTS activities.

### **STTS as a Discipline**

Security at an athlete’s home turf differs from security on the road in that travel is typically to less familiar or unfamiliar places. When traveling to another locale, the athlete is both a sports figure and also a visitor to this new location. As such, others

## SPORTS TEAM TRAVEL SECURITY

must provide for the athlete's on-the-road needs. As in the case of all travel, STTS requires flexibility, diplomacy, and ingenuity to create a secure environment at an on-the-road location.

The STTS function may be added to an already existing sports team security position or department, it may be an interaction between the team's security or risk management department, or it may be treated as an independent entity. For example, teams that are too small to maintain a dedicated security position may outsource this function to STTS consultants on an as-needed basis. From time to time, outsourcing may be appropriate for all sports teams and athletic departments in order to introduce new or evolving methods to the existing sports security complement.

### **Summation of Valid Literature**

The great preponderance of the relevant existing literature focuses on the planning of mega-events (including sporting events) and not on events of lesser magnitude, or on planning for the needs of individual sports teams (Boyle & Haggerty, 2009; Connors, 2007; Fonio, 2014; DCMS, 2008; Jones, 2005). The coverage deals with issues that are nearly always beyond an STTS organizer's purview. They offer no middle ground or planning for less complex or lower-profile events. However, this literature review identified the following themes related to STTS:

#### **A Focus on Mega-Event Planning**

There are a number of papers that focus on the planning of (sporting and other) mega-events. By and large, the authors have written these papers from the perspective of government entities charged with public safety and national security (Coaffee, 2010; Fussey, 2013; Plecas, Dow, Diplock, & Martin, 2010). One report also considers the role

of private security (as agents of the venue owner) in “quasi-public” (hybrid) spaces while working alongside law enforcement (Button, 2003; Hall, Byon, & Baker, 2013). Another article by Hall, Marciani, Cooper, and Rolan (2008) gives us an understanding of what goes into the protection of a major sports venue, and pays particular attention to risk assessments and analyses. There is also a great deal of indirect information to be gathered from the book *Event Risk Management and Safety* (Tarlow, 2002).

Another relevant source for traveling athletes is the U.S. State Department. It is the one agency that addresses the needs of business people traveling abroad (OSAC, 1994). Since traveling athletes have a similar sociological profile to that of business people, the travel security information provided by the OSAC booklet is also valid for athletes. However, precious little attention is given, to planning for simple low-key or low-threat sports events.

### **Academic Analyses of Limited Value to STTS**

Many papers are academic analyses of the social issues (demographic, geographic, crime, and terrorism) attendant to sporting and other mega-events, usually seeking to identify statistical causation or social policy solutions (Biagi & Detotto, 2010; Chiang, 2000; Crotts, 1996; Horn, 2009). Such literature is of little use to a practitioner except as background information that can help understand the industry of sports tourism.

### **Growing Awareness of Violence Against Athletes**

There is a growing awareness of the causes of violence against athletes in general, and female athletes in particular, from spectators, teammates, and coaches. These causes include various social problems such as domestic violence, substance

abuse, and a male-dominated sports cult (Crowley, 2014; Fasting, 2007, 2015; Palmer, 2011). More generally, the stalking of celebrities, including elite and professional athletes, for various motives and without regard to sex, can also result in stress and violence against the athletes (Hyman & Sierra, 2007; Rosenfeld, 2004; Meloy, 2003).

### **A Bounty of Medical Information**

We found publications that directly address the medical and health needs of traveling athletes, whether the athletes are traveling alone or as part of a team (Heggie, 2009). One article in particular provides a thorough discussion of health concerns and provides checklist for athletes prior to and during travel (Kary, 2007).

In a different vein, LaVetter and Kim (2010) point out a major safety hazard for collegiate sports teams: the use of 15-passenger vans for ground transportation. The National Health and Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) has demonstrated that these vans are excessively risky; yet, despite the fact that this mode of transportation has resulted in many injuries and deaths among collegiate athletes, their use continues. Apart from this caution, LaVetter also offers many safety and security suggestions for college athletes.

Other STTS issues, such as Freifelder's (1983) discussion of the cost of sports team security, can be found on a piecemeal basis but do not constitute a theme.

### **Current Responses: Strategies and Methods in Use**

When traveling, university or professional athletes will be "guests" at rest stops, places of lodging, the venue where they will practice or compete, the host locale's restaurants and attractions, and even its nightlife. As guests, athletes often fall under the safety and security umbrella of the host or host organization. This umbrella may not

## SPORTS TEAM TRAVEL SECURITY

include all of the security provisions needed and expected by traveling athletes, or the host's safety and security umbrella may conflict with the athlete's requirements.

Traveling athletes or sports teams may need to supplement the host's security provisions. In doing so, STTS practitioners need to be both diplomatic and demanding to ensure that the security standards of both the host and the traveling teams are met.

The literature contains a number of sports security practices that have proven successful for law enforcement, public safety, and private travel security professionals. Responses found in the literature are discussed in this section for consideration as strategies available to the STTS industry.

### **The Increasing Role of Hotel Security**

Whenever possible, it is in the interest of sports teams to perform surveys of facilities and venues to be visited and to verify the service arrangements expected ("advances"). For lower-profile events, a team may perform surveys through an on-site representative who understands the team's needs and can be trusted to perform advances in its stead. Alternatively, for significant or complex events, a team may be wise to dispatch its own security "agent" ahead of the team to perform advances in person.

Oftentimes, the arrangements made by third parties (such as travel agents, hosts, or hotel security), may suffice if the STTS practitioner can verify beforehand that the arrangements will provide the level of security desired (Plecas, Dow, Diplock, & Martin, 2010). As hotels host more sporting teams and vie for sports teams' ongoing business, they also become sensitized to the teams' particular needs both during the visit and for future visits. STTS practitioners will want to direct their business to hotels

where trusted hotel security managers or other trained personnel can represent their interests.

### **One Point of Contact**

Along with the increasing role of hotel security, another trend is also making the STTS practitioners' job easier: the expanding professional role of hotel security managers from "simple agents providing guarding and loss prevention" to include a number of other security issues such as the management of health, safety, IT security, fire safety, and insurance matters (Gill, Moon, Seaman & Turbin, 2002; Hilliard & Baloglu, 2008). In the case of the larger chains or specialized hotels, STTS practitioners may now expect to deal with one person, or at least one department, to handle the range of security and safety needs at the team's place of lodging.

Along with the increasing role of hotel security, many hotels—especially the major ones—are also making efforts to attract the business of sports teams by determining beforehand the teams' security requirements and advertising their security availability to the teams (Hilliard & Baloglu, 2015; Tse & Ho, 2006). This growing practice among hoteliers will make the STTS practitioner's job easier as preparations for their team's security and safety needs are made with fewer points-of-contact.

### **Team Separation From Guests**

When we speak of hotel security we mean an athlete's place of lodging while in transit or at a venue, be it an inn, hotel, motel, or private residence. In his major special events manual for law enforcement, Connors (2007, p. 26) emphasizes how critical it is to establish and cultivate relationships with hotel security because their staff can be a "force multiplier." Hotel (or venue) security is where the STTS practitioner will go for



access controls and credentialing—the function of identifying and vetting personnel who will be tasked with providing services or who will otherwise need access to the athletes and their entourage. The degree of access controls needed by the STTS contingent will depend on the size of the group, the threat level, and the group's own resources.

### **Ingress and Egress**

A good relationship with the hotel's entire staff, and especially its security staff, can multiply the STTS's own security capabilities tremendously. This good rapport can translate into housing in preferred areas of the hotel where public access is restricted and where egress may be clearer and shorter (DCMS 2008 p. 83).

When participating in special events, it is likely that the venue host (or law enforcement agency, if law enforcement is involved) will establish access controls and credentialing for the event. In this case, the STTS professional will be a *user* of the venue's or law enforcement's credentialing system and access rules. The STTS practitioner needs to coordinate with event managers early on to ensure that they can influence planning and procure adequate levels of security support.

### **Crime Avoidance Training**

The issue of crime against tourists and sporting venues, discussed in the sociological analyses we reviewed (Biagi & Detotto, 2010; Chiang, 2000; Crotts, 1996; Horn, 2009, Tarlow 2014), affects traveling business people and athletes as well. Athletes are as liable as anyone else to fall victim to crimes of opportunity.

Human beings are still the biggest problem in security lapses but—when they are properly and continuously trained—they are also the solution. The literature agrees with this premise. For instance, hoteliers have been using counter-victim training programs

## SPORTS TEAM TRAVEL SECURITY

to reduce the impact of crime in their venues (Chiang 2000). Traveling athletes and sports teams should receive similar training to avoid becoming victims of thieves, street criminals, stalkers, or terrorists.

Training also helps mitigate violence against athletes, particularly female athletes, from spectators, other athletes, and their own coaches (Kavanagh, 2014). This training is directed at both potential victims and perpetrators, in the case of team members and coaches. One institution, the Australian Football League (AFL), provides all of its athletes training in crime avoidance and sexual harassment. Another example, a U.S. program known as Mentors in Violence Prevention (MVP), prepares high school, collegiate and professional athletes for confrontations with aggressors through training that includes realistic role plays of sexual assaults, harassment and other forms of abuse of women (Palmer, 2011, pp. 18-20). Other types of training that could benefit athletes would be basic first aid and the prevention of Deep Venous Thrombosis (DVT).

Ultimately the standardized or specialized training that should be considered for individuals or groups of athletes will be unique to the institution's objectives, risk tolerance, and budget. However, a full list of practical and training topics for sports travel should be available for sports managers to choose from.

Depending on a team's resources, some, if not all, training may be provided by its own security personnel if STTS talent exists in-house. In other cases, a better solution may be to outsource training to specialized STTS consultants.

### **Coordination Between Public and Private Sectors**

Many special events occur on private property, with the leadership for the events shared among a mix of law enforcement, public safety, and private owners. Such

situations only make coordination all the more important. Fussey (2013) and Connors (2007) both point out that private security should be a part of the command and control structure and that law enforcement has tended toward using private sector volunteers to help them carry out their responsibilities. Thus, for complex events, STTS practitioners oftentimes can assist law enforcement by embedding an STTS member into the command and control structure of the lead agency. The benefits of such volunteerism are increased communication, intelligence that would otherwise not be shared, and contacts for additional public (and host) resources when warranted.

There are many reasons why law enforcement may want to embed STTS professionals into its command structure. Whether law enforcement wishes or is willing to embed an STTS member into its command and control group will depend upon numerous factors. Among these factors are: the availability of security resources; the level of competence exhibited by the STTS member; factors of trust; and the perceived overall benefit to participants, the venue, and the spectators. The embedded representative need not be an STTS manager; depending on the circumstances, a personable and well-trained communicator may be able to liaise between the sports team and law enforcement. The STTS liaison may remain posted in the command center or he or she may visit the center on a scheduled basis for updates.

### **Establishing Policies and Planning Early**

In 2011, the *Police Executive Research Forum* (PERF) emphasized the importance of an early start in special events planning. Law enforcement executives from all walks and levels of government conferred at the conference with the hope of taking away lessons learned from myriad disasters and crises other departments had

faced. The forum even included a former police chief turned National Football League (NFL) sports security executive.

Those attending discussed national level crises beyond what an STTS professional would most likely face. Forum participants emphasized that the time to produce policies and procedures to deal with crises and emergencies, and train to fulfill them, is before planning begins for an event; they added that planning itself needs to start as early as possible. They noted that one of the main approaches that had resulted in STTS successes was an early start in emergency planning.

### **Strategic Use of Logistics**

In a discussion of common themes that run through the disasters and crises that they have faced, the PERF executives noted that logistics has been a critical weak point. One solution is to have logistical supplies strategically dispersed and warehoused in different areas of their jurisdictions to cope with emergencies. When disaster strikes or a crisis blocks an egress route, security officers or other personnel dealing with the crisis may not have access to communications, medical supplies, gear, or whatever else may be needed unless they had the foresight to procure easy access to additional personnel, equipment and communications. As part of its preparations, the STTS group should also be sure to establish rapport with local individuals who may serve as a needed personnel reserves (PERF, 2011 p. 6).

Logistics discussions also cover some technical aspects of security operations—namely, the fact that a great deal of what once was expensive or hard-to-obtain technology is now easily obtainable and much cheaper. For example, it is not difficult to obtain and install CCTVs to monitor restricted space. This technology is no longer

## SPORTS TEAM TRAVEL SECURITY

beyond the reach of most security organizations and surveillance cameras are now affordable, small, light, and portable, and can be useful additions to an STTS practitioners' tool kit (PERF, 2011 p. 39; DCMS, 2008 pp. 16.18).

### **Assessments of Threats and Vulnerabilities**

Connors (2007) also provides the best overview of the U.S. Government's special events planning and management system in place. This system considers many factors, mostly of concern to national critical infrastructure, to evaluate the threats and vulnerabilities of major special events it will be asked to protect. The complexity of the formulas created by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (CRS, 2008) are inappropriate to sports travel assessments, but a simplified version would be useful to an STTS manager.

Once a methodology for using the formula is created, the STTS practitioner may find objective assessments to be a rational way to approach an otherwise difficult to assess intangible problem: the questions of whether or not to travel, and how much security should be applied.

### **Communications**

As noted above, some local police departments are beginning to look for ways to include other, smaller law enforcement agencies and even private security in a limited way in the lead agency's communications center (Connors, 2007, p. 28). But doing so makes the maintenance of radio discipline a problem that these agencies must overcome, especially during a crisis. A solution is to issue radios on a different frequency to external agencies and private security elements. In the case of private security, only one radio is issued to each private concern's supervisor. Another

## SPORTS TEAM TRAVEL SECURITY

approach has been to issue listen-only radios to private security. This development may be a huge assistance to an STTS group, permitting it to stay in direct contact with law enforcement for quick support and timely intelligence.

Another potentially more viable form of communication for STTS managers is the use of social media (PERF, 2011, p. 37). Social media communication is available to STTS professionals at any moment and is not dependent on others. Services such as *Twitter* or *Facebook* are being used to broadcast updates to designated group members, such as an STTS entourage and can be composed and sent quickly.

### **The Importance of Good Media Relations**

Organizations that have gone through crises know how integral media relations and an ongoing informational campaign can be throughout an event (Connors, 2007 p. xiv; Hall, Byon & Baker (2013). It is better to control the media by establishing rapport during the planning phase and cooperating with information during “good times” than to have the media produce a message without the STTS manager’s input when a crisis breaks (Island, 2016).

### **Medical Issues for Sports Travelers**

There is a great deal of literature dealing with the topic of travel medicine. As noted previously, we found publications that directly address the medical and health needs of traveling athletes, alone or in teams (Heggie, 2009). One article in particular provides a thorough discussion about health concerns and provides checklists for athletes prior to and during travel (Kary & Lavalee, 2007).

Some people assume that athletes are in better shape than the population as a whole. However, athletes are not only vulnerable to certain health problems, but heavy

## SPORTS TEAM TRAVEL SECURITY

travel schedules may also make athletes more vulnerable than individuals who do not travel. Following are examples of medical conditions faced by traveling athletes:

**Eating disorders.** Apart from the expected physical ailments, travel can also result in poor sleeping and eating habits.

**Weather and atmospheric conditions.** Climatic changes impact all travelers, athletes included. Weather difficulties can be a challenge when the athlete is in his or her own environment; but they become even more problematic when the athlete is not accustomed to the climatic conditions of the host area. Environmental changes such as altitude, humidity, change of food, time zones (and jet lag) can impact negatively on the athlete's performance and health.

**Pollution.** Air pollution is hard on the lungs and especially hard on athletes who must exert a great deal of physical energy. What is physically challenging for people exercising in their own locale may become dangerous for visitors who must demonstrate a great deal of physical stress in a locale to which their bodies are not accustomed.

**Deep Venous Thrombosis (DVT).** This condition is a potential health risk to traveling athletes. It should be noted that some 85% of air travel thrombosis victims are athletic, usually endurance athletes, and the great majority of DVT sufferers are younger than 60 years of age. The reason why so many victims of DVT are athletes has to do with several issues:

1. Often athletes must take long flights;
2. Many athletes are large;
3. Airlines continue to reduce both the size of seats and the space between

rows; and,

4. Athletes often travel as a team in coach-class on commercial flights where space is limited and the opportunity to stretch one's legs is minimal.

**Body clocks and jet lag.** East-west travel oftentimes requires that athletes cross one or more time zones at a rate faster than the body can adjust. In the case of north-south travel, there is less time zone crossing but an increased potential for climate changes. Competitive athletes suffer even more stress when traveling than do those in the general public. For example, Schwellnus, et al. (2012) noted that athletes who cross five time zones to compete run a much higher risk of getting sick than when they play on their home turf.

Jet lag is not only hard on the body but also impacts an athlete's ability to make rapid decisions and to perform. Jet lag also produces a "visiting team's disadvantage."

### **Revelations and Conclusions**

Three main observations are made here to summarize the existing body of knowledge about STTS:

#### **A Dearth of Information About Sports Travel**

The lack of attention to STTS issues in the literature leaves one to ponder where STTS practitioners turn for information. The lack of information may mean that STTS practitioners may be forced to formulate their planning or operating guidelines from their own experiences or their imagination. They may also be borrowing ideas and information from existing parallel literatures such as those that address executive protection. In the existing sporting events literature, the relevant articles are almost all government-produced special events checklists and procedures for law enforcement



and national security entities. Although these listings typically include suggestions for government agencies to contact and to coordinate with private security, they often fail to provide specifics.

Our own experience indicates that the details of a public/private security relationship is usually determined on a case-by-case basis with one or more government entities dictating the agency's needs to the private sector.

### **Needs of Female Travelers**

There are a few articles that focus on the needs of the female traveler. The most significant of which is Zsofia Bende's (2012) thesis about the needs of traveling female intercollegiate athletes. In this article she speaks about female athletes' special needs, like personal protection and health, in addition to the needs they share with other traveling business people.

### **Need to Downscale and Adapt Existing Data**

Several studies by various government/national security entities provide best practices and lessons learned from past sports mega-events that experienced crises or successfully thwarted them (Connors 2007). The studies delve into every facet of special events security at the venues of major special events, but do not address the issues revolving around the travel of sports teams to or from the venue. STTS practitioners and managers will not benefit from the high-gear-only approach in these reports. They are only useful to STTS professionals who dissect and analyze the existing data and then downscale the findings to the micro-operational level of a traveling sports group, as we have done in the sections that follow.

### **Approaches Suggested by the Literature**


Crises at mega-events such as the Olympic Games and Super Bowls have been the catalyst to devising procedures and methods for STTS, the best of which may come to be adopted by law enforcement and the sports industry. Indeed, sports events and, by extension, STTS, experienced paradigm shifts with the 1972 Munich massacre of Israeli athletes by Palestinian terrorists and the September 11, 2001 attacks. Each new major incident has the potential of causing another paradigm shift. Modern-day terrorists have shown repeatedly their ability to move weapons, money, and militants across borders to commit mass mayhem against sports and travel targets, exemplified in 2015 by the downing of the Russian airliner over Egypt, the attacks against the *Stade de France* soccer match and other Paris spots, and the hotel siege in Mali.

In this section, we define the role of the STTS practitioner or manager and the scope of STTS, and we offer STTS procedures founded on the existing literature.

### The STTS Practitioner's Scope

A majority of the security and safety services used by an STTS group are normally provided by others, such as hoteliers and sports arena operators, for the benefit of sports teams, individual athletes, or spectators. The STTS organizer's task is to understand and recognize good security, ensure that the needed services are available, and that they have been reserved for the traveling athletic group.

*Figure 1: STTS Group Embedded Into a Major Special Event*



*From Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement, p. 37, by E. Connors, 2007, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice. Adapted from an open source publication.*

An STTS practitioner's role is one element in a larger network. The scope is more than simply deciding whether or not to travel. The STTS practitioner also determines which preparations and capabilities others have or are providing in support. The STTS practitioner must also add what he or she considers to be crucial but missing elements for the athlete's or team's security.

The literature currently indicates that the STTS manager's focus is on the lowest operational level and he or she is not normally expected to provide a full security

## SPORTS TEAM TRAVEL SECURITY

operation. The STTS manager is expected to blend into, and make use of, the existing security framework of transportation, lodging, and sports venue providers, and to coordinate with local law enforcement, public safety, public health, and medical facilities for support as needed (as depicted in Figure 1). The STTS professional's task, in most cases, is to procure services and ensure that these services are both delivered and of high quality.

### **The Sports Team Travel Security Cycle**

Figure 2 depicts the cycle of STTS, from the creation and maintenance of STTS policies and training, to planning and execution, to the final phase of an STTS event: evaluations. The cycle is discussed in more detail below.

### **Early Preparations: Policies and Procedures**

Any program, including an STTS program, begins with a simple or extensive list of policies that set the rules and requirements.

Policies and procedures need to be thought out in advance. The larger an institution (e.g., an athletic club, a university sports department or a professional team), the more important it is to develop specific protocols, policies, and procedures. Consistently updated protocols reduce planning time and preparations for a new event and help avoid repeating past mistakes or committing new ones.

### **Risk-Based Planning**

**Intelligence.** The gathering of protective intelligence should be started early in the planning cycle. The results of this reconnaissance form the basis for a risk assessment that considers both threats and vulnerabilities, which we discuss in the next section. Available intelligence may result in a quick “no-go” decision when the threat

## SPORTS TEAM TRAVEL SECURITY

forecast clearly overshadows the benefits of the event. If intelligence produces a no-go decision, then the STTS practitioner need not spend any more time or energy on the trip's preparations.

Private sports teams normally do not get access to the sensitive information held by higher levels of government, but open sources are available for the *protective intelligence* needed for an STTS event. STTS practitioners will probably find that the following examples of open sources serve their purpose:

- ***Regional intelligence*** can be procured from the U.S. government and other countries in the form of travel advisories and warnings (e.g. the U.S. State Department's Travel website).
- ***Fact Book*** of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is openly available online to provide a good summary about any region or country being visited.
- ***Overseas Security Advisory Council*** (OSAC), an organ of the U.S. State Department's Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), exists to provide unclassified threat intelligence to traveling U.S. business persons, including U.S. sports groups and athletes traveling abroad (OSAC, 2007). OSAC has branches within the U.S. embassies in most countries. Likewise, the embassies of many other countries provide similar services to their nationals.




Figure 2: The Sports Team Travel Security Cycle

- **Domestic Security Alliance Council (DSAC)** of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is a relatively new organization patterned after OSAC to assist businesses with security matters within U.S. territories and states. Membership in the DSAC will help security practitioners in the United States stay informed about major threats to U.S. regions, venues and events.

- ***Liaisons with local police departments*** in the venue being visited is important. Oftentimes local police are the best source for threats within their jurisdictions and they typically can share more information than intelligence agencies.
- ***Private intelligence publishers*** may also be a source for institutions with active travel programs and a reasonable budget. For a subscription fee, such services provide corporations and other entities with ongoing targeted assessments of criminality and terrorism in the specific locales in which they operate. They also maintain updated regional risk and threat assessments for most countries.

Very often, intelligence is available for the asking from national and local authorities, especially when such authorities are involved in the sporting event. Alternatively, a workable intelligence report can be produced from existing open sources.

**Risk assessments.** For our purposes, these are tools used to evaluate the threats and vulnerabilities to an STTS athlete or group posed by an individual, gangs, protestors, vandals, terrorists, fire, natural disasters, or safety lapses. These risks would be juxtaposed with the characteristics of the physical structures and the security practices that protect the STTS event. An evaluation may be either qualitative—a narrative that simply reviews the known and potential threats in light of known vulnerabilities—or it can use a quantitative formula to measure the relative gravity of a threat versus the protections against it.

A risk assessment is not meant to determine whether or not to hold an event but

## SPORTS TEAM TRAVEL SECURITY

to determine what level of security is appropriate. If the level of security required to mitigate a serious threat is prohibitive in cost or unavailable, then cancellation may be in order.

Different organizations employ various methodologies for risk assessments. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the FBI, the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) and the DSS each use different sets of risk factors and each have developed quantitative formulas that reflect their specific missions. One universal formula is the DHS's (DHS, 2011)  $R=TV C$ , where "R" is risk, "T" is threat, "V" is vulnerability, and "C" is consequence.

For STTS events, this formula can be simplified to  $R=TV$ . When monetary consequences need to be considered, STTS practitioners can calculate the costs of certain decisions, such as the cancellation of a scheduled event, by employing a simpler tool, a cost-benefit analysis (CBA), instead of using the DHS's more complex formula.

To determine vulnerabilities for athletes or sporting events, we may use the following document from the United Kingdom's Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS, 2008). It lists factors for a major special event that seem to be potentially relevant for an athletic risk assessment:

- Service personnel screening/vetting,
- Barriers and access controls,
- Ingress and egress to lodging and venues,
- Emergency plans and equipment for fire and other hazards,
- Medical response and facilities availability, and
- Status of media relations



## SPORTS TEAM TRAVEL SECURITY

We would also add the following to the DCMS list of risks:

- Natural disaster preparedness appropriate for the destination,
- Health hazards or pandemics known to the region, and
- Exposure en route between locations (lodging to sports arena, etc.)

Measuring risk is not totally objective; much of the measurement's accuracy depends on judgments, such as assigned weights and vulnerability levels, made by those who set STTS organizational policies.

Table 1 provides a sample list of threats, with assigned weights, that could be of concern to an STTS event, followed by our definitions of vulnerability levels:

<b>Threat</b>	<b>Weight</b>	<b>x</b>	<b>Vulnerability</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>STTS Score</b>	<b>Comments/Observations</b>
Vandals active in hotel/venue	1					Can deface STTS image/property
Thieves active in hotel/venue	1					Can result in loss of property
Seemingly benign stalker	1					Unstable fan of STTS member
Threatening stalker	2					Directed against STTS member
Passive protestors	2					Can affect the STTS event
Street crimes of opportunity	2					Can victimize STTS members
Disruptive protestors	3					Can affect the STTS event
Natural disaster	3					Emergency

## SPORTS TEAM TRAVEL SECURITY

preparedness				procedures/equip.
Known health hazard	3			Can affect health, performance
Fire safety status in venue	4			Potentially unsafe structure
Violence-prone protestors	4			Can turn against STTS group
Violent group/gang threats	5			Expressed desire to harm STTS
Terrorism threat to area	5			STTS as target of opportunity
<p>Vulnerability Levels:</p> <p>1 : All physical characteristics of structure and security procedures are adequate for the threat</p> <p>2 : A part of the structure/venue/route has a minor but mostly mitigated weakness</p> <p>3 : A significant structural or procedural weakness is not mitigated adequately</p> <p>4 : A significant structural or procedural weakness is not mitigated at all</p> <p>5 : The structure/venue/route is not secure and cannot be mitigated against the known threat</p>				

*Table 1: Examples of STTS Threats with Assigned Weights on an Interval Scale of 1-5*

Take the following hypothetical scenario to illustrate Table 1's use: In planning a new STTS event, the STTS practitioner receives intelligence through liaison that the hotel site is likely to be the focus of protestors known to be violence prone. The police advise that they will not interfere with the planned demonstration unless the protestors

## SPORTS TEAM TRAVEL SECURITY

break the law first. The practitioner fears that waiting until the protestors turn into a destructive mob may be too late, so he or she determines the risk level and mitigation necessary as follows:

The practitioner surveys the hotel and finds that the public can enter freely and that there is a stairway from the lobby that leads to the team's suites in a separate wing of the hotel; however, there are no physical barriers to the hallway to impede an uninvited intruder, let alone a mob. The STTS practitioner decides that the usual complement of one unarmed floor guard for credentialing/screening will not pose a barrier to an aggressive individual or a mob.

In this example, we see a quick calculation of one threat, an intelligence report that "violence prone protestors are anticipated" at the STTS group's venue. In this case, the STTS practitioner determines that there is no deterring police presence at the hotel perimeter or lobby and that, if given the opportunity, a mob could proceed up a stairway to the team's floor and force its way past one unarmed guard.

In assessing the DCMS "barriers and access controls" factor (p. 29), the STTS practitioner would use Table 1 to assign a vulnerability level of 4 (or even 5) to the "violence prone protestors" threat. That vulnerability value (4) is multiplied by the threat's weight (4), which produces an STTS score of 16; that score is assigned a "High" DHS risk level in Table 2 (see below), calling for extraordinary security measures.

# SPORTS TEAM TRAVEL SECURITY

Risk Levels					Concurrent STTS Responses	
DHS Rating	Risk Level	Venue Threat	Security Measures	Action Steps	STTS Score	Recommended Matched STTS Response
Severe	5	Cancel	Secured	“Lock down” patrol perimeters restricting access	21-25	Cancel participation in event or, if under way, “lock down” in secure areas
High	4	Maximum	Govt. Control	National law officials/security agencies screen public and take control	16-20	High threat to the general public, including athletes—extra physical security for STTS members; consider cancellation
Elevated	3	Elevated	Restrictive	May involve regional or local law officials with “pat down” measures	11-15	Suspected gen. threat to STTS – screening; restrict STTS contingent to guarded spaces
Guarded	2	Moderate	Protective	Limited access to venue with screening	6-10	Known stalker threat(s)—add screening

## SPORTS TEAM TRAVEL SECURITY

				precautions implemented		
Low	1	Minimum	Routine	No primary factors of concern exist outside normal routine measures	1-5	No STTS threats; standard measures

*Table 2: DHS Special Events Risk Levels and Suggested Concurrent STTS Responses*

*From Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement, p. 17, by E. Connors, 2007, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice. Adapted from an open source publication.*

Each location, lodging, practice arena, competitive arena, eatery, place of rest and recreation, as well as the travel segments between them, should be submitted to a similar risk assessment. All of the scores for different risks could then be averaged for a mean risk posture, or the STTS practitioner can decide to assign the risk posture of the highest-weight risk assessment of any location or segment and apply that to the entire STTS event since the measures protecting against the worst threat should protect against lesser threats as well.

**Business continuity and crisis management.** Successful threat mitigation comes from careful planning followed by faithful execution. The goal of business continuity and crisis management is to avoid potentially dangerous situations and, when that fails, to manage the incident to a successful recovery. Even if the challenges put before the STTS practitioner are not on the threats list, it is likely that one or more of the contingencies in the plan can be quickly adapted to handle unforeseen problems.

The likelihood of a successful sports event typically relates to the amount and

## SPORTS TEAM TRAVEL SECURITY

thoroughness of the planning and, in the event of an emergency or crisis, to the training, experience, and resources available to the crisis managers. How much to plan for depends on such factors as the mode of transportation, the services provided at the venues visited, the places of lodging, and the issues that surround the individual athletes or sports team.

Ideally, the crisis management actions to be taken while in travel status should be an extension of a broader business continuity plan for the team, whether they are on their home turf or traveling. Island (2016) provides methods and tools needed by a sports team or athletic department to establish an effective business continuity program to deal with crises ranging from potential damage to the team's reputation to criminal attacks and natural disasters.

### **Execution**

To use a popular refrain: In war it is the months of planning and training (99% sweat) that prepares the soldier for a few moments of terror (1% action). The same holds true for STTS.

## SPORTS TEAM TRAVEL SECURITY

This is also the case for competitive sports. Most athletes train and “play” long hours in preparation for a brief competitive performance. If they really excel, they may participate in major leagues or major events like the Olympics. For such major special events they will be enveloped in a

security blanket provided by government authorities or by a highly organized and complex private sports venue, as illustrated in Figure 1 (STTS Group Embedded Into a Major Special Event).

Most of the time, however, athletes are alone, in small groups, or with a small entourage of athletes


and their support personnel. *Figure 3 (Error! Reference source not found.)*

represents the operating model in the great majority of the time in which the athletic group depends on contacts and liaisons with government security and safety services, and relies on hoteliers, transportation companies, private venues, private residences, and others, for services.

### Post Operative Evaluation

By its very nature, evaluations will vary from event to event. It suffices to say that evaluations may result in policy changes, new policies, and new planning tools that evolve with experience and changing times.

*Figure 3: STTS Group in Normal Mode of Operation*



### **Measuring Effectiveness**

The effectiveness of an STTS program can be measured in two ways: its overall effectiveness over time, and the effectiveness of a particular event. Protective operations, which include STTS events, measure success by the lowest number of incidents that needed resolution. An event that experiences no incidents is perfectly successful. The adage “no news is good news” is true for protective operations.

The security practitioner’s world exists because incidents do happen and these incidents call for professional resolution. Realistically, there are always numerous small problems and incidents to smooth out and resolve. Reports are not only to inform upper echelons of the practitioner’s work, but also to prevent similar occurrences in the future, or to learn how to produce better responses to similar problems. Reports are the “brain cells” in the institution’s memory from which we learn lessons and evolve better practices.

It should be the STTS manager’s responsibility to assure that everyone in the institution or group populates the database. The following types of information are examples of what might be useful in measuring the overall effectiveness of an STTS program:

- Security lapses at hotels or venues (to include a reason for the occurrence, how it was corrected, and how to prevent it in the future);
- Attempts to breach security;
- Actual breaches of security;
- Accidents that affected the STTS group (type and number);
- List of requested security services not provided by a host (and host’s rationale



## SPORTS TEAM TRAVEL SECURITY

for not providing it, and suggestion of how to get such service(s) in the future);

- Satisfaction surveys from STTS participants;
- Threats against STTS members;
- Aggression against STTS members;
- Property thefts or damage reports; and
- News articles about groups or issues that affect venues that may be destinations of the STTS group.

The information collected will be useful in organizing new events and providing data for:

- Risk assessments
- Cost-benefit analyses
- After-action reports (AAR)
- Intelligence assessments
- Historical reports

### **Future Research Needs**

During our research and review we sought to locate literature that addressed issues, lessons learned, and best practices that we believe are important to STTS. We succeeded in many of the topics of interest and found literature on topics we thought would be sparse. On the other hand, research on some of the issues we expected to be adequately covered was scarce.

From the many articles reviewed, only one researcher, Bende (2012), provided a suggestion for future STTS research. In her thesis on the regional security needs of collegiate female athletes, Bende concluded that future research could augment her

## SPORTS TEAM TRAVEL SECURITY

work by considering the greater distances and travel time requirements for national and international sports events; she also recommended that the results of such research be distributed to the traveling athletes themselves and to the sports travel industry.

As seen in this report, there is much work for researchers to do in this area.

Below are some of the subjects that researchers may need to explore:

### **Sports Teams and Terrorism**

- How does the threat of terrorism affect major sporting events?
- What are proven ways for securing public agency cooperation for athletes and venues?
- How can security practitioners reduce the impact of terrorism on athletic performance?
- What role does the media play in threats to athletes, sporting venues, and the local community?
- What are the interactive security issues between the local community, athletic events and security?

### **Relationship Between Security and Athletic Health**

- What impact does travel security have on the results of athletic events?
- What is the role of security on the athlete's mental health?

### **About Athlete Travel**

- What are the best practices for travel security?
  - Teams?
  - Individual athletes?
  - Professional athletes?

## SPORTS TEAM TRAVEL SECURITY

- Elite (collegiate) athletes?
- What are the greatest threats that the athletes state they face?
- Are there differences between the athlete's perceptions of threats and the athletic travel manager's perception of threats?
- Do athletes worry about their security when traveling to foreign lands for international competition? What differences do they perceive between domestic and international travels?
- What are the best practices used in the protection of athletes?
- Are there significant differences between the security expectations of team managers and security personnel? How do successful sports teams bridge these differences?
- What are the practices that have been discarded as not helpful?

### **Mitigating Violence Against Athletes**

- Female athletes
- Athletes in general

### **Other Subjects**

- Can one model serve to provide the planning tools to protect athletes? Do we need multiple models to protect athletes?
- How do we coordinate "in stadium" (in venue) security with the potential for violence outside of the venue, such as attacks on athletes at local hotels, transportation centers or city streets?
- What is the role of local security professionals in the pursuit of athlete security? How do their roles fit into best practices? How do we distinguish

between travel security and athlete security? Is the latter a subgroup of the former or are they two different fields of study?

- The production of a cost-benefit analysis answering such questions as: Does an STTS model produce sufficient acquired or saved revenue to justify the expenditure and if so, can this revenue stream be predicted?
- From an interview process, what are the problems and solutions of current STTS professionals? How do we protect athletes in an ever more dangerous world of terrorism and social unrest?

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**STTS Checklists**

The following checklists are provided to assist sports managers and STTS practitioners in planning activities and mitigating the identified risks to an STTS event of interest. The lists apply to both domestic and foreign travel.

<b>SPORTS TEAM TRAVEL SECURITY (STTS) CHECKLIST</b>		<b>Status</b>	
		Relevant	Done
<b>Policy and security resources</b>			
	Can the STTS events be managed or mitigated to a tolerable level of risk?		
	Does the STTS contingent have one or more dedicated STTS officer(s)?		
	Who can the STTS contingent partner with for security services (force multipliers) at the hotel? Venue?		
	What role will law enforcement (LE) perform for the STTS event?		
	Will LE be in support of STTS security or the host's security?		
	Will STTS or venue security be supporting LE as lead?		
	Will no LE involvement be needed or anticipated?		
<b>Before international travel</b>			
	Has there been a review of what may and may not be brought into or utilized in the destination country?		
	Will interaction with local doctors and hospitals be needed?		
	Will the team have a traveling member who speaks the local language?		
	Has STTS met with hotel security staff and reviewed local protocols?		
	Are all legal documents, such as passports and visas, in order?		
	Are work permits needed? If so, have they been obtained?		
	Has a review been done to identify local health issues, from special foods to deadly insects?		
<b>Risk management guide</b>			
Prior to travel intelligence			
Threat of terrorism			
	Who will be in the team's presence?		
	What specific team threats are there due to team members' nationality, religion or other such consideration?		
	What is the potential for major media coverage in case of attack?		
	Will the team be located in a place where mass casualties may		

## SPORTS TEAM TRAVEL SECURITY

	occur?		
	Have you reviewed evacuation plans?		
	How much do you know about the locale's security services? Are there protocols that are in place?		
<b>Crime threats</b>			
	What are the threats by visitors/fans to players (e.g., hooligans traveling with British teams), to the venue, and to areas outside of venue?		
	Do any of the players have a history of crime?		
	Are there locations for the safe-keeping of personal items?		
	Have the personnel who have access to players' possessions been vetted?		
<b>Other threats</b>			
	What is the history of natural disasters (lightening, earthquakes, etc.)?		
	Are there local health issues to be aware of? (e.g., quality of water, issues of contagious diseases etc.)		
	Is the destination threatened with pandemics or local diseases?		
	What natural disasters threaten the destination?		
	Is the destination under threats of food poisoning or illnesses?		
<b>Logistical issues</b>			
	What local laws can affect the STTS traveler/team?		
	Are any particular documents and/or licenses needed?		
	Are translators on hand if needed?		
<b>Safety and security at hotel</b>			
	Is there adequate protection from the public?		
	What is the locale's quality of food, water, beds?		
	Are there problems due to issues of noise and light pollution?		
	Is there safe and secure parking?		
	What is the distance from the airport/train station?		
	What is the distance to the stadium?		
	How secure is the road to the stadium?		
	What is the locale's ability to get from transportation mode (car/bus) to inside the stadium/protected area?		
	What is the level of training of the security personnel outside and around the athletes' venues (hotel, airport/stadium)?		
	How many security personnel are available?		
	What equipment do they possess?		
	What is their ability to interact between security personnel and safety personnel?		
	Do all security systems have the same communications system? If not, how would they communicate in an emergency?		

## SPORTS TEAM TRAVEL SECURITY

	Do security agents have cross-group training or individual group training?		
	What are the level and types of interaction between private and public (law enforcement) personnel?		
	Do the law enforcement and private security agencies respect each other?		
	Is there coordination between the security personnel of the hotel, transportation, and sports arena (stadium)?		
<b>Protocols at game/event</b>			
<i>Interactions between first responders</i>			
	How many types of first responders are present?		
	Is there a triage system?		
	How well is the first responder training integrated?		
	What are the quantities and quality of the first aid equipment?		
<i>At the stadium</i>			
	Have stadium ingress and egress routes been identified?		
	Are there metal detectors?		
	What is the level of on-duty security personnel training?		
	Are cameras used for passive filming (to be viewed later), actively monitored filming, or observed in real time?		
	Has someone checked and monitored the control of air ducts?		
	How well protected are the players' locker rooms?		
	Are there issues of privacy?		
	Are there issues of security?		
	How safe are the players from locker rooms to field of play?		
	How far is the offset between players and fans?		
<b>Stadium security</b>			
	Is there protection from inclement weather?		
	What is the state of the playing field? (i.e. slippery when wet?)		
	What type of emergency communication is available?		
	What is the potential to take players or fans hostage?		
	How much immediate medical attention can be provided?		
	Is there a medical evacuation plan? Using helicopters? Using ambulances? Is there fire equipment?		
	Are stadium employees vetted?		
	What is the level of vetting and who is vetted?		
<b>Medical</b>			
	How many and what types of medical personnel are available and on duty?		

## SPORTS TEAM TRAVEL SECURITY

	Is there an adequate supply of blood?		
	Has the STTS team acquired contact information for public health?		
	What participation will be required from public health?		
	<b>Miscellaneous (add as necessary)</b>		

### Biographies

#### **Peter Tarlow, Ph.D**

Peter Tarlow is the president and founder of Tourism & More. Since 1990, Tarlow has taught courses on tourism, crime, and terrorism throughout the world. Since 1998, Tarlow has worked with U.S. and other government agencies including: Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Customs services, the Salt Lake City 2002 Winter Olympic Games, the World Cup Games, the U.S. National Park Service, the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the American Bar Association's Latin America Office, the FBI, The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the United Nation's WTO (World Tourism Organization), and the Panama Canal Authority. He works with numerous police forces throughout the United States, the Caribbean, and Latin America.

Tarlow is a contributing author to multiple books on tourism security, and has published numerous academic and applied research articles. In 2002 Tarlow published *Event Risk Management and Safety* (John Wiley & Sons). In 2011, Tarlow published *Twenty Years of Tourism Tidbits: The Book*. He has co-published a book on cruise safety (written in Portuguese), *Abordagem Multidisciplinar dos Cruzeiros Turísticos* (2013), and in 2014, he published *Tourism Security: Strategies for Effective Managing Travel Risk and Safety*. (Elsevier). Since 1992, Tarlow has organized multiple tourism conferences around the world.

#### **Jacques R. Island**

Jacques Island has been the president of the Inquesta Corporation, a security consulting firm, since retiring from the FBI in 2002. He served as an FBI agent for 20 years investigating and resolving prison uprisings, terrorist incidents, hijackings, and

## SPORTS TEAM TRAVEL SECURITY

hostage takings. Before joining the FBI, he was a U.S. Foreign Service officer and was awarded a U.S. Department of State Meritorious Honor Service medal for organizing and executing the ground and air evacuation of U.S. Embassy personnel from a war zone. During his career, he has conducted myriad risk and threat assessments, managed many special events, and managed the security of U.S. missions, dignitaries, diplomatic personnel, and business executives in high-threat foreign areas. He earned a Master of Public Administration degree from the Florida International University.