

# Types of attacks

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## Attack models

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Let

- $m, k, c \in \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{K}, \mathcal{C}$
- $E : \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{K} \longrightarrow \mathcal{C}$  be an encryption function
- $c = E(m, k)$

### Ciphertext only attack - COA

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ciphertext-only\\_attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ciphertext-only_attack)

Given

- One or a set of ciphertexts  $c_i$

Task:

- Find the key  $k$  or
- Find the message  $m_i$
- Find the next message  $m_{i+1}$

### Known plaintext attack - KPA

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Known-plaintext\\_attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Known-plaintext_attack)

Given:

- a bit or the whole message  $m_i$  (the crib)
- the ciphertext  $c_i$

Task:

- Find the key  $k$  or
- Find the next message  $m_{i+1}$  from  $c_{i+1}$

### Chosen plaintext attack - CPA

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chosen-plaintext\\_attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chosen-plaintext_attack)

Given:

- Choose some  $m_i$  messages
- Gen their encryption  $c_i$

Task:

- Find the key  $k$  or

- Find the next message  $m_{i+1}$  from  $c_{i+1}$

*Intuition:*

- more control to the attacker
- The attacker can explore vulnerabilities of  $\mathcal{C} \times \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{K}$  and nonrandom behaviour
- Attacks **ciphertext indistinguishability**
  - Given  $c$  and a random string  $r$  An attacker *must not* be able to distinguish between them

**Remark:**

- CPA-security is stronger than KPA and COA security
- A cipher CPA-secure is KPA and COA secure

### **Adaptive CPA - CPA2**

- The attacker can request another set of messages  $m_j$  after seeing the first set
- This enables him to modify the message choice depending on the results of the previous encryption

### **Chosen Ciphertext attack - CCA**

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chosen-ciphertext\\_attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chosen-ciphertext_attack)

Given:

- Choose some  $c_i$  ciphertexts
- Gen their decryption  $m_i$

Task:

- Find the key  $k$

### **Adaptive CCA - CCA2**

- The attacker can request another set of ciphertexts  $c_j$  to be decrypted after seeing the first set
- This enables him to modify the ciphertext choice depending on the results of the previous decryptions

### **Open key model attacks**

Given:

- Some knowledge about the key
  - Related-key
  - For a chosen key he can distinguish from random

Task:

- Decrypt the message  $m$

### **Attack types**

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## Weak algorithm

### Implementation attack

- Mistakes in the implementation / software of the protocol / encryption algorithm

### Statistical attacks

- Not enough randomness
- Can exploit the indistinguishability propriety

### Mathematical attack

- Small dataset of keys => Weak encryptions

### Analytic attack

- Use algebraic proprieties to weaken the attack (Ex: LLL)

## Brute Force

Try every possible combination to search for the key / password

- — Slow

### Dictionary attacks

Brute force using a dictionary of common words (think of the language too)

An attacker can combine them too

- + Faster than brute force
- — Useless against good passwords

### Rainbow tables

Optimized, precomputed table for caching the output of cryptographic hash functions

- + Fast
  - Used for cracking password hashes
  - Given hash -> lookup rainbow table -> get password
- — You need a rainbow table for each hash type

## Birthday attack

Hash collision - The same hash value for two different messages

- Find collision through brute force
- + Based on the birthday paradox, there is a high chance to find a collision on small hashes
- — Weak against big hashes

## Meet-in-the-middle

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meet-in-the-middle\\_attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meet-in-the-middle_attack)

- KPA-like
- space-time tradeoff
- Use both  $\mathcal{C}$  and  $\mathcal{M}$  spaces

## Differential Cryptanalysis

- applicable primarily to block ciphers, stream ciphers and cryptographic hash functions.
- In the broadest sense: how differences in information input can affect the resultant difference at the output.
- The attacker follows several messages of plaintext into their transformed ciphertext. He observes the changes from plaintext to the ciphertext and deduces the key.
- CPA-like attack

## Linear Cryptanalysis

- KPA against messages encrypted with the same key
- Get insight into the probability of a particular key
- If more messages are attacked, there is a higher possibility of finding the particular "key"

## Side-Channel attacks

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side-channel\\_attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side-channel_attack)

Based on the faulty implementation of a system rather than software bugs

- Timing information
- Power consumption - Power analysis attacks
- Electromagnetic leaks
- Sound