


# Stream Ciphers

## Stream Ciphers



### Definition - cipher

A Cipher is defined over  $(\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{C})$  and is a pair of efficient algorithms  $(E, D)$

- $E$  is randomized,  $D$  is deterministic
- $E : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{C}$
- $D : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{C} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$
- has the **Corectness propriety**:  $\forall m \in \mathcal{M}, k \in \mathcal{K} \Rightarrow D(k, (E(k, m))) = m$
- Is efficient
  - Polynomial time
  - In good time

### Example One time pad

$$E(k, m) = k \oplus m$$

$$D(k, c) = k \oplus c$$

$$D(k, E(k, c)) = k \oplus k \oplus m = m$$

### Perfect secrecy

A cipher  $(E, D)$  has perfect secrecy if

- for all  $m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{M}$ , and all  $c \in \mathcal{C}$
- we have  $Pr[E(k, m_0) = c] = Pr[E(k, m_1) = c]$

*Intuition:*

- All messages are **equally** likely to be the ciphertext
- No adversary can learn something about the  $m$  from  $c$

- No chosen cipher attack

### Example:

OTP is perfectly secure

### The bad news

- For  $(E, D)$  to have perfect secrecy  $\Rightarrow |\mathcal{K}| > |\mathcal{M}|$
- So for each message we will need to send a key that is the same or bigger size  $\Rightarrow$  impractical
- If we already have a secure channel to communicate the key there is no use for the OTP
- Don't reuse the key

## Semantic security

### Stream ciphers




FIGURE 10.2. Stream ciphers

We use a seed to generate a key (Pseudorandom generator)

- We put a 128 seed into a function  $G$  that outputs a 2048 number
- $k = G(s)$  where  $s$  = seed

Let  $(E, D)$  be a cipher.

- $c = E(k, m) = E(G(s), m)$

### Remark

- Stream ciphers cannot have perfect secrecy!
- We need a new definition for security
- PRG must be unpredictable

A PRG is predictable if given the first  $n-1$  bits we can predict the next bits

### PRG security

We want the PRG to be indistinguishable from the true random distribution

Let  $A(x)$  be a **statistical test**

- 0 if the output is not random
- 1 if the output is random
- Examples
  - $|nr(0) - nr(1)| \leq 10 \cdot \sqrt{(n)}$  (nr of 0 - nr of 1)
  - $nr(00) \leq 10 \cdot \sqrt{(n)}$
  - longest sequence of 0

Let  $G : K \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  and define **Advantage** as:

$$\text{Adv}(A, G) = |Pr[A(G(k)) = 1] - Pr[A(k) = 1]| \in [0, 1]$$

- If  $\text{Adv} \rightarrow 1 \Rightarrow A$  can distinguish from random
- If  $\text{Adv} \rightarrow 0 \Rightarrow A$  can't distinguish from random

**Example:**

Suppose

- $msb(G(k)) = 1$  for  $2/3$  of  $k \in K$
- $A(x) = 1 \iff msb(x) = 1$

Then

- $\text{Adv}(A, G) = |Pr[A(G(k)) = 1] - Pr[A(k) = 1]| = |2/3 - 1/2| = 1/6$

**Definition - prg security**

A PRG is secure if for all efficient statistical tests  $A$  the  $\text{Adv}(A, G)$  is negligible

**Theorem**

If the generator  $G$  is secure  $\Rightarrow$  a PRG based on it's unpredictable

**Theorem**

An unpredictable PRG is secure (Then the G is secure)

**Definition - computational indistinguishability**

Let  $P_1, P_2$  be two distrib over  $\{0, 1\}^n$

We say that  $P_1, P_2$  are **computationally indistinguishable** if:


- $\forall$  efficient statistical tests  $A$
- $|Pr_{x \leftarrow P_1}[A(x) = 1] - Pr_{x \leftarrow P_2}[A(x) = 1]| < \epsilon$
- $\epsilon$  is negligible

**Semantic security**

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9MfeDP0fNDY>

*Intuition:*

- Having the ciphertext does reveal a negligible amount about the original message / key
- An attacker that has the ciphertext must have the same information as one without it



### Definition - semantic security

- Let  $\mathcal{E} = (E, D)$  be a cipher
- Let  $EXP(0)$ , and  $EXP(1)$  be two experiments
- An adversary  $A$  sends  $m_0, m_1 \in M$  to the challenger
- The challenger sends an encryption of **one** of them ( $EXP(0)$  or  $EXP(1)$ )
- The adversary must guess which one
- $W_b =$  event that  $EXP(b) = 1 =$  event that in  $EXP(b)$  the Adversary outputs 1
- $\text{Adv}_{SS}(A, \mathcal{E}) = |Pr[W_0] - Pr[W_1]| \in [0, 1]$ 
  - *intuition:* We look if the adversary behaves differently if he is given one ciphertext or the other
  - If  $\text{Adv}$  is close to 1  $\Rightarrow$  The adversary can distinguish between the encryptions

$\mathcal{E}$  is semantically secure if for all adversaries  $A$

- $\text{Adv}_{SS}(A, \mathcal{E}) < \epsilon$

### Stream ciphers are semantically secure

#### Theorem

$G : K \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  is a secure PRG  $\Rightarrow$  the Stream cipher is semantically secure

### More Resources

- [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stream\\_cipher](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stream_cipher) - wiki page
- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rAFNmO-4CIA> - Another short explanation
- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W39KqX0ZTbU> - Another long explanation
- <http://netlab.cs.ucla.edu/wiki/files/shannon1949.pdf> - Shannon security paper