

## 2. Hash-Based Signatures

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### Lamport signature scheme

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#### Algorithm

Let

- $M \in \{0, 1\}^v$  be a message. We split it in bits  $\Rightarrow M = m_0 || m_1 || \dots$
- $f : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$  be a one way function (a hash for example)

#### Key generation

- for each bit  $m$  the signer chooses 2 values
  - $(x_0, x_1) \rightarrow$  **Private key**
  - $(y_0, y_1) = (f(x_0), f(x_1)) \rightarrow$  **Public key**

#### Signing $m \in \{0, 1\}$

- $\sigma = S((x_0, x_1), m) = x_m$
- If the bit is 0 take the  $x_0$  else take  $y_1$
- Sign each bit accordingly

#### Verifying $m \in \{0, 1\}$

- $V((y_0, y_1), m, \sigma) = \text{accept} \iff f(\sigma) = y_m \text{ else reject}$
- Check for all bits

#### Note

- The size of the keys is  $2 * v * \text{bitsize}(x), 2 * v * \text{bitsize}(y)$
- To make it more efficient we can use a PRNG / PRF and keep the seed as the secret key
- There are way to shorten the signatures
  - Winternitz scheme
  - HORS
  - using Merkle trees

#### Security

The Lamport signature is a one time signature.

- If a key is reused an attacker can queue  $m_0 = 0^v, m_1 = 1^v$  and find the secret key then he can forge a signature for a message  $m' \neq m_0, m' \neq m_1$

- <https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/2640/lamport-signature-how-many-signatures-are-needed-to-forge-a-signature>
- If the key is not reused only half of the secret key is known and the attacker must brute force / reverse a the one way  $f$  to forge a signature
- Therefore the security is based on the key length and the one way resistance of  $f$

## Resources

- <http://lamport.azurewebsites.net/pubs/dig-sig.pdf>
- [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lamport\\_signature](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lamport_signature)
- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=be3DJEaOYfg>
- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v3yApr-8llo>