


Stream Ciphers

Stream Ciphers



Definition - cipher

A Cipher is defined over $(\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{C})$ and is a pair of efficient algorithms (E, D)

- E is randomized, D is deterministic
- $E : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{M} \longrightarrow \mathcal{C}$
- $D : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{C} \longrightarrow \mathcal{M}$
- has the **Corectness propriety**: $\forall m \in \mathcal{M}, k \in \mathcal{K} \Rightarrow D(k, (E(k, m))) = m$
- Is efficient
 - Polynomial time
 - In good time

Example One time pad

$$E(k, m) = k \oplus m$$

$$D(k, c) = k \oplus c$$

$$D(k, E(k, c)) = k \oplus k \oplus m = m$$

Perfect secrecy

A cipher (E, D) has perfect secrecy if

- for all $m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{M}$, and all $c \in \mathcal{C}$
- we have $Pr[E(k, m_0) = c] = Pr[E(k, m_1) = c]$

Intuition:

- All messages are **equally** likely to be the ciphertext
- No adversary can learn something about the m from c

- No chosen cipher attack

Example:

OTP is perfectly secure

The bad news

- For (E, D) to have perfect secrecy $\Rightarrow |\mathcal{K}| > |\mathcal{M}|$
- So for each message we will need to send a key that is the same or bigger size \Rightarrow impractical
- If we already have a secure channel to communicate the key there is no use for the OTP
- Don't reuse the key

Semantic security

Stream ciphers




FIGURE 10.2. Stream ciphers

We use a seed to generate a key (Pseudorandom generator)

- We put a 128 seed into a function G that outputs a 2048 number
- $k = G(s)$ where s = seed

Let (E, D) be a cipher.

- $c = E(k, m) = E(G(s), m)$

Remark

- Stream ciphers cannot have perfect secrecy!
- We need a new definition for security
- PRG must be unpredictable

A PRG is predictable if given the first $n-1$ bits we can predict the next bits

PRG security

We want the PRG to be indistinguishable from the true random distribution

Let $A(x)$ be a **statistical test**

- 0 if the output is not random
- 1 if the output is random
- Examples
 - $|nr(0) - nr(1)| \leq 10 \cdot \sqrt{(n)}$ (nr of 0 - nr of 1)
 - $nr(00) \leq 10 \cdot \sqrt{(n)}$
 - longest sequence of 0

Let $G : K \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ and define **Advantage** as:

$$\text{Adv}(A, G) = |Pr[A(G(k)) = 1] - Pr[A(k) = 1]| \in [0, 1]$$

- If $\text{Adv} \rightarrow 1 \Rightarrow A$ can distinguish from random
- If $\text{Adv} \rightarrow 0 \Rightarrow A$ can't distinguish from random

Example:

Suppose

- $msb(G(k)) = 1$ for $2/3$ of $k \in K$
- $A(x) = 1 \iff msb(x) = 1$

Then

- $\text{Adv}(A, G) = |Pr[A(G(k)) = 1] - Pr[A(k) = 1]| = |2/3 - 1/2| = 1/6$

Definition - prg security

A PRG is secure if for all efficient statistical tests A the $\text{Adv}(A, G)$ is negligible

Theorem

If the generator G is secure \Rightarrow a PRG based on it's unpredictable

Theorem

An unpredictable PRG is secure (Then the G is secure)

Definition - computational indistinguishability

Let P_1, P_2 be two distrib over $\{0, 1\}^n$

We say that P_1, P_2 are **computationally indistinguishable** if:


- \forall efficient statistical tests A
- $|Pr_{x \leftarrow P_1}[A(x) = 1] - Pr_{x \leftarrow P_2}[A(x) = 1]| < \epsilon$
- ϵ is negligible

Semantic security

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9MfeDP0fNDY>

Intuition:

- Having the ciphertext does reveal a negligible amount about the original message / key
- An attacker that has the ciphertext must have the same information as one without it



Definition - semantic security

- Let $\mathcal{E} = (E, D)$ be a cipher
- Let $EXP(0)$, and $EXP(1)$ be two experiments
- An adversary A sends $m_0, m_1 \in M$ to the challenger
- The challenger sends an encryption of **one** of them ($EXP(0)$ or $EXP(1)$)
- The adversary must guess which one
- $W_b =$ event that $EXP(b) = 1 =$ event that in $EXP(b)$ the Adversary outputs 1
- $\text{Adv}_{SS}(A, \mathcal{E}) = |Pr[W_0] - Pr[W_1]| \in [0, 1]$
 - *intuition:* We look if the adversary behaves differently if he is given one ciphertext or the other
 - If Adv is close to 1 \Rightarrow The adversary can distinguish between the encryptions

\mathcal{E} is semantically secure if for all adversaries A

- $\text{Adv}_{SS}(A, \mathcal{E}) < \epsilon$

Stream ciphers are semantically secure

Theorem

$G : K \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ is a secure PRG \Rightarrow the Stream cipher is semantically secure

More Resources

- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stream_cipher - wiki page
- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rAFNmO-4CIA> - Another short explanation
- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W39KqX0ZTbU> - Another long explanation
- <http://netlab.cs.ucla.edu/wiki/files/shannon1949.pdf> - Shannon security paper