

Protocol Audit Report

Version 1.0

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Protocol Summary


PasswordStore is a protocol that focuses on storage and retrieval of user's passwords. The protocol is meant to be used by single user only. It only allows owners to set and retrieve password.

Disclaimer

I makes all effort to find as many vulnerabilities in the code in the given time period, but holds no responsibilities for the findings provided in this document. A security audit by the team is not an endorsement of the underlying business or product. The audit was time-boxed and the review of the code was solely on the security aspects of the Solidity implementation of the contracts.

Risk Classification

		Impact		
		High	Medium	Low
	High	Н	H/M	М
Likelihood	Medium	H/M	М	M/L



We use the CodeHawks severity matrix to determine severity. See the documentation for more details.

Audit Details

The findings described below in this doc is base on following commit hash: 7d55682ddc4301a7b13ae9413099

Scope

```
1 ./src/
2 |__ PasswordStore.sol
```

Roles

- Owner: The user who can set the password and read the password.
- Outsides: No one else should be able to set or read the password.

Executive Summary

Issues found

Severity	Number of issues found
High	2
Medium	0
Low	0
Info	1
Total	3

Findings

High

[H-1] Anything stored on-chain can be accessed by anyone, solidity access control (i.e. private, public etc) is only applicable for contracts.

Description:

PasswordStore::s_password is accessible to anyone which defeats the protocol ideal This contract allows you to store a **private** password that others won't be able to see. Solidity keywords is only applicable on contracts. But you are storing s_password on-chain, so, anyone can see it.

Impact:

s_password is no more safe or private.

Proof of Concept:

Here is how one can attack your system.

1. Run anvil:

```
1 anvil
```

2. Deploy the Contract

```
1 make deploy
```

3. Read the Storage slot of **s_password** (i.e. 1) using cast

```
1 cast storage <CONTRACT_ADDRESS> 1
```

4. Decode the data obtained from step:3

Output (on success): myPassword

Recommended Mitigation:

Due to this, the overall architecture of the contract should be rethought. One could encrypt the password off-chain, and then store the encrypted password on-chain. This would require the user to remember another password off-chain to decrypt the password. However, you'd also likely want to remove the view function as you wouldn't want the user to accidentally send a transaction with the password that decrypts your password.

[H-2] PasswordStore::setpassword() don't have any "Access Control", so even a "non-owner" can change/set the password

Description:

According to natspec of **PasswordStore::setpassword()** i.e. @notice This function allows only the owner to set a **new** password. but the function don't have any access restriction/control. So, anyone can call this function and Change Password. this defeats the intention of the protocol.

Impact:

Anyone can change the **s_password**.

Proof of Concept:

Please paste Test Code attached below to test/PasswordStore.t.sol for checking....

Test Code

```
function test_nan_owner_can_set_password(address randomAddress) public
{
    vm.prank(owner);
    string memory owner_pass = passwordStore.getPassword();

    string memory hackedPassword = "HackedPassword";
    vm.prank(randomAddress);
    passwordStore.setPassword(hackedPassword);
```

```
8
9
           vm.prank(owner);
10
           string memory owner_pass_now = passwordStore.getPassword();
11
12
           // To prove:: owner_pass_now != Password set by owner (i.e.
               owner_pass) + owner_pass_now == HackedPassword
13
           assert(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(owner_pass)) != keccak256(abi
               .encodePacked(owner_pass_now)));
           assert(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(hackedPassword)) == keccak256
14
               (abi.encodePacked(owner_pass_now)));
15
       }
```

Recommended Mitigation:

You can add following Lines of code to PasswordStore::setpassword()

```
1 if (msg.sender != s_owner) {
2    revert PasswordStore__NotOwner;
3 }
```

Informational

[I-1] PasswordStore::getPassword() doesn't use any parameters, but the documentation mentions about newPassword

Description:

Since PasswordStore: getPassword() don't require any parameters, but the documentation mentions about a parameter newPassword. This suggests the signature of this function is getPassword(string) which is not true.

```
1  /*
2  * @notice This allows only the owner to retrieve the password.
3 @> * @param newPassword The new password to set.
4  */
5  function getPassword() external view returns (string memory) {
```

Impact:

Can be misleading for future reference.

Recommended Mitigation:

Remove the line from *natspec*:

```
1 +
2 - * @param newPassword The new password to set.
```