

# PublicAI: Web3 AI Data Infrastructure

Steven Wong, Zhen Li, Shuguang Cui

PublicAI.io

## Abstract

Artificial intelligence (AI) shows great potential to bring the 4th industrial revolution in human history. Deep learning is driving AI to improve its knowledge and recognition of the world, disrupting and advancing various fields. This includes enabling more accurate medical diagnoses, improving natural disaster response times, and creating more efficient transportation systems. However, to achieve all of this, deep learning AI applications require large-scale annotated datasets, which are then utilized for pretraining. For example, ChatGPT is trained on trillions of data points, which cost hundreds of millions of dollars for annotation and raw data structuring. PublicAI is a decentralized crowdsourcing marketplace focusing on AI data annotation. In general, training AI models requires large datasets that need to be structured and labeled. Structuring and labeling data is a labor-intensive manual process. Nowadays, AI researchers still rely on services provided by centralized platforms such as ScaleAI and MTurk. However, in the Web3 era, PublicAI leverages blockchain technology to deliver a trustless, permissionless, and cross-border labor market being strategically incentivized by crypto-economics and has instant cross-nation payment settlements. These features significantly reduce the cost of dataset annotations for AI companies and increase earnings for data annotators. The whitepaper illustrates the design principles and underlying mechanisms of implementation.

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
## 1. Introduction

In 1986, Geoffrey Hinton proposed the backpropagation approach [1] which became the foundational theory of deep learning. In general, deep learning approaches require structured data with manual annotations or labels to train the model. Once the deep learning model is trained using the labeled data, the trained model can recognize and classify totally new input information and make relevant predictions accordingly. Nowadays, all advanced AI models are based on deep learning theory, which requires large-scale structured and labeled data to train the algorithms. Thus, the AI data labeling industry is booming while also showing great promise to bring AI models to the level of and beyond human intelligence.

There are three steps necessary to create a deep learning based AI:

1. Create an AI algorithm.
2. Collect and label data manually.
3. Train the algorithm with the annotated data.

However, the second step poses the greatest barrier since it requires massive labor to structure or annotate data. Failing to provide the model with high-quality annotated data will affect its training, resulting in the AI producing low-quality results. This highlights the importance of providing the model with high-quality labeled data. The image in Figure 1 illustrates the procedure of AI data annotation.



**Figure 1:** Procedure of AI Data Labeling.

### 1.1. Self-Supervised and Reinforcement Learning

In recent years, many AI scientists have been trying to invent new approaches to replace fully supervised learning with self-supervised learning [2] and reinforcement learning [3], which could enable AI to learn from raw data without labels. However, those methods suffer from some limitations, and most of them only work in several special scenarios. For example, reinforcement learning is only effective in

solving strategic puzzles such as chess and computer games, and self-supervised learning only works for fundamental deep learning model pretraining [4] and shows no effectiveness in real-world applications.

## 1.2. Supervised Learning

In the field of supervised learning, researchers have focused on significantly improving the scale of labeled data and applying massive computations to train AI algorithms, resulting in breakthroughs that were previously unimaginable. For example, Alphafold2, proposed in [5], addresses the 50-year-old grand challenge in biology of protein folding. Alphafold2 is trained on a large-scale dataset called the Big Fantastic Database (BFD), which contains billions of protein structures. ESM-1b, proposed in [6], is a state-of-the-art protein language model that uses 250 million protein sequences to train the model and shows great performance in protein structure prediction. In 2022, OpenAI launched ChatGPT, achieving a milestone in the AI industry and increasing confidence in the development of general AI, as the performance of ChatGPT is nearly on par with that of humans. However an important fact behind this performance is that ChatGPT utilizes the DaVinci-003 model, which is trained on trillions of words. The estimated cost of annotating the data for ChatGPT is around 300 million dollars. Therefore, the AI data annotation industry will be a key sector in the AI revolution.

### Data Labeling Tasks are Labor Intensive


Most AI data labeling tasks can be completed by human labor with generic skill sets manually. For instance, ordinary people can easily label data for an image classification task to classify dogs or cats in images, as shown in Figure 2. However, deep learning approaches require large-scale labeled datasets for training, which means millions of animal images must be manually labeled as either a cat or a dog by humans. This is a labor-intensive task..

Image annotation tasks are the easiest work among all supervised AI labelling tasks. An example of this is point cloud segmentation, where a radar collects millions of points from the real world e.g., a street view, as shown in Figure 3 but the category of points themselves remain unknown. To train the deep learning model [7] to recognize the points, the raw street view image data needs to be labeled. The data labeling workers would give each point a label, e.g., point-cloud 1 belongs to the road, and that point cloud 2 belongs to the car. One 3D point cloud scan includes millions of points and one dataset contains millions of scans. Thus, one can get an idea of the humongous scale of the overall annotation work required to label these

<u>Image</u>	<u>Label</u>
	Cat
	Cat
	Dog
	Dog

**Figure 2:** Labeled data for image classification which can be utilized to train the AI algorithms. the last column is labeled data manually.

types of datasets. In conclusion, this work does not require high level industry skill set but rather a large number of workers to spend thousands of hours on annotation. Once the dataset is labeled, it could be utilized to train deep learning algorithms for various applications such as self-driving cars, machine vision, object recognition, and detection.



**Figure 3:** Labeled data for point cloud segmentation. The last image is the labeled data manually

### 1.3. The Middlemen in AI Data Annotation Market

Currently, there are two kinds of solutions to provide AI data labeling services.

The first category is labor-employ. These are centralized platforms that hire a massive number of workers who are trained in advance to label data, these workers aim to offer data annotation services to these companies and earn salaries. In this category, these workers usually have a long-term agreement with their employers

and receive fixed low salaries. e.g., Scale AI<sup>1</sup>. These labor-employ companies receive massive profits from AI research institutes and commercial companies, but distribute tiny incomes to the data labeling workers thus these companies act as a huge middleman.

The second category is on-demand crowdsourcing websites which allow AI companies to submit raw datasets with specific data labeling tasks with funds to the marketplace. Individual workers can log in to the website, check the marketplace to find tasks to annotate the raw dataset, complete the task and earn the division from the funds provided by the publisher. Conventionally, in such crowdsourcing platforms, workers are not required to sign long-term agreements with the website owners because it acts as an open marketplace. As workers complete more tasks, their earning increases accordingly. Therefore, AI companies allocate larger funds to get their raw data annotated faster since workers in these types of marketplaces prefer tasks that yield higher rewards. Amazon MTurk<sup>2</sup>, Appen<sup>3</sup>, and Fiverr<sup>4</sup> are the representative products in this category.

### **Exorbitant Commissions**

However, whether labor-employ or on-demand crowdsourcing platforms, both are based on centralized entities and charge massive commissions to act as the middlemen, which significantly increases the cost of AI data labeling and reduces the individual worker's income. Additionally, due to these huge commission fees, large-scale datasets suffer from high annotation costs, making it impossible for AI companies to annotate them on such centralized platforms. This hinders the AI research and development of the industry.

### **Cross-Border Payment Issue**

International payment issues limit the above-mentioned platform's growth to increase their workforce of data trainers worldwide which in turn limits their data annotation capacity and often bounds them to specific geographical locations.

The fiat payment system typically only works well in particular national regions; different countries use different payment systems and currencies, which presents an inherent barrier for cross-border payments. The lack of flawless international

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<sup>1</sup><https://scale.com>

<sup>2</sup><https://www.mturk.com>

<sup>3</sup><https://appen.com/>

<sup>4</sup><https://www.fiverr.com/>

payment settlement also hinders AI companies from accessing talent pools of data annotators present in different geographical locations around the world who are willing to complete the annotation tasks at a fraction of what they are currently spending. This inconsistency in data annotation costs across various regions of the world occurs because labor costs vary significantly among different countries.

More specifically, AI companies are mostly located in developed countries where labor costs are usually expensive. Meanwhile, there is a huge talented workforce of AI data workers in third-world countries that typically require lower costs due to their location in a poor economic environment. To access this existing talented labor pool without restrictions, an effective cross-border payment system is required. However, neither labor-employ nor crowdsourcing solutions can efficiently solve this problem since they only facilitate fiat payments. While labor-employ companies focus on hiring workers with agreements to offer data labeling services, this method is infeasible for crowdsourcing platforms that involve part-time micro-workers with different fiat payment systems. Due to these reasons centralized crowdsourcing platforms such as Amazon MTurk currently only allow workers from 25 countries to join their workforce only supporting fiat payments to US bank cardholders. The rest of their workforce receives compensation in the form of Amazon gift cards.

### **Centralized Trust Issue**

The current solutions rely on a centralized trust system between the AI companies and data labeling workers, which can be fragile, especially in cross-border conditions with a distributed workforce. The platform can shut down at any time, and the commission terms can be modified by the platform owner's will. The traditional legal system fails to protect the rights and interests of cross-border workers. Therefore it is difficult to establish trust between AI data labeling workers and the data annotation middlemen.

## **1.4. Cryptocurrency, Smart Contract, and DAO**

In 2008, Satoshi realized that a fully decentralized system with miners would provide the first game-changing breakthrough for traditional finance, and purposed the Bitcoin whitepaper [8]. Utilizing blockchain technology it enabled the world's first decentralized cryptocurrency called Bitcoin. In 2014, Ethereum was proposed [9], introducing a new technology called Smart Contracts. Bitcoin only facilitates transactions of the Bitcoin cryptocurrency. Smart contracts are intended to build upon this technology to enable cryptocurrency to facilitate logic-based applications. With blockchain decentralized EVM (Ethereum Virtual Machine), developers can build



decentralized applications (Dapps) that could form the basis of the next-generation web (Web3). These Smart contracts allow for the development of self-executing applications that are transparent and decentralized. This means that various Web2 companies that charge huge fees for providing a platform could be just developed as a self-executing Dapp on the blockchain. Since the Dapp code is present and executed on the blockchain, it makes decentralized governance possible, further reducing the necessity of Web2 companies. These centralized companies and institutes can now be replaced by decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) which are a set of decentralized smart contracts deployed on the blockchain and gives web service participants rights to share incomes from the treasury of the DAO and becomes involved DAO's governance by voting. The Web3 protocol functions with the same effect as DAO but with more generic options.

## 2. PublicAI

In this section, we introduce PublicAI as a solution that utilizes blockchain and smart contracts to address all the above-mentioned issues. PublicAI aims to create a Train-to-Earn (T2E) platform that leverages the global workforce to crowdsource AI data labeling tasks to advance model training and R&D of AI companies.


### 2.1. Vision

PublicAI is to create an open, transparent, and efficient ecosystem that improves data annotation quality and reduces costs for AI companies. By bringing the Web3 creator economy to AI, it enables annotators to share in the AI model's revenue collectively. PublicAI will empower workers from around the world, providing employment opportunities for the third world countries and alleviating global poverty.

### 2.2. Participant Coordination

There are four types of participants involved in the PublicAI workflow for AI data labeling which are **Trainers**, **Validators**, **Fishers**, and **Publishers** as shown in Figure4.

- **Trainer** or trainer is the annotation worker who chooses labeling tasks and provides annotation services for unlabeled raw AI data. This is the most important role in the ecosystem. The marker reads the annotation guide



**Figure 4:** Participants behaviors with 4 roles: Trainer, Validator, Fisher, and Publisher.

carefully and performs the labeling work. If an incorrect annotation task is verified by Validators, the Trainer's reputation score will be slashed.

- **Validator** can be the same group of people as Trainers who choose to perform verification tasks for marker's completed tasks to determine their quality by classifying them as accepted or rejected. Both Trainers and Validators are supervised by the third role - Fisher.
- **Fisher** is a senior member of the DAO who serves as an expert in AI data annotation works and has a deep understanding of data annotation principles. Once the verification is completed by the validators, an AI model will be used to select a set of assignments completed by markers for Fisher verification. If the verification is rejected by the Fisher, the corresponding Trainer's and Validator's reputation scores will be reduced. Otherwise, the annotations will be delivered to the Publisher for the final check.
- **Publisher** is the data labeling job creator who usually is an AI R&D company or research institute. The publisher provides the raw data with funds to PublicAI for annotation. Once labelled, the labeled data will be used will be used to train AI algorithms such as ChatGPT, injecting knowledge from the data into the model and improve the performance.

### 2.2.1. Reputation Score System

PublicAI uses a reputation score system to evaluate the performance of Trainers, Validators, and Fishers. This score increases when their data labeling delivery is

accepted by the Publisher. The Trainer and Validator's scores are slashed when their outputs are rejected by Fishers or the Publisher. Only the Publisher can cause the slashing of the Fisher's reputation score when their delivery is rejected. The highest reputation score attainable is 1000; if it drops below 0, workers cannot take any tasks from the Publisher. The initial reputation score is 500 for the users who pass the LST (Labeling Standard Test).

### 2.2.2. Decentralized Identity and LST

Users joining PublicAI wishing to become either Trainers, Validators or both, are required to take the LST (Labeling Standard Test) to become eligible to start working on an AI data annotation tasks. The test will examine the user's fundamental skills for various data annotation jobs as follows:

- **Languages Annotation Test**, which includes Sequence Labeling, Text Summary, Question Answer Matching, etc.
- **Image Annotation Test**, which includes Object Detection, Segmentation, Caption, etc.
- **Medical Annotation Test**, which includes Medical Knowledge Understanding, Lesion Classification and Detection, Medical Data Tools, etc.
- **3D Data Annotation Test**, which includes Point Cloud Detection, Segmentation, Caption. Point Cloud Tools, etc.

Once the user passes in a test, the system will transfer an SBT (soul-bound token) to that user's address as a certificate or a DID (decentralized identity) which grants access to the user to take on eligible annotation/verification tasks. If a user passes all of the above tests, they can apply to become a Fisher on the DAO panel to play a crucial role in the quality assurance of annotations.

### 2.3. Payment Mechanisms

Publishers can create AI data annotation jobs and make payments to the PublicAI smart contract. PublicAI accepts two kinds of payments: cryptocurrency and fiat. Cryptocurrency payments can be made in **\$USDK**, a stable-like token, is issued as collateral from the income of PublicAI protocol with real-world business orders.

However, there are still AI companies that act as Publishers but do not accept cryptocurrency payments and prefer to use fiat currency in their business. To address


this issue, we have Trainer Agents, which facilitate the conversion of fiat currency to cryptocurrency.

## Trainer Agent

Trainer Agents are the centralized companies who act as AI data labeling service providers. Trainer Agent takes tasks from the AI companies and research institutes with fiat payment and creates corresponding labeling jobs on PublicAI with crypto payment. Therefore, the Trainer Agent acts as a middleman between fiat paying Publishers and PublicAI.

## 3. Technical Implementation

In this section, we will introduce the technical implementation of PublicAI, which consists of three parts: the decentralized workflow engine (DWE), the Upgradeable Dapp structure, and AI Assisted data labelling. Figure 5 provides an overview of the architecture of PublicAI's technical design.




**Figure 5:** Architecture Overview

### 3.1. Decentralized Workflow Engine (DWE)

PublicAI is a decentralized crowdsourcing platform for AI dataset annotation based on blockchain, which can be implemented with a decentralized smart contract platform for task distribution. These tasks are the discrete units of composition, and the units are transferred between different roles for approval and are finally completed and settled.

The implementation will focus on the design of a task-based decentralized workflow. We deliver a decentralized workflow engine (DWE) in the whitepaper which consists of smart contracts with related DAO governance functionalities.

As shown in Figure 6, there are three layers in the DWE: The Network Layer, The Workflow Layer, and The Blockchain Layer.



**Figure 6:** 3 layers of Decentralized Workflow Engine.

- **Network Layer** is constructed with a P2P infrastructure with a certificate authority that issues keys to participating actors.
- **Blockchain Layer** includes transaction services, block services, and mining services, and is implemented on top of the P2P layer. These services appear on all proof-of-work blockchains. The transaction service manages the pool of pending transactions that are created by the local workflow service or received from inbound message handlers and verified upon receipt.
- **Workflow Layer** consists of a workflow engine and a worklist handler with a user interface, implemented on top of the blockchain layer. When a transition is enabled, the workflow engine on the node to which it is assigned

creates a work item and populates its input values from the current values of the workflow instance. The work item is then added to the local worklist. After a work item is executed (manually or through an external application call), the output values are written back to the workflow instance. Data constraints can be specified for each activity, and these constraints are checked as part of the transaction validation performed by the transaction and block services. After the work item is completed, the local workflow engine submits the corresponding workflow transaction to the blockchain.


CovenantSQL is partially adopted to store the user information which is a decentralized blockchain SQL database. DWE receives HTTP RESTful API requests from users on the front end. The requests can be classified as login, registration, user information management, task creation, task submission, role permissions, payment, etc. Particularly, there is corresponding permission management for the APIs which acts as the security assurance for the whole system. DWE interacts with the decentralized database CovenantSQL and the corresponding blockchain contracts.

### **Segmented Tasks Distribution Mechanism**

Publishers launch the whole dataset as one task PublicAI and determine the split size which is used to split the whole task into multiple small assignments with equal size. The related users such as Trainer, Validator, and Fisher work on appropriate sizes assignment instead of the whole dataset. Assignments are the smallest indivisible units that can be processed by the DWE. The assignments will be distributed to the mark pool and reviewed by quality inspectors and spot checkers assignment-wisely.

### **Role Based Access Control**

In the workflow, there is a corresponding role processing along with assignment states. The role management is based on the RBAC (Role-based access control) permission model, as shown in the Figure 7.




**Figure 7:** Overview of RBAC Model.

The role indicates a collection of permissions, and the set of permissions of the role can have an intersection. Permissions can be classified into read-only, write-only, and other resource operation permissions. Once a user is assigned to a particular role, the operating privileges are limited to a specific range of operating resources. In the RBAC model, a user could be assigned multiple roles, but the principle is the same - essentially a concatenation of sets of role permissions.

RBAC model grants the users the exact access rights required by their roles. The governance panel of DAO can easily update permissions for specific roles.

### 3.2. Upgradeable Dapp Implementation

We have designed an upgradeable Dapp architecture to make the PublicAI decentralized system highly scalable. The proxy contract architecture is the key to implementing it. Specifically, the transactions sent by users can be forwarded to different versions of PublicAI contracts through the proxy contract. Since the smart contracts on the blockchain are immutable, the requests could use the proxy contract to redirect to the specific implementation version address for the smart contracts. Therefore, a flexible contract upgrade mechanism can be achieved. Through the operations of the proxy contract, the context of the data state is shared between different versions, so there is no need to do data migration, which is equivalent to achieving a seamless and smooth smart contract upgrade.



**Figure 8:** Upgradable Decentralized Application Architecture.

## Multi-Chain Structure


The smart contract of PublicAI will be implemented in various languages. e.g., Solidity, Golang, Rust, link, Move, and deployed on multiple public blockchains. The marketplace data is shared among multiple blockchains, and the payment and transactions will be conducted on different chains with cross-chain bridges. For instance, the Publisher and Trainer could make the deal in the marketplace of PublicAI, although their wallets are on different blockchains. Therefore, cross-chain bridges will be applied to facilitate interaction of transactions from different blockchains.

The first version of PublicAI will be implemented in solidity and will support the ETH mainnet and other evm-compatible layer-1 and layer-2 blockchains.

## Task Manager

Task Manager will be implemented by smart contracts. Our task manager is a contract program that manages the lifecycle of AI data annotation tasks. The lifecycle of a task includes creation as well as completion and destruction. If we were to understand tasks as processes within an operating system, then the task manager would resemble an operating system's process manager. The contract responsible for managing the tasks is illustrated in the diagram below:





**Figure 9:** Minimal Core Contract Architecture

As you can see, the Task Manager in figure 9, the first parent contract ensures that Manager’s owner can transfer ownership. The second parent contract ensures that the Manager contract is upgradeable. Additionally, the Task contract inherits a ReentrancyGuard parent contract for added security, as the Task contract will eventually be involved in the on-chain settlement of Trainers. The ReentrancyGuard contract helps prevent reentrant attacks on the contract.

So, what is the relationship between the Task Manager and the Task contract? Actually, it can be understood like this, if we consider the Task contract as a process in the operating system, then the Task Manager acts as a process manager. The Manager is responsible for the life cycle of all Tasks, including the creation, deletion, submission, and tracking of certain metadata. This metadata includes the Task ID, the wallet address of the associated Trainer, and the hash-based URL address of the Task’s associated dataset packet storage.

### 3.3. AI-Assisted data labelling

Although AI learning requires labeled data, similar to AI empowering other industries, we could also adopt AI to facilitate and accelerate the data labeling process in PublicAI. PublicAI’s AI assisted data labelling is illustrated in the following two subsections:

#### AI-assisted Spot Check

As mentioned earlier, a Fisher is responsible for spot checking and inspecting low-quality annotations labeled by poorly-performing Trainers. However, spot checks do not mean that every assignment will be verified by a Fisher. Only a small proportion

of assignments by Trainers will be selected and verified by a Fisher. The traditional sampling approaches for spot check mainly focus on probability models e.g., a normal distribution that is straightforward and rough with low efficiency. In PublicAI, we have designed deep learning models to learn from paired data, which is formed by a triple array (Trainer, Assignment, Quality). This paired data IS collected from the historical records of PublicAI operations. Once the paired data forms a large scale, the designed deep learning model can be trained using the collected paired data and automatically grade the assignments with quality scores for Fisher Spot Checks. Specifically,  $M_i$  denotes the  $i$ -th Trainer, and  $A_i$  denotes the assignment annotated by Trainer  $M_i$ . The scoring model is  $E$ , and we have the quality score  $S_i$  for assignment  $A_i$  which can be calculated in Equation. 3.3.


$$S_i = E(A_i)$$

Once all quality scores are calculated, the assignments with low scores will be selected for Fisher Spot Checks. Therefore, by adopting deep learning models we significantly improve the hit rate for Fisher and ensure that low quality assignments are sent for spot checks thus increasing the overall quality of the labelled data.

### AI-assisted Data Labeling Tools

Data labeling is a complex and labor-intensive task, and one of the most critical components of the supervised learning pipeline. It is one such task that requires a lot of manual effort. It is a highly mundane, labor-intensive & time-consuming effort. In order to alleviate this challenge, we propose an approach that leverages machine learning to automate a bulk of the labeling process, minimizing the need for human intervention.

Specifically, we will train multi-task models in computer vision and natural language processing to accelerate the labeling process. For example, in an object labeling task, the AI-assisted data labeling tool would automatically recognize most of the cars in Figure 10 with only a few misses requiring manual labeling by human workers.



**Figure 10:** Pre-Labeled results of AI-assisted data labeling tool.

Therefore, PublicAI's AI-assisted Data Labeling Tool would significantly improve the efficiency of the AI Data Labeling industry by reducing the cost beared by Publishers for AI data annotation, expediting the time spent on AI data annotation and lastly, increasing the earnings for data annotators since workers can perform more annotations in given time.

## 4. Tokenomics

As shown in Section 2.2, four roles participate in the AI data labeling works by applying the DAO protocol and are incentivized by strategic tokenomics. For Trainer, the Trainer takes out the data package from the Mark pool, after labeling, and sends it to the quality inspector Validator. If Validator finds that there is a problem with the quality and calls back to Trainer, Trainer's Token will be calculated to do a pre-deduction according to the number of problematic data, but this pre-deduction is not a deduction. It is just similar to a record. When the final project is completed, the final deduction is made and the reputation value is reduced, which is designed to avoid excessive power of the Validator. On the contrary, Trainer gets paid for his work and a certain amount of platform tokens and reputation value.

The Validator role, its main responsibility is to conduct a comprehensive quality check on each marked packet, so its responsibility is also relatively heavy, if the packet it passes the test is found to be faulty by Fisher, the random checker behind, then the packet is sent back to the Trainer and the Validator is punished, but this time, the Trainer is not punished. This time, the Trainer is not punished, but also

to reduce the disadvantages to the Trainer, for maximum fairness, because imagine, if the Trainer is punished, then with the quality check the more hurdles, in fact, the more unfair to the Trainer, which is a chain of responsibility model.

The role of Fisher, its main responsibility is to selectively sample packets that have been vetted by Validator, and its reward and punishment mechanism is the same as Validators. If Fisher finds a faulty packet, he will punish Validator, but if the packet passes the sampling, he will not reward Validator, which is to prevent Fisher and Validator from colluding with each other to gather wealth. This chain of responsibility rewards, all only the final acceptance through, rewards and penalties will be executed, the latter role checks out the problem, will only punish the previous role.


For the Publisher, to ensure as fair as possible, there is only a corresponding token punishment mechanism, no reward mechanism, after all, the Publisher is equivalent to the role of an employer, it has the final decision and the employed personnel is a strong group. Once Publisher's acceptance is passed, then all the roles in the chain of responsibilities involved in this one task will be rewarded, but once Publisher refuses to pass and puts the task into Fix Pool, Trainer raises objections to the community platform, and if the ruling is passed, then Publisher is punished, and if it is passed, Publisher's If the ruling is passed, the Publisher's reputation value will increase, but there will be no corresponding token reward. If the ruling is passed, the publisher's reputation will increase, but there will be no token reward.

For the rewards, we use the principle of proof of fraud in Optimistic Rollup, leaving a window of time for locking the reward funds, during which any character can object to the result of the task. This is to prevent fraud with the highest probability possible. After the window has expired, the reward will be paid. The final settlement is completed.

#### 4.1. Token Fundamentals

In the PublicAI system, the Tensor token (TSR) is the native utility token of the PublicAI ecosystem, designed to serve multiple purposes and create a robust token economy. Users can spend and earn **\$TSR** through various platform activities, incentivizing participation and ensuring a healthy circulation of tokens. Payments for main quests on PublicAI are made in **\$USDK**, a stable-like token, is issued as collateral from the income of PublicAI protocol with real-world business orders, while payments for the Dugneon mode are paid in **\$TSR**. Publishers can pay in either **\$USDK** or fiats. Typical PublicAI payment flows looks below:

As illustrated in the graph, payments in fiats will be converted to **\$USDK** by decentralized Trainer Agent services for smart contract executions and on-chain



**Figure 11:** PublicAI Payment Flows

payments for main quests on the platform. However, the commissions from task facilitation will be used to give to the ecosystem participants and boost **\$TSR** price. Payments for quests in the Dungeon mode will be made in **\$TSR**.

Processes/mechanisms involving **\$TSR** payments include:

- **Certificate fees:** To access special earning boosts and privileges, workers must pass tests and have their skills verified, which requires a unique certificate. Users can obtain these certificates by paying the associated fees in **\$TSR**.
- **Upgrade fees:** As users accumulate reputation scores and obtain items to increase their future income and ecosystem rights, they may need to upgrade or mint these items. To do so, users must spend **\$TSR**.
- **Lottery fees:** Upon completing tasks in Dungeon mode, workers can participate in lotteries for additional rewards or items. Users must spend **\$TSR** to enter the lotteries. Lottery winners receive **\$veTSR**, which remains staked for 5 years, and can be used to vote, invite, or invest in others during that time to generate extra income.
- **Governance:** **\$TSR** token holders can participate in the DAO governing system, where they can propose, vote on, and influence decisions related to the platform's development and policies.
- **Backing and Investments:** Users can vote for other users or guilds with their **\$veTSR**, increasing the income of those they support while also earning income based on the amount of work completed by the backed parties.
- **Incentives for Workers:** Workers can earn extra **\$TSR** rewards when they complete tasks for guilds backed by stakers who have staked their **\$TSR** to-

kens to obtain **\$veTSR** and cast their votes. High-quality work by the workers leads to additional rewards for both the workers and the stakers backing them.

- **Incentives for Stakers:** Stakers who stake **\$TSR** to get **\$veTSR** can back guilds and workers, thus earning rewards for their contributions. When workers perform high-quality work, stakers also receive extra rewards. However, if a worker's output is of poor quality and rejected, the staker's profits may be slashed.
- **Incentives for Publishers:** Publishers benefit from the staking mechanism, as their published tasks receive backing from the stakers. This provides additional assurance to the workers and contributes to the overall stability and trustworthiness of the platform
- **Enhanced Security:** **\$TSR** is a secure cryptocurrency built on blockchain technology, offering participants on the PublicAI DAO platform enhanced security. By using **\$TSR**, participants can benefit from the platform's secure and decentralized nature, reducing the risk of fraud and hacking.

## 4.2. Staking

Staking is an essential part of the ecosystem to give the right incentives to all participants in PublicAI.

### 4.2.1. $ve(3,3,3)$

PublicAI implements an innovative design,  $ve(3,3,3)$ , in the staking system.  $ve(3,3,3)$  stands for "vote escrow (3,3,3)", where (3,3,3) is the result that all participants achieve the most favorable outcome, and "vote escrow" refers to the votes obtained through staking. Unlike the Prisoner's Dilemma game, this designed scenario is structured to incentivize participants to contribute and cooperate, maximizing the collective benefits for all involved.

The following graphs demonstrate the optimal actions for workers, stakers, and publishers.

	Stakers	
	Back Marker	Not Back Marker
	(3,3)	(2,0)
Marker	Works Diligently	(2,0)
	Not Works Diligently	(0,0)

**Figure 12:**  $ve(3,3,3)$  Part I

	Publisher	
	Publishes on DAO	Publishes Elsewhere
Marker	Works Diligently	(3,3)
	Not Works Diligently	(1,1)
		(0,2)

**Figure 13:**  $ve(3,3,3)$  Part II

	Publisher	
	Publishes on DAO	Publishes Elsewhere
Stakers	Back Marker	(3,3)
	Not Back Marker	(0,2)
		(0,2)

**Figure 14:**  $ve(3,3,3)$  Part III

For stakers, the ideal choice is to try to back guilds with the best workers, which will provide both them and the workers the extra rewards. For publishers, they would be best off publishing tasks on PublicAI, as the DAO system provides the widest access to workers but with the bare minimum of fees. Besides, stakers' backing also greatly reduces the cost of redundancy, where multiple trainers may need to label the same tasks for quality assurance. Furthermore, the workers would be best off work diligently to ensure task completion, as their consistency and efficiency would provide them more income for the same amount of tasks.

#### 4.2.2. Stake Tokens

Staking plays a crucial role in the PublicAI ecosystem, allowing users to earn income from inviting and backing new users. When users stake **\$TSR**, they receive **\$veTSR**, which could be used in:

**Inviting Mode:** New users must complete tasks in Dungeon mode to obtain **\$veTSR** before they can access more lucrative tasks in the main quest mode. However, existing users can invite new users to the main quests by directly backing them with **veTSR**. This allows both the backer and the new worker to earn additional income.

**Governance:** Users need **\$veTSR** to vote on committee and treasury actions, ensuring that active and invested participants in the platform's direction.

**Backing others:** Users can vote for other users or guilds with their **\$veTSR**, increasing the income of those they support while also earning income based on the amount of work completed by the backed parties.

In addition to **\$veTSR**, users can also participate in liquidity staking, which involves providing liquidity for exchanges and lending in exchange for **\$TSR** related LP tokens, further contributing to the platform's stability and growth. By incorporating staking and its various applications, PublicAI creates incentives for users to actively

contribute to the ecosystem and support one another's success.

#### 4.2.3. Yields

By staking **\$TSR**, users can enjoy multiple benefits. First, **\$TSR** block rewards are available for the first 5 years for stakers. The **\$TSR** release schedule is listed below, where  $y$  is the amount of **\$TSR** rewards to be released.




Figure 15: TSR Releasing Schedule

In addition to **\$TSR** block rewards, stakers will also earn a portion ( $> 50\%$ ) of the platform's total revenue by backing great workers. Workers who have lots of backers will also likely earn more. The exact earnings will depend on the staking duration and the total staking amount, as well as the RG PoS system (Reputation Guided Proof of Stake).


To join the staking system, stakers back markers using **\$TSR**. Workers have reputation scores, which are a reference for the quality and amount of their work. Workers gain a reputation for completed data labeling tasks but lose it if their work is rejected by publishers. Trainers with more backers and completed work earn more rewards, while backers with the most backed workers have a higher probability of earning rewards. Dilution occurs if too many backers are backing the same workers. Rewards are calculated based on RG POS, and if workers fail jobs, backers' profits are reduced.

In the RG PoS system, when stakers back the same workers, the earnings will depend on staking duration. For instance, if the base annual percentage yield (APY) is  $x$ , stakers who stake for 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, and 12 months will earn  $1x$ ,  $1.2x$ ,  $1.3x$ , and  $1.5x$  of APY, respectively. However, it is important to note that stakers who unstake early will forfeit their earned stakes.



#### 4.2.4. Ever-Protected Stakes

TSR prides itself on providing one of the most innovative and robust staking protection mechanisms in the market. Unlike other tokens where stakers do not get any compensation when the token's value declines, **\$TSR** give back to loyal stakers by taxing premature unstakers or people who leave early.



**Figure 16:** Ever-Protected Staking

For example, when a user chooses to unstake his/her **\$TSR** before the stakes mature, the system would automatically collect the forfeited **\$TSR** rewards and allocate it to the treasury. The treasury will then use the fund to give back to the community or burn.

Another key component of the protection mechanism comes from the unstakers profits, which would provide an additional layer of protection to stakers, ensuring

that they are not subjected to significant losses due to market volatility. This mechanism, coupled with the staking yields, makes **\$TSR** a compelling investment opportunity for those seeking to participate in the decentralized microtask platform ecosystem.

#### 4.2.5. Perpetual Earnings

Long-term supporters are the core of the PublicAI community. To encourage stakers to stay with PublicAI, anyone who withdraws their rewards immediately after they are incurred will face a 40% tax on their total equivalent USD profits. Half of the taxed amount will be burned, while the other half will be distributed to the treasury to give back to the current stakers and holders, providing them with strong protection against any losses and rewarding their loyalty.

However, stakers who stake their earned rewards again will enjoy tax-free earnings after 6 months and be rewarded with additional rewards depending on their staking duration. This mechanism is designed to encourage stakers to stay invested for the long term and further strengthen the stability and security of the **\$TSR** ecosystem.

### 4.3. Service Mode

Two service modes are designed in PublicAI for Publishers to release the AI data labeling jobs which are Marketplace and PublicAI Pro.

#### Marketplace

In Marketplace mode, the Publisher releases the jobs with payment on the smart contract but PublicAI cannot guarantee the time costs or how many days and months that are required since it is full market behavior. For instance, the Publisher raises the rewards higher which could attract more Trainers comes to take the tasks, otherwise, fewer Trainers are interested. Thus, it is a fully open market operation and the platform does not have a specific date of delivery which is only determined by the market.

#### PublicAI Pro

In the pro mode, the DAO committee will arrange a dedicated service team to work for the Publishers with the AI data labeling jobs and provide guidance for them. In

this mode, the Publisher could ‘create jobs and forget’. The service team will help Publisher to supervise the data labeling progress to guarantee the delivery on time. The corresponding premium will be paid by Publisher to incentive the service team, thus this mode could be more expensive than the Marketplace mode.

#### 4.4. Governance

The **\$TSR** token is also adopted as a governance token as the certificate to join the DAO events on the governance panel. In order to cast votes, **\$TSR** holders need first stake **\$TSR** to obtain **\$veTSR**, which stands for vote escrow **\$TSR** and counts as the actual votes. The number of **\$veTSR** obtained from staking 1 **\$veTSR** is directly correlated with staking period (in years), with the maximum number being 4 and the minimum number being 0.25. People with **\$veTSR** can vote in the DAO events. The DAO events can be classified into the following categories.

- **Appeal Proposal** can be raised by any role in PublicAI to claim the disputes between the others. For instance, Trainer works for the data labeling loyally whose outputs are also verified by Validator and Fisher, but still rejected by Publisher. The Trainer could raise an Appeal Proposal to claim the facts for judgment by the community. Once the Appeal Proposal got accepted, the Publisher payment in the smart contract will be automatically transferred to the corresponding users.
- **Upgrade Proposal** is raised for improving and upgrading the platform from different points such as security, multi-chain supports, UI/UX improvement.
- **Maintenance Proposal** aims to fix the bugs and defects of the DAO implementation. It could be technical or non-technical such as document improvement and correction.
- **Generic Proposal** fits other motivations which not belong to the above categories.

The treasury will be utilized to support DAO events in terms of any economic costs.

## 5. Conclusion

The AI industry’s requirement for data labelling service is ever-growing with high demand and fewer options to meet the requirement. In this white paper PublicAI

illustrated its plan to systematically drive innovation in the AI data labelling sector to eventually become the forefront platform in AI data labelling in the industry. Firstly, PublicAI proposes to leverage crypto payments which enables it to expand its data labelling workforce to a global level thus increasing its capacity for labelling data on a global scale, something which current data labelling platforms are struggling with. By implementing the Reputation score system, DiD and LST builds a robust system of an effective workforce that guarantees a high quality labeled data standard for AI companies. The Decentralised Workflow Engine (DWE), Upgradeable App infrastructure coupled with the PublicAI governance ensures that PublicAI is a platform that is always ready to adapt according to industry requirements. All of this makes PublicAI the number one platform for AI companies to label their data.

The unique AI-assisted sampling mechanism is a novel mechanism that trains itself on its own previously labelled data to pre-mark new data sets, this is intended to reduce the time for PublicAI markers to label data, validators, and fishers to validate the labels and publishers to receive their order, thus decreasing the time taken and increasing economic efficiency for each order on the PublicAI platform. Lastly, by proposing the protocol native utility token \$TSR, PublicAI intends to revolutionize the entire data labeling industry. \$TSR acts as the unit of payment and settlement for parties in the ecosystem while also acting as the governance token when staked. \$TSR enables 25% reductions in cost borne by AI companies to label their data and 60% increase in revenue by the PublicAI workforce. \$TSR 5-year staking offers a lucrative opportunity for 3rd party participants to buy the token and stake it for high returns. With its one of a kind “Loss adjustment algorithms” it penalizes early un-stakers, provides additional rewards to long-term stakers to break even in case of loss suffered by market fluctuations and lastly provides stakers with 50% revenues generated by the protocol depending upon the stake duration. To conclude, by leveraging blockchain, decentralization, and novel token economics PublicAI provides the AI industry with an extremely efficient, highly scalable, and economically lucrative platform for AI data labelling services. A platform that is designed to take a lead, direct the majority, and achieve a conglomerate monopoly in the AI data labeling industry.

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