Technical Report
Evaluating delays faced by users in large scale settings using GoogleDocs and MUTE

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1 Measurement

[1, 2, 3, 6] measures:

- How much A [1] send, what is payoff of A

- How much B send back, what is the proportion, what is payoff of B

They calculate mean and standard deviation for each value then compare.

[4] measures the percentage of reward between users.

[5], which is very close, measure the proportion of sending and sending back, average earning and hazard percentage (i.e, the receiver "betrays" the sender)

References

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[1] A: sender, B: receiver

[3] Cox, James C. "How to identify trust and reciprocity." Games and economic behavior 46, no. 2 (2004): 260-281.

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