EECS 388: Lab 3

Padding Oracle Attack Bleichenbacher Attack

Current Assignments


Reminder: Canvas quizzes due the day before the next lecture

- Project 1 Part 2 due Thursday, September 19 at 6 p.m.
 - Padding Oracle Attack
 - Bleichenbacher Attack (RSA signature forgery)

Padding Oracle Attack

Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) + MAC-then-Encrypt

- Last block uses padding to fit the block size
- Notoriously hard to implement correctly
- Vulnerable to Padding Oracle Attack
 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O5SeQxErXA4



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode encryption

Padding

- What if our message is not a multiple of the block size?
- Allows us to use CBC without ambiguity in the resulting message

FF

01

78

9A

PKCS #7

2A

XX	01						
XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	02	02



XX	07	07	07	07	07	07	07
08	08	08	08	08	08	08	08

XOR Properties


- \bullet $A \oplus A = 0$
- A ⊕ 0 = A
- $\bullet \quad \mathsf{A} \oplus \mathsf{B} = \mathsf{B} \oplus \mathsf{A}$
- If A ⊕ B = C,
 then C ⊕ B = A
 and C ⊕ A = B

XOR truth table

Inp	out	Output		
A	В	Output		
0	0	0		
0	1	1		
1	0	1		
1	1	0		

Padding Oracle Attack!


- You are Mallory and you've just intercepted an encrypted message from Alice to Bob. You know that Alice used CBC.
- Bob's server will tell you whether or not the padding was correct



Padding Oracle Attack!

- Mallory can modify the ciphertext and get feedback from Bob
- Assume Bob is using AES with PKCS #7 padding
 - Last block is padded with the number of padding bytes (R, E, A, L, S, T, U, F, F, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7)
- What can Mallory do with this?


Plaintext




Plaintext

Plaintext


- Mallory initially only knows the ciphertext
- Mallory is able to query Bob to incrementally decrypt the ciphertext




- Mallory initially only knows the ciphertext
- Mallory is able to query Bob to incrementally decrypt the ciphertext




Alice's Encryption




Alice's Encryption (cont.)




Alice's Encryption (cont.)




- Mallory initially only knows the ciphertext
- Mallory is able to query Bob to incrementally decrypt the ciphertext





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






Bob's Decryption


















Bob's Decryption (cont.)


Ciphertext`

Ciphertext


ED 85 6E F4 70 26 C6 AC 7B 2E 6A 00 91 0D 2D 5B




- Mallory initially only knows the ciphertext
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


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






Mallory's Attack





Mallory's Attack (cont.)






















































ED|85|6E|F4|70|26|C6|AC|7B|2E|6A|00|91|0D|2D|5B




Padding Valid

$$C12' = 0x02$$

$$P16' = 0x01$$

$$D16 = 0x02 \oplus 0x01$$

$$D16 = 0x03$$



Secret Plaintext

47 6F 20 42


6C|75|65|20

21 03 03 03

XOR

P16

ED|85|6E|F4|70|26|C6|AC|7B|2E|6A|00|91|0D|2D|5B




Padding Valid


$$C12' = 0x02$$

$$P16' = 0x01$$

$$D16 = 0x02 \oplus 0x01$$

$$D16 = 0x03$$






XOR

P16

Secret Plaintext

ED|85|6E|F4|70|26|C6|AC|7B|2E|6A|00|91|0D|2D|5B



Padding Valid

$$C12' = 0x02$$

$$P16' = 0x01$$

$$D16 = 0x02 \oplus 0x01$$


$$D16 = 0x03$$


Ciphertext Ciphertext Ciphertext C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 C15 C16 C5 C6 C7 70|26|C6|AC 7B|2E|6A|00 91 0D 2D 5B **Block** Block Block Key → Key → Cipher Cipher Key → Cipher Decryption Decryption Decryption D10 D11 D12 D13 D14 D15 D16 D6 ??|??|03 ??|?? ??| **XOR XOR XOR** P6 P7 P8 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 ??|??| ??|??|??|?? ??|??|??|03 **Plaintext Plaintext Plaintext** 6C|75|65|20


Secret Plaintext


47 6F 20 42


21 03 03 03



















































Tricky Edge Cases

What if one of the blocks of Plaintext is



?

When the last byte is 0x01 OR 0x02, the block can have valid padding!


ED 85 02 01


ED 85 02 02


Other edge cases as well, imagine:

ED 03 03 01

ED 03 03 03







Project Differences

- 16 byte blocks (4 byte blocks in this example)
- MAC appended to plaintext before padding and block encryption
- New error message from server: Invalid Mac
 - Padding is correct, but the MAC is not valid for the message

Another Edge Case

Plaintext looks like this



|47|6F|20|42|

6C 75 65 20

21 03 03 03

How will the server respond to the bottom case?

6C 75 65 20

21 03 03 01

6C 75 65 20

21 03 02 02




|47|6F|20|42|

6C 75 65 20

21 03 03 03

Bleichenbacher Attack (RSA Signature Forgery)

Textbook RSA Signatures





message that was signed


See the guts of your own key:

- \$ openssl genrsa -out private key 4096
- \$ openssl rsa -in private.key -pubout -out public.key
- \$ openssl rsa -in private.key -text -noout
- \$ openssl rsa -in public.key -pubin -text -noout

generate private ...and public key print private ...and public key info

Textbook RSA Signatures

 Our good friends Alice and Bob want to communicate with sender authenticity using RSA



Public: (e, N)
Private: d

Message: *m*

Signature: $s = m^d \mod N$

Verify: $s^e \mod N == m$

A Problem With Textbook RSA


- It's really easy for Mallory to generate a valid (m, s) pair
- Instead of starting with m and generating s, they start with s and generate m:

$$m = s^e \mod N$$

- Fix: Instead of signing **m**, we sign **PKCS-PAD(m)**
 - The output of PKCS-PAD follows a very specific format
 - It's infeasible for Mallory to find a value of **s** such that **s**^e **mod N** will follow this format
 - The PKCS-PAD digest will be the same length for any message

Bleichenbacher Attack: Vulnerability 1

So what's Bleichenbacher got to do with it?



If e is small enough, we can forge a signature that Bob will verify is correct without needing to know Alice's private key. How?

Public: (e, N)
Private: d

Message: *m*

Signature: $s = (PKCS-PAD(m))^d \mod N$ Verify: $s^e_{\uparrow} \mod N = PKCS-PAD(m)$

What if e is really small, like, 3?

Bleichenbacher Attack: Vulnerability 2

How <u>should</u> a secure bank's operations work?



$$s = (PKCS-PAD(m))^d \mod N$$



- 1. Admin sends the bank's server the (m, s) pair
- 2. Bank recreates the PKCS-PAD(m) using what Admin sent: x = PKCS-PAD(m)
- 3. Bank raises **s** to Admin's public exponent **e**: **y** = **s**^e **mod N**
- 4. If **x** == **y**, Admin is authenticated

Bleichenbacher Attack: Vulnerability 2

How do the bank's operations actually work?



$$s = (PKCS-PAD(m))^d \mod N$$



- Admin sends the bank's server the (m, s) pair
- 2. Bank raises **s** to Admin's public exponent **e**: **y** = **s**^e **mod N**
- 3. Bank parses the SHA-256 digest, **h**, from **y**
- 4. If h == SHA-256(m), Admin is authenticated

Bleichenbacher Attack

What the result of the signature verification should look like (se mod N)

Accepted due to poor

00 01 FF FF FF ... FF 00 30 31 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 05 00 04 20 XX XX XX XX ... XX k/8-54 bytes ASN.1 "magic" bytes denoting type of hash algorithm SHA-256 digest (32 bytes) ASN.1 "magic" bytes denoting type of hash algorithm SHA-256 digest (32 bytes) ASN.1 "magic" bytes denoting type of hash algorithm SHA-256 digest (32 bytes) k/8-55 arbitrary bytes


Format of PKCS-PAD(m) above.


- Lazy implementation
 - implementation

 Does not count FF bytes; also does not verify hash is in rightmost bytes
- How can we forge something such that (se mod N) gives us the 2nd message seen above?
 - What if e just so happens to be very small?

When it doesn't wrap around...

- Let's forge a signature for message m with e = 3
 - Oher the properties of the
 - How does the "lazy implementation" of checking signatures help with this?





See you next week!