

# QCrypt 2018: On the possibility of classical client blind quantum computing


Alexandru Cojocaru, Léo Colisson,  
Elham Kashefi, Petros Wallden

August 30, 2018

# Robin Hood



# Main Goal



**Figure:** (Blind) Quantum Computing

# Main Goal




Figure: (Blind) Quantum Computing

# Main Goal




Figure: (Blind) Quantum Computing

# Main Goal




Figure: (Blind) Quantum Computing

# Main Goal




Figure: (Blind) Quantum Computing


# Our solution

Universal Blind Quantum Computing (UBQC)  
[A. Broadbent, J. Fitzsimons, E. Kashefi]




QFactory


# UBQC in a nutshell




# UBQC in a nutshell




## UBQC in a nutshell




# UBQC in a nutshell




# UBQC in a nutshell




# UBQC in a nutshell




# UBQC in a nutshell




# UBQC in a nutshell




# UBQC in a nutshell




# UBQC in a nutshell




## UBQC in a nutshell






# UBQC in a nutshell






# UBQC in a nutshell







# UBQC in a nutshell







# UBQC in a nutshell






# UBQC in a nutshell







# UBQC in a nutshell







# UBQC in a nutshell






# UBQC in a nutshell






# UBQC in a nutshell





# UBQC in a nutshell






# UBQC in a nutshell






# UBQC in a nutshell





# UBQC in a nutshell






# UBQC in a nutshell



# UBQC in a nutshell



# UBQC in a nutshell



# QFactory: description




Figure: QFactory gadget: simulate quantum channel

# QFactory: description




Figure: QFactory gadget: simulate quantum channel

# QFactory: description






Figure: QFactory: ideal functionality

# Cryptographic assumptions



# Cryptographic assumptions



# Construction



# Construction



$t_k, k$

# Construction



$t_k, k$

$$(\alpha_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, \frac{\pi}{4}, \dots, \frac{7\pi}{4}\})_{i=1}^{n-1}$$

# Construction

 $t_k, k$ 

$$(\alpha_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, \frac{\pi}{4}, \dots, \frac{7\pi}{4}\})_{i=1}^{n-1}$$

---

$$k, (\alpha_i)$$


# Construction

 $t_k, k$ 

$$(\alpha_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, \frac{\pi}{4}, \dots, \frac{7\pi}{4}\})_{i=1}^{n-1}$$

 $k, (\alpha_i)$ 

Compute circuit




# Construction

 $|0\rangle^{\otimes n}|0\rangle^{\otimes m}$  $t_k, k$ 

$$(\alpha_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, \frac{\pi}{4}, \dots, \frac{7\pi}{4}\})_{i=1}^{n-1}$$

 $k, (\alpha_i)$ 

Compute circuit



# Construction


$$|0\rangle^{\otimes n} |0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle |0\rangle^{\otimes m}$$

 $t_k, k$ 

$$(\alpha_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, \frac{\pi}{4}, \dots, \frac{7\pi}{4}\})_{i=1}^{n-1}$$

 $k, (\alpha_i)$ 

Compute circuit



# Construction


$$|0\rangle^{\otimes n} |0\rangle^{\otimes m} \xrightarrow{} \sum_x |x\rangle |0\rangle^{\otimes m} \xrightarrow{} \sum_x |x\rangle |f_k(x)\rangle$$

 $t_k, k$ 

$$(\alpha_i \xleftarrow{s} \{0, \frac{\pi}{4}, \dots, \frac{7\pi}{4}\})_{i=1}^{n-1}$$

 $k, (\alpha_i)$ 

Compute circuit



# Construction

$$|0\rangle^{\otimes n} |0\rangle^{\otimes m} \xrightarrow{\sum_x |x\rangle |0\rangle^{\otimes m}} \sum_x |x\rangle |f_k(x)\rangle = \sum_y (|x\rangle + |x'\rangle) \otimes |y\rangle$$




$t_k, k$



$$(\alpha_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, \frac{\pi}{4}, \dots, \frac{7\pi}{4}\})_{i=1}^{n-1}$$

$k, (\alpha_i)$

Compute circuit



# Construction


$$|0\rangle^{\otimes n}|0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle|0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle|f_k(x)\rangle = \sum_y (|x\rangle + |x'\rangle) \otimes |y\rangle \Rightarrow (|x\rangle + |x'\rangle) \otimes |y\rangle$$

 $t_k, k$ 

$$(\alpha_i \xleftarrow{s} \{0, \frac{\pi}{4}, \dots, \frac{7\pi}{4}\})_{i=1}^{n-1}$$

 $k, (\alpha_i)$ 

Compute circuit



# Construction


$$|0\rangle^{\otimes n} |0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle |0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle |f_k(x)\rangle = \sum_y (|x\rangle + |x'\rangle) \otimes |y\rangle \Rightarrow (|x\rangle + |x'\rangle) \otimes |y\rangle \Rightarrow (\bigotimes_i |b_i\rangle) \otimes |+\theta\rangle \otimes |y\rangle$$

 $t_k, k$ 

$$(\alpha_i \xleftarrow{s} \{0, \frac{\pi}{4}, \dots, \frac{7\pi}{4}\})_{i=1}^{n-1}$$

 $k, (\alpha_i)$ 

Compute circuit



# Construction


$$|0\rangle^{\otimes n}|0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle|0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle|f_k(x)\rangle = \sum_y (|x\rangle + |x'\rangle) \otimes |y\rangle \Rightarrow (|x\rangle + |x'\rangle) \otimes |y\rangle \Rightarrow (\bigotimes_i |b_i\rangle) \otimes |+\theta\rangle \otimes |y\rangle$$

 $t_k, k$ 

$$(\alpha_i \xleftarrow{s} \{0, \frac{\pi}{4}, \dots, \frac{7\pi}{4}\})_{i=1}^{n-1}$$

 $k, (\alpha_i)$ 



Compute circuit



⇒ Produces  $|+\theta\rangle$

# Construction

$$|0\rangle^{\otimes n} |0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle |0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle |f_k(x)\rangle = \sum_y (|x\rangle + |x'\rangle) \otimes |y\rangle \Rightarrow (|x\rangle + |x'\rangle) \otimes |y\rangle \Rightarrow (\bigotimes_i |b_i\rangle) \otimes |+\theta\rangle \otimes |y\rangle$$

 $t_k, k$ 


⇒ Produces  $|+\theta\rangle$

# Construction


$$|0\rangle^{\otimes n} |0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle |0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle |f_k(x)\rangle = \sum_y (|x\rangle + |x'\rangle) \otimes |y\rangle \Rightarrow (|x\rangle + |x'\rangle) \otimes |y\rangle \Rightarrow (\bigotimes_i |b_i\rangle) \otimes |+\theta\rangle \otimes |y\rangle$$



$t_k, k$



$(x, x') := \text{Inv}(t_k, y)$




⇒ Produces  $|+\theta\rangle$

# Construction

$$|0\rangle^{\otimes n} |0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle |0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle |f_k(x)\rangle = \sum_y (|x\rangle + |x'\rangle) \otimes |y\rangle \Rightarrow (|x\rangle + |x'\rangle) \otimes |y\rangle \Rightarrow (\bigotimes_i |b_i\rangle) \otimes |+\theta\rangle \otimes |y\rangle$$




$t_k, k$



$(x, x') := \text{Inv}(t_k, y)$

$$\theta := (-1)^{x_n} \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} (x_i - x'_i)(b_i \pi + \alpha_i)$$




⇒ Produces  $|+\theta\rangle$

# Construction

$$|0\rangle^{\otimes n} |0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle |0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle |f_k(x)\rangle = \sum_y (|x\rangle + |x'\rangle) \otimes |y\rangle \Rightarrow (|x\rangle + |x'\rangle) \otimes |y\rangle \Rightarrow (\bigotimes_i |b_i\rangle) \otimes |+\theta\rangle \otimes |y\rangle$$




$t_k, k$



$(x, x') := \text{Inv}(t_k, y)$


$$\theta := (-1)^{x_n} \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} (x_i - x'_i)(b_i \pi + \alpha_i)$$

  $\Rightarrow$  Gets  $\theta$



  $\Rightarrow$  Produces  $|+\theta\rangle$

# Hardcore function and Honest-but-curious model



Cannot be better than random guess:  $\theta$  **hard-core** function.

## Security

Blindness of the output  $\theta$ .

Corollary: QFactory is secure in the honest-but-curious model.

If adversary:

- follows the protocol
- can only access classical registers

$\Rightarrow$  he cannot determine  $\theta$

# Intuition of proof

$\theta$  is a hardcore function: proof based on Goldreich-Levin Theorem:

## Theorem

*If  $f$  is a one-way function, then the predicate*

*$hc(x, r) = \sum x_i r_i \bmod 2$  cannot be distinguished from a random bit, given  $r$  and  $f(x)$ .*

Recall, in our case:  $f(x) \approx y$  and

$$\theta \approx \sum \underbrace{(x_i - x'_i)}_{\text{Unknown to server}} \underbrace{(4b_i + \alpha_i)}_{\text{Known to server}} \bmod 8$$

# Summary and future work

## Summary


- QFactory: simulate quantum channel from classical channel
- ~~quantum client~~ → classical clients
- For now, proof in honest-but-curious model



## Future work


- Improve proof of security in Universal Composability model
- Improve efficiency in blind computing
- Explore new possible applications, certified qubits (QFactory + Zero Knowledge proof) that could improve MPC, GHZ state.....

# Applications of QFactory




# Questions

Thank you for your attention!



[arxiv.org/abs/1802.08759](https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.08759)

## Function construction



$$f_{A,y}((s,e),c) = Ax + e + c \times y$$

# Comparison with other works

Paper	Classical Homomorphic Encryption for Quantum Circuits	On the possibility of blind quantum computing	Classical Verification of Quantum Computations
Blind input			
Blind algorithm			
Verifiability			
Non-Interactive			
Efficiency/Requirements	FHE	UBQC/VBQC, Linear	Post-hoc, poly degree 9?