




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

Quantum memories for Quantum networks and device-Indep QKD

Nicolas Gisin

Group of Applied Physics
Geneva University, Switzerland

1. QKD

2. Quantum memories






Spin-off from the University of Geneva, 2001

Industry Venture Session on Thursday 3.30 pm

GAP Optique Geneva University



Used daily by some commercial customers



Complete Solution






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Reliability: Swiss Quantum Network

Run continuously during 20 months
Monitored by the University of Applied Science

<http://www.swissquantum.com>





NTNU
Norwegian University of
Science and Technology

nature photronics

Access

To read this story in full you will need to login or make a payment (s
nature.com > Journal home > Table of Contents)

Letter

Nature Photonics 4, 686 - 689 (2010)

Published online: 29 August 2010 | doi:10.1038/nphoton.2010.214

Subject Category: [Quantum optics](#)

Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination

Lars Lydersen^{1,2}, Carlos Wiechers^{3,4,5}, Christoffer Wittmann^{3,4}, Dominique Elser^{3,4}, Johannes Skaar^{1,2} & Vadim Makarov¹



Friedrich-Alexander-Universität
Erlangen-Nürnberg
MPL



IDQ
FROM VISION TO TECHNOLOGY

Press release

Vulnerability in commercial quantum cryptography tackled by international collaboration

August 29, 2010

The Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) and the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg together with the Max Planck Institute for the Science of Light in Erlangen have recently developed and tested a technique exploiting imperfections in quantum cryptography systems to implement an attack. Countermeasures were also implemented within an ongoing collaboration with leading manufacturer ID Quantique.



Quantum Hacking

1. *There is nothing like “unconditional security” ! (as emphasized in our 2002 RMP)*
2. But it should not obscure the fact that
there is nothing like cracking QKD !

The principle of QKD will never be attacked,
only the implementation.

In contrast, in classical crypto both the principle
and the implementation can be attacked.

If the principle of classical crypto gets broken, then

- *All electronic money looses all value*
- *All past communications can be read*



$x=0$ or 1

y=0 or 1

If $p(a,b|x,y)$ violates some Bell inequality,
then $p(a,b|x,y)$ contains secrecy
irrespective of any detail of the
implementation !

safe location,

but untrusted equipment

safe location,

but untrusted equipment

**After publicly announcing a fair sample of their data,
Alice and Bob's information is entirely contained
in the conditional probability**


$$p(a,b|x,y)$$



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Another example of Device-Independent

ρ is entangled $\Leftrightarrow \rho$ not separable $\Leftrightarrow \rho \neq \sum_j p_j \cdot \rho_A^j \otimes \rho_B^j$





3-party entanglement witnesses

$$M = X_1 X_2 X_3 - X_1 Y_2 Y_3 - Y_1 X_2 Y_3 - Y_1 Y_2 X_3$$

If $X = \sigma_x$ and $Y = \sigma_y$,

then $\langle \Psi | M | \Psi \rangle \leq 2$ for all biseparable $\Psi = \Psi_{AB} \otimes \Psi_C$

But what if the settings are not perfectly under control:


$X \approx \sigma_x$ and $Y \approx \sigma_y$?

But what if the measured $\langle M \rangle_\psi$ can be achieved with a biseparable state in dimension larger than 2?

\Rightarrow The data can't be used for some quantum information tasks, like e.g. secret sharing.



3-party entanglement witnesses



Two choices:


1. Use device-independent entanglement witnesses (DIEWs) in a black-box scenario. [Bancal et al., PRL 106, 250404, 2011](#)
2. Re-define entanglement witnesses with bounds that depend on the assumed experimental uncertainty:
 $\langle M \rangle_{\psi} \leq 2 + \text{fct}(d, \text{experimental settings uncertainty})$



Bell violation guarantees entanglement independently of the devices !

Beautiful idea ... but
it is crucial to close the detection loophole!

≠ detector




Required detection efficiency $> 82.8\%$

But the transmission efficiency of 10 km of telecom fiber
is roughly 60% !

The infamous Detection Loophole is
now part of Applied Physics !!!



To overcome the transmission losses :
Heralded signal




NG, S. Pironio & N. Sangouard, PRL 105, 070501 (2010)

Experimental DI-QKD is a new Grand Challenge for
Quantum communication !



GAP Optique Geneva University


« Photon Amplifier »





GAP Optique Geneva University


« Photon Amplifier »





Experimental DI-QKD with qubit amplifier


NG, S. Pironio & N. Sangouard
PRL 105, 070501 (2010)





Back to "standard" QKD: quantum engineering feeds back to theory

Higher bit rates & longer distances



bit rate at emission
goal: > 1 Gbit/s

channel
loss

« no » loss in
Bob's
optics

Efficient
detector

+ noise \Rightarrow secret bit rate
goal: > 1 Mbit/s




Examples of practical protocols


Common feature: bits are not coded in qubits

This is quantum engineering, but raises the long standing open problem “how to analyse QKD security when the bit string can’t be decomposed into many subsystems?”

- DPS: Differential Phase Shift [Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 037902 \(2002\)](#).




- COW: Coherent One-Way






Long distance QKD: World records


150 km of installed fibers, Optics Express 17, 13326 (2009)



250 km in the lab.
NJP 11, 075003 (2009)



How far can one send a photon ?




There is a hard wall around 400 km !

With the best optical fibers, perfect noise-free detectors and ideal 10 GHz single-photon sources, it would take centuries to send 1 qubit over 1000 km !




Beating the hard wall: Teleportation of entanglement






How far can one send a photon ?


Q repeaters with atomic ensembles and linear optics



Storing N modes in ONE memory using *time*, spatial or frequency multiplexing will reduce this time with a factor N



Increasing P_0 using multi-mode memories



Conventional memory: have to wait time L_0/c before trying again.
 (Ex. For 100 km, $L_0/c=500 \mu\text{s}$, R=2 kHz)

$$P_0 = p\eta_{L_0}\eta_D \quad \text{Low success probability! (Typ. } 10^{-3} - 10^{-4})$$

Memories that can store N temporal modes.

N attempts per time interval L_0/c

$$P_0^{(N)} = 1 - (1 - P_0^{(1)})^N \approx NP_0^{(1)} \quad (N > 100 \text{ possible})$$


Speedup by factor of N .



Requirements for Quantum Repeaters


1. Distribution of entanglement over long distances
2. Multi-mode quantum memories
3. Entanglement swapping @ telecom λ

C. Simon, H. de Riedmatten, M. Afzelius, N. Sangouard, H. Zbinden and N. Gisin
Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 190503 (2007)




Quantum Repeaters for Long Distance Fibre-Based Quantum Communication

2010 – 2012 : 2 M€



The goal of QuReP is to develop a Quantum Repeater
- the elementary building block required to overcome current distance limitations for long-distance quantum communication.






Controlling the Dephasing! Atomic Frequency Comb

$$\sum_{j=1}^N e^{ikr_j} e^{-i\delta_j t} |g_1 \dots e_j \dots g_N\rangle$$

$$P_j = e^{-i\delta_j t}$$


Δ continuous \Rightarrow Dephasing





Atomic Frequency Comb (AFC) Quantum Memory

Ensemble of inhomogeneously broadened atoms



State after absorption
(superradiant Dicke state)


$$\sum_{k=1}^N c_k |g_1 g_2 \dots e_k \dots g_N\rangle$$

Dephasing

$$\sum_{k=1}^N c_k e^{-i\delta_k t} |g_1 g_2 \dots e_k \dots g_N\rangle$$

$$\delta_k = m_k \Delta$$


Periodic structure =>
Rephasing after a time



$$t_e = \frac{2\pi}{\Delta}$$

Collective emission in the
BACKWARD Photon echo
like emission

Efficiency vs optical depth (theory)





Time multiplexing (multi-mode)

- **EIT based memory (stopped light)**

J. Nunn et al, arXiv:0807.1250 (2008)

$$d \propto N^2$$


- **Controlled Reversible Inhomogeneous Broadening (CRIB) based memory**


C. Simon et al, PRL 98, 190503 (2007), J. Nunn et al, arXiv:0807.1250 (2008)

$$d = 30 \cdot N$$

- **AFC based memory**

d independent of N








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AFC storage experiment in $\text{Pr}^{3+}:\text{Y}_2\text{SiO}_5$

Geneva-Lund collaboration


PRL 104, 040503, 2010




*Decay of coherence
due to inhomogeneous
spin dephasing.*

*Fitted spin distribution
Gaussian FWHM: 26 kHz*

Solution: Spin echo \Rightarrow 1 s spin coherence !



(b) Time (μs)



Duration of spin storage T_s (μs)






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Multi-mode storage in Nd³⁺:Y₂SiO₅

Mapping 64 input modes onto one crystal

$\langle n \rangle < 1$ per mode




I. Usmani et al., Nature Communications 1,12 (2010)³²



Storage of arbitrary waveform (Nd:YSO)



Overlap between input and output






Probing the coherence of the storage

By preparing two gratings, it is possible to read out twice:




Probing the coherence of the storage

Incident pulses: 0.8 photon per pulse on average



Storage times: 200 ns and 300 ns




Visibility : $95 \pm 3 \%$




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
Demonstration of entanglement between a telecom photon and an excitation stored in a crystal



Clausen, Usmani et al, *Nature* **469**, 508-511, 2011




Filtering



	883 nm	1338 nm
◆ Photon from guide	1.5 THz	1.5 THz
◆ Diffraction grating	90GHz	60 GHz
◆ Fabry-Perot Cavity		FSR = 24 GHz
◆ 2 Etalons	FSR = 42, 50 GHz	$\Gamma = 45 \text{ MHz}$
		$\Gamma = 600 \text{ MHz}$

Photon-Crystal Entanglement



EOM: Electro-optic modulator

AOM: Acousto-optic modulator

PBS: Polarizing beam splitter

FBG: Fiber Bragg grating

SST SPD: Superconducting single-photon detector


BS: Beam splitter

FR: Faraday rotator

DM: Dichroic Mirror

→: Feedback for stabilization

Photon-Crystal Entanglement



EOM: Electro-optic modulator

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

DM: Dichroic Mirror

→: Feedback for stabilization




Photon – Crystal Entanglement

Clausen, Usmani et al, Nature **469**, 508-511, 2011




Photon-Crystal entanglement with
a violation of the CHSH-Bell
inequality: $S=2.64 > 2$






Photon-Hybrid qubit Entanglement





Photon-Hybrid qubit Entanglement







Heralded quantum entanglement between two crystals

Imam Usmani, Christoph Clausen, Félix Bussières, Nicolas Sangouard,
Mikael Afzelius, and Nicolas Gisin

arXiv:1109.0440

Group of Applied Physics, University of Geneva, Switzerland


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Industry Venture Session on Thursday at 3.30 pm




 id Quantique




Conclusions

- Quantum Engineering opens new theory questions.
- Experimental DI-QKD is a Grand Challenge.
- The AFC protocol is very promising for a solid-state multimode Q memory.




Calgary

Geneva



Photon-Crystal
CHSH = 2.64



C. Clausen *et al.*, Nature 469, 508, 2011



January 2012

4th Winter School on Practical Quantum Cryptography

Dates: Monday January 23 to Thursday January 26, 2012

Location: Les Diablerets, Switzerland

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- Renato Renner
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