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Detection of Faults and Attacks Including False Data Injection Attack in Smart Grid Using Kalman Filter

Kebina Manandhar, Xiaojun Cao, Fei Hu, Yao Liu

***Abstract*—By exploiting the communication infrastructure among the sensors, actuators, and control systems, attackers may compromise the security of smart grid systems, with techniques such as Denial of Service (DoS) attack, random attack and data injection attack. In this paper, we present a mathematical model of the system to study these pitfalls and propose a robust security framework for smart grid. Our framework adopts Kalman Filter to estimate the variables of a wide range of state processes in the model. The estimates from the Kalman Filter and the system readings are then fed into the χ^2-detector or the proposed Euclidean detector. The χ^2-detector is a proven-effective exploratory method used with Kalman Filter for the measurement of the relationship between dependent variables and a series of predictor variables. The χ^2-detector can detect system faults/attacks such as DoS attack, short termed and long termed random attacks. However, the study shows that the χ^2-detector is unable to detect the statistically derived False Data Injection attack. To overcome this limitation, we prove that Euclidean detector can effectively detect such a sophisticated injection attack.**

I. Introduction

Power grid is one of the important infrastructural backbones having a deep impact on economy as well as our daily activities. Failures in power grid often lead to catastrophic effects as the ones in New York (2003) and Mumbai (2012). Though both of these failures resulted due to the faults in the system, security failures can also result in similar consequences, if not worse. With the advent of new technologies, the secluded power grid system is being replaced by grid, which is a typical smart Cyber Physical System (CPS) having more embedded intelligence and networking capability. In such smart grid systems, cyber and physical components work in a complex co-ordination to provide better performance and stability. Sensors are equipped throughout the system to monitor various aspects of the grid such as the meter and voltage fluctuations in these systems. The collected information from the sensor networks help in providing feedback to the physical power grid devices. Hence, such a CPS involves a two-way communication between the controller system and the physical components as shown in Figure 1.

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As smart grid relies on wired/wireless networking infrastructures to integrate the control system and physical power grid system, it is important to understand and defend cyber attacks that emerge from both the networking and the control infrastructures. The addition of wired/wireless communication capabilities in the existing power grid system results in increasing complexity and potentially more holes in security. The smart grid system can incorporate the traditional security measures (e.g., intrusion detection and firewall) to prevent rudimentary attacks like the ones in traditional data networks. Much study in literature revolves around the security of data communication from the physical components to the central controller or among different elements (e.g., sensors and actuators). For example the authors in [1] propose an intrusion detection system to detect malicious nodes in the smart grid wireless network. Similarly, a distributed intrusion detection system is discussed in [2].

Recently, many emerging attacks specifically targeting at the communication and control systems in smart grid are exposed [3-8]. For example, security threats include the tampering of physically unguarded monitoring sensors in the grid system leading to false data. A general strategy to identify physical tampering is to deploy an estimator and a detector in the controller. The estimator compares the calculated estimates with the actual readings and verifies them [3],[4]. The detector triggers an alarm when the estimated states and measured states do not agree with each other. In other words, a remarkable difference between the estimated and measured states signifies either a fault or a possible attack on the system. However, the studies in [3],[4] show that a new type of attack called False Data Injection attack can be directed at the system if some system parameters are known to the attacker. To the best of our knowledge, no existing estimator and detector combination has been examined in the literature to effectively detect different types of attacks in power grid including False Data Injection attack.

In this paper, we present a security framework for smart grid using Kalman Filter (KF). The Kalman Filter generates estimates for state variables using the mathematical model for the power grid and the data obtained from the sensor network deployed to monitor the power grid. A χ^2-detector can then be employed to detect the discrepancies between the estimated data and the measured data, and trigger alarms. The χ^2-detector can effectively detect attacks like the DoS attack and random attack, even though the states of the system do not remain constant at various time period. However, the

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

Fig. 1. Block diagram for a smart grid system

study shows that the χ^2-detector can not detect the statistically derived False Data Injection attack. For the first time, we comprehensively investigate the sophisticated False Data Injection attack together with the proposed KF framework and propose an additional detection technique using the Euclidean distance metric. Our primary contributions include: (i) we propose a mathematical model together with KF to detect possible attacks and faults on the smart grid system; (ii) we investigate the performance of the exploratory method, χ^2-detector, in identifying faults and random attacks; (iii) we analyze the limitation of χ^2-detector in detecting the statistically derived False Data Injection attack and accordingly propose a new Euclidean detector to be coupled with KF; and (iv) we demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approaches via extensive simulations and analysis on practical systems.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the motivation and the related work on smart grid security. Section III describes the proposed framework, the mathematical model of the power grid system and the Kalman Filter estimator. Section IV presents the two detectors implemented in the framework in order to detect various attacks and failures in the system. In Section V, performance results of the proposed framework and the observations are discussed. Finally, Section VI presents the conclusion.

II. Motivation and Related Work

In this section, we review various security schemes studied in the literature. Most of the papers discussed in this section deal with the security of data communication using the rudimentary techniques such as intrusion detection, cryptography, physical layer security enhancement, and the utilization of recommendation based social network infrastructure (for example, [6-10]). The existing studies on the security of smart grid, can be broadly categorized into three categories. The work in the first category deals with the wired/wireless networking security among cyber components in the smart grid [1][2][5][6][7][8][9]. The papers in the second category investigates the early detection of anomalies in the system. Smart grid is a real time system and faults/attacks must be handled as soon as possible. The early anomaly detection schemes [10][11] can pro-actively protect the system. The work in the third category applies the control theories in the security process using various state estimation and detection techniques [12] [13] [14].

A wireless mesh network architecture was proposed in [1] for the smart grid system and an intrusion detection scheme called smart tracking firewall was introduced. To overcome the security pitfalls such as signal jamming and eavesdropping, the authors in [1] also investigated the anti-jamming, physical layer security technique coupled with smart tracking firewall. The proposed firewall consists of two agents: intrusion detection agent and response agent. The agents maintain two lists of misbehaving nodes called the black-list and the grey-list. These lists keep tracking the malicious nodes in the network. Another distributed intrusion detection scheme was discussed in [2], which deploys an intelligent module and an analyzing module along with an artificial immune system to detect and classify malicious data as well as possible attacks on the smart grid. In [5], secure estimation of the system states is discussed. The channel capacity requirement to ensure negligible information leakage to the adversary regarding the system states and control message is studied in this paper. A message authentication scheme was proposed in [6] to achieve the mutual authentication among the smart meters in the smart grid using shared keys and hash based authentication techniques. Another signature based message authentication scheme was proposed in [7], which employs the multicast authentication to reduce the signature size and communication bandwidth at the cost of increased computation. As suggested in the paper, such authentication scheme is more desirable in the smart grid, where there is a limitation in the storage size and bandwidth. The work in [8] uses the data concatenation and random drop schemes to defend traffic analysis attack and the study in [9] is about defending the internet based load altering attack.

Unlike the papers discussed above that focus mainly on the protection of data communication in the smart grid, the authors in [10] presented an early warning scheme to predict/prevent anomalous events in advance. The proposed approach consists of detection, reaction, data recollection and alarm management components. Anomaly detection in the existing power grid substation was studied in [11], which presents an anomaly inference algorithm based on the combination of transaction-based model, hidden Markov model and feature-aided tracking.

An attack/fault in the smart grid system is always reflected in the form of change in either voltage, current or phase [12]. The work in [12] proposed a control-theoretic adaptation framework for the system level security of smart grid. The control-theoretic framework uses the state estimation technique to estimate the data from the remote terminal units and applies power security analysis tools to detect attacks on the system. However, the proposed distributed state estimation owns slightly larger data estimation error [12]. Similarly, the protection for the set of meter measurements or changes was discussed in [13] [14]. The identification and verification of set of sensor measurements that are required to be protected in order to detect existence of False Data Injection attack in

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the smart grid is discussed in [14].

As discussed above, much of the present work is based on various security techniques that are originally developed for securing the Internet data communication. While these techniques are effective in securing the Internet, these security techniques alone are not sufficient to deal with attacks in a more complex CPS such as the smart grid system [5]. As stated in [5], the existing security approaches are either i) not viable; ii) or incompatible with smart grid; iii) or not appropriately scalable; iv) or not adequate. Particularly, the existing techniques did not address the new class of attack called False Data Injection attack [3]. This type of injection attack is undetectable by detectors used in the existing state-estimation security frameworks [3],[4]. Hence, this work presents a framework, based on a state space model derived from the voltage flow equations, to defend different types of attacks and faults including the False Data Injection attack. We show that the False Data Injection attack cannot be detected using a traditional combination of estimator and detector (i.e., KF and χ^2-detector). Then, we propose a different detector based on Euclidean distance metric to detect the complicated False Data Injection attack on the power grid system.

III. Proposed Framework For Smart Grid using Kalman Filter

In this section, we present the detailed description of the security framework for smart grid using Kalman Filter (KF). The framework is capable of detecting various attacks including short termed and long termed random attacks along with the powerful False Data Injection attack on the power system. We develop a state space model (as shown in Section III-A) from the 3-phase sinusoidal voltage equations, to integrate with the technique of Kalman Filter. Without loss of generality, we assume the use of voltage sensors to measure the state variables (e.g., amplitude and phase of the voltage) in the framework. The sampling rate for the sensors is assumed to be around 16 samples per 60 Hz cycle i.e. about 960 samples per second for medium to low data rate production [15].

Figure 2 shows the proposed security framework where Kalman Filter estimates the values for the state variables based on the system state and the data from the numerous sensor readings. The estimated values generated by KF and the observed values for the state variables are fed into the detector. The detector compares the two state vectors (consisting all the state variables). If the two differ from each other significantly and are above a certain precomputed threshold, the detector triggers an alarm to signify a possible attack on the smart grid. As the literature study shows, the χ^2-detector is a typical choice for the Kalman Filter estimators [16] when the residue of the KF equations follows gaussian distribution and $g(t)$, (as in Equation (32)), follows the χ^2 distribution [4]. Attacks such as DoS attack and random attack are readily detected by the KF and χ^2-detector combination. However, False Data Injection attack can bypass such detectors and may remain undetected [4]. Hence, we use an additional detector, based on the Euclidean distance, along with χ^2-detector. The Euclidean distance detector reconstructs the sinusoidal voltage signal from the state parameters and calculates the difference between the estimated and observed voltage signals. If the difference is larger than a precomputed threshold, the detector triggers an alarm.



Fig. 2. Security framework for the smart grid system

A. State Space Model

Power system deploys sensors or meters such as phasor measurement units to measure the system state at various locations and time to ensure a smooth operation of the power system. These meters are able to measure current phase and amplitude [17]. The measurements obtained from these meters/sensors are the state variables that are reported to the central controller via the wired/wireless communication infrastructure. As stated in [3], the state variables may include bus voltage, angles and magnitudes. Therefore, the state space model should reflect these properties of the power system. The study in [12] indicates that an attack or fault in the power system is always reflected in the form of change in either voltage, current or phase. Without loss of generality, we derive the state space model from the power grid voltage signal.

The voltage signal can be represented as a sinusoidal wave [18] as shown in Equation (1). The equation represents voltage as a function of amplitude (A_v), angular frequency wt and phase ϕ at discrete time. Equation (2) and (3) are mentioned here to represent the 3-phase voltage signal. For simplicity, we only consider Equation (1) in the process of developing the model.

$$V_1(t) = A_v cos(\omega t + \phi) \quad (1)$$

$$V_2(t) = A_v cos(\omega t + \phi - \frac{2\pi}{3}) \quad (2)$$

$$V_3(t) = A_v cos(\omega t + \phi - \frac{4\pi}{3}) \quad (3)$$

Equation (1) can be expanded as follows,

$$V_1(t) = A_v * cos\omega t * cos\phi - A_v * sin\omega t * sin\phi \quad (4)$$

Assuming the angular frequency is relatively constant over time, we consider amplitude and phase as the variables in the state space representation. The equation then becomes,

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$$V_1(t) = x_1 * cos\omega t - x_2 * sin\omega t \tag{5}$$

where, $x_1 = A_v * cos\phi$ and $x_2 = A_v * sin\phi$ are defined as the state variables. Assuming there is no additional delay in the system and considering random noise or small errors picked up by the system, we have Equation (6) representing the state equation over the time.

$$\begin{bmatrix} x_1(t+1) \\ x_2(t+1) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x_1(t) \\ x_2(t) \end{bmatrix} + w(t) \tag{6}$$

Equivalently,

$$x(t+1) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} x(t) + w(t) \tag{7}$$

where, $x(t) = \begin{bmatrix} x_1(t) \\ x_2(t) \end{bmatrix}$ and $w(t)$ is the process noise. Process noise represents the unmodeled system dynamics or the disturbance inputs in the system model.

The actual voltage signal for the current state using non stationary deterministic vector $[cos\omega t \ -sin\omega t]$ can be obtained using Equation (4) and can be written as shown in Equation (8), where $\gamma(t)$ represents the measurement noise.

$$y(t) = [cos\omega t \ -sin\omega t] \begin{bmatrix} x_1(t) \\ x_2(t) \end{bmatrix} + \gamma(t) \tag{8}$$

B. Kalman Filter

Figure 3 shows the control system with the KF embedded for the estimation of the state vector and detector for the detection of attacks or faults. As shown in Figure 3, $x(t)$ denotes the output of the state estimator that is fed to the controller and Z^{-1} is the control system feedback. The observations or sensor readings $y(t)$ are forwarded to the estimator at a regular time interval denoted by Δt. At each time step Δt, the estimator of the system generates estimated readings based on the estimates $x(t-1)$ from previous time step and the real-time sensor readings $y(t)$.



Fig. 3. Power grid system

To apply the Kalman Filter technique, the state equation can be written as,

$$x(t+1) = Ax(t) + w(t) \tag{9}$$

where, A = $\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$

From Equation (8), the observation equation for Kalman Filter can be written as:

$$y(t) = C(t)x(t) + v(t) \tag{10}$$

Here, $y(t)$ is the measurement vector collected from the sensors, $C = [cos\omega t - sin\omega t]$, $v(t)$ is the measurement noise and assumed to be white Gaussian noise with mean 0 and standard deviation σ, which is independent of the initial conditions and process noise.

Kalman Filter can then be applied to compute state estimations $\hat{x}(t)$. Let the mean and covariance of the estimates be defined as follows:

$$\hat{x}(t|t) = E[x(t), y(0), ..., y(t)] \tag{11}$$
$$\hat{x}(t|t-1) = E[x(t), y(t), ..., y(t-1)] \tag{12}$$
$$P(t|t-1) = \Sigma(t|t-1) \tag{13}$$
$$P(t|t) = \Sigma(t|t-1) \tag{14}$$

Here, $\hat{x}(t|t)$ is the estimate at time t using measurements up to time t, $\hat{x}(t|t-1)$ is the estimate at time t using measurements up to time $t-1$. Similarly, $P(t|t)$ is the covariance of the estimates at time t using readings up to time t and $P(t|t-1)$ is the covariance of the estimates at time t using data up to time $t-1$. Now, the iterations of Kalman Filter can be written as:

Time Update:

$$\hat{x}(t+1|t) = A\hat{x}(t) \tag{15}$$
$$P(t|t-1) = AP(t-1)A^T + Q \tag{16}$$

The Equation (15) projects the state and covariance estimates at $t+1$ time step from t time step. Here, A is obtained from the sate space model in Equation (6) and Q is the process noise covariance matrix.

Measurement Update:

$$K(t) = P(t|t-1)C(t)^T(C(t)P(t|t-1)C(t)^T + R)^{-1} \tag{17}$$
$$P(t|t) = P(t|t-1) - K(t)C(t)P(t|t-1) \tag{18}$$
$$\hat{x}(t) = \hat{x}(t|t-1) + K(t)(y(t) - C(t)\hat{x}(t|t-1)) \tag{19}$$

Equations (17)-(19) represent the measurement updates of the Kalman Filter. $K(t)$ is the Kalman gain, and R is the measurement noise covariance matrix. Equation (19) is used to generate a more accurate estimate by incorporating the measurements $y(t)$. The initial condition is $x(0|-1) = 0, P(0|-1) = \Sigma$ [12]. As shown in [16] [19], the Kalman gain can converge in a few steps and operate in a steady state. Given, a training period such that the filter knows the Kalman gain before the estimation, we have,

$$P \triangleq \lim_{k\to\infty} P(t|t-1), \tag{20}$$
$$K = PC^T(CPCT + R)^{-1} \tag{21}$$

Equation (19) can be further updated as:

$$\hat{x}(t+1) = A\hat{x}(t) + K[y(t+1) - C(A\hat{x}(t) + Bu(t))] \tag{22}$$

The estimation error $e(t)$ is defined as:

$$e(t) \triangleq \hat{x}(t) - x(t) \tag{23}$$

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C. Generalization of the model

The State space model described in Section III-A can be generalized for power grid measurements. The voltage at any given bus can be obtained in the form of a sinusoidal wave (or phasor representation) using Kirchoff's Voltage Law (KVL) and/or Kirchoff's Current Law (KCL). Let us consider a 3-bus system as shown in the Figure 4 as an example. The voltage amplitude ($|V_i|$), phase (ϕ_i), active power (P_i) and reactive power (Q_i) are the variables in this system. Given a set of known initial values, the values for the unknown variables at each bus is obtained by solving Equations (24) and (25) [20]. These equations are produced by applying KCL at each node. Hence, by solving the power flow problem for the 3-bus system below, the voltage amplitude $|V_i|$ and phase ϕ_i at each bus are calculated. For any bus $'i'$:

$$P_i = \sum_{k=1}^{n} |V_i||V_k|(G_{ik}cos(\phi_i - \phi_k) + sin(\phi_i - \phi_k)) \quad (24)$$

$$Q_i = \sum_{k=1}^{n} |V_i||V_k|(G_{ik}sin(\phi_i - \phi_k) - cos(\phi_i - \phi_k)) \quad (25)$$

where, $|P_i|$ and $|Q_i|$ are the active and reactive power at bus i. $|V_i|$ and ϕ_i are the voltage magnitude and phase at bus i and $Y_{ik} = G_{ik} + jB_{ik}$ are the Y-bus elements.



Fig. 4. 3-bus system

As describe in Section III-A, the state variables are $x_1 = A_v * cos\phi$ and $x_2 = A_v * sin\phi$. Assuming the system has reached the stable state, these values of $|V_i|$ and ϕ_i for bus i, obtained by solving the power flow equations, can be plugged in to obtain the initial values for the state variables at $t = 0$. Once the initial states are known, Equation (7) and (8) for the KF of bus i can be used to estimate values for next time step.

$$At\ bus\ i:$$

$$x_1(0) = |V_i|cos\phi_i \quad (26)$$

$$x_2(0) = |V_i|sin\phi_i \quad (27)$$

Equations (24) and (25) account for effect of all the generators and loads in the system at each bus. Hence, for any bus i, $|V_i|$ and ϕ_i obtained after solving this equation reflects the effect of all the system parameters. An attack/fault on any bus or branch in the system, is reflected in the form of change in the values of these variables. Since the KF described above uses the values of $|V_i|$ and ϕ_i obtained by solving Equations (24) and (25) as its initial state, any deflection in the values due to any attack/fault will cause the values of the state variables to deviate from the estimated values.

D. Attack Model

It is assumed that the attacker is able to control a subset of the sensor readings in the system. Three types of attacks are considered in this paper: DoS attack, random attack and False Data Injection attack.

1) Denial of Service (DoS) Attack: Denial of Service (DoS) attack is a form of attack where an adversary renders some or all the components of a control system inaccessible. DoS attack can be launched by jamming of the communication channels, flooding packets in the network, compromising devices to prevent data transfer etc. by the adversary [21]. DoS attack could be on sensor data, control data or both. In this paper, we model DoS attack as the lack of availability of the sensor data.

2) Random Attack: In this case, the attacks are not crafted to overcome the detection mechanism implemented by the central system. As describe in Equation (28), the attacker simply manipulates the sensor readings.

$$y'(t) = C(t)x'(t) + v(t) + y_a(t) \quad (28)$$

where $y_a(t)$ is the random attack vector generated by the attacker. When the system is under attack $y'(t)$ and $x'(t)$ denote observations and states. These random attacks could be generated at any point in time and could be a long term continuous attack or a short attack.

3) False Data Injection Attack: In case of False Data Injection attack, it is assumed that the attacker knows the system model including parameters A, B, C, Q, R and gain K [22]. The attacker can also control a subset of sensors (S_{bad}). The attack model can then be described in Equation (29),

$$y'(t) = C(t)x'(t) + v(t) + \tau y_a(t) \quad (29)$$

where $\tau = diag(\gamma_1, ...\gamma_m)$ is the sensor selection matrix; $\gamma_i = 1$ if and only if $i \in S_{bad}$, otherwise $\gamma_i = 0$; and $y_a(t)$ is the malicious input from the attacker.

IV. Attack/Failure Detector

The KF estimator calculates the following state of the system using the equations described in Section III-B. As the meter readings for that state become available, the projected estimates and the actual meter readings are compared by the detector. If the difference between the two is above a precomputed threshold, an alarm is triggered to notify a possible attack or failure. As previously discussed, the framework proposed in this paper implements two types of detectors: The χ^2-detector and the detector implementing the Euclidean distance metric.

A. χ^2-detector

The χ^2-detector is a conventional detector used with Kalman Filter. As described in [16], the χ^2-detector constructs a χ^2 test statistics from the Kalman Filter and compares them with the threshold obtained from the standard χ^2 table.

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Now, the residue z_{k+1} at time $k+1$ is defined as:

$$z(t+1) \stackrel{\Delta}{=} y(t+1) - \hat{y}(t+1|t) \tag{30}$$

Equivalently,

$$z(t+1) \stackrel{\Delta}{=} y(t+1) - C(A\hat{x}(t)) \tag{31}$$

Then, the χ^2-detector test consists of comparing the scalar test statistics given by:

$$g(t) = z(t)^T B(t) z(t) \tag{32}$$

where, $B(t)$ is the covariance matrix of $z(t)$. The χ^2 detector compares $g(t)$ with a precomputed threshold obtained using the χ^2-detector-table [16] to identify a failure or attack. The χ^2 test is long-term test because, at each detection step, all integrated effects since system start time are considered. This property makes it very useful for the fault detection in smart grid which consists of sensors that are subject to soft failures like instrument bias shift. Another advantage of χ^2 detector is its computational complexity. The parameters required to perform the test are already generated by the Kalman Filter making it compatible with the KF. Furthermore, the threshold for the detector can be easily obtained from the χ^2-table making the threshold computation relatively easy. In our experiments, the threshold is chosen such that error rate is less than 5%.

False Data Injection attack is characterized by an attack sequence y_a such that $\limsup_{t\to\infty} ||\Delta x(t)|| = \infty, ||\Delta z(t)|| \leq 1, t = 0, 1, ...$ where, $||\Delta x(t)|| = x_a(t) - x(t)$, $||\Delta z|| = z_a(t) - z(t)$ and $x_a(t)$ and $z_a(t)$ are state variables and residue of the compromised systems [22]. This definition shows that the χ^2-detector may fail to detect False Data Injection attack on the sensors [4]. Thus, we introduce the Euclidean-based detector in the following section.

B. Detector implementing the Euclidean Distance Metric

Though χ^2 detectors have a high noise tolerance and work in most cases, attacks like False Data Injection attack fails to get detected [4]. This phenomenon is also visualized in the simulation results in the Section V. The False Data Injection attack is a class of attack which is carefully crafted to bypass the statistical detector like χ^2-detectors. Thus to detect these types of attacks, we propose an Euclidean-based detector, which calculates the deviation of the observed data from the estimated data. To apply the Euclidean detector, we first reconstruct the sinusoidal signals from the state estimates and then compare them with the measurements obtained from the sensors as shown in Equation (33),

$$d(p,q) = \sqrt{(p_1 - q_1)^2 + (p_2 - q_2)^2 + ... + (p_n - q_n)^2} \tag{33}$$

where, p is the amplitude of the voltage signal and q is the amplitude of the estimated voltage signal.

If the difference between the two is greater than the threshold, as in case of χ^2 detector, an alarm is triggered. The above mentioned KF estimator (and detectors) cannot differentiate the state variable changes due to attack/fault from the noise such as system disturbance. To minimize the false positives caused due to the noise, we set the threshold to 3σ (σ being the standard deviation of the noise from Section III-B). As stated earlier, given the Gaussian noise with zero mean, setting the threshold to 3σ can filter out 99.73% false positives due to the noise [23].

Under steady state the input signal can be reconstructed by applying the values of state variables in Equation (5). Similarly the estimated signal can be reconstructed using Equation (5) and $\hat{x}(t)$ from Equation (17).

Hence, the following corollary can be obtained from the definition of False Data Injection attack in Section IV-A.

Corollary 1: Given $\limsup_{t\to\infty} ||\Delta x(t)|| = \infty$,

$$\lim_{t\to\infty} d(V_a(t), V(t)) = \infty$$

where, $d(V(t), V_a(t)) = \sqrt{(C(t)\hat{x}_a(t) - C(t)x'(t))^2}$.

As $||\Delta x(t)||$ tends to ∞, $d(V(t), V_a(t))$ approaches ∞ as well. Therefore, we can detect attacks and faults that results from the manipulation of the measured signal such as False Data Injection attack.

V. Implementation and Performance Evaluation

We implemented the KF estimator, χ^2-detector and Euclidean detector using Matlab. The experimental setup and the initial values are shown in Table I. A 60Hz Sinusoidal voltage signal with random Gaussian noise is generated and fed to the Kalman Filter estimator as the input. Matlab function $randn()$ is used to produce normally distributed noise with mean value zero. The input signal and the resulting sinusoidal signal obtained using the state estimates are plotted in Figures 5-9 and Figure 11. Each of these figures contains two graphs and shows the results of the simulation plotted against time. The top sub-graph shows how the amplitude varies with time for the input sinusoidal signal and the signal constructed using estimated state variables. In the bottom sub-graph, the value for $g(t)$ from Equation (32) are plotted against time. The straight horizontal line is the threshold obtained from the χ^2 table. For the Euclidean detectors, $d(p,q)$ from Equation (33) is plotted against time.

TABLE I
Experimental setup

Frequency	60Hz
Amplitude	1 Volt
Sampling frequency	2 KHz
Initial value for $x_1(0)$	0
Initial value for $x_2(0)$	0
Initial covariance matrix $P(0\|0)$	Identity matrix

A. Attack/Fault detection using χ^2 detector

Figure 5 shows the simulation results using the χ^2-detector in the absence of attacks/faults for a certain period of time. It can be seen that the estimated values obtained from the KF estimator overlaps with the input signal denoting there is no difference between the estimated and the observed value. Hence for $g(t)$ obtained from the detector stays within the threshold. Since our simulations also consider the random

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noise in the system, there is a slight difference between the estimates and the input signal in the beginning. However, Kalman Filter works iteratively by correcting its estimates using both the state space model and the measurements obtained, the estimates gradually converge with the input signal.



Fig. 5. χ^2-detector when there is no attack/fault

In case of attacks, the estimated values do not match with the observed values and $g(t)$ exceeds the threshold as shown in Figure 6. As a result, the detector triggers an alarm signifying an attack/fault in the system. Similarly, Figure 7 shows a short-timed attack being detected by the framework. Figure 8 shows detection of DoS attack.



Fig. 6. Continuous random attack detected using χ^2-detector

B. False Data Injection Attack

False Data Injection attack injects fake sensor measurements that can fool the system implementing KF-estimator with χ^2-detector as described in [22]. The attack sequence can be obtained from Equation (34).

$$y_a(n+t) = y_a(t) - \frac{\lambda^{(i+1)}}{M} y^* \tag{34}$$

where, n is the dimension of state space, $y^* = Cv$, v=eigenvector of A, $|\lambda| >= 1$, $M = max_{k=0..n-1}||\Delta z(k)||$



Fig. 7. Random attack for a short period of time detected using χ^2-detector



Fig. 8. DoS attack detected using χ^2-detector

and $\Delta z(k) = z'(k) - z(k)$. $z'(k)$ is the residue when the system is under attack.

The derivation of the attack sequence [22] ensures that it bypasses the detector and increases the error in the state estimation. The second sub graph in Figure 9 shows the behavior of χ^2-detector under the False Data Injection attack. We can see the estimates do not agree with the measured values in the top sub graph in Figure 9. However, $g(t)$ never exceeds the threshold. In other words, the graph shows that the statistical tests in χ^2-detector fails to detect the False Data Injection attack. We address this drawback in the next section, by using Euclidean detector, which can identify such attack by constantly monitoring the difference between the estimated values and the measured values.

C. False Data Injection attack detection using Euclidean Detector

The Euclidean detector compares the difference between the measured data and the estimated data based on the Euclidean distance metric as shown in Equation (33). Since the state variables only consider the time-invariant components of a sinusoid, the state variables remain relatively constant as described in Section III-A. Thus, change in state variables could mean either attack or fault in the system. However, to

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

Fig. 9. False Data Injection attack using χ^2-detector

avoid false alarms due to measurement or system errors, we set the threshold to 3σ as discussed in Section IV-B. Figure 10 shows the plot of the Euclidean Distance metric when there is no attack in the system and the bottom sub graph in Figure 10 shows the plot when there is a False Data Injection attack in the system. When there is an attack in the system, the difference between the two curves exceeds the threshold, hence the False Data Injection attack can be detected by the Euclidean distance metric.



Fig. 10. Euclidean detector when there is no attack/fault

D. Load Change

In the model derived in this paper, it is assumed the load in the system remains constant. In case there is change in load, there will be change in the voltage signal across the buses. If the load profile is known, then the change in voltage amplitude/phase caused due to the load change can be predicted. Assume there is a change in the voltage due to load change as shown in Figure 11. The parameters in the Kalman Filter can be adjusted to reflect the change in the voltage due to the load change. This allows us to obtain estimates for the state variables after the load change. Figure 11 shows that the estimates closely follow the signal with the load change. At time step 0.07, the random attack is detected by both the χ^2 detector and Euclidean detector in this scenario.



Fig. 11. Change in voltage due to load change

E. χ^2-detector vs. Euclidean detector

The probability of attack detection in both detectors are largely dependent on the value of the threshold. In the case of χ^2-detector, the threshold is obtained from the standard χ^2 table. Similarly, in the case of Euclidean detector, the threshold is obtained from the standard deviation of Gaussian distribution. In this experiment, we set the value of the thresholds in both detectors to filter 99% of noise. Thus the probability of false alarms due to noise is less than 1%.

In general, the Euclidean detector is more sensitive towards changes than χ^2-detector. As can be seen in Figure 12, Euclidean detector is faster in responding to the changes. Hence, if the noise parameters for the system are known, Euclidean detector gives better results. If the noise parameters are not known in advance, χ^2-detector is preferable since it handles the soft errors better. However, a disadvantage of the χ^2-detector relative to Euclidean detector is its inability to detect False Data Injection attack. Figure 9 shows the reaction of χ^2 detector and Euclidean detector when the system is under the False Data Injection attack.

Euclidean detector reconstructs the signal from the state estimates and compares it with the measured signal whereas χ^2-detector only computes the residue vector. Since reconstruction requires more computation, Euclidean detector is more resource intensive than χ^2-detector.

F. Implementation of the proposed framework in IEEE 9-bus system

Figure 13 shows an IEEE 9-bus system with sensors to monitor the state parameters and the estimator/detector for bus 3. The 9-bus system is simulated using MATPOWER [24] package in MATLAB. The voltages and phases, obtained by solving the IEEE 9-bus power system in MATPOWER, are used as the state parameters in the Kalman Filter estimator. Similar structure can be assumed for each bus in the system. For the simplicity, only bus 3 is discussed here. The attack

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

Fig. 12. Performance of both detectors under the random attack



Fig. 13. IEEE 9-bus system under False Data Injection attack

sequence y_a is generated by the adversary as discussed in [22]. The sensors in the bus report their readings to the corresponding Kalman Filter estimators and Euclidean detectors. The successful detection of the False Data Injection attack on bus 3 is shown in the Figure 14.



Fig. 14. False data attack detection for bus 3 in IEEE 9-bus system

VI. Conclusion

In this paper, a framework for smart grid system using Kalman Filter estimator together with the χ^2-detector and Euclidean detector has been designed. It has been shown that the χ^2-detector is efficient in detecting different types of faults and attacks like DoS attack and random attacks on the system. Further, to handle attacks on the system like False Data Injection which evades χ^2-detector, we have proposed Euclidean detector which uses Euclidean distance metric for detection. We have also shown that the false positives due to noise for the Euclidean detector can be reduced to less than 1% with the proper selection of the threshold. Our extensive simulation and analysis have demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed Euclidean detector in detecting various types of attacks including the False Data Injection attack.

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

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