## **Probabilistic Encryption**

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Recap:

- One-time pad from PRG.

- One-time pad from PRG. limitations: 1. Each key can only be used once

2. Deterministic.

Define (Secure Encryption) (Private)

(k, m, Gen, Enc, Dec) is a Secure Encryption, if:

Ym,m'∈M, k∈K.

 $\left\{ \text{Enc}_{k}(m) \right\} \approx_{c} \left\{ \text{Enc}_{k}(m') \right\}.$ for multiple cupertext.

Y m. mi, ..., mx, mx eM. he poly (n)

k ← K. {Enck (Mi), ..., Enck (Mh)} ≈ c {Enck (Mi), ..., Enck (Mh)}

This definition enforces randomness on encryption,

because an attack:  $M_1=M_1=M_2\neq M_2$  distinguish two distribution.

Achieve this by PRF?

F = \{F\_k: \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n\\\ k \in \mathcal{P}\_1.

KEnc = KPRF

Gen = k < KIRF

random r )

 $Enc_k(m,r) = m \oplus F_k(r), r$ 

Deck (c) = Fk(r) &C

Proof. Hybrid Argument

Enck (mi), ..., Enck (mh)}

 $\begin{cases} m_1 \otimes F_k(r_1) / r_1, \dots, m_k \otimes F_k(r_k) / r_k \end{cases}$   $m \Leftrightarrow D / r \implies P / r_1 \implies p / r_2 \implies p / r_3 \implies p / r_4 \implies p / r_4 \implies p / r_5 \implies$ 

 $| \underset{\mathsf{M}_1 \oplus \mathsf{R}_1 | \mathsf{r}_1 \to \mathsf{R}_1 | \mathsf{r}_1 \to \mathsf{r}_2 \mathsf{r}_1}{ \mathsf{M}_1 \oplus \mathsf{R}_1 | \mathsf{r}_1 \to \mathsf{r}_2 \mathsf{r}_2} | \mathsf{r}_1 \to \mathsf{r}_2 \mathsf{r}_2 \mathsf{r}_2 \mathsf{r}_3 \mathsf{r}_4 \mathsf{r}_4 \mathsf{r}_5 \mathsf{r}_5 \mathsf{r}_6 \mathsf$ 

## (M. K. Gen. Enc. Dec) : Public Key Encryption

- public secret - K: PK, SK.
- Gen (1t) -> pk. sk.
- $Enc_{pk}(m) \rightarrow C$
- Decsk (c) → n

Given a Trapdor OWP.

 $F = \{F_i : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n\}_{i \leftarrow K_{Trapolor}, ti}$ 

Gen (1"):  $P^{k} = f_i$ ,  $s_k = t_i$  

hardcore bit  $b_i : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ 

 $E_{nc_{pk}}(\underline{m},r) = f_i(r), b_i(r) \oplus m_i$ 

 $Dec_{gk}(c) = Invert f_i(r) \Rightarrow b_i(r) \oplus C = m_i$