Models of Creative Destruction Firm Dynamics

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Motivation

We extend the Schumpeterian model to have innovation by incumbents.

This produces a model of firm size dynamics.

Environment

Demographics, preferences, commodities: unchanged.

Resource constraint:

$$Y = C + X + Z \tag{1}$$

where

$$X(t) = \int_0^1 \psi x(v, t) dv \tag{2}$$

$$Z(t) = \int_0^1 \left[z(v,t) + \hat{z}(v,t) \right] q(v,t) dv$$
 (3)

Final goods technology

$$Y(t) = \frac{1}{1-\beta} L(t)^{\beta} \int_0^1 q(v,t)^{\beta} x(v,t|q)^{1-\beta} dv$$
 (4)

- the only change: quality is taken to power β
- implies: sales vary with quality (so the model has firm size implications)

Intermediate goods technology

ightharpoonup constant marginal cost ψ

Innovation technology for incumbents

- ▶ let q(v,s) be the quality at the time the incumbent invented it
- investing zq implies a flow probability of innovation of ϕz
- the quality step is λ

Innovation technology for entrants

- investing $\hat{z}q$ implies a flow probability of innovation of $\eta(\hat{z})$ (decreasing)
- the quality step is $\kappa > \lambda$ (leapfrogging)
- innovators take η as given (an externality)

Solving each agent's problem

Solving each agents' problem

Household:

$$g(C) = \frac{r - \rho}{\theta} \tag{5}$$

Final goods producer:

$$x(v,t|q) = p^{x}(v,t|q)^{-1/\beta} q(v,t)L$$
 (6)

$$w(t) = \beta Y(t) / L(t) \tag{7}$$

Intermediate goods producer

Assume drastic innovation

$$p^{x}(v,t|q) = \frac{\psi}{1-\beta} = 1 \tag{8}$$

Innovation by entrants

Free entry:

$$\eta\left(\hat{z}(v,t|q)\right)V(v,t|\kappa q) = q(v,t) \tag{9}$$

This assumes an equilibrium with entry.

Innovation by incumbents

Again assuming positive innovation.

Increase z until the marginal value equals marginal cost:

$$\phi z(v,t|q)[V(v,t|\lambda q) - V(v,t|q)] = q(v,t)z(v,t|q)$$
 (10)

Value of the firm

Expected discounted value or profits

$$rV(v,t|q) = \pi(v,t|q) - \dot{V}(v,t|q) - z(v,t|q) q(v,t)$$

$$+ \phi z(v,t|q) [V(v,t|\lambda q) - V(v,t|q)]$$
(12)

 $-\hat{z}(v,t|q)\eta(\hat{z}(v,t|q))V(v,t|q)$

Note: Terms 3 and 4 cancel by the incumbent's FOC. Profit

$$\pi(v,t|q) = [p^{x}(v,t|q) - \psi]x(v,t|q)$$
(14)

$$=\beta qL \tag{15}$$

because $p^x = 1$ and x = qL.

(13)

Equilibrium

Allocation

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\{C(t), X(t), Z(t), Y(t), L(t), z(v,t), \hat{z}(v,t), x(v,t), \pi(v,t), V(v,t)\}
Prices \{p^x(v,t), w(t), r(t)\}
that satisfy:
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- household: Euler (and TVC)
- ▶ final goods firm: 3
- intermediate goods firm: 1
- free entry of incumbents and entrants: 2
- market clearing: goods, labor (2)
- definitions of X, Z, π (3)
- definition of V (differential equation) (1)

Balance Growth Path

Assert $\dot{V}=0$, z(q), and $\hat{z}(q)$ constant over time (verify later) Law of motion for V implies: V(q)=vq.

• so that rV and $\pi = \beta Lq$ can grow at the same rate

Free entry for entrants:

- implies \hat{z} is the same for all q
- but z for incumbents may vary with q

Innovation for incumbents

$$\phi \left[V(v,t|\lambda q) - V(v,t|q) \right] = q(v,t)$$
 implies

$$V(q) = \frac{q}{\phi(\lambda - 1)} \tag{16}$$

Law of motion for V:

$$rV(q) = \beta Lq - \hat{z}\eta(\hat{z})V(q) \tag{17}$$

the term reflecting incumbent innovation drops out (by its FOC)

Combine the two:

$$\eta\left(\hat{z}\right) = \frac{\phi\left(\lambda - 1\right)}{\kappa} \tag{18}$$

This solves for \hat{z} .

Equilibrium growth rate

Substitute back into free entry

$$r = \phi (\lambda - 1) \beta L - \hat{z} \eta (\hat{z})$$
 (19)

Together with the Euler equation, this solves for the growth rate.

Implications for firm dynamics

Since x(v,t|q) = qL, firm size (sales) are governed by the evolution of q

For a given firm: x

- increases by factor λ with probability $\phi z \Delta t$
- ▶ stays the same with probability $\hat{z}\eta(\hat{z})\Delta t$
- drops to 0 with complementary probability

Reading

Acemoglu (2009), ch. 14.3.

References I

Acemoglu, D. (2009): *Introduction to modern economic growth*, MIT Press.