Growth Through Product Creation

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Issues

- ▶ We study a GE model of growth driven by innovation.
- ▶ Innovation takes the form of inventing new goods.
- Alternative: Quality ladders.

A Model of Product Innovation

- ► A representative household supplies capital and labor to firms
- Final goods firms use labor and intermediate inputs
- Intermediate inputs are produced from final goods
- Final goods can be used to create new varieties of intermediate inputs
- Innovators receive permanent monopolies

Note: Now that models get more complicated, it really pays off to be pedantic about details.

Demographics and Preferences

Demographics:

► A representative household.

Preferences:

$$\int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \, \frac{C_t^{1-\theta} - 1}{1 - \theta} dt \tag{1}$$

C: the final good

Technology: Final Goods

Resource constraint:

$$C_t + X_t + Z_t = Y_t$$

Final goods Y are used for

- Z: R&D investment.
- X: Inputs into the production of intermediates x.
- ▶ *C*: consumption

Technology: Final Goods

Production of **final goods** from intermediates and labor:

$$Y_{t} = (1 - \beta)^{-1} \left[\int_{0}^{N_{t}} x(v, t)^{1 - \beta} dv \right] L^{\beta}$$
 (2)

This is of the Dixit-Stiglitz form:

Write $\left[\int x^{1-\beta} dv\right]^{\frac{1-\beta}{1-\beta}}$ to see that this is a CES aggregator of x.

Technology: Intermediate Inputs

Each unit of x requires ψ units of Y:

$$X = \psi \int_0^{N_t} x(v, t) dv \tag{3}$$

Intermediate inputs fully depreciate in use.

Technology: Innovation

Investing the final good yields a flow of new patents:

$$\dot{N} = \eta Z_t \tag{4}$$

Think of this as the aggregate (deterministic) outcome of the (stochastic) innovation efforts of many firms.

Market arrangements

- Final goods and labor markets are competitive.
- Intermediates are sold by **monopolists** (the innovators).
 - Monopolies are permanent.
 - What the monopolists do with their profits is not clear.
- Free entry into innovation
 - ensures zero present value of profits
- ▶ The household owns the innovating firms.
- Asset markets are complicated
 - there is often no need to spell out the details

Notes

Production is cyclical:

- today's Y is used to make X which makes Y
- ▶ the alternative: durable *X* (more complicated)
- ▶ implication: the efficient allocation maximizes Y X = C + Z

The only long-lived object is a patent

this keeps the model simple

Assuming that intermediates are made from final goods fixes marginal costs (and prices)

Solving Each Agent's Problem

Final goods producers

- ▶ Maximize period profits by choosing L and x(v,t).
- ▶ Normalize the price *Y* to 1.
- Profits

$$Y_{t} - w_{t}L_{t} - \int_{0}^{N_{t}} p^{x}(v, t) \ x(v, t) dv$$
 (5)

where

$$Y_{t} = (1 - \beta)^{-1} \left[\int_{0}^{N_{t}} x(v, t)^{1 - \beta} dv \right] L^{\beta}$$
 (6)

Final goods producers

FOCs:

- $\rightarrow \partial Y/\partial L = \beta Y/L = w$

Demand function (cf. the Dixit Stiglitz discussion):

$$x(v,t) = L p^{x}(v,t)^{-1/\beta}$$
 (7)

Solution to the firm's problem: $L_t, x(v,t)$ that satisfy the "2" first-order conditions.

Intermediate input producers

Problem after inventing a variety.

x is produced at constant marginal cost ψ .

Maximize present value of profits

$$V(v,t) = \int_{t}^{\infty} e^{-rs} \pi(v,s) ds$$
 (8)

Instantaneous profits are

$$\pi(v,t) = (p^x(v,t) - \psi) x(v,t)$$
(9)

where $x(v,t) = Lp^x(v,t)^{-1/\beta}$

This is a sequence of static problems

Intermediate input producers

First order condition (standard monopoly pricing formula):

$$p^{x} = \psi/(1-\beta) \tag{10}$$

Profits are

$$\pi(v,t) = \psi \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} x(v,t) \tag{11}$$

Solution: A constant p^x .

Household

- ▶ The household holds shares of all intermediate input firms.
- Each firm produces a stream of profits.
- New firms issue new shares.
- ▶ But: the details don't matter to the household.
- There simply is an asset with rate of return r.
- Euler equation is standard:

$$g(C) = \frac{r - \rho}{\theta} \tag{12}$$

Invoke Walras' law - so you never have to write down the budget constraint!

Equilibrium

- ▶ Objects: $C_t, X_t, Z_t, x(v, t), V(v, t), N_t$ and prices $p^x(v, t), r(t), w(t)$.
- Conditions:
 - "Everybody maximizes." (see above)
 - Markets clear.
 - 1. Goods: resource constraint.
 - Shares: omitted b/c I did not write out the household budget constraint.
 - 3. Intermediates: implicit in notation.
 - Innovation effort satisfies a free entry condition: present value of profits equals 0.

Symmetric Equilibrium

We assume (and then show) that all varieties v share the same x, V and p^x .

Intuition:

- $ightharpoonup p^x$: monopoly pricing with a constant elasticity
- x: varieties enter final goods production symmetrically
- V: the age of a variety does not matter (no stock of x to build; permanent patents)

Equilibrium: Characterization

The growth rate follows from the Euler equation: $g(C) = (r - \rho)/\theta$.

▶ We need to solve for r.

Simplifications:

- Normalize marginl cost $\psi = 1 \beta$
 - ightharpoonup so that $p^x = 1$.
 - ▶ Why can I do that?
- Focus on balanced growth paths.

Equilibrium: Characterization

Free entry will determine the interest rate

Spend 1 to obtain η new patents, each valued (initially) at V(v,t)

$$\eta V(v,t) = 1 \tag{13}$$

- Then V is constant over time.
- ▶ This assumes that innovation takes place.

With balanced growth and constant profits (to be shown):

$$V = \pi/r \tag{14}$$

Profits

With a fixed markup, profits are a multiple of revenues:

$$\pi(t) = \psi \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} x(t) \tag{15}$$

$$= \beta x(t) \tag{16}$$

Demand for intermediates:

$$x(t) = L p^{x}(t)^{-1/\beta}$$
$$= L$$

Profits: $\pi = \beta L$.

Free Entry

Free entry:

$$\eta V = \eta \beta L/r = 1 \tag{17}$$

- ▶ This is the closed form solution for *r*.
- ▶ Balanced **growth** rate then follows from the Euler equation.

$$g(C) = \frac{\eta \beta L - \rho}{\theta} \tag{18}$$

Equilibrium: Characterization

Production function for final goods with x = L:

$$Y = \frac{N_t L}{1 - \beta} \tag{19}$$

Wage (from firm's FOC):

$$w_t = \beta \frac{Y_t}{L_t} = \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} N_t \tag{20}$$

Total expenditure on intermediates:

$$X_t = \psi N_t x_t = (1 - \beta) N_t L \tag{21}$$

Summary of Equilibrium

Prices and quantities of intermediate inputs are constant.

- the model is rigged to deliver this
- ▶ for tractability

Growth comes from rising N

No Transition Dynamics

The equilibrium looks like an AK model with production function

$$Y_t = \frac{L}{1 - \beta} N_t$$

$$\dot{N}_t = \eta \ s_z \ Y_t$$

Intuition:

- Period profits π are constant at βL .
- ▶ At any moment we need $\eta V = 1$.
- ▶ *V* is the present value of (constant) profits.
- Constant V is only possible with constant r.
- Intuition: There is a reduced form AK structure.

Scale Effects

$$g(C) = \frac{\eta \beta L - \rho}{\theta}$$

Larger economies (L) grow faster.

Population growth implies exploding income growth (!)

Mechanical reason:

- Innovation technology is linear in goods.
- ▶ Larger economy \rightarrow higher $Y \rightarrow$ higher $Z \rightarrow$ faster growth.

We will return to this later.

Pareto Efficient Allocation

Efficiency

Two distortions prevent efficiency of equilibrium:

- 1. Monopoly pricing.
- 2. Inefficient innovation due to aggregate demand externality.

Planner's Problem

Solve in two stages:

- 1. Given N, find optimal static allocation x(v,t).
 - That is: maximize Y X which is available for consumption and investment.
 - An odd feature of the model: goods are produced from goods without delay.
- Given the reduced from production function from #1, find optimal Z.

Static Allocation

Given N, choose x(v,t) to maximize Y-X:

$$\max(1-\beta)^{-1}L^{\beta}\int_{0}^{N_{t}}x(v,t)^{1-\beta}dv - \int_{0}^{N_{t}}\psi x(v,t)dv \qquad (22)$$

First-order condition

$$L^{\beta}x^{-\beta} = \psi \tag{23}$$

with
$$\psi = 1 - \beta$$
:

$$x = (1 - \beta)^{-1/\beta} L \tag{24}$$

The planner's x is larger than the equilibrium x (Intuition?)

Static Allocation

Next: find Y - X.

$$X = \psi Nx = (1 - \beta)N(1 - \beta)^{-1/\beta}L$$
 (25)

Reduced form production function:

$$Y_t = (1-\beta)^{-1} L^{\beta} N[(1-\beta)^{1-1/\beta} L]^{1-\beta}$$

$$= (1-\beta)^{-1/\beta} L N_t$$
(26)

Net output

$$Y - X = (1 - \beta)^{-1/\beta} LN - (1 - \beta)^{1 - 1/\beta} LN$$

= $(1 - \beta)^{-1/\beta} \beta L N$ (28)

Planner: Dynamic Optimization

$$\max \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \frac{C_t^{1-\theta} - 1}{1 - \theta} dt$$

subject to

$$\dot{N} = \eta Z
Y = (1-\beta)^{-1/\beta} \beta L N = C + Z$$

Or

$$\dot{N} = A N - \eta C \tag{29}$$

$$A = \eta (1-\beta)^{-1/\beta} \beta L$$
 (30)

Hamiltonian

$$H = \frac{C^{1-\theta} - 1}{1 - \theta} + \mu [AN - \eta C]$$
 (31)

FOC

$$\partial H/\partial C = C^{-\theta} - \mu \eta = 0 \tag{32}$$

$$\partial H/\partial N = \rho \mu - \dot{\mu} = \mu A$$
 (33)

Optimal growth

The same as in an AK model with

$$A = \eta (1 - \beta)^{-1/\beta} \beta L \tag{34}$$

we have

$$\dot{C}/C = \frac{A - \rho}{\theta} \tag{35}$$

Comparison with CE

- ► CE interest rate: $\eta \beta L$.
- ▶ Planner's "interest rate:" $(1-\beta)^{-1/\beta} \eta \beta L$.
- ▶ The planner chooses faster growth.
- Intuition:
 - ► CE under-utilizes the fruits of innovation: x is too low.
 - ▶ This reduces the value of innovation.

Policy Implications

- ▶ One might be tempted to reduce monopoly power.
- ▶ A policy that encourages competition (e.g. less patent protection, forcing lower p^x) reduces the static price distortion.
- ▶ But it also reduces growth: innovation is less valuable.
- Similar result for shorter patents.
- Policy trades off static efficiency and incentives for innovation.

Reading

- Acemoglu (2009), ch. 13.
- Krusell (2014), ch. 9
- ▶ Romer (2011), ch. 3.1-3.4.
- ▶ Jones (2005)

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