Partial Equilibrium R&D Models

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Issues

- We study models where intentional innovation drives productivity growth.
- We start with partial equilibrium to see how consumers and firms behave.
- ▶ Then we embed this into a GE model.

Background

- Historians often view innovation as the result of research that is not profit driven.
- Economists treat innovation as producing goods that are sold in markets ("blueprints").
- ▶ There are historical examples of both types of innovation.
- ► How important are the 2 cases? An open question.

How to model innovation

- Current models are somewhat reduced form.
- ► The issue how existing knowledge feeds into future innovation is treated as a knowledge spillover.
- Knowledge is treated as a scalar like capital.
- ► In fact, the only difference between blueprints and machines is non-rivalry:
 - blueprints can be used simultaneously in the production of several goods.

How to model innovation

There are N consumption goods (or intermediate inputs).

The goods are imperfect substitutes in preferences (or final output production).

Therefore downward sloping demand curves

Approach 1: Quality ladders

- Each good can be made by many firms.
- Firms can invest to improve quality (equivalently: lower the cost) of 1 good.

Approach 2: Increasing variety

- ▶ Each firm can invest to create a new variety $(N \rightarrow N+1)$
- ▶ Then it becomes the monopolist for that variety

The Supply Block: Quality Improvements

Firm

We study the problem of an innovating firm.

The industry faces a **demand curve** Q = D(p).

▶ Price elasticity: ε_D .

There are infinitely many competitors with marginal cost ψ .

All can make the same good.

No innovation \implies zero profit.

Innovation

Spend μ goods

Reduce marginal cost to ψ/λ .

The innovator becomes a monopolist

• subject to a fringe of competitors with MC ψ .

Pricing Decision

Monopoly price:

$$p^M = \frac{\psi/\lambda}{1 - 1/\varepsilon_D} \tag{1}$$

Monopoly profit:


$$\pi_1^I = D\left(p^M\right) \left[p^M - \psi/\lambda\right] - \mu \tag{2}$$

▶ This is also the (private) value of the innovation.

Drastic / non drastic innovation

- A drastic innovation gives the innovator a monopoly.
 - ▶ The monopoly price is below competitor's marginal cost ψ .
 - It is optimal to set the monopoly price.
- ▶ A **non-drastic** innovation leaves the monopoly price above ψ .
 - Charging monopoly prices results in 0 sales.
 - The demand curve facing the firm becomes infinitely elastic at price ψ.
 - It is optimal to set $p = \psi$.

Effective demand curve



Optimality

Is the level of innovation too above or below what maximizes "welfare"?

The answer is usually ambiguous.

- 1. The innovator does not capture the entire consumer surplus.
- 2. Business stealing effect: innovation destroys competitor profits.
- Replacement effect: innovation destroys the innovator's own profit.

The Role of Patents

Innovation only occurs, if the innovator earns monopoly status for some time

but see Boldrin and Levine (2008)

The trade-off:

- Stronger patents higher profits more innovation.
- Stronger patents distort prices.

The Demand Block

Modeling the Demand Side

- The trick in all R&D models: a demand side that generates a constant price elasticity
- ► This makes the monopoly price essentially exogenous $p_M = MC/(1-1/\varepsilon_D)$

Dixit Stiglitz Model

- The world is static.
- ▶ There are N consumption goods c_i with prices p_i .
- ► There is one "other" consumption good *y* with price 1.
 - ▶ It purpose is to absorb income effects.
- ▶ Household income is *m*.

Preferences

- ▶ Preferences: u(C,y)
- **C** is a CES composite consumption good:

$$C = \left(\sum_{i=1}^{N} c_i^{\theta}\right)^{1/\theta} \tag{3}$$

- $\bullet \ \theta = (\varepsilon 1)/\varepsilon > 0.$
- ▶ Elasticity of substitution $\varepsilon > 1$.
- ► The trick: constant substitution elasticity implies constant price elasticity.

Love for variety

A key implication: simply having more varieties increases welfare.

Assume you have \bar{C} units of "stuff" that can be made (1-for-1) into any variety:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{N} c_i = \bar{C}.$$

Consider the symmetric case: $c_i = \bar{C}/N$.

Then

$$C = \left(\sum_{i=1}^{N} [\bar{C}/N]^{\theta}\right)^{1/\theta}$$

$$= \left(N [\bar{C}/N]^{\theta}\right)^{1/\theta}$$

$$= N^{(1-\theta)/\theta} \bar{C}$$
(4)

Spreading \overline{C} over more varieties (N) increases utility.

The household's demand functions are iso-elastic.

The household solves:

$$\max u(C, y)$$

subject to

$$\sum_{i=1}^{N} p_i c_i + y = m \tag{6}$$

Given m, this is just a CES cost minimization problem.

$$\max u \left(\left[\sum_{i=1}^{N} c_i^{\theta} \right]^{1/\theta}, m - \sum p_i c_i \right)$$

FOC

$$\frac{\partial u}{\partial y} = \frac{\partial u}{\partial c_i} \frac{1}{p_i}$$

$$= \frac{\partial u}{\partial C} \frac{1}{\theta} \left[\sum_{i=1}^{N} c_i^{\theta} \right]^{1/\theta - 1} \theta \frac{c_i^{\theta - 1}}{p_i}$$

A useful feature:

$$[c_i/c_j]^{-1/\varepsilon} = p_i/p_j \tag{7}$$

Equal for all goods:

$$c_i^{-1/\varepsilon}/p_i \tag{8}$$

Demand function:

$$c_i = X p_i^{-\varepsilon} \tag{9}$$

for some endogenous constant X (which we need to find).

Price elasticity is constant at ε .

Claim:

The demand functions take the form

$$c_i/C = (p_i/P)^{-\varepsilon} \tag{10}$$

where *C* is the composite consumption good

$$C = \left[\sum_{i=1}^{N} c_i^{\theta}\right]^{1/\theta} \tag{11}$$

and *P* is the "ideal price index" for the household (the cost minimizing cost of *C*:

$$P = \left(\sum p_i^{1-\varepsilon}\right)^{1/(1-\varepsilon)} \tag{12}$$

Note: This is just a CES cost function.

Finding X

Now we have a simple two good problem:

$$\max u(C, y) \tag{13}$$

subject to

$$PC + y = m (14)$$

FOC:

$$u_y/u_C = 1/P \tag{15}$$

Example: $u(C, y) = \alpha \ln(C) + (1 - \alpha) \ln(y)$.

- $1/P = \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \frac{C}{y}$
- with budget constraint: $y = (1 \alpha)m$ and $PC = \alpha m$.

Ideal price index

- Another way of thinking about the household problem:
 - 1. For given C, find the cost minimizing c_i . Define the price index as

$$PC = \sum p_i c_i \tag{16}$$

- 2. max u(C,y) subject to PC+y=m.
- The cost minimizing price index is

$$P = \left(\sum p_i^{1-\varepsilon}\right)^{1/(1-\varepsilon)} \tag{17}$$

Ideal price index I

Proof:

$$\min \sum_{i} p_{i} c_{i} + \lambda \left[\left(\sum_{j} c_{j}^{\theta} \right)^{1/\theta} - C \right]$$
 (18)

FOC:

$$p_{i} = \lambda \left(\sum_{j} c_{j}^{\theta}\right)^{(1/\theta)-1} c_{i}^{\theta-1}$$

$$= \lambda C^{1-\theta} c_{i}^{\theta-1}$$
(20)

Solve for λ :

$$c_i = (\lambda/p_i)^{1/(1-\theta)} C$$

(21)

Ideal price index II

$$\left(\sum c_i^{\theta}\right)^{1/\theta} = C\lambda^{1/(1-\theta)} \left(\sum p_i^{\theta/(1-\theta)}\right)^{1/\theta} \tag{22}$$

$$\lambda = \left(\sum p_i^{\theta/(1-\theta)}\right)^{(1-\theta)/\theta} \tag{23}$$

Substitute and simplify.

The demand functions $c_i/C = (p_i/P)^{-\varepsilon}$ emerge.

QED

Digression: An Alternative Derivation

By definition:

$$PC = \sum p_i c_i \tag{24}$$

We need to express C and $\sum p_i c_i$ as functions of prices to solve for P.

First-order conditions determine relative demands:

$$c_i/c_1 = p_i^{-\varepsilon}/p_1^{-\varepsilon} \tag{25}$$

Sub into expression for

$$\sum p_i c_i = c_1 \sum p_i (c_i/c_1)$$
$$= c_1 p_1^{\varepsilon} \sum p_i^{1-\varepsilon}$$

Alternative Derivation

Sub the same into expression for

$$C = c_1 \left(\sum (c_i/c_1)^{(\varepsilon-1)/\varepsilon} \right)^{\varepsilon/(\varepsilon-1)}$$

$$= c_1 \left(\sum (p_i/p_1)^{1-\varepsilon} \right)^{\varepsilon/(\varepsilon-1)}$$

$$= c_1 p_1^{\varepsilon} \left(\sum p_i^{1-\varepsilon} \right)^{\varepsilon/(\varepsilon-1)}$$

Take the ratio:

$$P = \frac{PC}{C} = \frac{c_1 p_1^{\varepsilon}}{c_1 p_1^{\varepsilon}} \frac{\sum p_i^{1-\varepsilon}}{\left(\sum p_i^{1-\varepsilon}\right)^{\varepsilon/(\varepsilon-1)}}$$

Simplify to get the solution for *P*.

Alternative Derivation

The demand functions take the form

$$c_i/C = (p_i/P)^{-\varepsilon} \tag{26}$$

Proof:

$$p_i c_i = p_i c_1 \left(p_i / p_1 \right)^{-\varepsilon}$$

$$\sum p_i c_i = PC = c_1 p_1^{\varepsilon} \sum p_i^{1-\varepsilon}$$
$$= c_1 p_1^{\varepsilon} P^{1-\varepsilon}$$

$$PC P^{\varepsilon-1} = c_1 p_1^{\varepsilon}$$

Household summary

- Assume a Dixit-Stiglitz composite consumption good in preferences.
- Then demand is isoelastic.
 - ▶ the elasticity is determined by the elasticity of substitution across varieties in *C*.
- ► The cost of the optimal bundle C is given by P.
- ► The household reduces to a 2 good problem with standard solution.

Firms

- Each firm has a monopoly over a variety i.
- ▶ The demand elasticity is ε .
- Optimal monopoly pricing implies a constant markup over marginal cost:

$$p_i = \frac{\psi}{1 - 1/\varepsilon} \tag{27}$$

Assumption: The firm is small enough to neglect its effect on C and P.

Equilibrium

- Assume symmetry.
- Price index:

$$P = \left(\sum p_i^{1-\varepsilon}\right)^{1/(1-\varepsilon)}$$
$$= N^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}} \frac{\psi}{1-1/\varepsilon}$$

More goods of the same price → it costs less to achieve the same utility.

Equilibrium: Profits

$$\pi_{i} = c_{i}(p_{i} - \psi)
= C P^{\varepsilon} p_{i}^{-\varepsilon} (p_{i} - \psi)
= C N^{\varepsilon/(1-\varepsilon)} \frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon - 1} \psi$$
(28)

More varieties can increase profits:

- Direct effect: P falls more competitors erode profits.
- "Aggregate demand externality": C may rise (depends on preferences)
 - ► Higher *N* raises marginal utility for a given variety.
 - Innovators impose pecuniary externality on competitors.

Continuum of varieties

- ▶ Nothing changes when *i* is continuous.
- ▶ Replace all \sum with \int .

Reading

- ► Acemoglu (2009), ch. 12.
- ▶ Romer (2011), ch. 3.1-3.4.
- ▶ Jones (2005)

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- Acemoglu, D. (2009): *Introduction to modern economic growth*, MIT Press.
- Boldrin, M. and D. K. Levine (2008): "Perfectly competitive innovation," *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 55, 435–453.
- Jones, C. I. (2005): "Growth and ideas," *Handbook of economic growth*, 1, 1063–1111.
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