

# Validate Bayes-Nash Equilibrium Model in First-Price Reverse Auctions \*

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## Abstract

This paper tests the predictive power of Bayes-Nash equilibrium model in first-price procurement auctions through validation set approach. It estimates the equilibrium model on a subset of data using the Guerre-Perrigne-Vuong method and then generates predictions on validation set using inversion method. The generated predictions are compared to validation set. The result suggests that Bayes-Nash equilibrium model might not yield accurate predictions but the answer might be more nuanced due to flaws in the paper's approach.

## 1 Introduction

Participants at auctions submit bids for items based on their valuations and preferences of the items. There are many ways to think about the transformation from valuations and preferences into bids, and one usual economic approach is to consider the bids as a (hopefully not complex) function of valuations and preferences, an approach which this paper will take. At the end of auctions, the winner(s) is designated based on certain auction rules and the auction data becomes available. The data includes only bids, the final output of the bidding function, whereas valuations and preferences remain unknown, both of which are inputs to the bidding function. Interesting and useful analysis of auctions would entail additional knowledge about

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\*All code and data are located at <https://github.com/QuRyu/CDOT/>

valuations and preferences. For example, to compare how well DBE (disadvantaged business enterprise) performs in government procurement relative to other types of business enterprises, besides looking at how much DBE firms bid in auctions, it would also be useful to compare project costs of DBE firms to those of others. As project costs are an unknown, to do this essentially means conducting structural estimation on the data.

What is structural estimation? Structural estimation gives the ability to extract useful information from data, just like regression analysis. The difference lies in that structural analysis assumes a particular model and uses statistical methods to estimate relevant parameters of the model. The calibrated model can then generate predictions on objects of interest. For example, in first-price sealed-bid government procurement auctions, where the bidders who bids the lowest wins, one way to do structural analysis is assuming that bidders draw their costs independently and use the same bidding function to make bids. By reverse engineering the bidding function, structural analysis can be used to infer the cost distribution from bids (Guerre, Perrigne, & Vuong, 2000). On the other hand, compared to regression analysis, structural estimation imposes a stronger set of assumptions on the data. These additional assumptions enable structural estimation to be able to produce counter-factual predictions that are not discoverable under regression analysis.

Yet assumptions structural estimation impose on data also come at a cost. The central assumption underlying structural estimation is that the model used is correct in a particular environment of interest. But it is usually difficult to assess the model's fit in such environments. To overcome such a drawback, alternative studies such as lab experiments are used to confirm the theory's validity. Even though laboratory studies try to simulate real environments as much as possible, laboratory environments ultimately differ from those in real life and so the conclusions drawn from lab experiments do not necessarily hold true.

The goal of this paper is to test model validity in a new different way by borrowing techniques from statistical learning literature. In the prediction branch of statistical learning, a common technique to evaluate a model's

performance is by training the model on a dedicated training set that is a subset of the available dataset and then tests the model’s prediction on the validation set that is independent from the training set. In this paper, I will adapt the idea of validation set approach to investigate how well the equilibrium model performs in first-price procurement auctions. Specifically, I will split bidding data into training data and test data as in statistical learning. Then I will run structural estimation on the training data, simulate test data using inversion method, and compare the simulated data to actual test data. If the difference is statistically insignificant, that suggests fitness of the model in the particular environment. Similar work has been done in Chernomaz and Yoshimoto (2019), where they have compared the accuracy of semiparametric and nonparametric structural estimation methods in an asymmetric environment.

In this paper, I will use data from government procurement auctions to test the first-price sealed-bid equilibrium model (Riley & Samuelson, 1981) for structural estimation <sup>1</sup>.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the characteristics of the environment and derives the model for structural estimation. Section 3 examines the data and presents estimation results. Section 4 runs simulations based on estimation. Section 5 concludes with a discussion on the results and possible improvements.

## 2 Model

For the model setup, suppose there are  $n$  bidders in the auction, with  $n \geq 2$ , and there is a single, indivisible object being auctioned. Each bidder submits a sealed bid based on an observed cost before the auction. The bidder’s cost  $c$  is drawn i.i.d from a common distribution  $F(\cdot)$  which is continuous with

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<sup>1</sup>The original goal of this paper also includes comparing the cost distribution of DBE/MBE/WBE (standing respectively for Disadvantaged/Minority/Woman Business Enterprise) to the cost distribution of other firms, which will add to the existing literature on understanding how DBE/MBE/WBE perform relative to other firms. But due to data availability on these types of firms and time constraints on the project as this is a term paper, this goal is omitted.

density  $f(\cdot)$  on the support  $[\underline{c}, \bar{c}] \subset \mathbb{R}^+$ . All bidders are quasi-linear utility-maximizers, with the utility function  $u(c, b) = b - c$ . Bidders are therefore assumed to be risk-neutral. The number of bidders  $n$ , the cost distribution  $F$  and its support are common knowledge to all bidders in the auction. Besides, each bidder  $i$  can only observe her private cost  $c_i$ .

The paper focuses on the environment of first-price sealed-bid (FPSB) procurement auctions where the winner is the one who submits the lowest bid. In the following subsection, I will derive the Bayes-Nash Equilibrium in the FPSB reverse auction environment. After I have characterized the equilibrium, I will proceed to describe how private costs can be inferred from observed bids with the assumption that players are following equilibrium strategy.

## 2.1 Bayes-Nash Equilibrium

For bidder  $i$  in the procurement auction, she needs to report a bid  $b_i$  based on her private cost  $c_i$ . The bidder achieves maximal utility by maximizing the function

$$\max_{b_i} (b_i - c_i) P(\text{win} | b_i),$$

which is saying by picking an appropriate bid  $b_i$ , the bidder has a good balance between the revenue  $(b_i - c_i)$  and probability of winning.

Since this is a first-price reverse auction, where the lowest bidder wins, the probability of winning is

$$\begin{aligned} P(\text{win} | b_i) &= P(b_1 \geq b_i, \dots, b_{i-1} \geq b_i, b_{i+1} \geq b_i, \dots, b_n \geq b_i) \\ &= P(b_1 \geq b_i) \dots P(b_{i-1} \geq b_i) P(b_{i+1} \geq b_i) \dots P(b_n \geq b_i) \\ &= [1 - P(b_1 \leq b_i)] \dots [1 - P(b_{i-1} \leq b_i)] [1 - P(b_{i+1} \leq b_i)] \dots [1 - P(b_n \leq b_i)] \\ &= \prod_{j=1, j \neq i}^N [1 - P(b_j \leq b_i)] \end{aligned}$$

Now, suppose that there is a monotone bidding equilibrium function  $s(\cdot)$  such that all bidders abide by it and makes their bids based on it, i.e.

$b_i = s(c_i)$ . Then

$$\begin{aligned}
P(\text{win}|b_i) &= \prod_{j=1, j \neq i}^N [1 - P(s(c_j) \leq b_i)] \\
&= \prod_{j=1, j \neq i}^N [1 - P(c_j \leq s^{-1}(b_i))] \\
&= \prod_{j=1, j \neq i}^N [1 - F(s^{-1}(b_i))] \\
&= [1 - F(s^{-1}(b_i))]^{n-1},
\end{aligned}$$

where the last equality follows from symmetry – all bidders draw costs (independently) from the same distribution.

The objective function therefore becomes

$$\max_{b_i} (b_i - c_i) [1 - F(s^{-1}(b_i))]^{n-1}$$

and taking the first-order condition with respect to  $b_i$  yields

$$\begin{aligned}
[1 - F(s^{-1}(b_i))]^{n-1} &= (b_i - c_i)(n-1)[1 - F(s^{-1}(b_i))]^{n-2} f(s^{-1}(b_i)) \frac{ds^{-1}(b_i)}{db_i} \\
[1 - F(c_i)]^{n-1} &= (s(c_i) - c_i)(n-1)[1 - F(c_i)]^{n-2} f(c_i) \frac{1}{s'(c_i)} \\
1 &= (s(c_i) - c_i)(n-1) \frac{f(c_i)}{1 - F(c_i)} \frac{1}{s'(c_i)} \tag{1}
\end{aligned}$$

The differential equation characterizes the strategy in sealed-bid first-price reverse auction and the solution of it,  $s(\cdot)$ , gives the equilibrium bidding function as follows (Hubbard & Paarsch, 2009)

$$s(c) = b = c + \frac{\int_c^{\bar{c}} [1 - F(u)]^{n-1} du}{[1 - F(c)]^{n-1}} \tag{2}$$

## 2.2 Cost Inference

Our interest, however, lies not in the particular solution of this differential equation, but in using it as an intermediate step to derive cost as a function of bids,  $s^{-1}(\cdot)$ .

Assume  $G(\cdot)$  represents the cumulative distribution of bids, along with the continuous density function  $g(\cdot)$  and support  $[\underline{b}, \bar{b}] = [s(\underline{c}), s(\bar{c})]$ . As in Guerre et al. (2000), by a transformation of random variables, I have the identity  $G(b) = P(\tilde{b} < b) = P(\tilde{c} < s^{-1}(b)) = F(s^{-1}(b)) = F(c)$  and  $g(b) = f(c)/s'(c)$ . The ratio of  $g(b)/(1 - G(b))$  gives  $f(c_i)/(1 - F(c_i))(1/s'(c_i))$ . From this, equation (1) becomes

$$c_i = b_i - \frac{1}{n-1} \frac{g(b_i)}{1 - G(b_i)} \quad (3)$$

In an environment of  $n$  bidders, Equation (3) provides the method to estimate pseudo-costs from observed bids with kernel-estimated bid density and bid distribution. The estimated costs are pseudo because of assumptions that bidders are risk-neutral and play a Bayes-Nash equilibrium bidding strategy.

## 2.3 Estimation

The estimation consists of two steps. In step 1, I recover costs  $c$  based on observed bids  $b$ , by non-parametrically estimating  $G(b)$  and  $g(b)$  and using equation (3) to generate pseudo-costs. In step 2, I can then estimate the cost density  $f(c)$  from pseudo-costs.

The technique used to estimate  $G(b)$  and  $g(b)$ , as well as  $f(c)$ , is called kernel density estimation and has the following form

$$\hat{f}(x) = \frac{1}{nh} \sum_{i=1}^n K\left(\frac{x - x_i}{h}\right), \quad (4)$$

and

$$\hat{F}(x) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n I(x_i \leq x), \quad (5)$$

where  $x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n$  are the set of observed values. However, this kernel density estimation (4) method suffers from boundary problem: when the estimator is near the boundary values, the estimate will be downward biased. Instead, I will use the boundary-corrected kernel estimation method as proposed in (Hickman & Hubbard, 2015)

This two-step non-parametric estimation method has the advantage that to estimate cost distribution from observed bids, I do not need to assume a prior distribution of  $f(c)$ , whereas a parametric method works by first assuming the shape of a distribution and then estimating parameters of the distribution from data. This helps avoid implications brought by assumed distributions.

### 3 Data and Results

The bidding data used in this paper is downloaded from the Colorado Department of Transportation (<https://www.codot.gov/business/bidding>). I will take a short detour of the data itself before presenting results on cost estimation.

#### 3.1 Data Description

	Mean	Median	Standard Deviation	Max	Min
Total Bid	3,172,164.68	1,366,571.20	5,491,805.02	93,398,000.00	0.00
Percent of Engineer's Estimate (Cost)	106.54	100.02	22.63	750.00	0.00
Number of Bidders	5.47	5	2.5	16	1

Table 1: Basic summary statistics of data

There are in total 1182 auctions in the data. For each auction, I have the number of participants  $n$ , bids submitted by participants and the engineer's estimate. The summary statistics of the data are summarized in Table 1. Projects vary from each other in their sizes, types, and many other factors. Even the same type of projects will have different costs. As Table 1 shows,




Figure 1: Frequency of normalized bids (bids divided by engineer's estimate)

the variance in Total Bid is very large and not an ideal candidate for cost estimates. Instead, I will work with Percent of Engineer's Estimate to infer cost distribution. Percent of Engineer's Estimate is Total Bid divided by Engineer's Estimate, which is also known as normalized bids. Inferred cost distribution constructed this way will be invariant across projects.

Figure 1 plots the frequency of normalized bids. Most bids are centered around 110%, which is slightly higher than the engineer's estimate with respect to which bids are normalized. However, there are some outliers located in the *More* bin, which would cause numeric instability in estimation. For data that is *More* bins, the kernel-estimated bid distribution  $G_B(\cdot)$  is close to 1 and so  $1 - G_B(\cdot)$  close to 0. As in the right-hand side of equation (3), the part  $\frac{g(b)}{1 - G_B(b)}$  will tend to infinity as  $1 - G_B(b)$  approaches zero, resulting in the estimated cost to be negative. The problem will persist over the boundary of the data and is inherent in the kernel distribution estimation. The boundary-correction technique introduced in (Hickman & Hubbard, 2015) applies only to the kernel density estimation, not kernel distribution estimation, and overcoming the boundary problems in kernel distribution estimation is outside the scope of this paper. For simplicity, I






Figure 2: Estimated costs plotted against bids.

will first use equation (3) to estimate costs and then trim the negative costs.

### 3.2 Results

With data comprised of auctions that have a different number of participants, the general estimation procedure remains the same. But the equation (3) that assumes a fixed  $n$  for the number of participants is modified to accommodate varying  $n$  (Gentry, Hubbard, McComb, & Schiller, 2018)

$$c_{in} = b_{in} - \frac{1}{n-1} \cdot \frac{g(b_{in}|N=n)}{1 - G_B(b_{in}|N=n)}, \quad (6)$$

where  $c_{in}$  and  $b_{in}$  refer to the cost and bid in  $i$ -th auction with  $n$  participants, and the density  $g(\cdot|N=n)$  and distribution  $G(\cdot|N=n)$  are estimated on auction data with  $n$  participants.

Figure 2 plots the estimated cost against bids in the plot. Bidder's markup over costs is infinitesimal. This is so mainly due to the bid distribution. As shown in Figure 1, most of the bids are scattered in the range  $[70, 200]$ , which means that for each bid  $b$ , the estimated density value at the




Figure 3: Pseudo-cost density (on the left) and cost distribution (on the right)

specific bid value,  $f_c(b)$ , is small: the peak of  $f_c(\cdot)$  being 0.0222. A closer look at the bid distributions of auctions with a different number of participants,  $n$ , reveals that the majority of auction data with small  $n$ , where the competition is less fierce and bidders are able to have a larger markup over the costs than those having more competitors, has bids compressed around 110%. The fact that bids and costs are very close also suggests that the auctions are very efficient in helping the Colorado government save money.

Figure 3 shows the kernel-estimated density and distribution of pseudo-costs. Because pseudo-costs are close to corresponding bids, the density figure on the left of Figure 3 is very similar to the histogram of bids, Figure 1. As both plots in Figure 3 show, the inferred costs also center around the range  $[70, 200]$ . As the density outside the range  $[70, 200]$  is very slim, the implication will be that simulation based on this cost distribution will not be very accurate in generating values outside the range, which partially decreases the predictive power of the model.

## 4 Simulation

To test if the estimated cost distribution captures the underlying cost distribution that induces observed bids, I will proceed to the validation stage: simulate bids using estimated cost distribution  $F_c(\cdot)$  and comparing simu-




Figure 4: Simulated bids against simulated costs.




Figure 5: Bids from test data (x-axis) plotted against simulated bids (y-axis).

lated bids to actual bids. The validation data comes from an auction with 16 bidders.

The simulation technique is known as the inversion method and runs as follows. I will draw 16 random numbers uniformly distributed on the range  $(0,1)$  and use the inverse distribution function,  $F_c^{-1}(\cdot)$ , to find the corresponding costs. The bids are then computed using equation (2) and the estimated cost distribution  $F_c$ . This process is repeated 1000 times and the averages of each bid are taken.

Figure 4 plots simulated costs against simulated bids that are inferred from simulated costs using equation (2). The simulated costs and bids center around 110% and the range is small, with the max and min differing by less than 4%. This is due to the estimated unimodal cost distribution concentrating in the range  $[80, 200]$ , with a peak around 110%. With the inversion method repeated 1000 times, it is natural that the costs and bids fall into the place where most bids and costs are concentrated. With the number of runs curtailed to 100 and 50, as shown in Figure 6, the bids become more spread out and closer to the bid distribution. This shows that the number of runs is an important factor to determine in order to have a more accurate simulation. But determining the best number of runs is outside the scope of this paper. For the rest of this paper, I will keep referencing the data




Figure 6: Bid simulation run for 100 times (left) and 10 times(right)

generated with 1000 runs.

Figure 5 plots test data against simulated bids. A wide difference between simulation and test data is observed here. This difference, however, is not unexpected. The validation data, which contains an auction with 16 bidders, does not conform to the bid distribution depicted in Figure 1. The calibrated model has only learnt information from the training data and so can only make predictions from what it already knows. This might imply that equilibrium model adopted in this paper is not robust to new data. To derive more meaningful comparisons, I need to augment the size of validation set. For example, 80% of available data should be used for training and 20% of data for validation. However, due to time limit that this term paper imposes, I have not proceeded further.

## 5 Conclusion

This paper tries to propose a way to test economics models by validation set approach. It splits a government procurement auction dataset about highway constructions into training set and validation set. Then it estimates the cost distribution from training data assuming Bayes-Nash equilibrium model. Second, using the estimated cost distribution, it constructs simulated bids with the inversion method and compare the simulation to test data. Even though the wide difference between the simulation and test data

suggests that the first-price sealed-bid equilibrium model introduced in Riley and Samuelson (1981) may be not an accurate model to predict bidder's behavior in such environment, the flaws in this paper's experiment design demand further investigation before any firm conclusion can be drawn. For example, in the second step of the cross-validation procedure, comparing bids directly to test theory's validity may not be a good idea, as suggested in Harrison (1989). Harrison (1989) instead proposes to "evaluate subject behavior in the expected payoff space", which can be incorporated into future work of the project.

The practice of using validation set to verify model's performance has been standard in the statistical learning literature. I consider it a natural extension to introduce it into the economics field as a way to test how models match reality. As Structural estimation relies on the model's correctly modeling agent's behavior, I hope the introduction of validation set approach would help with model verification besides lab experiments and would help structural estimation becomes more robust.

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