# CSPB 3702 - Reckwerdt - Cognitive Science

Dashboard / My courses / 2237:CSPB 3702 / 13 November - 19 November / Games 4B Quiz

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|---|---|
| **Started on** | Monday, 6 November 2023, 9:24 PM |
| **State** | Finished |
| **Completed on** | Monday, 6 November 2023, 9:42 PM |
| **Time taken** | 18 mins 37 secs |

Question **1**

Complete

Marked out of 1.00

Which of the following are *not* key defining aspects of the prisoner's dilemma, that separate it from other game theory scenarios?

Select one or more:

- ☑ a. I personally know my opponent, and can guess their strategy.
- ☑ b. I can never remember what happened in the last round.
- ☑ c. I can always see what my opponent is going to choose before I make my decision.
- ☐ d. I will always score better in each round if I Defect, no matter what my opponent does (Defects or Cooperates).
- ☐ e. If we both Cooperate, we will both do better over many rounds than if we trade.

Your answer is correct.

Question **2**

Complete

Marked out of 1.00

In Axelrod's "Prisoner's Dilemma World", how many different options are there for defining a "creature"?

Select one:

○ a. 70!

○ b. $70^2$

◉ c. $2^{70}$

○ d. 70 * 100

Your answer is correct.

Question **3**

Complete

Marked out of 1.00

Which of the following best describes the "Leviathan" method of overcoming the tragedy of the commons, as described by Ostrom in chapter 1 of *The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*?

Select one:

◉ a. Common resources must be governed by a strong, controlling entity like the government

○ b. Common resources must be individually allocated

○ c. Common resources will never be overused if there is a looming threat of an unknown entity like a monster

Your answer is correct.

Question **4**

Complete

Marked out of 1.00

In Chapter 1 of Ostrom's *The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Actions*, which of the following is *not* a model of group decision making that Ostrom cites as an influence on the governance of shared resources?

Select one:

○ a. The Prisoner's Dilemma

○ b. The Tragedy of the Commons

◉ c. Schelling's Neighborhood Model

○ d. The Logic of Collective Action

Your answer is correct.

Question **5**

Complete

Marked out of 1.00

In lecture, we discussed a variety of scenarios for "large-scale" games in which the decisions of an individual are influenced by the (potential or anticipated) decisions of a crowd. What are examples of "I want to do "X" only if few or no others are doing "X."

Select one or more:

☑ a.
Wanting to visit the the Louvre in January to avoid lots of tourists

☑ b.
Wanting to give your child a unique name that they won't share with others

☐ c.
Wanting to go out to a new restaurant as soon as it opens

☐ d.
Wanting to work from home during a pandemic to avoid getting sick

Your answer is correct.

Question **6**

Complete

Marked out of 1.00

What is an example of "I want to do X only if many (nearly all? All?) others are doing X"?

Select one or more:

☑ a.

I only want to go to this party if all of my friends go to the party too.

☐ b.

I only want to get this tattoo if everyone gets this tattoo.

☐ c.

I only want to go to the office if everyone chooses to work from home.

☑ d.

I only want to see a movie in theater if everyone is going to see it.

Your answer is correct.

Question **7**

Complete

Marked out of 1.00

What is an example of "I would like to choose strategy X, but only if I can do so without my decision being made public."

◉ a. I only want to vote for this person for public office  if others don't know I voted for him/her.

○ b. I only want to buy this shirt, if no one knows I've bought it.

○ c. I only want to watch this movie, only if others have watched it too.

○ d. I only want to read *A Tale of Two Cities* if people won't know I've read it.

Your answer is correct.

Question **8**

Complete

Marked out of 1.00

Why was the

featured during the 1984 Super Bowl a great example of game theoretic reasoning?

○ a. Because they undermined IBM.

○ b. Because they were able to show how strong their product was.

◉ c. Because they wanted people to see that they had a large viewership and, therefore, it was "safe" to buy a Macintosh.

○ d. Because they made a commercial that was memorable and would make people consider Macintosh whenever they were buying a new computer.

Your answer is correct.

Question **9**

Complete

Marked out of 1.00

The phrase "Nobody ever got fired for choosing IBM" was meant to imply that choosing the larger and more establish option was the better decision. What line of reasoning is this an example of?

◉ a. I want to do X only if I think many people are doing X.

○ b. I would like to choose X, but only if I can do so without my decision being made public.

○ c. I want to do X only if I won't get fired.

○ d. I want to do X only if I think few people are doing X.

Your answer is correct.

Question **10**

Complete

Marked out of 1.00

Historically, kings and queens would go on tours after their coronation. Why was this necessary?

○ a. Because it allowed the king or queen to establish order in each place they visited. .

⊙ b. Because it allowed people to see the new king or queen and see others seeing the new king or queen.

○ c. Because it allowed people to see the new king or queen themselves.

○ d. Because it allowed them to discuss the Super Bowl commercials.

Your answer is correct.

Question **11**

Complete

Marked out of 1.00

In what way was the impact of the historical tours of kings and queens after coronation different and more successful from the 1984 Macintosh commercial?

○ a. The kings and queens were in a position of power over the people seeing them.

○ b. The tours' public crowds were much more evident than commercial viewership.

○ c. The two had different game theoretic reasoning.

⊙ d. The kings and queens were real people, not a company.

Your answer is incorrect.

Question **12**

Complete

Marked out of 1.00

In lecture, we discussed a "class-wide" game in which:

- If you choose "C," you get N * 100 dollars.
- If you choose "D", you get 200 + (N * 100) dollars.
- N is the number of people who chose "C."

Which of the following statements regarding the class-wide game are true?

Select one or more:

☑ a.
Choosing D benefits you more than choosing C.

☐ b.
Choosing C benefits you more than choosing D.

☑ c.
Someone's answer could be different depending on it is public or private.

☑ d. Choosing C benefits everyone the more than choosing D does.

Your answer is correct.

Question **13**

Complete

Marked out of 1.00

What makes the "tragedy of the commons" a tragedy?

○ a. Your decision to participate does not harm you.

○ b. The system only works when everyone makes a different decision.

○ c. It benefits everyone at first.

◉ d. The system collapses when everyone makes the same decision.

Your answer is correct.

Question **14**

Complete

Marked out of 1.00

What are some real world examples of the "Tragedy of the Commons"?

Select one or more:

☑ a.

When fishermen continuing to fish for an almost extinct species because everyone else continues to do so.

☑ b.

When everyone eats apples, we run out of apples and they will eventually go extinct.

☑ c.

When everyone takes the freeway, it's no longer the fastest route to your destination due to the traffic.

☐ d.

When everyone decides to see a movie, it it loses its appeal.

Your answer is correct.

Question **15**

Complete

Marked out of 1.00

The following is a description of a well-known experimental, or laboratory, game called "The Ultimatum Game". The game is played by two players, A and B. Here is the scenario:

A and B are sitting across a table from each other. The experimenter places a large sum of money in front of Player A (let's say, $1000).

Player A now has one choice to make: namely, how much of the $1000 to offer to Player B. For example, Player A might decide to offer $500; or $5; or nothing at all; or indeed, if A wishes, the entire $1000.

Now Player B has one choice to make: either accept A's offer, in which case both players go home with the amount of money in front of them, or reject A's offer. If B rejects the offer, the experimenter takes back the entire pot of money and both players go home with nothing.

Now, consider this game in terms of "classical" game theory for a moment. Suppose you are Player B. You watch Player A receive $1000 at the other end of the table. Player A now offers you one dollar (which means A gets $999). Would it be rational to accept the offer?

(If you want to read more about the Ultimatum Game, there is a good discussion of the scenario at Wikipedia, among other sites.)

○ a. No, because A doesn't deserve that large of a share.

○ b. No, because they should have offered me more.

○ c. Yes, because I will regret it if I don't.

⊙ d. Yes, because I will have $1 more than if I reject offer.

Your answer is correct.

Question **16**

Complete

Marked out of 1.00

What does the ultimatum game say about the potential limitations of "classical" game theory, in which the measure of reward can be expressed clearly (often in monetary terms)?

○ a. People want to choose the option that benefits them the most, regardless of how it benefits others.

◉ b. People may reject choices that, although technically beneficial to them, seem unfair.

○ c. People's choices are dependent on the choices of others.

○ d. People will always opt for the option that benefits them the most financially.

Your answer is correct.

Question **17**

Complete

Marked out of 9.00

Write a short discussion of these scenarios: If you were Player A, how much do you think you would realistically offer in this game? If you were Player B, how much would you realistically accept?

I'll start with Player B. Personally I would take anything as low as $1. This is because I would walk away with 1 more dollar than I started with even though Player A would be walking away with a significantly higher amount of money than me.

If I was Player A, I would want to walk away with enough money as possible and at the same time I would like to offer enough money to Player B so that they wouldn't get mad. In this case, I would probably offer Player B something like $333. In this case I would still walk away with twice the amount as Player B and I still think Player B would be happy with receiving that dollar amount.