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UpdateVM system defaults should only list NetVMs and ProxyVMs #1831

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mfc opened this Issue Mar 15, 2016 · 8 comments

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@mfc
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mfc commented Mar 15, 2016

Currently in Qubes VM Manager > System > System defaults > UpdateVM, it lists all VMs as possibilities for UpdateVM. It should only list netvms and proxyvms. Probably the same should be done for ClockVM.

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marmarek Mar 15, 2016

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Why? It is perfectly fine to have any AppVM set there. For example a VM behind Tor, or VPN, to be sure that yumdownloader/ntpdate will not see real IP.

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marmarek commented Mar 15, 2016

Why? It is perfectly fine to have any AppVM set there. For example a VM behind Tor, or VPN, to be sure that yumdownloader/ntpdate will not see real IP.

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mfc Mar 15, 2016

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For example a VM behind Tor, or VPN, to be sure that yumdownloader/ntpdate will not see real IP.

those VMs are ProxyVMs, no?

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mfc commented Mar 15, 2016

For example a VM behind Tor, or VPN, to be sure that yumdownloader/ntpdate will not see real IP.

those VMs are ProxyVMs, no?

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mfc Mar 15, 2016

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Why?

I can't think of a single use-case where a user should be putting their network traffic through a "qube" (AppVM) or a template, rather than a ProxyVM.

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mfc commented Mar 15, 2016

Why?

I can't think of a single use-case where a user should be putting their network traffic through a "qube" (AppVM) or a template, rather than a ProxyVM.

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marmarek Mar 15, 2016

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those VMs are ProxyVMs, no?

But those ProxyVMs itself see the real IP. Only VMs behind are are really isolated. I think Whonix gateway is some exception here - it also torify traffic originating directly from it.

(I agree templates are useless on that list)

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marmarek commented Mar 15, 2016

those VMs are ProxyVMs, no?

But those ProxyVMs itself see the real IP. Only VMs behind are are really isolated. I think Whonix gateway is some exception here - it also torify traffic originating directly from it.

(I agree templates are useless on that list)

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adrelanos Mar 18, 2016

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Marek Marczykowski-Górecki:

I think Whonix gateway is some exception here - it also torify traffic originating directly from it.

Yes.

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adrelanos commented Mar 18, 2016

Marek Marczykowski-Górecki:

I think Whonix gateway is some exception here - it also torify traffic originating directly from it.

Yes.

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bnvk Mar 22, 2016

But those ProxyVMs itself see the real IP. Only VMs behind are are really isolated. I think Whonix gateway is some exception here - it also torify traffic originating directly from it.

So, then perhaps the solution I think @mfc is after (making this selection process more simple + safe for users) is to only show AppVMs, or Whonix gateway so as to not allow users to accidentally leak their real IP

bnvk commented Mar 22, 2016

But those ProxyVMs itself see the real IP. Only VMs behind are are really isolated. I think Whonix gateway is some exception here - it also torify traffic originating directly from it.

So, then perhaps the solution I think @mfc is after (making this selection process more simple + safe for users) is to only show AppVMs, or Whonix gateway so as to not allow users to accidentally leak their real IP

@bnvk bnvk referenced this issue Mar 23, 2016

Closed

Implement a more intuitive Qubes Manager #1870

1 of 12 tasks complete

andrewdavidwong added a commit that referenced this issue Jun 7, 2016

marmarta added a commit to marmarta/qubes-manager that referenced this issue Jul 12, 2018

Offset context menu in Manager to avoid accidental clicks
Small fix to Qubes Manager to open the context menu slightly to the
right of the mouse to avoid accidental clicks. Originally created by
@unman , ported to 3.2 branch.

references QubesOS/qubes-issues#1831
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qubesos-bot Jul 18, 2018

Automated announcement from builder-github

The package qubes-manager-4.0.19-1.fc25 has been pushed to the r4.0 testing repository for dom0.
To test this update, please install it with the following command:

sudo qubes-dom0-update --enablerepo=qubes-dom0-current-testing

Changes included in this update

Automated announcement from builder-github

The package qubes-manager-4.0.19-1.fc25 has been pushed to the r4.0 testing repository for dom0.
To test this update, please install it with the following command:

sudo qubes-dom0-update --enablerepo=qubes-dom0-current-testing

Changes included in this update

@qubesos-bot qubesos-bot referenced this issue in QubesOS/updates-status Jul 18, 2018

Open

manager v4.0.19 (r4.0) #600

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