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Sign upR4.0 Saving default backup profile writes plaintext passphrase #3500
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I agree, there should be a warning in the GUI |
andrewdavidwong
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C: qubes-manager
P: major
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Jan 27, 2018
andrewdavidwong
added this to the Release 4.0 milestone
Jan 27, 2018
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Jan 27, 2018
awokd
changed the title from
R4.0 Default backup profile passphrase saved in plaintext
to
R4.0 Saving default backup profile writes plaintext passphrase
Feb 4, 2018
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awokd
Feb 4, 2018
Reworded title slightly because it's the act of saving the "default backup profile" that poses the issue, not a default setting somewhere.
Was thinking about this a bit more too. Should the dilemma of saving a passphrase be posed to the GUI user? Could remove it entirely so checking the box in the GUI saves all settings except passphrase, but leave the option to do so open to CLI users (with appropriate warnings there).
awokd
commented
Feb 4, 2018
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Reworded title slightly because it's the act of saving the "default backup profile" that poses the issue, not a default setting somewhere. Was thinking about this a bit more too. Should the dilemma of saving a passphrase be posed to the GUI user? Could remove it entirely so checking the box in the GUI saves all settings except passphrase, but leave the option to do so open to CLI users (with appropriate warnings there). |
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andrewdavidwong
Feb 4, 2018
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Was thinking about this a bit more too. Should the dilemma of saving a passphrase be posed to the GUI user? Could remove it entirely so checking the box in the GUI saves all settings except passphrase, but leave the option to do so open to CLI users (with appropriate warnings there).
That's a tough question, but I'm inclined to say that we shouldn't intentionally omit options from the GUI that are present in the CLI on the assumption that the classes of users who self-select into using the CLI vs. the GUI cleanly map onto the classes of users who are sophisticated enough to make this decision vs. those who are not, respectively. There's probably a correlation, but it might be a weak one. I know some savvy users who simply prefer the GUI for certain tasks.
That's a tough question, but I'm inclined to say that we shouldn't intentionally omit options from the GUI that are present in the CLI on the assumption that the classes of users who self-select into using the CLI vs. the GUI cleanly map onto the classes of users who are sophisticated enough to make this decision vs. those who are not, respectively. There's probably a correlation, but it might be a weak one. I know some savvy users who simply prefer the GUI for certain tasks. |
marmarta
referenced this issue
in QubesOS/qubes-manager
Feb 6, 2018
Merged
Added warning to backup gui that password is saved in plain text. #62
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marmarta
Feb 6, 2018
I've added a warning, and I'm wondering whether it would be a better idea to store the password in base64 - it's no encryption, but at least solves the shoulder-surfing problem a bit.
marmarta
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Feb 6, 2018
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I've added a warning, and I'm wondering whether it would be a better idea to store the password in base64 - it's no encryption, but at least solves the shoulder-surfing problem a bit. |
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awokd
Feb 8, 2018
That's usually how SMB commercial backup software saves passphrases too, some trivial algorithm easily reversed with third party tools in case you are in a rush to do a restore.
awokd
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Feb 8, 2018
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That's usually how SMB commercial backup software saves passphrases too, some trivial algorithm easily reversed with third party tools in case you are in a rush to do a restore. |
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lunarthegrey
Feb 10, 2018
@marmarta I would opt for base64 encoded. Better than it is now, at least a temporary solution.
lunarthegrey
commented
Feb 10, 2018
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@marmarta I would opt for base64 encoded. Better than it is now, at least a temporary solution. |
marmarek
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awokd
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Feb 10, 2018
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Thank you. |
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qubesos-bot
Feb 10, 2018
Automated announcement from builder-github
The package qubes-manager-4.0.14-1.fc25 has been pushed to the r4.0 testing repository for dom0.
To test this update, please install it with the following command:
sudo qubes-dom0-update --enablerepo=qubes-dom0-current-testing
qubesos-bot
commented
Feb 10, 2018
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Automated announcement from builder-github The package
|
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Feb 10, 2018
qubesos-bot
referenced this issue
in QubesOS/updates-status
Feb 10, 2018
Closed
manager v4.0.14 (r4.0) #404
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qubesos-bot
Feb 27, 2018
Automated announcement from builder-github
The package qubes-manager-4.0.15-1.fc25 has been pushed to the r4.0 stable repository for dom0.
To install this update, please use the standard update command:
sudo qubes-dom0-update
Or update dom0 via Qubes Manager.
qubesos-bot
commented
Feb 27, 2018
|
Automated announcement from builder-github The package
Or update dom0 via Qubes Manager. |
awokd commentedJan 27, 2018
Qubes OS version:
R4.0
Affected TemplateVMs:
N/A
Steps to reproduce the behavior:
Use Qubes Backup VM GUI
Enter passphrase
Check "Save settings as default backup profile" box
Proceed and run backup
cat /etc/qubes/backup/qubes-manager-backup.conf
Expected behavior:
Empty passphrase in file
Actual behavior:
Passphrase displayed in plaintext
General notes:
I know if dom0 is compromised to the point where individual files can be viewed it's pretty much game over, but this does not appear to be a good default if we are concerned about shoulder sniffing passphrases for example (#2777). If it's by design, it seems to me it should be strongly called out in the GUI and man/help page. I can see leaving the option of saving passphrases in profiles for users who are utilizing qvm-backup from the command line.
Related issues: