

Percentage Delay Rate (with one type of contractor): QuickPay (2009-2012)

Jan 19, 2023

- Sample restricted to contractors holding only one type of project in the sample horizon.
- Except where we examine “Spillover effect” – there we use a “clean control”
 - This means we keep all small projects
 - We keep only those large project-quarters that don’t have a concurrent small project.


1 Setup

2 Demeaned delay rate (in percentage)

- Subtract the average pre-quickpay delay rate from each observation

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## Warning: Using `size` aesthetic for lines was deprecated in ggplot2 3.4.0.
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## i Please use `linewidth` instead.
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3 Baseline Regressions

$$PercentDelay_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Treat_i + \beta_2 Post_t + \beta_3 (Treat_i \times Post_t) + e_{it}$$

$$PercentDelay_{it} = \alpha + \beta_0 Treat_i + \beta_1 Post_t + \beta_2 (Treat_i \times Post_t) \\ + X_i + (Post_t \times X_i) + \mu_t + \theta_{firm} + \lambda_{task} + \epsilon_{it}$$

Table 1: Effect of QuickPay on project delay rates

	<i>PercentDelay_{it}</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Treat_i</i>	-0.94*** (0.15)	-0.80*** (0.13)	-0.88*** (0.13)	-0.89*** (0.14)	-0.92*** (0.14)
<i>Post_t</i>	-0.38*** (0.14)	-6.94*** (1.06)			
<i>Treat_i × Post_t</i>	1.45*** (0.18)	1.31*** (0.17)	1.39*** (0.17)	1.38*** (0.17)	1.42*** (0.17)
Constant	6.12*** (0.11)	55.77*** (0.81)			
Duration, Budget, Bids	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Post_t × (Duration, Budget, Bids)</i>	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Project stage	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Task fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Industry fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	174,197	157,166	157,166	157,166	157,166
R ²	0.0005	0.18	0.19	0.22	0.22
Adjusted R ²	0.0005	0.18	0.18	0.21	0.21

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Each observation is a project-quarter.

SEs are robust and clustered at the project level.

3.1 Delay days

Table 2: Effect of QuickPay on days of delay rates

	<i>DelayDays_{it}</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Treat_i</i>	-2.17*** (0.23)	-1.33*** (0.22)	-1.50*** (0.22)	-1.88*** (0.22)	-1.94*** (0.23)
<i>Post_t</i>	1.47*** (0.23)	-5.08*** (1.55)			
<i>Treat_i × Post_t</i>	2.38*** (0.30)	2.45*** (0.30)	2.63*** (0.30)	2.63*** (0.29)	2.65*** (0.30)
Constant	9.74*** (0.18)	62.82*** (1.15)			
Duration, Budget, Bids	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Post_t × (Duration, Budget, Bids)</i>	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Project stage	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Task fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Industry fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	174,306	157,275	157,275	157,275	157,275
R ²	0.002	0.14	0.14	0.17	0.17
Adjusted R ²	0.002	0.14	0.14	0.17	0.17

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01


Each observation is a project-quarter.

SEs are robust and clustered at the project level.

4 Event study

$$PercentDelay_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Treat_i + \beta_2 Treat_i \times Quarter_t + \gamma_{task} + \theta_{naics} + \lambda_{quarter} + \nu_{sub-agency} + \epsilon_{it}$$

NOTE: 171,376 observations removed because of NA values (LHS: 154,345, RHS: 171,267).



5 Parallel Trends Test

Table 3: Linear Time Trend Before QuickPay

	<i>PercentDelay_{it}</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Treat_i</i>	−0.44 (0.55)	−0.35 (0.52)	−0.34 (0.52)	−0.57 (0.54)	−0.72 (0.54)
<i>QuarterNum</i>	0.47*** (0.09)	−1.68** (0.66)			
<i>Treat_i × QuarterNum</i>	−0.12 (0.12)	−0.13 (0.11)	−0.13 (0.11)	0.02 (0.11)	0.04 (0.11)
Constant	4.02*** (0.42)	63.83*** (3.10)			
Duration, Budget, Bids	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Post_t</i> × (Duration, Budget, Bids)	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Project stage	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Task fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Industry fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	64,786	59,707	59,707	59,707	59,707
R ²	0.001	0.21	0.21	0.27	0.27
Adjusted R ²	0.001	0.21	0.21	0.26	0.26

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Each observation is a project-quarter.

SEs are robust and clustered at the project level.

Observations are for quarters before quickpay.

6 Placebo Test

[1] 3

Table 4: Placebo test: Treatment Time 2010-06-30

	<i>PercentDelay_{it}</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Treat_i</i>	-2.47*** (0.91)	-4.37*** (0.90)	-4.39*** (0.90)	-2.62*** (0.89)	-2.86*** (0.89)
<i>Post</i>	0.27 (0.72)	-16.55*** (5.88)			
<i>Treat_i × Post</i>	0.79 (0.95)	2.56*** (0.94)	2.48*** (0.94)	1.73* (0.92)	1.85** (0.92)
Constant	9.79*** (0.70)	117.02*** (5.52)			
Duration, Budget, Bids	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Post_t × (Duration, Budget, Bids)</i>	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Project stage	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Task fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Industry fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	64,786	59,707	59,707	59,707	59,707
R ²	0.001	0.22	0.22	0.27	0.28
Adjusted R ²	0.001	0.22	0.22	0.26	0.26

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Each observation is a project-quarter.

SEs are robust and clustered at the project level.

Observations are for quarters before quickpay.

Table 5: Placebo test: Treatment Time 2010-09-30

	<i>PercentDelay_{it}</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Treat_i</i>	-1.03* (0.54)	-2.49*** (0.51)	-2.50*** (0.51)	-1.51*** (0.54)	-1.72*** (0.54)
<i>Post</i>	1.81*** (0.46)	-13.64*** (3.92)			
<i>Treat_i × Post</i>	-0.95 (0.61)	0.50 (0.59)	0.48 (0.59)	0.61 (0.59)	0.71 (0.59)
Constant	8.66*** (0.40)	112.74*** (3.41)			
Duration, Budget, Bids	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Post_t × (Duration, Budget, Bids)</i>	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Project stage	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Task fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Industry fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	64,786	59,707	59,707	59,707	59,707
R ²	0.001	0.22	0.22	0.27	0.28
Adjusted R ²	0.001	0.22	0.22	0.26	0.26

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Each observation is a project-quarter.

SEs are robust and clustered at the project level.

Observations are for quarters before quickpay.

Table 6: Placebo test: Treatment Time 2010-12-31

	<i>PercentDelay_{it}</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$Treat_i$	-1.00** (0.41)	-1.14*** (0.39)	-1.18*** (0.39)	-0.36 (0.44)	-0.55 (0.44)
$Post$	1.00** (0.42)	-20.67*** (3.38)			
$Treat_i \times Post$	-1.31** (0.54)	-1.73*** (0.53)	-1.66*** (0.52)	-1.08** (0.55)	-0.99* (0.55)
Constant	9.48*** (0.31)	114.18*** (2.60)			
Duration, Budget, Bids	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
$Post_t \times$ (Duration, Budget, Bids)	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Project stage	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Task fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Industry fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	64,786	59,707	59,707	59,707	59,707
R ²	0.001	0.22	0.22	0.27	0.28
Adjusted R ²	0.001	0.22	0.22	0.26	0.27

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Each observation is a project-quarter.

SEs are robust and clustered at the project level.

Observations are for quarters before quickpay.

7 Summary statistics

8 Congestion Effect

8.1 Number of projects per contractor

8.1.1 Contractors holding only small or only large projects




Table 7: Num Contractor Projects and QuickPay reform

	Number of projects	
	(1)	(2)
$Treat_i$	-2.03*** (0.39)	-2.03*** (0.39)
$Post_t$	0.94** (0.41)	
$Treat_i \times Post_t$	-0.58 (0.41)	-0.58 (0.41)
Constant	5.03*** (0.38)	
Time fixed effects	No	Yes
Observations	84,391	84,391
R^2	0.005	0.01
Adjusted R^2	0.005	0.01

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Each observation is a contractor-quarter.

SEs are robust and clustered at the contractor level.

Sample restricted to contractors performing only one type of project.

8.1.2 Contractors holding at least one small project are “treated”

8.2 Total budget

8.2.1 Contractors holding only small or only large projects




Table 8: Contractor Project Budget and QuickPay reform

	Total budget	
	(1)	(2)
$Treat_i$	-2,503,033.00*** (454,885.70)	-2,497,737.00*** (456,972.80)
$Post_t$	1,715,503.00*** (229,333.50)	
$Treat_i \times Post_t$	-953,041.30*** (231,908.60)	-955,237.70*** (233,131.80)
Constant	3,666,740.00*** (453,287.80)	
Time fixed effects	No	Yes
Observations	84,391	84,391
R ²	0.01	0.02
Adjusted R ²	0.01	0.01

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Each observation is a contractor-quarter.

SEs are robust and clustered at the contractor level.

Sample restricted to contractors performing only one type of project.

8.3 Number of tasks

8.3.1 Contractors holding only small or only large projects




Table 9: Contractor Project Tasks and QuickPay reform

Number of tasks		
	(1)	(2)
$Treat_i$	-0.23*** (0.04)	-0.23*** (0.04)
$Post_t$	0.17*** (0.02)	
$Treat_i \times Post_t$	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Constant	1.73*** (0.04)	
Time fixed effects	No	Yes
Observations	84,391	84,391
R ²	0.01	0.01
Adjusted R ²	0.01	0.01

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Each observation is a contractor-quarter.

SEs are robust and clustered at the contractor level.

Sample restricted to contractors performing only one type of project.

9 Project portfolio: Spillover effect

9.1 Regression 1: DID on large projects

- Sample restricted to large projects only.
- $Treat_i$ is an indicator that equals one for LARGE projects that have at least one parallel small project in the same quarter, and is zero otherwise.

Table 10: Project Portfolio and QuickPay reform

	<i>PercentDelay_{it}</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$Treat_i$	4.41*** (0.31)	0.70*** (0.20)	0.64*** (0.20)	1.15*** (0.20)	1.16*** (0.20)
$Post_t$	-0.10 (0.12)	-13.38*** (1.17)			
$Treat_i \times Post_t$	-1.17*** (0.36)	0.02 (0.26)	0.03 (0.26)	-0.65** (0.26)	-0.56** (0.26)
Constant	5.59*** (0.10)	63.76*** (0.89)			
Duration, Budget, Bids	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
$Post_t \times$ (Duration, Budget, Bids)	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Project stage	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Task fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Industry fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	117,787	110,601	110,601	110,601	110,601
R ²	0.01	0.26	0.26	0.30	0.30
Adjusted R ²	0.01	0.26	0.26	0.29	0.29

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Each observation is a project-quarter.

SEs are robust and clustered at the project level.

Sample restricted to large projects only.

9.2 Regression 2: Incremental effect on small project with existing large project

- $Treat_{i,l}$ is an indicator that equals 1 for small projects with co-existing large projects, and is zero otherwise.
- $Treat_{i,l} = 1 \implies Treat_i = 1$. This means we have:
 - $Treat_{i,l} \times Post_t = Treat_i \times Treat_{i,l} \times Post_t$
 - $Treat_{i,l} \times Treat_i = Treat_{i,l}$
- Large projects with parallel small projects are removed to get a clean control group.

Table 11: (Incremental effect) Project Portfolio and QuickPay reform

	<i>PercentDelay_{it}</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$Treat_i$	-1.04*** (0.11)	-0.96*** (0.10)	-1.00*** (0.10)	-0.80*** (0.10)	-0.82*** (0.10)
$Treat_{i,l}$	-2.14*** (0.12)	-1.26*** (0.12)	-1.29*** (0.12)	-0.37*** (0.11)	-0.32*** (0.11)
$Post_t$	-0.002 (0.10)	-5.37*** (0.76)			
$Treat_i \times Post_t$	1.04*** (0.13)	1.08*** (0.13)	1.11*** (0.13)	1.03*** (0.13)	1.04*** (0.13)
$Treat_{i,l} \times Post_t$	-0.63*** (0.15)	-0.62*** (0.15)	-0.61*** (0.15)	-0.64*** (0.15)	-0.58*** (0.15)
Constant	4.90*** (0.09)	41.79*** (0.58)			
Duration, Budget, Bids	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
$Post_t \times$ (Duration, Budget, Bids)	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Project stage	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Task fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Industry fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	237,093	212,627	212,627	212,627	212,627
R ²	0.004	0.17	0.18	0.21	0.21
Adjusted R ²	0.004	0.17	0.18	0.21	0.21

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Each observation is a project-quarter.

SEs are robust and clustered at the project level.

Large projects with parallel small projects are removed.

9.3 Regression 3: Total effect on small project with existing large project

- $Treat_{i,l}$ is an indicator that equals 1 for small projects with co-existing large projects, and is zero otherwise.
- $Treat_{i,s}$ is an indicator that equals 1 for small projects without co-existing large projects, and is zero otherwise.
- Large projects with parallel small projects are removed to get a clean control group.

Table 12: (Total effect) Project Portfolio and QuickPay reform

	<i>PercentDelay_{it}</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Treat_{i,s}</i>	-1.04*** (0.11)	-0.96*** (0.10)	-1.00*** (0.10)	-0.80*** (0.10)	-0.82*** (0.10)
<i>Treat_{i,l}</i>	-3.18*** (0.13)	-2.22*** (0.13)	-2.28*** (0.13)	-1.16*** (0.13)	-1.14*** (0.13)
<i>Post_t</i>	-0.002 (0.10)	-5.37*** (0.76)			
<i>Treat_{i,s} × Post_t</i>	1.04*** (0.13)	1.08*** (0.13)	1.11*** (0.13)	1.03*** (0.13)	1.04*** (0.13)
<i>Treat_{i,l} × Post_t</i>	0.41** (0.16)	0.46*** (0.16)	0.50*** (0.16)	0.39** (0.16)	0.46*** (0.16)
Constant	4.90*** (0.09)	41.79*** (0.58)			
Duration, Budget, Bids	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Post_t × (Duration, Budget, Bids)</i>	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Project stage	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Task fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Industry fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	237,093	212,627	212,627	212,627	212,627
R ²	0.004	0.17	0.18	0.21	0.21
Adjusted R ²	0.004	0.17	0.18	0.21	0.21

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Each observation is a project-quarter.

SEs are robust and clustered at the project level.

Large projects with parallel small projects are removed.

10 Project Stage

- t indicates the end of the quarter
- We want to get stage of the project at the beginning of a given quarter (before any delays materialize)

$$Stage_{it} = \frac{ActionDate_{t-1} - StartDate_i}{Duration_{i,t-1}} \quad Stage_{it} = \frac{(t-1) - StartDate_i}{Duration_{i,t-1}}$$

10.1 Stage Quintile

10.2 Logged Stage Regressions

Table 13: Project Stage and QuickPay reform

	<i>PercentDelay_{it}</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$Treat_i$	-0.93*** (0.31)	-0.44* (0.27)	-0.58** (0.27)	-0.66** (0.27)	-0.73*** (0.27)
Log(Stage)	3.70*** (0.09)	2.86*** (0.09)	2.81*** (0.09)	2.92*** (0.09)	2.93*** (0.09)
$Post_t$	-1.81*** (0.27)	-6.40*** (1.08)			
$Treat_i \times Post_t$	2.09*** (0.36)	2.11*** (0.33)	2.22*** (0.33)	2.35*** (0.33)	2.41*** (0.33)
$Treat_i \times \text{Log(Stage)}$	-0.23* (0.12)	0.26** (0.12)	0.22* (0.12)	0.16 (0.12)	0.13 (0.11)
$Post_t \times \text{Log(Stage)}$	-0.15 (0.11)	0.56*** (0.11)	0.56*** (0.11)	0.24** (0.11)	0.23** (0.11)
$Treat_i \times Post_t \times \text{Log(Stage)}$	0.65*** (0.16)	0.68*** (0.15)	0.70*** (0.15)	0.83*** (0.15)	0.84*** (0.15)
Constant	11.91*** (0.23)	55.41*** (0.82)			
Duration, Budget, Bids	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
$Post_t \times (\text{Duration, Budget, Bids})$	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Task fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Industry fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	174,169	157,166	157,166	157,166	157,166
R ²	0.06	0.19	0.19	0.22	0.22
Adjusted R ²	0.06	0.19	0.19	0.21	0.21

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Each observation is a project-quarter.

SEs are robust and clustered at the project level.

11 Contract Financing (Projects active on/before June 2010)

- $CF = 1$ if project was receiving contract financing
- Sample restricted to projects that started on or before June 2010
- Jobs act was launched in Sept 2010

Table 14: Contract Financing and QuickPay reform

	<i>PercentDelay_{it}</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$Treat_i$	-1.19*** (0.21)	-0.41** (0.20)	-0.58*** (0.19)	-0.31 (0.22)	-0.40* (0.22)
$Post_t$	1.21*** (0.32)	-14.21*** (3.45)			
CF_i	1.31*** (0.43)	1.84*** (0.37)	1.56*** (0.37)	-0.62 (0.41)	-0.71* (0.41)
$Treat_i \times Post_t$	-0.74* (0.40)	2.32*** (0.53)	2.49*** (0.54)	2.80*** (0.57)	2.83*** (0.57)
$Post_t \times CF_i$	0.04 (0.74)	-1.37* (0.76)	-1.10 (0.76)	0.61 (0.80)	0.65 (0.80)
$Treat_i \times CF_i$	1.07* (0.58)	0.47 (0.50)	0.53 (0.49)	0.33 (0.53)	0.33 (0.53)
$Treat_i \times Post_t \times CF_i$	1.92* (1.07)	-1.09 (1.09)	-1.15 (1.09)	-0.81 (1.13)	-0.88 (1.13)
Constant	6.22*** (0.16)	60.30*** (1.12)			
Duration, Budget, Bids	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
$Post_t \times$ (Duration, Budget, Bids)	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Project stage	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Task fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Industry fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	51,465	43,519	43,519	43,519	43,519
R ²	0.004	0.18	0.19	0.23	0.24
Adjusted R ²	0.004	0.18	0.19	0.22	0.22

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Each observation is a project-quarter.

SEs are robust and clustered at the project level.

12 Receives Grants/Financial Assistance (Projects active on/before June 2010)

- $CF = 1$ if receives_grants=='t'
- The variable "receives_grants" used to be called "receives financial assistance"

Table 15: Receives grants and QuickPay reform

	<i>PercentDelay_{it}</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$Treat_i$	-1.18*** (0.20)	-0.33* (0.18)	-0.51*** (0.18)	-0.27 (0.21)	-0.37* (0.21)
$Post_t$	1.34*** (0.30)	-13.60*** (3.40)			
CF_i	0.74 (0.90)	2.34*** (0.83)	2.06** (0.82)	1.61** (0.80)	1.63** (0.80)
$Treat_i \times Post_t$	-0.50 (0.38)	1.97*** (0.48)	2.15*** (0.48)	2.56*** (0.50)	2.56*** (0.50)
$Post_t \times CF_i$	-1.06 (1.33)	-2.06 (1.59)	-1.70 (1.58)	-0.43 (1.65)	-0.35 (1.64)
$Treat_i \times CF_i$	2.78** (1.19)	1.29 (1.06)	1.44 (1.05)	0.38 (1.04)	0.42 (1.05)
$Treat_i \times Post_t \times CF_i$	-0.06 (1.77)	0.47 (2.18)	0.33 (2.17)	0.63 (2.23)	0.78 (2.22)
Constant	6.38*** (0.15)	59.58*** (1.10)			
Duration, Budget, Bids	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
$Post_t \times$ (Duration, Budget, Bids)	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Project stage	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Task fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Industry fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	51,465	43,519	43,519	43,519	43,519
R ²	0.002	0.18	0.19	0.23	0.24
Adjusted R ²	0.002	0.18	0.19	0.22	0.22

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Each observation is a project-quarter.

SEs are robust and clustered at the project level.

13 Competition

13.1 Impact on bidding metrics

- This is for all projects, because no spillover issue with project-level competition metrics (unlike delays).
- That is, contractors would make aggressive bids on their small projects (to receive faster payment) regardless of other projects in their portfolio.

Table 16: Effect of Competition After QuickPay: Quickpay 2009-2011

	<i>NumberOfBids_{it}</i>	<i>InitialDuration_{it}</i>	<i>InitialBudget_{it}</i> (in 000s)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Treat_i</i>	0.88*** (0.09)	-7.27*** (0.72)	-15.06*** (1.59)
<i>Treat_i × Post_t</i>	0.27** (0.12)	-3.38*** (1.00)	-29.49*** (2.30)
Task fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	227,609	220,550	227,732
R ²	0.25	0.20	0.24
Adjusted R ²	0.24	0.19	0.24

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Each observation is a project-quarter.

SEs are robust and clustered at the project level.

Sample restricted to fully competed projects.

13.2 Impact on delays

13.2.1 Subsample model II

Define

$$SA_i = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if project was signed after QuickPay} \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$SB_i = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if project was signed before QuickPay} \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Table 17: Effect of QuickPay on competitively awarded projects

	<i>PercentDelay_{it}</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Treat_i</i>	-1.49*** (0.16)	-0.98*** (0.15)	-0.99*** (0.15)	-0.26 (0.16)	-0.34** (0.16)
<i>SA_i</i>	-2.00*** (0.20)	1.68*** (0.19)	2.93*** (0.21)	2.96*** (0.21)	2.89*** (0.21)
<i>Post_t</i>	1.11*** (0.18)	-2.00*** (0.18)			
<i>Treat_i × Post_t</i>	0.30 (0.24)	0.13 (0.23)	0.21 (0.23)	0.22 (0.22)	0.24 (0.22)
<i>Treat_i × Post_t × SA_i</i>	1.36*** (0.26)	1.06*** (0.24)	0.97*** (0.24)	0.84*** (0.24)	0.88*** (0.24)
Constant	6.36*** (0.13)	12.41*** (0.16)			
Project stage	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Task fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Industry fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	140,496	140,472	140,472	140,472	140,472
R ²	0.002	0.06	0.06	0.12	0.12
Adjusted R ²	0.002	0.06	0.06	0.11	0.12

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Each observation is a project-quarter.

SEs are robust and clustered at the project level.

Sample restricted to fully competed projects.

Table 18: Effect of QuickPay on non-competitively awarded projects

	<i>PercentDelay_{it}</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Treat_i</i>	1.96*** (0.37)	1.91*** (0.35)	1.79*** (0.36)	-0.17 (0.39)	-0.02 (0.39)
<i>SA_i</i>	-0.65** (0.26)	2.39*** (0.25)	4.18*** (0.31)	3.65*** (0.32)	3.58*** (0.32)
<i>Post_t</i>	-1.04*** (0.29)	-3.80*** (0.29)			
<i>Treat_i × Post_t</i>	3.46*** (0.53)	2.78*** (0.51)	2.70*** (0.51)	2.43*** (0.52)	2.31*** (0.52)
<i>Treat_i × Post_t × SA_i</i>	-2.32*** (0.53)	-1.73*** (0.50)	-1.68*** (0.50)	-2.43*** (0.50)	-2.29*** (0.50)
Constant	5.16*** (0.24)	11.39*** (0.31)			
Project stage	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Task fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Industry fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	33,557	33,553	33,553	33,553	33,553
R ²	0.01	0.07	0.07	0.15	0.15
Adjusted R ²	0.01	0.07	0.07	0.13	0.13

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Each observation is a project-quarter.

SEs are robust and clustered at the project level.

Sample restricted to non-competed projects.

13.2.2 Four-way interaction

We run the following model:

$$\begin{aligned}
PercentDelay_{it} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 Treat_i + \beta_2 StartedAfterQP_i + \beta_3 Post_t + \beta_4 Competitive_i \\
& + \beta_5 (Treat_i \times Competitive_i) + \beta_6 (Post_t \times Competitive_i) \\
& + \beta_7 (StartedAfterQP_i \times Competitive_i) + \beta_8 (Treat_i \times Post_t) \\
& + \beta_9 (Treat_i \times Post_t \times Competitive_i) \\
& + \beta_{10} (Treat_i \times Post_t \times StartedAfterQP_i) \\
& + \beta_{11} (Treat_i \times Post_t \times StartedAfterQP_i \times Competitive_i) + e_{it}
\end{aligned}$$

Interpretation:

- β_9 is the difference between treatment effect for competitive and non-competitive projects signed before quickpay.
- $\beta_9 + \beta_{11}$ is the difference between treatment effect for competitive and non-competitive projects signed *after* quickpay.
- β_{11} is our coefficient of interest because it tells us how much of the difference is there due to “aggressive bidding” after the policy.

Table 19: Effect of Competition After QuickPay: Quickpay 2009-2011

	<i>PercentDelay_{it}</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Treat_i</i>	1.96*** (0.37)	1.96*** (0.37)	1.91*** (0.35)	1.80*** (0.35)	-0.32 (0.36)	-0.31 (0.36)
<i>SA_i</i>	-0.65** (0.26)	-0.65** (0.26)	2.47*** (0.25)	3.85*** (0.26)	3.60*** (0.26)	3.54*** (0.26)
<i>Competitive_i</i>	1.19*** (0.27)	1.19*** (0.27)	0.82*** (0.26)	0.77*** (0.26)	-0.86*** (0.27)	-0.76*** (0.27)
<i>Post_t</i>	-1.04*** (0.29)	-1.04*** (0.29)	-3.88*** (0.28)			
<i>Treat_i × Competitive_i</i>	-3.45*** (0.41)	-3.45*** (0.41)	-2.89*** (0.38)	-2.79*** (0.38)	0.04 (0.39)	-0.05 (0.39)
<i>Post_t × Competitive_i</i>	2.15*** (0.34)	2.15*** (0.34)	1.90*** (0.33)	1.83*** (0.33)	0.74** (0.33)	0.64* (0.33)
<i>SA_i × Competitive_i</i>	-1.34*** (0.32)	-1.34*** (0.32)	-0.82*** (0.30)	-0.83*** (0.31)	-0.66** (0.30)	-0.68** (0.30)
<i>Treat_i × Post_t</i>	3.46*** (0.53)	3.46*** (0.53)	2.76*** (0.51)	2.72*** (0.51)	2.09*** (0.51)	2.00*** (0.51)
<i>Treat_i × Post_t × Competitive_i</i>	-3.16*** (0.58)	-3.16*** (0.58)	-2.63*** (0.56)	-2.51*** (0.56)	-1.86*** (0.55)	-1.76*** (0.56)
<i>Treat_i × Post_t × SA_i</i>	-2.32*** (0.53)	-2.32*** (0.53)	-1.71*** (0.49)	-1.70*** (0.50)	-1.85*** (0.49)	-1.86*** (0.49)
<i>Treat_i × Post_t × SA_i × Competitive_i</i>	3.68*** (0.59)	3.68*** (0.59)	2.77*** (0.55)	2.67*** (0.55)	2.69*** (0.55)	2.75*** (0.55)
Constant	5.16*** (0.24)	5.16*** (0.24)	11.56*** (0.24)			
Project stage	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Task fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Industry fixed effects	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	174,053	174,053	174,025	174,025	174,025	174,025
R ²	0.004	0.004	0.06	0.06	0.12	0.12
Adjusted R ²	0.004	0.004	0.06	0.06	0.11	0.11

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Each observation is a project-quarter.

SEs are robust and clustered at the project level.