
Other Metrics: QuickPay (2009-2012)


Nov 09, 2021

1 Relative delays over time

- Sample restricted to projects for which start dates matches the one in API
 This is done by using first reported "action_date" and "date_signed"
- $\bullet \ \ Relative Delay_{it} = Relative Delay_{it} / Intial Duration_i$



Normalized delay



2 Baseline Regressions

$$Relative Delay_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Treat_i + \beta_2 Post_t + \beta_3 (Treat_i \times Post_t) + e_{it}$$

$$Relative Delay_{it} = \alpha + \beta_0 Treat_i + \beta_1 Post_t + \beta_2 (Treat_i \times Post_t) + X_i + (Post_t \times X_i) + \mu_t + \theta_{firm} + \lambda_{task} + \epsilon_{it}$$

Table 1: Effect of QuickPay on project delay rates

	$Relative Delay_{it}$						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)		
$Treat_i$	-0.03***	-0.02***	-0.02^{***}	-0.02^{***}	-0.01***		
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)		
$Post_t$	0.0003	-0.02***					
	(0.001)	(0.002)					
$Treat_i \times Post_t$	0.01***	0.02***	0.02***	0.01***	0.01***		
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)		
Constant	0.08***	0.06***					
	(0.001)	(0.001)					
Budget, Bids	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
$Post_t \times (Budget, Bids)$	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Project age	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Year-Quarter fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Task fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes		
Contractor fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes		
Observations	$263,\!550$	$263,\!482$	$263,\!482$	$263,\!482$	$263,\!482$		
R^2	0.002	0.01	0.01	0.07	0.18		
Adjusted R ²	0.002	0.01	0.01	0.07	0.14		

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Each observation is a project-quarter.

SEs are robust and clustered at the project level.

3 Contract Financing

$$CF_i = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if project } i \text{ receives contract financing} \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$Relative Delay_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Treat_i + \beta_2 Post_t + \beta_3 (Treat_i \times Post_t) + \beta_4 CF_i + \beta_5 (CF_i \times Post_t) + \beta_6 (Treat_i \times Post_t \times CF_i) + X_i + (Post_t \times X_i) + \mu_t + \theta_{firm} + \lambda_{task} + \epsilon_{it}$$

Table 2: Financial constraints and QuickPay reform

	$Relative Delay_{it}$						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)		
$\overline{Treat_i}$	-0.03^{***} (0.001)	-0.03^{***} (0.002)	-0.03^{***} (0.002)	-0.02^{***} (0.001)	-0.01^{***} (0.003)		
$Post_t$	-0.0001 (0.002)	-0.02^{***} (0.002)					
$Treat_i \times Post_t$	0.01*** (0.002)	0.02*** (0.002)	0.02*** (0.002)	0.01*** (0.002)	0.01*** (0.002)		
CF_i	0.02*** (0.002)	0.02*** (0.002)	0.02*** (0.002)	-0.02^{***} (0.003)	-0.01^{***} (0.003)		
$Post_t \times CF_i$	0.001 (0.003)	-0.01 (0.003)	-0.01 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.01*** (0.004)		
$Post_t \times CF_i \times Treat_i$	0.02*** (0.004)	0.01*** (0.004)	0.01*** (0.004)	0.01*** (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)		
Constant	0.08*** (0.001)	0.06*** (0.001)					
Budget, Bids	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
$Post_t \times (Budget, Bids)$	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Project age	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Year-Quarter fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Task fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes		
Contractor fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes		
Observations	$263,\!550$	$263,\!482$	$263,\!482$	$263,\!482$	$263,\!482$		
\mathbb{R}^2	0.005	0.01	0.01	0.07	0.18		
Adjusted R ²	0.005	0.01	0.01	0.07	0.14		

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Each observation is a project-quarter.

SEs are robust and clustered at the project level.

4 Competition

4.1 Impact on delays

Define

$$SA_i = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if project was signed after QuickPay} \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$SB_i = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if project was signed before QuickPay} \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

4.1.1 Subsample model

For a subsample of competitive or noncompetitive projects:

$$Relative Delay_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Treat_i + \beta_2 SA_i + \beta_3 Post_t + \beta_4 (Treat_i \times Post_t \times SA_i) + \beta_5 (Treat_i \times Post_t \times SB_i) + e_{it}$$

- According to our hypothesis, β_4 should be positive and significant for competitive projects, and insignificant for non-competitive projects.
- In the following regressions, we also control for the project's age. Project's age is defined as the number of quarters since it first showed up in the sample. We include the terciles of project's age as a control variable.

Table 3: Effect of QuickPay on competitively awarded projects

	$Relative Delay_{it}$							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)			
$\overline{Treat_i}$	-0.04***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.02***	-0.02***			
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)			
SA_i	-0.03***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.03***	-0.02***			
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)			
$Post_t$	0.02***	-0.004						
	(0.002)	(0.002)						
$Treat_i \times SB_i \times Post_t$	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***			
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)			
$Treat_i \times SA_i \times Post_t$	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***			
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)			
Constant	0.08***	0.07***						
	(0.001)	(0.002)						
Budget, Bids	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			
$Post_t \times (Budget, Bids)$	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Project age	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Year-Quarter fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Task fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes			
Contractor fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes			
Observations	214,483	$214,\!415$	$214,\!415$	$214,\!415$	214,415			
\mathbb{R}^2	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.08	0.19			
Adjusted R ²	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.14			

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Each observation is a project-quarter.

SEs are robust and clustered at the project level. Sample restricted to fully competed projects.

Table 4: Non-competitive projects and QuickPay law

	$Relative Delay_{it}$					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
$Treat_i$	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	-0.002		
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)		
SA_i	-0.01***	0.005	0.002	-0.01		
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)		
$Post_t$	-0.001	-0.02***				
	(0.003)	(0.01)				
$Treat_i \times SB_i \times Post_t$	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.02***		
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		
$Treat_i \times SA_i \times Post_t$	0.003	0.002	0.002	-0.002		
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		
Constant	0.06***	0.05***				
	(0.002)	(0.005)				
Budget, Bids	No	Yes	Yes	Yes		
$Post_t \times (Budget, Bids)$	No	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Project age	No	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Year-Quarter fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes		
Task fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes		
Observations	49,067	49,067	49,067	49,067		
\mathbb{R}^2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.08		
Adjusted R ²	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.06		

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Each observation is a project-quarter.

SEs are robust and clustered at the project level. Sample restricted to non-competed projects.

4.1.2 Four-way interaction

We run the following model:

$$Relative Delay_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Treat_i + \beta_2 Started After QP_i + \beta_3 Post_t + \beta_4 Competitive_i \\ + \beta_5 (Treat_i \times Competitive_i) + \beta_6 (Post_t \times Competitive_i) \\ + \beta_7 (Started After QP_i \times Competitive_i) + \beta_8 (Treat_i \times Post_t) \\ + \beta_9 (Treat_i \times Post_t \times Competitive_i) \\ + \beta_{10} (Treat_i \times Post_t \times Started After QP_i) \\ + \beta_{11} (Treat_i \times Post_t \times Started After QP_i \times Competitive_i) + e_{it}$$

Interpretation:

- β_9 is the difference between treatment effect for competitive and non-competitive projects signed before quickpay.
- $\beta_9 + \beta_{11}$ is the difference between treatment effect for competitive and non-competitive projects signed after quickpay.

• β_{11} is our coefficient of interest because it tells us how much of the difference is there due to "aggressive bidding" after the policy.

Table 5: Effect of Competition After QuickPay: Quickpay 2009-2011

	$Relative Delay_{it}$						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
$\Gamma reat_i$	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	-0.002	-0.01^*	
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.01)	
$StartedAfterQP_i$	-0.01^{***}	-0.01**	0.01**	-0.001	-0.01^{***}	-0.01***	
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	
$Competitive_i$	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.01**	-0.0005	
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	
$Post_t$	-0.001	-0.01**	-0.02***				
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)				
$Treat_i \times Competitive_i$	-0.05^{***}	-0.05^{***}	-0.05^{***}	-0.05^{***}	-0.02^{***}	-0.01	
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	
$Post_t \times Competitive_i$	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.005	0.002	
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	
$StartedAfterQP_i \times Competitive_i$	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01***	
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	
$Treat_i \times Post_t$	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.02***	0.02***	
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
$Treat_i \times Post_t \times Competitive_i$	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.01	-0.01	
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
$Treat_i \times Post_t \times StartedAfterQP_i$	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.02***	-0.02***	
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
$Treat_i \times Post_t \times StartedAfterQP_i \times Competitive_i$	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.02***	
v · ·	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
Constant	0.06***	0.06***	0.04***				
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)				
Budget, Bids	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
$Post_t \times (Budget, Bids)$	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Project age	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Year-Quarter fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Task fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	
Contractor fixed effects	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	
Observations	263,550	263,482	263,482	263,482	263,482	263,482	
R ²	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.07	0.18	
$Adjusted R^2$	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.07	0.13 0.14	

Note:

 $\label{eq:proposition} ^*p{<}0.1;~^{**}p{<}0.05;~^{***}p{<}0.01$ Each observation is a project-quarter.

SEs are robust and clustered at the project level.