



# AUDIT REPORT


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October 2025

For



# Table of Content

Executive Summary	03
Number of Security Issues per Severity	04
Summary of Issues	05
Checked Vulnerabilities	06
Techniques and Methods	07
Types of Severity	10
Types of Issues	11
Severity Matrix	12
 <b>Low Severity Issues</b>	13
1. Consider Using Ownable2Step instead	13
Functional Tests	14
Automated Tests	14
Threat Model	15
Quill Trust assumptions	16
Closing Summary & Disclaimer	17



# Executive Summary

<b>Project Name</b>	Celini Token
<b>Protocol Type</b>	ERC20
<b>Project URL</b>	<a href="https://celini.io/">https://celini.io/</a>
<b>Overview</b>	<p>CeliniToken is a minimal, fixed-supply ERC-20 token implementation intended to represent the CELI token. The total supply is set at deployment to 600,000,000 CELI (18 decimals) and is minted entirely to the deployer address. The contract implements standard ERC-20 behavior (transfer, approve, transferFrom) and includes a simple Ownable pattern that allows ownership transfer or renunciation.</p>
<b>Audit Scope</b>	<p>The scope of this Audit was to analyze the Celini Token Smart Contracts for quality, security, and correctness.</p>
<b>Source Code Link</b>	<a href="https://bscscan.com/address/0x6741935407e64d78eeb1acf315746089a304a082#code">https://bscscan.com/address/0x6741935407e64d78eeb1acf315746089a304a082#code</a>
<b>Contracts in Scope</b>	CeliniToken
<b>Language</b>	Solidity
<b>Blockchain</b>	BSC
<b>Method</b>	Manual Analysis, Functional Testing, Automated Testing
<b>Review 1</b>	30th September 2025 - 2nd October 2025

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# Number of Issues per Severity



Critical	0 (0.0%)
High	0 (0.0%)
Medium	0 (0.0%)
Low	1 (100.0%)
Informational	0 (0.0%)

		Severity				
		Critical	High	Medium	Low	Informational
Issues	Open	0	0	0	0	0
	Acknowledged	0	0	0	1	0
	Partially Resolved	0	0	0	0	0
	Resolved	0	0	0	0	0



# Summary of Issues

Issue No.	Issue Title	Severity	Status
1	Consider Using Ownable2Step instead	Low	Acknowledged



# Checked Vulnerabilities

✓ Access Management

✓ Arbitrary write to storage

✓ Centralization of control

✓ Ether theft

✓ Improper or missing events

✓ Logical issues and flaws

✓ Arithmetic Computations  
Correctness

✓ Race conditions/front running

✓ SWC Registry

✓ Re-entrancy

✓ Timestamp Dependence

✓ Gas Limit and Loops

✓ Exception Disorder

✓ Gasless Send

✓ Use of tx.origin

✓ Malicious libraries

✓ Compiler version not fixed

✓ Address hardcoded

✓ Divide before multiply

✓ Integer overflow/underflow

✓ ERC's conformance

✓ Dangerous strict equalities

✓ Tautology or contradiction

✓ Return values of low-level calls



✓ Missing Zero Address Validation

✓ Private modifier

✓ Revert/require functions

✓ Multiple Sends

✓ Using suicide

✓ Using delegatecall

✓ Upgradeable safety

✓ Using throw

✓ Using inline assembly

✓ Style guide violation

✓ Unsafe type inference

✓ Implicit visibility level

# Techniques and Methods

**Throughout the audit of smart contracts, care was taken to ensure:**

- The overall quality of code
- Use of best practices
- Code documentation and comments, match logic and expected behavior
- Token distribution and calculations are as per the intended behavior mentioned in the whitepaper
- Implementation of ERC standards
- Efficient use of gas
- Code is safe from re-entrancy and other vulnerabilities

**The following techniques, methods, and tools were used to review all the smart contracts:**

## Structural Analysis

In this step, we have analyzed the design patterns and structure of smart contracts. A thorough check was done to ensure the smart contract is structured in a way that will not result in future problems.

## Static Analysis

A static Analysis of Smart Contracts was done to identify contract vulnerabilities. In this step, a series of automated tools are used to test the security of smart contracts.





### Code Review / Manual Analysis

Manual Analysis or review of code was done to identify new vulnerabilities or verify the vulnerabilities found during the static analysis. Contracts were completely manually analyzed, their logic was checked and compared with the one described in the whitepaper. Besides, the results of the automated analysis were manually verified.

### Gas Consumption

In this step, we have checked the behavior of smart contracts in production. Checks were done to know how much gas gets consumed and the possibilities of optimization of code to reduce gas consumption.

### Tools and Platforms Used for Audit

Remix IDE, Foundry, Solhint, Mythril, Slither, Solidity Static Analysis.



# Types of Severity

Every issue in this report has been assigned to a severity level. There are five levels of severity, and each of them has been explained below.

## ■ **Critical: Immediate and Catastrophic Impact**

Critical issues are the ones that an attacker could exploit with relative ease, potentially leading to an immediate and complete loss of user funds, a total takeover of the protocol's functionality, or other catastrophic failures. Critical vulnerabilities are non-negotiable; they absolutely must be fixed.

## ■ **High (H): Significant Risk of Major Loss or Compromise**

High-severity issues represent serious weaknesses that could result in significant financial losses for users, major malfunctions within the protocol, or substantial compromise of its intended operations. While exploiting these vulnerabilities might require specific conditions to be met or a moderate level of technical skill, the potential damage is considerable. These findings are critical and should be addressed and resolved thoroughly before the contract is put into the Mainnet.

## ■ **Medium (M): Potential for Moderate Harm Under Specific Circumstances**

Medium-severity bugs are loopholes in the protocol that could lead to moderate financial losses or partial disruptions of the protocol's intended behavior. However, exploiting these vulnerabilities typically requires more specific and less common conditions to occur, and the overall impact is generally lower compared to high or critical issues. While not as immediately threatening, it's still highly recommended to address these findings to enhance the contract's robustness and prevent potential problems down the line.

## ■ **Low (L): Minor Imperfections with Limited Repercussions**

Low-severity issues are essentially minor imperfections in the smart contract that have a limited impact on user funds or the core functionality of the protocol. Exploiting these would usually require very specific and unlikely scenarios and would yield minimal gain for an attacker. While these findings don't pose an immediate threat, addressing them when feasible can contribute to a more polished and well-maintained codebase.

## ■ **Informational (I): Opportunities for Improvement, Not Immediate Risks**

Informational findings aren't security vulnerabilities in the traditional sense. Instead, they highlight areas related to the clarity and efficiency of the code, gas optimization, the quality of documentation, or adherence to best development practices. These findings don't represent any immediate risk to the security or functionality of the contract but offer valuable insights for improving its overall quality and maintainability. Addressing these is optional but often beneficial for long-term health and clarity.



# Types of Issues

## Open

Security vulnerabilities identified that must be resolved and are currently unresolved.

## Resolved

These are the issues identified in the initial audit and have been successfully fixed.

## Acknowledged

Vulnerabilities which have been acknowledged but are yet to be resolved.

## Partially Resolved

Considerable efforts have been invested to reduce the risk/impact of the security issue, but are not completely resolved.

# Severity Matrix

		Impact		
		High	Medium	Low
Likelihood	High	Critical	High	Medium
	Medium	High	Medium	Low
	Low	Medium	Low	Low

## Impact

- **High** - leads to a significant material loss of assets in the protocol or significantly harms a group of users.
- **Medium** - only a small amount of funds can be lost (such as leakage of value) or a core functionality of the protocol is affected.
- **Low** - can lead to any kind of unexpected behavior with some of the protocol's functionalities that's not so critical.

## Likelihood

- **High** - attack path is possible with reasonable assumptions that mimic on-chain conditions, and the cost of the attack is relatively low compared to the amount of funds that can be stolen or lost.
- **Medium** - only a conditionally incentivized attack vector, but still relatively likely.
- **Low** - has too many or too unlikely assumptions or requires a significant stake by the attacker with little or no incentive.



# Low Severity Issues

## Consider Using Ownable2Step instead

**Acknowledged**

### Description

The contract currently uses OpenZeppelin's single-step Ownable, where calling `transferOwnership` immediately assigns ownership to the new address. This creates a risk of accidental or unintended transfers. A safer approach is to adopt OpenZeppelin's Ownable2Step, which introduces a confirmation process: the current owner nominates a new owner, and the nominated address must explicitly call `acceptOwnership` to finalize the transfer. This two-step flow helps prevent ownership from being lost due to mistakes or unacknowledged transfers.

### Recommendation

Consider using Ownable2Step instead



# Functional Tests

Some of the tests performed are mentioned below:

- ✓ Should return correct token name, symbol, and decimals
- ✓ Should return totalSupply equal to initial minted supply
- ✓ Deployer should hold the full initial supply
- ✓ Only owner should be able to call transferOwnership
- ✓ Should emit Transfer event on successful transfer

# Automated Tests

No major issues were found. Some false positive errors were reported by the tools. All the other issues have been categorized above according to their level of severity.



# Threat Model

Contract	Threats
CeliniToken	Owner compromise — attacker obtains the owner's private key (single-signature or multisig signer).
CeliniToken	Malicious deployer — deployer intentionally keeps all supply for exit or rug.
CeliniToken	External contract attacker — attacker interacts with token via approve/transferFrom or via dApp integrations to drain funds (e.g., approving malicious contracts).



# Quill Trust assumptions

**1. Owner key custody:** The deployer/owner private key is secure and controlled by a trusted multisig or a secure key management process.

**2.No hidden off-chain controls:** Distribution of tokens, liquidity listing, and any off-chain admin actions will be handled transparently and per communicated governance.

**3.User knowledge of centralization:** Token holders understand the deployer initially owns full supply and that ownership can be transferred or renounced by the owner.

**4.No external dependencies:** The token relies only on the Ethereum VM (BSC) primitives; there are no external oracles or third-party contracts it depends on.

**5.No future upgrades:** There is no upgrade pattern in the contract; any future changes require redeployment and token migration (i.e., the code is immutable after deployment except owner-controlled state like balances).





# Closing Summary

In this report, we have considered the security of Celini Token. We performed our audit according to the procedure described above.

No critical issues in Celini token, just 1 issue of low severity was found, which have been noted and acknowledged by Celini team.

# Disclaimer

At QuillAudits, we have spent years helping projects strengthen their smart contract security. However, security is not a one-time event—threats evolve, and so do attack vectors. Our audit provides a security assessment based on the best industry practices at the time of review, identifying known vulnerabilities in the received smart contract source code.

This report does not serve as a security guarantee, investment advice, or an endorsement of any platform. It reflects our findings based on the provided code at the time of analysis and may no longer be relevant after any modifications. The presence of an audit does not imply that the contract is free of vulnerabilities or fully secure.

While we have conducted a thorough review, security is an ongoing process. We strongly recommend multiple independent audits, continuous monitoring, and a public bug bounty program to enhance resilience against emerging threats.

Stay proactive. Stay secure.



# About QuillAudits

QuillAudits is a leading name in Web3 security, offering top-notch solutions to safeguard projects across DeFi, GameFi, NFT gaming, and all blockchain layers.

With seven years of expertise, we've secured over 1400 projects globally, averting over \$3 billion in losses. Our specialists rigorously audit smart contracts and ensure DApp safety on major platforms like Ethereum, BSC, Arbitrum, Algorand, Tron, Polygon, Polkadot, Fantom, NEAR, Solana, and others, guaranteeing your project's security with cutting-edge practices.

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