



AUDIT REPORT

July 2025

For



Table of Content

Executive Summary	03
Number of Security Issues per Severity	04
Summary of Issues	05
Checked Vulnerabilities	06
Techniques and Methods	07
Types of Severity	09
Types of Issues	10
Severity Matrix	11
 Critical Severity Issues	12
1. Replenish allows worthless tokens	12
 Medium Severity Issues	15
2. Guardian Initialization can be frontran	15
3. Unpause Execution Does Not Verify Timelock Action Type	17
 Low Severity Issues	18
4. Rent refund sent to manager instead of zynk operator wallet	18
5. Redundant account closure in CloseOrder	19
 Informational Issues	20
6. Non deterministic Order account creation	20
Functional Tests	21
Threat Model	24
Closing Summary & Disclaimer	27



Executive Summary


Project Name	ZYNK Labs
Protocol Type	Token Transfer
Project URL	https://www.zynklabs.xyz/
Overview	The Zynk Protocol is a Solana-based smart contract that facilitates token transfers between different parties through a managed operator system. It implements a sophisticated architecture with timelock mechanisms, signature verification, and order tracking capabilities.
Audit Scope	The scope of this Audit was to analyze the Zynk Labs Smart Contracts for quality, security, and correctness.
Source Code link	https://github.com/Zynklabs/zynk-protocol-smart-contracts_solana/tree/5b8f6f17369b26aeffa971a0597320f493ec47d
Branch	contract -refresh
Contracts in Scope	lib.rs
Commit Hash	5b8f6f17369b26aeffa971a0597320f493ec47d
Language	Rust
Blockchain	Solana
Method	Manual Analysis, Functional Testing, Automated Testing
Review 1	10th July 2025 - 18th July 2025
Updated Code Received	18th July 2025 and 27th July 2025
Review 2	23th July 2025 - 28th July 2025
Fixed In	05b043b5dde4639ba9b57b81e829019e8913e173

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Number of Issues per Severity



Critical	1 (16.7%)
High	0 (0.0%)
Medium	2 (33.3%)
Low	2 (33.3%)
Informational	1 (16.7%)

		Severity				
		Critical	High	Medium	Low	Informational
Issues	Open	0	0	0	0	0
	Acknowledged	1	0	0	1	1
	Partially Resolved	0	0	0	0	0
	Resolved	0	0	2	1	0



Summary of Issues

Issue No.	Issue Title	Severity	Status
1	Replenish allows worthless tokens	High	Acknowledged
2	Guardian Initialization can be frontran	Medium	Resolved
3	Unpause Execution Does Not Verify Timelock Action Type	Medium	Resolved
4	Rent refund sent to manager instead of zynk operator wallet	Low	Acknowledged
5	Redundant account closure in CloseOrder	Low	Resolved
6	Non deterministic Order account creation	Informational	Acknowledged



Checked Vulnerabilities

We have scanned the solana program for commonly known and more specific vulnerabilities. Here are some of the commonly known vulnerabilities that we considered:



Signer authorization



Account data matching



Sysvar address checking



Owner checks



Type cosplay



Initialization



Arbitrary cpi



Duplicate mutable accounts



Bump seed canonicalization



PDA Sharing



Incorrect closing accounts



Missing rent exemption checks



Arithmetic overflows/underflows



Numerical precision errors



Solana account confusions



Casting truncation



Insufficient SPL token account verification



Signed invocation of unverified programs



Techniques and Methods

Throughout the audit of Solana Programs, care was taken to ensure:

- The overall quality of code
- Use of best practices
- Code documentation and comments, match logic and expected behavior
- Token distribution and calculations are as per the intended behavior mentioned in the whitepaper
- Efficient use of gas
- Code is safe from re-entrancy and other vulnerabilities

The following techniques, methods, and tools were used to review all the smart contracts:

Structural Analysis

In this step, we have analyzed the design patterns and structure of smart contracts. A thorough check was done to ensure the smart contract is structured in a way that will not result in future problems.

Static Analysis

A static Analysis of Smart Contracts was done to identify contract vulnerabilities. In this step, a series of automated tools are used to test the security of smart contracts.



Code Review / Manual Analysis

Manual Analysis or review of code was done to identify new vulnerabilities or verify the vulnerabilities found during the static analysis. Contracts were completely manually analyzed, their logic was checked and compared with the one described in the whitepaper. Besides, the results of the automated analysis were manually verified.

Gas Consumption

In this step, we have checked the behavior of smart contracts in production. Checks were done to know how much gas gets consumed and the possibilities of optimization of code to reduce gas consumption.



Types of Severity

Every issue in this report has been assigned to a severity level. There are five levels of severity, and each of them has been explained below.

■ **Critical: Immediate and Catastrophic Impact**

Critical issues are the ones that an attacker could exploit with relative ease, potentially leading to an immediate and complete loss of user funds, a total takeover of the protocol's functionality, or other catastrophic failures. Critical vulnerabilities are non-negotiable; they absolutely must be fixed.

■ **High (H): Significant Risk of Major Loss or Compromise**

High-severity issues represent serious weaknesses that could result in significant financial losses for users, major malfunctions within the protocol, or substantial compromise of its intended operations. While exploiting these vulnerabilities might require specific conditions to be met or a moderate level of technical skill, the potential damage is considerable. These findings are critical and should be addressed and resolved thoroughly before the contract is put into the Mainnet.

■ **Medium (M): Potential for Moderate Harm Under Specific Circumstances**

Medium-severity bugs are loopholes in the protocol that could lead to moderate financial losses or partial disruptions of the protocol's intended behavior. However, exploiting these vulnerabilities typically requires more specific and less common conditions to occur, and the overall impact is generally lower compared to high or critical issues. While not as immediately threatening, it's still highly recommended to address these findings to enhance the contract's robustness and prevent potential problems down the line.

■ **Low (L): Minor Imperfections with Limited Repercussions**

Low-severity issues are essentially minor imperfections in the smart contract that have a limited impact on user funds or the core functionality of the protocol. Exploiting these would usually require very specific and unlikely scenarios and would yield minimal gain for an attacker. While these findings don't pose an immediate threat, addressing them when feasible can contribute to a more polished and well-maintained codebase.

■ **Informational (I): Opportunities for Improvement, Not Immediate Risks**

Informational findings aren't security vulnerabilities in the traditional sense. Instead, they highlight areas related to the clarity and efficiency of the code, gas optimization, the quality of documentation, or adherence to best development practices. These findings don't represent any immediate risk to the security or functionality of the contract but offer valuable insights for improving its overall quality and maintainability. Addressing these is optional but often beneficial for long-term health and clarity.



Types of Issues

Open

Security vulnerabilities identified that must be resolved and are currently unresolved.

Resolved

These are the issues identified in the initial audit and have been successfully fixed.

Acknowledged

Vulnerabilities which have been acknowledged but are yet to be resolved.

Partially Resolved

Considerable efforts have been invested to reduce the risk/impact of the security issue, but are not completely resolved.



Severity Matrix

		Impact		
		High	Medium	Low
Likelihood	High	Critical	High	Medium
	Medium	High	Medium	Low
	Low	Medium	Low	Low

Impact

- **High** - leads to a significant material loss of assets in the protocol or significantly harms a group of users.
- **Medium** - only a small amount of funds can be lost (such as leakage of value) or a core functionality of the protocol is affected.
- **Low** - can lead to any kind of unexpected behavior with some of the protocol's functionalities that's not so critical.

Likelihood

- **High** - attack path is possible with reasonable assumptions that mimic on-chain conditions, and the cost of the attack is relatively low compared to the amount of funds that can be stolen or lost.
- **Medium** - only a conditionally incentivized attack vector, but still relatively likely.
- **Low** - has too many or too unlikely assumptions or requires a significant stake by the attacker with little or no incentive.



Critical Severity Issues

Replenish allows worthless tokens

Acknowledged**Path**

lib.rs

Function Name

replenish

Likelihood

High

Impact

High

Description

The `replenish` instruction is designed to allow the partner deposit wallet to replenish tokens to the protocol's operator wallet's token account. However, the current implementation does not properly validate the mint of the token accounts involved in the transfer. Specifically, the only constraint on the destination account (`zow_token_account`) is that it is owned by `zynk_op_wallet`:

```
```rust
#[account(
 mut,
 constraint = zow_token_account.owner == config.zynk_op_wallet @
 CustomError::InvalidTokenMint
)]
pub zow_token_account: Box<Account<'info, TokenAccount>>,
```
```

On Solana, anyone can create a token account for any mint and set the owner to any address. This means a malicious partner deposit wallet can create a token account for a worthless mint (not the intended protocol mint), set its owner to `zynk_op_wallet`, and supply it as `zow_token_account`. The same applies to the source account (`pdw_token_account`). The replenish instruction will then transfer worthless tokens and increment `order_tracker.amount_in` as if valid tokens were replenished.

There is no check that the mint of `pdw_token_account` and `zow_token_account` matches the expected protocol mint or each other. This allows attackers to replenish with arbitrary, valueless tokens, undermining the integrity of the protocol's accounting and token balances.



Impact

- **Protocol Accounting Corruption:** Attackers can artificially inflate `order_tracker.amount_in` with worthless tokens, making the protocol believe valid tokens have been replenished.
- **Loss of Funds:** The protocol may release assets or perform actions based on fake replenishments, leading to financial loss or theft.
- **Bypass of Business Logic:** Any logic relying on the replenished amount (e.g., order closure mechanism) can be bypassed or abused.

Remediation

- **Enforce Mint Validation:** Add constraints to ensure both `pdw_token_account` and `zow_token_account` have the same mint and that this mint matches the intended protocol mint. For example:

```

rust
#[account(
    mut,
    constraint = pdw_token_account.mint == zow_token_account.mint @
CustomError::InvalidTokenMint,
    constraint = zow_token_account.mint == EXPECTED_PROTOCOL_MINT @
CustomError::InvalidTokenMint,
    constraint = zow_token_account.owner == config.zynk_op_wallet @
CustomError::InvalidTokenMint
)]
pub zow_token_account: Box<Account<'info, TokenAccount>>,

```

Where `EXPECTED_PROTOCOL_MINT` is a constant or a field in your config/account that stores the correct mint address.

- **Validate in Instruction Logic:** In addition to account constraints, validate the mint addresses in the instruction logic before performing the transfer and updating `order_tracker.amount_in`.

Specific Fixed In Commit

b6276f24cca9e02b72f95e014dbe2b2008862265

Zynk Labs team's Response

The likelihood of the above attack vector is very low, as mentioned earlier, PDWs are wallets totally controlled by us. We create, track and validate the PDWs offchain. In other words, the `replenish()` function can never be invoked by any external user, unless they gain access to the private key of the PDW. But still, for the sake of robustness, we have updated the `send()` function to accept PDW's ATA of the concerned token instead of the PDW itself, and have applied checks for the ATA.

2nd update: The upgraded implementation restricts the `create_order()` to accept only a certain token account of the partner wallet. Since, the aforesaid function is a controlled feature having ZOW as the signer, we declare which token account can be used during `replenish()`. The constraints in the `create_order()` boils down to

PDW token account mint == beneficiary token account mint == ZOW token account mint.

Once the PDW token account gets embedded inside `orderTracker`, the PDW token account being passed in the `replenish()` must strictly match with the one in the `orderTracker`. Now, even if an attacker tries to manipulate the token accounts during `replenish()`, it is impossible for the transaction to go through, unless s/he has the access to the ZOW's private key beforehand for creating the order.

```
457     let pdw_token_account = ctx.accounts.pdw_token_account.key();
458     // Verify that the pdw_token_account is authorized by comparing it with
the stored pdw_token_account.
459     require!(
460         pdw_token_account == order_tracker.pdw_token_account,
461         CustomError::UnauthorizedSigner
462     );
```



Medium Severity Issues

Guardian Initialization can be frontran

Resolved

Path

lib.rs

Path

Initialize and set_guardian

Likelihood

Low

Impact

High

Description

The protocol's `Config` struct includes a `guardian` field, which is critical for security-sensitive operations such as pausing the contract and bypassing timelocks. However, the `initialize` function does not set the `guardian` field during deployment, leaving it as `Pubkey::default()`. The `set_guardian` function is then used to assign the guardian, but it currently allows any account to call it as long as the guardian is unset. This creates a frontrunning vulnerability: any user can race to set themselves as guardian before the intended admin, potentially taking control of privileged actions.

Impact

- Unauthorized Access: Any user can become the protocol guardian if they call `set_guardian` before the admin, gaining control over critical functions.
- Loss of Control: The intended admin or team may lose the ability to manage or recover the protocol if a malicious actor sets themselves as guardian.
- Protocol Integrity Risk: The guardian role can bypass timelocks and pause/unpause the contract, so unauthorized access could disrupt protocol operations or enable malicious actions.

Remediation

- Set Guardian During Initialization: Add a `guardian` parameter to the `initialize` function and set it at deployment, removing the need for a separate assignment.
- Restrict Access to set_guardian: If post-deployment assignment is required, restrict `set_guardian` so only the admin can call it:



```
```rust
pub fn set_guardian(ctx: Context<Misc>) -> Result<()> {
 let config = &mut ctx.accounts.config;
 require!(config.guardian == Pubkey::default(),
CustomError::AlreadyExecuted);
 require!(ctx.accounts.authority.key == config.admin,
CustomError::UnauthorizedAdmin);
 config.guardian = ctx.accounts.authority.key();
 Ok(())
}
```
```

Specific Fixed In Commit

7d52219a0c3d4f43d4ff6251dccf519ce08032d7

Zynk Labs team's Response

Removed the redundant `setGuardian()` function and included `guardian` in the `initialize()` function.



Unpause Execution Does Not Verify Timelock Action Type

Resolved

Description

The `execute_unpause` function does not verify that the timelock request being executed is actually an "Unpause" action. It only checks the execution status and timing/ack conditions, but does not enforce that `req.action` corresponds to the `TimelockAction::Unpause` variant.

Impact

Any valid timelock request (with correct timing or ack) could be used to unpause the protocol, regardless of its intended action. This could allow unauthorized or unintended unpausing, potentially bypassing governance or security controls.

Remediation

Add a check to ensure that `req.action` is equal to the value for `TimelockAction::Unpause` before proceeding with the unpause logic. For example:

```
// ...existing code...
let action: TimelockAction = req.action.try_into()?;
require!(action == TimelockAction::Unpause, CustomError::InvalidAction);
// ...existing code...
```

Specific Fixed In Commit

05b043b5dde4639ba9b57b81e829019e8913e173

Zynk Labs team's Response

Applied the necessary check



Low Severity Issues

Rent refund sent to manager instead of zynk operator wallet

Acknowledged

Path

lib.rs

Function

close_order

Description

In the `CloseOperation` account struct, the `order_tracker` account uses the Anchor `close` constraint to send the remaining rent (lamports) to the `manager` when the account is closed:

```
```rust
#[account(
 mut,
 close = manager
)]
pub order_tracker: Account<'info, OrderTracker>,
```
```

However, the `order_tracker` account is originally created and funded by the `zynk_op_wallet` (the protocol operator) in the `pull_and_send` and `send` instructions. This means the rent paid for account creation comes from the zync operator wallet, but when the account is closed, the refund is sent to the manager instead.

Remediation

Pass the `zynk_op_wallet` in instruction as mutable and change the `close` constraint in the `CloseOperation` struct to send the rent refund to the `zynk_op_wallet` instead of the manager:

```
```rust
#[account(
 mut,
 close = zynk_op_wallet
)]
pub order_tracker: Account<'info, OrderTracker>,
```
```

Zynk Labs team's Response

This is an intended functionality.



Redundant account closure in CloseOrder

Resolved

Path

lib.rs

Function Name

close_order

Description

In the `CloseOrder` struct, the `order_tracker` account uses the Anchor `close` constraint to automatically close the account and transfer its lamports to the `manager` upon successful instruction execution:

```
```rust
#[account(
 mut,
 close = manager
)]
pub order_tracker: Account<'info, OrderTracker>,
```
```

However, within the `close_order` instruction logic, the account is also manually closed using the `close_account` helper function:

```
```rust
close_account(&ctx.accounts.order_tracker, &ctx.accounts.manager)?;
```
```

This results in redundant attempts to close the same account, which is unnecessary and could lead to confusion or unexpected behavior.

Remediation

Remove the manual call to `close_account` in the instruction logic and rely solely on the Anchor `close` constraint for account closure. This will simplify the code and avoid redundant operations.

Specific Fixed In Commit

7d52219a0c3d4f43d4ff6251dccf519ce08032d7

Zynk Labs team's Response

Removed the redundant `close_account()` function invocation.



Informational Issues

Non deterministic Order account creation

Acknowledged

Path

lib.rs

Function Name

Pull_and_send, send

Description

Currently, the `order_tracker` account for each order is created using the default Anchor `init` constraint, which does not use deterministic seeds. This means the address of each order account is not predictable and cannot be derived off-chain using known parameters. By incorporating the order nonce as seeds when creating the order account, we can make the order account address deterministic and easily discoverable.

Recommendation

Update the order account creation to use deterministic seeds, such as:

```
```rust
#[account(
 init,
 payer = zynk_op_wallet,
 space = OrderTracker::LEN,
 seeds = [b"order", &nonce.to_le_bytes()],
 bump
)]
pub order_tracker: Account<'info, OrderTracker>,
```
```

This will make each order account address predictable and tied to its unique nonce.

Zynk Labs team's Response

We are not using `order_tracker` as a PDA but a generated Keypair, used only once when signing the `send()` transaction.



Functional Tests

Initialization Tests

- ✓ Should initialize with correct admin, manager, and zynk_op_wallet: Verify Config account stores provided addresses
- ✓ Should start with nonce zero and unpaused state: Confirm initial state values
- ✓ Should fail if config already exists: Test re-initialization prevention
- ✓ Should fail with null addresses: Verify address validation for parameters

Pull and Send Tests

- ✓ Should pull tokens from partner and send to beneficiary: Verify complete token flow with correct amounts
- ✓ Should increment nonce and create OrderTracker: Confirm nonce becomes order_id and tracker stores correct data
- ✓ Should emit PullAndSend event: Verify event contains order_id, token, wallets, amount, domain_separator
- ✓ Should fail when contract is paused: Test pause state blocking
- ✓ Should fail with invalid manager signature: Verify Ed25519 signature validation
- ✓ Should fail with mismatched token mints: Ensure all token accounts use same mint
- ✓ Should fail with insufficient partner balance: Test token balance validation

Send Tests

- ✓ Should send tokens from zynk_op_wallet to beneficiary: Verify token transfer works
- ✓ Should create OrderTracker with zero amount_in: Confirm send-only orders start with amount_in = 0
- ✓ Should emit Send event with correct data: Verify event parameters
- ✓ Should accept any valid partner_deposit_wallet: Test PDW parameter flexibility
- ✓ Should fail with null partner_deposit_wallet: Verify address validation
- ✓ Should fail when paused: Test pause state enforcement



Replenish Tests

- ✓ Should transfer tokens from partner to zynk_op_wallet: Verify replenishment flow
- ✓ Should update amount_in correctly: Confirm cumulative amount tracking
- ✓ Should emit Replenish event: Check event data accuracy
- ✓ Should fail with invalid order_id: Test order validation
- ✓ Should fail with expired validity: Verify timestamp checking
- ✓ Should fail with wrong partner wallet: Test authorization
- ✓ Should allow multiple replenishments: Verify cumulative tracking

Close Order Tests

- ✓ Should close order when fully replenished: Verify amount_in \geq amount_out check
- ✓ Should fail when order is deficient: Test insufficient replenishment rejection
- ✓ Should emit OrderClosure event with timestamp: Verify event emission
- ✓ Should transfer lamports to manager: Confirm account closure
- ✓ Only manager can close orders: Test access control

Timelock Tests

- ✓ Should create timelock with correct ETA: Verify delay calculation for each action
- ✓ Should execute after ETA passes: Test time-based execution
- ✓ Guardian should bypass timelock delays: Test guardian override in execute_wallet_update and execute_unpause
- ✓ Should update config values correctly: Verify admin, manager, zynk_op_wallet updates
- ✓ Should fail if already executed: Test double execution prevention
- ✓ Only admin can request timelocks: Verify access control

Guardian Tests

- ✓ Anyone can set guardian initially: Verify set_guardian vulnerability
- ✓ Should fail to set guardian if already set: Test one-time setting
- ✓ Guardian updates require admin and guardian signatures: Verify execute_guardian_update access
- ✓ Guardian can bypass timelock delays: Test bypass functionality



Pause/Unpause Tests

- ✓ Admin, manager, or guardian can pause: Verify pause permissions
- ✓ Pause blocks all main operations: Test pull_and_send, send, replenish blocking
- ✓ Unpause requires timelock execution: Verify execute_unpause process
- ✓ Guardian can bypass unpause timelock



Threat Model

| Contract | Function | Threats |
|--------------|---------------|---|
| ZynkProtocol | initialize | Zero-address parameters for zynk_op_wallet / manager, Centralized ownership risk, Missing guardian initialization |
| | pull_and_send | Manager signature replay attacks, Token freeze by mint authority, Nonce overflow DoS, Partner wallet compromise drains funds, Beneficiary receives frozen/ worthless tokens |
| | send | Arbitrary partner_deposit_wallet manipulation, Manager signature forgery, Token supply manipulation by mint authority, Zero-value orders waste gas |
| | replenish | Worthless token deposits to fulfill orders, Expired validity timestamps bypass, Partner wallet compromise, Token mint mismatch exploitation |
| | close_order | Manager-only closure creates centralization risk, Premature closure with insufficient replenishment, Double closure via constraint and manual call |



| Contract | Function | Threats |
|----------|--------------------------|---|
| | request_timelock | Limited to 5 concurrent timelocks (action 0-4), Admin-only control creates single point of failure, Timelock grieving attacks |
| | execute_wallet_update | Guardian bypass without ETA validation, Missing guardian update action (hardcoded exclusion), Invalid timelock action processing |
| | execute_guardian_update | Requires both admin and guardian signatures, No guardian bypass option, Address validation can be bypassed |
| | set_guardian | Anyone can set guardian initially (critical vulnerability), One-time setting with no recovery mechanism, Race condition during initialization |
| | execute_unpause | Guardian can bypass timelock delays, No validation of unpause necessity, Admin dependency for unpause operations |
| | pause | Missing AND logic creates authorization bypass, Multiple actors can pause but only admin can unpause, No pause duration limits |
| | verify_signature_syscall | Ed25519 instruction data manipulation, Signature replay across different contexts, Message format injection attacks |



| Contract | Function | Threats |
|------------------|------------------|---|
| Config | validate_address | Only checks for default pubkey, No validation against protocol-controlled addresses, System program addresses allowed |
| | close_account | Manual closure combined with Anchor's close constraint, Lamport drain attacks, Account data not fully zeroed |
| | Storage | Mutable state without proper access controls, Guardian address can be overwritten, Nonce overflow potential |
| | OrderTracker | No PDA derivation for unique orders, Amount tracking integer overflow, Partner wallet spoofing |
| TimelockRequest` | Storage | Fixed delay periods cannot be adjusted, Action enum limited to 5 values, ETA manipulation possible |



Closing Summary

In this report, we have considered the security of Zynk Labs. We performed our audit according to the procedure described above.

Issues of Critical, Medium, Low and informational severity were found. Zynk Labs resolved few and acknowledged others

Disclaimer

At QuillAudits, we have spent years helping projects strengthen their smart contract security. However, security is not a one-time event—threats evolve, and so do attack vectors. Our audit provides a security assessment based on the best industry practices at the time of review, identifying known vulnerabilities in the received smart contract source code.

This report does not serve as a security guarantee, investment advice, or an endorsement of any platform. It reflects our findings based on the provided code at the time of analysis and may no longer be relevant after any modifications. The presence of an audit does not imply that the contract is free of vulnerabilities or fully secure.

While we have conducted a thorough review, security is an ongoing process. We strongly recommend multiple independent audits, continuous monitoring, and a public bug bounty program to enhance resilience against emerging threats.

Stay proactive. Stay secure.



About QuillAudits

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With seven years of expertise, we've secured over 1400 projects globally, averting over \$3 billion in losses. Our specialists rigorously audit smart contracts and ensure DApp safety on major platforms like Ethereum, BSC, Arbitrum, Algorand, Tron, Polygon, Polkadot, Fantom, NEAR, Solana, and others, guaranteeing your project's security with cutting-edge practices.



7+

Years of Expertise

1M+

Lines of Code Audited

50+

Chains Supported

1400+

Projects Secured

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AUDIT REPORT

July 2025

For



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