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What's up with Right-Wing Voters?

Right-wing Party Success accross Europe

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Abstract: In this study we explain extreme right-wing voting behaviour in the countries of the European Union and Norway from a micro and macro perspective. Using a multidisci- plinary multilevel approach, we take into account individual-level social background char- acteristics and public opinion alongside country characteristics and characteristics of extreme right-wing parties themselves. By making use of large-scale survey data (N = 49,801) together with country-level statistics and expert survey data, we are able to explain extreme right-wing voting behaviour from this multilevel perspective. Our results show that cross- national differences in support of extreme right-wing parties are particularly due to dif- ferences in public opinion on immigration and democracy, the number of non-Western residents in a country and, above all, to party characteristics of the extreme right-wing parties themselves.

Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

1   Introduction

In the 2009 European Parliamentary elections, especially right-wing parties mobilized anti-EU sentiment and gained seats in the European parliament.

Since the early 1980s, parties such as the French Front National, the Belgian Vlaams Blok, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the Danish People's Party have established themselves in their respective party systems, sometimes with vote shares exceeding 20 per cent.

In the following study we are eager to answer the question whether . . .

In this article, we will try to explain differences in extreme right-wing voting behaviour between 16 Western European countries. So far, cross-national empirical research on extreme right-wing voting has been scarce, even though in 1988 von Beyme emphasized that "future studies of right-wing extremism will have to pay more attention to the whole political context of the political movement" (von Beyme 1988: 16).

(Bühlmann & Freitag 2006a): Since Lazarsfeld et al. (1949), socio-economic status (SES) has played a prominent role in explaining both the decision to vote and participation behaviour. Normally, socio-economic status consists of the individual's educational level, income, and her occupational status. In theory, a high SES leads to a higher propensity to participate in elections, because individuals with high education levels and/or with a high income have more disposable time and a greater capacity to understand political debates (Kleinhenz 1995). This leads not only to greater political interest, but also to a greater probability of participation. Furthermore, wealthy individuals have an interest in contributing to the stability of the political system by participating in it (Wol nger and Rosenstone 1980). • Political skills are seen as the most important resource of participation (Bühlmann 2006): individuals with a lot of political interest (Campbell et al. 1976; Lazarsfeld et al. 1949) and internal ef cacy (Campbell et al. 1976) make wider use of all the different possibilities of in uencing politics - including electoral participation - than uninterested individuals or persons who do not think they have the ability to participate in politics.2 • Political attitudes play a crucial role in the decision to vote. Since Campbell et al. (1976), party ties have been considered long-term factors which stabilise electoral choices. However, party ties are also important for participation (Dalton et al. 1984). People with only weak, or no party identi cation at all, show a lower propensity to participate in elections (Pattie and Johnston 1998). An important and widely discussed (especially in German political science (Feist 1992))3 factor is the attitude that voting is a civic duty. If participation in elections is seen as the ful lment of one's duty as a citizen, the propensity to vote increases.

Kenski & Stroud (2006): Research in several European countries has shown that voters for the radical right-wing parties feel less politically efficacious, more alienated, and more dissatisfied with

the established parties, the political institutions, and the demo.. cratic system in general (Beta 1994:35..67).

(**???**) : Any attempt to explain an individual's propensity to vote must take into account the differences in the context in which the individual lives. We mainly assume that different contextual settings will have different impacts on individual participation. We also expect different interactions between contextual and individual characteristics. In other words: differences in individual resources play a key role in explaining individual participation behaviour, but the latter also depends on the canton in which a person lives. On the one hand the cantonal context builds a framework which fosters or hinders the individual's propensity to vote, and on the other hand, the effect of individual resources on participation also differs from context to context.

Third, we advance a methodological argument. We hypothesise that an individual's propensity to vote is in uenced by both his personal characteristics as well as by contextual attributes. Individual-level explanations of electoral participation on the one hand typically argue that non-voting is determined by a combination of facilitative and motivational variables. Motivational factors as such include ideology, political attitudes, and basic tendencies, whereas facilitative determinants refer to speci c individual resources and socio-demographic factors (education, income, age etc.) (Kleinhenz 1995; Knight and Marsh 2002). Macro-level approaches, on the other hand, evaluate the determinants of total voting turnout rather than focusing on the individual (Franklin 2002; Norris 2002). In this strand of research, cross-country variance is explained by cultural, economic, and – most importantly – politico-institutional settings (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Crepaz 1990; Franklin 2002; Freitag 1996, 2005; Norris 2004; Wernli 1998). While micro-level research neglects the contextual framework within which individual actions take place, macro-level approaches face the risk of ecological fallacies. Against this background, we argue that non-voting has to be explained by both individual and contextual characteristics. Moreover, the environmental context also functions in an interactive manner, in uencing the strength of the effect of individual characteristics on participation. By combining individual and contextual determinants of electoral participation and modelling them simultaneously with multilevel analysis, we contribute to the overcoming of the "midlife crisis" facing electoral studies (Curtice 2002: 6). We see multilevel analysis as a possibility to overcome the micro-macro dualism widely discussed in social sciences. With multilevel analyses, the determinants of individual behaviour can be analysed in a much more appropriate manner than with simple micro-analyses or macro-analyses (Hank 2003). For the rst time, data on the 2003 Swiss elections allows the in uence of the cantonal contexts on individual participation to be tested. We can therefore go further than the very rare existing studies on electoral participation in Switzerland, which are conducted either on the aggregate (Freitag 2005; Wernli 1998, 2001) or the individual level (Ballmer-Cao and Sgier 1998; Bühlmann et al. 2003). This contribution is divided into four sections. Before we turn to a short description of our method and our results we discuss the existing

theoretical and empirical contributions to our investigation (next section). Our last section offers conclusions and outlines for future research.

So far, these factors have been studied in isolation and have not as yet been integrated into an explanatory model of cross-national differences in extreme right-wing voting. This article is among the first to take all these factors into account for all countries of the European Union and Norway using a multi- level approach. This approach also allows us to examine how the contextual and individual levels are interrelated. It brings together a large amount of individual-level survey data (N = 49,801). Moreover, country characteristics are added from census data as well as data from an expert judgement survey conducted among political scientists in all countries included in the study to trigger information on the opportunity structure for extreme right-wing parties as well as their specific characteristics (Lubbers 2000). To summarize, we answer the question as to what extent differences between countries in extreme right-wing voting can be explained in terms of (a) composition effects, (b) country conditions, and (c) characteristics of extreme right-wing parties themselves. Moreover we examine how individual-level effects differ between countries and to what extent these differences are influenced by contextual conditions.

Whether or not this fear is justified, the fact remains that many countries have witnessed a growing popularity of these parties since the 1980s and that this growth in popularity is mirrored by a declining popularity of the more traditional political parties.

he ability of populist politics to galvanize new forms of political engagement is especially important in an era of decline in formal political participation such as turnout and party membership Skocpol & Williamson (2016). At the same time, in unconsolidated democracies populism may erode democratic institutions and usher competitive authoritarian regimes (Levistky & Loxton 2012).

populist politics can reshape repertoires of political mobilization, especially in the forms of mass social movements and socially engaged party organizations (Hawkins 2010; Jansen 2011).

2   State of Research

These past years populism has received great attention from the social science community (Mudde 2004; Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017). The term "populism" is both widely used and disputed (Roberts 2006; Barr 2009). Several scientists have taken on the challenge of conceptualising populism with only a small number of widely acknowledged characteristics. It has been considered as an political style, as an ideology and as an organizational form (Pauwels 2014). Often, the concept is broken down to political, economic, social, cultural and discursive features and analyzed from numerous theoretical perspectives including democratic and modernization theory, social movement theory, party politics and political psychology (Postel 2007; Goodliffe 2012; Acemoglu et al. 2013). Within the wide range of literature there is a general agreement that populism is context-dependent and culture-bound, therefore strongly variable across countries. By the means of cross-national analyses, Mudde & Kaltwasser (2012) were able to gain extensive insight into populism and democracy in Latin America, Canada, Eastern and Western Europe.

Further scholars differentiate populism based on historical periods with studies using data going back to the late 19th century (Arter 2010; Rosenthal & Trost 2012; Levitsky & Roberts 2013). Furthermore, populism cuts across ideological cleavages (Kaltwasser 2014): in Europe, an exclusionary right-wing variant of populism emerged in the 1980s—and has intensified since—targeting mostly immigrants and national minorities (Mudde 2007; Ivarsflaten 2008; Arter 2011; Berezin 2013). Finding common traits which combine various populist activites across several countries remains a great challenge. The task therefore is to explain how specific circumstances and culture nature populists politics and how these in turn impact the political sphere (Arter 2010). Despite such difficulties, it is possible to conceptualise populism by clearly identifing the key features of the phenomenon to be observed, allowing a comparison of populist politics across contexts.

The increase of right-wing extremism is of great matter in several Western European democracies. While right-wing parties with conservative and anti-system attitudes are gaining more and more ground in the political arena, the actual democratic process is jeopardised (Coffé et al. 2007). Comparative evidence on the intentions of right-wing voters is rather insufficient (Kai 2008). Several analyses have shown that vote intentions and therefore election outcomes for right-wing parties are affected by political, economic and social circumstances such as the political landscape, socio-econonmic characteristics, political trust, the presence of immigrants, crime rate and social capital (Carter 2002; Golder 2003; Coffé et al. 2007).

Most comparative analyses either observed solely on the individual level or on the aggregate level. In aggregate-level studies, several country-specific characteristics connected to the vote of right-wing parties were identified (Lubbers et al. 2002). However, when analysing the context, individual characteristics on voting for the right wing are often disregarded (Merkl & Weinberg 2014). Further

researchers recognized these flaws and derived important factors to explain variations between several countries (Husbands 1996; Van der Brug et al. 2000). Lubbers et al. (2002) propose the distinction between political, economic and sociological factors. While the party system and party-specific factors play an important part from the political perspective, economic competetion and malaise as well as immigrants have to be considered when explaining differences in right-wing voting (Husbands 1996; Lubbers et al. 2002). Werts et al. (2013) found evidence for the impact of increasing immigration rates as well as the use of such by right-wing parties in order to mobilize their voters (Werts et al. 2013). Sociological factors however refer to the social structure and the public opinion within it and are often tested with data on education and attitudes towards ethnic minorities.

Recent findings from France and Denmark however show that economic factors are not the prevalent explanation, rather cultural ethnic threats and their effect on far-right support (Ivarsflaten 2005). Findings by Lubbers & Güveli (2007) support the idea of important differences between cultural and economic threats in order to explain right-wing voting. Werts et al. (2013) derive from the national identity approach "[. . .] that the EU poses same threat as mass migration, i.e. a threat to a supposed homogeneous society" (Werts et al. 2013: 188). Turning to the EUs institutions, Werts et al. (2013) find political distrust being a relatively important attitude of right-wing voters. Ivarsflaten (2005) showed that euro-scepticism is an important determinant for radical right-wing support in France and Denmark. Van der Brug et al. (2005) also found a positive relationship between anti-EU sentiments and radical right-wing voting in France. Citizens who perceive deprivation in their current situation, have higher levels of political distrust and therefore are more inclined to vote for a right-wing party. Also, Arzheimer & Carter (2009) found evidence for the relevance of euro-scepticism, although he was not able to test its effect next to the major predictors such as attitudes towards migrants.

Next to the presence of a variety of material resources, political participation is also triggered by cognitive resources such as political trust and efficacy.

zu trust:

Past research has not highlighted the role of political trust. Especially evidence on the relationship between trust and voting for right-wing parties is not suffiecient, as its impact might have been overestimatedpast methodological approaches might have overestimated its impact. Additionally, previous studies did not pay the sufficient attention to the role of political trust, and they found contradictory results (Bergh, 2004; Norris, 2005). They also overlooked the fact that the impact of trust might depend on the characteristics of the context. Moreover, the relationship between trust and vote has not been sufficiently controlled by other explanatory factors, which may have overestimated the impact of trust.

Over the last 40 years, internal efficacy almost always occurs when explaining political participation. Within this literature, internal efficacy is predominantly characterized as a stable psychological resource used to overcome the costs of participation (Valentino et al. 2009). Political deliberation can also have quite powerful effects on what Morrell (2005) calls "situation-specific" internal efficacy: the ability to discuss, understand, and make decisions about politics. It refers to citizens' feelings of their own personal competence to participate in politics, and scholars have demonstrated that it has important consequences for democracy by influencing citizens' political participation (Morrell 2005). While the concept of political efficacy is widely studied, literature and especially empirical evidence of its impact on voting behaviour are rather scarce. In order to overcome these flaws, we analyse several theoretic perspectives which take individual as well as aggregate characteristics into account. By combing these, we hope to develop a more precise concept for cross-country evaluation of right-wing voting. Moreover we are eager to contribute essential evidence to the internal efficacy and political psychology literature.

3   Voting Right-Wing Parties

These the past years, the radical right have become important players when analysing citizens' political participation. As there are several possibilites for citizens to take part in the political process - the decisive challenge is to clarify which activities are included in the concept. Following Verba et al. (1995), most researchers define it as an "activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action - either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies" (Brady et al. 1995: 38). Political participation helps governments to recognize what needs and attitudes people accross the country have. These are typically acquired through several methods such as voting, campaigning or political debating guaranting that citizens input possibilities (Blais 2010).

As most representative democracies are built upon electoral processes, voting in elections is the most common practice of citizen political engagement. Elections are considered an important source of legitimisation as representatives only receive citizens' support if these are satisfied with the outcomes of the system (Easton 1965, Bühlmann & Freitag (2006a)). Electoral outcomes define who operates government activities and who makes public policies. Citizens ability to vote different representatives at the next election is an ultimate instrument of power. Indeed, such competative nature within the political system strengthens debates on government, policies and potential policy-makers between citizens and elites (Blais 2010). Eventually, citizens vote for the party with which the agree the most.

Early studies indicate that while most elaborated parties are known for their wide-ranging agenda on several political issues, most righ-wing parties are characterised as alliances solely focussing

on immigration attitudes (Husbands 1988; Eatwell 1998). Further studies indicate that broader ideological aspects are more important when explaing right-wing voting (Van der Brug et al. 2000; Husbands 2013). Moreover, positions of parties and voters on policy issues are mainly defined by left-right ideology (Van der Brug et al. 2000).

Indeed

Since several scholars stressed the importance of the mediating role of socio-political attitudes (e.g. Kitschelt, 1995; Van der Brug et al., 2000), we connect the "who" and "why" question of radical right-wing voting. The question of why lower social strata and disintegrated categories are more likely to vote for a radical right-wing party is explained by four clusters of socio-political attitudes: anti-immigrant attitudes, favourable in-group attitudes, authoritarian attitudes and political dissatisfaction (e.g. Billiet and De Witte, 1995; Mudde, 2007). To these explanations we propose to add euro-scepticism, to properly test its additional effect. We first briefly discuss the classic explanations, after which we elaborate on the role of euro-scepticism on radical right-wing voting.

3.1   Individual-level Explanations

3.1.1   Political Trust & External Efficacy

These past 10 years, the enhancing trend of voting for right-wing parties was often studied in connection to the Great Recession. Worsened economic conditions accross most European countries as well as an extreme political crisis resulted and left their marks (Bosco & Verney 2012). In response, supranational institutions pressured national governments to implement severe methods in order to face the sovereign debt crisis. Such developments quickly lead to the perception that political elites are more eager to please external demands then those of their own citizens (Armingeon & Guthmann 2014). Indeed, recent events have shown that a large number of citizens are hesitant to encourage European integration. Several parties express euro-criticism and sucessfully mobilize national identity considerations against the European Union (De Vries & Edwards 2009; Hooghe & Marks 2005; Lubbers 2008). These parties see the EU as a threat to the sovereignty of the nation state (Mudde 2007).

Simultaneously political trust towards parties and politicians has been declining, especially in Eastern and Southern Europe (Torcal 2014). Citizens have started to distrust the political processes, are not convinced by the system of representative democracy and are turning more and more to populist parties (Serani 2016). While the political system is characterised as working against the common good, established parties and single elites are often accused of being incompetent, ignorent and selfish (Taggart 2000). Populists not only despise the political system itself, but also the

economic, media and cultural elite. These are often described as one corrupt group neglecting citizens' attitudes and wishes towards political policies (Abedi 2004; Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017). Anti-elitism is therefore one of the most obvious traits of right-wing parties and nurtures the increase of right-wing voters (Mény & Surel 2002).

Next to trust in parties correlating to the satisfation with the democratic process and democracy itself, Dalton & Weldon (2005) investigate its impact on electoral behaviour. Drawn from "reward-punishmenent"-theories, further researchers find that voters judge parties and vote accordingly (Fiorina (2002); Dalton & Weldon (2005); Dassonneville (2012)). They use their democratic rights to punish established parties by voting right-wing. The "political disaffection"-theory highlights institutional disaffection. Next to institutional confidence, external political efficacy is the main determinent of institutinal disaffection (Dassonneville 2012). When citizens believe that their efforts such as voting and debating can impact politics, they are more likely to participate. External efficacy is defined through one's certainty in the responsiveness and openness of government authorities and institutions (Easton 1965). Citizens with low levels in political trust and external efficacy feel neglected by the political sphere, are more volatile in their party preferences as well as vote choices and are therefore interested in changing the players of the political arena by voting for an anti-system party (Dassonneville 2012). We expect these citizens to be more drawn to right-wing parties which prioritise the lack of transparency and commitment towards the nation.

Hypothesis 1: Citizens with low levels of political trust are more likely to vote for a right-wing party.

3.1.2   Economic Deprivation

In order to determine the sucess of right-wing parties, several studies have highlighted the analysis of economic conditions. Often, citizens unemployment is used in order to analyse economic deprivation. However, since positive (Jackman & Volpert 1996) as well as negative effects (Jesuit & Mahler 2004) are found, the true impact of unemployment remains uncertain. Next to unemployment, further studies analyse the impact of micro variables such as education, religiosity and age. They illustrate how voters from lower social classes as well as voters with lower social strata experience more disintegration than others and therefore are more likely to vote for a right-wing party. It turns out that young, non-religious citziens with poorer education have a higher likelihood to vote for right-wing parties (Lubbers et al. 2002). Research based on the ethnic competition theory shows that "[...] ethnic groups sharing similar economic interests are in competition for scarce resources, which induces perceived ethnic threat and intergroup antagonistic attitudes" (Coffé et al. 2007: 185). A great amount of ethnic groups are located in low labour sectors. Within such sectors, the unemployment rate tends to be higher and the frustration with one's social strata increases. As these

citizens are more likely to come across scarcity, poverty and social exclusion, they turn to political authorities who emphasize the power of traditional norms. Citizens from lower classes are therefore less satisfied with their socio-econmic position, perceive more ethnic threat and consequently turn to parties which promise policies of exclusion (Lubbers et al. (2002); Coffé et al. (2007)).

Hypothesis 2: Citizens who feel economic deprivation in their socio-economic position are more likely to vote for a right-wing party.

Smilar to the competition for scarce resources, the fear of cultural resource loss is identified as determinant for anti-immigrant attitudes. The associated hostility to minorities is claimed to have a greater impact on right-wing voting than economic deprivation. They feel directly threatened by ethnic minorities (Norris (2005); Dagevos & Gijsberts (2010)). Indeed, empirical results show that concerns about group identity can outweigh poor economic conditions (Sniderman et al. 2004). Latest immigrant and asylum rates show that the number of foreigners outside the EU searching for sanctuary has risen drastically these past years and several European countries were not prepared for such cultural changes. This quickly led to controversial integration policies such as the ban of wearing religious symbols in schools. The media in turn emphasised the nagative consequences of these policies (Coffé et al. 2007). Right-wing parties then saw their opportunity to attract voters by blaming the government for failed integration and started to claim that foreigners are associated to a wide range of social issues. Eventhough not all voters with concerns on immigration rate vote for right-wing parties, most right-wing voters have anti-immigration attitudes and want more restrictive policies (Sniderman et al. 2004; Coffé et al. 2007). In conclusion, we expect voters with cultural anti-immigrant attitudes to be more likely to vote for a radical right-wing party. We draw this back to two attributes: 1. these voters experience more cultural ethnic threat, and 2. their wishes towards immigration and asylum policies are ignored by other parties.

Hypothesis 3: Citizens who perceive cultural ethnic treats, hold a more hostile attitudes towards minorties and are therefore more likely to vote for a right-wing party.

Next to our main hypotheses we follow previous research by integrating political interest, income, gender, religiosity and self-assessment on the political left-right scale.

3.2   Contextual Factors

Little research has been done on the impact of both individual- and country-level characteristics on the sucess of right-wing parties. Jackman and Volpert (1996) conducted a first large scale quantitative comparative analysis right-wing parties' electoral sucess. Their main findings were that

(1) the ER benefits from high unemployment, (2) higher electoral thresholds reduce the support for the ER, and (3) mul tipartyism in combination with a proportional electoral system is associated with higher levels of ER vot

-mehr intro- Our first approach to explain extreme right-wing voting from a macro-perspective is the observation of political factors. In existing comparative electoral participation research, most studies on participation include politico-institutional determinants (Haskell 2018). However, we propose that such determinants have received little attention so far when testing sucess of right-wing parties.

In the age of populism, polls illustrate that a great amount of citizens are not satisfied with the concepts of checks and balances as well as federalism as they tend to limit parties in their action. Consequently, governments are too distant from and unresponsive to the concerns of the people and therefore undemocratic. In order to be closer to citizens, populists suggest more direct-base participation such as initiatives and referenda (Haskell 2018). In order to overcome the distance between voters and the political establishment, Barber (2003) suggest to implement more community-based actions. Moreover, the use of national referendum and repersentative citizen assemblies providing policy advice to elected officials are claimed to be effective innovations against perceptions of isolation (Dahl 1989; Phillips 1996; Fishkin 1997).

Indeed, empirical results show that direct democratic institutions are becoming more popular, especially when debating about the most important public issues. As populists argue that representative institutions ignore the will of ordinary citizens, their answer to political distance is very straightforward: citizens should vote whenever possible (Haskell 2018). Citizens who perceive political distance from the establishment demand more direct democratic institutions. Thereby, the government, parliament and parties hand over segments of competence to voters who recognise that they are "[. . .]in a position to decide authoritatively on important issues, independently and without recourse to members of parliament" (Bühlmann & Freitag 2006b: 20). Drawn from this previous research, we come to the conclusion that citizens from countries with greater amounts of direct democratic institutions should perceive less political distance than others and should therefore be less likely to vote for a right-wing party.

Hypothesis 4: In countries with with greater amounts of direct democratic institutions, citizens are less likely to vote for a right-wing party.

As previously discussed, perceived economic and cultural ethnic threats play an important role when analysing right-wing voting. One may not only expect conflict to be more severe in regions with high levels of unemployment, but also in regions where the level of immigration is high. For example on the labour market, migrants and refugees are perceived as unfair competition. Often, rising refugee rates and the sole presence of these foreigners supported with addtional state services are stressed.

Populists feel overwhelmed by the "masses of immigration" and therefore judge their own social opportunities to be poor. Since extreme right parties take advantage of these feelings of competition, the presence of immigrants and refugees may facilitate their electoral growth. Lubbers et al. (2002) merge surveys from 16 West European countries and conclude that the number of non-Western residents has a substantial impact on the likelihood of an extreme right vote. Golder (2003) confirms this claim and finds an additional positive interaction between unemployment and immigration rates. Consequently, we argue that foreigners' presence translates into electoral successes for extreme right.

Hypothesis 5: In countries with higher immigration rates citizens are more likely to vote for a radical right-wing party.

Following Werts et al. (2013), we also take the effect of modernization into account. Modernization is claimed to reflect disintegration. A well-functioning economic system nurtures positive attitudes towards the political system, conveys citizens' perception of effective participation and encourages political interest. Previous research shows that the engagement in social institutions is declining, more and more voters are deserted from social support systems and are therefore more likely to be socially isolated and vote for right-wing parties which promise to represent them.

Hypothesis 6: In countries with higher levels of modernization citizens are more likely to vote for a radical right-wing party.

4 Methods

4.1 Research Design

- summary stats

4.2 Data Descriptions

Different data sources data set were used:

- **European Social Survey** (ESS8 2016). The ESS is a multi-country scientific survey conducted every two years since 2002 by scientists in several European countries. The objectives of the ESS are to understand the changing attitudes and values in Europe, to explain how European institutions are changing and to develop a range of European social indicators and values (ESS8 2016). The data for the present analysis were collected from different survey waves the latest for each country.

- **Chapel Hill Expert Survey**. Since 1999 CHES provides party positioning scores on European integration, ideology and policy issues for national parties in a variety of European countries. The more recent survey waves also comprise questions on non-EU policy issues, such as immigration, redistribution, decentralization, and environmental policy.

The dependent variable from our final model is the populism cluster infered from Ches party data that has been matched and merged to the ESS micro data on voting a particular party. Variable Description . . .

https://www.chesdata.eu/our-surveys/

4.3   Model Based Clustering

Voting for a right wing party is often approximated by left-right scales or is time-intensiv coded. This analysis adopts Cas Mudde's clear minimalist definition of populism to identify core features that all sub types of populism have in common. In line with this definition, we suggest that populist parties are primarily shaped by their degree of anti-establishment attitudes as well as their opposition to globalization. Subsequently, we propose to classify European populist parties along a progressive and traditionalist left-right dimension. Some CHES party indicators are part of the clustering even though they are not be present in the ESS micro data.

This multidimensional classification problem is best approached by model-based hierarchical clustering (Scrucca et al. 2016). This tool set is already adopted in political science and praised for estimating meaningful clusters on high-dimensional data political science (Ahlquist & Breunig 2012; Jang & Hitchcock 2012). Model-based clustering assumes the data generating process to be driven by a mixture of underlying probability distributions in which each component represents a different cluster. Consequently each sub population is separately estimated and summarized by a mixture of these sub populations. Therefore the density tends to be centered at the multidimensional means (μ_k) and increased by geometric features (shape, volume, orientation) of the clusters being determined by the parameters of the covariance matrices Σ_k, which may also induce cross-cluster conditions (Ahlquist & Breunig 2012). In a nutshell the Gaussian Finite Normal Mixture model assumes a d-dimensional data set $y_1, \ldots, y_n$ to calculate G components with the likelihood

$$\ell_{MIX}(\theta_1, \ldots, \theta_G | y) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{k=1}^{G} \tau_k f_k(y_i | \theta_k)$$

where f_k is the density of the θ_k mixture parameters, unlike traditional methods model-based clustering uses a soft assignment and calculates τ_k that represents the probability of a given observation belonging to the k component (Ahlquist & Breunig 2012). Unsupervised machine learning algorithms are often criticized for introducing bias by hyper parameter settings. `mclust` addresses this by estimating a grid of different models and hyper parameter constellations. Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is provided to pick the most useful model (Scrucca et al. 2016). The metric is penalized for the complexity of the model to ensure Osam Razor.

The estimated grid models are represented by the following identifiers: EII, VII, EEI, VEI, EVI, VVI, EEE, EEV, VEV and VVV. The first Letter refers to volume, the second to shape and the third to orientation. E stands for "equal", V for "variable" and I for "coordinate axes" (Kassambara 2017).

There is a clear indication of a four-component mixture with covariances having different shapes but the same volume and orientation (EVE) (VEV (ellipsoidal, equal shape)).

Model selection
Best model: VEV | Optimal clusters: n = 3

Figure 1: BIC Model Selection for mixture models on the CHES party positioning data set. Following Fraley and Raftery (2010), the grid component structures are labeled using: EII=spherical, equal volume; EEI=diagonal, equal volume and shape; EVI=diagonal, equal volume, varying shape; EEE=ellipsoidal, equal volume, shape, and orientation; VEV=ellipsoidal, equal shape; VII=spherical, unequal volume; VEI=diagonal, varying volume, equal shape; VVI=diagonal, varying volume and shape; EEV=ellipsoidal, equal volume and equal shape; VVV=ellipsoidal, varying volume, shape, and orientation.

Following Milligan and Cooper's (1988) finding that standardization by dividing each variable by its range gives consistently superior recovery of the underlying cluster structure, all the variables are standardized by dividing by each variable's range. PCA . . .

Cluster plot
Classification

Figure 2: Classification and Cluster Boundaries

Table X displays the characteristics of each cluster through mean and standard deviation.

Table 1: Cluster means and standard deviations for populist indicators

Var	Establishment	Left Populist	Right Populist
antielite_salience	3.42	5.9	7.73
	(1.78)	(2.44)	(1.5)
civlib_laworder	4.67	3.47	8.19
	(1.75)	(1.97)	(1.07)
eu_position	6.16	3.28	2.81
	(0.51)	(1.15)	(1.24)
galtan	4.52	3.58	8.35
	(2.13)	(2.36)	(0.95)

[1] Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses

Table 2: Party Cluster Membership

Cluster	Parties
Establishment	CDU (ger); SPD (ger); FDP (ger); Grunen (ger); CSU (ger); PS (fra); PRG (fra); EELV (fra); UMP (fra); MODEM (fra); NC (fra); PRV (fra); AC (fra)
Left Populist	Linke (ger); Piraten (ger); DieTier (ger); PCF (fra); PG (fra); Ens (fra)
Right Populist	NPD (ger); AfD (ger); FN (fra); MPF (fra)

[1] Note: ...

To validate the clusters lets inspect the party classification for three countries. The final cluster vector is attached to the data with name `cluster`.

4.4   Principal Component Analysis

Principal Component Analysis (PCA) another unsupervised machine learning approach is now used to reduce the dimensions of two item batteries to get a parsimonious model size. For both variables we are only interested in the first Dimension/Component that contributes most to the variability in the underlining data structure. The formal model for the first principal component of a data set is the linear combination its features

$$Z_i = \phi_{11}X_1 + \phi_{21}X_2 + \cdots + \phi_{p1}X_p$$

that has the largest variance and where is the first principal component loading vector, with elements $\phi_{11}X_1 + \phi_{21}X_2 + \cdots + \phi_{p1}$ are normalized, which means that $\sum_{j=1}^{p} \phi_{j1}^2 = 1$. To calculate these loadings, we must find the vector that maximizes the variance. It can be shown using techniques from linear algebra that the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of the covariance matrix is the set of loadings that explains the greatest proportion of the variability. This method does not depend compared to Factor Analysis or SEM on model assumptions or multivariate error distributions. Despite all dimensionality reduction methods have different background and purposes they often yield similar results. But for construct validation I recommend factor analysis or any other framework that provides hypothesis testing.


Figure 3: Bivariate Scatter plots for item battery public trust

4.4.1   Trust Items

First we explore the diemnionality of the given trust items by applying standard pairwise scatter plots for each variable combination. The visual inspection confirms a strong linear association between all variables and the diagonal histograms approximate a normal distribution with a heavy tail on 0, as people are especially critical against political institutions and put more overall confidence in the police.

The next plot shows a two-dimensional representation of the data that captures most of the information in a lower-dimensional subspace. The First two components contribute together to nearly 80% of the total variance.


Figure 4: First and Second PC Dimensions for the Trust Items

As each principal component vector defines a direction in the feature space and all arrows in Figure X point to the same direction we can be confident to approximate one trust dimension. This notion is supported by the scree plot capturing 66,7% of the total Variance by the first dimension. We can further see that the trust items for political institutions do somewhat differ in their contribution to the first PC due to different reasons. The European Parliament is often seen as disconnected from people and the police is always highly appreciated by everyone. The first PC scores are stored for later analysis as `pc_trust`.

Figure 5: scree plot and Component Contribution by Variable

Figure 6: Bivariate Scatter Plots for item battery immigration

4.4.2   Immigration Items

Next we applied the same PCA for the Immigration Items. But first we explore again the nationality of the given data by standard pairwise scatter plots for each variable combination. The visual inspection again confirms a strong linear association between all variables but seem to be more noisy than the trust items before. The diagonal histograms approximate a normal distribution, despite the fact that three out of four variables have only 4 levels. This Likert scale is assumed to

be equal-distant to be suitable for PCA.

Figure 7: PCA Dimensionality for the Immigration Items

The two-dimensional representation of the immigration items proposes again a strong one PC solution but points to a minor second dimension entirely rooted in imm_econ. We are only interested in the first PC that captures over 70% of the total variance. The scree plot and contribution plot support these findings. The final PC scores are stored for later analysis as `pc_imm`.


Figure 8: scree plot and Component Contribution by Variable

5   Analysis

here we will dispaly the results

5.1   Results

5.2   Discussion

6   Conclusion

6.1   Limitations

6.2   Future Research

add: conclusion: future work: Trust in the political establishment and cofidence in the responsiveness of the political system are often treated intuitively as synonyms. Consequently, external efficacy is mostly analysed with framework of political trust. -> future work should differentiate trust and efficacy methodisch. . . .besseren einblick in die mechanismen. . .

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