Universität Stuttgart

Course: *Wahlen, direkte und mitgestaltende (dialogische) Bürgerbeteiligung im Vergleich* - WS 2017/18

Right-Wing Participation: who is attrackted by right populists?

Rebecca Litauer
Email: rebecca.litauer@t-online.de
Matr.: 2809173

Simon Roth
Email: nomis.roth@gmx.net
Matr.: 2805614

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Angelika Vetter
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Abstract: Is following ...

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This is a great way to test whether 1233.34 really works in the way it is intended to work. This is different though becasue 34.876 might be better actually. Or how about 4.4864×10^4.

Some Citations

- brady1995beyond = `brady1995beyond`
- (Brady et al. 1995) = `[@brady1995beyond]`
- (Brady et al. 1995: 38) = `[@brady1995beyond, p. 38]`
- Brady et al. (1995: 33) = `@brady1995beyond [p. 33]`
- (1995) = `[-@brady1995beyond]`
- (Brady et al. 1995; Brady et al. 1995) = `[@brady1995beyond; @brady1995beyond]`
- (for example see Brady et al. 1995: 92-93) = `[for example see @brady1995beyond: 92-93]`

ALLE Zitierweisen von Zotero gibts HIER.

- Populism as we understand it
- Liberal Populism
- Illiberal Populism
- Cultural Backlash
- Economic Deprivation

2   State of Research

These past years, populism has received great attention from social scientists and political commentators (Mudde 2004; Panizza 2005). The term "populism" is both widely used and disputed (Roberts 2006; Barr 2009). Several scientists have taken on the challenge of conceptualising populism with only a small number of widely acknowledged characteristics. Often, the concept is broken down to political, economic, social, and discursive features and analyzed from numerous theoretical perspectives including democratic and modernization theory, social movement theory, party politics and political psychology (Postel 2007; Goodliffe 2012; Acemoglu et al. 2013). Within the wide range of literature there is a general agreement that populism is context-dependent and culture-bound, therefore strongly variable across countries. By the means of cross-national analyses, Mudde & Kaltwasser (2012) were able to gain extensive insight into populism and democracy in Latin America, Canada, Eastern and Western Europe. Further scholars differentiate populism based on historical

periods with studies using data going back to the late 19th century (Arter 2010; Rosenthal & Trost 2012; Levitsky & Roberts 2013). Furthermore, populism cuts across ideological cleavages (Kaltwasser 2014): in Europe, an exclusionary right-wing variant of populism emerged in the 1980s—and has intensified since—targeting mostly immigrants and national minorities (Mudde 2007; Ivarsflaten 2008; Arter 2011; Berezin 2013). Finding common traits which combine various populist activites across several countries remains a great challenge. The task therefore is to explain how specific circumstances and culture nature populists politics and how these in turn impact the political sphere (Arter 2010). Despite such difficulties, it is possible to conceptualise populism by clearly identifing the key features of the phenomenon to be observed, allowing a comparison of populist politics across contexts.

3   Theory

Zunächst Political participation beleuchten konzepte usw. . . .literatur vetter

Populist politics can reshape repertoires of political mobilization, especially in the forms of mass social movements and socially engaged party organizations (Hawkins 2010; Jansen 2011). The ability of populist politics to galvanize new forms of political engagement is especially important in an era of decline in formal political participation such as turnout and party membership Skocpol & Williamson (2016). At the same time, in unconsolidated democracies populism may erode democratic institutions and usher competitive authoritarian regimes (Levistky & Loxton 2012).

Voting is only one form of political participation. There are many other ways in which citizens can get involved in the political process. Once this is recognized, the challenge is to clarify what we mean by political participation, what activities are and are not covered by the concept. (Brady et al. 1995: 38) provide the standard definition of political participation. For them, it refers to *"activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action - either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies."* They also specify that they focus on voluntary activity that is, not obligatory and unpaid. 3 In practice, this amounts to, beyond electoral activity (voting and campaigning), contacting government officials, being active in groups that attempt to influence governments, and being involved in protests and demonstrations (Blais 2010).

3.1   Voting Right-Wing Parties

Populists argue that they despise the political system of representative politics itself (Taggart 2000). Moreover, populists are characterised being against the political establishment, the economic, media and cultural elite. Each of them are portrayed as one homogeneous corrupt group acting

against the "general will" of citizens (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017). Therefore populism tends to develop an inner group working against the corrupt others. As Mudde and Kaltwasser elaborate furthermore, *"This anti-elitist impetus goes together with a critique of institutions such as political parties, big organizations, and bureaucracies, which are accused of distorting the 'truthful' links between populist leaders and 'the common people'"* (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017). It is emphasized that voters of populist parties do not trust the political system they live in, neither are they satisfied with representative democracy in their country. Populism may be broadly defined as *"a general protest against the checks and balances introduced to prevent 'the people's' direct rule"* (Pelinka 2013). Summarizing, we can observe the great accordance of scholars, that populist electorate is not supporting the political system and wants to rebel against the established structures.

Recent events showed that numerous citizens are hesitant to further European integration and in the political arena, numerous parties air euro-criticism (De Vries & Edwards 2009). On the radical right, parties successfully mobilize national identity considerations against the European Union (Hooghe & Marks 2005), Lubbers (2008)]. In the 2009 European Parliamentary elections, especially radical right-wing parties mobilized anti-EU sentiment and gained seats in the European parliament. These parties see the foundation of a political European Union as a threat to the sovereignty of the nation state: nearly all radical right-wing parties agree that the EU is bad and should be either reformed fundamentally or abolished (Mudde 2007). Yet, the relationship between euro-scepticism and radical right-wing voting behaviour has received little empirical attention in previous studies. Ivarsflaten (2005) showed that euro-scepticism is an important determinant for radical right-wing support in France and Denmark. Van der Brug et al. (2005) also found a positive relationship between anti-EU sentiments and radical right-wing voting in France. Using data from 2002, Lubbers & Scheepers (2007) focused on the role of euro-scepticism for radical right-wing support in national elections in 13 countries. They found that voting for radical right-wing parties can partly be explained by euro-scepticism, over and beyond other relevant socio-political attitudes. Also, Arzheimer & Carter (2009) found evidence for the relevance of euro-scepticism, although he was not able to test its effect next to the major predictor of radical right-wing voting: the unfavourable attitudes towards migrants.

3.1.1   Anti-Establishment

3.1.2   Economic Deprivation

text: what unites right wing populists in western europe All existing theories of party system evolution, be they inspired by the Downsean economic tradition (Downs, 1957) or by the political sociology tradition of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), agree on one point. They implicitly or explicitly argue that unless there is some sort of societal change that gives rise to a widespread public grievance,

a major change in the party system is unlikely to occur.3 Thus, in the most detailed explanation yet of the pattern of party systems evolution in Western Europe, Lipset and Rokkan emphasized the intimate connections between grievances, the expansion of suffrage, and the rise of new parties.

3.1.2.1   The Protest Vote

This approach builds on a widely accepted idea that radical right-wing parties gain from political protest. From this point of view, voters for these parties are not attracted by their anti-immigrant stances, but express predominantly political dissatisfaction (Mudde 2007). Although several studies emphasize that voters not only cast a radical right-wing vote based on political dissatisfaction, the protest proposition explains at least some of the variation in radical right-wing voting (Ivarsflaten 2005). We expect people who perceive their socio-economic situation as deprived to oppose established parties. They will be dissatisfied politically, feel more powerless, and are consequently more likely to cast a radical right-wing vote, since parties on the radical right claim to listen to the dissatisfied and oppose government decisions. People who perceive deprivation in their present socio-economic situation are more likely to vote for a radical right-wing party, as they are more dissatisfied politically (Werts et al. 2013).

3.1.2.2   Ethnic competition theory

Contributors to the ethnic competition theory proposed that ethnic groups sharing similar economic interests are in competition for scarce resources, which induces perceived ethnic threat and intergroup antagonistic attitudes (Coser, 1956; Levine and Campbell, 1972). In most European countries, ethnic out-groups (search for) work particularly in the lowest labour segments, where unemployment levels tend to be higher (Kiehl and Werner, 1999). Social categories that hold similar positions to ethnic minorities perceive more ethnic threat and therefore have stronger exclu- sionary reactions, e.g. voting for radical right-wing parties (Lubbers et al., 2002).

Coffe (2005) and Van der Brug and Fennema (2003) stressed the relevance of more general threat perceptions: deterioration of the living environment will also nourish feelings of threat, particularly among lower social strata that are more likely to live in neighbourhoods with relatively high levels of criminality. Therefore, those people are expected to feel unsafe in their own neighbourhood more often (e.g. Hale, 1996). Moreover, people may feel directly threatened by ethnic minorities, since ethnic groups are overrepresented in criminality statistics (Dagevos and Gijsberts, 2010). Since radical right-wing parties claim to serve the interests of the in-group and suggest that foreigners are related to a variety of problems, these parties may be an attractive option for people from lower social strata. H1: Lower-educated people, manual workers and unemployed people are more likely to vote for a radical right-wing party, (a) as they experience more ethnic threat, and (b) as their level of subjective victimization is generally higher.

3.1.2.3   Theory of psychological interests

The classic study of the Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al., 1950) gives another explanation of why lower social strata would be more likely to vote for radical right-wing parties (e.g. Lipset, 1981 [1960]; Falter and Klein, 1994). Its core idea is that the socio-economic position of lower social strata may be characterized by poverty and deprivation, which in turn would create anxiety and frustration. To deal with anxiety and frustration, these particular strata are likely to submit themselves to strong authorities or strong traditional norms (Scheepers et al., 1990). Radical right-wing parties serve these psychological needs, as these parties empha- size traditional norms and a strong leader (Lubbers et al., 2002). H2: Lower-educated people, manual workers, unemployed people, as well as people who perceive deprivation in their present socio-economic situation, are more likely to vote for a radical right-wing party, as they favour authoritarian attitudes.

3.1.3   Internal Political Efficacy

3.1.4   Dimension: social??

Previous research has repeatedly shown that, in particular, lower social strata and social categories suffering from disintegration are more likely to vote for a radical right-wing party (e.g. Falter and Klein, 1994, Kitschelt, 1995, Lubbers et al, 2002).

4   Methods

4.1   Research Design

- summary stats

4.2   Data Descriptions

Different data sources data set were used:

- **European Social Survey** (ESS8 2016). The ESS is a multi-country scientific survey conducted every two years since 2002 by scientists in several European countries. The objectives of the ESS are to understand the changing attitudes and values in Europe, to explain how European institutions are changing and to develop a range of European social indicators and values (ESS8 2016). The data for the present analysis were collected from different survey waves the latest for each country.
- **Chapel Hill Expert Survey**. Since 1999 CHES provides party positioning scores on European integration, ideology and policy issues for national parties in a variety of European

countries. The more recent survey waves also comprise questions on non-EU policy issues, such as immigration, redistribution, decentralization, and environmental policy.

The dependent variable from our final model is the populism cluster infered from Ches party data that has been matched and merged to the ESS micro data on voting a particular party. Variable Description . . .

https://www.chesdata.eu/our-surveys/

4.3   Model Based Clustering

Voting for a right wing party is often approximated by left-right scales or is time-intensiv coded. This analysis adopts Cas Mudde's clear minimalist definition of populism to identify core features that all sub types of populism have in common. In line with this definition, we suggest that populist parties are primarily shaped by their degree of anti-establishment attitudes as well as their opposition to globalization. Subsequently, we propose to classify European populist parties along a progressive and traditionalist left-right dimension. Some CHES party indicators are part of the clustering even though they are not be present in the ESS micro data.

This multidimensional classification problem is best approached by model-based hierarchical clustering (Scrucca et al. 2016). This tool set is already adopted in political science and praised for estimating meaningful clusters on high-dimensional data political science (Ahlquist & Breunig 2012; Jang & Hitchcock 2012). Model-based clustering assumes the data generating process to be driven by a mixture of underlying probability distributions in which each component represents a different cluster. Consequently each sub population is separately estimated and summarized by a mixture of these sub populations. Therefore the density tends to be centered at the multidimensional means (μ_k) and increased by geometric features (shape, volume, orientation) of the clusters being determined by the parameters of the covariance matrices Σ_k, which may also induce cross-cluster conditions (Ahlquist & Breunig 2012). In a nutshell the Gaussian Finite Normal Mixture model assumes a d-dimensional data set $y_1, \ldots, y_n$ to calculate G components with the likelihood

$$\ell_{MIX}(\theta_1, \ldots, \theta_G | y) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{k=1}^{G} \tau_k f_k(y_i | \theta_k)$$

where f_k is the density of the θ_k mixture parameters, unlike traditional methods model-based clustering uses a soft assignment and calculates τ_k that represents the probability of a given observation belonging to the k component (Ahlquist & Breunig 2012). Unsupervised machine learning algorithms are often criticized for introducing bias by hyper parameter settings. `mclust` addresses this by estimating a grid of different models and hyper parameter constellations. Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is provided to pick the most useful model (Scrucca et al. 2016). The metric is penalized for the complexity of the model to ensure Osam Razor.

The estimated grid models are represented by the following identifiers: EII, VII, EEI, VEI, EVI, VVI, EEE, EEV, VEV and VVV. The first Letter refers to volume, the second to shape and the third to orientation. E stands for "equal", V for "variable" and I for "coordinate axes" (Kassambara 2017).

There is a clear indication of a four-component mixture with covariances having different shapes but the same volume and orientation (EVE) (VEV (ellipsoidal, equal shape)).

Figure 1: BIC Model Selection for mixture models on the CHES party positioning data set. Following Fraley and Raftery (2010), the grid component structures are labeled using: EII=spherical, equal volume; EEI=diagonal, equal volume and shape; EVI=diagonal, equal volume, varying shape; EEE=ellipsoidal, equal volume, shape, and orientation; VEV=ellipsoidal, equal shape; VII=spherical, unequal volume; VEI=diagonal, varying volume, equal shape; VVI=diagonal, varying volume and shape; EEV=ellipsoidal, equal volume and equal shape; VVV=ellipsoidal, varying volume, shape, and orientation.

Following Milligan and Cooper's (1988) finding that standardization by dividing each variable by its range gives consistently superior recovery of the underlying cluster structure, all the variables are standardized by dividing by each variable's range. PCA . . .


Figure 2: Classification and Cluster Boundaries

Table X displays the characteristics of each cluster through mean and standard deviation.

Table 1: Cluster means and standard deviations for populist indicators

Var	Establishment	Left Populist	Right Populist
antielite_salience	3.42	5.9	7.73
	(1.78)	(2.44)	(1.5)
civlib_laworder	4.67	3.47	8.19
	(1.75)	(1.97)	(1.07)
eu_position	6.16	3.28	2.81
	(0.51)	(1.15)	(1.24)
galtan	4.52	3.58	8.35
	(2.13)	(2.36)	(0.95)

[1] Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses

Table 2: Party Cluster Membership

Cluster	Parties
Establishment	CDU (ger); SPD (ger); FDP (ger); Grunen (ger); CSU (ger); PS (fra); PRG (fra); EELV (fra); UMP (fra); MODEM (fra); NC (fra); PRV (fra); AC (fra)
Left Populist	Linke (ger); Piraten (ger); DieTier (ger); PCF (fra); PG (fra); Ens (fra)
Right Populist	NPD (ger); AfD (ger); FN (fra); MPF (fra)

[1] Note: ...

To validate the clusters lets inspect the party classification for three countries. The final cluster vector is attached to the data with name `cluster`.

4.4   Principal Component Analysis

Principal Component Analysis (PCA) another unsupervised machine learning approach is now used to reduce the dimensions of two item batteries to get a parsimonious model size. For both variables we are only interested in the first Dimension/Component that contributes most to the variability in the underlining data structure. The formal model for the first principal component of a data set is the linear combination its features

$$Z_i = \phi_{11}X_1 + \phi_{21}X_2 + \cdots + \phi_{p1}X_p$$

that has the largest variance and where is the first principal component loading vector, with elements $\phi_{11}X_1 + \phi_{21}X_2 + \cdots + \phi_{p1}$ are normalized, which means that $\sum_{j=1}^{p} \phi_{j1}^2 = 1$. To calculate these loadings, we must find the vector that maximizes the variance. It can be shown using techniques from linear algebra that the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of the covariance matrix is the set of loadings that explains the greatest proportion of the variability. This method does not depend compared to Factor Analysis or SEM on model assumptions or multivariate error distributions. Despite all dimensionality reduction methods have different background and purposes they often yield similar results. But for construct validation I recommend factor analysis or any other framework that provides hypothesis testing.


Figure 3: Bivariate Scatter plots for item battery public trust

4.4.1 Trust Items

First we explore the diemnionality of the given trust items by applying standard pairwise scatter plots for each variable combination. The visual inspection confirms a strong linear association between all variables and the diagonal histograms approximate a normal distribution with a heavy tail on 0, as people are especially critical against political institutions and put more overall confidence in the police.

The next plot shows a two-dimensional representation of the data that captures most of the information in a lower-dimensional subspace. The First two components contribute together to nearly 80% of the total variance.


Figure 4: First and Second PC Dimensions for the Trust Items

As each principal component vector defines a direction in the feature space and all arrows in Figure X point to the same direction we can be confident to approximate one trust dimension. This notion is supported by the scree plot capturing 66,7% of the total Variance by the first dimension. We can further see that the trust items for political institutions do somewhat differ in their contribution to the first PC due to different reasons. The European Parliament is often seen as disconnected from people and the police is always highly appreciated by everyone. The first PC scores are stored for later analysis as `pc_trust`.

Figure 5: scree plot and Component Contribution by Variable

Figure 6: Bivariate Scatter Plots for item battery immigration

4.4.2   Immigration Items

Next we applied the same PCA for the Immigration Items. But first we explore again the nationality of the given data by standard pairwise scatter plots for each variable combination. The visual inspection again confirms a strong linear association between all variables but seem to be more noisy than the trust items before. The diagonal histograms approximate a normal distribution, despite the fact that three out of four variables have only 4 levels. This Likert scale is assumed to

be equal-distant to be suitable for PCA.

Figure 7: PCA Dimensionality for the Immigration Items

The two-dimensional representation of the immigration items proposes again a strong one PC solution but points to a minor second dimension entirely rooted in imm_econ. We are only interested in the first PC that captures over 70% of the total variance. The scree plot and contribution plot support these findings. The final PC scores are stored for later analysis as `pc_imm`.


Figure 8: scree plot and Component Contribution by Variable

5   Analysis

5.1   Results

5.2   Discussions

6   Conclusions

6.1   Limitations

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