MProve: A Proof of Reserves Protocol for Monero Exchanges

Arijit Dutta, Saravanan Vijayakumaran Department of Electrical Engineering Indian Institute of Technology Bombay arijit.dutta@iitb.ac.in, sarva@ee.iitb.ac.in

Abstract

Theft from cryptocurrency exchanges due to cyberattacks or internal fraud is a major problem. Exchanges can partially alleviate customer concerns by providing periodic proofs of solvency. We describe MProve, a proof of reserves protocol for Monero exchanges which can be combined with a known proof of liabilities protocol to provide a proof of solvency. It is the first protocol for Monero which provides address privacy by allowing an exchange to hide its own addresses within a larger anonymity set. MProve also provides a simple proof of non-collusion between exchanges.

Index Terms

Cryptocurrency, Monero, proof of reserves

I. INTRODUCTION

Cryptocurrency exchanges represent a tradeoff between convenience and security for their customers. An exchange provides its customers with a familiar login interface on a website where they can view, transfer, or trade their cryptocurrency balances. In case customers forget their password, they can recover it using multi-factor authentication or by contacting the exchange's customer support. The customer is free from the hassle of storing the private keys corresponding to their cryptocurrency funds, which are subject to loss and theft. But these conveniences for the customers come at the risk of their funds being stolen from the exchange due to hacking or internal fraud. The loss of bitcoins from the Mt. Gox exchange in 2014 is the most infamous embodiment of this risk [1]. Despite being acutely aware of the need to secure their systems, several cryptocurrency exchanges have failed to prevent theft of their assets. An estimated \$927 million worth of cryptocurrencies were reported as stolen from exchanges in the first nine months of 2018 [2].

While ensuring security of the systems and protocols used by cryptocurrency exchanges is an important problem, we do not address it in this work. Instead, we consider protocols by which exchanges can provide *proofs of solvency* to their customers. These proofs give the customers assurance that an exchange continues to hold enough cryptocurrency reserves to cover their cumulative liabilities. There are two main benefits of such proofs: (1) they prevent exchanges from concealing the loss of cryptocurrency funds due to cyberattacks, and (2) they prevent exchanges from selling cryptocurrency assets to customers without actually owning the required quantities of the assets.

Monero is a privacy-focused cryptocurrency which uses ring signatures, one-time addresses, and cryptographic commitments to obfuscate the sources, destinations, and amounts in a transaction [3]. In this paper, we describe MProve, a proof of reserves protocol for Monero exchanges. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first such protocol for Monero which provides *address* privacy by allowing an exchange to hide its own addresses within an anonymity set of addresses. Since address privacy can allow dishonest exchanges to collude by sharing the same addresses for generating their proofs, MProve also provides a proof of non-collusion between exchanges. MProve can be combined with a known proof of liabilities protocol to provide a proof of solvency.

In the next section, we discuss previous work on proof of reserves protocols. In Section III, we give a brief overview of the Monero protocol. After a discussion of the challenges in using the Provisions proof of reserves protocol [4] for Monero exchanges, we describe the MProve protocol in Section IV. In Section V, we briefly discuss the application of MProve to Bitcoin exchanges. Some potential areas of improvement are discussed in Section VI.

II. RELATED WORK

The first known approach for generating a proof of solvency is attributed to Greg Maxwell and Peter Todd [5]. But this approach revealed the total amount of assets held by an exchange and the cryptocurrency addresses storing these assets. Decker *et al.* proposed a method for proving solvency of exchanges which uses a trusted platform module (TPM) to generate the proof [6]. This method does not leak any information about the amounts or addresses owned by the exchange and outputs a boolean result indicating solvency or insolvency. While ideal in terms of privacy, it requires trust in the security of the TPM implementation [7].

Relying on conventional cryptographic assumptions, Dagher *et al.* proposed a scheme called Provisions which generates privacy-preserving proofs of solvency for Bitcoin exchanges [4]. It consists of three main protocols and an optional fourth protocol:

- 1) Proof of reserves: The exchange chooses a set \mathcal{P} of unspent addresses with known public keys from the Bitcoin blockchain such that it knows the private keys corresponding to a subset $\mathcal{P}_{known} \subset \mathcal{P}$. The exchange then creates a Pedersen commitment C_{assets} [8] to the total amount of bitcoins available in the \mathcal{P}_{known} addresses. The commitment C_{assets} is accompanied by a proof that the exchange included the amount corresponding to an address in \mathcal{P} only if it knows the corresponding private key. The proof preserves the exchange's privacy in the sense that the set \mathcal{P}_{known} is not revealed.
- 2) Proof of liabilities: The exchange publishes a list of liabilities which contains an entry for each of its customers. Each entry contains Pedersen commitments to the bits in the binary representation of a particular customer's Bitcoin balance. These commitments can be combined (even by a third party) to generate a Pedersen commitment C_i to the balance of the *i*th customer. The *i*th customer can check the correctness of C_i by logging in to the exchange and obtaining the blinding factor used to generate C_i . Finally, a Pedersen commitment to the total liabilities of the exchange is computed as $C_{\text{liabilities}} = \sum_i C_i$. This scheme is not foolproof as customer omissions from the list of liabilities can be detected only if one of the omitted customers checks the list.
- 3) Proof of solvency: The exchange computes $C_{\text{difference}} = C_{\text{assets}} C_{\text{liabilities}}$ and gives a zero-knowledge proof that $C_{\text{difference}}$ is a Pedersen commitment to the zero amount.
- 4) Proof of non-collusion (optional): To prevent exchanges from sharing unspent addresses while generating their individual proofs of reserves, a proof of non-collusion is required. The proof of reserves protocol in Provisions involves publishing a list L_1 containing Pedersen commitments to the private keys corresponding to the public keys in \mathcal{P}_{known} . Using the same private keys, a second list L_2 is computed containing public keys generated using a base point which is different from the default base point of the secp256k1 elliptic curve used in Bitcoin. Each exchange gives a zero-knowledge proof that L_2 is a permutation of L_1 after base change and removal of blinding factors. If two exchanges were to use the same unspent address, their respective L_2 lists would have an element in common, revealing their collusion. This proof of non-collusion reveals the number of Bitcoin addresses owned by an exchange. For this reason, it was presented as an optional protocol by the designers of Provisions.

The proofs of liabilities and solvency in Provisions can be used without modification for Monero exchanges. But the proof of reserves protocol in Provisions cannot be used due to the privacy-focused design of Monero (see discussion in Section IV).

More recently, Blockstream released a tool for generating a proof of reserves for Bitcoin exchanges [9], [10]. It involves creating a transaction which takes all the unspent outputs (UTXOs) owned by an exchange as inputs. An invalid input is also included to make the transaction invalid so that it cannot be used to spend the exchange's funds. Nevertheless, this transaction allows one to verify that the exchange does own a certain amount of Bitcoin. This technique does not provide address privacy as all the outputs owned by the exchange are revealed. While the proof of reserves protocol in Provisions provides address privacy, it is restricted to UTXOs which are either pay to public key (P2PK) or pay to public key hash (P2PKH) addresses with known public key. The Blockstream tool does not have this restriction.

The state-of-the-art in generating proof of reserves for Monero is a technique which was added to the official Monero client in 2018 by a developer with the moniker Stoffu Noether [11]. It can be invoked via a command line tool or an RPC call to the Monero client. In addition to the identity of the account to be used for proof generation, it takes a target amount as input and attempts to find the smallest set of addresses owned by the account whose amount sum exceeds the target amount. Once such a set is identified, the addresses in this set along with their corresponding key images and shared secrets used in address generation are revealed as part of the proof of reserves. For each address in the set, signatures proving that the shared secret and key image were correctly generated are included in the proof. Upon receiving the proof, an auditor will mark an address as spent if its key image has already appeared on the blockchain. As the amount corresponding to an address can be recovered from the shared secret, the auditor can calculate the sum of the amounts in unspent addresses as the reserve amount corresponding to a particular account. By repeating the proof generation process over all the accounts owned by it, an exchange could generate a proof of reserves. But such a proof does not provide address privacy as it reveals all the addresses owned by the exchange and the amounts contained in them. As the key image of each address owned by the exchange is revealed, ring signatures in future transactions spending from exchange-owned addresses become redundant. An observer can identify the source address in such transactions by using the key image to address mapping.

In contrast, MProve reveals that the exchange owns some addresses in a larger anonymity set. MProve does not reveal any amounts corresponding to the addresses in the anonymity set and only generates a Pedersen commitment to the reserve amount. However, MProve also reveals the mapping between exchange-owned addresses and their key images making ring signatures in future transactions redundant (see Section IV-F).

III. OVERVIEW OF MONERO

The design of Monero is based on the CryptoNote protocol [12]. In the following subsections, we describe those aspects of Monero addresses and transactions needed to present our proof of reserves protocol.

A. Monero Public Keys and One-Time Addresses

In a Monero transaction, one-time addresses (also called stealth addresses) are used to hide the recipient of the funds. One-time addresses are just public keys whose private keys are generated using the recipient's long-term public keys and a Diffie-Hellman protocol. Monero public keys are points on the elliptic curve used in EdDSA generated by the base point G = (x, 4/5) with positive x [12], [13]. The order of G is a prime I which is larger than 2^{252} . Monero private keys are integers in the set $\mathbb{Z}_l^+ = \{1, 2, \dots, l-1\}$. Let $\mathcal E$ denote the subgroup of the EdDSA curve generated by the base point G. We will use additive notation for the group operation on the curve. The public key $A \in \mathcal E$ corresponding to the private key $a \in \mathbb{Z}_l^+$ is given by

$$A = aG = \underbrace{G + \dots + G}_{a \text{ times}}.$$

To receive funds in the Monero system, the recipient shares a pair of public keys (A_{vk}, A_{sk}) with the sender, where $A_{vk} = a_{vk}G$, $A_{sk} = a_{sk}G$. The subscripts vk and sk denote the *view key* and *spend key* respectively. The received funds cannot be spent without knowledge of the private spend key a_{sk} . On the other hand, the private view key a_{vk} can be shared with third parties allowing them to view (but not spend) the fund receipts.

Suppose Bob wants to send funds to Alice whose public key pair is (A_{vk}, A_{sk}) . He chooses a random integer $r \in \mathbb{Z}_l^+$ and computes the points rA_{vk} and $H(rA_{vk}\|o_{index})G$, where $H: \mathcal{E} \mapsto \mathbb{Z}_l^+$ is a hash function which maps curve points to integers and o_{index} is the index of the new output in the transaction. Bob creates and broadcasts the transaction which specifies the one-time address $P = H(rA_{vk}\|o_{index})G + A_{sk}$ as the destination of the funds. The transaction also contains the point R = rG which will enable Alice to recover the private key corresponding to P. The transaction will eventually be added to the blockchain as part of a block.

From every transaction which appears on the blockchain, Alice reads the one-time address P and random point R. Using her private view key a_{vk} , she computes the point $P' = H(a_{vk}R\|o_{index})G + A_{sk}$. For the transaction Bob created using Alice's public key pair, P' will be equal to P since the Diffie-Hellman shared secret is $rA_{vk} = ra_{vk}G = a_{vk}R$. By checking for this equality, Alice can identify transactions which are sending funds to her. The private key corresponding to P is given by $H(a_{vk}R\|o_{index}) + a_{sk}$.

B. Linkable Ring Signatures

To prevent double spending, *linkable ring signatures* proposed in [14] are used in Monero with some modifications [15]. Two linkable ring signatures which spend from the same one-time address will have identical *key images* revealing the double spend.

Suppose Alice wants to spend the funds from a one-time address P for which she knows the private key. She creates a linkable ring signature on a message m as follows:

- 1. She assembles a list of one-time addresses $\mathcal{P}=(P_0,P_1,\ldots,P_{n-1})$ from the blockchain such that $P_j=P$ for exactly one $j\in\{0,1,\ldots,n-1\}$.
- 2. Let $x_i \in \mathbb{Z}_l^+$ be the private key corresponding to P_i , i.e. $P_i = x_i G$. Using the private key corresponding to P_j , she computes the key image $I = x_j H_p(P_j)$ where $H_p : \mathcal{E} \mapsto \mathcal{E}$ is a hash function.
- 3. She picks α and $s_i, i = 0, 1, \dots, n-1, i \neq j$, randomly from \mathbb{Z}_l^+ . Note that s_j has not been chosen.
- 4. She computes points $L_j = \alpha G$, $R_j = \alpha H_p(P_j)$, and integer $c_{j+1} = H_s(\mathcal{P}, m, L_j, R_j)$ where $H_s : \{0, 1\}^* \mapsto \mathbb{Z}_l^+$ is a hash function.
- 5. Increasing j modulo n, she computes points and integers

$$\begin{split} L_{j+1} &= s_{j+1}G + c_{j+1}P_{j+1}, \\ R_{j+1} &= s_{j+1}H_p(P_{j+1}) + c_{j+1}I, \\ c_{j+2} &= H_s(\mathcal{P}, m, L_{j+1}, R_{j+1}), \\ &\vdots \\ L_{j-1} &= s_{j-1}G + c_{j-1}P_{j-1}, \\ R_{j-1} &= s_{j-1}H_p(P_{j-1}) + c_{j-1}I, \\ c_j &= H_s(\mathcal{P}, m, L_{j-1}, R_{j-1}). \end{split}$$

6. Finally, she computes $s_j = \alpha - c_j x_j$. As L_j and R_j were computed using α in step 4, this implies that

$$L_{j} = \alpha G = (s_{j} + c_{j}x_{j})G = s_{j}G + c_{j}P_{j},$$

$$R_{j} = \alpha H_{p}(P_{j}) = (s_{j} + c_{j}x_{j})H_{p}(P_{j})$$

$$= s_{j}H_{p}(P_{j}) + c_{j}I.$$

7. The linkable ring signature on the message m is given by $\sigma = (I, c_0, s_0, s_1, \dots, s_{n-1})$.

Alice includes the linkable ring signature in a transaction spending funds in the address P and broadcasts it onto the network for inclusion in the blockchain. The message m is the hash of the transaction prefix which consists all the transaction data except for the signatures. The verification of the linkable ring signature proceeds as follows:

- 1. The message m which was signed is recreated from the transaction prefix.
- 2. The one-time addresses $\mathcal{P} = \{P_0, P_1, \dots, P_{n-1}\}$ used to create the linkable ring signature are read from the transaction.
- 3. Using σ , the integers c_j , j = 1, 2, ..., n 1, are calculated as

$$\begin{split} L_0 &= s_0 G + c_0 P_0, \\ R_0 &= s_0 H_p(P_0) + c_0 I, \\ c_1 &= H_s(\mathcal{P}, m, L_0, R_0), \\ \vdots \\ L_{n-2} &= s_{n-2} G + c_{n-2} P_{n-2}, \\ R_{n-2} &= s_{n-2} H_p(P_{n-2}) + c_{n-2} I, \\ c_{n-1} &= H_s(\mathcal{P}, m, L_{n-2}, R_{n-2}). \end{split}$$

4. Finally, c_{n-1} and s_{n-1} are used to calculate c'_0 as

$$L_{n-1} = s_{n-1}G + c_{n-1}P_{n-1},$$

$$R_{n-1} = s_{n-1}H_p(P_{n-1}) + c_{n-1}I,$$

$$c'_0 = H_s(\mathcal{P}, m, L_{n-1}, R_{n-1}).$$

5. The signature σ is accepted if c'_0 equals the c_0 given in σ . Otherwise, it is rejected.

A valid linkable ring signature is a proof that the transaction was created by someone with knowledge of a private key among the n private keys corresponding to the addresses in \mathcal{P} . As the one-time address P_j which is spent in the transaction is not revealed, Alice can potentially try to double spend from it. But the second transaction's linkable ring signature σ will contain the same key image $I = x_j H_p(P_j)$ leading to its rejection by the network.

C. Pedersen Commitments and Range Proofs

In the current implementation of Monero, transaction amounts are hidden using Pedersen commitments [8]. A point $H \in \mathcal{E}$ was generated from the Keccak hash of the base point G to ensure that the discrete logarithm of H with respect to G is unknown. The Pedersen commitment to an amount $a \in \mathbb{Z}_l$ is given by

$$C(y, a) = yG + aH,$$

where $y \in \mathbb{Z}_l$ is a randomly chosen blinding factor. This commitment scheme is perfectly hiding as C(y,a) is indistinguishable from a random element in \mathcal{E} even to computationally unbounded adversaries. It is computationally binding as an adversary capable of computing the discrete logarithm of H with respect to G can generate a pair $(y',a') \neq (y,a)$ such that C(y',a') = C(y,a). Pedersen commitments to amounts can be added (without knowing the blinding factors) to generate a commitment to the sum of the amounts, i.e.

$$C(y_1, a_1) + C(y_2, a_2) = C(y_1 + y_2, a_1 + a_2).$$

A key feature of Pedersen commitments is that digital signatures can be used to show that a commitment is hiding the zero amount without revealing the blinding factor. Note that a commitment to the zero amount C(y,0)=yG can be viewed as a public key whose corresponding private key is the blinding factor y. If an ECDSA signature is generated using the private key y, its validity can be verified using the public key C(y,0). If the commitment had been to a non-zero amount a, then C(y,a) will contain a contribution from the point H. Since the discrete logarithm of H with respect to G is unknown, a computationally bounded adversary cannot compute the private key y' such that y'G = C(y,a) = yG + aH.

In a transaction, the sum of the input amounts should be equal to the sum of the output amounts and the transaction fees. This relation needs to be verifiable by miners without revealing the blinding factors used to generate the amount commitments.

For simplicity, assume that a transaction has one input and two outputs. Let a_{in} be the input amount, a_{out}^1, a_{out}^2 be the output amounts, and f be the transaction fees. These amounts satisfy the relation

$$a_{\text{in}} = a_{\text{out}}^1 + a_{\text{out}}^2 + f.$$

The commitment to the input amount $C(y_{\rm in}, a_{\rm in})$ will be recorded in the blockchain with the blinding factor $y_{\rm in}$ known to the owner of the input. The input owner will randomly choose blinding factors $y_{\text{out}}^1, y_{\text{out}}^2$ and create the output commitments

$$\begin{split} C(y_{\text{out}}^1, a_{\text{out}}^1) &= y_{\text{out}}^1 G + a_{\text{out}}^1 H, \\ C(y_{\text{out}}^2, a_{\text{out}}^2) &= y_{\text{out}}^2 G + a_{\text{out}}^2 H. \end{split}$$

The transaction will contain $C(y_{\text{out}}^1, a_{\text{out}}^1)$, $C(y_{\text{out}}^2, a_{\text{out}}^2)$, and the transaction fees f. It will also contain an ECDSA signature verifiable by the public key

$$C(y_{\text{in}}, a_{\text{in}}) - C(y_{\text{out}}^{1}, a_{\text{out}}^{1}) - C(y_{\text{out}}^{2}, a_{\text{out}}^{2}) - fH$$

$$= (y_{\text{in}} - y_{\text{out}}^{1} - y_{\text{out}}^{2}) G + (a_{\text{in}} - a_{\text{out}}^{1} - a_{\text{out}}^{2} - f) H$$

$$= zG + 0H = C(z, 0)$$

where the input owner knows the private key z. By calculating the public key C(z,0) and performing ECDSA signature verification, the miners are convinced that the difference between the commitments and the fees term is a commitment to zero.

The receiver of the outputs in a transaction needs to know the blinding factors and amounts in order to verify receipt and subsequently spend the received funds. These are securely communicated to the receiver using the same shared secret $rA_{\rm vk}=a_{\rm vk}R$ which was used to generate the one-time address. To communicate a blinding factor $y_{\rm out}$ and amount $a_{\rm out}$, the sender stores $y_{\text{out}} \oplus H_K(rA_{\text{vk}})$ and $a_{\text{out}} \oplus H_K(H_K(rA_{\text{vk}}))$ in the transaction where \oplus denote bitwise XOR and H_K is the Keccak hash function. As the point R is contained in the transaction, the receiver can use a_{vk} to recover the blinding factor and amount.

As lG is the identity of the group \mathcal{E} , we have C(y, l+a) = C(y, a). To prevent this relation from being exploited to inflate the amount stored in an input commitment, range proofs are used to prove that the amounts in a commitment are in the range $\{0,1,\ldots,2^{64}-1\}$. This particular range is of interest since the maximum number of piconeros (the smallest unit of currency in Monero) which can come into existence is limited to $2^{64} - 1$.

IV. MPROVE PROOF OF RESERVES PROTOCOL

The main obstacle to using the proof of reserves protocol proposed in Provisions [4] for Monero exchanges stems from a fundamental difference between unspent transaction outputs in Bitcoin and Monero. In Bitcoin, the unspent outputs can be identified by reading the blockchain. In Monero, ring signatures are used to hide the specific one-time address which is being spent in a transaction. Each Monero transaction specifies an anonymity set of one-time addresses which contains the address being spent. It only contains the key image of the address being spent to avoid double spending. So the set of unspent outputs cannot be identified by reading the Monero blockchain. This prevents us from using the Provisions proof of reserves protocol which begins by assembling a set of unspent outputs containing the exchange-owned outputs as a subset.

A fundamental requirement of any proof of reserves protocol for Monero is that it should prove that the key images of the exchange-owned one-time addresses, which contribute to the total assets commitment C_{assets} , have not appeared on the blockchain. If this requirement is not met, then we cannot detect the usage of already spent one-time addresses to generate Cassets. Protocols which explicitly reveal the key images have the benefit of providing an automatic proof of non-collusion as one-time addresses shared between exchanges will be revealed. But a drawback on explicitly revealing the key images is that a future transaction spending from an exchange-owned address may reveal the source of funds making the ring signature obfuscation unnecessary (see Section IV-F). MProve suffers from this drawback and removing it is an open problem for now.

A. Ring Signatures

Our proposed proof of reserves protocol uses both linkable and regular ring signatures. While the regular ring signature creation and verification algorithms (as defined in [16]) are similar to their linkable counterparts, we present them here for clarity.

Suppose Alice wants to sign a message m using a ring signature involving the public keys $\mathcal{P} = (P_0, P_1, \dots, P_{n-1})$ where she knows the private key x_i corresponding to P_i . She creates the ring signature as follows:

- 1. She picks α and $s_i, i=0,1,\ldots,n-1, i\neq j$, randomly from \mathbb{Z}_l^+ . 2. She computes points $L_j=\alpha G$ and integer $c_{j+1}=H_s(\mathcal{P},m,L_j)$ where $H_s:\{0,1\}^*\mapsto \mathbb{Z}_l^+$ is a hash function.

3. Increasing j modulo n, she computes points and integers

$$\begin{split} L_{j+1} &= s_{j+1}G + c_{j+1}P_{j+1}, \\ c_{j+2} &= H_s(\mathcal{P}, m, L_{j+1}), \\ &\vdots \\ L_{j-1} &= s_{j-1}G + c_{j-1}P_{j-1}, \\ c_{j} &= H_s(\mathcal{P}, m, L_{j-1}). \end{split}$$

4. Finally, she computes $s_j = \alpha - c_j x_j$. As L_j was computed using α in step 2, this implies that

$$L_j = \alpha G = (s_j + c_j x_j)G = s_j G + c_j P_j.$$

- 5. The ring signature on the message m is given by $\gamma = (c_0, s_0, s_1, \dots, s_{n-1})$. To check the validity of a ring signature, a verifier does the following:
- 1. Using the public key list $\mathcal{P} = (P_0, P_1, \dots, P_{n-1})$, the message m, and the ring signature $\gamma = (c_0, s_0, s_1, \dots, s_{n-1})$, the verifier calculates the integers $c_j, j = 1, 2, \dots, n-1$, as

$$L_0 = s_0 G + c_0 P_0,$$

$$c_1 = H_s(\mathcal{P}, m, L_0),$$

$$\vdots$$

$$L_{n-2} = s_{n-2} G + c_{n-2} P_{n-2},$$

$$c_{n-1} = H_s(\mathcal{P}, m, L_{n-2}).$$

2. Finally, c_{n-1} and s_{n-1} are used to calculate c'_0 as

$$L_{n-1} = s_{n-1}G + c_{n-1}P_{n-1},$$

$$c'_0 = H_s(\mathcal{P}, m, L_{n-1}).$$

- 3. The signature γ is accepted if c'_0 equals the c_0 given in γ . Otherwise, it is rejected.
- B. Proof Generation

The MProve proof of reserves protocol proceeds as follows:

- 1. The exchange chooses a list of one-time addresses $\mathcal{P} = (P_1, P_2, \dots, P_N)$ from the Monero blockchain such that it knows the private keys corresponding to a subset¹ \mathcal{P}_{known} of \mathcal{P} . The list \mathcal{P} is made public by the exchange.
- 2. For each $P_i \in \mathcal{P}$, the exchange can read the corresponding Pedersen commitment C_i from the blockchain. Let C_i be the commitment to an amount a_i with blinding factor y_i , i.e.

$$C_i = C(y_i, a_i) = y_i G + a_i H. \tag{1}$$

For $P_i \in \mathcal{P}_{known}$, the exchange knows y_i and a_i . For $P_i \notin \mathcal{P}_{known}$, the exchange may know y_i and a_i if it was the party which sent funds to P_i . In general, the exchange will not know y_i and a_i for $P_i \notin \mathcal{P}_{known}$.

3. For each $P_i \in \mathcal{P}$, the exchange randomly picks $z_i \in \mathbb{Z}_l$ and generates C'_i as

$$C_i' = \begin{cases} z_i G & \text{if } P_i \in \mathcal{P}_{\text{known}}, \\ z_i G + C_i & \text{if } P_i \notin \mathcal{P}_{\text{known}}. \end{cases}$$
 (2)

- 4. For each i = 1, 2, ..., N, the exchange publishes a regular ring signature γ_i on a message m verifiable by the pair of public keys $(C'_i, C'_i C_i)$. The calculation of γ_i is described in Appendix A.
- 5. For each $i=1,2,\ldots,N$, the exchange publishes a linkable ring signature σ_i on a message m verifiable by the pair of public keys $(P_i, C_i' C_i)$. The calculation of σ_i is described in Appendix B.
- 6. The exchange publishes a commitment $C_{\rm assets}$ which satisfies the equation

$$\sum_{i=1}^{N} C_i = C_{\text{assets}} + \sum_{i=1}^{N} C_i'. \tag{3}$$

The exchange claims that $C_{
m assets}$ is a Pedersen commitment to the amount of Monero it owns.

¹Even though \mathcal{P} is a list, we will sometimes find it convenient to interpret it as a set.

The intuition behind the protocol construction is as follows. Let $I_{\text{known}} = \{i \mid P_i \in \mathcal{P}_{\text{known}}\}$ be the set of indices i such that the exchange knows the private key corresponding to P_i . The left hand side of (3) is a commitment to the amount $\sum_{i=1}^{N} a_i$. Ideally, we want the C_{assets} term on the right hand side of (3) to be a commitment to $\sum_{i \in I_{\text{known}}} a_i$ and the $\sum_{i=1}^N C_i'$ term to be a commitment to the remaining amount.

If $P_i \notin \mathcal{P}_{known}$, then the exchange does not know the private key corresponding to P_i . To create the ring signature σ_i , the exchange has to then use the private key z_i where $C'_i - C_i = z_i G$. This implies that $C'_i - C_i$ is a commitment to zero whenever $P_i \notin \mathcal{P}_{known}$. So the commitments C_i and C_i' on both sides of (3) commit to the same amounts whenever $P_i \notin \mathcal{P}_{known}$ and there is no transfer of funds (in the form of the a_iH terms) from the corresponding C_i terms to the C_{assets} term.

If there were no constraint on C'_i for $P_i \in \mathcal{P}_{known}$, then an exchange can inflate the amount committed in C_{assets} using a single such C'_i . For example, suppose $P_1 \in \mathcal{P}_{known}$. Then the exchange can set

$$C'_{1} = z_{1}G + C_{1} + (l - b)H,$$
 $C'_{i} = z_{i}G + C_{i}$ for $i = 2, 3, ..., N,$

$$C_{\text{assets}} = -\sum_{i=1}^{N} z_{i}G + bH,$$
(4)

and still satisfy the equation in (3) for some arbitrary amount $b \in \mathbb{Z}_l$. We could force every C'_i for $i \in I_{known}$ to be commitment to the zero amount by requiring a signature verifiable by the public key C'_i . While this would ensure the transfer of funds (in the form of the a_iH terms) from C_i to the C_{assets} term in (3), it would also reveal the set $\mathcal{P}_{\text{known}}$. To avoid this, we require a regular ring signature γ_i verifiable by the pair of public keys $(C_i', C_i' - C_i)$ for all i = 1, 2, ..., N. For $i \notin I_{known}$, γ_i can be generated using the same private key (corresponding to $C_i' - C_i$) which was used to generate σ_i . For $i \in I_{known}$, if the private key corresponding to $C'_i - C_i$ is used to generate γ_i then C'_i and C_i commit to the same amount. Consequently, C'_i cannot contain any H term beyond that contributed by C_i and cannot be used to inflate the C_{assets} term as illustrated in (4). On the other hand, if for some $i \in I_{known}$ the private key corresponding to C'_i is used to generate γ_i then this implies that C'_i is a commitment to zero ensuring that the a_iH terms from C_i are included in C_{assets} .

While the above discussion considers a potentially malicious exchange, the following theorem assures us that an honest exchange can correctly generate a commitment to its total reserves.

Theorem 1. If an exchange follows the MProve protocol honestly, then C_{assets} will be a commitment to the amount

$$a_{owned} = \sum_{i \in I_{linown}} a_i. \tag{5}$$

Proof: Consider the definition of C'_i given in (2).

- If $P_i \in \mathcal{P}_{known}$, C_i' is a commitment to zero. Hence $\sum_{i \in I_{known}} C_i'$ is a commitment to the zero amount. If $P_i \notin \mathcal{P}_{known}$, $C_i' C_i$ is a commitment to zero. Let $I_{unknown} = \{i \mid 1 \leq i \leq N, P_i \notin \mathcal{P}_{known}\}$ denote the set of indices i such that the exchange does not know the private key corresponding to P_i . Then $\sum_{i \in I_{unknown}} (C_i' C_i)$ is a commitment to the zero amount.

Rearranging (3), we get

$$\sum_{i \in I_{\text{known}}} C_i = C_{\text{assets}} + \sum_{i \in I_{\text{known}}} C_i' + \sum_{i \in I_{\text{unknown}}} (C_i' - C_i).$$

$$(6)$$

As the last two sums on the right hand side are commitments to zero, C_{assets} and $\sum_{i \in I_{\text{known}}} C_i$ must be commitments to the same amount. Since

$$\sum_{i \in I_{\text{known}}} C_i = \sum_{i \in I_{\text{known}}} (y_i G + a_i H)$$

$$= a_{\text{owned}} H + \sum_{i \in I_{\text{known}}} y_i G,$$
(7)

 C_{assets} is a commitment to a_{owned} .

C. Proof Verification

The output of an exchange in the MProve protocol consists of the following:

- A list of one-time addresses P_1, P_2, \dots, P_N .
- The commitments C'_1, C'_2, \ldots, C'_N created by the exchange.
- The regular ring signatures $\gamma_i = (d_0^i, t_0^i, t_1^i)$ for $i = 1, 2, \dots, N$.
- The linkable ring signatures $\sigma_i = (I_i, c_0^i, s_0^i, s_1^i)$ for $i = 1, 2, \dots, N$.

- The message m used to create γ_i and σ_i .
- The commitment C_{assets} which the exchange claims to be a commitment to its total reserves.

Verification involves the following operations:

- 1. The verifier checks that none of the key images I_i published by the exchange as part of the signatures σ_i appear in any of the transactions in the blockchain. If a key image appears in a transaction, the verifier rejects the proof of reserves as it implies that the funds in the corresponding one-time address P_i have already been spent. If none of the key images have appeared on the blockchain, the verifier continues with proof verification.
- 2. The verifier reads the commitments C_i corresponding to the P_i s from the blockchain.
- 3. The public key $C'_i C_i$ is computed for each i.
- 4. The public key pair $(C'_i, C'_i C_i)$ is used to verify the regular ring signatures γ_i . 5. The public key pair $(P_i, C'_i C_i)$ is used to verify the linkable ring signatures σ_i .
- 6. Equality in (3) is verified using the C_i s, C'_i s, and C_{assets} .
- 7. The verifier also checks that none of the key images I_i published by the exchange appear in the signatures published by other exchanges. If a key image is common to the signatures published by two different exchanges, collusion is declared.

As observed in [4], the exchanges need to generate their proofs after the same block for collusion to be detectable.

D. Security Properties

We consider two security properties of the MProve proof of reserves protocol: inflation resistance and address privacy. We will model computationally bounded entities as probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithms. The inflation resistance property prevents a PPT exchange from creating a commitment to an amount which is greater than its total reserves. The address privacy property prevents a PPT adversary from identifying the addresses owned by the exchange from the information provided as output of the proof of reserves protocol.

If we assume that a PPT entity cannot calculate the discrete logarithm of H with respect to G, the following theorem assures us that a PPT exchange can only use MProve to output a commitment to an amount which is a sum of a subset of the reserves it owns. It cannot use MProve to output a commitment to an amount which is greater than the total reserves it owns.

Theorem 2. Suppose an exchange can create a proof of reserves with commitment $C_{assets} = C(y, a)$ such that

- (i) it knows the blinding factor $y \in \mathbb{Z}_l$ and amount $a \in \mathbb{Z}_l$,
- (ii) the amount a is not of the form $\sum_{i \in I_1} a_i$ for any set $I_1 \subseteq I_{known}$, and (iii) the proof is accepted by the verification procedure in Section IV-C.

Then the exchange can calculate the discrete logarithm of H with respect to G with overwhelming probability.

Proof: As the exchange was successful in creating the linkable ring signatures σ_i , it knows $w_i \in \mathbb{Z}_l$ such that $w_i G = C'_i - C_i$ for $i \in I_{\text{unknown}}$, i.e. $P_i \notin \mathcal{P}_{\text{known}}$, with overwhelming probability. This is because creating σ_i without knowing either of the private keys corresponding to the public keys $\{P_i, C'_i - C_i\}$ amounts to a forgery of the linkable ring signature which is possible only with negligible probability.

As the exchange was successful in creating the regular ring signatures γ_i , it knows $w_i \in \mathbb{Z}_l$ such that w_iG is equal to either C_i' or $C_i' - C_i$ for $i \in I_{known}$, i.e. $P_i \in \mathcal{P}_{known}$, with overwhelming probability. Let I_1, I_2 be a partition of the set I_{known} such that $w_i G = C_i'$ for $i \in I_1$ and $w_i G = C_i' - C_i$ for $i \in I_2$.

As $I_{\text{unknown}} \cup I_1 \cup I_2 = \{1, 2, \dots, N\}$, we can rearrange the terms in (3) to get

$$\sum_{i \in I_1} C_i = C_{\text{assets}} + \sum_{i \in I_1} C'_i + \sum_{i \in I_{\text{unknown}} \cup I_2} (C'_i - C_i)$$

$$= C_{\text{assets}} + \sum_{i=1}^N w_i G. \tag{8}$$

Since $I_1 \subseteq I_{known}$, the exchange knows the blinding factors y_i and amounts a_i such that $C_i = y_i G + a_i H$ for all $i \in I_1$. By the theorem hypothesis, it also knows y and a such that $C_{\text{assets}} = yG + aH$. Substituting these values in (8), we get

$$\sum_{i \in I_1} (y_i G + a_i H) = yG + aH + \sum_{i=1}^N w_i G$$
(9)

$$\implies \left(\sum_{i \in I_1} y_i - \sum_{i=1}^N w_i - y\right) G = \left(a - \sum_{i \in I_1} a_i\right) H \tag{10}$$

The exchange can then calculate the discrete logarithm of H with respect to G as

$$\left(a - \sum_{i \in I_1} a_i\right)^{-1} \left(\sum_{i \in I_1} y_i - \sum_{i=1}^N w_i - y\right).$$
(11)

The multiplicative inverse of $a - \sum_{i \in I_1} a_i$ exists because it is a non-zero element in the prime field \mathbb{F}_l . This follows from the assumption that $a \neq \sum_{i \in I_1} a_i$ for all possible subsets I_1 of I_{known} .

We define the address privacy of the MProve protocol using the following experiment (which we call AddrPriv). Let $\mathbf{C}' = (C_1', C_2', \dots, C_N')$, $\mathbf{\Gamma} = (\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \dots, \gamma_N)$, $\mathbf{\Sigma} = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \dots, \sigma_N)$ be vectors containing the commitments and signatures output by the MProve protocol. Let $\mathbf{C} = (C_1, C_2, \dots, C_N)$ be the commitments corresponding to the list of one-time addresses in \mathcal{P} . Let m be the message which is signed to create the signatures. The value of C_{assets} is determined by \mathbf{C} and \mathbf{C}' according to (3).

- 1. The exchange chooses an index j such that $P_j \in \mathcal{P}$ is a one-time address whose private key is known to it.
- 2. The exchange chooses a bit b uniformly from $\{0, 1\}$.
- 3. If b = 0, the exchange uses the MProve protocol to create a proof of reserves where the linkable ring signature σ_j is created using the private key corresponding to P_j and the ring signature γ_j is created using the private key corresponding to C'_j .
- 4. If b = 1, the exchange uses the MProve protocol to create a proof of reserves where both the linkable ring signature σ_j and ring signature γ_j are created using the private key corresponding to $C'_j C_j$.
- 5. Given $\mathcal{P}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{C}', \mathbf{\Gamma}, \mathbf{\Sigma}, m$, and index j, an adversary \mathcal{A} outputs a bit b', i.e.

$$b' = \mathcal{A}(\mathcal{P}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{C}', \mathbf{\Gamma}, \mathbf{\Sigma}, m, j). \tag{12}$$

6. The adversary succeeds if b' = b. Otherwise, it fails.

Definition 1. The MProve protocol provides address privacy if every PPT adversary A succeeds in the AddrPriv experiment with a probability which is negligibly close to $\frac{1}{2}$, irrespective of the message m and index j.

As the C_i' s in the MProve protocol are chosen randomly and independently of each other (see definition in (2)), the signatures γ_i for $i \neq j$ do not aid the adversary in estimating b. Similarly, the signatures σ_i created by one of the private keys corresponding to the public key pair $(P_i, C_i' - C_i)$ do not aid in the estimation of b for $i \neq j$. Hence, we can restrict our attention to adversaries of the form $\mathcal{A}(P_j, C_j, C_j', \gamma_j, \sigma_j, m)$.

A ring signature scheme is said to provide *signer ambiguity* if it does not reveal the identity of the signing key except with probability negligibly close to that achievable by random guessing [14]. The linkable ring signature scheme used to generate σ_j has been shown to be signer ambiguous in the random oracle model provided the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is hard [17, Appendix C]. A similar argument can be used to show that the MProve protocol provides address privacy in the random oracle model. We state the following theorem whose proof is given in Appendix C.

Theorem 3. The MProve protocol provides address privacy in the random oracle model under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.

E. Performance

The performance of MProve is given in Table I for anonymity list \mathcal{P} having sizes 1000, 10000, and 100000. The generation and verification (except for the key image blockchain query) algorithms were implemented in C++ as a test in the Monero codebase [18]. The program to check whether the key images in the proof appear on the blockchain was implemented as a Python script which sends an RPC call to the Monero daemon (script available at [18]). The query time column in Table I gives the execution times of this script after the LMDB database was fully loaded into RAM (it consumes about 2 GB). The execution times were measured on a 3.6 GHz CPU/8 GB RAM desktop PC. For each case, the percentage of known addresses is either 10%, 50%, or 90%. Both generation/verification times and proof sizes increase linearly with the size of \mathcal{P} with the proof generation time having a small dependence on the size of \mathcal{P}_{known} . Even for an anonymity list size of 100000, the proof generation algorithms take approximately a minute to complete.

While there is no other proof of reserves protocol for Monero which provides address privacy, a comparison to the non-private reserve proof technique [11] would give insights into the cost of privacy. We defer this comparison to the extended version of this paper.

F. Drawback

The main drawback of the MProve protocol is that it does not preserve sender address privacy when an exchange spends from an address $P_i \in \mathcal{P}_{known}$ which was used in the protocol. This is because the key image I_i is revealed in the MProve protocol which can be matched with the key image which appears in the transaction spending from P_i . This does not affect the privacy of the MProve protocol itself as the transaction appears on the blockchain after the proof of reserves is generated. But

TABLE I
MPROVE PROOF GENERATION AND VERIFICATION PERFORMANCE

$ \mathcal{P} $	$ \mathcal{P}_{known} $	Proof	Generat.	Verif.	Query
		Size	Time	Time	Time
1000	100	0.32 MB	0.70 s	0.65 s	0.048 s
1000	500	0.32 MB	0.69 s	0.69 s	0.048 s
1000	900	0.32 MB	0.68 s	0.67 s	0.048 s
10000	1000	3.2 MB	7.01 s	6.76 s	0.087 s
10000	5000	3.2 MB	6.92 s	6.76 s	0.087 s
10000	9000	3.2 MB	6.87 s	6.75 s	0.087 s
100000	10000	32 MB	71.79 s	67.85 s	0.545 s
100000	50000	32 MB	71.13 s	67.83 s	0.545 s
100000	90000	32 MB	70.39 s	67.82 s	0.545 s

it effectively makes the transaction a zero mix-in transaction which increases traceability [19], [20]. Alleviating this problem is an interesting direction for future research.

V. APPLICATION TO BITCOIN EXCHANGES

While MProve is intended for Monero exchanges, it can also be used for Bitcoin exchanges for taking advantage of the proof of non-collusion. As the unspent amount a_i associated with a public key P_i is known, the commitment C_i can be simply set to a_iH . Here H needs to be a group element whose discrete logarithm with respect to the base point of the secp256k1 curve is not known. The C_i' commitments will be generated as in (2). As the z_i s are randomly chosen, knowledge of the opening of C_i does not reveal whether $P_i \in \mathcal{P}_{known}$ or not. The ring signatures γ_i and linkable ring signatures σ_i are generated as in the MProve protocol. The commitment C_{assets} published by the exchange has to satisfy

$$\sum_{i=1}^{N} a_i H = C_{\text{assets}} + \sum_{i=1}^{N} C_i'. \tag{13}$$

Collusion between exchanges can be detected by checking if any of the key images I_i in the linkable ring signatues σ_i appear in the proofs provided by two different exchanges. As spending from a Bitcoin address does not involve the generation of a key image, the drawback mentioned in Section IV-F does not apply. However, this technique suffers from the same restriction as Provisions, i.e. it is restricted to UTXOs which are either P2PK or P2PKH with known public key.

VI. CONCLUSION

We have described the design of MProve, a proof of reserves protocol for Monero exchanges. It is the first known protocol to provide address privacy while avoiding collusion between exchanges. MProve's proof generation and verification algorithms are efficient taking only about a minute to complete for an anonymity set having 100,000 addresses. We foresee two areas for improvement.

- The key image of an address is an essential part of the proof as it prevents exchanges from using spent addresses for proof generation. But revealing the key images is bad for privacy. Ideally, we would like to efficiently prove that the key image corresponding to an exchange-owned address has not appeared on the blockchain without revealing it. Additionally, this proof should not reveal which addresses are owned by the exchange.
- The proof sizes scale linearly with the size of the anonymity list \mathcal{P} . Applying recent techniques like Bulletproofs [21] to reduce the proof size is an interesting direction for future research.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments which have made this paper better. We also acknowledge the support of the Bharti Centre for Communication at IIT Bombay.

APPENDIX A

RING SIGNATURE GENERATION IN MPROVE

In this appendix, we describe the calculation of the regular ring signature γ_i corresponding to step 4 of the MProve proof generation procedure described in Section IV-B. The calculation is the same as the algorithm described in Section IV-A with the public key list $Q^i = (C'_i, C'_i - C_i)$. We use different notation to differentiate the terms from those used in the linkable ring signature calculation of Appendix B.

(i) For i such that $P_i \in P_{\text{known}}$, the private key z_i corresponding to the public key $C'_i = z_i G$ is used to create the regular ring signature $\gamma_i = (d_0^i, t_0^i, t_1^i)$ where

- Using randomly chosen β_i from \mathbb{Z}_l^+ , d_1^i is calculated as $d_1^i = H_s(\mathcal{Q}^i, m, S_0^i)$ where $S_0^i = \beta_i G$. Using randomly chosen t_1^i from \mathbb{Z}_l^+ , d_0^i is calculated as $d_0^i = H_s(\mathcal{Q}^i, m, S_1^i)$ where $S_1^i = t_1^i G + d_1^i (C_1' C_i)$.
- The value t_0^i is set to $\beta_i d_0^i z_i$.
- (ii) For i such that $P_i \notin P_{known}$, the private key z_i corresponding to the public key $C'_i C_i = z_i G$ is used to create the regular ring signature $\gamma_i = (d_0^i, t_0^i, t_1^i)$ where
 - Using randomly chosen β_i from \mathbb{Z}_l^+ , d_0^i is calculated as $d_0^i = H_s(\mathcal{Q}^i, m, S_1^i)$ where $S_1^i = \beta_i G$. Using randomly chosen t_0^i from \mathbb{Z}_l^+ , d_1^i is calculated as $d_1^i = H_s(\mathcal{Q}^i, m, S_0^i)$ where $S_0^i = t_0^i G + d_0^i C_i'$.

 - The value t_1^i is set to $\beta_i d_1^i z_i$.

APPENDIX B

LINKABLE RING SIGNATURE GENERATION IN MPROVE

In this appendix, we describe the calculation of the linkable ring signature σ_i corresponding to step 5 of the MProve proof generation procedure described in Section IV-B. The calculation is the same as the algorithm described in Section III-B with the public key list $\mathcal{R}^i = (P_i, C'_i - C_i)$.

Let $x_i \in \mathbb{Z}_l^+$ be the private key corresponding to P_i , i.e. $P_i = x_i G$.

- (i) For i such that $P_i \in P_{known}$, the private key x_i is used to create the linkable ring signature $\sigma_i = (I_i, c_0^i, s_0^i, s_1^i)$ where $I_i = x_i H_p(P_i)$ is the key image.
 - Using randomly chosen α_i from \mathbb{Z}_l^+ , c_1^i is calculated as

$$L_0^i = \alpha_i G, \ R_0^i = \alpha_i H_p(P_i),$$

$$c_1^i = H_s(\mathcal{R}^i, m, L_0^i, R_0^i).$$
(14)

• Using randomly chosen s_1^i from \mathbb{Z}_l^+ , c_0^i is calculated as

$$L_{1}^{i} = s_{1}^{i}G + c_{1}^{i}(C_{i}' - C_{i}),$$

$$R_{1}^{i} = s_{1}^{i}H_{p}(C_{i}' - C_{i}) + c_{1}^{i}I_{i},$$

$$c_{0}^{i} = H_{s}(\mathcal{R}^{i}, m, L_{1}^{i}, R_{1}^{i}).$$
(15)

- The value s_0^i is set to $\alpha_i c_0^i x_i$.
- (ii) For i such that $P_i \notin P_{known}$, the private key z_i corresponding to the public key $C'_i C_i = z_i G$ is used to create the linkable ring signature $\sigma_i = (I_i, c_0^i, s_0^i, s_1^i)$ where $I_i = z_i H_p(C_i' - C_i)$ is the key image.
 - Using randomly chosen α_i from $\mathbb{Z}_l^+,\,c_0^i$ is calculated as

$$L_1^i = \alpha_i G, \ R_1^i = \alpha_i H_p(C_i' - C_i),$$

$$c_0^i = H_s(\mathcal{R}^i, m, L_1^i, R_1^i).$$
(16)

• Using randomly chosen s_0^i from \mathbb{Z}_l^+ , c_1^i is calculated as

$$L_0^i = s_0^i G + c_0^i P_i, \ R_0^i = s_0^i H_p(P_i) + c_0^i I_i,$$

$$c_1^i = H_s(\mathcal{R}^i, m, L_0^i, R_0^i). \tag{17}$$

• The value s_1^i is set to $\alpha_i - c_1^i x_i$.

APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 3

The proof involves constructing a PPT adversary \mathcal{M} who violates the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption using a PPT adversary A who violates address privacy in the MProve protocol. The hash functions H_s and H_p will be modeled as random oracles which enables \mathcal{M} to create a valid MProve protocol output that is fed to \mathcal{A} .

Suppose A is a PPT adversary who violates address privacy in the AddrPriv experiment. By the discussion following Definition 1, we can restrict our attention to adversaries of the form $\mathcal{A}(P_j, C_j, C_j', \gamma_j, \sigma_j, m)$. If \mathcal{A} violates address privacy, then there exists a polynomial f such that

$$\Pr\left[\mathcal{A}(P_j, C_j, C'_j, \gamma_j, \sigma_j, m) = b\right] > \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{f(\lambda)},\tag{18}$$

where λ is a security parameter. Recall that the linkable ring signature $\sigma_j = (I_j, c_0^j, s_0^j, s_1^j)$. For b = 0, the point I_j is the key image of P_j , i.e. $I_j = x_j H_p(P_j)$. In this case, the triple $(P_j, H_p(P_j), I_j)$ is a Diffie-Hellman triple. This is because for $P_j = x_j G$ and $H_p(P_j) = y_j G$, we have $I_j = x_j y_j G$. And for b = 1, I_j is the key image of $C'_j - C_j$, i.e. $I_j = x_j H_p(C'_j - C_j)$, and $(C'_j - C_j, H_p(C'_j - C_j), I_j)$ is a Diffie-Hellman triple. As \mathcal{A} can estimate b with a probability which is non-negligibly better than $\frac{1}{2}$, it must be implicitly able to identify which of the two triples is a Diffie-Hellman triple. This idea is exploited in the construction of the adversary \mathcal{M} .

Suppose \mathcal{M} is an adversary tasked with identifying Diffie-Hellman triples. Let G be the generator of a cyclic group of order l. An entity who wishes to test \mathcal{M} chooses a bit d uniformly from $\{0,1\}$ and gives \mathcal{M} the triple $(G_1,G_2,G_3)=(aG,bG,c_dG)$ where a,b,c_0 are chosen uniformly from \mathbb{Z}_l^+ and $c_1=ab$. To estimate d from (G_1,G_2,G_3) , \mathcal{M} will use \mathcal{A} as a subroutine as follows.

- 1. \mathcal{M} chooses a bit b uniformly from $\{0, 1\}$.
- 2. If b = 0, \mathcal{M} does the following:
 - (i) It sets $P_j = G_1$, $H_p(P_j) = G_2$ (using the random oracle assumption), and $I_j = G_3$.
 - (ii) It chooses random group elements C_j and C'_j and sets the public key list $\mathcal{R} = (P_j, C'_j C_j)$.
 - (iii) It chooses scalars c_0, s_0, s_1 uniformly from \mathbb{Z}_l^+ and calculates L_1, R_1 as follows.

$$L_{0} = s_{0}G + c_{0}P_{j},$$

$$R_{0} = s_{0}H_{p}(P_{j}) + c_{0}I_{j},$$

$$c_{1} = H_{s}(\mathcal{R}, m, L_{0}, R_{0}),$$

$$L_{1} = s_{1}G + c_{1}(C'_{j} - C_{j}),$$

$$R_{1} = s_{1}H_{p}(C'_{j} - C_{j}) + c_{1}I_{j}.$$
(19)

- (iv) It sets the random oracle output $H_s(\mathcal{R}, m, L_1, R_1)$ to be equal to c_0 .
- (v) It sets $\sigma_j = (I_j, c_0, s_0, s_1)$ which will pass the linkable ring signature verification algorithm for the public key list \mathcal{R} .
- (vi) It chooses scalars d_0, t_0, t_1 uniformly from \mathbb{Z}_l^+ and calculates S_1 for public key list $\mathcal{Q} = (C'_j, C'_j C_j)$ as follows.

$$S_0 = t_0 G + d_0 C'_j,$$

$$d_1 = H_s(\mathcal{Q}, m, S_0),$$

$$S_1 = t_1 G + d_1 (C'_i - C_j),$$
(20)

- (vii) It sets the random oracle output $H_s(\mathcal{Q}, m, S_1)$ to be equal to d_0 .
- (viii) It sets $\gamma_j = (d_0, t_0, t_1)$ which will pass the ring signature verification algorithm for the public key list Q.
- 3. If b = 1, \mathcal{M} does the following:
 - (i) It chooses a random group element C_j and sets $C'_j = C_j + G_1$.
 - (ii) It sets $H_p(C'_i C_j) = G_2$ (using the random oracle assumption) and $I_j = G_3$.
 - (iii) It chooses a random group elements P_j and sets the public key list $\mathcal{R} = (P_j, C'_j C_j)$.
 - (iv) For public key list \mathcal{R} , it generates the linkable ring signature $\sigma_j = (I_j, c_0, s_0, s_1)$ using the same procedure as the b = 0 case.
 - (v) For public key list $Q = (C'_j, C'_j C_j)$, it generates the ring signature $\gamma_j = (d_0, t_0, t_1)$ using the same procedure as the b = 0 case.
- 4. \mathcal{M} obtains the output $b' = \mathcal{A}(P_j, C_j, C_j', \gamma_j, \sigma_j, m)$. If b' = b, then \mathcal{M} estimates the bit d as 1. Otherwise, \mathcal{M} estimates d as 0.

When d=1, the triple (G_1,G_2,G_3) is a DH triple and the I_j in the linkable ring signature σ_j constructed by \mathcal{M} is the key image of one of the keys in \mathcal{R} . By (18), the adversary \mathcal{A} can identify which key was used with a probability which is non-neglibly better than $\frac{1}{2}$. This in turn implies that \mathcal{M} can correctly estimate d as 1 with the same probability. So we have

$$\Pr\left[\mathcal{M}(G_1, G_2, G_3) = 1 \mid d = 1\right] = \Pr[b' = b \mid d = 1]$$

$$> \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{f(\lambda)}.$$
(21)

When d=0, G_3 (and consequently I_j) is independent of (G_1,G_2) . As the inputs $P_j,C_j,C_j',\gamma_j,\sigma_j$ to $\mathcal A$ or their components are either uniformly random group elements/scalars or outputs of random oracles, the adversary can only estimate the bit b with probability $\frac{1}{2}$. So we have

$$\Pr\left[\mathcal{M}(G_1, G_2, G_3) = 0 \mid d = 0\right] = \Pr[b' \neq b \mid d = 0]$$

$$= \frac{1}{2}.$$
(22)

As d was chosen uniformly from $\{0,1\}$, averaging (21) and (22) we get

$$\Pr\left[\mathcal{M}(G_1, G_2, G_3) = d\right] > \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2f(\lambda)}.$$
(23)

This contradicts the DDH assumption as \mathcal{M} is a PPT adversary.

REFERENCES

- [1] Wikipedia contributors. Mt. Gox Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. [Accessed 15-Nov-2018]. [Online]. Available: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mt._ Gox
- "Cryptocurrency anti-money laundering report," 2018 Q3 Report, CipherTrace Inc, Oct. 2018. [Online]. Available: https://ciphertrace.com/ crypto-aml-report-2018q3
- [3] Monero website. [Online]. Available: https://getmonero.org/
- G. G. Dagher, B. Bünz, J. Bonneau, J. Clark, and D. Boneh, "Provisions: Privacy-preserving proofs of solvency for Bitcoin exchanges," in Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS), New York, NY, USA, 2015, pp. 720-731.
- Z. Wilcox, "Proving your Bitcoin reserves," Bitcoin Talk Forum Post, May 2014. [Online]. Available: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=595180.0
- C. Decker, J. Guthrie, J. Seidel, and R. Wattenhofer, "Making Bitcoin exchanges transparent," in 20th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS), 2015, pp. 561-576.
- Wikipedia contributors. Trusted Platform Module Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. [Accessed 15-Feb-2019]. [Online]. Available: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted Platform Module#Attacks
- [8] T. P. Pedersen, "Non-interactive and information-theoretic secure verifiable secret sharing," in Advances in Cryptology CRYPTO '91. Springer, 1992, pp. 129-140.
- [9] S. Roose, "Standardizing Bitcoin Proof of Reserves," Blockstream Blog Post, Feb. 2018. [Online]. Available: https://blockstream.com/2019/02/04/ standardizing-bitcoin-proof-of-reserves/
- Proof-of-Reserves tool for Bitcoin. [Online]. Available: https://github.com/ElementsProject/reserves
- [11] S. Noether. (2018) Reserve proof pull request. [Online]. Available: https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/3027 [12] N. v. Saberhagen, "CryptoNote v 2.0," White paper, 2013. [Online]. Available: https://cryptonote.org/whitepaper.pdf
- [13] D. J. Bernstein, N. Duif, T. Lange, P. Schwabe, and B.-Y. Yang, "High-speed high-security signatures," Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 77-89, Sep 2012.
- [14] J. K. Liu, V. K. Wei, and D. S. Wong, "Linkable spontaneous anonymous group signature for ad hoc groups," in Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy. Springer, 2004, pp. 325–335.
 [15] S. Noether and A. Mackenzie, "Ring confidential transactions," Ledger, vol. 1, pp. 1–18, 2016.
- [16] M. Abe, M. Ohkubo, and K. Suzuki, "1-out-of-n signatures from a variety of keys," in Advances in Cryptology ASIACRYPT 2002. Springer, 2002, pp. 415-432.
- J. K. Liu, V. K. Wei, and D. S. Wong, "Linkable spontaneous anonymous group signature for ad hoc groups," Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2004/027, 2004, https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/027.
- [18] MProve simulation code. [Online]. Available: https://github.com/avras/monero/tree/v0.14.0.2-mprove/tests/mprove
- A. Kumar, C. Fischer, S. Tople, and P. Saxena, "A traceability analysis of Monero's blockchain," in European Symposium on Research in Computer Security - ESORICS 2017, 2017, pp. 153-173.
- M. Möser, K. Soska, E. Heilman, K. Lee, H. Heffan, S. Srivastava, K. Hogan, J. Hennessey, A. Miller, A. Narayanan, and N. Christin, "An empirical analysis of traceability in the Monero blockchain," Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, vol. 2018, no. 3, pp. 143-163, 2018.
- B. Bünz, J. Bootle, D. Boneh, A. Poelstra, P. Wuille, and G. Maxwell, "Bulletproofs: Short proofs for confidential transactions and more," in 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), May 2018, pp. 315-334.