2-Source Extractors Under Computational Assumptions and Cryptography with Defective Randomness[*]

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1   Context and Overview

Randomness is a useful resource for solving many problems in computer science. The goal of the broad area of *derandomization* is to weaken the assumptions that are placed on the randomness used. One way to do this is to design randomness extractors: these are algorithms that take randomness that comes from defective sources and extract truly random bits from them. A 2-Source extractor is an algorithm that extracts random bits from two independent sources, each giving bits with some entropy. The best known extractor algorithms for this situation require that at least one of the sources has 0.499 entropy rate. This is a construction of Bourgain that relies on relatively recent developments (involving sum-product estimates) in additive number theory. However, the probabilistic method shows that a random bit can be extracted from two independent sources each of which gives n bits with only $\log n + O(1)$ bits of entropy. The best known explicit constructions using more than 2 sources require $n^{\Omega(1)}$ entropy. In this work we prove that *computational assumptions* about the existence of hard permutations imply *statistical guarantees* about the performance of a two source extractors. Perhaps the most interesting conclusion of our work is that computational assumptions can be used to defeat an adversary (the weak source) that is not computationally bounded.

Past work in derandomization has left us with the dramatic result that any randomized algorithm can be simulated by an algorithm that only has access to a *single* source of randomness with some entropy. Even though randomness is used in an essential way in cryptography and distributed computing, there was no analogous result known, and there is a strong negative result showing that many cryptographic tasks are impossible given only a single weak random source. Nevertheless, past work does use a variant of the DDH assumption to do secure multiparty computation, where each party has only access to an *independent* weak source of randomness. This result requires that the number of participants in the protocol is super constant, and depends on the security parameter. We address this deficit in the current paper.

2   Our Contribution

We rely on the assumption that there exists a *one way permutation for weak sources*, f. This means that for any distribution $X \in \{0,1\}^n$ with $\Omega(n)$ min-entropy, a circuit of size $\mathrm{poly}(n^{\log n})$ cannot invert $f(X)$, except with negligible probability. A concrete candidate may be the exponentiation function, over an appropriate group (i.e. we might hope that computing discrete log is hard, even on weak sources). Using such a permutation f, we show how to build a 2-source extractor that only requires the sources to have entropy

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$\Omega(n)$.[1] Our conclusion is an information theoretic object, even though our assumption is a computational one.

We use these ideas to design a *computational network extractor protocol*. This is a protocol that allows a collection of processors, each of which has access to a *single* independent source with $\Omega(n)$ entropy, to extract bits which are computationally indistinguishable from being uniform and private. Our protocol succeeds as long as at least 2 of the participants are honest.

The key observation used in our work is an idea that was implicitly used in the hardcore predicate construction of Goldreich-Levin — a one way function can be used to generate distributions which are computationally indistinguishable from being independent, even though they are very correlated in reality. If R, X are uniform, Goldreich-Levin showed that $(\langle X, R \rangle, f(X), R)$ look like three independent distributions to any small circuit. This idea generalizes[2]: if X is a weak source with some entropy, R is independent and uniform, and Ext is a *reconstructive extractor*, then the following two distributions are computationally indistinguishable:

$$(\mathsf{Ext}(X, R), f(X), R) \approx (\mathsf{Uniform}, \mathsf{f(X)}, \mathsf{R}),$$

where here the three strings on the right are independent. Today we know of several explicit constructions of reconstructive extractors, many of which only require $\mathsf{polylog}(n)$ bits in R.

2.1 A Toy Version of our 2-Source Extractor

Let X, Y be the two independent sources, each which has entropy δn, from which we would like to extract random bits. In order to describe our key ideas, we shall make a simplifying assumption: we assume that for every δ, there is a constant $t(\delta)$ such that if $X = X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_t$ is broken into t blocks, there is a constant g such that for every fixing of $x_1, \ldots, x_{g-1}$, we have that $X_g | x_1, \ldots, x_{g-1}$ is uniform. Thus, the g'th block is uniform even conditioned on previous blocks. Although our assumption seems unreasonable at first, it turns out that there is a way to use past work on extractors (and a careful analysis) to convert two independent sources X, Y into sources that are close to having properties similar to what we assume.

Since one of the blocks in X is uniform, we might hope that the bitwise xor $X_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus X_t$ would be uniform. Of course this is not at all true, since the blocks following the good block g can depend on X_g. Still, we show how to use a one way permutation to make something like this work. Let Ext and f be as in our discussion above. We define

$$\mathsf{TExt}(x, y) \stackrel{def}{=} \mathsf{Ext}(f(y), x_1) \oplus \mathsf{Ext}(f^2(y), x_2) \oplus \cdots \oplus \mathsf{Ext}(f^t(y), x_t)$$

Here f^i denotes the permutation obtained by composing f with itself i times.

We shall argue that $\mathsf{TExt}(X, Y)$ is computationally indistinguishable from being uniform. Since computational indistinguishability is the same as statistical indistinguishability when the input is of size $O(\log n)$, we conclude that the first $O(\log n)$ bits of $\mathsf{TExt}(X, Y)$ are actually statistically indistinguishable from uniform.

Let $R_1(x, y)$ denote the string $\mathsf{Ext}(f(y), x_1) \oplus \mathsf{Ext}(f^2(y), x_2) \oplus \cdots \oplus \mathsf{Ext}(f^{g-1}(y), x_{g-1})$. Note that since $X_1, \ldots, X_{g-1}$ are fixed, $R_1(X, Y)$ is actually only a function of Y. We denote this string by $R_1(Y)$. Then it suffices to show that

$$(\mathsf{Ext}(f^g(Y), X_g), X, R_1(Y), f^{g+1}(Y)) \approx (\mathsf{Uniform}, X, R_1(Y), f^{g+1}(Y)), \tag{1}$$

since $\mathsf{TExt}(\mathsf{X}, \mathsf{Y})$ can be efficiently computed from $\mathsf{Ext}(f^g(Y), X_g), X, R_1(Y), f^{g+1}(Y)$. We take Ext with output length that is significantly shorter than the entropy of Y, and thus we can argue that for almost all $R_1(Y)$, Y has linear entropy even conditioned on the value of $R_1(Y)$. Let Y' denote the source obtained after such a fixing. Then we can use the properties of reconstructive extractors to argue that

$$(\mathsf{Ext}(f^g(Y'), X_g), X, f^{g+1}(Y')) \approx (\mathsf{Uniform}, X, f^{g+1}(Y')),$$

Since the above statement is true for Y' obtained by all but a negligible fraction of the fixings of $R_1(Y)$, this actually proves Equation (1).

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[1]Our extractor can also extract randomness if only one of the sources has entropy $\Omega(n)$ and the other has only entropy k. However, then we need to assume that it is hard to invert $f(X)$, where X is any distribution with entropy k.

[2]This observation was made in an earlier work of TaShma and Zuckerman.