

WORLDWIDE DISMAY
AT
KIM DAE JUNG MARTYRDOM

WORLDWIDE DISMAY
AT
KIM DAE JUNG MARTYRDOM

December 1980

The Korean Democratic Lawyers Association in Japan

CONTENTS

1. What Is on Trial in S. Korea
The New York Times Editorial,
Dec. 1, 1980. 1
2. Kim Will Be Executed before Reagan's Inauguration
U.S. News & World Report,
Dec. 1, 1980. 1
3. U.S. Pedaling Too Softly on Chun's Crackdown
by Mikey Chinoy, The Asian Wall Street Journal,
Oct. 22, 1980 2
4. Samurai Justice in Korea
The New York Times Editorial,
Sept. 18, 1980 7
5. Sordid Celebrations in Seoul
The New York Times Editorial,
Nov. 20, 1980. 8
6. Korea's Silent Anniversary
by Fred Bruning & Andrew Nagorski,
Newsweek, Nov. 10, 1980.10
7. Bankruptcy of U.S. Korea Policy
by Jerome Alan Cohen, The New York Times,
Sept. 18, 198012
8. The Threat of a Korean Martyrdom
The Times Editorial,
Sept. 18, 198013
9. Memories of a Bloody May
by Don Kirk, Newsweek,
Oct. 6, 1980.14

10.	Kim Takes Death Appeal to Seoul's Highest Court by Henry Scott Stokes, The New York Times, Nov. 9, 1980.	16
11.	A Mistake of Seoul Government The Washington Star Editorial, Sept., 18, 1980.	18
12.	A Dual Threat to Korea by Charles Smith, The Financial Times, Sept. 18, 1980.	19
13.	Worldwide Dismay at Kim's Fate The South China Morning Post, Sept. 18, 1980.	21
14.	The Army vs. 'Chaos' by Philippe Pons, Le Monde, Sept. 9, 1980.	23
15.	Kim S. Koreans' Hope for Democracy & Reunification Mainichi Shimbun, Nov. 29, 1980.	27
16.	Changing Attitudes to N. Korea and the U.S. American Quaker Report.	30
17.	Canadian Parliament, European Leaders, U.S. Solons Demand Kim's Freedom.	35
18.	U.N. Secretary General Mulling Kim Action.	38

1. What Is on Trial in S. Korea

The New York Times Editorial, Dec. 1, 1980

Governments, like families, resent what they feel is outside meddling in domestic quarrels. The military rulers of South Korea regard the case of Kim Dae Jung as strictly an internal affair. Kim, the most prominent opposition leader, has been tried and found guilty of sedition. In the coming week, the Supreme Court is likely to sustain his death sentence; his execution could follow within hours unless it is stayed by President Chun Doo Hwan. And to the Chun regime, it has seemingly become a question of national honor to remain deaf to all foreign appeals for clemency.

But the fate of Kim is hardly a domestic matter. His death would serve neither the honor nor interest of South Korea. The matter is serious enough to warrant sending a special American emissary before an execution disrupts the stability of the region.

If the Chun regime executes Kim Dae Jung, it would heavily draw down American good will—the more so if the deed is timed with an eye to an American internal affair, the transition hiatus.

The Seoul Government has thus far ignored the quiet warnings of the Carter Administration, and the concurring voices from the Reagan team. Those warnings should be stiffened by a special emissary. By exiling rather than executing Kim, the Chun regime could make its point forcibly enough. Not just a man, but the character and wisdom of a new government are now on trial in South Korea.

2. Kim Will Be Executed before Reagan's Inauguration

U.S. News & World Report, Dec. 1, 1980

Asian diplomats are predicting South Korea will execute dissident leader Kim Dae Jung before Reagan takes office on January 20. Seoul's reasons: Placate its military hard-liners, demonstrate toughness to restive students, show independence from the U.S.—and avoid embarrassing the new American President.

3. U.S. Pedaling Too Softly on Chun's Crackdown

by Mike Chinoy, The Asian Wall Street Journal, Oct. 22, 1980

Mike Chinoy, a Hong Kong-based reporter for NBC News, recently completed a month-long assignment in South Korea.

KWANGJU — The death sentence ordered a month ago for former presidential candidate Kim Dae-Jung is merely the most visible manifestation of a nationwide wave of repression harsh even by the authoritarian standards of South Korea.

While international attention has focused primarily on the sedition case against the 54-year-old opposition leader, hundreds of other Korean dissidents have also been facing military trials at the hands of President Chun Doo-Hwan's martial law regime.

Thousands more, deemed by the government to be politically or socially undesirable, have been forced from their jobs, expelled from their schools or detained as "hooligans" and sent to re-education camps.

The most significant and potentially most explosive of the trials which have followed the Kim verdict is taking place in Kwangju, the scene of a bloody anti-government insurrection last May. Hundreds of people were killed in the uprising when soldiers clashed with demonstrators demanding an end to martial law and the restoration of democracy.

Since then, there has been an uneasy calm in the city, due in large part to the continued presence of armed soldiers on the streets, military checkpoints, a greatly expanded network of police informers and a continuing roundup of dissidents.

But beneath the surface, Kwangju is bitter and tense. Posters hailing President Chun's recent inauguration were repeatedly defaced, and eventually had to be protected by armed guards. Copies of the government's just-published constitution have been torn from local billboards.

The atmosphere has been further inflamed by the current trial. Unlike the proceedings against Kim Dae-Jung, which were open to diplomatic observers and local and foreign journalists, the Kwangju trial is being held in absolute

secrecy before a five-man military tribunal at an army base just outside the city.

The only acknowledgement of it the authorities have made was a report published in two local newspapers on September 18 that the trial of 175 people accused of participating in the springtime protests was underway. The government gave no details and has suppressed all other domestic and foreign press reports.

Dissident sources say the 175 have been charged with offenses ranging from disturbing public order to sedition. The sources report that most of those facing lesser charges have already been convicted and given jail terms of up to 20 years.

Now, the trial has moved into its final phase, with the arraignment on sedition charges of 13 prominent local citizens described by the government as the ringleaders of the uprising. The 13 include Myong Ro-Kuen, a distinguished professor of English at Kwangju's Chonnam National University, Oh Byong-Moon, a former dean of the university, the president and secretary-general of the Kwangju Young Men's Christian Association, two priests and several well-known lawyers and academics. All of them could face the death penalty.

The government's indictment claims the 13 maintained clandestine links with Kim Dae-Jung and incited the population to revolt. The defendants have denied the charges, pointing out that they were members of a committee which tried to mediate between the protesters and the army last spring in the hope of avoiding further bloodshed.

Whatever the truth, those on trial have been denied lawyers of their choice and provided instead with government-appointed attorneys. Moreover, friends and relatives of the 13 claim they have been beaten and in some cases stripped naked and interrogated while in prison.

The trial in Kwangju is not the only sign of the regime's continuing campaign to eliminate its political opponents and consolidate its hold on power. In recent weeks, several hundred young dissidents have been secretly tried in Seoul for participating in protest rallies last spring. Appearing before military tribunals in groups of 40 or 50, the protesters have been given sentences ranging from probation to two or three years in jail.

At the same time, government-sponsored "purification committees" have been spearheading a political and cultural purge which has left no Korean institution untouched. Virtually every factory, shop, church, newspaper and office in the country has been required to establish such a committee.

With close links to the Korean Central Intelligence Agency and military intelligence, the committees have been charged with the job of rooting out all "impure elements." The definition of "impurity" has been left up to the authorities, which has meant that most of those targeted for purification have been critics of the government.

Creation of the committees has made many Koreans fearful of speaking openly about politics not only in public places but even in their own homes. Said one long-time foreign resident of Seoul, "I've never seen people so scared, not even during the most repressive days of the late President Park Chung Hee."

Even as it has been clamping down on its opponents with an approach one diplomat described as "playing hardball below the belt," President Chun's military-dominated regime has moved to "civilianize" itself and gain greater political legitimacy.

At the core of this effort has been the publication of a new constitution to replace the "Yushin" or "Revitalizing" constitution of the assassinated President Park.

Government officials claim the new document, which is being put to a nation-wide referendum this week, is much more liberal than Park's. As evidence, they point to clauses which limit the president to a single 7-year term, restrict the president's authority to assume emergency powers, increase the influence of the National Assembly and provide for firmer constitutional guarantees of civil rights.

But the new constitution contains ten "supplementary articles" which raise serious questions as to just how democratic it will be. The articles order the dissolution of all existing political parties and the National Assembly as soon as the constitution takes effect. This will be immediately after the referendum.

In place of the legislature, a "Special Committee on National Security Measures" is to govern South Korea until a presidential election, to be held

before next June 1. The Special Committee is heavily dominated by the military. In addition to President Chun, its members include the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the heads of the army, navy and air force, the director of the KCIA, the country's martial law commander plus the Prime Minister and several cabinet ministers.

According to the articles, the Special Committee, in its role as temporary replacement for the National Assembly, will have the power to ban from political life people who in the past were allegedly responsible for corruption or "social unrest." At the same time, it will determine the framework for whatever new political parties are allowed to contest next year's election.

Korean officials have promised that these powers will not be used in a "vengeful manner." But many Koreans remain convinced the legislation is designed to remove antigovernment figures from the country's political life. They point to the forced retirement of a number of top politicians this summer on similar vaguely worded charges as a chilling sign of possible future developments.

While all this has been taking place, the United States, which has 40,000 troops stationed in South Korea and is the country's closed ally and chief trading partner, has stood uncomfortably on the sidelines. The ferocity and scope of the crackdown has clearly distressed policy-makers in Washington and at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul. But, to the dismay of many thoughtful Koreans and a growing number of Americans living and working in Korea, the Carter administration has been unwilling to exert any meaningful pressure on President Chun to moderate his repressive policies.

The reason for this is clear. Even before the Kim Dae-Jung verdict, President Carter stated publicly that the U.S. would not use its security commitment to South Korea, or its close economic ties, to put pressure on the Chun regime. Washington's fear, apparently, is that tampering with the U.S. Korea defense relationship would encourage instability and undermine the American strategic position in northeast Asia, while economic sanctions would only make South Korea's dismal economic situation even worse.

The result is that the U.S. has been left only with what one Embassy official in Seoul called "moral and political pressure." Even in this area, however, the pressuring has been ineffectual, and has been totally ignored by the martial

law authorities.

The State Department's official reaction to the death sentence against Kim, for example, was exceptionally weak. A one paragraph statement expressing American "concern" contrasted sharply with strongly worded remarks from the West German Foreign Minister, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Japan, Amnesty International and many others.

Since then, the U.S. Embassy has taken an extremely low profile, with Embassy officials arguing that further public criticism of Chun would only be counter-productive and damaging to relations between Washington and Seoul. Meanwhile, a report on the Kim trial prepared by a State Department lawyer sent to Seoul to observe the proceedings has not yet been made public, even though an Embassy spokesman assured reporters it would be released within a matter of days after the trial's conclusion.

Washington has further undercut its own expressions of concern over the repression in South Korea with a series of moves that have been widely interpreted here as gestures of support for the Chun regime, even if they were not deliberately intended to convey such an impression.

For example, on the day of the verdict against Kim, Chase Manhattan Bank Chairman David Rockefeller called on President Chun and praised South Korea's economic climate. The following day, U.S. Ambassador William Gleysteen met with Foreign Minister Lho Shin-yong. Although Embassy officials were at pains to describe both meetings as courtesy calls, the regime took advantage of the inopportune timing to portray them as American endorsement of President Chun.

Then, just a few days ago, the Pentagon announced plans to send 48 sophisticated new F-16 jet fighters to South Korea in mid-1981 to replace an equal number of aging F-4 Phantoms. In Korean eyes, the move was yet another sign of the Carter administration's pro-Chun sympathies.

In the short term, this approach may succeed in avoiding a crisis in U.S.-Korean relations, which strong American criticism of the Chun regime might set off. But, quite apart from its implications for the administration's human rights policies, the American position has led to what is for South Korea an unprecedented development — stirrings of anti-American sentiment among

a strongly anti-Communist and deeply pro-Western population.

Not surprisingly, the feeling has been strongest in Kwangju, where many people continue to believe — incorrectly — that the U.S. sanctioned the bloody army attack which crushed last spring's uprising. Threats have been telephoned to the American Cultural Center in the city, and some Koreans working there have quit in protest.

But American residents in Seoul say the feeling exists in the capital as well. And if the U.S. maintains its subdued response to the draconian policies of the South Korean government and continues to be perceived by politically conscious Koreans as a supporter of President Chun, it is likely that such sentiments will become even more widespread in the future.

4. Samurai Justice in Korea

The New York Times Editorial, Sept. 18, 1980

Millions of people watching television this week need no further instruction in samurai justice. The loser's penalty in early 17th-century Japan was predictable and brutal — a quick thwack of the sword, a suddenly headless neck. In "Shogun," the NBC mini-series based on James Clavell's novel, the feudal savagery is rooted in Asian history which viewers may assume is mercifully past. It isn't, Samurai swords are still flashing in ostensibly civilized South Korea.

Last November, the old shogun, President Park Chung Hee, was assassinated by a trusted lieutenant. Now there is a new military overlord, Gen. Chun Doo Hwan. He may bear the more modern title of President. But he seems intent on governing in the feudal manner.

He had scores to settle, especially after a humiliating student uprising in Kwangju. That uprising was blamed on the seditious intrigues of South Korea's foremost democratic leader, Kim Dae Jung. But the evidence was tenuous; Mr. Kim and his co-defendants were already in jail when the Kwangju riots occurred. So Government prosecutors duly came up with another charge, that Mr. Kim was plotting subversion during a trip to Japan in 1973. But the evidence was tainted, since Mr. Kim had been kidnapped from Tokyo by Korean

agents. The abduction outraged the Japanese, who obtained a promise that no evidence developed in Japan would be used against him. The promise was broken.

Yesterday, as expected, Mr. Kim was found guilty of sedition by a military tribunal after a semi-secret trial marred by charges of fraud and crude Government pressure. And, as feared, the sentence is death by hanging. Under President Chun's samurai code, there is seemingly no mercy for losers.

The comparison with feudal Japan may be offensive to Koreans; they are a proud people with bitter memories of their past as an imperial colony of the Japanese. Defenders of General Chun insist that Korea's judiciary is independent, and that appeals or executive clemency are still possible. They assert that a new constitution is being shaped that will give Koreans a more or less democratic system.

American policy-makers have been indulgent to a fault in accepting these assurances. While the Chun shogunate was assuming power, President Carter saw fit to remark that "the Koreans are not ready for democracy ... according to their own judgment." Washington's tolerance has now been repaid with the Kim death sentence. Official pragmatism notwithstanding, that verdict is an affront to civilized opinion everywhere. A human rights policy that winks at samurai justice can hardly "ready" South Korea for democracy.

5. Sordid Celebrations in Seoul

The New York Times Editorial, Nov. 20, 1980

This editorial is reprinted in the Nov. 21 issue of The International Herald Tribune

According to news reports, President Carter's defeat was greeted with jubilation by the military rulers of South Korea. We wonder why. In the past depressing six months, President Chun Doo Hwan has tightened his grip and fled from his promise of democratic reform. In response, Washington has glowered a little, but nothing more. It says something about the insecurity of Gen. Chun that even this glowering should have provoked so much annoyance.

That same insecurity may explain the new wave of repression that followed the U.S. election. The Chun regime has banned nearly every prominent opposition leader from political activity (811 in all), thereby eliminating all serious challengers from next year's presidential voting. That takes a good deal of the gloss off the new constitution that contained apparently meaningless guarantees of free speech.

The government has also sponsored a plan to merge South Korean news agencies and newspapers. The ostensible reason is that Koreans have been "confused" by "too many" media. In fact, the press has already become a pliant propaganda organ for the government. No reader could be "confused" by its reporting of the show-trial of Kim Dae Jung, now under death sentence for alleged sedition.

If that sentence is sustained by the Korean Supreme Court, only the president could save him. An outspoken democrat, Mr. Kim has never been forgiven for daring to challenge (and worse, almost beating) the late President Park Chung Hee in a 1971 election. Gen. Chun may figure that the right time to get rid of Mr. Kim once and for all is while Americans are caught unawares, between two administrations.

Let him be disabused by the alert response of Ronald Reagan's circle. The president-elect has been prudently silent on most diplomatic issues, but one of his senior aides has pointedly warned that the execution of Mr. Kim would further harm relations with Seoul. The United States has an obvious strategic interest in the stability of South Korea, and an economic interest in expanded trade with its booming economy. But the killing of Mr. Kim would be an outrage and a risky insult to the new U.S. government. Whatever the partisan differences among Americans, they do not diminish distaste for tyranny.

To kill an opposition leader for a political "crime" is not the act of a secure and stable government. It is behavior associated with a frightened and closed society. If South Korea persists in conveying that impression, Americans will reasonably wonder where their interest truly lies — with a floundering military regime or a badly used people.

6. Korea's Silent Anniversary

by Fred Bruning & Andrew Nagorski,
Newsweek, Nov. 10, 1980

SEOUL — The first anniversary of the assassination of Park Chung Hee passed quietly last week—by order of his successor. South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan outlawed public ceremonies honoring Park and, although he visited the slain leader's grave, Chun made no speeches in memory of his old friend. "Chun has great admiration for the late President," an aide explained. "But he is also aware what went wrong under Park and is determined to avoid the same mistakes." The new leader made the point even more emphatically. Said Chun: "An old era has closed."

To avoid those old "mistakes," Chun has pledged to limit his Presidency to a single, seven-year term beginning in 1981. In addition, Chun insists his revised constitution will impose greater limits on the office of the Presidency. Finally, the President vows to continue his aggressive campaign against the corruption that became institutionalized under Park.

Surprise: Chun's critics charge that he has more than that in mind. The President apparently is convinced that Park was too tolerant of political opposition—a surprise, no doubt, to those who suffered under Park's authoritarian rule—and critics fear Chun is determined to make things much tougher for dissidents. He has already dissolved all political parties, orchestrated the arrest, trial and conviction of Kim Dae Jung, the nation's leading opposition figure, and demanded harsh treatment for the activists associated with last May's bloody uprising in Kwangju.

The vindictive quality of the Kim case frightens anti-government forces. Last week, for instance, an appeals court refused to allow Kim or 23 co-defendants the right to call witnesses in their own behalf. When defendants complained, the military judges simply declared the case closed—except for the verdict. The court is almost certain to uphold Kim's death sentence, and analysts say Chun may allow him to be executed. Presidential aides have recently urged local journalists to print more stories excoriating Kim. Said one dissident: "The government is trying to make the case that the people are demanding his execution."

Underground: Indeed, Chun has made the price of dissent very high. His “purification” drive intentionally blurs the distinction between those purged for corruption and those banished for their beliefs. On university campuses, police plain-clothesmen and military security officers stand ready to stop any protests. As a result, the country’s most committed activists have gone into hiding. “The only real opposition is underground now,” said a member of the disbanded New Democratic Party.

Chun has dropped direct elections for President—a provision of Park’s 1963 constitution—because, as Chun sees it, they led to “overheated controversy between the government and opposition camps.” Another convenient device is the Legislative Council for National Security, which will establish procedures for barring trouble-makers from running for office. Park had a similar system, but Chun’s people feel standards were too lax. “He will screen politicians much more stringently,” said a member of the new council.

Despite his disregard for human rights, Chun has effectively neutralized criticism from the Carter Administration. The President has argued persuasively that pressure from Washington could be disruptive at this point and counter to the interests of both nations. In case U.S. officials missed the point, South Korean military officers have been firing off angry letters to the American Embassy in Seoul demanding that there be no meddling in their country’s internal affairs—and particularly in the case of Kim Dae Jung. In private, Korean officials like to point out that foreign criticism may only prompt Chun to act more harshly—if only to avoid giving the appearance of backing down.

The tactics appear to be working. So far, Washington’s objections have been mild indeed—a discouraging sign for dissidents. “We cannot understand U.S. policy,” said one human-rights activist, who says the first rumblings of anti-Americanism are being heard in the ranks of Chun’s critics. Dissidents argue that a continuation of Chun’s hard-line policies—and more silence from Washington—could lead to a backlash of sizable proportions. Eventually, they say, the people of South Korea will resist violently if “progress” under Chun Doo Hwan means a further retreat from democracy.

7. Bankruptcy of U.S. Korea Policy

by Jerome Alan Cohen,
The New York Times, Sept. 18, 1980

Jerome Alan Cohen is currently director of the East Asian Legal Studies Center, Harvard University.

The sentence of death that a military court in Seoul dealt on Sept. 17 to Kim Dae Jung, the opposition leader, demonstrates the bankruptcy of United States policy toward South Korea.

Four years ago, Jimmy Carter warned the dictator Park Chung Hee that continuing repression was undermining American support for his Government. Now, in Mr. Carter's re-election campaign, he will likely portray it as a victory for his statesmanship if American pressure manages to save Mr. Kim, South Korea's most dynamic democratic leader, from death, even if Mr. Kim is left unjustly to rot in prison for life while Koreans suffer under the even more repressive regime that seized power after Mr. Park's assassination.

We could savor the ironies were the situation not so tragic. Gen. Chun Doo Hwan literally shoots his way to power, violating the United Nations Command structure by his illegitimate use of troops. He then jails Mr. Kim to prevent him from taking part in a widely demanded popular Presidential election. When protests break out in Mr. Kim's native province, the savage reaction of General Chun's troops leads to an uprising in the provincial capital of Kwangju that results in a bloodbath that shatters the painstakingly nurtured *modus vivendi* between the army and civilian society. Mr. Kim then is accused of sedition for supposedly having fomented all this. To discredit the popular Mr. Kim, whose real "crime" is that in 1971 he almost unseated Mr. Park in South Korea's last relatively free election and is a persuasive proponent of the human rights that General Chun detests, the general fabricates charges that Mr. Kim is a Communist. This is doubly ironic: Mr. Kim is a Jeffersonian democrat and devout Roman Catholic who has kept his faith in the possibility of representative government despite all manner of intimidation including an auto "accident," kidnapping, house arrest, and repeated imprisonment.

General Chun, now President, has perfected the "big lie" technique. Mr. Park's Government was notorious for censorship that sanitized reality, but

General Chun's goes beyond that, falsely telling the people that at his trial Mr. Kim admitted key charges of an indictment that sought to make up in length what it lacked in strength. Mr. Kim has admitted violations of the martial-law decree and the foreign-currency-control law, but has vigorously denied that he violated the sedition and national-security laws, under which the death penalty has been imposed. Actually, the military judges, under command influence, had to rely on the "confession" extracted from Mr. Kim in long weeks of interrogation, 15 hours per day, in an underground cell where he was often stripped nude. Mr. Kim, like his 23 co-defendants, repudiated his coerced confession. Still, in a trial that travestied justice, they were all convicted—the 23 got prison terms — despite the prosecution's failure to prove what our State Department has called the "farfetched" charges. The Korean authorities' view was summed up by the chief prosecutor who, echoing General Chun's public statements, told the court: "Such an opportunist, agitator politician must be eliminated from this land for good."

Kim Dae Jung's life must be spared, and General Chun may well be prepared to spare it — at least for now — in return for the American support he so desperately needs for legitimacy. But for Washington to barter its support so cheaply would be tragic. The sedition and national-security charges should be dropped and Mr. Kim and the other defendants released, together with all political prisoners. More fundamentally, the country should be permitted to resume the quest for an open political system that it was embarked upon when General Chun shot his way to power.

8. The Threat of a Korean Martyrdom

The Times Editorial, Sept. 18, 1980

The trial of Mr. Kim Dae Jung, the South Korean opposition leader, and the death sentence which has now been passed on him, have appalled all those who had hoped that South Korea might be moving towards a more democratic system. Mr. Kim, who stood in the 1971 presidential election and received 45 per cent of the vote, has been a symbol of the growing pressure for more open ways both under former President Park Chung Hee and since his assassination last October. Yet President Chun Doo Hwan has been apparently determined to eliminate him from the country's political life, along with any other

politicians who might threaten the military's control. Since the riots which broke out in Kwangju in May, several thousand people have been detained many of them political dissidents, and thousands of government employees have been purged. Now Mr. Kim, accused of inciting the riots, has been sentenced on death on charges of subversive activity and communist sympathies.

His trial before a military court convinced few outside observers that he was being given a fair hearing. The case against him was an extremely flimsy one, and he and the others being tried with him had difficulty in obtaining the lawyers they wanted to represent them. Several of them spoke of mistreatment before the trial opened, when they were under pressure to make confessions. During the trial attempts were made by the Korean authorities to censor foreign journalists' reports of the proceedings, including statements by Mr. Kim in his own defence. It seemed clear from the beginning that the trial was being stage-managed, and that the verdict was a foregone conclusion.

The case is embarrassing for the United States, which has troops in South Korea to defend it against attack but finds that it can exercise little influence on the government in Seoul; and also for Japan, particularly since Mr. Kim was originally kidnapped from a hotel in Tokyo. Both of them have made their disapproval clear—Mr. Muskie in unusually strong terms—as have several members of the European Community. South Korea is an unusual case of a country which has had great success in overcoming underdevelopment in the economic field—though it has run into difficulties lately—but has so far been unable to create a more open political system to match it. President Chun has paid lip service to democratic principles, and has said that there will be elections next year under a new constitution. None of this can possibly be credible if he first proceeds to have Mr. Kim put to death on the basis of a wholly unconvincing trial. If Mr. Kim is killed, that will permanently damage South Korea's world position.

9. Memories of a Bloody May

by Don Kirk, Newsweek, Oct. 6, 1980

Last May the Korean city of Kwangju became the scene of the nation's bloodiest outburst since the Korean War, as government troops

clashed with youthful insurgents protesting the imposition of martial law. Today the city is calm—but its citizens seem nervous and tense. People do not speak about the government, for fear they will be arrested. The press is censored. And at a nearby army base the military recently began a “secret” trial of those arrested during the May riots. NEWS-WEEK’S Don Kirk visited Kwangju last week and filed this report:

Policemen in neat, gray uniforms guard the iron gates of the provincial capital building, a sprawling cement structure that gleams with a fresh coat of white paint. On the roof soldiers scrutinize the tangle of midday traffic from their sand-bagged lookout. A secretary sitting in an office briefly held by the rebels last spring told me that “everybody wants to forget the accident.” But forgetting will not be easy. There are too many uniformed men to remind the city’s residents of the limits to their freedom. Although the presence of the troops precludes any likelihood of revolt, a spirit of rebellion still smolders in Kwangju. Protesters poke holes in the eyes of Chun Doo Hwan’s picture on magazine covers. The day after his inauguration as President, they cut up his campaign posters or sprayed them with black ink. And last week a pamphlet urging a second insurrection circulated at the local universities. “Do not stand still,” it said.

One source of resentment is the trial under way at an army base west of the city. Officially, the trial is not even acknowledged. The trial is not open to the public, nor allowed to be mentioned in the press. But rumors abound. A student at Chonnam University says that two or three people have already been sentenced to death. One academic source says two dozen more have received jail terms, while another ten await verdicts on capital charges. Kwangju activists say that many of the prisoners have been beaten and tortured, and that they are not allowed to speak with attorneys. “Lawyers are not permitted to meet their clients until the trials begin,” said the wife of Hung Nam Soon, 68, an attorney jailed for his political affiliation with opposition leader Kim Dae Jung—who was sentenced to death two weeks ago in Seoul.

There is also bitterness toward the United States in Kwangju; many people are angry that President Carter has not pressured the Seoul regime to accept his human-rights policies. “Surely, since the United States has said things about Iran, Afghanistan and Cambodia, it could discuss the Korean situation,” complains a Korean businessman. Press reports that the Carter Administration is supporting Chun have led many Kwangju citizens to believe that the United

States actively collaborated in the rebels' defeat. The American Cultural Center, run by the U.S. Government's International Communications Agency, has received three telephone threats to burn down the building.

Despite Kwangju's seething mood, few people expect a prompt replay of last May's bloody events. Still, if the military tribunal insists on handing out stiff sentences, it could multiply the problems that caused the Kwangju "accident"—and possibly spur more unrest in months to come.

10. Kim Takes Death Appeal to Seoul's Highest Court

by Henry Scott Stokes, The New York Times, Nov. 9, 1980

This report is carried in the Nov. 10 issue of The International Herald Tribune.

Dissident leader Kim Dae Jung has appealed the death sentence handed down by a Seoul military appeals court last week to the Supreme Court, South Korea's highest civilian court. defense lawyers in Seoul said during the week-end.

The Supreme Court, five of whose 16 justices were fired this year under pressure from the South Korean military and replaced by hard-liners, is empowered only to review papers in the Kim case and is believed unlikely to commute his sentence. That would leave his fate in the hands of President Chun Doo Hwan, who has the authority to reduce the sentence or to carry it out.

A series of unrelated events make the outlook highly uncertain for Mr. Kim, who was convicted on sedition charges.

The events include the election victory of Ronald Reagan last week, a decision by the South Korean martial law authorities under President Chun to accelerate court proceedings and student demonstrations against Mr. Chun's leadership in South Korea. These influences could speed his execution, sources said, unless the United States intervenes.

Mr. Reagan's landslide victory in the U.S. presidential elections against President Carter, whose human rights policies he disavowed, was received with jubilation in Seoul and may encourage Mr. Chun, a former army officer who seized the presidency Aug. 27, to hang Mr. Kim, sources said.

Colonels Advise

Mr. Chun is considered by Japanese officials to rely heavily on advice from hawkish army colonels who are on the presidential staff and in other key positions. They were not expected to favor mercy for Mr. Kim after a series of anti-government demonstration in Seoul last month, dissidents here said.

Demonstrators at Korea University and other Seoul institutes of higher education have sharply criticized Mr. Chun for his alleged role in provoking an armed uprising in May at the provincial city of Kwangju, home base of Mr. Kim, that cost hundreds of lives.

Unpublicized court martials in the city last month reportedly handed down death sentences for five students and citizens and more than 160 prison sentences in connection with the uprising.

The student protests in Seoul in September and October are believed to have enraged army advisers to Mr. Chun, and may have played a role in the decision to accelerate court proceedings against Mr. Kim, depicted by the court as the architect of the Kwangju revolt though he was in prison at the time.

Court Action

After a court martial sentenced Mr. Kim to death Sept. 17, the appeals court rapidly reconfirmed his death sentence. Sources here said that the Supreme Court also was likely to act quickly in the case and that the Chun regime planned to have the controlled press maintain hostile coverage of the dissident leader.

Since Mr. Kim's arrest May 17, which helped to spark the Kwangju revolt and bring a declaration of martial law, the media in South Korea have been carefully controlled by the government and coverage by foreign news organizations has been difficult.

Much of the available information comes from dissident and government sources in Japan.

Public opinion in South Korea, especially in conservative rural areas, was roused against Mr. Kim by months of one-sided press coverage that depicted him as a Communist supporter of North Korea.

“By sensationalizing such a ‘popular’ movement, President Chun Doo Hwan could proceed in implementing the death sentence within the year,” said a statement during the weekend by the Japan Emergency Christian Conference on Korean Problems, a Tokyo-based group founded in 1974.

The U.S. and Japanese governments have criticized the death sentence against Mr. Kim, who almost won the presidency in South Korea in 1971. His case is considered significant because of the dozens of other South Koreans, without his international reputation, who have been jailed on similar sedition charges.

The Kim case appears to the Japanese as a test of U.S. power in South Korea, where nearly 40,000 U.S. servicemen are based.

“Not one country that I know of out of some 160-odd nations in the world is in favor of the death sentence for Kim,” said a news editor at the Asahi newspaper, expressing a belief that U.S. influence would prevail. “His execution would mark Chun’s reputation forever abroad if it took place.”

11. A Mistake of Seoul Government

The Washington Star Editorial, Sept. 18, 1980

WASHINGTON — “It would be a mistake for the Seoul Government to carry out the sentence” against Kim Dae Jung, the South Korean political Opposition leader sentenced to death by a military court, the *Washington Star* said in an editorial.

“...Advice to that effect is reported to have been given to the South Korean leadership by the United States and Japan, the newspaper said. “President

Chun Doo Hwan may, in fact, have offered private assurance that Mr. Kim will not be executed.

“The harsh sentence is not justified by any information that has reached here about the prosecution of Mr. Kim, who ran a close second to the late Park Chung Hee in the 1971 presidential election. The prosecution made a weak case on the serious charges of plotting to overthrow the government.”

And the Washington Star added: “The trial, in which 23 codefendants drew prison sentences was seriously flawed.

“Mr. Kim’s main “crime” seems to have been to act as a democratic goad to the military leaders during the crackdown on dissent after the assassination of President Park. The veteran Opposition leader was hoping to run again for president in free elections that were promised for next year. General Chun has since had himself named to the top post and appears determined to stay.

“U.S.-South Korean relations have been strained by the disappointment of democratic aspirations in that country, where American troops remain on guard. The execution of Mr. Kim would be a further insult the alliance can ill afford. President Chun and his associates must suspect, anyway, that disproportionate harshness with a group of political dissident will not make the South Korean people more easily governable.” the Washington Star concluded.

12. A Dual Threat to Korea

by Charles Smith, The Financial Times, Sept. 18, 1980

The Kim Dae Jung case has profound significance for the future of South Korea, not merely because of Mr. Kim’s own reputation as the country’s most determined and articulate opponent of authoritarian rule, but also because of its international ramifications.

Both the United States and Japan have expressed strong concern over the case to the Korean authorities, and Japan has hinted that the execution of Mr. Kim could do serious damage to Japan-South Korea relations.

Within Korea, the death of Mr. Kim could leave a permanent legacy of bitterness in the south western province of Cholla (Kim's birth-place) and among liberals throughout the country.

Mr. Kim made his name in South Korea's highly restricted political world after narrowly failing to defeat incumbent president Park Chung Hee in the presidential elections of 1972 (the last direct presidential elections to have been held in South Korea).

After the elections, he moved to Japan, where he became politically active among the large expatriate Korean community, in ways which apparently upset the Seoul Government.

In August, 1973, under circumstances which have never been properly explained, he was kidnapped from a Tokyo hotel and returned to Seoul, where he was placed under house arrest.

For the next six years (during which the Park regime continued in office) Kim was moved from house arrest to gaol and from there to "hospital confinement," without at any stage being allowed to resume a normal life.

His chance came late in 1979, when the assassination of President Park led to a series of moves towards greater democratic freedom. As part of this process, Kim's political rights were restored earlier this year, and he appeared to be one of the main probable contenders for power in future democratic elections.

Mr. Kim's hopes of gaining power (and South Korea's hopes of full "democratisation") were abruptly ended after the now famous "May Riots" in Seoul, when a series of student demonstrations provided the army with an excuse for arresting democratic leaders and aborting the process of political liberalisation.

Mr. Kim was not the only leader arrested after the May Riots but is the only one of national importance to be placed on trial for his life. Others, including former Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil, were released from goal after agreeing to retire into private life, and after pleading guilty to charges brought against them by the military.

Mr. Kim is believed by most Korean intellectuals to be wholly innocent of

the charges against him, although elsewhere in the country, the intense Government propaganda campaign waged against him during the past few months may have had some effect.

Given the strength and determination of the current army backed Korean Government, it appears unlikely that his death would lead to an immediate upheaval inside the country.

13. Worldwide Dismay at Kim's Fate

The South China Morning Post, Sept. 18, 1980

Dismay and concern has been expressed throughout the world at the death sentence passed today on leading Korean dissident Kim Dae-jung.

Kim was found guilty by a military court of anti-state activity and plotting rebellion.

A five-man military panel of judges took only six minutes to sum up the findings of the 19-day trial and pronounce sentences on 54-year-old Kim and his 23 codefendants, who received prison terms of between two and 20 years.

Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki, said of the sentence "We are worried."

His Government's concern at the trial result would be conveyed to Seoul within the next few days.

Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito said the sentence was severe and unexpected by Japanese.

Japan's biggest labour organisation, the 4.6 million strong General Council of Trades Unions, plans protests and a campaign to collect 10 million signatures calling on Seoul not to execute Mr. Kim.

All Japanese opposition parties — except the anti-communist Democratic Socialist Party — and eight South Korean residents' associations in Japan

denounced the death sentence.

Sixty students protesting at the court ruling scuffled with police outside the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

In Washington, a State Department spokesman said contact with the South Korean Government had been made on the issue but a prepared statement would be released later.

In Bonn, West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher called for a joint appeal by European Common Market countries to stop the South Korean Government executing Mr. Kim.

In Canberra, the Australian Government deplored the passing of the death sentence, saying it would affect relations between the two countries.

Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock told Parliament: "It is our earnest wish that the warmth of our relations with South Korea should continue.

"But it could be eroded if the sentence is carried out."

He said the Australian Government hoped the court's decision today would be changed by a presidential act or judicial review.

Mr. Peacock said the Government had previously expressed concern about the arrest of Mr. Kim and 23 others following civil unrest earlier this year.

"Political considerations appear regrettably to have been applied," he said.

The London-based human rights group Amnesty International said it was appalled by the death sentence.

It said Mr. Kim's trial had failed to meet internationally recognised standards of fairness.

A British Foreign Office spokesman commented: "We note that Kim Dae-jung has been sentenced to death, but we understand that there are still a number of appeal procedures."

Expressions of concern were received from Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, France and West Germany about the trial earlier.

The head of South Korea's Roman Catholic Church, Cardinal Kim Su-whan, expressed shock but said it was too soon for the church to take a stand.

Kim, wearing coarse white prison robes with the number 201 on his breast, grimaced as he heard presiding judge Major General Moon Ung-sil say: "Kim Dae-jung, punishment with death."

But he managed a smile as he was escorted out of court between two military policemen past two US observers at the trial.

The court dissolved in uproar at the harshness of the sentences, with relatives standing to sing the South Korean national anthem before being bundled out by plainclothes security men.

Under martial law regulations in force throughout the country, a higher military court and the civilian Supreme Court have to hear appeals against the capital sentence passed on Kim Dae-jung.

Judge advocate Lieutenant Colonel Yang Shin-ki, summarising the reasons for the sentences, said: "It is intolerable that he (Kim) instigated and misguided innocent students and used them as tools for the realisation of his political ambition, thus plunging the nation and society into chaos."

Col Yang said the military court had taken into consideration diplomatic relations with friendly countries and international practices when considering the charges against Kim Dae-jung.

Kim had denied all sedition charges.

14. The Army versus 'Chaos'

by Philippe Pons, Le Monde, Sept. 9, 1980

This in-depth analytical report is reprinted in the Oct. 17, 1980 issue of The Asahi Evening News.

SEOUL — Once again the South Korean military and industrial elite find themselves standing shoulder to shoulder in a fight against what they call “chaos.” The army is campaigning for order, disguised as a “national mission,” while businessmen are more prosaically concerned with safeguarding their own interests. They would rather see these handled roughly by the generals’ populist rhetoric than challenged by workers’ demands.

The silence of some Koreans, the evasive answers given by others, and the indifference or resignation of those who do agree to talk about their country’s predicament, contrast with noisy demonstrations of support for the “new leader.” In Seoul, Chun Doo Hwan’s swearing-in as President was feted on everything from bunting to cigarette packs. The truth is that for many Koreans there is virtually no alternative solution to restoring “Parkism.”

Impotence and apprehension are part of the numbness that has seized Koreans. The new regime began its rule with the political trial of opposition leader Kim Dae Jung, symbol during the past decade of the democratic struggle, and 23 codefendants. Memories of the repression of the Kwangju riots by paratroops are still fresh: whatever the number of dead (179 according to the authorities, at least twice as many according to other sources), the event made a deep impression because of the army’s brutality when it went in.

The newspapers are more restricted than ever in what they can publish, but nobody remains uninformed about what happened, and there’s little doubt in the minds of many that Chun played a part. The lesson drawn from the event by circles hostile to the regime is that now that Chun has the country in his grasp he will brook no opposition: all protest is likely to be regarded as sedition and put down as such.

Tradition of Dissidence

There is a tradition of intellectual dissidence and opposition in Korea which dates back to the beginning of the century: even the Japanese colonial juggernaut wasn’t able to crush it. The Chun regime is accepted with resignation by many Koreans and out of self-interest by others, but intellectuals find it much harder to swallow. They were in the vanguard of the movement from the Japanese, and took to the streets in 1960 to clamor for the downfall of Syngman Rhee. The military may believe itself invested with a “mission,” but the students also believe they have a duty towards the country. The reopening of the

universities in October will serve as a test for the new government.

The U.S., in regard both to the resignation of President Choi Kyu Hah, which paved the way to the official accession of Chun, and the death sentence of Kim Dae Jung, symbol of the political opposition, has limited itself to proffering sentiments of "concern," sometimes qualified as "deep." During August, when Chun consolidated his hold on the country, such high-ranking American representatives as Ambassador William H. Gleysteen and General Kenneth Gregory Wickham, commander in chief of the U.S. Armed Forces in Korea, were absent from Seoul.

In the past eleven months the United States seems to have lost a credibility in Korea which it is unlikely to regain soon, and which, in more than one respect, was exceptional: contrary to the rest of Asia.

Human Rights

A year ago on a visit to Seoul President Carter declaimed that economic progress must be accompanied by parallel progress in regard to human rights, but the generals showed that all you had to do was stand up to the Americans to make them back down from their principles. As for the opposition, the majority of whom are liberal or conservative, they now know that the U.S. will let them be crushed without raising a finger—or almost.

With 40,000 troops stationed in Korea for the past 30 years, the U.S. has had a responsibility to this country of an entirely different kind than it has had to its neighbor Japan, where it is content with making its capital bear fruit. Rarely has the thwarting of a people's hopes for democracy aroused so little emotion on the part of international public opinion, American in particular.

For the American military, General Wickham in particular, security questions have absolute priority. The Soviet Pacific buildup and the disarmament debate in the U.S. in fact bolster the position of those in Washington who want to close their eyes to the installation of a military regime in the south.

For several months now, it appears that the U.S. command in Korea has not been hostile to a strong regime. In statement attributed to Wickham in August, which Seoul pounced on as "proof" of American support, the general noted

that in January a few young colonels came to warn him of their intention to unseat Chun, but that he dissuaded them. The general affirmed that the U.S. was ready to support Chun's regime on condition that he demonstrate his "popularity," but the State Department declared that his statement did not reflect the official U.S. position. In fact, Wickham's declaration seemed to be regarded by the Americans as primarily "inopportune." Yet it did express a position which, in the absence of any other clearly defined policy, seemed to be that of the U.S.

Hedging by the Americans in recent months has, it seems, lost them support on all fronts. The regime's opponents, taking the measure of their isolation, felt the U.S. was no longer providing even moral support. During the 18 years of the Park regime, his adversaries here had no illusions about American support, but they did have relative confidence in the U.S.

U.S. Prestige

The political know-how Park managed to acquire in his relations with the U.S.—when he had to, he could take one step back in order to take two forward immediately—allowed Washington to preserve relative credibility among dissidents. Park's death could have been an occasion for the U.S. to heighten its prestige. Instead, the event revealed what the ambiguous dealings with the defunct regime concealed: the absence of any American desire to encourage the democratization of Korea.

American's loss of credibility among the Korean opposition is obvious, particularly since the military authorities have shrewdly manipulated America's hesitations to give the impression in a controlled press that Washington has lent full support to their policies, notably the army's intervention in Kwangju and the take-over by General Chun.

The loss of American credibility in Korea may bode ill for future relations between the two countries. Nobody knows how long the Chun regime can last. In not distancing itself from the generals—the August 27 electoral farce changed nothing—the U.S. identified with them.

This is a political mistake which could one day have important consequences on America's presence in a country where for years the opposition relied on an America which they now see to be a Utopia. Apparently, the

Americans are giving the generals their lead with the thought that a few months from now, in order to legitimize their regime internationally, they will have to make concessions. But a bitter taste will remain.

15. Kim S. Koreans' Hope for Democracy & Reunification

Mainichi Shimbun, Nov. 29, 1980

Japan's leading vernacular daily Mainichi Shimbun portrayed Mr. Kim Dae Jung as a symbol of Korean democracy and reunification, the shared aspirations of the Korean people. This portrayal was given in a lengthy analysts of the background of the Kim Dae Jung case.

The Mainichi Shimbun in its November 29 issue quoted Prof. Chong Song Bae of the French National University of Social Sciences as saying, "Mr. Kim Dae Jung is the first politician to have challenged the taboo when the reunification issue was still a taboo in south Korea."

The in-depth analytical report of the daily referred to Mr. Kim's remarks that any effort for political or economic development and be in the interests of Korea's reunification.

The author, Mr. Torichigae, city-news reporter of the Tokyo daily, strongly urged the Japanese Government to press for the freedom of the south Korean Opposition leader. Excerpts:

All the More Distant But Near Country

Since the May "Kwangju incident," south Korea has become all the more "distant but near country." Information is extremely fragmentary and trickling in due to a strict censorship. The voices of the families of the 24 defendants of the Kim Dae Jung trial came anyhow.

"The martial-law command has already taken into custody all those lawyers who could defend Mr. Kim Dae Jung and his friends. The families visited more than fifty attorneys who refused to become their defense counsel as they were aware of what pressure would be brought upon them if they agreed." This is

from an appeal of the defendants' families released to the public by the Emergency Christian Conference on the Korean Problems which was made available through Christian sources after August.

The military appeals court which ended its hearings on November 3 rejected the request for defense witnesses and did not give the defendants the change for their final arguments. The sentences were demanded by the prosecution in the absence of any defendant. The appeal from their families concluded this way: "We offer prayers to the life of Mr. Kim Dae Jung who drew a death penalty in the interests of Korean democracy. We hope for assistance and support from our friends all over the world. November 20."

Can we remain indifferent to this as "an affair of others"? There are those who say, "The Kim Dae Jung trial is an internal affair of south Korea. We should not repeat the old mistake of poking our noses at it." In their view, the rescue movement is an act of interference. This plausibly correct view sounds fishy.

The Kim Dae Jung trial is not only a domestic affair of south Korea but also a matter of concern to Japan as an extension of the Kim Dae Jung kidnapping case.

Korean Hopes for Reunification

What impressed me most when I made friends of many Korean residents in this country was the extent of their aspirations for north-south reunification.

A certain second-generation young Korean remarked to me: "Many of our generation were thrown stones at by Japanese children when we were pupils of primary and lower-secondary schools..... 'You, *chosenjin* (the derogatory term for the Korean)'. This discrimination still persists. The only way to overcome this discrimination is achieving the reunification of our homeland. A reunified and strong homeland will enable us to beat back such discrimination."

Mr. Kim Dae Jung seems to stand for this national aspiration.

I know many Koreans who regard Mr. Kim as symbol of reunification. "Mr. Kim Dae Jung is the first politician to have challenged the taboo when the reunification issue was still a taboo in south Korea." This statement was made by Prof. Chong Song Bae at the French National University of Social Sciences.

He is now 47 years old. He was once abducted by the KCIA from France to Seoul. An elderly Korean resident with no particular relation with Han-mintong said, "The north-south division will be perpetuated that much with the passage of time. Reunification must be attempted. The sooner, the better. Mr. Kim Dae Jung is the sole man capable of bringing about it. So, he shall not die. It will take the Koreans too much time to bear and rear a second Kim Dae Jung."

A certain junior officer of Mindan (the pro-Seoul Union of ROK Residents in Japan) happened to disclose his true thinking, "We cannot say openly. But we think at the bottom of our hearts that Mr. Kim Dae Jung shall not die."

In spring this year, a "temporary spring in Seoul," Mr. Kim Dae Jung made the following remark: "I feel boundless sorrow when I mediate on reunification....Political development (democracy), economic construction.....all effects must contribute to the happiness of our Korean people. I emphatically declare if all these efforts are not linked ultimately to the reunification of the country, they are anti-popular and anti-national. (his lecture at Korea Theological College on April 16)

Needless to say, it is the job of the Korean people themselves to end the division and achieve reunification, not a matter with which we Japanese should interfere. Yet, shall we be permitted to pay no heed to the yearnings of the Korean people? The current trial should not be allowed to dampen the hopes for north-south reunification.

It is necessary for us the Japanese to view the Mr. Kim-rescue movement not only as our own but also as a matter of sympathy with the neighboring people's aspirations.

Now at issue is whether genuine Japanese-Korean intercourse is initiated. The Government must maintain to the last its stern stand of not tolerating Mr. Kim's execution. The more people should chant, "Save Mr. Kim Dae Jung!" Time is running out.

16. Changing Attitudes to North Korea and the U.S.

The American Quaker Report (Excerpts), July, 1980

Chun Doo Hwan

A number of people stressed that it is very important to understand the nature of Chun Doo Hwan and the several generals thought to make up his inner circle. "These are not just power-grabbers. They are fanatically sure that they are super-patriots called upon to eradicate all evil." "They are confident of their ends, and means do not matter — so you have Kwangju where soldiers were drugged and deprived of food to increase their brutality."

We talked with one person whose cousin is a member of the paratroopers who initiated the violence in Kwangju. He explained that the paratroopers recruit people with psychological problems and train them to have absolute loyalty to their leaders. Our friend's cousin once said, "Sometimes I just want to go out on the street and shoot everyone I see. If you think I'm crazy you should see the others." These are considered Chun's "elite troops."

Chun and those close to him — many of whom now hold positions on the Military Standing Committee running the country — are believed to have been recruited personally by Park Chung Hee into a secret organization. They called Park their father and a major part of their responsibility was to detect any anti-Park sentiments in the military. Park is said to have given them access to special funds and told them not to become corrupt from other sources. Chun's current position as head of the Defense Security Command continues to provide him with a network of informers which make any moves against him in the military very difficult.

Chun's current purges of thousands of bureaucrats were seen as killing several birds with one stone: Personal experience with the corruption of the government is commonplace in south Korea, so removing those known to be involved in bribery is in general a popular move with the people. However, there is considerable cynicism about how long any purification will last in a repressive situation in which officials cannot be criticized from below or outside the government. It is also realized that many are being replaced because during the past year they've expressed support for democratization or have spoken against the military. We heard of one case where a government official

lost a relative in Kwangju but won't admit it even to friends because if the government knew, it'd be assumed he was anti-military and he'd be purged. In addition, it is feared that those newly advanced by Chun, in many cases over the heads of more experienced people, will be grateful and thus loyal to the military.

This is not to say that Chun's position is at all secure. In fact, most people believe him to have become more isolated than ever since May 17th. There is a joke going around that Park had 4 official cars so that no one could tell which one he'd riding in and attack it — and that Chun has 10! There are rumors of two assassination attempts against Chun, one the week before we arrived. The economy is suffering horribly, both from basic structural problems and from the paralysts of all decision-making caused by the purges. Someone at the US Embassy remarked, "Half my contacts have disappeared. Who am I supposed to talk to?" And even the civilian based Korean elite sounds fed up with Chun. A prominent lawyer said, "I don't have any friends in the military. They didn't attend my schools. I need to get my network back. I can't make any money as it is."

What Next?

The situation is obviously very frightening. As one person said to us, "My god, what can students do against paratroopers?" At the same time, the past two months have created deep anger at many levels in the country (which incidentally we felt the US Embassy personnel didn't understand at all.) People feel tricked. They say, "From October to May the government acted as if we were free to speak, but all the time was taking notes and pictures. Now they've arrested or purged anyone who came forward." There have been two public suicides by activists who obviously hoped that their statements would trigger a major protest. One contact described the changes in people after Kwangju this way, "Hard-core activists have become so angry they are willing to kill themselves. Those previously on the fringe are now ready to be involved. The former mutterers, for example, cab drivers and shopkeepers, are speaking out now. They are so angry they don't care."

The massive demonstrations in mid-May of 50,000 and 100,000 persons were very orderly and essentially nonviolent, even in the face of serious police provocation. The movement in south Korea has been generally very non-violent up to this point. It still is, but people are talking increasingly about the use of

force — both about prolonged armed struggle and about terrorist attacks (the latter in particular has some meaning to those who expect arrest and certain torture to be only a matter of time and don't want to endure that for nothing.) This seems to us to be a clear case in which despair over Chun's institutionalized violence, particularly buttressed by a deep sense of betrayal by the US, is driving a nonviolent movement increasingly toward violence.

It is certain that the May 17th coup and the Kwangju experience have radicalized many people, creating the possibility of a stronger movement, of whatever kind emerges. Things are being said now by many people which would have been uttered only rarely in the most secretive conditions before. In the past, the Christians in the opposition in particular have been moderate, with their views very much affected by anti-communism and faith in the US government. There are still considerable differences among those in the opposition movement, so the comments we heard do not reflect an official position, but coming from a range of Christians, students, reporters and workers, we believe there are significant shifts on two issues: attitudes toward north Korea and attitudes toward the US.

Attitudes toward North Korea

Some activists now seem to believe that it was a mistake to accept the government's position that the greatest conceivable threat to the society comes from north Korea. People are saying that conditions in the south are so terrible that the north can't be worse. Their comments don't show enthusiasm for the north, but do stress that the "threat of communism" can no longer be used to justify an abusive government in the south and continued lack of progress on the unification issue.

There is an adage going the rounds that "Chun is the lion protecting us against the northern tiger in order to eat us himself." A group of Seoul students, described to us as formerly very hesitant, said after Kwangju, "The student resistance has just begun. It will have two major focuses: anti-Americanism and unification of the country at any cost. It doesn't matter whose terms. There's no difference anymore." In Kwangju, people said about Chun's troops, "This is just like the Korean War." Christians have asked rather openly, "Who is the enemy, the north or the government?" A group of workers told an American, "If the north invades, they won't hurt us. They'd be after the people at the top."

Attitudes toward the US

In the past the human rights movement in south Korea has been unclear on the question of what kind of action it wanted from the US government. Those who wanted strong sanctions by the US against Park Chung Hee — for example, withdrawal of the support of military aid and troops — were in the minority and were not among the internationally best known Christian leaders. Most appeals boiled down to requesting symbolic actions, quiet diplomacy or lectures from the US. Many people seemed to believe that despite the long years of US support for Park Chung Hee, that in the end the US would help Koreans establish democracy. An American reported that in Kwangju he was repeatedly begged to “Please get the American troops to come to Kwangju and save us.” It was ironic that the official appeal of the Kwangju Citizens Committee for US mediation was censored off the air of Armed Forces Radio in Korea, on orders of a US General.

American support of Chun during the Kwangju incident and during the past two months seems to have created major changes in activists’ attitudes toward the US. In Kwangju an American told us he saw cans of tear gas with “Made in the USA” on them, and that Koreans he knew assumed that all the weapons used against them came from America. Over and over we heard of Koreans’ horror that US General Wickham released Korean troops under his command to reimpose Chun’s power in Kwangju. It was pointed out to us that in 1960, when people rebelled against Syngman Rhee, the US refused to release soldiers to put down the civil disturbances. The US is perceived as much more concerned about maintaining its friendship with Chun and the other generals than with the Korean people. Americans told us of being asked by a number of Korean Christians, “Why don’t you get your troops out?” Troop withdrawal is apparently considered the most effective US sanction by a good many people. In the past one of the reasons given against US troop withdrawals was that the US military would at least protect the south Korean population and the democratic movement from the south Korean military. Now after Kwangju, human rights-activists no longer have faith in this argument.

Others, while still believing the troops are necessary to protect the south from the north, nevertheless urged that the US should take very strong economic sanctions. There seemed almost unanimous agreement among activists that the US should cut off economic aid and financial loans.

We were told of much anger about the visit to Seoul by the US Export-Import Bank President promising funds to Chun just two weeks after his military crackdown on May 17th. Nor had the visit of 160 US businessmen in early June gone unnoticed. "It's your economic interests, not ours, they're concerned about," an American was told by Koreans. Referring to US loans granted for telephone switching equipment and nuclear power plants one comment was, "Maybe that'll help us someday and maybe it won't hurt workers and farmers."

We were in Seoul at the time Stephen Solarz visited before going on to Pyongyang. Several people commented that they thought the US should talk directly with the north — "maybe that would put some pressure on." Even a Korean policeman was reported to have remarked about Solarz's trip, "That's probably a good idea."

The US's Position

We met with two persons at the American Embassy, to express our concern about US policy and also to learn how they saw the situation. The interviews were appalling.

We talked with Spence Richardson, First Secretary in the Political Section, about the range of policy options the US has. He said, "Yes, we have a lot of things we could do. We could withdraw the troops. We could effect the economy. We have a lot of power here. The question is, do we want to use it. The answer is no."

He said the US's "security interest is paramount. We'll never withdraw the troops." Richardson also explained, "We have tremendous business interests here. To say the least, they wouldn't be happy losing money here if the economy failed." He said, "US business here wants to make money. They're capitalists. Americans see stability as the key."

We also talked with Jack Klemstein, First Secretary in the Economic Section, who admitted the US was not using the economic sanctions that it could. "The US either abstained or voted no on an Inchon Port Loan by the Asian Development Bank (he didn't know which!). That's all the US has done." He said the Export-Import Bank loans won't be stopped "because the US needs the exports." He said, "We won't do anything unless something really blatant

happens.” Thinking about Kwangju, we asked a bit incredulously what it would take to be blatant. He did say that “The hanging of Kim Dae Jung would be blatant. Then we’ll have to do something. US and Korean public opinion would demand it.”

It is of course instructive to compare the US response in Korea to that in Bolivia where the Carter administration reacted forcefully to the July military coup by ending all military assistance and economic aid, and by withdrawing most of its military and diplomatic personnel.

Someone who knows a lot of the Embassy staff in south Korea observed to us that they are largely Cold Warriors, many of them posted outside the US since the 1950’s. “They missed the changes in the States in the 1960’s and 70’s. This is especially critical in Korea where the situation of a divided peninsula tends to evoke simplistic analyses.” Many people criticized American Embassy personnel to us as hopelessly naive as well, thinking that General Chun would respond to diplomatic subtleties, assuming a cancelled dinner would convey a major rebuke. The situation in the Embassy may not be helped by this summer’s major transfer of personnel. No one was mourning the loss of John Lamazza (whom dissidents believed spied on them for the CIA) but the turnover of several other top posts is expected to create a situation where newcomers will accept Chun’s government as the established order and, having missed the events of recent months, will not realize how thin his support is.

We found little reason to hope that any initiative for changed US policy is going to come from the Embassy in Seoul. The Quaker leader Ham Sok Hon probably put it to us best, “We need the American people to be stronger, Chun will only listen to military power. The situation is going to depend on US policy about its army.” Certainly all the actions which can be initiated by Koreans have dreadful, bloody risks involved. An altered American policy — demanded by activists in the US, ending military and economic support of Chun — seems to us to offer the only non-violent possibility for change.

17. Canadian Parliament, European Leaders, U.S. Solons Demand Kim’s Freedom

The Canadian House of Commons Nov. 21 unanimously appealed to the south Korean “Government” to show clemency to the condemned opposition

leader and release him, AFP reported.

The Canadian parliamentarians who offered to motion said that the appeal possibilities for Mr. Kim were now very limited and he could be executed soon.

The 15th Congress of the Socialist International which was held in Madrid attended by 34 socialist parties from 31 countries Nov. 16 closed by adopting a resolution demanding the retraction of the death sentence imposed on Mr. Kim.

The resolution said: "We express deep concern again over the recent developments in south Korea and pledge to support democratic forces there struggling for free, democratic society. We demand strongly the south Korean authorities retract the death verdict passed on Mr. Kim Dae Jung."

European leaders will shortly appeal to the south Korean "government" not to carry out the death sentence against dissident leader Kim Dae Jung, Japan Socialist Party Asukata Ichio said on Nov. 22 quoting the Socialist International Chairman Willy Brandt, as saying, "within two weeks after the end of the congress, European leaders will make joint representations to the south Korean 'government' not to execute Mr. Kim Dae Jung."

A U.S. congressional panel approved a resolution Nov. 20 urging the south Korean military regime to commute the death sentence of Mr. Kim Dae Jung.

The resolution, adopted by the House Subcommittee on International Organizations, urged the Seoul "government" to fulfil stated commitments to the democratization of the country's political life and examine the justice system under which "Kim Dae Jung and other critics of the 'government' have been tried and convicted."

Genscher, Foreign Minister of West Germany, said at a meeting of foreign ministers of the European Community held in Luxemburg that heads of state of European countries should save the life of south Korean democratic Kim Dae Jung.

At the meeting he appealed to the foreign ministers of the European Community to take a joint initiative for it and stressed the need to take a measure

against the south Korean “government.”

A European meeting to rescue Kim Dae Jung was held in Paris on the evening of Nov. 7.

The meeting sponsored by the European branch of the Liaison Council of Oversea South Koreans to Rescue Kim Dae Jung elected Daniel Mayer, former Minister of Labour of the French Government who is president of the International League for the Rights of Man, its chairman.

Recalling that the signature campaign launched in Japan for rescuing Kim Dae Jung collected 1,000,000 signatures in a month. Daniel Mayer exposed the political and economic compact between the French Government and the south Korean military group and stressed the need to wage a movement against it.

Robert Charvin, Secretary of the International Committee of Jurists for Democracy and Human Rights in South Korea, in the Nov. 7 statement, said:

“As the course of the trials shows, the sentences on Kim Dae Jung and other defendants stripped bare the intention of the Chon Du Hwan group to remove all the opposition forces by every conceivable means and obliterate all democratic factors in south Korea.”

He called upon the lawyers to send protests speedily to the south Korean “embassies” in their countries.

Members of the U.S. Quaker Committee staged a demonstration on Nov. 7 in front of the south Korean “consulate” in Honolulu.

The demonstrators carried the placards reading “South Korean Authorities, Release All the Political Prisoners!” “Set Free Kim Dae Jung!” and “U.S. Troops, Get Out of South Korea!”

They handed a letter of protest at the south Korean “consulate.”

The mission of the African National Congress of South Africa in Egypt issued a statement on Nov. 7 in connection with the south Korean situation.

Noting that the Chon Du Hwan military junta, in defiance of strong protest and denunciation of the progressive people of the world, passed capital punishment and heavy penalties upon Kim Dae Jung and other democrats, is slaughtering people who call for social democracy and stepping up the new war provocation manoeuvres to strengthen the fascist ruling system, the statement strongly demanded the unconditional and immediate release of Kim Dae Jung and other democratic figures and students who were illegally arrested.

Georges Marchais, General Secretary of the French Communist Party, on Nov. 3 issued an appeal titled “Not A Minute Should Be Delayed”, calling for rescuing south Korean democrat Kim Dae Jung.

The appeal said:

“The south Korean puppet fascist clique is going to commit another murderous act in defiance of world public opinion.

“The French public should lift up its voice and more strongly demand the French Government check this crime.”

The Japan national meeting against Seoul’s military appellate court’s decision to uphold the death sentence of Kim Dae Jung was held at an open-air music theater of Hibiya in Tokyo. The meeting was sponsored by the Tokyo Liaison Office to Save Mr. Kim Dae Jung.

The 6,000 Japanese workers and citizens called for an end to economic aid to south Korea, retraction of the so-called “political settlements” of the Kim Dae Jung case.

They also urged the Japanese government to take a resolute action and demand that the junta spare Kim’s life.

18. UN Secretary General Mulling Kim Action

UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim said on November 7 that he was studying a Japanese petition signed by more than one million people and people and demanding the release of south Korean Opposition leader

Kim Dae Jung condemned to death on sedition charges, AFP reported from the United Nations headquarters in New York that day, an English-language daily here The Mainichi Daily News said.

The petition was organized in part by the Committee for the Freedom of Kim Dae Jung, a Tokyo-based group of citizens protesting human rights violations in south Korea.

Calling Kim a staunch friend of democracy, human rights, peace and justice, the petition claimed that he was sentenced to death on charge which “were baseless fabrications concocted” by the Chon junta.

A European solidarity rally for the freedom of Kim Dae Jung was held at the Maison de la Mutualite in Paris on the night of November 7, The Mainichi Shimbun, one of the leading Tokyo dailies, reported on November 8.

The rally was sponsored by the European chapter of the Liaison Council of Overseas Koreans. Speakers included Mr. Daniel Maiel, former French Minister of Labor and currently President of the International Human Rights Union, Mr. Jeans-Pierre Subenemann, National Secretary of the French Socialist Party and Prof. Channing Liem (the University of Pittsburg), President of Hanminryon (the Union of Koreans Overseas for Democracy and Unification).

They strongly appealed to the 200 people gathered to join the campaign for the freedom of Kim Dae Jung, a symbol of liberty. Mr. Maiel urged his Government to cancel the contract to sell two nuclear reactors to south Korea and called the contract signed with the Chon junta “a political hypocrisy.”

Former Le Monde Tokyo correspondent Robert Guillain contributed an article to the rally, under the title, “Man of Freedom.” He said, “Mr. Kim Dae Jung is far from a Communist or Socialist. He is a democrat and a man of freedom, enthusiastic for making Korea a country of democracy and liberty.” His article received ovations from the audience.

The European rally received messages of solidarity from Japanese figures: Socialist Party Chairman Asukata, Sohyo (the General Council of Trade Unions) Chairman Makieda, Dietmen Utsunomiya and Den.