Psychological Correlates of Support for Compromise: A Polling Study of Jewish-Israeli Attitudes toward Solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

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A representative national sampling of Israeli Jewish adults (n = 550) reported attitudes toward solutions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that were salient in Israeli public discourse in 2002. Negative attitudes toward compromise were associated with zero-sum threat perceptions of the conflict with Palestinians, such that improvement for the Palestinian side can only come at the expense of the Israeli side. Positive attitudes toward compromise were associated with feelings of sympathy toward Palestinians, but, surprisingly, attitudes toward compromise were not associated with feelings of fear toward Palestinians. The possibility is advanced that it is fear of harm to the group, not fear of harm to self and family, that is related to willingness to compromise. Zero-sum perceptions of collective threat were not strongly related to affective reactions, and, contrary to a realist analysis of intergroup conflict, sympathy for Palestinians predicted support for compromise beyond what zero-sum perceptions of threat could predict.

KEY WORDS: Israeli-Palestinian conflict, polling, Jewish-Israeli attitudes, compromise, survey, ethnonational conflicts, public opinion, emotion, affect, zero-sum perception, threat perception

Ethnonational conflicts and civil wars are a prominent feature of the post-Cold-War world. Many believe that such conflicts are potentially the most destabilizing force in the present era (Ross & Rothman, 1999). Ethnonational conflicts are associated with major human rights abuses and loss of life, as well as massive refugee flows and other disruptions. Severe cases of ethnopolitical violence are found all over the world, including Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tibet, Indonesia, and

Israel/Palestine, and it is the conflict between Jews and Palestinians that is the focus of this paper. Our goal is to understand how some Israeli Jews are willing to move toward peace by compromise with Palestinians while others reject such compromise. Specifically, we compare the power of intergroup threat perception and affective reactions of sympathy and fear as predictors of attitude toward compromise.

Public Opinion in Peace Making

In recent decades, there has been growing attention to various ways and devices to resolve destructive ethic conflicts and civil wars. Clearly, an important component in resolving conflict is the formulation of a compromise solution that both sides can agree on, but compromise often seems out of reach in protracted ethnic conflicts. The difficulties are not only related to the lack of agreement between the official representatives of each side in the negotiation, but are also related to lack of public support on each side for solutions that involve making compromises to the other side.

Scholars of foreign policy decision making recognize public opinion as a significant factor influencing policy choices. Attitudes and beliefs of citizens are described as forming part of the societal environment that influences government decisions in democratic states (Naveh, 1998; Yuchtman-Yaar, Herman, & Nadler, 1996). A notable example of this kind of influence exists in Israel, where there is marked opposition of large sectors of Jewish-Israelis to making concessions to the Palestinians. This opposition is a crucial factor determining policy makers' ability to negotiate and implement concessions to Palestinians (Yuchtman-Yaar et al., 1996).

Given the significance of public opinion in resolving conflict, it is important to understand the origins of attitudes toward compromise. The goal of this study is to explore these attitudes in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; in particular our study examines beliefs and emotions of Jewish Israelis as predictors of support for compromises with Palestinians.

Perceived Threat and Unwillingness to Compromise:
The Realist Perspective

The dominant framing of international relations in recent decades has emphasized perceptions of power and threat (Jervis, 1976; Schelling, 1966; Waltz, 1979). States exist in a competitive and anarchic environment in which survival depends on military power to resist the power of competitors. Assessing the intentions of other states is difficult and fallible; assessing the power of other states is more objective and reliable. Thus threat assessments tend to be power assessments, and the growing power of another state is most safely interpreted as a growing threat to one's own state. This perspective is embodied in the concept of "security

dilemma," a situation in which a state must increase its power in order to counter the power of another state, with the result that the other state perceives that it must increase its own power, and so on into escalations that can easily develop into violence and war.

The realist perspective has been applied not only to states but to ethnic groups. In an influential example of this application, Posen (1993) argues that ethnic groups in the context of state failure are in a situation of anarchy with security dilemmas formally analogous to the dilemmas of interstate relations. Posen finds support for his perspective in a comparison of Russian and Ukranian relations after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (less mutual threat) with relations of Serbs and Croats in the breakup of Jugoslavia (more mutual threat). In this paper, we assume that relations between Israeli Jews and Palestinians can also be seen as a situation of anarchic competition in which perceived outgroup threat to the ingroup may be the key to understanding attitudes toward compromise.

For our purposes, what is interesting in the realist analysis and its application to ethnic conflict is that this analysis does not require recourse to the kinds of emotional reactions typically cited by psychologists trying to understand intergroup conflict. The realist tradition need not deny the existence of emotions such as pride, fear, and humiliation; these may well exist but in the realist view they are not part of the causal chain that leads to intergroup conflict. Rather conflict and violence arise out of perceptions of intergroup relations in general and perceptions of collective threat in particular. Perceived threat may produce fear, but it is the threat not the fear that determines intergroup behavior.

Negotiation research has identified a form of threat perception that appears to be particularly powerful in blocking mutually agreed upon solutions between individuals with conflicting interests. This is the zero-sum game perception—the perception that each side can profit only to the extent that the other side loses, that there is no possibility of an agreement that would leave both sides better off (Bazerman & Neale, 1992, pp. 16–22; Thompson, 1995). Thus the present study included a number of items asking about aspects of the zero-sum threat perception, including questions about abstract perception of "either we win or they win" and questions about the motivations of Palestinians to destroy the state of Israel (see Table 2).

Thus the prediction from the realist perspective is that zero-sum threat perceptions, including perceptions of Palestinian feelings and intentions toward Jews, should strongly predict attitudes toward compromise. Higher threat should be associated with less support for compromise. More controversially, the realist perspective predicts that measures of emotion, whether of fear of or sympathy toward Palestinians, should not predict attitudes toward compromise—except perhaps to the extent that emotions are correlated with threat perception. Thus the realist prediction is that measures of emotion should not predict attitude toward compromise beyond what threat perception can predict.

Affective Predictors of Support for Compromise:
The Social-Psychological Approach

In contrast to the realist tradition, social-psychological theorizing has emphasized subjective over objective factors for understanding intergroup conflict and violence. No matter their power, other groups are perceived as threats only to the extent of their being perceived as harboring malevolent intentions. Given a perceived threat, it is not the cold cognition of threat that is important but the affective reaction to the threat. Group-related emotions such as pride, fear, and humiliation are seen, in the psychological perspective, as proximate causes of behavior. It is interesting to note that an influential modern theorizing of emotion points to situational appraisal as the initiation of emotion (Lazarus, 1991). Fear, for instance, is the emotional reaction to appraisal of a situation as likely to bring hurt and harm. Thus the psychological and the realist traditions agree in seeing threat appraisal as important; the difference is that the psychological approach takes the affective consequences of appraisal as having independent power to determine behavior. Appraisal and affect are not identical because different individuals can draw different appraisals from the same objective situation, and because individuals with the same appraisal can differ in emotional reaction.

Considerable research points to the importance of emotions in understanding intergroup conflict (Bar-On, 1997, 1999; Bar-Tal, 2001; Staub, 1993, 1996, 2000). This literature describes how negative affective reactions such as fear and hate can escalate conflict and hinder its resolution (Bar-On, 1997; Bar-Tal, 2001; Staub, 1990, 2000) and, on the other hand, how positive emotions such as hope (Bar-Tal, 2001; Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2002) and empathy (Kelman, 1998, 1999; Steinberg & Bar-On, 2002; Staub, 1993, 1996, 2000; Struch & Schwartz, 1989) can help resolve conflict and support reconciliation. However, research in this tradition only seldom examines the relation between emotions and support for political solutions in an ongoing conflict.

Notable exceptions to this generalization are studies by Bar-Tal and his colleagues (Bar-Tal, 2001; Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2002) that do examine the relation between emotions such as fear and hope and self-identification as hawk versus dove in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Results indicate that individuals with less fear and those with more hope are more likely to self-identify as doves on a hawk-dove opinion dimension (more about this dimension below).

Thus we examine in this study the extent to which affective reactions to Palestinians can predict support for compromise. Our study included questions about both positive and negative emotions felt by Israeli Jews toward Palestinians (understanding, liking, fear, anger, and hate—see Table 2). We predicted that positive affective reactions toward Palestinians should be associated with more willingness to compromise and that negative affective reactions toward Palestinians should be associated with less willingness to compromise. More controversially, the psychological approach predicts that emotional reactions should have

independent prediction power, that is, should predict level of support for compromise beyond what cold threat perception can predict.

Overview of the Study

Our study began with the assumption that it would be useful to learn what kinds of perceptions are associated with support for compromise. Thus the criterion measures for our study included measures of attitude toward a number of specific compromise alternatives as well as towards more general aspects of solutions (such as establishment of a Palestinian State and compromising settlements) that repeatedly appear in Israeli discourse as central to the resolution of the conflict (see below for full text of the items). As predictors of support for compromise, we included, as already indicated, measures of both threat perception and affective reactions toward Palestinians.

In addition, we included an item that asks respondents to place themselves on a dimension from *hawk* to *dove*. This item appears in many surveys of political opinions in Israel (Bar-Tal, Raviv, & Freund, 1994; Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2003; Shamir & Shamir, 2000; Yuchtman-Yaar et al., 1996). The statistical power of this kind of item is clear, insofar as responses are strongly related to attitude toward any form of compromise solution (Maoz, 1999; Maoz, Ward, Katz, & Ross, 2002; Shamir & Shamir, 2000). Its conceptual power is, however, not so clear. Why do some individuals oppose compromise while others favor it? The hawk-dove item is more a summary of attitude toward compromise than an explication of this attitude. Moreover, past studies have found that hawk-dove identification could explain a significant part but not all of the variation in support for solutions (Maoz, 1999; Maoz et al., 2002). The hawk-dove item was included in our study in order to provide a benchmark to which the success of our other predictors could be compared. In addition we hoped that correlation of our predictors with the hawk-dove item might give some hints as to the psychological meaning of an item that is a standard of Israeli polling research.

In sum, the goal of this study was to explore the extent to which beliefs and emotions—zero-sum perceptions of collective threat and positive and negative affective reactions toward Palestinians—can help understanding of differences among Israeli Jews in support for compromise with Palestinians.

Method

Survey Methods and Overview

Data came from a survey of the Jewish population in Israel that was fielded during July 2002. In the context of the second intifada that began in September 2000, this was a relatively calm period in the relations between Israelis and Palestinians. In July there was a temporary halt in Palestinian terror attacks as well as

a decrease in Israeli military actions against Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. The survey was conducted by the Dahaf Research Institute (a major professional polling agency in Israel) using telephone interviews of a representative sample (n = 559) of the Jewish-Israeli adult population. Respondents were randomly sampled out of a CD containing all the listed phone numbers of Israeli households that is used by Israeli polling agencies for this purpose. Response rate in surveys of the Jewish-Israeli population, such as this survey, is estimated as between 20 and 30%. The survey was conducted in Hebrew, but items are reproduced here in English translation. The survey was introduced with the clarification that all questions about "Palestinians" should be understood as referring to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.

The survey included the following measures: Respondents were first asked questions regarding perceptions of threat from Palestinians and of the extent to which Israeli-Palestinian relations are a zero-sum conflict, followed by questions about affective responses to Palestinians. These were followed by questions about their attitudes toward different solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (detailed below) and last, questions about demographic and socioeconomic background.

Attitudes toward Compromise

Attitudes toward compromise solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were assessed by presentation of four solutions current in political dialogue at the time of the survey. Each solution was described by a brief text, and respondents were asked to rate agreement with each solution on a 6-point bipolar scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 4 = slightly agree, 5 = agree, and 6 = strongly agree).

1. *1967 lines—Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty.* In the framework of a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, Israel will withdraw from the territories to the 1967 lines, with territorial adjustments taking into account Israeli security needs. Jerusalem will stay under Israeli sovereignty, a Palestinian state will be established, and the Palestinians will commit themselves to prevent terror acts against Israelis.
2. *1967 lines—Two capitals in Jerusalem.* In the framework of a peace agreement, Israel will withdraw from the territories to the 1967 lines, with territorial adjustments taking into account Israeli security needs. A Palestinian state will be established and in Jerusalem there will be two capitals—an Israeli capital in the Western part and a Palestinian capital in the Eastern part. The Palestinians will commit themselves to prevent terror acts against Israelis.
3. *Compromise on Temple Mount.* In the framework of a full peace agreement with the Palestinians, Palestinians will be given sovereignty on parts of Temple Mount and of the old city in Jerusalem (excluding the Jewish quarter and the Western wall).

4. *Unilateral withdrawal*. Unilateral withdrawal of Israel from the territories to secure lines. Three major clusters of settlements will stay under Israeli control: the Ezion bloc, the area of Jerusalem, and the area of Ariel. The Jordan Valley will also stay under Israeli control. A security fence will be constructed, that will prevent unmonitored passing from the territories to Israel. Isolated settlements will be evacuated or transferred to clusters of settlements.

In addition to the four solution-texts, respondents rated two general aspects of solutions that repeatedly appear in Israeli discourse (as well as in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations) as central to the resolution of the conflict using the same 6-point scale.

5. *Palestinian state.* Israel cannot be secure until a Palestinian state is established that will be strong enough to control Palestinian terror.

6. *Cannot compromise settlements.* One cannot compromise even one settlement for a peace agreement with Palestinians.

Perceptions of the Conflict and of Threat from Palestinians

Perceptions of the conflict as zero-sum and perceptions of threat from Palestinians were assessed with seven statements about whether there is no solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, whether most of the Palestinians would destroy Israel if they could, and so forth (see Table 2 for full text of statements). Respondents were asked to rate their agreement with each statement on a 6-point bipolar scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 4 = slightly agree, 5 = agree, and 6 = strongly agree).

Affective Reactions to Palestinians

Feelings about Palestinians were assessed with five statements about feeling hate, understanding, and so forth (see Table 2). Respondents were asked to rate each statement on a 5-point unipolar scale (1 = do not agree at all, 2 = agree to a small extent, 3 = agree to a certain extent, 4 = agree to a quite high extent, and 5 = strongly agree).

Hawk-Dove Identification

Respondents placed themselves on a hawk-dove dimension using a 7-point scale as follows. In the scale presented to you, 1 represents full identification with rightwing (hawkish) attitudes, 7 represents full identification with left-wing (dovish) attitudes, and 4 represents in the middle/center attitudes toward Arab-Israeli relations. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

Demographic Questions

Demographic questions included gender and age of the respondent, number of years of education, and economic status.

Results

Compromise Scale

Means and standard deviations of the solution items ratings appear in Table 1 (with the *cannot compromise settlements* item reversed). It is clear that the most acceptable solutions were *Unilateral withdrawal, 1967 lines—Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty,* and *Palestinian state* (means around 3.5–3.6). The least acceptable solutions were *1967 lines—Two capitals in Jerusalem*, and *Compromise on Temple Mount* (mean 2.4 for both). In between these two poles we find the reversed *Cannot compromise settlements* item (mean = 3.1).

The six solutions items had intercorrelations ranging from .18 to .64 with median correlation of .38. An exploratory analysis of these six items with principle component analysis (PCA) found that the first component accounted for 49% of the variance of the items. The loadings of the items on the first component ranged from .32 to .65 (see Table 1). Because these six items were highly related, responses to these items were averaged for each respondent to form the "Compromise Scale" (Cronbach's alpha .79), where higher scores mean more favorable attitudes toward compromise.

Zero-Sum Perception and Affective Reactions Scales

The next step in analysis was to identify and define the independent variables, namely the measures of zero-sum threat perception and measures of affective reactions toward Palestinians. Exploratory PCA with Oblimin rotation (rotation

Table 1. Means (SD) and Component Loadings of Solution Items

Item	Mean (SD)	Component loading
1967 lines—Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty	3.5 (1.9)	.65
1967 lines—Two capitals in Jerusalem	2.4 (1.7)	.64
Compromise on Temple Mount	2.4 (1.7)	.57
Unilateral withdrawal	3.6 (1.8)	.34
Palestinian state	3.6 (1.8)	.32
Cannot compromise settlements (reversed)	3.1 (1.7)	.41
Composite Compromise Scale	3.2 (1.2)	

Note. Bipolar scale where 1 = *strongly disagree,* 6 = *strongly agree.*

Table 2. Mean (SD) and Component Loadings of Perceptions of Palestinians and of the Conflict and of Feelings toward Palestinians

Item	Mean (SD)	Component		
		1	2	3
In the near future there will be peace between Israel and the Palestinians	2.5[a] (1.4)	**−.68**	−.11	.02
One can trust Palestinians	1.9[a] (1.1)	−.53	−.04	.33
Most Palestinians hate Jews	4.5[a] (1.5)	.53	.03	−.27
There is no solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict	3.5[a] (1.6)	**.74**	.15	−.20
I am afraid that me or my family will be injured in a terror attack	4.7[a] (1.5)	.11	**.73**	.15
Most of the Palestinians would destroy Israel if they could	5.0[a] (1.3)	.59	.02	−.24
In the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians there is no place for compromise. Either we win or they do	3.8[a] (1.6)	**.76**	.00	.01
I feel anger toward Palestinians	4.0[b] (1.2)	−.08	.50	−.55
I feel understanding to Palestinians	2.1[b] (1.2)	−.08	.08	**.72**
I feel fear toward Palestinians	2.9[b] (1.6)	−.08	**.85**	.02
I feel liking toward Palestinians	1.3[b] (.7)	−.06	.15	**.70**
I feel hate toward Palestinians	2.5[b] (1.6)	.23	.33	−.40

Note. Loadings in boldface used in two-item scales. [a]bipolar scale where 1 = *strongly disagree*, 6 = *strongly agree*. [b]unipolar scale where 1 = *do not agree at all*, 5 = *strongly agree*.

converged in 9 iterations) was applied to the twelve items that appear in Table 2. A structure of three components was found that together accounted for 53% of the variance. The first component accounted for 31% of the variance (Eigenvalue = 3.7), the second component accounted for 13% of the variance (Eigenvalue = 1.6), and the third for 9% (Eigenvalue = 1.0). Components one and two correlated .12, components one and three correlated −.37, and components two and three correlated −.07. For the first component the three highest loading items (.76 and .74, and −.68) were "zero-sum" (*In the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians there is no place for compromise, either we win or they win*), "No solution" (*There is no solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict*), and "Near future peace" (*In the near future there will be peace between Israel and the Palestinians*). For the second component the two highest loading items (.85 and .73) were "fear" (*I feel fear toward Palestinians*) and "afraid of terror" (*I am afraid that me or my family will be injured in a terror attack*). For the third component the two highest loading items (.72 and .70) were "understanding" (*I feel understanding toward Palestinians*) and "liking" (*I feel liking toward Palestinians*). See Table 2 for all item loadings.

Zero-Sum and Affective Reactions Scales as Predictors
of Support for Compromise

As predictors of the Compromise Scale, the three components showed results very similar to results obtained with the highest-loading items on each component. For reasons of transparency and ease of replication in future research, we represented each of the three components with a scale based on the mean of its two highest-loading items. For the first component we used the second and third highest loading items "No solution" and "Near future peace" (reversed). "Zero-sum," the item loading highest on the first component, was not used as a predictor of attitude toward compromise because this item includes an explicit statement that there is no place for compromise.

Cronbach's alpha for the Zero-sum Scale was .47 (mean = 4.0, SD = 1.2); for the Fear Scale alpha was .60 (mean = 3.8, SD = 1.3); and for the Sympathy Scale alpha was .54 (mean = 1.7, SD = .82). Intercorrelations among the three scales were: Zero-sum with Fear, $r = .09$, Zero-sum with Sympathy, $r = -.31$, and Sympathy with Fear, $r = -.02$. (These scale intercorrelations are similar to the corresponding component intercorrelations of .12, $-.39$, and $-.07$.) The three scales—Zero-sum, Fear, and Sympathy—correlated, respectively, $-.38$, $-.05$, and .38 with the Compromise Scale.

The Zero-sum Scale, Fear Scale, and Sympathy Scale were entered as a block into a regression to predict the Compromise Scale. The resulting R was .47 (Rsquare .22) ($F (3, 555) = 53$, $p < .001$). Examination of the Betas of the three predictors indicated that the Zero-sum Scale and the Sympathy Scale were significant predictors (respectively, beta = $-.30$; $t = -7.6$, $p < .001$; and Beta = .28; $t = 7.2$, $p < .001$), but the Fear Scale was not a significant predictor (beta = $-.05$; ns).

Hawk-Dove Item

The hawk-dove item (mean = 3.1, SD = 1.6) was the strongest predictor of the Compromise Scale, with correlation of .62. Traditionally, in studies and surveys in the Israeli context, identification with hawks or doves is considered as centrally conveying attitudes toward compromise in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with hawks objecting to such compromise, and the doves supporting it. Therefore, it is not surprising that this item alone predicted about as well as the two best psychological scales combined ($R = .47$ for combination of the Zero-sum Scale and the Sympathy Scale versus $r = .62$ for hawk-dove).

In order to explore further the relations among predictors of the Compromise Scale, we performed a stepwise regression in which the Zero-sum Scale and the Sympathy Scale entered together after the hawk-dove item. The addition of these two scales to the prediction model increased the prediction of the Compromise Scale from R^2. 38 for hawk-dove alone to $R^2 = .44$ (R^2 increase = .06, $F(2, 538)$

= 33 , $p < .001$). Both Zero-sum and Sympathy contributed to this increase: beta $-.20$, $t = -5.7$, p < .001; beta = .19, $t = 5.3$, $ps < .001$.

We also performed a two-stage stepwise regression in which the hawk-dove item was entered after the Zero-sum and the Sympathy Scales. The addition of the hawk-dove item increased the prediction of the Compromise Scale from R^2 .22 for Zero-sum and Sympathy Scales to .44 (R^2 increase = .22, F (1, 538) = 209, $p < .001$).

Regression results thus indicate that the hawk-dove item predicts support for compromise beyond what the Zero-sum and Sympathy Scales can predict and that the Zero-sum and Sympathy Scales predict support for compromise beyond what hawk-dove can predict.

Demographic Predictors

None of the demographic measures—gender, age, years of education, economic status (monthly expenditure)—was correlated significantly with the Compromise Scale. Nor was any demographic measure correlated significantly with the Zero-sum Scale or the Sympathy Scale. The Fear Scale was however significantly correlated with one demographic measure: Female respondents reported on the average higher levels of fear ($r = .28$, $p < .01$). A similar relation has been found in previous studies (Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2002; Jacobson & Bar-Tal, 1995), although the meaning of this correlation remains unclear.

Discussion

In this study, we used a national poll of Jewish Israelis to explore the origins of variation in support for compromise solutions with Palestinians. The first point of interest in our results is the structure of the twelve predictor items. Results of Principal Components Analysis indicated three components: perception of the conflict as zero-sum, fear of Palestinians, and sympathy toward Palestinians. The first of these corresponds to the threat perception emphasized in the realist tradition as a source of conflict and violence: zero-sum perceptions of the conflict of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and perceptions of implacable hostility from Palestinians. The second and third correspond to negative and positive emotional reactions of the kind usually emphasized in psychological approaches to understanding intergroup conflict. Thus our results are consistent with the conceptual distinction between cold cognitions about a threatening group and emotional reactions, both negative and positive, toward that group.

Zero-Sum Perception of the Conflict

From the perspective of the ingroup, seeing a conflict as zero-sum is a summary judgment about the nature of the threat from the outgroup: that the struc-

ture of the situation is such that either we win or they win, that there is no pos-
sibility of a middle ground in which each side can do better than losing. The zero-
sum perception is salient in literature that deals with cognitive and
decision-making aspects of negotiation (Bazerman & Neale, 1992; Ross; 1995).
This literature has empirically demonstrated the relation between the degree of
zero-sum perception in a conflict and the probability of the sides reaching an inte-
grative solution in negotiation (Thompson, 1995). However, this relation is mostly
tested in laboratory experiments and not often examined in the context of a polling
study of support for solutions in a violent ethnopolitical conflict.

Our study confirms the importance of zero-sum perceptions, which were neg-
atively associated with support for compromise. Our results provide some hint of
where zero-sum judgments come from, because two items related to perception
of the enemy loaded high on the zero-sum dimension. Seeing the conflict as zero-
sum was associated with believing that Palestinians hate Israelis and would
destroy Israel if they could: *Most Palestinians hate Jews (*loading .53*); Most of
the Palestinians would destroy Israel if they could* (loading .59). The implication
is that zero-sum thinking in ethnonational conflict may depend on seeing the
enemy as intent on destruction of the ingroup, including the idea implicit in "hate"
that the intent is stable and implacable.

Fear of Palestinians

The emotion of fear is frequently described as central in intergroup conflict
and as crucially affecting the chances of conflict resolution and reconciliation
(Bar-Tal, 2001; Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2002). Surprisingly, in our study fear of
Palestinians was not related to support for compromise solutions. Mackie, Devos,
and Smith (2000) were similarly surprised to find that feeling fear toward an out-
group did not predict action tendencies toward the outgroup.

These results suggest a specification of the role of fear. It is possible that fear
for one's group is a source of resistance to compromise, as Bar-Tal (2001) has
suggested, whereas fear for personal safety is not. Our study inquired about per-
sonal fear (*I feel fear toward Palestinians*); similarly Mackie et al. inquired about
personal fear of the outgroup. Future research should inquire specifically about
feeling of fear for the ingroup—Bar-Tal's (2001) "collective fear"—that may not
be correlated with personal fear. A related distinction between personal and
national threat perceptions of Americans after 9/11 has recently been offered by
Huddy and her colleagues (Huddy, Khatib, Capelos, & Provost, 2002).

Sympathy toward Palestinians

Feelings of empathy and sympathy are also extensively referred to in litera-
ture about intergroup relations (Staub, 1993, 1996, 2000; Struch & Schwartz,
1989), and in literature about transformative contact aimed at reconciliation
(Kelman, 1998, 1999; Maoz, Steinberg, Bar-On, & Fakhereldeen, 2002; Steinberg

& Bar-On, 2002). However, we know of no empirical investigation in a case of ethnopolitical violence of the relation between the degree of empathy to the other side and the readiness to support a compromise solution. Results of our study indicate that more sympathy for the outgroup is associated with significant increase in support for compromise.

The Relative Power of Threat Perception and Affective Reactions toward the Threatening Group

As described in the introduction, the realist tradition in understanding intergroup conflict generally treats emotions as negligible. Perception of threat may produce emotions, but it is the threat, not the emotions, that is the focus of analysis. Thus we used multiple regression to assess whether measures of affective reaction offered any prediction of support for compromise beyond what threat perception could offer. The answer was a clear yes. As noted above, sympathy for Palestinians was positively associated with support for compromise and variation in the sympathy scale added to prediction of support for compromise when entered into the regression after the zero-sum scale. This result is inconsistent with a strong version of the realist perspective, according to which affective reactions need not appear in the analysis of intergroup conflict.

One might imagine that perceiving another group as threatening, especially perceiving a zero-sum relation such that the other group's gains can only be at the expense of the ingroup, would necessarily produce fear of the other group. Our results suggest the contrary. The correlation between the Zero-sum scale and the fear scale was .09. As suggested above, a measure of intergroup threat might show different results than our measure of personal threat. Nevertheless it is interesting that intergroup threat does not necessarily translate into feelings of personal vulnerability. Evidently strong identification with a group does not mean a blurring of the boundaries between individual and group.

Similarly one might imagine that higher perception of outgroup threat would necessarily produce reduced sympathy for the enemy. The surprise here is less; the correlation between the zero-sum scale and the sympathy scale was significant and expectedly negative at −.31. Still, this correlation is not large and the independent prediction power of the Sympathy scale indicates that greater sympathy is not just a reflection of lower perceived threat.

To the extent that emotional reactions to a threatening group cannot be reduced to level of threat perceived, there should be space and practical value for future research that can tell us about the origins of these reactions.

The Meaning of the Hawk-Dove Dimension

A final point of interest is that our results confirm the value of the hawk-dove dimension as a shorthand or summary indication of individual differences in

support for compromise. The intercorrelations of the six solutions items in this study indicated a general dimension of support for compromise, and our scale averaging attitudes toward the six solutions was strongly associated ($r = .61$) with the hawk-dove item.

Also interesting was the relation we found between the hawk-dove item and our other measures. Regression results make clear that both the hawk-dove item and our zero-sum and sympathy scales have unique variance in predicting support for compromise solutions, but the unique variance accounted for by the hawk-dove item is about twice the unique variance accounted for by zero-sum perceptions and sympathy. What is the source of the variation on the hawk-dove item that is beyond variation in threat perception and sympathy? We lean toward the possibility that this item to some degree assesses the norms of the political party or faction with which each respondent identifies.

According to Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), intention is determined both by attitude and perceived norms. Support for compromise solutions can be seen as a measure of intention, perhaps even a measure of voting intention with regard to compromise solutions. Then this intention should depend both on the individual's beliefs about the positive and negative outcomes of compromise and on the positive and negative outcomes of behaving in accord with the wishes of salient others in the individual's environment. Thus the hawk-dove dimension may include, in addition to attitude toward compromise based on perceived threat and sympathy, variation associated with perception of ingroup norms. This possibility might be examined in future research by inquiring directly about perceived norms of the political party or faction with whom each respondent identifies.

Conclusion

Our results indicate that willingness to compromise depends both on sympathy for the outgroup and on the perception that there is a possible future in which both groups are better off. The power of the latter is entirely consistent with the realist tradition in analyzing group conflict, but, contrary to the realist account, our results suggest that emotional reactions to the outgroup are more than epiphenomenal. Sympathy for Palestinians predicts support for compromise independent of the prediction power of perceived threat. Further study of groups caught up in ethnopolitical conflict will be required to test the generalizability of these results.

For psychologists, however, the power of perceived threat in predicting resistance to compromise is an indication that changing perception of the structure of conflict may be at least as important as increasing sympathy for the enemy. It is our impression that many peace-building interventions aim to encourage positive feelings toward the outgroup through some kind of contact with or education about the outgroup (Maoz, 2000a, 2000b; Maoz et al., 2002; McCauley, 2002; McCauley, Wright, & Harris, 2000). Our results suggest that this strategy may be more effective if joined with explicit efforts to change perception of the structure

of intergroup relations, in particular to change perception of the threat posed by the outgroup. If most members of a group see a zero-sum competition with the outgroup, more positive feelings toward the outgroup may be difficult to achieve and have little impact on intergroup relations.

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