# Response to Barricaded Individuals

May 2020





The IACP Law Enforcement Policy Center creates four types of documents: Model Policies, Considerations Documents, Concepts & Issues Papers, and Need to Know one-page summaries. Typically, for each topic, either a Model Policy or a Considerations Document is created, supplemented with a Concepts & Issues Paper. This file contains the following documents:

- <u>Considerations Document</u>: Offered as an alternative to the bright-line directives found in a Model Policy. Instead of providing exact policy language, the Considerations Document outlines items that agencies should address and provides options that agencies should examine when developing their own policies on the topic.
- <u>Concepts & Issues Paper</u>: Designed to provide context and background information to support a Model Policy or Considerations Document for a deeper understanding of the topic.

### IACP Law Enforcement Policy Center

### **Considerations Document**

#### Updated: May 2020

## Response to Barricaded Individuals

### I. Purpose

This document is intended to provide agencies with items for consideration when developing their policies regarding response to and resolution of situations involving barricaded subjects/suspects. The primary goal of law enforcement response to barricaded individuals is to save lives and to resolve crisis incidents while attempting to avoid unnecessary risk to officers, suspects/subjects, and innocent bystanders.

### II. POLICY

Agencies should develop a policy statement to concisely explain to agency personnel and the public, the agency's policy on responding to barricaded incidents.

Sample: This agency shall use properly trained, equipped, and supervised field officers to respond to and contain a potential barricaded incident.

### III. DEFINITIONS

Barricaded Individual(s): An individual who is the focus of a law enforcement intervention effort, has taken a position in a physical location that does not allow immediate law enforcement access, and is refusing law enforcement orders to exit. This may include barricaded subjects and/or barricaded suspects.

- Barricaded Subject: A barricaded individuals who is not suspected of committing a crime.
- Barricaded Suspect: A barricaded individual who is suspected of committing a crime.

*Triggering Point:* Specific predetermined circumstance that prompts the initiation of law enforcement's direct action to prevent or terminate a particular course of the barricaded individual's behavior.

### IV. PROCEDURES

### A. General Provisions

When developing their policies and procedures regarding barricaded subjects/suspects, agencies should:

- 1. Address how to:
  - Verify that the individual is inside the location.
  - Determine whether the individual is barricaded.

- Determine whether the barricaded individual is a suspect or subject, taking into consideration whether or not they are armed.
- Determine when specialized assistance is and is not warranted.
- 2. Identify safety priorities, to include:
  - Hostages
  - Innocent involved civilians
  - Law enforcement officers
  - Barricaded subjects/suspects
- 3. Develop guidelines for the response to barricaded incidents, which may involve:
  - Weighing the benefits of forcing the individual from the location against the potential risks.
  - Considering the commitment of agency personnel and resources, and the impact the barricaded incident might have on response capabilities to other critical incidents in the community.
  - Considering the impact on the community surrounding the operation.
  - Considering agency safety priorities and the recognition of the risks involved when intervention tactics are used.
- 4. Recognizing that the best course of action may be to stand down, depending upon the jurisdiction and circumstances.<sup>1</sup>

### **B.** Initial Response – Operational Containment

Agencies should develop guidelines for the initial response to a barricaded incident. These may include guidelines for:

- 1. Agencies without the capacity to engage in prolonged barricaded incidents. Such agencies should consider developing agreements with other agencies in their jurisdiction with the necessary tactical and negotiation capabilities.
- 2. Communications personnel. Such guidelines should recommend that communications personnel:
  - Immediately dispatch patrol officers and supervisor(s),
  - Identify on-scene command,
  - Establish communication channels,
  - Notify the appropriate specialty units or personnel, such as tactical and negotiation teams, and any support personnel determined by command or policy upon arrival.<sup>2</sup>
- 3. Establishing an incident command system, to include who is designated as the incident commander (IC).<sup>3</sup> Specifically, the IC should establish:
  - Themselves as the IC.
  - Assignments and locations, including the:
    - o Inner and outer perimeter.
    - o Command post location.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Agencies should consult local legal counsel in determining whether this decision should be taken, and what responsibilities the agency may assume should this decision be made.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> For example, in the United States, tactical teams may include SWAT Teams. Additional examples of support personnel include tactical EMS, officers trained in mental health response, and fire/medical services personnel.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See the IACP Policy Center documents on Incident Command available at <a href="https://www.theiacp.org/resources/policy-center-resource/incident-command">https://www.theiacp.org/resources/policy-center-resource/incident-command</a>.

- Staging area for those responding on behalf of the operation, such as law enforcement, fire, and medical personnel.
- O Staging area for media representatives and establishing a media liaison.
- Personnel for exigent breach and entry to include any personnel with enhanced medical capabilities.
- 4. Intelligence and information gathering, to include:
  - Assessing the individual's knowledge, skills, abilities, motives, options, and means to execute their plans, as well as related triggering points.
  - Background information on the individual including who can be contacted for more information, such as the individual's family and friends and witnesses of the incident.
  - Gathering the individual's name, physical description, clothing description, military background, criminal history, weapons, history of mental illness or drug/alcohol use, current or recent mental state, and social media presence.<sup>4</sup>
  - Gathering structural and location information
- 5. A plan for immediate action in the event of an adverse or threatening response, such as:
  - Determining when immediate action by responding personnel will be authorized, to include what actions are appropriate and factors that may influence this decision.
  - Developing a contingency plan based on the previous assessment.

### C. Ongoing Response

Agencies should develop procedures to follow after the initial response, such as:

- 1. Establishing communications with specialized teams, such as the negotiation team, tactical team, and/or Crisis Intervention Team (CIT).
- 2. Determining the appropriate level of response based on the circumstances, to include deciding whether to:
  - Obtain a search warrant;
  - Utilize measures such as electronics, police canines, less lethal options, and/or chemical munitions;
  - Deploy a team into the structure; and/or
  - Develop a timeframe for remaining on the scene, taking into consideration neighborhood impact, personnel impact, and/or legal issues.
- 3. Developing procedures for barricaded incidents involving suspects/subjects who:
  - Pose a danger to others,
  - Engage in overtly dangerous or assaultive behavior directed toward officers or involved community members.
  - Are known to be armed, thought to be armed, have access to weapons in the location, or be in an unknown weapons status, and/or
  - Are wanted for criminal action.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Information, especially information pertaining to the individual's health, should be gathered in accordance with local laws and regulations.

### **D. Tactical Operations Considerations**

Agencies should develop guidance for responding to barricaded subjects/suspects once the decision to engage has been made. Guidelines may address the following:

- 1. Assessing the potential positive impact of using minimally intrusive resolution techniques, such as negotiation.
- 2. Determining the appropriate specialized resources and requesting their assistance.
- 3. Evacuating victims and innocent bystanders from the inner and outer perimeters when safe to do so.
- 4. Continuing in-depth intelligence gathering using specialized personnel.
- 5. Establishing procedures regarding a direct tactical action, which may include determining:
  - When a tactical response is appropriate;
  - Whether to deploy the following:
    - o armored vehicles
    - o tactical emergency medical teams
    - o long rifle and observer teams
    - o sound-gathering equipment
    - electronic intervention and control equipment
    - robots
    - o chemical munitions, including formulating a chemical munitions plan
    - o police canines
    - o secondary teams, such as personnel from another agency
    - o small unmanned aircraft systems.<sup>5</sup>
  - Preparing a tactical resolution team, to include:
    - o rehearsing entry
    - o coordinating with, or staging of any medical resources that may be needed
  - Identifying any applicable exceptions to search warrant requirements.

### E. Resolution

Agencies should create policies and procedures to address the potential resolutions of barricaded incidents, including:

- 1. Surrender; agency personnel should be equipped to respond in the event of a
  - Negotiated surrender
  - Surrender procedure, i.e., how to take person into custody.
- 2. Intervention; agencies should carefully consider warrant requirements before determining to intervene, and should consider the most effective method to do so, including:
  - tactical entry
  - chemical use.
- 3. Suicide; agencies should prepare response procedures and provide personnel with resiliency training and mental health support resources.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See the IACP Policy Center documents on Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems available at <a href="https://www.theiacp.org/resources/policy-center-resource/unmanned-aircraft">https://www.theiacp.org/resources/policy-center-resource/unmanned-aircraft</a>.

### F. Demobilization Considerations

Following an incident, agencies should prepare guidelines for demobilization. These may include procedures regarding:

- 1. Documentation such as photographs, videos, or written records.
- 2. Personnel/equipment accountability.
- 3. Post-event debriefing.

Every effort has been made by the IACP Law Enforcement Policy Center staff and advisory board to ensure that this model policy incorporates the most current information and contemporary professional judgment on this issue. However, law enforcement administrators should be cautioned that no model policy can meet all the needs of any given law enforcement agency. In addition, the formulation of specific agency policies must take into account local political and community perspectives and customs, prerogatives, and demands; often divergent law enforcement strategies and philosophies; and the impact of varied agency resource capabilities, among other factors. Readers outside of the United States should note that, while this document promotes procedures reflective of a democratic society, its legal basis follows United States Supreme Court rulings and other federal laws and statutes. Law enforcement administrators should be cautioned that each law enforcement agency operates in a unique environment of court rulings, state laws, local ordinances, regulations, judicial and administrative decisions, and collective bargaining agreements that must be considered and should therefore consult their legal advisor before implementing any policy.

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# IACP Law Enforcement Policy Center

### **Concepts & Issues Paper**

Updated: May 2020

# Response to Barricaded Individuals

### I. INTRODUCTION

### A. Purpose of Document

This paper is designed to accompany the Considerations Document on Response to Barricaded Individuals established by the IACP Law Enforcement Policy Center. This paper provides essential background material and supporting documentation to provide a greater understanding of the recommendations and guidance provided in the Considerations Document. This material may be of value to law enforcement executives in their efforts to develop their own policies that meet the requirements and circumstances of their communities and their law enforcement agencies.

### B. Background

The primary goal of law enforcement response to barricaded individuals is to save lives and resolve crisis incidents while attempting to avoid unnecessary risk to officers, barricaded individuals, and innocent bystanders. By developing clear procedures on appropriate response to barricaded individuals, agencies can better prepare for these incidents. Specific policies, procedures, and training may assist the agency in mitigating the danger to officers and community members, while promoting a positive resolution to the incident. For example, the use of negotiation and less-lethal interventions, such as a stabilizing unit, as well as crisis intervention tactics, may help resolve the incident peacefully with minimal impact.

Moreover, appropriate response to barricaded incidents may have a positive effect on community-police relations. In practicing transparency with the community, agencies have a chance to demonstrate the steps that were taken to achieve safe resolution. Listing the actions that were taken and demonstrating that the agency proceeded with safety as the top priority throughout the decision-making process can help mitigate community concerns.

#### C. Definitions

For the purposes of this document, a *barricaded individual* is someone who is the focus of a law enforcement intervention effort, has taken position in a physical location that does not allow immediate law enforcement access, and is refusing law enforcement orders to exit. A *barricaded subject* is a person who is not suspected of committing a crime, whereas a *barricaded suspect* is a person who is suspected of committing a crime. Finally, a *triggering point* is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> National Council of Negotiation Associations (NCNA) and FBI Crisis Negotiation Unit (CNU), Recommended Negotiation Guidelines and Policies, (April 2009), 1.

a specific predetermined circumstance that justifies the initiation of direct law enforcement action to prevent or terminate a particular course of barricaded individual behavior, such as hostile actions towards victims, innocent bystanders, or officers.

### II. PROCEDURES

### A. General Provisions

Agencies should establish safety priorities as a starting point when developing policies and procedures regarding barricaded incidents. These priorities may dictate the response to the incident and may include hostages, bystanders, involved civilians, law enforcement officers, and barricaded individual(s). In the event of a potential barricaded incident, agencies should systematically evaluate the situation to determine how to move forward. This entails quickly gathering information and/or intelligence to clarify what type of operation will be initiated and the appropriate level of response. It is suggested that agencies refrain from automatically and immediately calling in specialized and/or tactical units.

First, agencies should verify that an individual who is suspected to be barricaded is inside the location. This will ensure that response is not focused in the wrong area or disproportionate to the incident. To do so, officers should immediately initiate investigations and consult eyewitnesses, including initial responding officers.

Second, agencies should establish procedures for determining whether the individual is actually barricaded and refusing to come out. This may include accessing whether the location allows immediate law enforcement access and whether the individual has refused law enforcement orders to exit the location. Agencies should not immediately assume that an individual is barricaded. Agency personnel should also consider whether the individual is likely to be armed or have access to weapons. To promote officer safety, personnel should treat every barricaded incident as thought the individual is armed and should consult observers as well as the individual's behavioral history to attempt to verify whether they have access to a weapon. The individual's mental health history may also be considered. The reason the individual is barricaded should be considered, as well as the presence of anyone else in the location based on intelligence/information gathered. Agencies may call-in to notify additional or specialized units of the incident so they can begin to determine whether to activate further response.

Finally, if the agency has verified that the located individual is barricaded, steps should be taken to determine whether the individual is suspected of committing a crime. The status of the barricaded individual as a suspect or subject will inform next steps, such as whether to obtain an arrest warrant or a mental health evaluation.

Agencies should ensure that they have gathered any available relevant information/intelligence regarding the incident and then weigh the benefits and risks of response options before initiating response procedures. The decision to respond should be influenced by the circumstances of the incident. For example, agencies should weigh the benefits of forcing the barricaded individual from the location against the potential risks. Circumstances that may influence response decisions include the commitment of agency personnel and resources; the impact the barricaded incident might have on response capabilities to other calls for service or critical incidents in the community; the impact on the community surrounding the operation; agency safety priorities; and the recognition of the risks involved when intervention tactics are used. Contingency plans should be developed based on this assessment. In some circumstances, the best course of action may be to stand down. Agencies should consult local legal counsel when time and circumstances permit when determining how to proceed, and what responsibilities the agency may assume should the decision to take action be made.

In all situations, innocent involved civilians inside the barricaded location and any bystanders in the vicinity should be evacuated outside the established perimeter for their safety.

### B. Initial Response - Operational Containment

Initial responders to barricaded incidents should immediately attempt to contain the situation prior to the arrival of other personnel. Upon arrival, responders should determine the level of support personnel needed, including emergency medical and/or fire services. It may be necessary to adjust the level of response to the incident based on agency capabilities. For example, agencies without the capacity to engage in prolonged barricaded incidents should consider developing agreements with other agencies in their jurisdiction to secure effective tactical and negotiation response.

As soon as a barricaded incident is reported, communications personnel should dispatch patrol officers and supervisor(s) to the scene, identify on-scene command, and establish communication channels. Communications personnel may also be called upon to notify the appropriate specialty units or personnel where appropriate, such as tactical and negotiation teams, mental health professionals, and any support personnel once the initial assessment of the situation has been completed. Once the incident has been called-in, additional personnel can determine whether to activate response. A secure system should be utilized for ongoing communications. These communications should occur on a separate frequency, especially when transmitting critical information.

An incident command system should be established, and an Incident Commander (IC) should be designated.<sup>2</sup> Agencies should consider developing checklists of the procedures to be followed to ensure that all immediate and basic measures are taken, such as setting up an inner and outer perimeter. This may include establishing an activity log and ensuring a roster of responding personnel is maintained.

Whenever possible, the IC should be trained, experienced, and in a command or supervisory position to ensure that they are capable of effective decision-making and delegating in high-risk situations. ICs are responsible for notifying all personnel of who the IC is. In addition, the IC should address the following:

- Inner and outer perimeter security, to include establishing a perimeter sufficient to contain the disturbance and prohibit entrance into the affected area.
- Identification of a:
  - O Single command post location and related responsibilities, taking into consideration the proximity and circumstances of the incident as well as agency resources.
  - Staging area for those responding on behalf of the operation and their equipment, such as law enforcement, fire, and medical personnel, to ensure that ingress and egress are not impeded by equipment of vehicles. This may involve utilizing liaisons to coordinate staging areas and ensuring that all parties have met prior to an incident to discuss coordination of response.
  - o Staging area for media representatives and a designated media liaison.
- Personnel for exigent breach and entry.<sup>3</sup>
- Any personnel with enhanced medical capabilities, such as tactical emergency medical support.<sup>4</sup>

To avoid further endangering bystanders, responders, and/or other involved individuals, a planned response to accommodate media personnel should be organized. The public information officer (PIO) should immediately ensure that representatives from the media are moved to a safe and controlled area.<sup>5</sup> They should also provide the media with direction and guidance to prevent sensitive information from being transmitted to the barricaded individual during the initial stages of the operation and should screen all information provided to the media. Prior to an incident, the agency should consider scheduling periodic briefings with the media to outline agency procedures for these types of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See IACP Policy Center documents on Incident Command available at <a href="https://www.theiacp.org/resources/policy-center-resource/incident-command">https://www.theiacp.org/resources/policy-center-resource/incident-command</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> For more information, see the IACP Policy Center documents on Crowd Management available at https://www.theiacp.org/resources/policy-center-resource/crowd.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> For more information on personnel trained to provide medical care and provide logistical support during high-risk law enforcement operations, visit the NTOA website at <a href="https://www.ntoa.org/sections/tems/">https://www.ntoa.org/sections/tems/</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See the IACP Policy Center documents on Media Relations available at https://www.theiacp.org/resources/policy-center-resource/media-relations.

incidents, including cautioning media personnel against interfering with law enforcement efforts during a barricaded incident.

Personnel should continue to gather information and intelligence, continually assessing the barricaded individual's skills, knowledge, abilities, motives, options, means to execute their plans, and related triggering points. To do so, personnel may interview friends, relatives, and/or witnesses of the barricaded individual. Information gathered may include name, physical description, clothing description, military background, criminal history, weapons, history of mental illness or drug/alcohol use, and current and/or recent mental state. In some locations, agencies may be able to acquire protected health information to assist officers in responding to a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of an individual or the public.<sup>6</sup> Agencies should make a record check and attempt to verify if there have been past arrests or prior contacts with the barricaded individual.

Structural and location information should also be gathered, including obtaining a floor plan of the location detailing the layout of entrances and exits, windows, and garage access. Attempts should be made to verify the barricaded individual's location within the structure. The agency should also try to obtain the phone number for the individual or location to contact the barricaded individual.

If an incident begins to devolve and the barricaded individual responds in an adverse or threatening way, personnel should be prepared to immediately respond. A contingency plan derived from prior assessments should be developed prior to incident response, and all personnel should be aware of their duties and responsibilities according to this plan, as well as the level of authorization required to act, depending on the circumstances. Agencies should determine when immediate action by responding personnel will be authorized, to include what actions are appropriate and factors that influence this decision.

While the barricaded individual's behavior ultimately determines the outcome of the incident, agencies should make all reasonable efforts to obtain a nonviolent resolution.<sup>7</sup>

### C. Ongoing Response

Procedures to follow after the initial response depend on the circumstances of the incident. Agencies should carefully determine the appropriate level of response. Potential response options include:

- Obtaining a search warrant or mental health evaluation.
- Utilizing measures such as electronic surveillance, canines, less-lethal options, small unmanned aircraft systems, 8 and/or chemical munitions.
- Deploying a team into the structure.
- Developing a timeframe for remaining on the scene, taking into consideration neighborhood impact, personnel impact, and/or legal concerns.

When necessary, communications should be established with specialized teams, such as the negotiation team, tactical team, and/or CIT. Early communication with the negotiation team can help reduce tension and contain the scene. Effective response to a barricaded incident requires extensive communication between patrol, tactical, medical, and negotiations personnel, including direct access to the IC throughout the incident.

Agencies should determine how specialized teams fall under the command structure. For example, agencies should ensure that tactical and negotiation teams function in an advisory role to the IC, and that their

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, *Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule: A Guide for Law Enforcement*, <a href="https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/special/emergency/final hipaa guide law enforcement.pdf">https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/special/emergency/final hipaa guide law enforcement.pdf</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> National Council of Negotiation Associations (NCNA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation Crisis Negotiation Unit (CNU) *Recommended Negotiation Guidelines and Policies* (2009), 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> For more information, see IACP Policy Center Documents on Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems available at <a href="https://www.theiacp.org/resources/policy-center-resource/unmanned-aircraft">https://www.theiacp.org/resources/policy-center-resource/unmanned-aircraft</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> National Council of Negotiation Associations (NCNA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation Crisis Negotiation Unit (CNU) *Recommended Negotiation Guidelines and Policies* (2009), 7.

recommendations have equal weight. Mental health professionals should, when possible, also serve in an advisory role for both the IC and the negotiation personnel. The IC should refrain from taking on the responsibilities of specialized units and vice versa.

When making ongoing decisions, personnel should consider whether the incident involves an individual who poses a danger to others, engages in overtly dangerous or assaultive behavior directed towards officers or involved community members; is known to be armed, is thought to be armed, has access to weapons in the location, or is in an unknown weapons status; and/or is wanted for criminal action.

Agencies should ensure they have procedures in place for long-term or extended operations. Attempting to extend the time frame of an incident may allow agencies to develop tactical plans, establish rapport between barricaded individuals and negotiators, calm the individual, and/or distract the individual from tactical actions. <sup>10</sup> Processes should include the relief and rotation of personnel and appropriate staffing and training of supplemental incident command center.11

### **D. Tactical Operation Considerations**

Available intelligence should be used to make decisions regarding direct tactical action, including whether tactical response is appropriate. If it is appropriate, agencies should decide which techniques are safest and most effective considering the circumstances. In determining the safest and most effective response, agencies should also seek to identify any applicable exceptions to search warrant requirements. For example, agencies should decide whether to deploy armored vehicles, tactical emergency medical teams, long rifle and observer teams, sound-gathering equipment, electronic intervention and control equipment, robots, chemical munitions, police canines, secondary teams such as personnel from other agencies, and/or small unmanned aircraft systems.

Personnel should be prepared to respond if the decision to engage is made. All responses should be appropriate to the level of threat posed and should aim to ensure the safety of hostages, civilians and bystanders, law enforcement officers, and barricaded individuals. To this end, initial considerations should include the use of minimally intrusive resolution techniques, such as negotiation. All reasonable efforts should be made to prompt the barricaded individual's surrender prior to aggressive action. Tactical resolution should only be used if the barricaded individual appears likely to engage in violence despite all negotiation efforts. 12

A tactical resolution team should be prepared to respond where appropriate. The team should rehearse entry and coordinate with and/or stage medical resources that may be needed.

Victims, innocent involved civilians, and bystanders should be evacuated from the inner and outer perimeters when appropriate. The safety and feasibility of this action will depend on whether the individual has a weapon, as well as the weapon capabilities; the location of the individual; and the availability of resources, such as evacuation vehicles. The IC should determine whether sheltering in place or evacuation is appropriate depending on these and other circumstances. The IC should continue to evaluate the need for specialized assistance.

### E. Resolution

There are a variety of ways in which a barricaded incident could be resolved. Agencies should have procedures to respond to any resolution that occurs. Personnel should be equipped to respond if the barricaded individual surrenders, including knowing how to negotiate surrenders and how to take the individual into custody.

Personnel should also be prepared to intervene to remove the individual from the location. The decision to intervene should occur after careful consideration of the incident circumstances and agency safety priorities. The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) Tactical Response and Operations Standard for Law Enforcement Agencies (2018), 35.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 33.

<sup>12</sup> National Council of Negotiation Associations (NCNA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation Crisis Negotiation Unit (CNU) Recommended Negotiation Guidelines and Policies (2009), 2.

method of intervention should be scaled to the level of threat posed by the barricaded individual. Methods may include tactical entry or using chemicals to force the individual from the location.

Barricaded incidents may also end if the individual takes their life. Agencies can help equip employees to respond to such an event through ongoing resiliency training<sup>13</sup> and should also be provided with mental health wellness resources such as peer support services after the incident. 14

### F. Demobilization Considerations

After the resolution of a barricaded incident, the incident should be documented using photography/video and written reports; all involved personnel and equipment should be accounted for; and post-event debriefings with all involved parties should be conducted. Post-event tactical debriefings should be conducted promptly and should consider the entire incident and team performance including areas to address in future training. When appropriate, agencies should also provide mental health resources following traumatic incidents.<sup>15</sup> Agencies should consider reviewing incidents and reports regularly to identify areas of improvement or the need to change or update existing agency policy, procedures, and training for safety, efficiency, or legal reasons.

After incident resolution, law enforcement personnel should inform residents of the area that they may return. Agencies should also contact the PIO to communicate with the media on-scene. The community should be informed that the situation has been resolved, and they should be reassured that it is safe to return to the area. The agency's media function may determine whether appropriate additional information should be provided.

### G. Training

All agency personnel should be prepared for a barricaded incident; an understanding of response tactics and decision-making processes will assist all personnel if an incident should occur. Patrol personnel will likely be first responders to such a scene and should be equipped to organize initial response and containment. Communications personnel and leadership should be involved at all stages of response. The PIO should be familiar with the capabilities and limitations of the tactical response team to ensure the media is managed in a way which does not further endanger agency response. Negotiation personnel should receive training on abnormal psychology, crisis and suicide intervention, and active listening skills. Each responding party should know their duties and responsibilities and be required to maintain their skill levels through initial and on-going training, individually and as a team. <sup>16</sup>

Additionally, agencies should provide opportunities for inter- and intra-unit training including patrol personnel, tactical response teams, negotiations personnel, mental health professionals, tactical emergency medical support, emergency medical and fire personnel, and media personnel. Training may include roll call videos, role-playing drills, scenario-based training, and/or periodic meetings with all units to review past incidents. It is beneficial to include all potential responding agencies to ensure a coordinated response to an incident.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>13</sup> For more resources, see IACP's Law Enforcement Agency and Officer Resilience Training Program, <a href="https://www.theiacp.org/projects/mental-wellness-of-police-">https://www.theiacp.org/projects/mental-wellness-of-police-</a> officers

<sup>14</sup> See IACP Policy Center documents on Critical Incident Stress Management available at https://www.theiacp.org/resources/policy-center-resource/critical-incidentstress-management.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> NCNA, CNU, Recommended Negotiation Guidelines and Policies, 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> For additional training information, US-based agencies may consider locating resources such as the National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) Tactical Response and Operations Standard for Law Enforcement Agencies (2018), the National Incident Management System (NIMS) Training Program, and/or the National Council of Negotiation Associations (NCNA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation Crisis Negotiation Unit (CNU) Recommended Negotiation Guidelines and Policies (2009).

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