
- -> It is an authentication mechanism that enables the creator of a wessage to attach code that acts as a signature. The signature is formed by taking the hash of the wessage and encrypting the wessage with the creator's public private tey.
- -> The signature guarantees the source and integrity of the message.

## DSS APR.

DSS APPROACHS- (DISTAL SISNATURE STANDARD)

DSS uses an algorithm that is designed to provide only the difital Signature Function.



## Algorithm 9-

- Q Global Public key Components
- p prime number, with a length between 512 and 1024 bits such that q divides (P-1).
- 9 A 160-bit prime number 9.
- g selected to be if the form

  h (P-1)/a mod p, where

  h is an integer between

  I and (P-1)
- Signing  $V = (g^{k} \mod p) \mod q$   $S = [K'(H(M) + 2x)] \mod q$ Signature = (8,5)

- 2 vandom integer with OCXC9
- 3) User's Public key
- (4) User's Per-message Secret Mumber


  K dandom integer with

  0 < K < 2
  - (a) Verifying  $W = (S')^{-1} \mod 2$   $U_1 = [H(H') w] \mod 2$   $U_2 = (S') w \mod 2$   $V = [(g^{u_1} y^{u_2}) \mod p] \mod 2$   $V = [(g^{u_1} y^{u_2}) \mod p] \mod 2$   $V = [(g^{u_1} y^{u_2}) \mod p] \mod 2$


M= message to be signed.

H(M)= hash of M using SHA-1.

M', s', s' = received versions of Mir, s.



$$r = f_2(k, p, q, g)$$



## I CAN'T TELL YOU MY SECRET, BUT I CAN PROVE TO YOU THAT I KNOW THE SECRET

>2+ is a method by which one party (the prover) can prove to another porty (the vesifier) that a given statement is true, without conveying any information apart from the fact that the Statement is true.

Properties :-

The verifier will always accepts a proof from the prover, given that they both follows the correct protocol. i Completness :-

The verifier will not accept any "incorrect" proof from the prover, given that the verifier follows the correct protocol. ii/ Soundness/+

iii) Zero-knowledge - During the whole "proving" process, the verifier will be learn nothing about the Prover's Secret, nor will be able to prove that secret to any other posty.

PROVER: The knows some kind of Secret but he don't want to share it with anyone, not even the verifier.

VERIFIER: He verify whether (Prover) knows the secret or not.

CHALLENGE - RESPONSE AUTHENTICATION OF

-It is a family of protocols in which one pointy presents a question ("challenge") and another posty must provide a valid answer ("Response") to be alithenticated.

- Challenge-ves porce protocol is password authentication, where the challenge is asking for the password and the valid response is the correct password. SIMPLE AUTHENTICATION SEQUENCE:

i) Server sends a unique value &c to client.

1) Client generates unique challege value EC

iii) Client computes Co

cx = hash (cc+sc+ secret)

SS = Server generated Challerge CC = Client gen. challerge

C&= client gen. response

SX = Server response.

in Client sends 68 and 60 to the server.

y) Server calculates the expected value of 68 and ensures the chent responded correctly.

vi) Server computes 58 = hash (sc+cc+ secret)

vij) Server sends 55

viii) Client calculates the expected value of 58 and ensures the Server responded correctly.

## TECHNIQUES FOR C-R AUTHENTICATION ?-

- 1). Using a Symmetric-tey Cither
- 2). Using keyed-Hash functions
- 8) Using an Asymmetric-tey cipher
- 4). Using Digital Signature

SIDE CHANNEL ATTACKS: — It is any attack based on information gained from the physical implementation of a cryptosystem. For exitiming information, power consumption, electromagnetic leaks or even sound coun provide an extra source of information, which can be exploited to break the system.

RELY ON the relationship between information emitted (leaked)

General class of S-C attacks:

i) Timing attack - Based on measuring how much time vorious computations take to perform.

How somittees that - Make use of voring nower consumption by the

ii) Power-monitoring attack - Make use of varying power consumption by the hardware during computation.

iii) Differential fault analysis - In which secrets are discovered by introducing faults in a computation.

iv) Acoustic cryptanalysis] - Attacks that exploits sound produced during a computation.

V) [ Row Hammer] - In which off-limits memory can be charged by accessing adjacent memory.

COUNTERMEASURES: - i) Eliminate or reduce the release of secret information.

ii) Eliminate the relationship between the leaked information and the secret data.