



# TAPShield: Securing Trigger-Action Platforms against Strong Attackers

**Mojtaba Moazen** Nicolae Paladi Adnan J.Ahsan Musard Balliu

IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (Euro S&P)


*July 2025*

# Trigger-Action Platforms


Trigger




# Trigger-Action Platforms




# Trigger-Action Platforms




# Trigger-Action Platforms




# IFTTT App




# Node-RED App




# Attacker Models: Cloud-Level Attacker




# Attacker Models: Cloud-Level Attacker



# Attacker Models: App-Level Attacker



# Attacker Models: App-Level Attacker



# Research Questions

- **RQ1:**

How to secure TAPs from cloud and app-level attackers?

**Cloud-level:**

**Isolation between host OS and app runtime**

- Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)

**Verify the runtime integrity:**

- Remote Attestation

**App-level:**

**Isolation between apps in TAP runtime**


- JavaScript Sandboxing

- **RQ2:**

How to evaluate the solution's benefits in **security, performance, and compatibility?**


# TAPShield Design

- Securing TAPs against both Cloud and App-level attacker model




# TAPShield Design

- Securing TAPs against both Cloud and App-level attacker model




# TAPShield Design

- Securing TAPs against both Cloud and App-level attacker model




# TAPShield Design

- Securing TAPs against both Cloud and App-level attacker model




# TAPShield Design

- Securing TAPs against both Cloud and App-level attacker model




# TAPShield Design

- Securing TAPs against both Cloud and App-level attacker model




# TAPShield Design

- Securing TAPs against both Cloud and App-level attacker model



# TAPShield Design

- Securing TAPs against both Cloud and App-level attacker model



# What are the **Security and Privacy** benefits ?

## - Node-RED

- 10 Most popular flows in community are randomly selected
- We design two types of attacks as PoCs and verify the protection against those
  - o **Leak sensitive information of app e.g. API Keys of Trigger and Action**
  - o **Modify the functionality of apps after deployments**

## - IFTTT


- We evaluated TAPShield **against 30 IFTTT apps including 20** most popular apps in 2024
- Attacks are designed based on **both attacker models w.r.t multi-tenant structure of IFTTT**

- TAPShiled effectively protects against both Cloud and App-level attacker for all attack scenarios

# What is the **performance overhead** ?


- **Node-RED core flows**
- **114** flows are experimented in this evaluation
- **Node-RED core nodes**
- **12** most popular nodes in Node-RED
- Results show 2.2x overhead
- Average execution time: 1.8ms

Node-RED Apps Execution Time



# What is the **performance** overhead ?

- **IFTTT**
- We evaluated the execution time of **30 IFTTT apps** with TAPShield
- We evaluated with both **SandTrap** and **Vm2**
- Results shows a high overhead when we secure apps against both attacker model
- This overhead is **acceptable** given **IFTTT Pro/Pro+** users have a **5-minute** polling interval



# To what extent is this approach **compatible** with real-world apps?


- **Node-RED**
- Identifying 5 Most-Dependent Upon flows in Node-RED Community
- Dependent Upon flow : **A flow which is dependent on more Nodes**
- **More nodes cause more computation at runtime and therefore more overhead**

Flow Name	Specification	Number of Nodes	Number of Unique Nodes
Monitoring URL	Web app for testing URLs and endpoints	206	23
Weather Database	An app to store various weather utilities in MySQL	100	10

- **IFTTT**
- 50 random IFTTT apps are selected from **prior research and IFTTT website**
- TAPShiled is compatible with real world apps for Node-RED and IFTTT
- **Seamless execution** without any limitation

# TAPShield Takeaways

- **Security**
- **Securing** Node-RED and IFTTT against two attacker model
- **Seamless** deployment for developers
  
- **Evaluation**
- Ensure **secure** application execution by protecting against **confidentiality** and **integrity** attacks
- Acceptable **performance** overhead
- **Compatible** with **real-world** applications developed by the community



Source Code



Contact