

LPN Codes for PCG and PCF

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Outline

- 1 PCG Based on LPN
- 2 Linear Test Framework
- 3 Expander-Accumulator Codes
- 4 Expander-Convolute Codes
- 5 Silver LDPC Codes

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1 PCG Based on LPN

- Pseudorandom Correlation Generator
- Learning Parity with Noise
- Timeline of LPN-friendly Codes for PCG

2 Linear Test Framework

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4 Expander-Convolute Codes

5 Silver LDPC Codes

Definition

(Primal LPN). Let $\mathcal{D}(\mathcal{R}) = \{\mathcal{D}_{k,n}(\mathcal{R})\}_{k,n \in \mathbb{N}}$ denote a family of efficiently sampleable distributions over a ring \mathcal{R} , such that for any $k, n \in \mathbb{N}$, $\text{Im}(\mathcal{D}_{k,n}(\mathcal{R})) \subseteq \mathcal{R}^n$. Let \mathbf{C} be a probabilistic code generation algorithm such that $\mathbf{C}(k, n, \mathcal{R})$ outputs a matrix $A \in \mathcal{R}^{n \times k}$. For dimension $k = k(\lambda)$, number of samples (or block length) $n = n(\lambda)$, and ring $\mathcal{R} = \mathcal{R}(\lambda)$, the (primal) $(\mathcal{D}, \mathbf{C}, \mathcal{R})$ -LPN(k, n) assumption states that

$$\left\{ (A, \mathbf{b}) \mid A \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbf{C}(k, n, \mathcal{R}), \mathbf{e} \xleftarrow{\mathbb{F}} \mathcal{D}_{k,n}(\mathcal{R}), \mathbf{s} \xleftarrow{\mathbb{F}} \mathbb{F}^k, \mathbf{b} \leftarrow A \cdot \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e} \right\} \\ \stackrel{c}{\approx} \left\{ (A, \mathbf{b}) \mid A \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbf{C}(k, n, \mathcal{R}), \mathbf{b} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}^n \right\}.$$

Definition

(Dual LPN) Let $\mathcal{D}(\mathcal{R}) = \{\mathcal{D}_{k,n}(\mathcal{R})\}_{k,n \in \mathbb{N}}$ denote a family of efficiently sampleable distributions over a ring \mathcal{R} , such that for any $k, n \in \mathbb{N}$, $\text{Im}(\mathcal{D}_{k,n}(\mathcal{R})) \subseteq \mathcal{R}^n$. Let \mathbf{C}' be a probabilistic code generation algorithm such that $\mathbf{C}'(n-k, n, \mathcal{R})$ outputs a matrix $H \in \mathcal{R}^{(n-k) \times n}$. For dimension $(n-k)$ and number of samples (or block length) n , $n = n(\lambda)$, $k = k(\lambda)$, and ring $\mathcal{R} = \mathcal{R}(\lambda)$, the (dual) $(\mathcal{D}, \mathbf{C}', \mathcal{R})$ -LPN($n-k, n$) assumption states that

$$\left\{ (H, \mathbf{b}) \mid H \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbf{C}'(n-k, n, \mathcal{R}), \mathbf{e} \xleftarrow{\mathbb{F}} \mathcal{D}_{k,n}(\mathcal{R}), \mathbf{b} \leftarrow H \cdot \mathbf{e} \right\} \\ \stackrel{c}{\approx} \left\{ (H, \mathbf{b}) \mid H \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbf{C}'(n-k, n, \mathcal{R}), \mathbf{b} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}^{n-k} \right\}.$$

Noise Distributions

- Bernoulli noise: $\mathbf{e} \leftarrow \text{Ber}_{w/n}^n(\mathbb{F}_2)$
- Exact hamming weight noise: $\mathbf{e} \leftarrow \text{HW}_w^n(\mathbb{F}_2)$
- Regular noise: $\mathbf{e} \leftarrow \text{Reg}_w^n(\mathbb{F}_2)$

What codes are secure in LPN assumption?

- Standard LPN
- Variable-Density LPN (2020,2023)
- Silver LDPC Codes (2021)
- Expander-Accumulator Codes (2022)
- Expander-Convolute Codes (2023)

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Linear Attacks

Current Attacks:

- Gaussian Elimination
- BKW Algorithm and Covering Codes
- Information Set Decoding Attacks
- Generalized Birthday Attacks
- Statistical Decoding Attacks
- ...

Linear attacks! A common framework in which an adversary is trying to detect a bias in the LPN samples **by computing a linear combination of the samples.**

from [BCG+20] VDLPN

Definition

(Bias of a Distribution). Given a distribution \mathcal{D} over \mathbb{F}^n and a vector $\mathbf{u} \in \mathbb{F}^n$, the bias of \mathcal{D} with respect to \mathbf{u} , denoted $\text{bias}_{\mathbf{u}}(\mathcal{D})$, is equal to

$$\text{bias}_{\mathbf{u}}(\mathcal{D}) = \left| \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{x} \sim \mathcal{D}} [\mathbf{u}^\top \cdot \mathbf{x}] - \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{x} \sim \mathcal{U}_n} [\mathbf{u}^\top \cdot \mathbf{x}] \right| = \left| \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{x} \sim \mathcal{D}} [\mathbf{u}^\top \cdot \mathbf{x}] - \frac{1}{|\mathbb{F}|} \right|,$$

where \mathcal{U}_n denotes the uniform distribution over \mathbb{F}^n . The bias of \mathcal{D} , denoted $\text{bias}(\mathcal{D})$, is the maximum bias of \mathcal{D} with respect to any nonzero vector \mathbf{u} .

Linear Test Framework

Definition

(Security against Linear Tests).

Let \mathcal{R} be a ring, and let $\mathcal{D} = \{\mathcal{D}_{k,n}\}_{k,n \in \mathbb{N}}$ denote a family of noise distributions over \mathcal{R}^n . Let \mathbf{C} be a probabilistic code generation algorithm such that $\mathbf{C}(k, n)$ outputs a matrix $H \in \mathcal{R}^{k \times n}$. Let $\varepsilon, \eta : \mathbb{N} \mapsto [0, 1]$ be two functions. We say that the $(\mathcal{D}, \mathbf{C}, \mathcal{R})$ -LPN(k, n) is (ε, η) -secure against linear tests if for any (possibly inefficient) adversary \mathcal{A} which, on input H outputs a nonzero $\mathbf{v} \in \mathcal{R}^n$, it holds that

$$\Pr \left[H \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbf{C}(k, n), \mathbf{v} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}(H) : \text{bias}_{\mathbf{v}}(\mathcal{D}_H) \geq \varepsilon(\lambda) \right] \leq \eta(\lambda),$$

where \mathcal{D}_H denotes the distribution induced by sampling $\mathbf{e} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{n,N}$, and outputting the LPN samples $H \cdot \mathbf{e}$.

Minimum Distance and Dual Distance

Definition

(Minimum Distance). the smallest Hamming distance between any two different codewords, and is equal to the minimum Hamming weight of the non-zero codewords in the code.

If A is a generator matrix of a linear code \mathcal{C} , then its minimum distance write $d(A)$

$$d(A) = \# \text{the minimum weight of a vector in } A \text{'s rowspan.}$$

Definition

(Dual Distance). If H is the parity check matrix of \mathcal{C} , the largest integer d such that every subset of d rows of H is linearly independent is called the dual distance of \mathcal{C} .

$$dd(H) = d(A)$$

Linear Test based on Minimum Distance

Lemma

For any $d \in \mathbb{N}$, the $(\mathcal{D}, \mathbf{C}, \mathcal{R})$ -LPN(k, n) is (ε_d, η_d) -secure against linear tests, where

$$\varepsilon_d = \max_{HW(\mathbf{v}) > d} \text{bias}_{\mathbf{v}}(\mathcal{D}_{k,n}), \quad \eta_d = \Pr_{H \leftarrow \mathbf{C}(k,n)}[d(H) \leq d].$$

$$\Pr \left[H \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbf{C}(k, n), \mathbf{v} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}(H) : \text{bias}_{\mathbf{v}}(\mathcal{D}_H) \geq \varepsilon_d \right] \leq \eta_d$$

$$\Pr \left[H \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbf{C}(k, n), \mathbf{v} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}(H) : \text{bias}_{\mathbf{v}}(\mathcal{D}_H) \geq \max_{HW(\mathbf{v}) > d} \text{bias}_{\mathbf{v}}(\mathcal{D}_{k,n}) \right] \leq$$

$$\Pr_{H \leftarrow \mathbf{C}(k,n)}[d(H) \leq d]$$

Pseudorandom Minimum Distance

Definition

(Pseudodistance) Let \mathbf{C} be a probabilistic code generation algorithm such that $\mathbf{C}(k, n)$ outputs a matrix $H \in \mathbb{F}_2^{k \times n}$. For a weight parameter $\delta(\lambda)$, we say that $\mathbf{C}(k(\lambda), n(\lambda))$ has pseudodistance $\delta(\lambda)$ if for every PPT algorithm \mathcal{A} there is a negligible function \mathbf{negl} such that

$$\Pr \left[\mathcal{A}(H) = \vec{x} \text{ s.t. } \vec{x} \neq \vec{0} \text{ and } \mathcal{HW}(\vec{x}^\top H) \leq \delta n \mid H \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbf{C}(k, n) \right] \leq \mathbf{negl}(\lambda)$$

Computing minimum distance is NP hard. Silver, EA-Code: estimate the minimum distance in a **heuristic/empirical** way.(making silver fail...)

Minimum Distance and Noise Rate

If $|v| = d$, and noise rate is r , then

$$\Pr \left[\mathbf{e} \leftarrow \text{Ber}_r^n(\mathbb{F}_2) : \mathbf{v}^\top \cdot \mathbf{e} = 1 \right] = \frac{1 - (1 - 2r)^d}{2}$$

$$\text{bias}_{\mathbf{v}}(\text{Ber}_r^n(\mathbb{F}_2)) = (1 - 2r)^d \leq e^{-2rd}$$

Leverage between minimum distance and noise rate:

As $\mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e}$, \mathbf{s} is uniformly random, $d(A) = d$.

- If the adversary choose \vec{v} s.t. $wt(\vec{v}) \leq d$, then $\vec{v}^T A \neq \vec{0}$, and $\vec{v}^T A \vec{s}$ is uniformly random.
- If the adversary choose \vec{v} s.t. $wt(\vec{v}) > d$, then by adding noise rate make $\vec{v}^T \mathbf{e}$ looks random.

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Expander-Accumulator Code

Definition

$H \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} EAGen(k, n, p, \mathcal{R})$

- $\vec{r}_1^T, \dots, \vec{r}_k^T \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} Ber_p^n(\mathcal{R})$ independently, and put $B = [\vec{r}_1 \| \vec{r}_2 \dots \| \vec{r}_k]^T$
- $A \in \mathcal{R}^{n \times n}$ is the Accumulator matrix, with 1's on and below the main diagonal, and 0's elsewhere.
- from $EAGen$ outputs $H = BA, B \in \mathcal{R}^{k \times n}, A \in \mathcal{R}^{n \times n}, H \in \mathcal{R}^{k \times n}$

It's assumed that $\mathcal{R} = \mathbb{F}_2$.

EA-LPN Assumption

Definition

(EA-LPN Assumption).

$$\left\{ (H, \vec{b}) \mid H \xleftarrow{\$} \text{EAGen}(k, n, p, \mathcal{R}), \vec{e} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{D}_N(\mathcal{R}), \vec{b} \leftarrow H \cdot \vec{e} \right\} \\ \stackrel{c}{\approx} \left\{ (H, \vec{b}) \mid H \xleftarrow{\$} \text{EAGen}(k, n, p, \mathcal{R}), \vec{b} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}^N \right\}.$$

According to the Linear Test Framework, we should prove that $d(H)$ is unlikely to be small.

$$\mathcal{HW}(\vec{y}^T) = \mathcal{HW}(\vec{x}^T H) = \mathcal{HW}(\vec{x}^T B A)$$

Bound $\mathcal{HW}(\vec{x}^T H)$

Lemma

Denote code rate $R = \frac{k}{n}$. Fix $p \in (0, \frac{1}{2})$ and $\delta > 0$. Let $r \in \mathbb{N}$ and let $\vec{x} \in \mathbb{F}_2^k$ be a vector of weight r . define $\xi_r = (1 - 2p)^r$, Then

$$\Pr [\mathcal{HW}(\vec{x}^T H) \leq \delta n] \leq 2 \exp \left(-2n \frac{1 - \xi_r}{1 + \xi_r} \left(\frac{1}{2} - \delta \right)^2 \right)$$

Markov Chain and Random Walk

- state space V
- transition matrix $P \in \mathbb{R}^{V \times V}$, $P_{u,v} = \Pr[\vec{u} \rightarrow \vec{v}]$.
- a distribution over the state space $\vec{v} \in \mathbb{R}^V$.
- random walk by P on V : $x_0 \leftarrow \vec{v}$. For $i \in [n]$, sample $x_i \leftarrow P_{x_{i-1}}$.
- stationary distribution: $\vec{\pi} \in \mathbb{R}^V$ s.t. $\vec{\pi}P = \vec{\pi}$
- irreducible: strongly connected
- reversible: $\forall u, v \in V$, $\vec{\pi}_u P_{u,v} = \vec{\pi}_v P_{v,u}$
- spectral gap of P

Irreducible chain has a unique stationary distribution, therefore has unique max eigenvalue 1.

Expander Hoeffding Bound

Theorem

(Expander Hoeffding Bound). Let (\mathcal{V}, P) denote a finite, irreducible and reversible Markov chain with stationary distribution $\vec{\pi}$ and second largest eigenvalue λ . Let $f: \mathcal{V} \rightarrow [0, 1]$ with $\mu = \mathbb{E}_{V \sim \vec{\pi}}[f(V)]$. For any integer $N \geq 1$, consider the random variable $S_N = \sum_{i=1}^N f(V_i)$, where V_0 is sampled uniformly at random from V and then V_1, \dots, V_N is a random walk starting at V_0 . Then, for $\lambda_0 = \max(0, \lambda)$ and any $\varepsilon > 0$ with $\mu + \varepsilon < 1$, the following bound holds:

$$\Pr[S_N \geq N(\mu + \varepsilon)] \leq \exp\left(-2 \frac{1 - \lambda_0}{1 + \lambda_0} N \varepsilon^2\right)$$

Piling-up Lemma

Lemma

(Piling-up Lemma). For any $r \in (0, \frac{1}{2})$ and any integer n , given n random variables X_1, \dots, X_n i.i.d. to $\text{Ber}_r(\mathbb{F}_2)$, we have

$$\Pr[\oplus_{i=1}^n X_i = 0] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{(1 - 2r)^n}{2}$$

EA Code Viewed as Random Walk

$$B = [\vec{c}_1, \dots, \vec{c}_n], \vec{c}_i \in \mathbb{F}_2^k$$

$$H = BA = [(\vec{c}_1 + \dots + \vec{c}_n), (\vec{c}_2 + \dots + \vec{c}_n), \dots, \vec{c}_n]$$

$$(y_1, \dots, y_n) = (\vec{x}^T (\vec{c}_1 + \dots + \vec{c}_n), \vec{x}^T (\vec{c}_2 + \dots + \vec{c}_n), \dots, \vec{x}^T \vec{c}_n)$$

$$y_n = \vec{x}^T \vec{c}_n, y_i = y_{i+1} + \vec{x}^T \vec{c}_i, \forall 1 \leq i \leq n-1$$

See y_n, \dots, y_1 as a random walk on state space $\mathcal{V} = \{0, 1\}$, and each step is a random variable $\vec{x}^T \vec{c}_i$.

$wt(\vec{x}^T) = r, \vec{c}_i \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} Ber_p^k(\mathbb{F}_2)$, then by piling-up lemma:

$$\Pr [\vec{x}^T \vec{c}_i = 0] = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{(1-2p)^r}{2} = \frac{1-\xi_r}{2}$$

EA Code Viewed as Random Walk

$$\Pr [\vec{x}^T \vec{c}_i = 0] = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{(1-2p)^r}{2} = \frac{1-\xi_r}{2}$$
$$\text{transition } P = \begin{bmatrix} 0 \rightarrow 0 & 0 \rightarrow 1 \\ 1 \rightarrow 0 & 1 \rightarrow 1 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1+\xi_r}{2} & \frac{1-\xi_r}{2} \\ \frac{1-\xi_r}{2} & \frac{1+\xi_r}{2} \end{bmatrix}$$

P is irreducible and reversible, and ξ_r is the second largest eigenvalue of P , and $(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$ is the stationary distribution of P .

Define a function $f: \mathcal{V} \rightarrow [0, 1]: f(0) = 1, f(1) = 0$, then by Expander Hoeffding Bound we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr [\mathcal{HW}(\vec{x}^T H) \leq \delta n] &= \Pr [\sum_{i=0}^n V_i \leq \delta n] \\ &= \Pr [S_n = \sum_{i=0}^n f(V_i) \geq (1 - \beta)n] \\ &\leq \exp \left(-2 \frac{1 - \xi_r}{1 + \xi_r} n \beta^2 \right) \end{aligned}$$

Bound on $d(H)$

Use union bound for all $\vec{x} \in \mathbb{F}_2^k$ of weight r :

Theorem

Theorem 3.10 Let $k, n \in \mathbb{N}$ with $k \leq n$ and put $R = \frac{k}{n}$, which we assume to be a constant. Let $C > 0$ and set $p = \frac{C \ln n}{n} \in (0, 1/2)$. Fix $\delta \in (0, 1/2)$ and put $\beta = 1/2 - \delta$. Then, assuming n is sufficiently large and assume $R < \min \left\{ \frac{2}{\ln 2} \cdot \frac{1-e^{-1}}{1+e^{-1}} \cdot \beta^2, \frac{2}{e} \right\}$ and $C > \frac{1}{\beta^2}$, we have


$$\Pr[d(H) \geq \delta n \mid H \xleftarrow{\$} \text{EAGen}(k, n, p)] \geq 1 - 2Rn^{-2\beta^2 C+2}.$$

$p = \Theta(\frac{\log n}{n})$, constant rate, $\Pr[d(H) = \Omega(n)] = 1 - 1/\text{poly}(n)$

$p = \Theta\left(\frac{\log^2 n}{n}\right)$, constant rate, $\Pr[d(H) = \Omega(n)] = 1 - 1/n^{-O(\log n)}$,
which is negligible in n .

Variants

- B 's rows from exact weight distribution
- B 's rows from regular distribution



heuristically using $\mathcal{HW}(\vec{x}^T H)$ as $d(H)$. Blue corresponds to exact; red corresponds to regular; and orange corresponds to Bernoulli.

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Expander-Convolute Codes

Definition

$H \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{ECGen}(k, n, p, \mathcal{R})$

For a ring \mathcal{R} and parameters $w, k, n \in \mathbb{N}$ with $w \ll k \leq n$, which is B 's row weight. $m \in \mathbb{N}$, $m \leq n$ is the size of convolutional internal state.

- $B \in \mathcal{R}^{k \times n}$, $B_{i,j} \leftarrow \text{Ber}_{p_w}(\mathcal{R})$, $p_w = \frac{w}{n}$
- convolutional code generator matrix $C \in \mathcal{R}^{n \times n}$ upper-triangular matrix with state size m , below the diagonal being some linear combination of the following m columns.
- from ECGen outputs $H = BC$, $B \in \mathcal{R}^{k \times n}$, $C \in \mathcal{R}^{n \times n}$, $H \in \mathcal{R}^{k \times n}$

Better than EA-Code, more generalized.

EC-LPN Assumption

Definition

(EC-LPN). Let $\mathcal{D}(\mathcal{R}) = \{\mathcal{D}_n(\mathcal{R})\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ denote a family of efficiently sampleable distributions over a ring \mathcal{R} , such that for any $n \in \mathbb{N}$, $\text{Im}(\mathcal{D}_n(\mathcal{R})) \subseteq \mathcal{R}^n$. For a dimension $k = k(\kappa)$, number of samples $n = n(\kappa)$, expansion weight $w = w(\kappa) \in [n]$, state size $m = m(\kappa) \in [n]$, convolving density $p_c = p_c(\kappa) \in [0, 1]$ and ring $\mathcal{R} = \mathcal{R}(\kappa)$, the $(\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{R})$ -EC-LPN(w, m, k, n, p_c) assumption states that

$$\{(H, \mathbf{b}) \text{ s.t. } H \leftarrow \text{ECGen}(w, m, k, n, p_c, \mathcal{R}), \mathbf{e} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_n(\mathcal{R}, \mathbf{b} \leftarrow H\mathbf{e})\} \\ \stackrel{c}{\approx} \{(H, \mathbf{b}) \text{ s.t. } H \leftarrow \text{ECGen}(w, m, k, n, p_c, \mathcal{R}), \mathbf{b} \leftarrow \mathcal{R}^k\}.$$

Roadmap: also random walking on Markov chains, and bound the visits to the state 1. But irreversible???

EC Code Viewed as Random Walk

$$B = [\vec{c}_1, \dots, \vec{c}_n], \vec{c}_i \in \mathbb{F}_2^k, \vec{c}_i \leftarrow \text{Ber}_{p_w}^k$$
$$y_i = \sum_{j \in [m]} \alpha_{i,j} y_{i,j} + \vec{x}^T \vec{c}_i, \forall 2 \leq i \leq n$$

Denote the internal state by $\vec{\sigma}_i = (y_{i-1}, \dots, y_{i-m})$, so $y_i = \vec{x}^T \vec{c}_i + \vec{\sigma}_i^T \vec{\alpha}_i$.

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[y_i = 1 \mid \vec{\sigma}_i] \\ &= \Pr[\vec{x}^T \vec{c}_i = 0] \Pr[\vec{\sigma}_i^T \vec{\alpha}_i = 1] + \Pr[\vec{x}^T \vec{c}_i = 1] \Pr[\vec{\sigma}_i^T \vec{\alpha}_i = 0] \\ &= \frac{1 + (1 - 2p_w)^r}{2} \Pr[\vec{\sigma}_i^T \vec{\alpha}_i = 1] + \frac{1 - (1 - 2p_w)^r}{2} \Pr[\vec{\sigma}_i^T \vec{\alpha}_i = 0] \end{aligned}$$

$\alpha_{i,j}$ is random (if $p_c = \frac{1}{2}$), but the internal state has impact on the probability.

EC Code Viewed As Random Walk

$$\Pr \left[y_i = 1 \mid \vec{\sigma}_{i-1} \neq \vec{0} \right] = \frac{1}{2}$$

$$\Pr \left[y_i = 1 \mid \vec{\sigma}_{i-1} = \vec{0} \right] = \frac{1 - (1 - 2p_w)^r}{2}$$

$$\Pr \left[y_i = 0 \mid \vec{\sigma}_{i-1} \neq \vec{0} \right] = \frac{1}{2}$$

$$\Pr \left[y_i = 0 \mid \vec{\sigma}_{i-1} = \vec{0} \right] = \frac{1 + (1 - 2p_w)^r}{2}$$

Situation is only bad when $\vec{\sigma}_{i-1} = \vec{0}$, intuitively better than EA-Code. Then we can view the **changes of internal state** as a random walk on $\mathcal{V} = \{0, 1\}^m$, and each step is y_i . Imagine the transition matrix being $2^m \times 2^m$, but with many 0's.

But this scale is too large to analyze, so we shrink the Markov chain.

EC Code Viewed As Random Walk, Shrunk

Intuition: only all-0 state matter, so we only care how far is the internal state from all-0 state.

We can group states based on the **suffix of the m bits representing the state**, shrinking all the 2^m states to $m - 1$ states:

$1, 0_1, 0_2, \dots, 0_{m-1}, 0_m$. Define $p_r := \frac{1 - (1 - 2p_w)^r}{2}$




Figure: 1, Shrunk Markov Chain, irreversible

EC Code Viewed As Random Walk, Reversible

for some $\theta_m > 0$, $\Pr[0 \rightarrow 0] = 1 - p_r$, $\Pr[0 \rightarrow ?] = p_r$,
 $\Pr[? \rightarrow 0] = 2^{-(m+\theta_m)}$, $\Pr[? \rightarrow ?] = 1 - 2^{-(m+\theta_m)}$ 0 is the same as 0_m ,
and ? emulates all other states, containing all different paths to 0_m .




Figure: 2, Coupling Markov Chain, reversible

Reversible. Claim walking on these two Markov Chains, $\#(\text{steps on ?})$ bounds $\#(\text{steps on 1})$ because of the coupling of the two chains.

Theorem


Let n denote the length of the random walks performed on the chains in Figures 1 and 2, where $m \geq \log n + 2$. Starting from state 0_m of the irreversible chain (Figure 1), let X_i be the indicator of being in state 1 at step i . Starting from state 0 of the reversible chain (Figure 2), let Y_i be the indicator of being in state? at step i and then **uniformly mapping ? to $\{0, 1\}$ (with probability $\frac{1}{2}$)**. Fix $\delta \in [0, 1]$ and $\hat{k} > 0$. Then, there exists $\theta_m \in [0, 1)$ such that

$$\Pr \left[\sum_{i \in [n]} X_i \leq \delta n - \hat{k}(m-1) \right] \leq \frac{1}{1 - \exp \left(-\frac{\tilde{\delta}_r \hat{k}}{2 + \tilde{\delta}_r} \right)} \Pr \left[\sum_{i \in [n]} Y_i \leq \delta n \right]$$


where $\tilde{\delta}_r = \frac{\hat{k}}{n \cdot 2^{-(m+\theta_m)} \cdot p_r}$.

Conjecture: Theorem holds for all $m \geq 2$.

Flip a Coin, But Heavier



In i steps, $S_0 : 0_m \rightarrow \dots 0_m \rightarrow 1$ $S_1 : 1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow 0_{m-1} \rightarrow 0_m$



In i steps, $S'_0 : 0 \rightarrow \dots 0 \rightarrow ?$ $S'_1 : ? \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow ? \rightarrow 0$

$S_0 = S'_0$, $S_1(p) - (m-1) \geq S'_1(p)$.

Lemma

Fix $\hat{k} > 0$. Define $\tilde{\delta}_r = \frac{\hat{k}}{n \cdot 2^{-m} \cdot p_r}$. Then, we have with probability at least $1 - \exp\left(-\frac{\tilde{\delta}_r \hat{k}}{2 + \tilde{\delta}_r}\right)$:

$$HW(Z_{\tilde{X}}) \geq HW(Z_{\tilde{Y}}) - \hat{k}(m-1)$$

Theorem

$$\Pr \left[\sum_{i \in [n]} X_i \leq \delta n - \hat{k}(m-1) \right] \leq \frac{1}{1 - \exp\left(-\frac{\tilde{\delta}_r \hat{k}}{2 + \tilde{\delta}_r}\right)} \Pr \left[\sum_{i \in [n]} Y_i \leq \delta n \right]$$

where $\tilde{\delta}_r = \frac{\hat{k}}{n \cdot 2^{-(m+\theta_m)} \cdot p_r}$.

Bound $\sum_{i \in [n]} Y_i$ on Reversible Chain

$$\vec{\pi}_r = \left(\frac{2^{-(m+\theta_m)}}{p_r + 2^{-(m+\theta_m)}}, \frac{p_r}{p_r + 2^{-(m+\theta_m)}} \right)$$
$$\lambda_r = 1 - p_r - 2^{-(m+\theta_m)}$$

Walk on the reversible chain for n steps, the time we visit ? is bounded by Expander Hoeffding Inequality:

$$\Pr[N_{?} < n\vec{\pi}_{r,?} - \epsilon] \leq \left(1 + 2^{m+\theta_m} p_r\right) \exp\left(-2 \frac{\epsilon^2}{n} \cdot \frac{1 - \lambda_r}{1 + \lambda_r}\right)$$

And in the ? state, suppose we walk T steps on the flipping-coin chain, bound the time we visit 1, $\epsilon = (\frac{1}{2} - \beta) T$

$$\Pr\left[N_1 \leq \frac{1}{2} T - \epsilon\right] \leq \exp\left(\frac{-2\epsilon^2}{T}\right) = \chi_{\beta,T}$$

.

$$N_?, N_1 \rightarrow \Pr \left[\sum_{i \in [n]} Y_i \leq \delta n \right] \rightarrow \Pr \left[\sum_{i \in [n]} X_i \leq \delta n - \hat{k}(m-1) \right] \rightarrow \\ \mathcal{HW}(\vec{x}^T H) \rightarrow \Pr \left[d(H) \leq \delta n - \hat{k}(m-1) \right]$$

Theorem

Let $w, m, k, n \in \mathbb{N}$ with $w, m, k \leq n$. Define $R = \frac{k}{n}$. Fix $\delta \in [0, 1]$ and $\hat{k} > 0$. We assume that the following hold: $w = C \ln n$ for some $C > 2$; $m = C_m \log n$ for some $C_m > 1$; $R \leq \frac{2}{e}$, $C \left(\frac{20}{41} - \delta \right)^2 > 2$ and $R < \frac{1}{\ln 2} \cdot \frac{e-1}{e+1} \left(\frac{20}{41} - \delta \right)^2$; $\hat{k} \geq n^{1-C_m}$ and $\hat{k} \geq 2 \ln 2$. Then, for all sufficiently large n ,

$$\Pr \left[d(G) < \delta n - \hat{k}(m-1) : G \leftarrow \text{ECGen} \left(w, m, k, n, \frac{1}{2}, \mathbb{F}_2 \right) \right] \\ \leq 2Rn^{-C \left(\frac{20}{41} - \delta \right)^2 + C_m + 3}$$

When $\mathcal{R} = \mathbb{F}_2$, $w, m = \Theta(\log n)$, $p_c = \frac{1}{2}$, secure against Linear Test.

- 1 PCG Based on LPN
- 2 Linear Test Framework
- 3 Expander-Accumulator Codes
- 4 Expander-Convolute Codes
- 5 Silver LDPC Codes
 - Preliminaries for Silver Codes
 - From Uniform, TZ to Silver
 - Failed Security

fastest(linear encoding time, cache-friendly), linear minimum time.

Warning: The conjectured linear minimum distance of this work has been shown to be false. Silver codes should not be used. See [RRT23].

The Construction of Silver:

- Empirical estimation of minimum distance
 - Brouwer-Zimmerman algorithm: solving exact minimum distance (exponential, $n \leq 180$)
 - Noise impulse method: by solving a flipped vector close to zero vector to approximate $d(H)$
- Try to fit into an efficient decoder: g-ALT (better efficiency)
- Try to get better memory locality (better efficiency)

g -Approximate Lower Triangle Matrix

Definition

(g -ALT). If H can be transformed into the form below with **only column and row swaps**, then it can be encoded in $O(n + g^2)$ time

- 1 null space of H doesn't change with only column and row swaps
- 2 Silver want to keep $g = O(\sqrt{n})$ to achieve linear encoding time.




Fig. 9: The structure of an g approximate lower triangular matrix. The diagonal of C should all be ones.

LDPC Code and Tanner Graph


Definition

(regular LDPC Code). An LDPC code with constant number of 0's per row and per column.

Definition

(Tanner Graph). A Tanner graph of an LDPC code with parity check matrix \mathbf{H} is a bipartite graph $\{V_1, V_2\}$, having one vertex in V_1 for each row of \mathbf{H} (called check nodes) and one vertex in V_2 for each column of \mathbf{H} (called variable nodes), and there is an edge between two vertices c_i and v_j exactly when $h_{ij} \neq 0$.

$$\mathbf{H} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}.$$





Tanner Graph and Minimum Distance

- We don't want short cycle, which means small $d(H)$
- We don't want too many variable nodes with degree 2, if $H \in \mathbb{F}_2^{k \times n}$, if $n_2/m < 1$, $d(H) = O(\log n)$; $n_2/m > 1$, $\Pr[d(H) = O(n)] > 0$
- It is well-known that odd column weight t LDPC codes achieve better minimum distance performance


Standard LDPC

- well-studied security, under Alekhnovich Assumption
- $g = O(n)$, which cannot be efficiently encoded.





Tillich-Zémor Code

- with structure $H = [L||R]$, $k = m = n/2$. L is a $m \times m$ matrix standard sparse, R is a $m \times m$ matrix with a diagonal bind, its n_2/m is 1.
- sublinear minimum distance due to the diagonal bind.
- fast encoding, $O(n)$




Tillich-Zémor Code

The diagonal band is concentrated, R cancelling L .




Silver #1

- start with TZ Codes, removing weight-2 columns(i.e. degree-2 variable nodes in Tanner Graph)
- efficient encoding, $g = O(1)$ which depends on the fixed column weight(the hight of the left bottom).
- much better minimum distance than TZ Codes.




Silver #1


- start with TZ Codes, removing weight-2 columns(i.e. degree-2 variable nodes in Tanner Graph)
- efficient encoding, $g = O(1)$ which depends on the fixed column weight(the hight of the left bottom).
- much better minimum distance than TZ Codes. But still sublinear due to clumping.



Silver #1




(b) Average minimum distance of weight $t = 5$




Silver #2


- adding additional weight one diagonals below the main diagonal prevents clumping, because there may be some 1 at bottom.
- achieve almost linear minimum distance, close to uniform LDPC.
- keep efficient encoding, $g = O(1)$





Silver #2




(b) d_{avg} of column weight 5 codes.




Silver #3, #5



Silver #3, #5



(a) Average minimum distance of Slv2, Slv3 vs uniform with $t = 5$.



Failed Security

- A kind of convolutional code which has been studied (turbo-like codes), but with weak internal state.
- Failed linear minimum distance at large scale: Silver was only able to evaluate the codes of size up to $n = 800$ and observed minimum distance up to 140. our attacks show that the minimum distance of these codes stop growing at approximately 8705 or 4, 158 depending on the variant.
- Stronger turbo-like variant with permutation matrix rather than shifts in silver, only achieve linear minimum distance when w is relatively small, i.e. $w = 5, 11$ as Silver specifies.

Possible Future Analysis

- silver-turbo-RA-EA-EC
- regular ISD

References

PCF from VDLPN <https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1417> revisited
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/650.pdf>
silver LDPC <https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1150>
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FCNcrxcFLtU>
Expand-Accumulate Codes <https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1014>
Expand-Convolute Codes <https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/882>