Sessions



Agenda

- Sessions
- Cookies
- Third-party cookies
- Example from project 2

The web remembers you

- How does a shopping cart stay full?
- How do I log in?
- How does Google remember my past queries?

Sessions

- Goal: maintain state with stateless HTTP
- This is called a **session**


But HTTP is stateless!!!

- Principle of the web is to build in layers, with each layer as simple as possible
- Could have built state into HTTP
 - State not always required
 - When state is needed, the reasons are various, and corresponding sizes vary
 - Supporting all this in HTTP would have made it bloated
- So instead, build state on top of HTTP

Sessions


- A session is a single "interaction" between the site and user
 - Precise definition depends on application
- Example: Facebook or Gmail login
- Example: Amazon cart
 - Even when you're not logged in

Session perspectives - client



Session perspectives: server

- A server must track many sessions at once
- How can it tell the difference between clients?



Sessions and stateless HTTP

- HTTP is stateless, so we want to use a "session protocol" on top of it
- There's no such thing as a "session protocol"
- Implemented at application layer instead
 - State maintained in session variables
 - Data stored in one request can be accessed by later request
- Application layer sessions are one reason to use a web framework
 - Flask, Django, Ruby-on-rails, etc.

Server session model

- Sessions are explicitly opened and closed by the server
- When to create a session?
- How to store session data?
- When to close a session?
- How to link sessions to users?
- How to link HTTP requests to a session?

When to create a session?

- Depends on the application
- Amazon?
 - When you visit the page
 - Needed for a shopping cart
- Gmail?
 - When you log in
 - Needed so that it shows the right mail to the right person


How to store session data?

- Session data storage is up to the server
- Best practice: store a small amount of data identify the session
 - Username, session ID, etc.
- Use session ID or username to do a database lookup
 - Shopping cart content, news feed items, etc.

When to close a session?

- We can't rely on logout
- Timeouts needed for almost all apps
 - When should the online game be reset?
 - When should Google forget your search?
 - When has your cart been abandoned?
 - When have you started searching for a different flight?
- Timeout from first request or most recent?

How to link sessions to users



How to link sessions to users

- 1. Client requests https://mail.google.com
- 2. Server responds with redirect to https://accounts.google.com/signin/v2/identifier?continue=https %3A%2F%2Fmail.google.com/2Fmail%2F
 - Recall URL escaping: %3A == :, %2F == /
- 3. Client sends request with username and password
- 4. Server tests and responds with redirect to https://mail.google.com

Agenda

- Sessions
- Cookies
- Third-party cookies
- Example from project 2


Session implementation

How to link HTTP requests to a session?

Turn this

Check credit card Put book in cart Put shirt in cart Request gift wrapping Take book out of cart Put top hat in cart Change address Put in another book

... into this



Cookies

Me heard of something called "computer cookie"! How can me get one? Me bet it delicious! RETWEETS S 🚅 🎏 😭 🕰 🦠 🛍 389 280 7:42 AM - 13 Jan 2016 Cookies are small files on client machine

Cookie Monster

- - Carry state between HTTP requests
 - Contain key/value pairs
- According to the lore, the name originates from the story of Hansel and Gretel, who were able to mark their trail through a dark forest by dropping cookie crumbs behind them.


Follow

Cookies

Client Server Put book in cart (and set cookie) (Modifies database) Put in another book (and here's my cookie) (Modifies database again) (Cart looks full thanks to cookie info)


Example: cookies in Chrome

- See all cookies by browsing to chrome: //settings/siteData
- Take a look at the cookies on your own laptop




Example: cookies in Chrome

- Browse to https://www.amazon.com/
- Settings / Advanced / Content settings / Cookies / See all cookies




- Browse to https://www.amazon.com/
- Add something to the cart



- Again, browse to https://www.amazon.com/
- Cart has one item, even though we're on a different page



Clear cookies using the developer console



- Again, browse to https://www.amazon.com/
- Cart appears empty



Example: facebook log in

Log in Facebook (or any other web site)



- Clear the Facebook cookies using the developer console
- Visit facebook.com again
- You're no longer logged in



Cookie content

- Name is up to the server
- Value is up to server: encrypted? OK!
- **Domain** used by browser per-domain, total limits
- Path specifies scope of cookie
 - / vs. /cart/ or whatever
- Expiration tells client when to delete
- Secure is how cookie may be transmitted

Name	Value	Domain	Path	Expires / Max	Size	HTTP	Secure	SameSite
csm-hit	6SMS3JE6TN8HC9JXT1BM+s-D02JSKPWCWCEQ1JBFH	www.amazon.com	/	2018-01-23T	64			
session-id	133-7499895-4230864	.amazon.com	/	2036-01-01T	29			
session-id-time	20827872011	.amazon.com	/	2036-01-01T	26			
session-token	Z7BBJabdxLhufMLF1UNiZK75ibXyTodM3OuusYgiO7xCgR	.amazon.com	/	2038-01-11T	269			
skin	noskin	.amazon.com	/	Session	10			
spblockdate	1516117231080	www.amazon.com	/	2028-01-14T	24			
ubid-main	132-0740974-0237934	.amazon.com	/	2036-01-01T	28			
x-wl-uid	1gaw0tztjcgWgcjkDQSl9Hr4AkyB33hlw9lk44qFtLMtimrpn	.amazon.com	/	2036-01-01T	85			

Cookie content

- Cookies only over-writable by same domain and path
- Enforced by browser
- Store a username, session ID, etc. in the cookie
- Use session ID or username to do a database lookup
 - Shopping card content, news feed items, etc.

- Set by server, but not requested
- Sent by client, but never edited
- Either side can delete/ignore cookies
- Sent as part of HTTP headers

- Visit Amazon using curl
- Fake the user agent, pretend to be a web browser
 - --user-agent "Mozilla/5.0"
- Ignore the page itself, just look at the the headers
 - > /dev/null
- Curl sends Host and User-Agent headers to Amazon

```
$ curl --verbose --user-agent "Mozilla/5.0"
https://www.amazon.com/ > /dev/null
> GET / HTTP/1.1
> Host: www.amazon.com
> User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0
> Accept: */*
...
```

• Amazon responds with 200 OK, some headers, and data

```
$ curl --verbose --user-agent "Mozilla/5.0"
https://www.amazon.com/ > /dev/null
...
< HTTP/1.1 200 OK
< Content-Type: text/html;charset=UTF-8
...
< Set-Cookie: skin=noskin; path=/; domain=.amazon.com
< Set-Cookie: session-id=130-5594428-2333702;
Domain=.amazon.com; Expires=Tue, 01-Jan-2036 08:00:01
GMT; Path=/
< Set-Cookie: session-id-time=20827872011;
Domain=.amazon.com; Expires=Tue, 01-Jan-2036 08:00:01
GMT; Path=/</pre>
```

- Headers include request to Set-Cookie
- These are exactly (some of) the cookies we saw in Chrome

```
$ curl --verbose --user-agent "Mozilla/5.0"
https://www.amazon.com/ > /dev/null
...
< Set-Cookie: skin=noskin; path=/; domain=.amazon.com
< Set-Cookie: session-id=130-5594428-2333702;
Domain=.amazon.com; Expires=Tue, 01-Jan-2036 08:00:01
GMT; Path=/
< Set-Cookie: session-id-time=20827872011;
Domain=.amazon.com; Expires=Tue, 01-Jan-2036 08:00:01
GMT; Path=/</pre>
```

Name	Value	Domain	Path	Expires / Max	Size	HTTP	Secure	SameSite
csm-hit	6SMS3JE6TN8HC9JXT1BM+s-D02JSKPWCWCEQ1JBFH	www.amazon.com	/	2018-01-23T	64			
session-id	133-7499895-4230864	.amazon.com	/	2036-01-01T	29			
session-id-time	20827872011	.amazon.com	/	2036-01-01T	26			
session-token	Z7BBJabdxLhufMLF1UNiZK75ibXyTodM3OuusYgiO7xCgR	.amazon.com	/	2038-01-11T	269			
skin	noskin	.amazon.com	/	Session	10			
spblockdate	1516117231080	www.amazon.com	/	2028-01-14T	24			
ubid-main	132-0740974-0237934	.amazon.com	/	2036-01-01T	28			
x-wl-uid	1gaw0tztjcgWgcjkDQSl9Hr4AkyB33hlw9lk44qFtLMtimrpn	.amazon.com	/	2036-01-01T	85			

- Cookies add to HTTP overhead
- Again, best practice is to store a small amount of data in the cookie
- Use that data to do a database lookup on the server side

Saving cookies

- Your browser saves cookies by default
- Tell curl to save cookies with --cookie-jar

```
$ curl --verbose --user-agent "Mozilla/5.0"
    -cookie-jar cookies.txt https://www.amazon.com/
    > /dev/null
$ cat cookies.txt
.amazon.com TRUE / FALSE 0 skin noskin
.amazon.com TRUE / FALSE 2082787201 session-id 147-
4402398-5757441
.amazon.com TRUE / FALSE 2082787201 session-id-time
20827872011
```

Encrypted cookie transfer

- If I have your cookies, I can steal your session
 - To the server, I look just like you!
- Prevent this with cookies that can only be transmitted over HTTPS

Name	Value	Domain	P	Expires / Max	Size	HTTP	Secure
a-ogbcbff	1	.amazon.com	/	2018-01-16T	10		
at-main	Atza IwEBIL-ZdP_TnX55gVrEdKvscQRM4Tjoq0cTj_bivnQG	.amazon.com	/	2038-01-11T	424	√	√
aws-ubid-main	102-1422888-1085586	.amazon.com	/	2086-02-03T	32	√	√
csm-hit	s-MZBVZTC3VF120DMVJDF6 1516118415619	www.amazon.com	/	2018-01-23T	43		
Ic-main	en_US	.amazon.com	/	2038-01-11T	12		
sess-at-main	"bWhsxGV15YSI5RDUGleDQGcU9k+PLNN0Ml3JPNsPj28="	.amazon.com	/	Session	58	√	√
session-id	142-6976303-8296237	.amazon.com	/	2036-01-01T	29		
session-id-time	20827872011	.amazon.com	/	2036-01-01T	26		
session-token	OCpqc+N1p2eiUvVrZI+3wUqsRi6Fm3I6JnSMhC19oN5kve	.amazon.com	/	2038-01-11T	281		
skin	noskin	.amazon.com	/	Session	10		
spblockdate	1514917833143	www.amazon.com	/	2027-12-31T	24		
sst-main	Sst1 PQGjiLW9hWUjZIPbIHPIPXH8CAeBAYdLmz4cPvGgEb	.amazon.com	/	2038-01-11T	295	√	√
ubid-main	132-7633599-2974057	.amazon.com	/	2036-01-01T	28		
x-main	"JqL@@cu6yh0xuDwQrAfLeP9PI@9TlcZgRYXh08zDQC7gV	.amazon.com	/	2038-01-11T	72		
x-wl-uid	1qpmQHYEzowtwk8DHEWu0Bfr4FGX+O579dYLEygZC8kyj	.amazon.com	/	2036-01-01T	149		

Encrypted cookie values

- If the client has a copy of cookies set by the server, then the client can manipulate the server
- Prevent this with encrypted cookie content
 - Only the server can decrypt

Name	Value	Domain	P	Expires / Max	Size	HTTP	Secure
a-ogbcbff	1	.amazon.com	1	2018-01-16T	10		
at-main	Atza IwEBIL-ZdP_TnX55gVrEdKvscQRM4Tjoq0cTj_biv	nQGamazon.com	/	2038-01-11T	424	√	√
aws-ubid-main	102-1422888-1085586	.amazon.com	/	2086-02-03T	32	✓	✓
csm-hit	s-MZBVZTC3VF120DMVJDF6 1516118415619	www.amazon.com	/	2018-01-23T	43		
lc-main	en_US	.amazon.com	/	2038-01-11T	12		
sess-at-main	"bWhsxGV15YSI5RDUGleDQGcU9k+PLNN0MI3JPNsF	Pj28=" .amazon.com	/	Session	58	✓	√
session-id	142-6976303-8296237	.amazon.com	/	2036-01-01T	29		
session-id-time	20827872011	.amazon.com	/	2036-01-01T	26		
session-token	OCpqc+N1p2eiUvVrZI+3wUqsRi6Fm3I6JnSMhC19oN	5kveamazon.com	/	2038-01-11T	281		
skin	noskin	.amazon.com	/	Session	10		
spblockdate	1514917833143	www.amazon.com	/	2027-12-31T	24		
sst-main	Sst1 PQGjiLW9hWUjZIPbIHPIPXH8CAeBAYdLmz4cPv0	GgEbamazon.com	/	2038-01-11T	295	✓	√
ubid-main	132-7633599-2974057	.amazon.com	/	2036-01-01T	28		
x-main	"JqL@@cu6yh0xuDwQrAfLeP9PI@9TlcZgRYXh08zDQ0	C7gVamazon.com	/	2038-01-11T	72		
x-wl-uid	1qpmQHYEzowtwk8DHEWu0Bfr4FGX+O579dYLEygZ	C8kyjamazon.com	/	2036-01-01T	149		

Session vs. permanent cookies

- Session cookies are deleted by the client shuts down
 - Close the tab or quit the browser
- Permanent cookies have explicit expiration dates

Name	Value	Domain	P	Expires / Max	Size	НТТР	Secure
a-ogbcbff	1	.amazon.com	1	2018-01-16T	10		
at-main	Atza IwEBIL-ZdP_TnX55gVrEdKvscQRM4Tjoq0cTj_biv	nQGamazon.com	/	2038-01-11T	424	√	√
aws-ubid-main	102-1422888-1085586	.amazon.com	/	2086-02-03T	32	✓	✓
csm-hit	s-MZBVZTC3VF120DMVJDF6 1516118415619	www.amazon.com	/	2018-01-23T	43		
lc-main	en_US	.amazon.com	/	2038-01-11T	12		
sess-at-main	"bWhsxGV15YSI5RDUGleDQGcU9k+PLNN0MI3JPNsf	Pj28=" .amazon.com	/	Session	58	✓	✓
session-id	142-6976303-8296237	.amazon.com	/	2036-01-01T	29		
session-id-time	20827872011	.amazon.com	/	2036-01-01T	26		
session-token	OCpqc+N1p2eiUvVrZI+3wUqsRi6Fm3I6JnSMhC19oN	5kveamazon.com	/	2038-01-11T	281		
skin	noskin	.amazon.com	/	Session	10		
spblockdate	1514917833143	www.amazon.com	/	2027-12-31T	24		
sst-main	Sst1 PQGjiLW9hWUjZIPbIHPIPXH8CAeBAYdLmz4cPv	GgEbamazon.com	/	2038-01-11T	295	✓	✓
ubid-main	132-7633599-2974057	.amazon.com	/	2036-01-01T	28		
x-main	"JqL@@cu6yh0xuDwQrAfLeP9Pl@9TlcZgRYXh08zDQ0	C7gVamazon.com	/	2038-01-11T	72		
x-wl-uid	1qpmQHYEzowtwk8DHEWu0Bfr4FGX+O579dYLEygZ	C8kyjamazon.com	/	2036-01-01T	149		

Agenda

- Sessions
- Cookies
- Third-party cookies
- Example from project 2

Third-party cookies

- Page may contain objects from many sources
 - Scripts, images, etc.
- These 3rd-party objects set and get cookies
- Example: nytimes.com

Third-party cookies

- Cookies have a domain
- First-party cookie: domain is the same as the domain of the page you are on
- Third-party cookie: domain is different
- Example from nytimes.com

Name	Value	Domain	P	Expires / Ma	Size	HTTP	Secure	SameSite
IDE	AHWqTUle_KCiqXNrNt3LWAFbPHlkNNCKdka6oVRxF	.doubleclick.net	/	2020-01-16	67	√		
UID	15718486a24320a1606e8cg1516118895	.scorecardres	/	2020-01-06	36			
UIDR	1516118895	.scorecardres	/	2020-01-06	14			
gads	ID=a2a38e066efb072b:T=1516118895:S=ALNI_MYy9	.nytimes.com	/	2020-01-16	75			
utma	69104142.228179094.1516118895.1516118895.15161	.nytimes.com	/	2020-01-16	59			
utmb	69104142.1.10.1516118896	.nytimes.com	/	2018-01-16	30			
utmc	69104142	.nytimes.com	/	Session	14			
utmt	1	.nytimes.com	/	2018-01-16	7			
utmz	69104142.1516118896.1.1.utmcsr=(direct) utmccn=(di	.nytimes.com	/	2018-07-18	75			

Example: Google third party cookies

- One of the main advertising cookies on non-Google sites is named IDE and is stored in browsers under the domain doubleclick.net.
 - https://www.google.com/policies/technologies/types/
- Visit nytimes.com and view cookies:

Name	Value	Domain	P	Expires / Ma	Size	HTTP	Secure	SameSite
IDE	AHWqTUle_KCiqXNrNt3LWAFbPHlkNNCKdka6oVRxF	.doubleclick.net	/	2020-01-16	67	√		
UID	15718486a24320a1606e8cg1516118895	.scorecardres	/	2020-01-06	36			
UIDR	1516118895	.scorecardres	/	2020-01-06	14			
gads	ID=a2a38e066efb072b:T=1516118895:S=ALNI_MYy9	.nytimes.com	/	2020-01-16	75			
utma	69104142.228179094.1516118895.1516118895.15161	.nytimes.com	/	2020-01-16	59			
utmb	69104142.1.10.1516118896	.nytimes.com	/	2018-01-16	30			
utmc	69104142	.nytimes.com	/	Session	14			
utmt	1	.nytimes.com	/	2018-01-16	7			
utmz	69104142.1516118896.1.1.utmcsr=(direct) utmccn=(di	.nytimes.com	/	2018-07-18	75			

Example: Google third party cookies

Excerpt from nytimes.com HTML source

```
<html>
  <body>
    <script>
     function placeGpt() {
       var gptScript = document.createElement('script');
       gptScript.src = '//securepubads.g.doubleclick.net/tag/js/gpt.js';
       document.head.appendChild(gptScript);
     placeGpt()
    </script>
  </body>
</ht.ml>
                                                              42
```

Example: Google third party cookies

- You type nytimes.com into your browser
- Browser issues GET request to nytimes.com
 - Includes nytimes.com cookies
- Browser receives HTML for nytimes.com
 - HTML includes some JavaScript via the <script> tag
- Browser executes JavaScript included by nytimes.com
 - JS code figures out you are on nytimes.com, e.g., with window.location.href
 - JS codes initiates a request to doubleclick.net
- Browser issues GET request to doubleclick.net
 - Includes doubleclick.net cookie
 - Appends your current location (nytimes.com) to the URL
- Now, doubleclick.net (AKA Google) knows you visited nytimes.com

Who uses third-party cookies?

- Companies that sell ads directly
 - Google and Facebook (obviously)
- Companies that sell information about you



- Acxiom "one of the biggest companies you've never heard of" (\$1B+)
- "If you're not paying for the product, then you are the product"
 - That's mostly how the business side of the web is structured

What does Acxiom have on me?

You can view part of the profile Acxiom has on you


•



• But to see it, you need to give them your name, address, email, social security number ...

Checking what you send to trackers

https://panopticlick.eff.org/




Browser fingerprinting

- Browser fingerprinting attempts to uniquely identify your browser using information other than cookies
 - User Agent
 - Time zone
 - Fonts
 - Language
 - And lots more
- Anti-fingerprinting options announced by Firefox, Chrome, Safari
 - As of fall 2019

Avoiding trackers

- Add-ons like uBlock Origin, Privacy Badger, Brave, Disconnect or ScriptNo block trackers
- Monitors embedded links and blacklists trackers



Discussion

- Many web companies make their money from information about users
- In exchange, they give you a "free" service (email, web search, a platform for gossip, etc.)
- Is it OK to block trackers?

Agenda

- Sessions
- Cookies
- Third-party cookies
- Example from project 2

Cookie example

app.run (debug=True)

```
import flask
                                    flask.session
app = flask.Flask( name )
app.secret key = b'uAy \times 9d \times 08[x12 \times 8d \times 9d \times 1f \times 86A \times 9fpQy4 \times 05] \times 04'
@app.route('/')
                                Test if key exists
def index():
    if "user" in flask.session:
                                                      Get key/value
         user = flask.session["user"]
         app.logger.debug("Get user=%s", user)
         return "<html><body>Hello {}</body></html>".format(user)
    else:
         flask.session["user"] = "awdeorio"
                                                      Set key/value
         app.logger.debug("Set user=%s", user)
         return "<html><body>Logging in ...</body></html>"
if name == ' main ':
```

Key idea: cookie is a bunch of

them in a dictionary called

key/value pairs. Flask provides

Cookie example

Start server

```
$ python3 test.py
 * Running on http://127.0.0.1:5000/ (Press CTRL+C to quit)
[2019-01-22 08:40:31,790] DEBUG in test: Set user=awdeorio
127.0.0.1 - - [22/Jan/2019 08:40:31] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 -
```

Browse to http://localhost:5000/



• See encrypted cookie in developer console

Network	Performance	Memory	Application	Security	Audits	HTTPS Everywhere						8 1	:	×
€ 0	× Filter													
Name			Value				Domain	P	Expires / Ma.x	Size	HTTP	Secure	Same	Site
session			eyJ1c2VyljoiY	XdkZW9yaW	8ifQ.Dyiuzv	w.PaM16reRt90H	localhost	/	1969-12-31	68	√			

Cookie example

Hit refresh



• Checker server logs. User read from encrypted cookie.

```
$ python3 test.py
 * Running on http://127.0.0.1:5000/ (Press CTRL+C to quit)
[2019-01-22 08:40:31,790] DEBUG in test: Set user=awdeorio
127.0.0.1 - - [22/Jan/2019 08:40:31] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 -
[2019-01-22 08:51:20,506] DEBUG in test: Get user=awdeorio
127.0.0.1 - - [22/Jan/2019 08:51:20] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 -
```

Cookie encryption key

```
import flask
app = flask.Flask(__name__)

app.secret_key = b'uAy\x9d\x08[\x12\x8d\x9d\x1f\xbar\x86A\x9fpQy4\x05)v04'
# ...
```

- Session cookies are encrypted
- The server has the encryption key

Cookie encryption key

- How to generate a secure encryption key?
- Need a cryptographically secure random number.
 - If a "random" number is in any way predictable, then a hacker could guess it and masquerade as any user!
- Generate a Python string
- \$ python3 -c "import os; print(os.urandom(24))" b'uAy\x9d\x08[\x12\x8d\x9d\x1f\xbar\x86A\x9fpQy4\x05)v04'

Further reading

- Good reference on cookies
- https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Cookies