

EECS 388

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# Introduction to Computer Security

Lecture 20:

## Privacy and Anonymity

Nov 21, 2023

Prof. Ensafi



# What is Privacy?



**Privacy is ...** a complex philosophical and cultural concept.

**Seclusion** **The right to be let alone.** — *Louis Brandeis (1890)*

Right to *choose seclusion* and limit scrutiny in private settings.

**Limits** **The ability to limit access.**

Ability to *participate in society* without others collecting data about you.

**Control** **Control over information.**

Ability to choose when, how, and *what information about you is shared*.

**Secrecy** **The option of secrecy.** — *Richard Posner (1983)*

Right to *conceal information* that others might use to your disadvantage.

**Liberty** **A prerequisite for political liberty.**

Essential condition for free speech, association, personal autonomy.

# Part 1: Privacy vs. Business



Businesses **track and analyze people's behavior** in order to:

- Deliver targeted advertising
- Recommend products to buy
- Develop better products
- Perform differential pricing
- Obtain competitive intelligence
- Make investment decisions
- Influence public opinion  
(e.g., political microtargeting)
- Make decisions about you  
(e.g., employment, insurance, credit)

Companies learn about you through:

- **Data you give them directly**  
(e.g. search queries, Facebook profile)
- **Data they passively collect**  
(e.g. geolocation, online behavior)
- **Data they buy from others**  
(e.g. consumer profiles)

Data collection, resale, aggregation, and use mostly occur without people's knowledge.

Many people find these practices creepy, as they can violate several privacy notions.

**Seclusion** **Limits** **Control** **Secrecy** **Liberty**

# Tracking Risks: Target



- Using ground truth from customers who signed up for its baby-shower registry, **Target** developed a model to predict when women are pregnant based on their pattern of purchases.
- They mailed a teenage girl baby-related coupons.
- Her dad saw them and fumed at Target that she wasn't pregnant... but she was!

## BUSINESS INSIDER

### The Incredible Story Of How Target Exposed A Teen Girl's Pregnancy



GUS LUBIN  
FEB. 16, 2012, 10:27 AM

Target broke through to a new level of customer tracking with the help of statistical genius Andrew Pole, according to a [New York Times Magazine](#) cover story by Charles Duigg.

Pole identified 25 products that when purchased together indicate a woman is likely pregnant. The value of this information was that Target could send coupons to the pregnant woman at an expensive and habit-forming period of her life.

Plugged into Target's customer tracking technology, Pole's formula was a beast. Once it even exposed a teen girl's pregnancy:



[A] man walked into a Target outside Minneapolis and demanded to see the manager. He

# Direct Sharing: Facebook



What kinds of personal data have you given Facebook?

**Find out:** Use the Download Your Information function.

## Download Your Information

Get a copy of what you've shared on Facebook.

This is a copy of personal information you've shared on Facebook. To protect your info, we'll ask you to re-enter your password to confirm that this is your account.

Download Archive

### Caution: Protect your archive

Your Facebook archive includes sensitive info like your private Wall posts, photos and profile information. Please keep this in mind before storing or sending your archive.




What info is available?	What is it?
About Me	Information you added to the <b>About</b> section of your timeline like relationships, work, education, where you live and more. It includes any updates or changes you made in the past and what is currently in the <b>About</b> section of your timeline.
Account Status History	The dates when your account was reactivated, deactivated, disabled or deleted.
Active Sessions	All stored active sessions, including date, time, device, IP address, machine cookie and browser information.
Ads Clicked	Dates, times and titles of ads clicked (limited retention period).
Address	Your current address or any past addresses you had on your account.
Ad Topics	A list of topics that you may be targeted against based on your stated likes, interests and other data you put in your timeline.
Alternate Name	Any alternate names you have on your account (ex: a maiden name or a nickname).
Apps	All of the apps you have added.
Birthday Visibility	How your birthday appears on your timeline.
Chat	A history of the conversations you've had on Facebook Chat (a complete history is available directly from your messages inbox).
Check-Ins	The places you've checked into.

# Data Aggregators and Brokers



**Data brokers** such as Acxiom and Oracle aggregate data sources to create detailed profiles about billions of people, which they sell to businesses and governments.

*“our goal is to connect every piece of data with every person on the planet with every available use case that matters ... if we accomplish that amazing things happen ”* → Scott Howe CEO Acxiom





# Location Tracking




<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/10/business/location-data-privacy-apps.html?module=inline>

Weather channel apps bought by IBM! The Wall Street Journal put the deal at over \$2 billion.

Your Apps Know Where You  
Were Last Night, and They're  
Not Keeping It Secret

Dozens of companies use  
smartphone locations to help  
advertisers and even hedge funds.  
They say it's anonymous, but the  
data shows how personal it is.




# Tracking Mechanisms: Third-Party Cookies




When a page loads a resource (image, script, iframe) from another site, the browser sends the cookies set by that **third-party origin**.

**Example:** 1. Doubleclick.com sets a **tracking cookie** in your browser when you first load one of its ads.  
2. Your browser sends the **same cookie** each time any site loads any ad from Doubleclick.com.



DoubleClick learns that the browser with this tracking ID visited a particular story at CNN.com.





3. When you visit another site with an ad from Doubleclick.com, **same cookie** is sent again. Used to build a profile of the pages you view.
4. If the site knows demographics about you (name, email, age, spending habits, etc.), they can sell to Doubleclick to associate with cookie.
5. Doubleclick uses the entire profile to target ads or could sell it to other data aggregators.



# Tracking Mechanisms: Third-Party Cookies



Social media “Like” buttons send third-party cookies when they load. This lets these sites track what pages you visit, **even if you don’t click the buttons.**



**Mitigation:** Configure your browser to **disable third-party cookies.**

## Apple and Google Are Killing the (Ad) Cookie. Here's Why

FORBES > SMALL BUSINESS > ENTREPRENEURS

### The Slow Death Of Third-Party Cookies

# Browser Fingerprinting




Even without cookies, sites can use **browser fingerprinting** to track you.

Pages can read hundreds of attributes about your computer configuration. Taken together, they are often globally unique.

Attribute	Similarity ratio ⓘ	Value
User agent ⓘ	<0.1%	"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML e/74.0.3729.40 Safari/537.36"
Accept ⓘ	0.45%	"text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image cation/signed-exchange;v=b3"
List of plugins ⓘ	6.50%	"Plugin 0: Chrome PDF Plugin; Portable Document Format; internal-pdf-vie e PDF Viewer; ; mhjfbmdgcfjbbpaeojofohoefgihjai. Plugin 2: Native Client; n."
Content language ⓘ	6.00%	"en-US,en;q=0.9"

AmlUnique.org tests whether your browser stands out.

**Example: Canvas fingerprinting** is a browser fingerprinting method that uses the HTML <canvas> element to detect subtle rendering differences caused by different GPUs and graphics driver versions.




# Defending Against Tracking



**Privacy Badger** is a browser extension created by EFF that uses **behavioral detection** to identify trackers.

Servers that it detects attempting third-party tracking or canvas fingerprinting are added to a blocklist.



# Data Anonymization: A Hard Problem



One approach to protecting privacy is **remove identifying information** from datasets you collect or share through a process of **data anonymization**.

Naive approach:

**Strip names, addresses, birthdays, etc.**  
**Often not sufficient!**


**Example:** NYC published a database of taxi rides for research purposes [what could go wrong?]

- hash of taxi driver number
- pick up latitude, longitude, and time
- drop off latitude, longitude, and time
- number of passengers



Tracking celebrities who people spotted getting into a cab at a particular place and time.



Bradley Cooper



Jessica Alba



Addresses of  
pickups for rides  
that ended at  
strip clubs.

Stronger way to anonymize a dataset: ensure each record is **indistinguishable** from at least  $k - 1$  other records. Called **k-anonymity**.

Must remove **quasi-identifiers** (e.g., zip code, date of birth, gender) or sufficiently reduce their granularity (e.g., use partial zip codes, remove birth month/day).

Many caveats:

- Which attributes form a quasi-identifier?
- What auxiliary information the attacker has?
- Protects **identity disclosure**, not **attribute disclosure** (can learn things about a person other than which record is theirs)
- Tradeoff between privacy and utility.

Example: 3-anonymized table

ZIP	DOD	Disease
902**	1987	Cancer
902**	1987	Cancer
902**	1987	Cancer
902**	1954	Heart Disease
902**	1954	GI Disease
902**	1954	Died of poison apple
904**	1978	Heart Disease
904**	1978	Cancer
904**	1978	Cancer



# K-anonymity example details



- We suppose ZIP and DOD are quasi-identifiers, so we ensure that there are at least 3 values with each (ZIP,DOD) pair.
- But with sufficient aux info, disease can be part of a quasi-identifier: suppose attacker knows Alan Turing was the only person in the population to die of a poison apple in 1954. Then his record is identified.
- Attribute disclosure: Suppose you know someone in the population died in 1987. Although you don't know which record was theirs, you learn they had of cancer.
- Can't use data to spot cancer cluster within a particular zip code, since we had to reduce their granularity.

Example: 3-anonymized table



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904**	1978	Cancer

# Part 2: Privacy vs. Government



Governments **track and analyze** people's **behavior** in order to:

- Enforce the law
- Protect the public
- Safeguard national security
- Improve services
- Gain military or economic advantage
- Suppress dissent
- Make decisions about you (e.g., security clearance, PreCheck)



Our relations with companies are often voluntary, with government rarely so.

History and literature abound with examples of government spying abuses.



**Seclusion** **Limits** **Control** **Secrecy** **Liberty**

# Tracking Physical Documents




In communist Romania and East Germany, **typewriters had to be registered with the government**, and samples kept on file. This allowed subversive documents to be traced to the owners.

ABCDEFGHIJ  
abcdefghij  
1234567890




Today, most color printers produce a **Machine Identification Code (MIC)**, a pattern of faint yellow dots on every page. Visible under UV light, this watermark encodes a timestamp and device serial number.


MIC on NSA documents published by journalists in 2017 may have led to the leaker's prosecution.



# National Security Orders



The FBI has issued over 300,000 **National Security Letters (NSLs)** since 2005. NSLs compel a network operator to provide subscriber identity + transaction records relevant to investigations into matters of national security. Providers are often prohibited from disclosing that they received an NSL.






Google users whose data or communications content were provided to the U.S. government under secret orders from the **Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court**.

*Source: Google Transparency Report*



# Mass Surveillance



LAW

## Utah's new social media law means children will need approval from parents

### **SOCIAL MEDIA REGULATION AMENDMENTS**

2023 GENERAL SESSION

STATE OF UTAH



- ▶ requires a social media company to provide a parent or guardian access to the

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content and interactions of an account held by a Utah resident under the age of 18;



# Off-the-Record (OTR) Messaging's Descendants




# Anonymous Networking



**Anonymous networking** techniques provide the ability to communicate online where the identity of the source and/or destination host are concealed.

Note: *Confidentiality* is about content, whereas anonymity is about identity.

Internet anonymity is challenging, because every TCP connection must have a valid source and destination IP address.



**Naive approach:** Tunnel connection through a **Virtual Private Network (VPN)** or **proxy server**.

- Your traffic appears to originate at the VPN, so **Server** doesn't learn your real IP address.
- Your connection to the VPN is encrypted, so **your ISP** doesn't know the Server's address.
- But the **VPN provider** knows who you are and where you're going! Can be dishonest, hacked, or compelled to compromise anonymity.

# Anonymous Networking: Tor



## Better approach: **Tor**


A distributed anonymity service based on a network of volunteer-run relay servers located all over the world.

Connection travels over a randomly selected path of three relays:

**entry node**, **middle node**, and **exit node**.

**Onion-routing** technique uses nested encrypted tunnels. Each node along path removes the outer layer of encryption and forwards the contents.

No Tor relay knows both the client's address and the destination address.



**Entry node:** knows client's address and identity of middle node, but not destination.

**Exit node:** knows a Tor client is connecting to destination, doesn't know client's address.

**Destination:** knows a Tor user is connecting.

# Try It Yourself!




Experiment with these privacy tools and defenses:





## Privacy Badger

<https://eff.org/privacybadger>



## Signal

<https://signal.org>



## Tor Browser

<https://torproject.org>

# Coming Up



Reminders:

**Lab 5 due 6 p.m at Nov 30**

**Forensics Project due 6 p.m at Dec. 7**

Thursday

**Thursday, Nov. 23**

**No lecture**

**Thanksgiving break**

Tuesday, Nov. 28

**Only via Zoom**

**Side Channels**

Guest Lecture by Andrew Kwong